KCL MUN Study Guide - Historical IAEA Simulation: Nuclear Weapons in Gaddafi's Libya (29/11 and 6/12/2011)

KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012

UN International Atomic Energy Agency – Historical Simulation

(December 2009): " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s

Libya"


" Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 1



Table of Contents Introduction ........................................................................................................ 3

Introduction to the Committee ................................................................................. 4

Overview on the Topic ........................................................................................... 5

Past UN Actions .................................................................................................. 12

Proposed solutions .............................................................................................. 14

Key Actors and Positions ....................................................................................... 16

Issues a resolution must address ............................................................................. 18



Introduction The International Atomic Energy Agency will be dealing with the topic of Libya, which has recently signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty after years of running a secretive nuclear program. Libya has been working closely with the IAEA in its verification activities and is now collaborating with the IAEA on a number of projects aimed at disseminating the many benefits of nuclear technology to the people of the country. The IAEA must decide on further steps to be taken with regards to this topic, while also considering the option of internal instability breaking out within Libya.



Introduction to the Committee The conclusion of World War II by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought the issue of nuclear power and its potential for shaping the future to the forefront of the global conscience. United States President Dwight Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” address to the United Nations General Assembly in December of 1953 outlined U.S. efforts to disseminate peaceful nuclear technologies throughout the world. This call to awareness of the pressing issue of nuclear proliferation was echoed by the United Nations proper. In October of 1956, the IAEA statute, informed by many of the same ideas that Eisenhower presented, was unanimously approved by 81 nations. This new organization, which officially began operation in 1957, was chartered to become a facilitator in the exchange of nuclear knowledge and a monitor ensuring that nuclear technologies provided by the as a means of providing hardier crops necessary to address issues of famine and global hunger. Nevertheless, much of the IAEA’s time and energy is devoted to addressing militaristic applications of nuclear technology. The IAEA has actively discouraged the use of depleted uranium shells, often employed in conventional munitions, as they have a demonstrated a deleterious environmental and health impact years when they rest in the ground. But perhaps one of the biggest tasks undertaken by the IAEA is the monitoring of rogue nuclear states and the development of their weapons programs. Of late, Iran and North Korea have been particularly concerning to the IAEA and the wider international community. Neither of these countries has fully complied with IAEA requests for information and have not complied with procedures necessary to provide greater transparency, fuelling suspicion that both remain intent on developing nuclear weapons.

Two policy-making bodies control the IAEA: the 35-member Board of Governors and the General Conference of all Member States. The General Conference, the highest policy-making body within the IAEA, meets annually to decide upon the agency’s programs and budget, as well as any other issues brought before it by the Board of Governors. The General Conference elects the Board of Governors and it meets five times per year, examining and making recommendations to the General Conference on a range of issues. This body also considers applications for membership and appoints the Director- General of the IAEA with the approval of the General Conference.There exist three pillars underpinning the IAEA’s worldwide efforts. The first is safeguarding and verification. In this capacity, the IAEA serves as the world’s nuclear inspectorate, ensuring that nuclear technologies are not being employed for militaristic purposes. The second pillar is safety and security. This role empowers the IAEA to advise countries how to best deal with nuclear technologies to protect its citizens from harmful radiation. IAEA safety standards are critical components of dealing with this task. The final pillar is science and technology, and the IAEA works to ensure that peaceful applications of nuclear technologies are used to address the needs of developing nations throughout the world by fighting poverty, sickness, and environmental pollution.



Overview on the Topic

Statement of the Problem

Nuclear proliferation has become an unavoidable reality as the technology and technical expertise required to engage in nuclear enrichment and atomic fission have become increasingly ubiquitous. Libya shocked the world on December 19th, 2003 when it announced the existence of its own covert nuclear program. Libya’s subsequent cooperation with the international community to remove and eliminate any such nuclear materials that could be used to create weapons was a critical step in halting proliferation in Africa, but work remains to be done to ensure that the nuclear capacity that Libya currently possesses can be put to use for the benefit of its people as well as within the regulations established by the IAEA.

