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Kedah During The Japanese Occupation (1942-45)
ABDUL WAHAB HASHIM
SINOPSIS Esei ini tidak bertujuan untuk mengkaji setiflp aspek
pendudukan Jepun di Kedah.
tetapi sekadar untuk melihat 'kesan-kesannya ke atas politik dan
sosia!. Keadaan ekonomi tidak disentuh walaupun ianya aspek yang
terpenting. Hanya pandangan-pandangan umum terhadapnya
diperkatakan. Penekanan esei ini ialah kepada sikap orang-orang
Melayu terhadap pendudukan Jepun. Esei ini juga tidak membicarakan
tentang orang-orang Cina dan India kerana mereka itu adalah
golongan minoriti di Kedah di waktu itu. Mereka disebut apabi/a
disentuh isu gerakan anti-Jepun.
INTRODUcnON The period after 1909 treaty was relatively peaceful
as for as Anglo-Siamese
relations was concerned. Both countries were not at loggerheads
with each other. In fact Siam was quite happy with the existing
friendly Anglo-Siamese relations. Thus when the Second World War
broke out "it seemed apparent that the Thai government world resist
the Japanese aggression. Solemn promises of assistance were given.'
However this "apparent" supports proved to be misleading. Lord
Strabolgi2 considered it to be a failure or! the part of the
British Intelligence Service to give a proper picture of the
influence of the Japanese over the Thai government. But, perhaps,
the Intelligence Service should not be blamed altogether since
there were cases when warning and information of such nature was
ignored by Ibe War Cabinet. Even in the 1930's, there were
"circumstancial stories of Japanese designs on Thai, though in view
of the apparently strong position of the British in Malaya, and the
French in Indochina, they were not taken seriously".3 This was
again a grave miscalculation on the part of the British
policy-makers. In addition to this, there had also been a growth in
the "Young SiameSe movement"· which was &trongly nationalistic
in character. By the 1930's it was virtually in control of the
Siamese government. "Part of the propaganda was directed against
the Treaty of 1909 which transferred the four northern unfederated
Malay states from Thailand to Britain.'" In this campaign the
"Young Siamese" were supported by Japan who advocated the
restoration of these four Malay states to Thailand.
In the late 1930's it became apparent to the Thai leaders that a
policy of
I Strabolsi, Lord (R.N.) Singapore and aft~r. Q stiUly oj tht
Pacifi~ Campaign. (London. 1942) pp. S2. 2 - ibid . 3 - ibid 4
-ibid 5 - ibid
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cooperation with Japan was more realistic and rofitable. They
had seen the Japanese success in China in 1937 is a clear sign of
Japanese supremacy in this part of the world. Moreover, cooperation
with Japan would provide them with an apportunity to "regain lost
territories in Indochina and to advance Thai interests in Burma and
Malaya as well."6 At the league of Nations Thailand discreetly
abstained from "a vote of pen sure against Japan for invading
Manchuria."7 When War broke out in Europe the Thai government under
Pibul Songgram saw it fit to adopt a "revisionist policy in
Southeast Asia in the hope of regaining its lost territories in
Loas and Cambodia and of generally anhancing its position in
respect of France and possibly to Britain."· When finally the
Japanese decided to attack Malaya the Japanese government chose to
offer the Thai government three alternatives: it could allow the
Japanese to use its territory for moving troops and supplies into
Burma and Malaya in return for which Japan promised not to intefere
in Thailand's internal administration; or Thailand and Japan would
from a defensive military alliance, under which Thailand would
assist the Japanese war effort, in return for a guarantee of
assistance in case Thailand were attacked by a third party; or
Thailand would join Japan in the War against the Allies, in return
for which Japan would agree to the return to Thailand of all
territories in the Malay peninsular ceded to Britain in 1909."·
With the type of government in power then, it was not surprising
that the latter alternative was accepted by the Pibul government.
The Japanese effected this treaty immediately.
On 13th December 1941, the Thai Prime Minister, Field Marshall
Pibun Songgram made a broadcast over the Radio. Strabolgi gave the
gist of the Speech as follows: "I want to assure you, in this
instance I am not a traitor. I would like you to know that Japan is
our greatest friend in life or death, and we have to walk together
shoulder to shoulder to fight our cornman enemy. All of you should
know that Britain took a large piece of our territory in the south
for which Japan is now fighting. I hope our army will be proud to
be in the same front with the Japanese army. Presently we will ally
ourselves with Japan."!O It is clear from this speech that Thailand
was already on the verge of re-alignment. They were no longer in
sympathy with the British. It was not surprising that they soon
made their formal declaration of war on the United States and the
British empire in January 1942.
Kedah was the first state in Malaya to have felt the full brunt
of Japanese armed might. Kedah was the most highly guarded British
position outside Singapore. The famous 'Jitra Line' deployed about
30,000 soldiers who were mainly composed of the 11th Indian
Division under the command of General Murray Lyons. According to
the British the Jitra Line was hastily prepared despite the fact
that their Intelligence had already informed them of the impending
Japanese attack from northen Malaya, probably through Siam. When
the Japanese opened up on the British forces on the 10th December
1941, the Jitra Line was not yet ready. As a result delaying
tactics were employed. However, it proved to be ineffective.
The Japanese forces were not really checked. They surged forward
untiringly. In this campaign the use of thanks on the part of the
Japanese was a decisive factor in paving the way for the Japanese
sweeping victory over the Malayan defenders.
Many reasons for the British defeat have been offerred by the
various authors who had written on this episode. Lieut. General
Percival" had put forth several explanations for the Japanese
victory. He cited the lack of fighter planes as one of the factors
that accounted for the absence of resistance against the Japanese
over the air. The Japanese Air Force made use of the air bases in
Southern Thailand to freely harass
6 Nuechterlcin. Donald E .. Thailand and the Struggle for
SoutheQst Asia. (New York, 1965) pp.68. 7 ibid. 8 ibid pp.69. 9
ibid pp.73.
10 Strabolgi, Lord (R.N.) Singapore and A/ter. (London 1942)
pp.53. 11 Lieut. General Percival was the British commander of
Malaya at the lime of the Japanese invasion.
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the Malayan targets. As a result of the constant attacks by the
Japanese aircrafts heavy losses and casualties were inflicted. "The
situation was made worse by our lack of fighter protection and
proper anti-aircraft ground defence,"" argued Percival.
Consequently by the 11 th December almost all the aerodromes in
Northern Malaya had to be evacuated. These aerodromes, some of
which were left almost in tact (example Alor Star) provided
theJapanese with further advantages over the British Air Force.
With regards to the Jitra Line Percival said that "the battle of
Jitra was half-lost before it began."13 Instead of taking an
offensive step, the British employed a defensive strategy which had
an adversed effect on the morale of the troops. Moreover, the
composition of the British troops was also weak. Most of the troops
were inexperienced whereas the Japanese on the other hand, were
well-trained in jungle fighting. In addition the Japanese soldiers
fought in the traditional Japanese manner, paying no attention to
their losses.
