If You Give it, Trust Will Come: The Impacts of Community-Managed Cash Transfers Katrina Kosec International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Development Strategy and Governance Division Joint work with David K. Evans and Brian Holtemeyer Strengthening Institutions and Governance 9 Nov 2015 Evans, Holtemeyer, Kosec (2015) (IFPRI) 9 Nov 2015 1 / 27
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Katrina Kosec - If You Give it, Trust Will Come: The Impacts of Community-Managed Cash Transfers
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If You Give it, Trust Will Come:The Impacts of Community-Managed Cash Transfers
Katrina Kosec
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)Development Strategy and Governance Division
Joint work with David K. Evans and Brian Holtemeyer
Strengthening Institutions and Governance9 Nov 2015
Greater trust in leaders – especially elected bodies (village councilsand CCT management committees); positive impacts on trust aregreatest in villages with the most village meetings at baselineIncreased confidence that local policymakers are honest,hard-working, and take villagers’ concerns into account; these effectsare also greatest in villages with the most village meetings at baselineBetter government record-keeping, though no more transparencyNo increase in voter turnout or attendance of community meetingsIncreased trust in known villagers (shopkeepers, teachers, doctors,and nurses); no enduring impacts on trust of strangersGreater perceived access to informal safety netsMore reported willingness to contribute time or money to acommunal project, but no actual increaseNo enduring impact on transfers to or from other villagers (thoughinitial decrease in receipts from other villagers)
Almost every country in Latin America has a CCT program (Fiszbeinand Schady, 2009)As of 2010, at least 35 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa hadimplemented a cash transfer program; 14 made transfers conditionalon behaviors Garcia and Moore (2012)While much is known about the impacts of CCTs on education andhealth outcomes, far less is known about their impacts on trust,governance, and informal safety netsFor the most part, CCTs have relied on central governmentmanagement and administration, involving communities only lightly inthe processWe evaluate a novel program that elected community managementcommittees in each community to identify the most vulnerablehouseholds, verify compliance, and distribute transfers
Mixed Evidence on How CCTs Impact, Trust, Governance,and Informal Safety Nets
Positive effects:Increased cooperation as measured through a voluntary contributionmechanism game (Attanasio et al. 2015, Attanasio et al. 2009)Stronger relationships between beneficiary women (Adato 2000)Reduction in bribery (Grimes 2010)Increased trust in institutions (Camacho 2014)Reduced insurgent influence (Crost 2016)
Negative effects:Crowd out of private transfers (Albarran and Attanasio 2004) andremittances (Angelucci and De Giorgi 2009) to CCT recipient HHsWelfare programs can destroy social capital (Chong 2009)Targeted programs that involve extensive needs-testing and requirerecipients to divulge considerable private information reduce individualengagement with their community (Grimes 2010)
Can community management reduce any negative impacts?
Randomized control trial: Community-managed Conditional CashTransfer (CCT) program piloted in 3 districts of TanzaniaProgram relied on elected community management committees toidentify the most vulnerable households, verify compliance, anddistribute transfers
A unique feature of this program which decentralized programadministration to the local level
Approx. 1800 households, divided across 40 treatment villages and 40control villagesFirst transfers made in January 2010 (every 2 months)Amount of transfers ranged from a US $12 minimum to a US $36maximum, depending on household size and composition (mean:$16.50); about 10% of household expenditure
i indexes households and t indexes the survey roundyit is a trust outcomeαi are household fixed effectsTi =1 in the CCT treatment group and zero otherwise2011t=1 at the time of the midline survey (July - September 2011)and zero otherwise, and2012t = 1 at the time of the endline (August - October 2012) and zerootherwise.
Baseline balanceTreatment (T) Control (C) Difference (T-C)
Outcome Mean N Mean N Mean S.E.Dummy - leaders can generally be trusted 0.81 878 0.80 873 0.01 (0.03)Dummy - most people can be trusted 0.26 875 0.23 874 0.03 (0.03)Dummy - community people can be trusted 0.59 876 0.53 873 0.06* (0.03)Dummy - contributed labor to CDP in past year 0.36 880 0.35 879 0.01 (0.04)
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the village level, and appear below the coefficient in parentheses.Coefficient estimates’ statistical significance is indicated at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels with *, **, and***, respectively.