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s mission is guided by three pillars, and the one of ensuring nuclear safeguards and verification of nuclear capability proved to be critical to the earliest stage of responding to the Libya issue. The agency’s initial 2004 investigation into the Libyan acquisition of nuclear technology was critical in providing assurance to the international community that the Libyan concessions were made in good faith and revealed the succession of government policies that led to the development of the nuclear program.

The subsequent removal of weapon’s grade highly enriched uranium from Libya in March 2004 was another watershed for the country. While only 13 kilograms of fissile Uranium- 235 was removed, further confidence in the country’s disarmament activities was gained. Despite the gains already made, more questions remain to be answered about the Libyan nuclear program. According to the latest report of the IAEA Director-General to its Board of Governors, impurity analysis techniques used to identify place of origin of uranium compounds have failed to identify the source of Libya’s UF6. That same report stated that the absence of sensitive documentations concerning the design of nuclear equipment and facilities requires further inquiry.

As such, Libya will continue to remain under IAEA scrutiny until these issues can be resolved satisfactorily. Another issue that remains to be settled is how the Libyan nuclear program will proceed from this point. Libya still has nuclear capabilities that can be utilized for peaceful energy usage, and the IAEA can be a facilitator for the development of any subsequent power plants and reactors. The Libyan’s are already engaged in a Technical Cooperative agreement with the IAEA directed towards development of infrastructure required for sustainable nuclear power. The IAEA must continue to work with the Libyan government to promulgate more such cooperative projects.



History and Discussion of the Problem

The Libyan nuclear program was the child of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, the ruler of Libya following his successful coup in 1969. While he initially defended Libya’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities as purely peaceful, noting in 1979 that Libya had “signed all agreements on the non proliferation of nuclear weapons,” he complicated matters through his failure to deny the Libyan pursuit of nuclear weapons technology. Earlier in 1976, he said “atomic weapons will be like traditional ones, possessed by every state according to its potential. We will have our share of this new weapon.” He viewed Israel and the defense of the Muslim world as a primary impetus to attain a nuclear weapon, saying later in 1987 that “The Arabs must possess the atom bomb to defend themselves, until their numbers reach one thousand million and they learn to desalinate water and until they liberate Palestine.”

Yet a number of other factors also likely affected Qaddafi’s decision to pursue nuclear technologies. More than anything else, he needed to secure the status and legitimacy of his regime. Such an ambitious program of scientific development would have served to increase public confidence in and public support for him and his new government. Similarly, pitting himself as a potential counterbalance against Israel and defender of the Muslim world would have granted him further favor with the Libyan populace, as well as gain validation from other countries sympathetic to his cause. Later evidence would show that the leader’s words were more grandstanding than assertion of fact, but they would serve his ends regardless.

The Beginnings of a Nuclear State

The history of Libya’s nuclear program can be traced back nearly forty years. The establishment of the Atomic Energy Establishment (AEE) in 1973 was intended to hearken a nuclear age in the African nation by spearheading infrastructural development and implementation of improvements in other areas as required to improve the state of Libyan nuclear science. Ostensibly, this program was only directed for the peaceful application of nuclear technology.

The next major breakthrough for the Libyans would come four years later. Working in collaboration with the now-defunct USSR, Libya constructed the Tajura Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) in 1977. This new facility included a 10 megawatt infrared thermal (IRT) research reactor as well as other laboratories and departments. Testing and initial operation of the facility was carried out in 1981, and the reactor was put into operation that same year. Another key development of this year was the establishment of the Secretariat of Atomic Energy, under whose aegis the AEE and TNRC came to fall. When Libya entered the IAEA Safeguards Agreement in July 1980, it declared its nuclear program to consist of the IRT reactor and a 100 watt critical assembly, both located at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center. Subsequent developments of the program would



not be accurately reported to the IAEA, as required by this compact, for nearly 30 years.

