M&A Review - Theory Chand Sooran Develop a framework for understanding acquisitions and buyouts along the following dimensions of risk: Valuation Legal Accounting Tax Transaction Mechanics Seven Recurring Corporate Themes advantage (e.g. Amazon.com) superior insight into the inherent value of companies or through superior insight into specific industries (e functional skill itself (e.g. GE) multiple business units (e.g. Intel) industry (e.g. BCG) (e.g. IBM) Some M&A Facts From Copeland et al., Valuation : The Industry Shaper: Repeatedly spots discontinuities in industries and acts pre-emptively to shape the emerg The Deal Maker: Systematically beats the market through superior skill at spotting and executing deals. This The Scarce Asset Allocator: Efficiently allocates capital, cash, time and talent across multiple business uni The Skill Replicator: Repeatedly transfers particular skills across business units. The skill of lateral tra The Performance Manager: Has proven skills at instilling a high performance ethic with matching incentives an The Talent Agency: Institutionalizes a model for attracting, retaining and developing talent that is truly di The Growth Asset Attractor: Possesses a proven and sustained record of consistently leading in innovation in
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M&A Review - Theory Chand Sooran
Develop a framework for understanding acquisitions and buyouts along the following dimensions of risk:
ValuationLegalAccountingTaxTransaction Mechanics
Seven Recurring Corporate Themes
advantage (e.g. Amazon.com)
superior insight into the inherent value of companies or through superior insight into specific industries (e.g. Cisco).
functional skill itself (e.g. GE)
multiple business units (e.g. Intel)
industry (e.g. BCG)
(e.g. IBM)
Some M&A Facts
From Copeland et al., Valuation:
The Industry Shaper: Repeatedly spots discontinuities in industries and acts pre-emptively to shape the emerging new industry to its own
The Deal Maker: Systematically beats the market through superior skill at spotting and executing deals. This could be either through
The Scarce Asset Allocator: Efficiently allocates capital, cash, time and talent across multiple business units (e.g. ABB)
The Skill Replicator: Repeatedly transfers particular skills across business units. The skill of lateral transfer is a distinct skill from the
The Performance Manager: Has proven skills at instilling a high performance ethic with matching incentives and MIS processes across
The Talent Agency: Institutionalizes a model for attracting, retaining and developing talent that is truly distinctive relative to all others in the
The Growth Asset Attractor: Possesses a proven and sustained record of consistently leading in innovation in multiple businesses
Global M&A is growing exponentially, with particular growth in EuropeBig deals are advised, smaller deals (greater number) are notTypical investment bank compensation: 0.25% for very big deals, 1% norm, 2-3% for smaller dealsMost corporates have M&A teamsInvestment bank advantage: ability to raise capitalThree types of mergers: vertical mergers, horizontal mergers and conglomerate mergersMergers occur in waves (six in the 20th century)Waves track periods of rising equity valuesOut-of-market acquisitions are a recipe for disasterMergers typically do not work but when they do, their success is spectacular
7% underperformance in the first year70% of the time, the merged company's PAT is less than the sum of the separate PATs from the previous yearIt takes 5 years on average for margins to return to the industry average
Common justifications for mergers:
Changing industry economics (technological shifts; regulatory shifts)Synergy (economies of scale and scope; efficiencies in production, distribution and procurement; reduction in SG&A)Financial synergies (lower costs of financing with larger, putatively safer, firms)Managerial inefficiencies (oust bad management)Valuation errors (cheap are targets and overvalued use stock as currency)Value transfers (tax; monopoly rent-seeking; union busting; from bondholders - buy a highly leveraged company)Hubris
WACC DCF Valuation Methodology
Net Assets = Total Assets -(Current Liabilities - Short Term Interest Bearing Liabilities)Net Assets = Net Working Capital + PP&E + Other AssetsNet Assets must be equal to the sum of Interest Bearing Liabilities and Equity
Value of Net Assets = Value of the Firm = Value of Debt (I.e. Interest Bearing Liabilities) + Value of Equity
Approach:
Objective: To obtain the present value of cash generated by net assets, thereby valuing debt and equity
