Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R.
No. 111416 September 26, 1994FELICIDAD UY,petitioner,vs.HON. MAXIMO
C. CONTRERAS, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati, Metro Manila; HON. MAURO M. CASTRO, Provincial Prosecutor
of Pasig, Metro Manila; SUSANNA ATAYDE and WINNIE
JAVIER,respondents.Albon & Serrano Law Office for
petitioner.Ramon M. Velez for private respondents.DAVIDE,
JR.,J.:Assailed in this petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the order dated 2 July 1993 of public respondent
Judge Maximo C. Contreras of Branch 61 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC) of Makati, Metro Manila, denying the petitioner's
motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 for slight
physical injuries. The motion to dismiss is based on the failure of
the private respondents, as the offended parties therein, to comply
with Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 and Section 18 of the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure requiring prior referral of disputes to
theLupong Tagapamayapaof the proper barangay.At the outset, it must
be stated that were it not for the importance of the issue to be
resolved in the light of the revised law onkatarungang
pambarangayprovided for in the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
No. 7160) which took effect on 1 January 1992,1this Court would
have declined to accept the invocation of its original jurisdiction
to issue the extraordinary writ prayed for. We have already ruled
that while it is true that this Court, the Court of Appeals, and
the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction to
issue writs ofcertiorari, prohibition,mandamus, quo warranto,
andhabeas corpus, such concurrence does not accord litigants
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor may be directed. There is a hierarchy of courts
determinative of the venue of appeals which should also serve as a
general determinant of the proper forum for the application for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for this judicial hierarchy
by the petitioner and her lawyers ought to have led them to file
the petition with the proper Regional Trial Court.2The antecedent
facts as disclosed by the pleadings of the parties are not
complicated.Petitioner subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde
(hereinafterAtayde) the other half of the second floor of a
building located at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets, Makati, Metro
Manila. She operated and maintained therein a beauty parlor.3The
sublease contract expired on 15 April 1993. However, the petitioner
was not able to remove all her movable properties.On 17 April 1993,
an argument arose between the petitioner and Atayde when the former
sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her remaining
movable properties such as cabinets, shelves, frames, a mirror, a
shampoo bowl, and an airconditioning casing.4The argument
degenerated into a scuffle between the petitioner, on the one hand,
and Atayde and several of Atayde's employees, including private
respondent Winnie Javier (hereinafterJavier), on the other.On 21
April 1993, the private respondent had themselves medically
examined for the alleged injuries inflicted on them by the
petitioner.5On 23 April 1993, the private respondents filed a
complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati, which
was docketed as Barangay Cases Nos. 10236and 1024.7The
confrontation of the parties was scheduled by the barangay captain
for 28 April 1993. On the said date, only the petitioner appeared.
The barangay captain then reset the confrontation to 26 May
1993.8On 11 May 1993, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal filed two informations for slight physical injuries against
the petitioner with the MTC of Makati, which were docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 and assigned to Branch 61
thereof.On 21 May 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras of Branch
61 ordered the petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit and those
of her witnesses.On 14 June 1993, the petitioner submitted the
required counter-affidavits.9In her own counter-affidavit, the
petitioner specifically alleged the prematurity of the filing of
the criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings
as she and the private respondents are residents of Manila.10She
also attached to it a certification by the barangay captain of
Valenzuela, Makati, dated 18 May 1993, that there was an ongoing
conciliation between Atayde and the petitioner in Barangay Case No.