The Libyans wasted little time in moving to acquire nuclear materials. From 1978 to 1981, over 2300 tons of “yellowcake” uranium oxide concentrate (UOC) were imported from Niger. Throughout the ensuing decade, the Libyan’s engaged a variety of activities directed at enriching and converting this nuclear material. In 1982, Libya acquired from a Belgian party the basic plans for a uranium ore concentration plant. The Libyans never began construction on this facility. Enrichment activities began in the early 1980s, directed by a foreign expert under whose guidance Libyan engineers began work on uranium gas centrifugation technology. Despite his assistance, which continued up until 1992, Libyan efforts to create a functional nuclear centrifuge proved fruitless.

Further Dealings with the USSR

Libya began concluding many of its contracts with the USSR related to the upkeep of the TNRC during the between 1981 and 1983. 1985 saw the Libyans send 100 kg of UOC to the Soviet Union, for which they received 56 kg of refined uranium product. They also engaged in talks with the USSR aimed towards another collaborative project; this time the goal was creating a uranium conversion facility within Libya. Without the vital ability to convert unrefined yellowcake into useable forms of uranium, the Libyan nuclear program would be totally reliant upon other nations to provide conversion services. The desire to develop domestic a self-reliant domestic nuclear infrastructure would come to define the Libyan nuclear program during the coming years.

In addition to nuclear refinement and conversion, useable nuclear power was also an issue of concern to the Libyans. From 1981-1985, they discussed the possibility of acquiring two VVER-440 (Russian acronym for Water Water Energetic Reactor) reactors from the Soviet Union. These reactors would be employed to generate electricity as well as provide water desalination capabilities. Although the Libyans would conduct initial site studies to assess the feasibility of this plan, they would later claim that no final agreement could be made with the USSR regarding the supply of these reactors.

A.Q. Khan and Libya’s Nuclear “Middle Ages”

The desire to develop indigenous capacity for creating fissionable nuclear products led Libya to actively contact multiple countries during the years of 1983 up until 1985. This effort saw little success other than the acquisition of two boxes of microfiche documentation from unknown sources. Upon these slides was information pertinent to nuclear fuel cycle facilities, but neither tangible equipment nor additional nuclear capability was acquired during these proceedings.

The next stage in nuclear enrichment would be attained with the assistance of A.Q. Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist who ran a network



of supplying nuclear weapons technology to a number of different regimes, including nations such as Iran and North Korea. Libyan officials first met with Khan in January 1984. During this initial exchange, Khan went about describing the necessary equipment and technology for fissile material acquisition, as well as the resources and capabilities required to acquire said technologies. He concluded the meeting by attempting to sell the Libyan’s nuclear centrifuge technology. What Khan offered was certainly a step forward, but the Libyans were hamstrung by the lack of progress they had made up unto that point in their own nuclear program. A Libyan official made a decision not to pursue Khan’s offer after concluding that Libya lacked the resources and technology required to meet Khan’s scientific and industrial requirements. Khan would remain an important fixture in the Libyan nuclear program during the coming years.

Libya would continue to pursue multiple avenues to improve its nuclear capabilities. In 1986, Libya used an intermediary to purchase a modular mobile Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) from a Japanese corporation. With this new equipment, the Libyans would be able to produce a variety of uranium compounds, including pure uranium metal. Nevertheless, this would prove to be another case of Libya’s failure to put acquired technology to use. The facility was only partially assembled, and the Libyans never actually operated it. On the other hand, in 1984 the Libyans began fabricating small uranium oxide and uranium metal targets to be irradiated within the IRT reactor. This fabrication procedure would continue until 1990. Some of these targets were processed within a radiochemical laboratory within the same TNRC facility, evidencing a certain degree of progress, although these successes remained minor. Minute amounts of plutonium, a critical model often employed in nuclear weapons, were separated during these proceedings.