1. Determine the cash flows for years 1 to N2. Calculate the appropriate discount rate3. Calculate the terminal value at end of year N4. Calculate the present value of the cash flows and of the terminal value and sum these two numbers, which is equal to the value of the firm5. Subtract the value of debt to obtain the value of equity
Determining the Cash Flows:
Sales EBIT x (1 - Tax Rate)-COGS + Depreciation= Gross Profit (EBITDA) + Amortization- SG&A + Other Non-Cash Charges= Operating Profit (EBITDA) - Change in Net Working Capital- Depreciation - Change in PP&E (CapEx)- Amortization - Change in Other Assets= PBIT (EBIT) = Free Cash Flow- Interest= PBT (EBT)- Taxes= Net Income
Calculating the Appropriate Discount Rate:
The opportunity cost of debt; what creditors could earn by lending to similar projectsThe opportunity cost of capital; what shareholders could earn by investing in similar projects
%D The post-execution target capital structuret The tax rate for ordinary income
Free Cash Flow to the Firm: Cash generated that is available for creditors and shareholders
Free Cash Flow to Equity: Cash generated that is available for shareholders
We want to have a discount rate that is appropriate to the risks of the project under consideration and that incorporates the tax shield of debt
WACC = kD(1-t)(%D) + kE(%E)
kD
kE
The 1% is the liquidity premium
Market Risk Premium = 8.8% (from historical performance of market relative to bills)
Find comparablesCompare debt structures --> Look at the ratio of MV Equity to (MV Equity + BV Debt) <-- assuming BV Debt = MV Debt
Calculating the Terminal Value:
There are three methods to calculate terminal value:
Liquidation Best for low growth firmsPerpetuity Best for stable cash generating firmsMultiples Best for high growth firms
The Liquidation method:
TV = NWC + PPE + Other Assets
The Perpetuity method:
g = annual growth rate in cash flows from year N to infinity (by assumption)
We use the CAPM model to determine kE
kE = rf + b(Market Risk Premium)
rf = Long-term Treasury rate - 1% <-- trying to get a proxy for the long-term bill rate because the market risk premium relates to bills
b found by looking at comparables
For each comp, unlever its b --> bunlevered = blevered x (MV Equity)/(MV Equity+BV Debt)Calculate the average bunlevered
Relever this average --> blevered = blevered average x (MV Equity + BV Debt)/(MV Equity) <-- use target capital structure
The termination value is assumed to be the book value of net assets in year n
The Multiples method:
Determine multiple of pre-interest earnings (EBIAT) at which comparables trade and apply to own project's EBIAT
Putting It All Together:
Implementation Notes (from Cases):
1. You want to use the capital structure that is unique and appropriate to the project
5. If there is recourse debt, then you use the parent's cost of debt; if no recourse, then use the project's cost of debt6. Don't just focus on valuation; consider other statistics as well
8. There are conditions under which multiples are inappropriateCyclical industry --> volatile multipliersMultiples may not take into account any step-up
APV Valuation Methodology
Useful in situations in which the firm is highly leveraged
FCFn = FCF at year n
TVn = (FCFn) x (1-g)/(WACC - g)
Multiplecomparable = (MV Equity + BV Debt)/EBIATand compute average multiple
TVn = Multiple x EBIAT (or Revenues, or whatever other index used)
Value of the Firm = Value of Equity + Value of Debt --> Value of Equity = Value of the Firm - Value of Debt
Value of the Firm = S PV FCF + S PV TV
2. There are two sorts of systematic risk in the blevered: operating risk and financial risk (which comes from leverage)3. The bunlevered reflects the operating risk of the assets4. Only count as debt interest-bearing liabilities
7. Don't forget to deduct the value of the debt when calculating the value of the equity
9. If you use a 5-year b, then use a 5-year capital structure
1. Pretend the firm has a certain % of debt (the target %)
3. Subtract the MV of debt it does have4. Add the tax shields --> estimated value of the equity
For each tranche of debt --> the tax shield of debt is equal to the interest payment (using average debt balances) x tax rate
Note: Unleveraging companies caluses P/Es to go up
Source: www.victoryrisk.com
2. Value the all equity company, discounting at kA
Discount the tax shield of debt stream using the yield on that tranche
Execution and Legal
There are 2 ways to gain control of a company:
This can vary from 50.1% to 90%+ (some states don't want outsiders to control their companies)
Or, a private offer to a major holder (e.g. an institution)
2. Gain control of the Board of Directors (and then force the company to sell)
Technically, you do not need to own shares in order to be a Director (beyond some token amount)Annual shareholders' meeting has elections for Directors
Practical considerations: staggered elections, different classes of Directors, etc.)