1023.11On 18 June 1993, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 for non-compliance with the
requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral to theLupong
Tagapamayapaand pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.On 2 July 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras
handed down an order denying the motion to dismiss, pertinent
portions of which read:The court finds the motion to be without
sufficient merit. In the first place, the offense subject of these
cases accussed in Makati, Metro Manila on April 17, 1993; that
Barangay Valenzuela of the Municipality of Makati had started the
conciliation proceedings between the parties but as of May 18, 1993
nothing has been achieved by the barangay (Annex "2" of the
Counter-Affidavit of the accused); that the above-entitled cases
were filed directly with this court by the public prosecutor on May
11, 1993; and the accused and her witnesses had already filed their
counter-affidavits and documents. At this stage of the proceedings,
the court believes that the accused had already waived the right to
a reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela,
Makati considering that accused and complainant are residents of
different barangays; that the offense charged occurred in the
Municipality of Makati; and finally, this offense is about to
prescribe.Under the foregoing circumstances, the court believes,
and so holds, that the complainants may go directly to the court
where their complaint is about to prescribe or barred by statute of
limitations pursuant to Section 6 of PD 1508."12A motion to
reconsider the above order was denied on 5 August 1993.Hence this
special civil action forcertiorari. The petitioner contends that
the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion to dismiss
considering that the private respondents failed to comply with the
mandatory requirement of P.D. No. 1508, now embodied in Section 412
of the Local Government Code of 1991 and further required under the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.In their Comment, the
private respondents contend that the denial of the motion to
dismiss is proper because prior referral of the dispute to
theluponis not applicable in the case of private respondent Javier
since she and the petitioner are not residents of barangays in the
same city or municipality or of adjoining barangays in different
cities or municipalities and that referral to theluponis not
likewise required if the case may otherwise be barred by the
statute of limitations. Moreover, even assumingarguendothat prior
referral to theluponapplies to the case of private respondent
Atayde, the latter had, nevertheless, substantially complied with
the requirement.In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General
agrees with the petitioner that Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and
145234 should be dismissed for non-compliance with Sections 408,
409, 410, and 412 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation
to Section 7, Rule VI of the Rules Implementing P.D. No. 1508.The
petitioner replied to the comments of the private respondents and
of the Office of the Solicitor General. The private respondents
filed a rejoinder to the petitioner's reply to their comment and a
reply to the comment of the Office of the Solicitor General.In the
Resolution of 16 May 1994, this Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda, which the petitioner and the private respondents
complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General, in view of its
prior submission, moved that it be excused from filing a
memorandum.The petition is impressed with merit.The law on
thekatarungang pambarangaywas originally governed by P.D. No. 1508
which was enacted on 11 June 1978. However, the Local Government
Code of 1991, specifically Chapter 7, Title I, Book III
thereof,13revised the law on thekatarungang pambarangay. As a
consequence of this revision, P.D. No. 1508 was expressly repealed
pursuant to Section 534(b) of the Code. Pertinent portions of
Chapter 7, Title I, Book III thereof read as follows:Sec. 408.
Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto.
Thelupponof each barangay shall have authority to bring together
the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for
amicable settlement of all disputes except:(a) Where one party is
the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;(b)
Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute
relates to the performance of his official functions;(c) Offenses
punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine
exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);(d) Offenses where there
is no private offended party;(e) Where the dispute involves real
properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriatelupon;(f) Disputes involving parties
who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other
and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by appropriatelupon;(g) Such other classes of
disputes which the President may determine in the interest of
justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.The
court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority
of theluponunder this Code are filed may, at anytime before
trial,motu propriorefer the case to theluponconcerned for amicable
settlement.Sec. 409. Venue. (a) Disputes between persons actually
residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable
settlement before theluponof said barangay.(b) Those involving
actual residents of different barangays within the same city or
municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent
or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the
complainant.(c) All disputes involving real property or any
interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real
property or the larger portion thereof is situated.(d) Those
arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed
or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study
shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or
institution is located.Objections to venue shall be raised in the
mediation proceedings before the punong barangay; otherwise, the
same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront
the punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein
referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his
duly designated representative whose ruling thereon shall be
binding.Sec. 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. . . .xxx xxx
xxx(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. While the
dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the
prescriptive periods for offenses and cause of action under
existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint
with the punong barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume
upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate
of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by
theluponor pangkat secretary:Provided, however, That such
interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of
the complaint with the punong barangay.xxx xxx xxxSec. 412.