In the mid-1980s Libya made further attempts to acquire fuel fabrication and reprocessing technology. These discussions were carried out with a liaison that had also collaborated with the Libyans on their chemical weapons program. At the furthest stage of discussions, plans were made for a pilot reprocessing plant. Actual detailed designs would be drawn up in the later that decade, with the plant and attendant facilities based upon German technologies. The Libyans failed to acquire a complete set of design drawings for the plant, and they never obtained any equipment from this contact. This particular project would come to a close at the end of the 1980s. Libyan inquiry into a heavy water production facility during this period yielded similar results, leaving the country with nothing to show for their efforts aside from documents containing basic information.



The Next Step Forward

A.Q. Khan became a key figure yet again from 1989 up through 1991. Libya re-engaged with high- level contacts with the Pakistani scientist. This time though, deliberations resulted in a solid agreement between government officials and Khan’s clandestine nuclear network. The result of the arrangement was the Libyan acquisition of information on the L-1 centrifuge technology developed by Khan himself. Deliberations stalled, however, when the Libyans began to feel that the information Khan was providing didn’t match the price he was demanding for it. With the two parties at an impasse, the centrifuge arrangement stalled, and no complete centrifuges were provided to the Libyans. 1995 would see the Libyans turn back to A.Q. Khan and his network. Their continued desire to obtain nuclear enrichment equipment would finally come to fruition during this round of negotiations. Libya received twenty pre-assembled L-1 centrifuges in 1997 from Khan’s contacts. Additionally, they obtained the necessary parts required to construct another two hundred L-1 centrifuges that same year. Libya was finally on track to initiate nuclear enrichment activities.

The coming of the twenty-first century brought a series of rapid developments to the Libyans, who finally saw some of their nuclear ambitions coming to fruition. The nuclear program surged ahead, taking a decidedly more active approach to new acquisitions. The year 2000 would see the Libyan government resume the import of uranium products. In September the same year, the government received two cylinders of UF6, and received another cylinder of the material the following February, in total acquiring nearly two tons of UF6

24.

There were even more successes during the fall of 2000. Libya completed the first successful test of an L-1 centrifuge by October. Later that same year, Libya furthered development of centrifuge technologies, building progressively larger 9-machine, 19-machine, and 64-machine L-1 centrifuge cascades. These larger cascade configurations allowed for multiple centrifugation processes to occur simultaneously, thus giving greater purification yields more quickly. Despite this leap in technical prowess, none of these cascades were ever totally constructed, with each at varying stages of completion. Furthermore, the Libyans would later claim that no nuclear material was ever employed in the testing of these centrifuges.

Libyan interest in gas centrifuges extended beyond using the older L-1 technology acquired in the nineties, but looked to acquiring newer L-2 centrifuges from A.Q. Khan’s network. In September 2000, Libya purchased two L-2 centrifuges. Following this acquisition, the Libyans proceeded to order another 5000 L-2 machines. This number later doubled to 10,000 L-2s, and a large amount of ancillary equipment was also purchased from the network. The network not only acquired the equipment on behalf of the Libyans, but additionally was responsible for the manufacture and transfer of the components from parties in a number of different countries. Later in 2001, the Libyans acquired a “precision



machine workshop” from the network, intended to provide support for the gas centrifuge program.

The Beginning of the End

By 2002, the Libyan nuclear program had reached unprecedented heights, but some of the old problems that had plagued the Libyans for decades resurfaced despite the successes, most notably a failure to acquire and properly employ all of the necessary technology required to complete conversion and enrichment activities. The sections of the L-2 centrifuges ordered from Khan’s network began arriving in large quantities. Missing from these shipments were rotating components critical to the centrifugation process. As such, the Libyans could not complete any of the L-2 centrifuges received. This setback didn’t prevent the Libyan’s from further acquisition of nuclear materials. 2002 would see the Libyans acquire even more fissile compounds from an underground source. A clandestine contact would provide them with uranium compounds, this time intended for use as laboratory standards. Attempting to disguise this transaction, the Libyans employed subterfuge, mislabeling the containers holding the nuclear compounds to conceal their hazardous nature. The culmination of most nuclear programs i.e., the development of nuclear weapons, was one of the final projects the Libyans sought to explore. Towards the end of 2001 or beginning of 2002, the Libyans received documents from Khan’s network concerning nuclear weapon design and manufacture. Yet virtually lacking all of the required technology necessary to perform basic preparation of nuclear materials, Libya’s effort was improbable from the very beginning. Later investigation by the IAEA would find no evidence that the Libyans had engaged in work related to this project.