Having gained control of a company, there are 3 possible things can happen subsequently:
1. Election is made to do a statutory merger of the target with the acquirer (most exposure to unknown)
2 old companies cease to exist, replaced by a new companyAll old contracts etc. of old companies revert to the new companyRequires votes and approval of both sets of shareholders (generally, a simple majority)
Some shareholders may object because they are being forced to surrender their economic interest in thetarget for a different economic interest in the merged companies
1. Acquire enough shares to constitute control according to the laws of the state in which the target is incorporated
Typically executed via a tender offer to the public (e.g. Offer to pay $x/share in cash for y% of the outstanding equity)
Or, by acquiring shares in the open market quietly, using a creeping tender offer
Propose a slate of Directors at the annual meeting --> shareholders vote
2. Make selected asset purchases and selected assumption of liabilities (implying limited liability)3. Do nothing and keep as is --> target becomes a subsidiary of the acquirer (a stock deal) (least exposure to unknown)
A merger is a combination of the two companies terms of assets, liabilities and equity, referring to the liabilities both known and unknown
Minority squeeze-out: merger consideration is forced on a dissenting minority
Miscellaneous:
1. The Williams Act of 1968 stipulates that tender offers have to be open for a minimum of 20 business days (30 calendar days)2. If you own more than 80% of a target company, you can report its financial results as part of your consolidated financial statements
Non-taxable to shareholders of target as they transfer old share basis to new stockNon-taxable to target company since no realized P/L on assets
Insiders cannot buy and sell within 6 monthsIf insiders trade, they must give back all profits and stand criminal trial
10. A 338(h)(10) Election is as if the acquirer sells the acquired assets to himself on Day 1Assets are written upTax payable (at ordinary rates)Used typically if acquirer has NOLs that it can monetize (I.e. by transforming into the step-up stream)
12. Problem: How can you structure the deal in order to meet the interests of all of the parties?
more efficiently and access capital markets more efficiently14. Every state has rules that preclude the Board of Directors from deals that would leave the firm with negative equity pursuant to an actionby the board
Statutory Mergers:
No taxes at the individual levelNo taxes at the corporate level
Often goes to state court, minority arguing that they did not receive fair consideration
3. A White Knight is a third-party who intervenes on a target-friendly basis with a competing bid4. Rule of Tender: You have until the last minute to revoke tender subscriptions5. An exchange offer is an offer of stock-for-stock
6. Rule 16(b) - "No Flipping/Short Swing Rule": Anyone who owns more than 10% of the stock is a constructive insider
7. Rule 13(d) - "D is for Disclosure: Must disclose ownership and intention above 5%8. "Sweeping the Street": Getting block shares (typically from institutions or arbs) in a single day (or a short period of time)9. A Type C reorg: asset purchase in consideration for 100% stock, after which target liquidates and goes out of business
11. Greenmail: Money paid to a putative bidder to make him go away
13. Conglomerate Theory: Under sophisticated management, conglomerate forms an umbrella under which the companies can be operated
15. A triangular merger is one in which one of the acquirer's subsidiary companies is merged into the target company
Generally structured as a Type A reorganization (from S. 368 (a)(1)(A) of the IRS Code of 1954
Requires that shareholders maintain their continuity of interestExchange shares-for-shares pursuant to the transaction
Leveraged Buyouts
Use the target company's debt capacity to finance its acquisition, structuring the deal so as to take on as much debt as you think you canhandle, so that you as you pay down the debt, your equity slice becomes more valuable
Typically, LBOs or MBOs are executed where the target company has the following characteristics:
Stable cash flows growing at the rate of inflation
Brand does the workd, not necessarily the steward
Lots of cushy overhead and a casual ex-ante management attitude