Mills in his article on Malaya had stated that the "Japanese had
100,000 seasoned troops, at least 175 tanks and complete control of
the air"" for the battle of Singapore. The British, on the other
hand had only 75,000 troops fully armed. While the number of
British troops defending Singapore could be accepted the number of
Japanese troops is questionable. Tsuji Masanobu gave 60,000" as the
total strength of the Japanese army who were involved in the whole
of the Malayan Campaign. It is possible, therefore that the large
number of Japanese Army given by Mills is merely an excuse, a
justification for British defeat. It must be admitted that the
Japanese troops outmanoeuvred the British by their superior
mobility, training and preparation. In fact, the Japanese deserved
their victories. Lieut. General Cordon Bennet '6 considered the
speed of Japanese movements as contributary factor to the Japanese
success. In fact, he considered it as the most important reason for
the British defeat. He then gave three reasons for this speed. The
Japanese, in the first place, could adapt themselves pretty well to
the climatic conditions. As a result they could carry out their
operations better. Moreover, the speed also accounted for "the
ability of the Japanese to cut through difficult terrain without
depending on roads and railways."l7 Finally, the speed helped the
japanese to overcome rivers, swamps and streams swiftly. Destroyed
facilities were also repaired in record time. All these factors in
a way accounted for the Japanese superiority. The short period they
took to capture Malaya is a further testimony to the truth of this
'speed' factor.
In a broadcast over Radio Japan (during the Japanese occupation
of Malaya), Lieut. General Sir Lewis Heath was reported to have
stated that "a policy of 'secrecy and surprise attack' played a
potent role in the early stages of the current war.",a These
qualities were further enhanced by the fact that "they could carry
out their plans despite all obstacles as thoroughly as they cail
prepare it on paper."'9 Perhaps, this statement has some element of
truth in it through it is know that this report in reality had
already been censured by the Japanese authority before it was
broadcast. It is true in the sense that the coming of the Japanese
was not expected, though the British Intelligence (authority) had
know that the Japanese would invade North Malaya first. The
Japanese convoy carrying . the invading forces had been sighted by
the British Reconnaissance plane which fell to the Japanese ruse.
The convoy had changed course
12 Percival, A.E., Thf! War in Malaya, (Calculta, 1957) pp. 128.
I) - ibid - pp. 132. 14 Mills, L.A .. (ed.) Thf! Nf!M' World of
Soulnnul Asia, (Minnesota. 1949) pp. 196. 15 Tsuji. Colonel
Masanobu. Singaporf! tht! Jopanf!u Version, Transl. Margaret E.,
B.A., Dip. Ed (Ed.) Howe H.V.,
(Sycieny, 19(0) pp. J&.J7. 16 Lieul, General Bennet. Gordon
wrote lhe book "Why Sinppore fell ," 17 Bennet. Gordon. Why
SingopDrf! Flll, (Sydeny. 1944) pp. 244 18 ibid - pp. 248. 19 ibid
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on seeing the British plane, but later continued on her journey.
The British pilot reported this discovery to the British
Headquarters in Singapore. The High Command in turn postponed the
launching of the MATADOR 20 plan. As a result, the plan failed
miserably. In this instance, the element of 'surprise' helped the
Japanese to gain advantage over their British counterparts.
Finally, it must be admitted that the British had overlooked the
local factors in their preparation for war. They relied mostly on
foreign forces like the Indians, Australians as well as EroufJean
Volunteers rather than capitalising on the local natives
themselves. Apart from the two battalions of the Malay Regiment,
the vast majority of available manpower was not utilised. These
natives had two distinct advantages over their alien" counterparts.
Firstly they have a better knowledge of the area in which the
fighting took place. Their ability to adapt themselves to the local
situation is much superior than that of the Japanese and the
Europeans. Secondly, the fight against the Japanese would affect
them more since they were fighting for their. own motherland unlike
the British and her allies who were out only to maintain their
territorial gains. In this respect even General Percival himself
realised the advantages when he said that "I am of the opinion that
we did not make proper use of the local forces.,,22 He was more
inclined to beliave that the local forces would better, at least,
to be employed as guides and helpers, instead of being were
spectators.
All the above factors which accounted for the fall of Malaya
also applies to that of kedah for the fall of Kedah was the first
step towards Japanese victory over all parts of Malaya. Hence,
whatever the weakness of the British Army in general as well as the
Japanese superiority on the whole was manifested in the major
battle that took place in Jitra.
I After the British surrender, the Japanese government made some
decisions
regarding the future administration of Malaya. According to
Kakuo Aoki, the Greater East Asia Minister, Singapore and the
Japanese territory, since the Japanese 'considered it to be very
important strategically. "In the rest of Malaya, the existing
administrative structure was to be maintained as far as possible
with Japanese Advisers and controllers assigned to the native
rulers.,,23 It was also announced that a new federation of state
would be established, and "Japan would assume a protectorate over
it as well as over the component states."" .
At first millitary administration would be established. In this
respect, local administrative structure would be utilised as much
as possible. This military administration would be gradually done
away with as soon as a new administrative formula is found. The
primary duty of this military administration was to restore peace
and order. In addition the administration should also "secure
immediate control of resources for the war effort and to strive for
the self-sufficiency of the needs of occupation troops from local
resources. "25 Commercial, communication, industrial as well as
financial facilities were to come under the Japanese control
too.
20 The MATADOR plan was a defence plan devised by Gen. Percival
for the defence of Malaya. 21 'alien' here refers to troops fonned
from non-native soldiers. 22 Percival. A.E. The War in Malaya,
(Culcutta, 1957) pp.311. 23 Eisbree. W.H., Japan's Role in
Southeast Asian Nationalist MOllemenlS, 1940 - 1949. (Harvard.
1953) pp. 21-22. 24 - ibid - pp.22 2S Lee Ah Chai. Singapore under
the Japanese 1942·1945. (Singapore. 1959) pp.3.
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Guidance was to be given to the local people in order to make
them feel dependent on the military administration. "Natives were
to reconcile themselves to such pressure as would be unavoidably
involved for them in the acquisition of resources by the
administration."2. The administration also encourged the rise in
"political standard" of the Malayans. However "independence was not
regarded as within the realm of possibility because of the low
living standards and the lack of political development. "27
As far as the Chinese were concerned they were to be compelled
to cooperate with the administration in addition to having to
renounce their loyalty to the "Chungking" government. 2. Similar
action were to be taken against the enemy nationals, meaning those
people who owed allegiance to the Allied powers. Those who were
unwilling were to be either deported or punished accordingly.
However, the administration had to give due respect to all the
national and social customs of the country. Finally it was stated
that any modifications and changes in the overall colonial policy
were to be decided upon at latter conferences. These were the
outlines of policies which the Japanese foreign office had drafted
out for the various territories that fell into their hands. In most
cases, these objectives were aimed primarily at Malaya. They were
the skeletons on which the Japanese administrators based their
policies in Malaya. Kedah was similarly treated before it was
handed over to Siam in 1943.
In the economic field, it was the policy of the Japanese
government that there would be a division of labour in regard to
products and industries based on economic, geographical and other
relevant factors. The most relevant of all these factors was the
objective of making the countries "incapable of separating from
Japan politically. "2. In addition the Japanese confiscated all the
property of the British and her allies in Malaya including Kedah.
This confiscation was not for the benefits of the local population
but for the Japanese themselves. This policy clearly shows the real
intention of the Japanese as far as the Co-Prosperity sphere was
concerned.
The coming of the Japanese Premier, General Tojo, to Malaya in
July 1943 was quite timely for the people of Kedah. Due to this
visit a Thai-Japanese agreement was reached. The transfer of
sovereignty from Japan to Siam was to materialise from this
agreement. Though this agreement merely introduced new master to
Kedah, nevertheless, the new master was very much the lesser of the
two evils. At least, the Thai government proved to be more liberal
and tolerent as we will see in the later stages of this essay.