Conciliation. (a)Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. No
complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter
within the authority of theluponshall be filed or instituted
directly in court or any other government office for adjudication,
unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before
theluponchairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by theluponsecretary or
pangkat secretary as attested to by theluponchairman or pangkat
chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the
parties thereto.(b) Where parties may go directly to court. The
parties may go directly to court in the following instances:(1)
Where the accused is under detention;(2) Where a person has
otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling forhabeas
corpusproceedings;(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional
remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of
personal property, and supportpendente lite; and(4) Where the
action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.xxx
xxx xxxSec. 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. In all
katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in
person without the assistance of counsel or representative, except
for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their
next-of-kin who are not lawyers.Pursuant to the authority vested in
him under Section 421 of the Code, the Secretary of Justice
promulgated theKatarungang PambarangayRules to implement the
revised law on katarungang pambarangay. Sections 8 and 11 of Rule
VI (Amicable Settlement of Disputes) thereof provide in part as
follows:SECTION 8. Failure to appear. a. SanctionsThe complaint may
be dismissed when complainant, after due notice, refuses or
willfully fails to appear without justifiable reason on the date
set for mediation, conciliation or arbitration. Such dismissal
ordered by the Punong Barangay/Pangkat Chairman after giving the
complainant an opportunity to explain his non-appearance shall be
certified to by theLuponor Pangkat Secretary as the case may be,
and shall bar the complainant from seeking judicial recourse for
the same cause of action as that dismissed.xxx xxx xxxSec. 11.
Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses and cause of action.
The prescriptive periods for offenses and causes of action under
existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint
with the Punong Barangay. The running of the prescriptive periods
shall resume upon receipts by the complainant of the certificate of
repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by
theLuponor Pangkat Secretary: Provided, however, that such
interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of
the complaint with the Punong Barangay. After the expiration of the
aforesaid period of sixty days, the filing of the case in court or
government office for adjudication shall be subject to the
provision of paragraph (b) (4) of Rule VIII of these Rules.It may
thus be observed that the revisedkatarungang pambarangaylaw has at
least three new significant features, to wit:1. It increased the
authority of theluponin criminal offenses from those punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding
P200.00 in P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding
P5,000.00.2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the
workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the
institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be
brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is
located.3. It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive
periods of offenses during the pendency of the mediation,
conciliation, or arbitration process. Paragraph (c) of Section 410
of the law, however, suffers from some ambiguity when it provides
that the prescriptive periods "shall resume upon receipt by the
complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or
of the certification to file action issued by theluponor pangkat
secretary." What is referred to asreceiptby thecomplainant of the
complaintis unclear; obviously, it could have been a drafting
oversight. Accordingly, in the above quoted Section 11 of the Rules
and Regulations issued by the Secretary of Justice, the phrase "the
complaint or" is not found, such that the resumption of the running
of the prescriptive period shall, properly, be from receipt by the
complainant of the certificate of repudiation or the certification
to file action issued by thelupon or the pangkat secretary. Such
suspension, however, shall not exceed sixty days.The first feature
has necessarily broadened the jurisdiction of theluponand if the
mediation and conciliation process at that level would be
effectively pursued, few cases would reach the regular courts,
justice would be achieved at less expense to the litigants, cordial
relationships among protagonists in a small community would be
restored, and peace and order therein enhanced.The second feature,
which is covered by paragraph (d), Section 409 of the Local
Government code, also broadens the authority of theluponin the
sense that appropriate civil and criminal cases arising from
incidents occurring in workplaces or institutions of learning shall
be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is
located. That barangay may not be the appropriate venue in either
paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the said section. This rule
provides convenience to the parties. Procedural rules including
those relating to venue are designed to insure a fair and
convenient hearing to the parties with complete justice between
them as a result.14Elsewise stated, convenience is theraison
d'etreof the rule on venue.The third feature is aimed at maximizing
the effectiveness of the mediation, conciliation, or arbitration
process. It discourages any intentional delay of the referral to a
date close to the expiration of the prescriptive period and then
invoking the proximity of such expiration as the reason for
immediate recourse to the courts. It also affords the parties
sufficient time to cool off and face each other with less
emotionalism and more objectivity which are essential ingredients
in the resolution of their dispute. The sixty-day suspension of the
prescriptive period could spell the difference between peace and a
full-blown, wearisome, and expensive litigation between the
parties.While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local
Government Code of 1991, the jurisprudence built thereon regarding
prior referral to theluponas a pre-condition to the filing of an
action in court remains applicable because its provisions on prior
referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.In Peregrina vs.
Panis,15this Court stated:Thus,Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983),
andVda. de Borromeo vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held that
P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level
a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court.
Non-compliance with that condition precedent could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his
complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of
action or prematurity. The condition is analogous to exhaustion of
administrative remedies, or the lack of earnest efforts to
compromise suits between family members, lacking which the case can
be dismissed.The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of
P.D. No. 1508. They are actual residents in the same barangay and
their disputes does not fall under any of the excepted cases."