Age 35.54 3462 37.04 3456 -1.49 (1.20)Dummy - male 0.47 3462 0.45 3456 0.02 (0.01)Dummy - has less than Standard 1 education 0.53 3459 0.54 3451 0.00 (0.02)Dummy - has Standard 1-4 education 0.22 3459 0.22 3451 0.00 (0.01)Dummy - has at least Standard 5 education 0.24 3459 0.24 3451 0.00 (0.02)Dummy - literate 0.41 3462 0.42 3456 -0.01 (0.03)
Household characteristicsDummy - household has improved roof 0.33 880 0.37 878 -0.04 (0.06)Dummy - household has improved floor 0.03 880 0.09 878 -0.06** (0.02)Dummy - household has toilet facilities 0.69 880 0.76 879 -0.07 (0.04)Dummy - household has piped water 0.30 880 0.32 879 -0.01 (0.08)Dummy - head of household is male 0.63 879 0.59 878 0.04 (0.03)Notes: Treatment indicates assignment to treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the village level, andappear below the coefficient in parentheses. Coefficient estimates’ statistical significance is indicated at the10, 5, and 1 percent levels with *, **, and ***, respectively.
(0.039) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.043)p-value of difference (midline) 0.774p-value of difference (endline) 0.514 0.035 0.041 0.036 0.328Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the village level, and appear below the coefficient in parentheses. Coefficientestimates’ statistical significance is indicated at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels with *, **, and ***, respectively.
(0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.040)Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the village level, and appear below the coefficient inparentheses. Coefficient estimates’ statistical significance is indicated at the 10, 5, and 1 percentlevels with *, **, and ***, respectively.
(0.041) (0.046)p-value of difference (endline) 0.013 0.004Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the village level, and appear below the coefficient in parentheses. Coefficientestimates’ statistical significance is indicated at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels with *, **, and ***, respectively.
(0.037) (0.036) (0.029)R2 0.094 0.054 0.096Observations 1593 1593 1593Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the village level, and appear below thecoefficient in parentheses. Coefficient estimates’ statistical significance is indicatedat the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels with *, **, and ***, respectively.
(0.028) (0.028)R2 0.168 0.041 0.030 0.031 0.024 0.029Baseline mean 0.242 0.556 n/a n/a n/a n/aObservations 4876 4876 1594 1594 1594 1594Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the village level, and appear below the coefficient in parentheses.Coefficient estimates’ statistical significance is indicated at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels with *, **,and ***, respectively.
(0.032) (0.033) (0.022)R2 0.052 0.038 0.068Observations 1594 1594 1594Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the village level, and appear below thecoefficient in parentheses. Coefficient estimates’ statistical significance is indicatedat the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels with *, **, and ***, respectively.
(0.025)R2 0.055 0.053 0.085 0.064Baseline mean n/a n/a n/a 0.358Observations 1594 1594 1594 4920Notes: CDP = Community development project. Standard errors are clustered at thevillage level, and appear below the coefficient in parentheses. Coefficient estimates’ sta-tistical significance is indicated at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels with *, **, and ***,respectively.
(0.027) (0.029) (0.026) (0.007) (0.017) (0.018)R2 0.040 0.041 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.008Baseline mean 0.257 0.243 0.242 0.010 0.020 0.039Observations 4908 4902 4903 4919 4920 4919Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the village level, and appear below the coefficient in parentheses.Coefficient estimates’ statistical significance is indicated at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels with *, **,and ***, respectively.
(5,818) (6,284) (250) (899)R2 0.187 0.033 0.432 0.001Baseline mean 21,853 20,228 648 1,038Observations 5,368 4,920 4,918 4,920Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the village level, and appear below the coefficientin parentheses. Coefficient estimates’ statistical significance is indicated at the 10, 5, and1 percent levels with *, **, and ***, respectively.
(576) (237) (359) (510)R2 0.006 0.003 0.008 0.004Baseline mean 1523 411 572 536Observations 4920 4920 4920 4920Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the village level, and appear below the coefficientin parentheses. Coefficient estimates’ statistical significance is indicated at the 10, 5, and1 percent levels with *, **, and ***, respectively.
Greater trust in leaders – especially elected bodies (village councilsand CCT management committees); positive impacts on trust aregreatest in villages with the most village meetings at baselineIncreased confidence that local policymakers are honest,hard-working, and take villagers’ concerns into account; these effectsare also greatest in villages with the most village meetings at baselineBetter government record-keeping, though no more transparencyNo increase in voter turnout or attendance of community meetingsIncreased trust in known villagers (shopkeepers, teachers, doctors,and nurses); no enduring impacts on trust of strangersGreater perceived access to informal safety netsMore reported willingness to contribute time or money to acommunal project, but no actual increaseNo enduring impact on transfers to or from other villagers (thoughinitial decrease in receipts from other villagers)