To understand how this transfer came about, we must go back to
the period just prior to the outbreak of the second world war. Up
to 1938, the sympathy of the Thai government was still with the
British. However, when Pibul Songgram came to power in 1938 it was
alrqdy apparent thatJapan was going to attack Hong Kong and Malaya
eventually. Thailand itself would become a battleground if there
was to be no adju.stment to her prevailing foreign policy. Sir
Josiah Crosby, the British Minister in Bangkok believed that, "in
the final resort it was our military weakness in the Far East which
... led to the alliance between Japan and Siam."30 Were the British
able to hold their own against the Japanese it was doubtful that
Siam would change her neutral policy. As it was, it was already
evident that Japan was going to win the first encounter.
At about this time, the 'Young Siamese' movement was born. This
movement was nationalistic in character. It was interested in
regaining the past greatness of Siam. The movement also aspired to
regain their lost territories in Loas, the Shan states and the 26 -
ibid - pp.l 27 Elsbree. W.H .. Jopo1f's rol~ ill SoulMiuI Asialt
NatiCNfQ/i.1:t MOPrlMnt /940-/946. (Harvard. 1953) pp.22. 28
Chungkins was the seat of the Nationalist government under Chiang
Kai Shek. 29 E1mm:. W.H .• Japan 's rok in SotiIMQ.JI Asimr
Nationalist M()~menIS 1940-1946. (Harvad. 19S3) pp. 28 - quoted
from a
telegram from German Ambasador in Tokyo 10 Gennan Foreign
Office. 29th January, 1942 -International Mititary Tribunal for the
Far East.
30 Nuechterlein, Donald E .• Thai/aM and the ~lruggle for
SOIIlhMfI Asia, (New York. 1965) pp. 12-13.
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Northern parts of Malaya. It was this consideration that made
the government change the name of the country to Thailand in 1939.
By 1940, Thailand had gained certain parts of Indochina through the
support of Japan.
On December 7th, the Thai Foreign Office was approached by the
Thai Ambassador who requested for permission to move through
Thailand en route to Burma and Malaya. Pibul, who was away was
hastily recalled and a Cabinet meeting was convened. At this
meeting, Pridi spoke in favour of resisting the Japanese while
Pibul "chose the middle course of granting the requested permission
but refusing either the active collaboration or the complete
alliance with the Axis powers which had also been suggested. "31
Earlier, in the introduction I have listed out some ofthe
alternatives which the Thais had to choose from. But in actuality,
the Thais had no alternatives at all. Pibul could not rely on the
British for be had received "a message from the British at
Singapore to the effect that no help would be forthcoming from that
quarter. "32
Later, however, it was found out that by not collaborating with
Japan, Thailand was to suffer more. As such on December 21st, 1941,
a treaty of alliance was formally concluded between Japan and
Thailand and in January 1942, Thailand declared war on the United
States and the British Empire. The terms of the December 21st
treaty referred mainly to the question of Thai-Japanese friendship.
Article II of the Treaty states that, "if either party is involved
in military dissenssion with a third party, Japan and Thailand as
allied powers agree to help each other by every kind of political,
military and economic means."33 This article clearly shows how
Japan intended to
. make use of this treaty for her own ends, especially when it
was signed amidst Japanese hostilities against the British and her
allies. In addition it was also stated that the treaty would remain
valid for only ten years after its signing. Hence, this treaty
became the basis of Thai-Japanese relation throughout the Japanese
supremacy in Southeast Asia.
The visit of the Japanese Premier, General Tojo, to Southeast
Asia in July 1943, further enhanced the Thai position in the eyes
of the Japanese government. Before arriving in Malaya General Tojo
had already visited Thailand. While in Thailand, Pibul Songgram
took the opportunity to approach Hideki Tojo on the subject of
Thai-Nippon collaboration. On July 6th, 1943, Malai Sinpo quoted a
report from Bangkok with this headlines, "Thailand Recovers Lost
Territories - Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu."34 Under this
banner the newspaper went on to report that Nippon and Thailand
have agreed upon the inclusion of four Malay states as well as two
provinces in the Shan states within the Thai territory. The joint
statement reads, " .... Later the two premiers in the most friendly
atmosphere conducted an important discussions regarding the Thai
territory and Nippon-Thai collaboration. As a result the two
premiers reached a complete agreement in views regarding the
inclusion within the Thai territory of the four provinces of Per
lis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, in North Malai and two
provinces in Keng Tung and Mong Tan, in the Shan states. "35 T!iis
agreement was soon followed by efforts to implement it. Discussions
were carried out between the Nippon and Thai officials on the
manner in which the states should be incorporated into Thailand.
Meanwhile, Kedah remained under the Japanese administration.
On August 11th, 1943, the Thai Cabinet approved the Nippon-Thai
agreement, "Details together with the primary budget for these
territories will be submitted immediately to the National
Assembly."'6 On August 14th, the Malai Sinpo
31 Bush, Noel E., Thailand .- An Inlrodvction to modem Siam,
(Toronto. 1964) pp.78. 32 - ibid -33 Tsuji. Colonel Masnobu.
Singapore the Japanese Version. Transl. Margaret, E., (Ed.) Howe,
H.V. (Sydney, 19(0)
pp.I06. 34 MaJa; Sinpo, July 6th, 1943. Vo!.l. No. 158. 35 -
ibid -36 - ibid - August 12th, 1943, Vol.3, No.l90.
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announced that the Thai Army would be stationed in the New
Provinces and local Governors were also established. On August
21st, the Thai-Nippon treaty which was signed on August 20th, 1943
was announced by Malai Sinpo. This ·treaty formally stated Japan's
recognition of the inclusion of Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis and
Trengganu and their islands into the Thai territory. Futher the
treaty disclosed that, "Nippon Will have ceased the administration
which it at present excercises in the two foregoing Articles within
sixty days from the date of the coming into force of the present
treaty."37 These sixty days would be the transitional period in
which the Thai administrators will replace their Japanese
counterparts. Meanwhile the Japanese would still be in full
control.
By September 2nd, the Thai National Assembly of People
Representatives had unanimously passed a Bill authorising the
Government to appoint local inhabitants to govern the newly
acquired territories. This new measure was adopted "with a view to
preventing any inconveniences that may be caused to the inhabitants
on account of their unfamiliarity with the Thai system of
administration. "38 It is evident here that by September 1947
Thailand was already prepared· to take in the new territories.
However, the formal take-over only took place on October 20th,
1943. This was therefore done in accordance with the treaty signed
on August 20th which called for a transitional period of sixty days
before the switch of authority can be made.
On this date Thailand completed peaceful take-over of Kedah's
administration. The Malai Sinpo reported that "the National Army of
Thailand completed peaceful entry into the capital cities of the
four states. Citizens waving Thailand Nippon flags, lined up on
both sides of the streets and welcomed the Thai soldiers. "3. This
report tends to give the impression that the people were very happy
to receive their new masters. However, it is doubtful that the
majority of the people were happy with this change. Perhaps, they
were happy to the extent that they no longer had to bear the
Japanese strocities. Their past experiences with Thailand promised
them a better time under the Thai administration. The truth of this
statement, however, has yet to be seen.