When Libya officially renounced its nuclear weapons program in December 2003 the world at large was certainly shocked, but the British and American governments were intimately aware of the dealings that had initiated the announcement. The Libyan government had been subject to unilateral American sanctions for years, but both governments had been secretly engaging Libya in negotiations since 1999. These discussions had touched upon the subject of weapons of mass destruction, but hadn’t concretely addressed the Libyan nuclear issue. That all changed following a visit to Libya by UK Foreign Office Minister Mike O’Brien’s visit to Libya in 2002. Later in 2004, the Libyan foreign minister would assert “Libya decided more than 10 years ago not to develop any weapons of mass destruction,” and claim that O’Brien’s visit had indeed been a watershed moment in Libya’s relations with the West. Although the opening of diplomatic channels certainly served to ameliorate relations with Libya, the impact of the war in Iraq on Qaddafi’s decision-making must also be considered. The Libyans had been considerably intransigent on their stance towards the nuclear issues throughout their discussions. Nevertheless, America demonstrated its will to use military strength to tackle regimes possessing or believed to possess weapons of mass destruction, and the quick fall of Saddam’s regime in Iraq bode ill



portents for Libya, which had still not fully reconciled itself with the United States. Just as political survival may have motivated the creation of the Libyan nuclear program, that same self-preservation instinct may have driven Qaddafi to quit his nuclear ambitions and come clean to the world, rather than incur the wrath of Bush and the American military.

The end of the secret Libyan nuclear program had come not with a bang, but instead a whimper. The December announcement was followed by swift action by an international community eager to catch up with the Libyans’ progress. IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei made a series of visits to Libya that December and the following February. IAEA nuclear inspectors were soon to follow, and the verification of the Libyan nuclear program would begin in January 2004. The Libyans’ demonstrated marked cooperation in the IAEA verification efforts, keen to gain the confidence and trust of the IAEA inspectorate and other nations. By March, the UN had initiated the removal of highly-enriched uranium from the country, evincing the tangible successes of the inspection process. With Libya returned to the fold, the IAEA has been assisting the country with its development of peaceful nuclear technologies. The IAEA has initiated a number of technical cooperative projects with the Libyan government aimed at a wide variety of issues ranging from improving the TNRC reactor and developing nuclear power to improving the water desalination technology. Much work remains to be done in order to see the Libyans attain their goals, but with the support of the IAEA and the international community, that day will certainly come sooner rather than later.



Past UN Actions Following Libya’s declaration of a secret nuclear program in December 20031, the IAEA responded quickly to begin verification of the Libyans’ nuclear capabilities. In a meeting held December 20 with the Libyan Assistant Secretary for Services Affairs Matooq Mohamed Matooq, Director General Mohamed ElBaradei secured assurances of Libya signing a further Additional Protocol to its safeguard agreement granting the IAEA a greater inspection powers. One week later, ElBaradei and the IAEA inspection team was on the ground in Libya and verification activities were being commenced. The IAEA’s quick action was certainly a credit to the organization, and the willingness of the Libyans to initiate inspections was also notable. Nevertheless, the true test of the success of these initiatives would come later, as the verification got underway.