Transaction Mechanics:
Example Transaction:
Kelly/KKR group want to do a LBO of Beatrice
Start with an acquisition vehicle P (a single purpose vehicle)
P borrows $6 bio from a syndicate of banks and investorsKelly and KKR together contributed $400 mm in consideration for equity in PThis leaves them with a single asset of $6.4 bio in cash
Create a subsidiary S and put all the cash into the sub in consideration for stock
The subsidiary must guarantee P's loans (using an off-balance sheet item)
P makes a tender offer of $6.4 bio to Beatrice shareholders, conditional on receipt of Beatrice shares and a triangular merger of S into BeatriceApproval required by both sets of shareholders (P's Board and Beatrice's shareholders)
Profitable if you can fund with debt and earn a positive spread (leverage)
Trim fat and waste (agency problem)
P becomes the de facto owner of BeatriceS* (S+Beatrice) has a clean balance sheet, carrying only Beatrice's ex-ante debtValuation Issues:
1. Will cash flows be able to service debt and with what cushion2. Need an exit multiple (IPO, typically)3. Possible to have huge swings in valuation, bigger than size of equity piece4. How do you pick a WACC with a dynamic capital structure (becoming progressively less leveraged)
FCF methodology is very poor in valuing highly levered transactions --> APV is better
Two-tiered offer: Make a tender offer at one price for 50.1% (or control) and a second tender offer at a second price for the remainder (often thought of as a coercive technique)
Generally, if there is the potential for competitive bidding, the best chance for winning is with offering the best bid up front.
Incremental savings don't outweigh the risk of losing the first-mover surprise advantage
Anti-takeover techniques:
Staggered board electionShare buyback --> puts more shares in control of target firm and out of circulationIssue of different classes of shares with voting rights contingent upon the period holding the stockReclassification of different classes of stock --> dilution of voting rights of potential acquirerMake owning stock unattractive to the arbsShare buyback premium --> pay exiting shareholders at the expense of those who are staying (since price will drop next day)Sell the crucial asset in the target firm --> unattractive to the unwanted bidder
Unlevered b theoretically overestimates the riskiness of equity at high levels of debt because debt becomes like equity
White Knight: A company that is friendly to the target company's management and that intervenes with a competing takeover proposal
Accounting
There are two types of accounting treatment (as disconnected from tax treatment)
Add up the balance sheets of the two companies at historical cost (assets, liabilities, other equity) <-- very simpleA marriage of two companiesDifficult to pass all of the requirements that FASB has set up for pooling (7 tests), including:
No assets sales for x # of yearsNo pre-agreed buyouts for a group of shareholdersCannot merge acquired company into a subCannot acquire a sub of a bigger company, merge it and call it a subGenerally, only financial institutions qualify for pooling (Fed requires an immediate writeoff of goodwill ag. Reg. Capital)
Tax and accounting treatment very similarTax basis not adjusted, simply carried over
Biggest failure to qualify for pooling: A subsidiary, contrived acquisition vehicle ( a single purpose acquisition entity) typically bidsNot a true merger of equals, per se
Assets of one (and possibly both) must be written up to their Fair Market ValueLiabilities are restated at marketAny difference between FMV and the purchase price becomes goodwillGoodwill is expensed --> lowers earningsBook value is written upPossible to have tax-free carryover of basis while writing up the basis for accounting purposes --> 2 sets of books
Statutory Merger:
Tax Treatment:
If pooling --> tax basis not adjusted, just carried over; tax-free transactionIf purchase --> could be either taxable or tax-free
The desired treatment is Pooling of Interests
Alternative is Purchase Treatment
Accounting Treatment
Could be either pooling or purchase
Asset Purchase:
Tax Treatment
Almost always taxable
Acquirer writes up the value of the assets and enjoys a depreciation benefit ("step up") going forward
Accounting Treatment
Stock Acquisition:
Occurs when the acquirer obtains stock in the target in consideration for cash
Tax Treatment
Selling shareholders pay capital gains taxAcquiring company does not revalue the assets of the target, carrying over the old basis in assets and liabilitiesUnless the acquirer makes a 338(h)(10) election in which they have a deemed sale and repurchase of the assets, effectivelymarking-to-market the position
Accounting Treatment
Purchase accounting
Accounting Treatment Tax TreatmentStat. Merger Pooling or Purchase Follows accounting treatmentAsset Purchase Purchase Taxable with step-up and taxable to selling shareholders
Seller pays tax on any difference between price and basis at ordinary rates if asset is depreciable, capital gains otherwise
Must use purchase accounting
Stock Acquisition Purchase Tax-Free (no write-up) unless 338(h)(10) election; CG tax to selling S/H
Corporate Governance
Directors have a responsibility to show:
1. Loyalty
Put shareholder interests above their own, acting in a disinterested manner
2. Care
Be well informedMust not be negligent or close their eyes to the facts
Principle: Courts do not want to second-guess board decisionsYou can have a stupid board, but you can't sue them unless they acted in their own self-interest or they violated their duty of care
Penalties:
1. Personal liability (rare)2. Injunctive relief (much more common)
Enjoin (or reverse) the decision of the directors, by the court
There are 3 big cases in M&A:
RevlonUnocalSociety for Savings
Case Pressure Application Court Finding
Revlon Most onerous Auctions Directors must maximize short-term value --> must take highest priceUnocal Middle Unsolicited hostile offers The takeover defense must be proportional to the threatSOCS Least onerous Strategic combinations Not obliged to maximize short-term value in a strategic combination
Business Judgment rule: Directors are assumed to meet these standards unless proven otherwise
Revlon Principle
Directors must maximize short-term value in the following situations:
Auctions of the companyA break-up transaction in response to a bidEngaging in a sale transaction that results in a change of control
Last condition can be tricky if there are a large # of shares held in the hands of the public, freely trading them
Example: Paramount
Had a deal with Viacom (controlled by Sumner Redstone)QVC (controlled by Barry Diller) makes an offer for Paramount that matches and/or beats the Viacom dealParamount and Viacom try to "put the deal away" (I.e. to make it impregnable to a third-party bid)
Termination fee of $100 mm payable to Viacom if deal is unfulfilledLockup option on Paramount stock granted to Viacom in respect of 19.9% of Paramount common
Ensures Viacom handsomely compensated if QVC winsNo shop clause: Paramount couldn't talk to another party unless that party had the ability to finance the deal immediately
Court held that the directors of Paramount were bound by Revlon
If Viacom had succeeded, it would have been a change of control Rescinded the protective provisions
Example: Society for Savings
SOCS starts soliciting bids in 1991
Received 9 bids, 2 of which are prominentGoldman - leveraged deal, complicated, $19.25/shareBank of Boston - all stock-for-stock deal
May 1992: Board of SOCS says that they want to be independent --> no bid accepted
Note: If there is an increase in shares outstanding by > 20% without a S/H vote, NYSE will delist the stock 17(e)
August 1992: SOCS announces merger with BKB, stock-for-stock at $17.30/shareGoldman reiterates its $19.25/share bid in cashSOCS directors tells GS no --> BKB deal is a better strategic fitSOCS investors sue under the Revlon principleCourt: Not obligated to take the higher price in a strategic combination
Strategic combination: --> stock-for-stock as evidence of joint economic interest
Problem: Wasn't it an auction? Was there a 'decent' interval of time?
Example: Unocal Precedent in Unitrin
Unitrin --> 23% owned by Henry Singleton (also the CEO of Teledyne)American General offers a 30% premium for Unitrin (skimpy-ish premium)Unitrin response
Announces a shareholder rights plan in which anyone with over 15% of the stock needs a 75% S/H vote to do a mergerAnnounces a buyback of shares which if successful will give Singleton over 25% ownership (a blocking minority)
Court decided that the Unitrin response was excessive
Preclusive of a mergerBenefited a member of the Board