II
Before the occupation of Kedah and the other three northern
states of Malaya by 1bailand was formally effected on October 20th,
1943, Thailand had already drawn up the main outlines of policy of
administration. According to the outline of administration
published in the Malai Sinpo on September 17ih, 40 the
administration oft~e four states would be placed under the Thai
Army. Secondly, the administrative aff3lrs of each state shall be
carried out by the administrator." The four administrators assigned
to the respective states were to be under overall supervision of a
Chief Administrator. In addition each Administrator would be
advised by the local army commander. Thirdly, the Administrator was
allowed the choice of using his discretion on the methods of
administration "he deems most suitable to the inhabitants or
conditions in his province. "42 Fourthly, it was the duty of the
administrative adviser to assist the Cheif Administrator in
carrying out the general administrative affairs. Finally, it was
clearly stated that the "chief of the armed police force shall
assist the
37 - ibid -, August 21st 1943. Vo1.3. No.I98. 38 - ibid-
September ltd, 1943, Vol.), No.209. 39 - ibid. October 20th, 1943.
VoI.4. No. 249. 40 MaJaj Sinpo, September 17th, 1943, Vol.3,
No.ll!. 41 -ibid-42 - ibid-
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Chief Administrator in matters concerning general policing"" of
the respective states. These were the outlines of the
administration of Kedah, Trengganu, Kelantan and Perlis as
announced by Thailand on September 15th, in Bangkok. From these
outlines, it is apparent that the emphasis was still on military
administration. There was to be no civilian administration until
the beginning of 1944'when the Thai government decided to be more
liberal in her attitudes towards these four states. Until then
Kedah remained and continued to be under military
administration.
Simultaneous with this announcement the Thai Highest Command
also gazetted the appointment of the Cheif Administrator for the
four Malay states as well as an administrator for each state.44
Major Pramit Chong Charaen was to be Administrator of Kedah Police
while Perlis was to be administered by Cham Na Songkhrma. Kelantan
and Trengganu were to be administered by Lieutenant Charn Charan
Chaichakar and Colonel Prayoon Ratenakich respectively. The adviser
to the administration was Captain Momrajuorgse Chalermlarfwhile
Police-Colonel Chaiam Linjat was appointed as the Commander of the
armed police. From this list it is apparent that Thai officers
occupy the most important posts in the administration of the
respective states. However, it was not stated whether minor
appointments were to be from the Thai nationals as well. As such we
find that in Kedah these minor posts were given to the Malay
officers who had held some positions during the pre-war period.
Tengku Abdul Rahman was one of those appointed to serve under the
Siamese rule. He was delegated the post of Director of Education
for Kedah. His first action was to abolish the study of the
Japanese language in all schools. Instead Malay was included in the
school carriculum. He could do this because many of the Siamese
officers in Kedah were his schoolmates. Soine of the had been
studying with him at the Cambridge. In addition he also introduced
a new subject as well, that is "Discipline" for he considered "adab
sopan yang baik ada-Iah satu keutamaan besar dalam kehidupan
tiap-tiap manusia .....
The above story with regards to Tengku Abdul Rahman is indeed a
small example of the liberal outlook of the Thai military
administration. In other departments similar structure of
administration prevailed. Malay officers with previous experience
under the British Advisory administration were appointed to serve
under the Siamese high officials. This administrative structure was
even more predominant in district level. Here, almost all the
officers (Malay) which had been serving under the previous
government were retained. The only difference was to be found in
the Thai terms which were used for the various posts. A good
example would be the use of the word "Neban .. 46 instead of the
usual Malay term of "Ketua Kampong". Apart from this difference in
terminology, the administration at district level remained
unchanged from its pre-war level.
However, when "power" is taken into consideration, it will be
evident that the highest authority in the district in this period
lie with the commander of the District Police force. His power was
usually above that of the District Officer. This is understandable
considering that Kedah was then under Martial law. In addition to
this, it could also be seen that the various departments in the
district office usually were not as efficient as before. In fact,
problems regarding land was completely neglected. No request for
land was entertained. This is again understandable since, the
emphasis then was more on self-sufficiency rather than anything
else.
With regards to low, judicial or otherwise, there was
practically no change. If there were, at least the rural people
were not made aware of it. They only knew of one great
significance, that is if they committed crime they would be heavily
punished. Apart 43 - ibid -44 - ibid -45 Miller. Harry. Trans!.
MustafTa Suhaimi. Pulera Dj-Raja dan Perdana Menter;, (Kuala
lumpur. 1959) pp. 69. 46 This inforamtion is obtained from an
interview conducted in Baling.
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from this knew nothing of the changes. Muslim laws ~efinitely
not changed since, the power to change these laws were still vested
in the Sultan.
In the field of defence, the changes that occurred were merely
the continuation of the Japanese legislation whereby, every
able-bodied man, between eighteen and fifty years of age were
compelled to undergo military training twice a week. In addition
guard-posts were also maintained in every village. The villagers,
under the direction of the "Neban" would take turns to guard the
various posts erected by the villagers themselves under the
so-called spirit of "gotong-royong". But, nevertheless, in reality,
the people built all these posts under fear of death at the hands
of the Japanese whose atrocities had already been well-know.
Although the villagers were responsible for the security of their
own village, they were not issued with any kind of guns or arms.
They were to car.ry either poles or "parang". All these guard-posts
were under the overall charge of the District police commander. It
was observed that under the Siamese rule, the military training as
well as guard duties were more relaxed. At least the people were
allowed some breathing space.
Coming back to the administration proper, the liberal Siamese
attitude was further illustrated when the Thai authority did not
prevent Malay officers from organising relief fund for the refugees
of the "Burmese death railway" who were pouring into Kedah. Though
the government on her part was not willing to help, to contribute
due to treaty obligation with Japan, she did not persecute those
who organised the funds. In this respect, once again Tengku Abdul
Rahman came into prominence. Due to the poor response of the public
the Tengku together with his colleagues organised
'Sandiwara-sandiwara mengutip derma di sana sini."47 All in all,
the Tengku could call upon thirty Malay youths to help him in the
voluntary job. As a result of this effort, two hostels were erected
to accommodate all these refugees who had suffered terribly at the
hands of the Japanese. Such voluntary work could not have been
possible if Kedah was under the Japanese direct rule.
Finally, it must be noted also that by December 1943, the Thai
government was already considering the transfer of administration
to the Sultan of kedah. They intended to do this in order to
"strengthen the political power of the Sultans so as to place these
states (meaning Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu and Perlis) completely
under their leadership. "48 This plan further assured the Sultan's
trust in the sincerity of the Siamese government. In addition, this
concession proved the advantage of being under the Siamese
influence in this period.
III In Kedah, as in other parts of Malaya, the Malays were
extremely fortunate in
that they were considered to be the natives ofKedah. Being the
rightful rulers they were thus given the benefits which the other
races could not enjoy. The Japanese made them feel that they were
responsible for their own government. Though, this was not
precisely the case, the opportunity to occupy the post which had
previously been occupied by the British improved their confidence
to govern by themselves.49
Moreover the Japanese were instructed to "treat the Natives with
kindness."'o The Japanese soldiers and administrators had also been
told that "these natives have" reached a point of almost complete
emasculation,"" since they have already been
47 Miller, Hany, Trans!. MustafTa Suhaimi. /'ulera Di-Roja dan
Perdana Menteri. (Kuala Lumpur. 1959). 48 MoJo; Sinpo, Kuala
Lumpur, December 18th. 1943. VolA. No. 300. 49 The administration
of kedah had been undertaken mostly by the Malays themselves even
before the Japanese
occupation. SO Tsuji. Col. Masanobu Singapore '~Japa1U!st!
Version. Trans!. Margaret E.t (Ed.) Howe. H.Y. (Sydney. 19(0) pp.
305. 51 -ibid- .
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exploited by the Chinese and Europeans alike. Besides, the
customs of the natives were also to be respected, especially with
regards to religion. They were not to offend the Muslims by
occupying their mosques without due observation of their (the
Malays) common practice, that is to remove shoes before entering
the mosques. Above all, if possible, they were to avoid using
places of worship altogether. All these instructions with
'reference to the natives further illustrate the discrimination of
the Japanese against the other races.