By the end of January 2004, the IAEA had reported preliminary inspections had been extremely successful. Initial inventories of nuclear components and materials were completed, and items deemed “sensitive” were removed from the country with the assistance of the US and UK. These ostensible successes were further heightened by the praise of the IAEA team, which cited “high level cooperation with Libyan authorities.” These sorts of statements and the corresponding actions by Libyan officials allayed concerns that the cooperation in the verification process was merely superficial. ElBaradei would give further praise to the Libyans’ forthrightness and assistance in February. Nevertheless, much work remained to be done for the IAEA inspectorate in the coming months.

One of the first major successes of the IAEA’s inspections of Libya would come on March 8 with the removal of highly-enriched uranium from Libya. The operation was financed by the United States Department of Energy under a joint US-Russia-IAEA anti-proliferation program called the Tripartite Initiative. The materials would be airlifted back to Russia, which in its prior incarnation as the Soviet Union had originally provided this material to the Libyan government. The Russians assured all parties that it would convert the product into low-enriched uranium, which is unsuitable for nuclear weapons usage. This was undoubtedly a tangible success for the IAEA, and conclusively signaled the full cooperation of the Libyan government. Two days later, the IAEA Board of Governors issued a resolution that broadly praised Libyan conduct in the proceedings and encouraging other countries to enter into full compliance with IAEA regulations. This same day would see the Libyans sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty with the IAEA8. This made good on Matooq’s earlier promise of granting the agency further oversight powers within Libya. During the remainder of 2004, Mohamed ElBaradei would proceed to issue two reports on the status of verification activities in Libya, detailing the results of IAEA investigations into the extent of the nuclear program. This would be the last substantial dealing with Libya for nearly two years.



With Libya reintegrated into the fold of compliant nuclear nations, the IAEA verification activities continued without undue urgency, and 2005 would prove to be a quiet year. July 2006 would bring another set of exciting developments. Libya ratified the IAEA’s International Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, a legally binding document that unsurprisingly governed the physical protection of nuclear materials by member states. Later that month, more Russian-origin nuclear material would be removed from Libya by the IAEA in conjunction with the United States. As of 2008, Director-General ElBaradei has distributed a number of reports about the verification activities of the IAEA in Libya, detailing the history of the Libyan nuclear program and the results of IAEA investigation. With Libyan cooperation ensured, the present offers the IAEA an opportunity to continue to investigate unresolved questions about the Libyan nuclear program. While the time of obfuscation by the Libyans has certainly passed, the necessity for detailed examination of Libyan records and facilities still persists.

Without solid answers to the remaining questions, it will be hard for the Libyans to move forward with the full confidence of the IAEA. Nevertheless, the IAEA continues to move forward with Libya, striking multiple partnerships on programs designed to integrate peaceful nuclear technologies into everyday employ. The continuation and expansion of such programs will define the future of Libya’s nuclear activities and the legacy of its nuclear program for years to come.



Proposed solutions With the Libyan nuclear program now in full compliance with IAEA regulations, the way forward is quite clear. Libya needs to develop proficiency in utilizing domestic nuclear capabilities, and the IAEA is there to assist the country as it moves along that path. To that end, the IAEA can help Libya attain a number of goals as they develop their peaceful applications of nuclear technology.

Primary Applications

The most glaring failure of the Libyan nuclear program was that it never actually harnessed the power of fissile molecules to do useful work. A critical role for the IAEA is to ensure that the Libyan nuclear program will be able to provide the Libyans with critical services, most importantly power and water desalination. Nevertheless, every journey begins with a single step, and many steps remain in Libya before those lofty ambitions can be feasibly entertained.

Training

The Libyans still require training in use of their nuclear reactors, which have yet to be employed in a consistent, reliable manner, even for basic scientific testing. With a wealth of nuclear experts at its disposal, the IAEA can address this need with relative ease. On the issue of water desalination, the Libyans are in similar straits, still very far away from any sort of functional domestic applications of the available technology. With regards to that situation, the IAEA is already engaged in assisting the Libyans in developing the technology required to simulate nuclear water desalination.