(Emphasis omitted)Such non-compliance is not, however,
jurisdictional. This Court said so inGarces vs. Court of
Appeals:16In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to
the conciliation procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a
jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with which would deprive
a court of its jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over
the person of the defendant. Where, however, the fact of
non-compliance with and non-observance of such procedure has been
seasonably raised as an issue before the court first taking
cognizance of the complaint, dismissal of the action is proper.xxx
xxx xxxThe precise technical effect of failure to comply with the
requirement of P.D. 1508 where applicable is much the same effect
produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; the
complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; the
controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination.
The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. (emphasis
omitted)There were, of course, cases where this Court ruled that
the failure of the defendant to seasonably invoke non-referral to
the appropriateluponoperated as a waiver thereof.17Furthermore,
when such defect was initially present when the case was first
filed in the trial court, the subsequent issuance of the
certification to file action by the barangay, which constituted
substantial compliance with the said requirement, cured the
defect.18On 15 October 1991, this Court promulgated the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure.19Section 18 thereof provides:Sec. 18.
ReferraltoLupon. Cases requiring referral to theLuponfor
conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508
where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement,
shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after
such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision
shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested
without a warrant.In the proceeding before the courta quo, the
petitioner and the respondent had in mind only P.D. No. 1508. The
petitioner further invoked the aforequoted Section 18. None knew of
the repeal of the decree by the Local Government Code of 1991. Even
in her instant petition, the petitioner invokes the decree and
Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. However, the
private respondents, realizing the weakness of their position under
P.D. No. 1508 since they did refer their grievances to what might
be a wrong forum under the decree, changed tack. In their Comment,
they assert that on 20 April 1993 Atayde "filed a complaint against
petitioner before the barangay council of Barangay Valenzuela,
Makati,in compliance with the requirement of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law under the Local Government Code."20Yet, in a
deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd, which is condemnable for
it disregards the virtue of candor, they assert that the said law
is not applicable to their cases before the courta quobecause (a)
the petitioner and respondent Atayde are not residents of barangays
in the same city or municipality; (b) the law does not apply when
the action, as in the said cases, may otherwise be barred by the
statute of limitations; and (c) even assuming that the law applies
insofar as Atayde is concerned, she has substantially complied with
it.The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have
exerted enough diligence to inquire from the private respondents if
prior referral to theluponwas necessary before filing the
informations.Respondent judge did not do any better. His total
unawareness of the Local Government Code of 1991, more specifically
on the provisions on theKatarungang pambarangay, is distressing. He
should have taken judicial notice thereof, ever mindful that under
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, courts are mandatorily
required to take judicial notice of "the official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines." We have ruled that a judge is called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules.21He should have applied the revisedkatarungang
pambarangaylaw under the Local Government Code of 1991. Had he done
so, this petition would not have reached us and taken valuable
attention and time which could have been devoted to more important
cases.In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the
first scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the mediation
was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for slight physical injuries
could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time before
such date. The filing then of Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234
with the said court on 11 May 1993 was premature and, pursuant to
paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local Government Code, respondent
Judge Contreras should have granted the motion to dismiss the
criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the
Local Government Code of 1991) which states that the parties may go
directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. This is
because, as earlier stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410
of the Code, the prescriptive period was automatically suspended
for a maximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the
private respondents filed their complaints with theluponof
Valenzuela Makati.Moreover, having brought the dispute before
theluponof barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are
estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they
themselves had sought. Their act of trifling with the authority of
theluponby unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation
hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial
court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the
barangay conciliation system.Grantingarguendothat the petitioner
did inflict the alleged physical injuries, the offense for which
she may be liable would only be slight physical injuries under
paragraph (2), Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, considering
that per the medical certificates22the injuries sustained by the
private respondents would "heal" in nine days "in the absence of
complication" and there is no showing that the said injuries
incapacitated them for labor or would require medical attendance
for such period. The penalty therefor would only be "arresto
menoror a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure." These
penalties arelightunder Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code and
would prescribe intwo monthspursuant to Article 90.Accordingly,
since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases Nos.