Many reports of disrespect as regards to the mosques were made
by the Malays regarding the use of the mosques by the soldiers.
However, after complaints had been made by the natives to the local
commanders, due action was taken by the Japanese. From henceforth,
all mosques were left in tact. Muslims were allowed to worship in
peace. [This is true even with respects to other religions).
That the Malays had not suffered much economically was apparent
at the cutset. That they were comparatively well of in this period
of "brutality, poverty and disorder"" is a clear indication of
their position viz-a-viz the Japanese. But, however good they were
treated by the Japanese, there is no denying the fact that the
Malays themselves have sufferred to some extent.
Many authors have given opinions on the attitude of the Malays
in general towards the Japanese. Allegations from being Japanese
collaboraters to being extremely passive have been made. Numerous
reasons have been offerred. I shall now examine the truth of these
allegations. By so doing I hope to establish the true picture of
the situation [if not, the nearest picture would do). In addition
to the opinion which have been experessed in books, I shall also
venture to uncover the various arguments put forth in the Malay
newspapers in post-war issues.
General Percival was of the opinion that "the Malay Civil
population, taken all round, was inclined to be apathetic
throughout the campaign, though there was no very extensive
fifth-column activity. "53 However he did not deny the fact that
the Malays were more united in their stand and that "they could
still fight and fight well, however, when properly trained and
disciplines. "54 This was clearly shown by the gallantary of the
members of the Malay Regiment. This opinion was somewhat shared by
L.A. Mills though he did not precisely state that the Malays were
passive. He excused those few who had worked in collaboration with
the Japanese as a factor which prevails in every country. These
individuals had served the British enemy either for money or
because they had previous grievances. He was of the opinion that,
"the overwhelming majority were loyal to British rule"" There were
no cases of "any Malay ever having fired on British troops."s.
Reports of such nature could be attributed to the success of the
Japanese infiltration tactics. In their disguise, they were taken
to be Malays.
Dennis Russel-Roberts, on the other hand, divided the Malays
into two categories. To him, most of the "civilian Malaysjust sat
on the fence to see which side was going to win and there were many
cases of our position being given away by them."" While to some
extent it is true that most Malays were fence-sitters, it is
questionable that the Malays had purposely given away British
position. Perhaps they had done so under thereat of death. The
second category Malays were those who had served in the Malay
Regiment. Dennis Russel Roberts commended them in these words,
"these were little men with big hearts. The two regular battalions
commanded by Toby Andre and Walter Young and led by the best type
of British Officer, showed
52 Williams W.o Malol'.fia and the Modern Wor/d, (Ed.) Bro.
Micheal T .. (Penang, 1964) pp.208 . S3 Percival. A.E .. The' War
in Malayo, (Cakutta. 1957) pp.71. 54 - ibid-SS Mills. l.A. (ed.)
Th, N('\',' Slolel a/Southeast A.fio. (Minnesota. 1949) pp. 191. 56
- ibid-57 Roberts. Dennis Russel . Spotlight on Singapore.
(Singapore. 1965) pp. 280.
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the staff they were made of in fighting at the Gap on the
island."sB. It is noticeable here that the author, in praising the
soldiers in the Malay Regiment also commanded the British officers
who led them. But, nevertheless, all the authors whose opinions I
have already discussed have agreed in a way or other, that the
Malays under arms were brave fighters. To this extent they all
agreed. Perhaps all these opinions are fair considering the
circumstances,s9 the Malays had to face. It is true that most
Malays had been fence-sitters during the war. They have not been
made aware of the consequences by their British rulers. As such
they should not be blamed entirely. They could have resisted the
Japanese if they were given a chance to defend their country as was
illustrated by the soldiers in the Malay Regiment.
Malay language newspapers which were in circulation during the
war have expressed opinions in their editorials as regards to the
Japanese occupatiori. Having studied and compared the various
comments made by the editors about the Japanese rulers during and
after the Japanese occupation, I Have come to the conclusion that
they are indeed conflicting. During the Japanese occupation,
newspapers like the Perobahan Baharu, Seruan Raayat and Majlis seem
to supports the Japanese. Whatever the policies of the Japanese
government, they praised them. In fact they went to the extent of
calling upon all Malays to be vigilant and to fight against the
British and her allies. But, on the other hand, immediately after
the war, they changed their tune. They suddenly became
anti-Japanese and they treated the Japanese occupation of Malay as
a most unfortunate period of Malayan history. These contradictory
stands seem to indicate that freedom of press was not tolerated by
the Japanese. Censorship must have been carried out by the Japanese
Information Service over all the news and editorials. The ban on
radios and wireless sets during this period further confirms the
allegation that editorials were heavily censored. This censorship
can therefore explain the collaborative nature of all the Malay
editorials. Only when the British came back that they were free to
say as they wish. In spite of this the editor of the Perobahan
Baharu, Mohd Yunus Hamidi, was prosecuted in Court by the British
for his vicious editorials during the Japanese occupation. He was
acquited on the argument that the editorials were not essentially
his work.
In addition, fierce editorial exchanges also took place between
the Malay-language and non-Malay-language newspapers, just
immediately after the war. The non-Malay language papers like the
Malay Mail accused the Malays of being Japanese collaborators. This
allegation was later denied by the Malay-language newspapers. These
exchanges went on for some time before they cooled down.
To support further the above argument relevant passages from the
above-mentioned newspapers can be cited. Perubahan Baharu its
editorial on 11.3.1364 (A.H.) had made a call to the Malays in
these terms, " ... kita suka berpesan kata lagi kepada orang ramai
terutama bangsa Melayu iaitu dengan melihat kekenchangan perang
sekarang ini maka dewasa yang akhirnya telah hampir sampai tetapi
sudah tentu kemenangan muktamad itu akanjatuh ke tangan pihak yang
suci niatdan tujuan perangnya .. .. ".60
This editorial did not really shown that it was anti-British. It
discreetly stated that ultimate victory would only be gained by
those with sincere motives (" .... kemenangan muktamad itu akan
jatuh ke tangan pihak yang suci niat dan tujuan perang-nya ... ").
It did not commit itself on this matter of ultimate victory. Hence
it is quite difficult to say that it was pro-Japanese. The
editorial then went on to say that the Malays should stand firm in
their struggle for their own rights. " ... membela dan
mempertahankan
58 - ibid-59 I shall discuss all the various circumstances and
reasons for the Malay attitude towards the end of this Chapter. 60
P~rubohan BanQru, 11.3.1364 (A.H.): Kuala Lumpur.
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hak-hak kebangsaan kita bukan merampas hak orang."61 Towards the
end of the Japanese rule the Perubahan Baharu again made
another
call for Malay support. This time it clearly stated that the
British were the enemies. However, the call was quoted from the
"Warta Perak". It was bluntly stated that Malays would perish if
the British were win the war. Hence it was the duty of the Malays
to resist the allied forces.
"Semua orang sedia maklum hidup atau mati, timbul atau
tenggelamnya bangsa (Melayu) pada masa yang akan datang terletak
pada hasilnya sekarang. Kalau Inggeris dan Amerika menang bangsa
Melayu akan mati, akan tenggelam .... ".2
This call for Malay resistance was also made over the Radio.
Such radio-talks were reported in the Malay papers in tum.