Infrastructure Development

The goal of nuclear power for Libya is contingent on a number of other developments occurring beforehand. The necessary infrastructure to support nuclear power and its distribution throughout the country has yet to be expanded. The IAEA can certainly serve an advisory role for the Libyan government as they work towards this goal, but the task remains quite large, and it is up to the Libyans to ultimately decide how to proceed.

Social Services

Another way that the IAEA could assist the Libyans is by working on a number of smaller projects employing radiation technology. Modern industry in countries throughout the world use radiation to serve a variety of purposes. These can range from killing bacteria on food to medical imaging. Like many other developing countries, Libya would benefit from



the IAEA’s assistance in training and exposure to these sorts of technologies as they begin to incorporate them into regular employ. Such small developments can greatly improve the standard of living in the country with less investment of time and resources than necessary for larger projects related to nuclear power or water desalination.



Key Actors and Positions

Russian Federation

The Soviet Union was initially an active partner with the Libyan government, providing some of the foundational technologies for their nuclear program. Since its dissolution, Russia has been actively engaged in reclaiming nuclear materials from former Soviet states as well as those nations for whom the Russians provided assistance with the nuclear program. It has already extracted nuclear materials from Libya and would likely continue to provide logistical support for further non- proliferation activities.

United States of America

The United States has been an active force against proliferation of nuclear technologies, especially in regimes that it perceives opposing American policy or harboring extremists groups. The United States had pressured Libya with sanctions for decades, and the war in Iraq may have proven to be the final straw for the Libyans, who possibly feared incurring similar American attentions. Following the renouncement of the nuclear program, America has worked closely with the IAEA to remove nuclear materials from the country, and remain likely to demonstrate further leadership on similar initiatives.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom’s attempts to negotiate with the Libyan government was cited as one of the primary reasons Libya chose to renounce its secret nuclear program and give up any consideration of pursuing weapons of mass destruction. The UK collaborated with the Americans and IAEA to help with initial removal of sensitive nuclear materials from Libya.

Pakistan

The Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan established a number of contacts throughout the world that provided the centrifuges, uranium, and other items required to develop nuclear programs. Implicated in helping a number of nations, including Iran and North Korea, with creating their nuclear programs, Khan was a major figure in latter stages of the Libyan nuclear program. His contributions were critical in the Libyan acquisition of critical centrifuge technology for nuclear enrichment.



IAEA Interest Blocs

Following the end of the secret Libyan nuclear program, most of the decisions regarding Libya are expectedly nonpartisan, as there is no resistance from the Libyan government to the IAEA intervention. Most have no reason to oppose IAEA assistance of the Libyans. Nevertheless, considerations such as the global financial crisis and its economic fallout might constrain the organization’s general willingness to devote too many resources to new projects.



Issues a resolution must address

What importance will be given to further verification activities in Libya now that they are under full IAEA compliance? How much, in terms of physical resources, will be devoted to such efforts?

How will the IAEA cooperate with the Libyan government to improve the reactor and water desalination technologies already present in the country? How much investment will this require on the part of the IAEA, and what contributions will Libyans be expected to make towards any such efforts?

What sorts of infrastructure development projects can be undertaken to promote sustainable growth of the Libyan nuclear sector? What expertise can the IAEA bring to the fore in order to assist the Libyans in such efforts?

Which small-scale applications of nuclear technology are the most promising prospects for employment in a nuclear Libya? How will the IAEA assist the Libyans in incorporating these techniques and procedures into the practical applications of daily life?

What sort of training programs will the IAEA initiate to allow Libya to develop domestic competence in utilizing the new nuclear technologies afforded to them? How will these educational initiatives correspond with government and private sector training? How will the IAEA initiate projects in Libya while respecting the country’s sovereignty and encouraging domestic participation? Should the private sector be brought in to assist on these projects?

KCL MUN Study Guide - Historical IAEA Simulation: Nuclear Weapons in Gaddafi's Libya (29/11 and 6/12/2011)

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