145233 and 145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the
prescriptive period therefor would have expired two months
thereafter. Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the filing of
the private respondents' complaints with theluponof Valenzuela,
Makati, on 23 April 1993 and automatically suspended for a period
of sixty days, or until 22 June 1993. If no mediation or
conciliation could be reached within the said period of suspension
and, accordingly, a certification to file action is issued, the
private respondents would still have fifty-six days within which to
file their separate criminal complaints for such offense.
Evidently, there was no basis for the invocation by the respondent
judge of the exception provided for in paragraph (b), Section 412
of the Local Government Code.Neither are we persuaded by the
reasoning of the respondent Judge that the petitioner "had already
waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before the
barangay of Valenzuela, Makati, considering that the accused and
the complainant are residents of different barangays." The
petitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before
theluponof Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to it and attended the
scheduled conciliation on 28 April 1993 and invoked the
pre-condition of referral to theluponin her counter-affidavit.23Nor
would this Court accept the contention of the private respondent
that the parties could not agree on a compromise and that they had
to request the barangay captain to issue a certification to file
action.24The request is dated23 June 1993,25or nearly one and a
half months after Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were filed
with the courta quo. Evidently, this was done to support their
contention in the said court that, in any event, there was
substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to
thelupon. It must be stressed that the private respondents, after
failing to appear at the initial confrontation and long after the
criminal cases were filed, had no right to demand the issuance of a
certification to file action.The respondent judge thus acted with
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss Criminal Cases
Nos. 145233 and 145234.Before closing these cases, this Court
wishes to emphasize the vital role which the revisedkatarungang
pambarangaylaw plays in the delivery of justice at the barangay
level, in promoting peace, stability, and progress therein, and in
effectively preventing or reducing expensive and wearisome
litigation. Parties to disputes cognizable by theluponshould, with
sincerity, exhaust the remedies provided by that law, government
prosecutors should exercise due diligence in ascertaining
compliance with it, and trial courts should not hesitate to impose
the appropriate sanctions for non-compliance thereof.WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is GRANTED. The Orders of respondent Judge of 2
July 1993 and 5 August 1993 in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and
1452334, both entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Felicidad Uy"
are hereby SET ASIDE and the respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to
DISMISS said cases within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of
this decision.Costs against the private respondents.SO
ORDERED.Cruz, Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R.
No. 113615 January 25, 1996BIENVENIDO VELARMA,petitioner,vs.COURT
OF APPEALS and JOSEFINA PANSACOLA,respondents.R E S O L U T I O
NPANGANIBAN,J.:Will the lot owner's agreement to sell the property
to the government as evidenced by the minutes of a meeting of the
Sangguniang Bayan, absent a formal deed, constitute a sufficient
ground to defeat a forcible entry suit? This was the main question
raised in this petition for review oncertiorariwhich seeks to set
aside the Decision dated January 26, 1994 of the Court of
Appeals1in CA-G.R. CV No. 33332. By a Resolution dated October 25,
1995, this case, along with several others, was transferred from
the First Division to the Third. After due deliberation on the
submissions of the parties, it was assigned to
undersignedponentefor the writing of the Court's Resolution.This
case arose from an "ejectment suit"2filed by private respondent
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64,
Mauban, Quezon. Private respondent alleged: (1) that sometime in
May 1981, petitioner surreptitiously built his dwelling on a
portion of her land at Barangay Lual (Poblacion), Mauban, Quezon,
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-91037 in the
name of private respondent's husband Publio (deceased); (2) that
the matter was reported to the Barangay Captain who conducted
several conferences during which petitioner promised to vacate the
land and remove his house therefrom, notwithstanding which he still
failed or refused to do so; (3) that she instituted Criminal Case
No. 1068 against petitioner in 1986 for violation of P.D. No. 772
(the Anti-Squatting Law); (4) that the trial court convicted
petitioner of the offense and imposed a fine of P1,500.00 on him;
(5) that, despite such judgment, and notwithstanding repeated
demands to vacate, petitioner continued occupying the property,
compelling her to bring the suit.The trial court in its nine-page
judgment rendered on April 2, 1991 found that private respondent
had satisfactorily established her ownership over the parcel of
land in question. It also found that petitioner entered and
occupied private respondent's land "without authority of law and
against the will of the owner . . . through strategy and
stealth."3Furthermore, it declared that the claim of petitioner
that "by virtue of an agreement between the former owner (Publio
Pansacola) and the Municipality of Mauban . . . the lot [being
occupied by petitioner] became the property of the government, and
therefore, [respondent] has no cause of action against
[petitioner]" was "baseless and unwarranted"4since no deed had ever
been executed to "perfect the deal" between the municipality and
Publio for the exchange of a portion of the abandoned provincial
road with a portion of the lot owned by Publio (on which was built
petitioner's dwelling), such that the Pansacola spouses later
demanded that petitioner vacate the land and sought the help of the
barangay council. They eventually instituted the criminal case
against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.The
trial court ordered petitioner to vacate the subject land, remove
his house therefrom and pay private respondent exemplary damages
and attorney's fees in the amounts of P2,000.00 and P3,000.00,
respectively.The Court of Appeals affirmedin totothe decision of
the trial court. Hence, this petition.Petitioner insists that
private respondent has no cause of action against him because the
land on which his house stands belongs to the government.