Perubahan Baharu, for example had reported the speech ofChe'
Halimah Noor in its edition on 19.6.1364 (A.H.) Due to this
simultaneous campaign by.!he Radio and newspapers to rally Malay
support, it is highly probable that the call did not originate from
the Malays themselves. Perhaps there were a few Malays who
collaborated with"the Japanese on this issue, but it is more
possible that the Japanese masterminded the campaign.
Immediately after the war non-Malay language newspapers started
hurling accusations at the Malays. The Malay Mail stated,
"Bahawasanya semua orang tahu dalam masa pemerintahan Jepun dahulu
perjuangan bermati-matian antara Melayu dengan China telah berlaku
di Johor .... ".3 The editor summed up this Malay Mail comment by
saying, "Pendek kata Malay Mail menuduh Melayu berhati jahat
menyerang dan membunuh China .... ".. This accusation was answered
comprehensively by the Seruan Rakyat in one of its December, 1945
issue. In addition to elaborating on the activities of the Malays
during the Japanese occupation, the editorial also quoted from the
'!Seruan Rakyat" ofIpoh. It endorsed the opinion of the Seruan
Rakyat which stated, " .... ada pun yang sebenamya jadi talibarut
Jepun itu bukannya Melayu melainkan China dan Indians. China jadi
talibarut dengan menyokong kerajaan patung Wang Ching Wei dan
Indian kerajaan patung Subhas Chandra Bose .... "., In other words,
Seruan Rakyat flatly denied the accusation that the Malays were
Japanese collaborators. To the Seruan rakyat, Chinese and Indians
were the real collaborators. The editorial then went on to describe
some of the activities of the Malays in Malaya with regards to the
defence of ' Malaya as well as the guerella activities.
All the above descriptions of the Malay attitudes reflect mainly
on the Malays in Malaya as a whole, It is questionable whether this
also applies to the Kedah Malays, As newspapers and materials are
not available to ascertain their views at that period it is
difficult to make any comment. However, it is probable that
educated Malays shared these views,
How then can we account for the naive and indifferent attitudes
of the rural Malays, Several probable reasons can be offered here,
the most important of which is education. Being mostly uneducated
they were unawere of the real significance of the new arrangement.
Thus, they could not really think for themselves. They usually
succumbed to the Japanese propagal)da. Most of them could not be
persuaded even to support the guerella movement because they were
too frightened of the Japanese. Secondaly, they had no means of
communication with the outside world, Generally they did not
possess any radio or wireless set. Even if they had access to
newspapers, they would not understand them since they were mostly
illiterates, Thirdly they were too pre-occupied with their economic
problems to ,bother about anything else. They
61 -ibid-62 - ibid - 6.6.1364 (A.H.). 63 SerutJlf Rakyal, Kuala
Lumpur. No.16. Tahun 1,20.1 1.1945, translation of quotation from
the Malaya Mail. 64 - ibid-6S - ibid - 12.12.1945., No. 35, Tahun
t.
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would rather concentrate on survival rather than resisting the
Japanese. The fear of the consequences of resistence held them
back. Finally, they were also lacking in active leadership.
Inspired leadership was absent. As such, the feeling of national
consciousness was not awakened in their minds. All these factors
accounted for their seemingly "naive and indifferent"
attitudes.··
IV
In Thailand, the imminent defeat of the Japanese at the hands of
the Allies was foreseen by the Pibul Songgaram regime as early as
1944. He took the opportunity to resign from the government when a
motion for compulsory conscription was defeated in the National
Assembly. Apart from the realisation that the Japanese were going
to be defeated, Pibul was also aware that Pridi was organising an
underground movement in support of the Allies. The Thai Legation in
Washington had also dissociate itself from the decision of
declaring war on the Allied powers in 1942. By resigning Pibul
probably hoped that Thailand would not be so harshly treated by the
Allies later on. Pridi, though he was the most influential
politician in Thailand then, did not seize the Premiership for fear
that Japan would be too suspicious. Instead the premiership was
given to Khuang Aphaiwongse "whose main task during the last year
of the war was to placate the incerasingly nervous Japanese.
".7
Immediately after the Japanese surrender on August 15th, 1945,
Pridi declared himselfto be the Regent. In order to regain the
favour of the Western Allies he declared that "territories taken
from Britain in Malaya and Burma in 1943 would be returned and
damages were promised to citizens of these countries for losses
sufferred. ".8 He further pointed out that Pibul's declaration of
war on the Allies was illegal sir.ce it was not signed by the
Regency and not ratified by the national Assembly. To please the
Allies, he appointed Seri Pramoj. the leader of Thai Legation in
Washington as the new Premier. It pleased the United States a great
deal while the British government criticised the American stand.
However, due to American intervention and pressure, the British
finally agreed to sign a treaty with Thailand on January 1st, 1946.
"The British withdrew their demand to reorganize the armed forces
and the Thais were given the authority to prosecute their own war
criminals."·' In addition to this Japan also agreed to a grant of
It million tons of free rice to the British. However the major
point of the treaty dealt with the Malay states. as well as the
Burmese provinces ceded to Thailand by the Japanese in 1943. It was
agreed that "Thailand would return the Malay and Burmese
territories acquired during the war.,,70 Later on British was to
relax her request for free rice from Thailand. A fixed price was
arranged in order that Thai economy would not be destroyed by the
drastic measure. It was with this arrangement between Thailand and
Britain that Kedah was once again handed over to the British. The
people of Kedah were never consulted over this new arrangement.
The decisive factor that contributed to the immediate surrender
of the Japanese was undoubtedly the atomic bombs. However, the
supremacy of the atomic bombs does not eclipse the fact that there
was a fifth column movement raging in Kedah during the occupational
period. Kedah being under the Siamese rule in the second half of
the JapaneSe occupation was undoubtedly the centre of guerella
activities since, the Siamese were not as harsh as the Japanese. To
some extent they can be considered as very liberal. This liberal
attitude has been apparent when in December 1943, the 66 Allthesc
factors which accounted for the rural Malay attitude is derived
from my observation gained from interviews. 67 Darling, F.e.,
Thui/and and 1M Unjt~d Stules, (Washington D.C .• 1965), pp. 36. 68
Nucchtcrlein. Donald. E .. Thailanti and the Struggle for Southeast
Asia. (N. York. 1965) pp. 85. 69 Darling, F.e., Thailand and the
United Stales. (Washington D.C.. 19(5), pp. 43. 70 Nuechterlein.
D.E .. Thailand and the Slruggle for Southeast Asia, (N. York,
1965) pp. 87.
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Siamese had already decided to give more power to the Sultan.
Moreover the Malay administrators in Kedah were also given a great
deal offreedom in their activities. No cases can be cited whereby
suspected guerellas and fifth-colummists were persecuted by the
Siamese. In addition, Kedah also had a very poor communication
system. Most of the areas were in accessible. Urban centres were
very few. All these conditions provided an ideal atmosphere for
resistence movements to flourish. Thus, it was not surprising that
MPAJA 71 members could move freely in areas like Baling and SikH
Apart from these people, British trained guerellas were also
dropped in Kedah, or to be precise, in Kroh, a border town in
Perak. A notable member of such group is the present Chief of the
Malaysian Armed Forces staff, General Tengku Osman Jewa. These
guerellas had been trained in India. They were made up of Malays
who were stranded in Mecca and Egypt. Having completed their
training they were in · tum parachuted into Kedah and Pahang. They
were more popularly known as "force 136".
Meanwhile in Kedah itself a new movement was taking shape. Most
of the people who had called for the formation of this movement, a
movement for independence, had been inspired by the Indonesian
nationalist who had visited Malaya just before the Japanese
surrender. These inspired young men who were excited by the idea of
an independent Malay included Encik Khir Johari and Encik Senu
Abdul Rahman. They formed a movement which was known as "Seberkas"
in 1944. To escape from the Japanese persecution this association
was submerged as a commerical enterprise, called "Syarikat
Seberkas". One ofits first members was Tengku Abdul Rahman. This
movement planned to seize independence as soon as the war was over.
Unfortunately, this goal could not be achieved due to the lack of
cooperation between the nationalists in the rest of Malaya.
In the jungle, it has been rumoured that the Communist guerellas
under the MPAJA banner was planning to seize control immediately
after the Japanese surrender. They planned to declare Malaya as a
Communist Republic. The Tengku and his colleagues in the "Seberkas"
were not happy with this communist idea. They feared that there
would be bloodshed if such a declaration was made. The Malays would
have definitely oppose it. All the Chinese would have been
massacred had it not been for the Tengku and his 'Seberkas'
colleagues. In order to prevent a communist take-over, the Tengku
contacted the guerella Force 136. This Force was ready to march
into 'Alor Setar and deprive the communists of their objective.
When the Japanese finally surrendered in August 1945, the
communist take-over did not materialise. Instead the flag of Kedah
was raised in front of the Balai Besar, by the youths of Seberkas,
supported by the Force 136. In this way, bloodshed was prevented.
The communist guerellas did not dare to fight it out. In any case,
if the communits had resisted the Chinese would have been massacred
since the Malays greatly outnumbered them even in Alor Star.
The British Army had liberated Malay rather swiftly since they
met with little resistence from the people. In fact, they were
warmly welcomed back as liberators. This lack of resistence on the
part of Malayans clearly showed the lack of national consciousness
among the majority of the people and the failure of the Japanese to
rally the natives against· the British. In short, their stay in
Kedah as weD as in Malaya as a whole was never accepted by the
people. Many probable reasons can be advanced to account for the
Japanese failures. In the first place their Army h!tif' already
created a bad impression in their campaign against Malay. The local
people were treated harshly. Such treatment, undoubtedly turned the
people against them though, they somewhat mended their ways towards
the latter part oftheir stay. Lack offair trials for
71 MPAJA stands for the Malayan Peoples anti·Japancsc Army. 12
During the Emergency these two Districts became infested with
Communist terrorists. the remnanls of MPAJA
gu=JIas.
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suspects further aggravated the situation. Secondly, the people
were also not given freedom of movements and communications. For
instance, they were not allowed to listen to news from other radio
stations apart from those operated in Malaya. Thirdly, the people
had to suffer as a result of economic hardships.
Economic activities in Malaya were disrupted when the Japanese
took over. Efforts at selt-reliance failed miserably. The shortage
of foodstuffs was not remedied. Social amenities were also not
provided. These facilities that have been destroyed during the war
were not repaired. Finally, due to economic difficulties, the
Japanese could not plan any development in order to attract and to
rally the natives to their side. Thus it was not surprising that
when the war ended, the Japanese found themselves without local
sympathisers.
CONCLUSION
In reviewing the whole period under discussion many significant
points can be observed. Politically, it can be realised that Kedah
during this period was theoretically under two occupational powers,
viz. the Japanese up to 1943 and the Siamese in the remainder
years. It is also evident that although Kedah came under the
Siamese control after 1943, in reality the Japanese still had the
overall power. Administratively the Siamese might have been the
rulers of Kedah, but defence matters were still with the Japanese.
No doubt Kedah was principally different from the rest of Malaya,
excluding Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu, in that it was rather
liberally administered after October 1943, nevertheless, notable
achievements were not apparent. It is granted that Malay officers
had been employed in the administration, but this policy provided
hardly any change at all to its prewar structure. Malay officers
had been employed extensively in the administration even before the
war.
In the economic field, the Japanese could not boast of any
substantial achievement. The standard of living of the people
declined miserably. Tin and rubber industries were neglected.
Foodstuffs were inadequate to cater for all the demand. Clothings
were inadequate to cater for all the demand. Clothings were also
scarce. Though money was in great abundance, it has relatively no
purchasing power. In short, inflation was widespread. It is
admitted that the Japanese had attempted" to introduce double
-
words, ..... pada hari inilah empat tahun yang lalu telah
berlaku peristiwa yang sehabis-habis malang sekali yang pernah
dialami oleh dunia Timur .... "" The editor went on to state that
the Japanese had celebrated December 8th, with great joy, " ...
walhasil hujung ekornya berlumur dengan tahi. ,,"
The Japanese had left many legacies them when they finally
surrendered in 1945. These legacies are mostly evil though it must
be admitted that the Japanese had contributed a great deal towards
the development of nationalism in Malaya.
In the field of Medicine, the Japanese did nothing to improve
the health conditions of the population, When the British came back
they found that they did not have enough doctors, nurses and
dresers to go round. Before the occupation adequate supply of
staffs were available. At least the number of staff was kept at
operational level. ,. Apart from this, the Japanese also disrupted
the good work of their predecessors in the field of "malaria". An
anti-malarial campaign was launched just before the war. By 1941 it
had achieved a certain amount of success. The coming of the
Japanese undid the whole of the good work. In fact new breeding
grounds for mosquitoes appeared which threatened to increase the
danger of the problem. Typhoid, malaria and yaws were on the
increase since the Japanese had made no effort to improve and to
remedy the situation. Diseases like cholera, small-pox, tropical
typhus and beri-beri which had been under controlled in prewar
years became uncontrollable during the Japanese occupation due to
ne~ect as well as poor nutrition together with undernourishment.
Besides all these diseases, a new one came to flourish, that is
venereal disease. This disease was largely spread by the Japanese
soldiers who had gone on rampage during the early part of the
Japanese campaign. the victims of rape surrerred considerably and
they were the people who spread the disease. These were among the
few legacies which the British had to face in the reconstruction
period. many years were required and drastic measures had to be
undertaken.
Similar disruptions occurred in the field of education. In this
case the people in towns sufferred because the schools here were
used for other purposes; like accommodating the soldiers. School
eauipments were also lost. No chinese schools were allowed to
function . Only Malay and Indian vernacvular schools remained open
and these were few in number. Thus there was a great need for
teachers and school equipments after the war in order to normalise
the education system.
The Japanese also left behind a corrupt police force,
comparatively smaller in number but less efficient. " ... The
standards of eficiency of the police forces had fallen during the
Japanese occupation,"" said Jones. This decline in standards of
efficiency can be attributed to the economic instability of the
period as well as thecerrupt attitude of the Japanese
administrators. Though, the Japanese had dealt severely with
criminals, the record of brutal · crimes increased due to the
easiness of obtaining firearms. The British administration
therefore, had to re-vitalise the police force and control the
crime. This was indeed a formidable task.
In addition to all these departments, dormant departments like
Agriculture, Forestry, Sllrveys, Geology and Mines had to be
reactivated. New and skilled officers had to be found to
re-organise these departments.
Only in the field of nationalism that Malay and Kedah in
particular can be thankful to the Japanese. Malays, especially were
roused to a new consciousness. The myth that the British were
unconquarable had now been shattered by the Japanese triumph in
1942. The Japanese had put forth the idea of "Asia forthe Asians"
and had attc:mpted 10 form the "Co-prosperity sphere." Altilough
these concepts failed, they
74 Semon RDk)'Qt. Kuala Lumpur, 8.12.1945, No.J2. Tabun I
(Editorial commenl in memoryo(thefirstJapaneseauack on Malaya
entitled "HART IN''') ,
75 - ibid -76 Operational level here means the level by which
the running of the Health Department can be maintained. 17 Jones,
S.W ., Public Administration in Malaya. (London. 1953) pp. 168.