Petitioner's dwelling is situated on the shoulder of the new
provincial highway, part of which was constructed on a portion of
the land belonging to and titled in the name of private
respondent's husband. According to petitioner, "while it is
conceded that the premises [occupied by him] is still within the
area covered by [private respondent's] title, nonetheless, . . .
[the subject premises] . . . already belong to the government by
virtue of its exchange of the abandoned road and
bridge."5Petitioner's claim is anchored on a document entitled
"Minutes of the Meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban, Quezon"
dated November 5, 1974. Therein, Publio Pansacola signified before
the Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban his agreement to the transfer of
that portion of his land traversed by the new provincial highway
and its shoulder in exchange for a corresponding portion of the old
abandoned provincial road.As found by the trial court, the said
minutes of the meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan do not mention the
execution of any deed to perfect the agreement. An engineer was
appointed to survey the old abandoned road, but this act does not
in any manner convey title over the abandoned road to the Pansacola
spouses nor extinguish their ownership over the land traversed by
the new provincial highway. No evidence was introduced by
petitioner to show that the survey was actually undertaken and a
specific portion of the abandoned road partitioned and conveyed to
the Pansacolas. It must be stressed that the agreement to transfer
the property was made in 1974. More than twenty years later, no
actual transfer had yet been made. Unless and until the transfer is
consummated, or expropriation proceedings instituted by the
government, private respondent continues to retain ownership of the
land subject of this case.We note that the ejectment suit should
have been filed before the Municipal Trial Court, and not the
Regional Trial Court. The issue of ownership, however, had been
specifically raised before the Regional Trial Court by petitioner
himself, who at the same time did not move to dismiss the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction. Instead, he filed his answer and went to
trial. Estoppel by laches has already set in at this point in
time.6Petitioner also challenges the findings of the respondent
Court that prior referral to the Lupong Barangay had been made
before the ejectment case was filed in the lower court, and that
therefore, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over the
case. We agree, however, with the trial court's finding that -The
compliance (with) the provision of P.D. No. 1508, Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, can no longer be assailed by the defendant [herein
petitioner], its reference having beenadmitted(in) his affirmative
allegations and affirmative defenses in the Answer (page 3, par.
3.3 of defendant's answer).7(emphasis supplied)Other issues raised
had already been adequately traversed and disposed of by the
appellate Court.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED,
with costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Davide,
Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ.,concur.
Footnotes1Fourth Division, composed ofJ. Asaali S.
Isnani,ponenteandJJ. Nathanael P. De Pano Jr. (chairman) and Corona
Ibay-Somera.2Civil Case No. 0371-M, filed on June 24, 1987; Judge
Antonio O. Cabungcal, presiding.3RTC Judgment, p. 9;rollo, p.
39.4RTC Judgment, pp. 6 & 7;rollo, pp. 36 & 37.5Petition,
p. 9;rollo, p. 15.6Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 7,
Tacloban City, et al.,226 SCRA 408 (September 14, 1993);Pantranco
North Express Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,224 SCRA 477 (July
5, 1993).7RTC Judgment, p. 8;rollo, p. 38.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND
DIVISIONG.R. No. 101328. April 7, 1993.EMILIANA CANDIDO AND
FRANCISCA CANDIDO, petitioners,vs.HONORABLE DEMETRIO MACAPAGAL,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 18, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BULACAN AND
MILA CONTRERAS, respondents.Alberto M. Diaz for petitioners.Luis S.