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nevertheless made the Malays realised their future role.
Inspired by their counterparts in Indonesia they no longer think in
terms of Kedah only but Malaya in general. The term 'independence'
came to mean something to them. It was with this hope in mind that
the "Saberkas" association was founded in Kedah. Similar
organisations were encouraged by the Japanese, namely the Kesatuan
Melayu Muda (K.M.M.), Pembela Tanah Ayer (PET A) and Kesatuan
Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung (KRIS). All these national
organisations were inspired by the Japanese. Though some of them
opposed the British, the majority of them secretly opposed any
power which tried to tule them. Thus far, Malaya can be thankful to
the Japanese. Beyond that, the people of Malaya including Kedah
owens nothing.
Finally, it must be admitted that the Japanese occupation
period, be it in Kedah or anywhere else in Malaya is not popular.
Even those who had gained something or other in that period, have
denounced the period as the most unfortunate events in the history
of Malaya. Those who had sufferred at the hands of the Japanese
have all the more reasons to dispise the occupation.
APPENDIX I
The Thai-Japanese Treaty signed in Bangkok on 21st December
1941. Its terms were: For the Governments of the Empire of Japan
and the itingdom of Thai the
establishment of a new Order in East Asia is the onaly road to
the prosperity of Eastern Asia.
This agreement is made in the belief that 'the above-named
government have the firm will and the ability to eliminate all
sources of trouble between them and that restoration of
unconditional world peace is an essential matter.
Article I An alliance is established between the two countries,
Japan and Thailand as the
foundation for respect of sovereignty and the mutual
independence.
Article II If either party is involved in military dissension
with a third party, Japan and
Thailand as allied powers agree to help each other by every kind
of politi cia I, military and economic means.
Article III
Matters which become operative under Article II shall be
determined by a conference between the Government Agencies in Japan
and in Thailand having power to deal with the matters in
question.
Article IV In the event of Japan and Thailand becoming involved
in collaborations in
hostilities no peace or truce shall be made expect in accordance
with mutual agreement.
Article V This treaty becomes effective simultaneously with
signatures on behalf of the two
powers and it will remain valid for ten years. The contracting
countries shall consult each other about renewal of the treaty at
an appropriate time before the expiration of the aforesaid
period.
Appendix. I - Tsuj i. Colonel Masanobu, Singapore the JOJ1(lMse
Version. Transl. by Margaret. E., B.A., Dip. Ed., (ed.) Howe, H.V.,
(Sydney 1960) pp. 106.
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APPENDIXll
Thai-Japanese Treaty The Government of the Empire of Nippon and
the Royal Government of
Thailand, being unshakeably determined in close cooperation
between the two countries to prosecute the common war against the
United States of America and the British Empire to its successful
conclusion and establish a Greater East Asia based on justice, have
agreed upon the following articles:-
Article I Nippon rcognises the incorporation into the
territories of Thailand of the states of
Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, Perlis and the islands belonging to
those states.
Article II Nippon recognises the incorporation into the
territories of Thailand of the states
of Kentung and Mongpan in the Shan region.
Article m Nippon will have ceased the administr;ltion which it
at present excercise in the
territories specified in the two foregoing Articles within sixty
days from the date of the coming into force of the present
treaty.
Article IV The frontiers of the territories specified in
Articles I and II shall be in accordance
with the boundaries of the states as on the dates of the signing
of the present treaty.
Article V Matters of detail for execution of the present. treaty
shall be decided through
consultions between the authorities concerned of the two
territories.
Article VI The present treaty shall come into force on the date
if its signature. This treaty was signed by Field Marshal Pibual
Songgram and Teiji Tsubokami,
on 20th August 1943.
Appendix II - Mala; Sinpo. August 21st. 1943, Vol. J . No.
198.
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KEDAH UNDER THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION (1942 - 1945)
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
A NEWSPAPERS: a) ENGLISH
Malai Sinpo (Japanese Occupation), Kuala Lumpur, 1943 -
1945.
b) MALAY
Majlis, Kuala Lumpur, 1940, 1945 (Jawi) Pelita Malaya, Kuala
Lumpur, 1945, 1946 (Rinni) Perubahan Baharu, Kuala Lumpur, 1944,
1946 (Rumi) Seruan Rakyat, Kuala Lumpur, 1945, 1946 (Rumi)
B REPORTS
Fetkration of Malaya Annual Report, 1948 Kedoh-Perlis Annual
Reports by British Officers, 1938
C BOOKS:
Baharin, Shamsu1, Malaya Dalam Tawarikh Dunia (3), (Saudara
Sinaran Berhad, Penang, 1965) Bennet, Gordon, H., Why Singapore
Fell, (Sydney, 1944) Busch, Noel, F., Thailand: An Introduction to
Modern Siam, (Toronto, Canada 1964) Chin Kee Onn, Malaya Upsitk
Down, (Singapore, 1949) Cowan, C.D., Nineteenth Century Malaya,
(London, 1962) Darling, Frank, C., Thailand and the United States,
(Washington D.C., 1965) E1sbree, W.H., Japan's Role in Southeast
Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940 -1946, (Harvard, 1953)
Emerson, R., Malaysia: a study of Direct and Indirect Rule,
(Kuala Lumpur, 1964). Glover, Edwin, In 70 Days: The Story of
Japanese Campaign in British Malaya
(London, 1946). Gullick, J. M., Malaya, (London, 1964). Jones,
S. W., Public Administration in Malaya, (London, 1953). Lee Ah
Chai, Singopore Under the Japanese 1942-1945, (B. A. Academic
Exercise)
(Singapore, 1956). Maxwell, W. G., Gibson, W. S., (Eds.)
Treaties and Engagements affecting the Malay
States and Borneo, (London, 1924). Miller, Harry, (Transl.)
Mustaffa Shuhaimi, Putera Di Raja dan Perdana Menteri
(Kuala Lumpur, 1959). Mills, L. A., (ed.) The New World of
Southeast Asia, (Minnesota, 1949). Nuechterlein, Donald, E.,
Thailand and the struggle for Southeast Asia, (N. York,
1965). Percival. A. E., The War in Malaya (Calcutta, 1957).
Potter, John Deano, A Soldier Must Hang (London, 1963). Roberts,
Dennis Russel, Spotlight on Singapore, Singapore, 1965.
Hak Cipta Terpelihara © 1990 – Persatuan Sejarah Malaysia
Hak Cipta Terpelihara © 1990 – Persatuan Sejarah Malaysia
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Soenamo, Radin, "Malay Nationalism 1900-1945", Journal of
Southeast Asian History, Vol. I, N·o.l, 1960.
Strabolgi, Lord., (R. N.) Singapore and After: A Study of the
Pacific Campaign, (London, 1942).
Strategieus, The War Moves East, (London, 19 ). Tsuji, Colonel
Masanobu, Singapore The Japanese Version Transl. by Margaret, E.,
B.
A., Dip. Ed., (ed) Howe, H. V. (Sydney, 1960). Tregonning, K.
G., A History of Modem Malaya, 1964. Williams, W ., Malaysia and
the Modern World, (ed.) Bro. Michael, T., (Penang, 1964). Winstedt,
Sir Richard., A History of Malaya (London, 1949).
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Hak Cipta Terpelihara © 1990 – Persatuan Sejarah Malaysia