Cuvin for private respondent.SYLLABUS1. REMEDIAL LAW; KATARUNGANG
PAMBARANGAY (P.D. NO. 1508); SCOPE OF POWER; RULE. From the
provisions of P.D. No. 1508, it is clear that the barangay court or
Lupon has jurisdiction over disputes between parties who are actual
residents of barangays located in the same city or municipality or
adjoining barangays of different cities or municipalities. The
Lupon of the barangay ordinarily has the authority to settle
amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually
reside in the same municipality, city or province. Where the
complaint does not state that it is one of the excepted cases, or
it does not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or
it does not have a certification that no conciliation or settlement
had been reached by the parties, the case could be dismissed on
motion. In the instant case, the fact that petitioners and private
respondent, reside in the same municipality of Obando, Bulacan does
not justify compulsory conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 where the
other co-defendants reside in barangays of different
municipalities, cities and provinces.D E C I S I O NNOCON, J p:This
is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the Orders 1
dated July 10, 1991 and August 9, 1991 of the trial court
dismissing the complaint of petitioners Emiliana and Francisca
Candido against private respondent Mila Contreras on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction for petitioners' failure to comply with the
mandatory barangay conciliation process required by Presidential
Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law.It appears on record that petitioners Emiliana and Francisca
Candido are the only legitimate children of spouses Agapito Candido
and Florencia Santos as shown by the certificates 2 of the latter's
Record of Marriage and the petitioners' Record of Birth.However,
petitioners' father eventually left his legitimate family and lived
with Sagraria Lozada until his death on May 6, 1987.On May 11,
1990, Sagraria Lozada, Jorge Candido, Virginia Candido, Maximina
Candido and Eduardo Candido who represented themselves to be the
sole heirs of the late Agapito Candido executed a Deed of
Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale 3 covering parcels of
land owned by the latter and sold to private respondent Mila
Contreras in whose name said properties are now registered under
TCT No. T-120656-M.On November 6, 1990, petitioners instituted an
action with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 18 in Civil
Case No. 697-M-90 against Sagraria Lozada, Gorge Candido, Virginia
Candido, Maximina Candido, Eduardo Candido, Register of Deeds of
Bulacan and private respondent Mila Contreras to annul the Deed of
Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale, to cancel TCT No.
120656-M issued in the name of private respondent and to reinstate
TCT No. 223602 in the name of Agapito Candido married to Sagraria
Lozada.On December 5, 1990, private respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss 4 on the ground that petitioners failed to comply with the
mandatory conciliation process required under P.D. No. 1508 as she
resides in the same municipality with the petitioners.On July 10,
1991, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of
which reads, as follows:"WHEREFORE, as prayed for, let this case
be, as it is hereby DISMISSED in so far as defendant Mila Contreras
is concerned for lack of prior referral of the dispute before the
Katarungang Pambarangay, without prejudice." 5Thereafter,
petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 6 which was denied
in an Order 7 dated August 9, 1991.Hence, this petition alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge
dismissing private respondent in the complaint instituted by the
petitioners notwithstanding the fact that the other defendants in
Civil Case No. 697-M-90 reside in different municipalities and
cities.The petition is impressed with merit.Section 2 of P.D. No.
1508 provides:"SEC. 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The
Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the
parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for
amicable settlement of all disputes except:"(1) Where one party is
the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof:"(2)
Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute
relates to the performance of his official functions;"(3) Offenses
punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding
P200.00;"(4) Offenses where there is no private offended party;"(5)
Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the
interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister
of Justice and the Minister of Local Government."Further, section 3
of the same law provides:"SEC. 3. Venue. Disputes between or among
persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for
amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those
involving actual residents of different barangays within the same
city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the
respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the
election of the complainant. However, all disputes which involve
real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or any part thereof is
situated."The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:(1)
involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different
cities or municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each
other; . . ."From the foregoing provisions of P.D. No. 1508, it is
clear that the barangay court or Lupon has jurisdiction over
disputes between parties who are actual residents of barangays
located in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays of
different cities or municipalities.In the instant case, petitioners
alleged in their complaint that they are residents of Barrio
Paliwas, Municipality of Obando, Bulacan while defendants'
residences are as follows: Sagraria Lozada and Jorge Candido at
Javier Compound, Bo. Sto. Nio, Taytay, Rizal; Virginia and Maximina
Candido at Road 2, Doa Faustina Village, San Bartolome, Novaliches,
Quezon City; Eduardo Candido at 388 Barrio Paliwas, Municipality of
Obando, Bulacan; Mila Contreras at San Pascual, Municipality of
Obando, Bulacan; and the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan at his
official address in Bulacan.The Lupon of the barangay ordinarily
has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes
involving parties who actually reside in the same municipality,
city or province. Where the complaint does not state that it is one
of the excepted cases, or it does not allege prior availment of
said conciliation process, or it does not have a certification that
no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties, the
case could be dismissed on motion. 8 In the instant case, the fact
that petitioners and private respondent, reside in the same
municipality of Obando, Bulacan does not justify compulsory
conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 where the other co-defendants
reside in barangays of different municipalities, cities and
provinces.Petitioners can immediately file the case in court. It
would not serve the purpose of the law in discouraging litigation
among members of the same barangay through conciliation where the
other parties reside in barangays other than the one where the
Lupon is located and where the dispute arose.WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders of the trial court
dated July 10, 1991 and August 9, 1991 dismissing Civil Case No.
697-M-90 in so far as defendant Mila Contreras is concerned are
hereby annulled and set aside. The case is remanded to the Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan for further proceedings and to REINSTATE
private respondent Mila Contreras as defendant in Civil Case No.
697-M-90. No costs.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado
and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND
DIVISIONG.R. No. 115213 December 19, 1995WILSON DIU and DORCITA
DIU,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PETER LYNDON BUSHNELL and
PATRICIA PAGBA,respondents.REGALADO,J.:Before us is an appeal
bycertiorarifrom the judgment of the Court of Appeals1setting aside
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch
16,2without prejudice to the refiling of the case by petitioners
after due compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1508, otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay
Law."Prefatorily, the Court desires to digress and call attention
to the lamentable saga of delay in the dispensation of justice and
the regrettable abuse of judicial processes exemplified by this
case. For, if just to collect an indebtedness of P7,862.55 incurred
way back in 1988, the proceedings had to go through all the rungs
of the judicial ladder and still present the prospect of hereafter
infringing again upon the time of this Court and three other
courts, such protraction being manipulated by trifling with the
very law which ironically was intended to prevent such delay, then
the bench and the bar should soberly reflect thereon and now take
stock of themselves. Indeed, it is not improbable that there are
other cases agonizing under the same ennui created by our
courts.Coming now to the case at hand, it appears that on several
occasions from January 8, 1988 up to and until April 18, 1989,
private respondent Patricia Pagba purchased on credit various
articles of merchandise from petitioners' store at Naval, Biliran,
all valued at P7,862.55, as evidenced by receipts of goods marked
as Annexes "A" to "O" of petitioner's Manifestation filed in the
trial court, dated August 9, 1991. Private respondents failed to
pay despite repeated demands.Petitioners brought the matter before
theBarangayChairman of Naval and the latter set the case for
hearing, but private respondents failed to appear. When the case
was again set for hearing, the parties appeared but they failed to
reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, thebarangaychairman
issued a Certification to File Action.3Petitioners then filed their
complaint for a sum of money before the Municipal Trial Court of
Naval.Private respondents, in their Answer,4while admitting the
indebtedness to petitioner, interposed two counterclaims, namely,
(1) one for P6,227.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and
repair of the boat belonging to petitioners, and (b) another for
P12,000.00 representing the cost of the two tires which petitioners
allegedly misappropriated. Private respondents likewise alleged
that despite the confrontations before thebarangaychairman,
petitioners refused to pay their just and valid obligations to
private respondent and her husband.Aside from petitioners claim and
private respondents' counterclaims, the Municipal Trial Court of
Naval also resolved the issue on whether or not there was
compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 on
conciliation. In resolving the said issue, the trial court relied
on the case ofTijam vs.Sibonghanoy5which held that:While
petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exemption thereto,
they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer
and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they
participated in the trial of the case by cross-examining the
respondent. Upon this premise, petitioner cannot now be allowed
belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves
voluntarily.6However, said lower court dismissed the complaint by
ruling against the admissibility of Exhibits "E-1" to "E-15", which
are the receipts of good marked as Annexes "A" to "O" of
petitioners' manifestation therein, for not having been properly
identified in court.7On private respondents' counterclaims, said
trial court also ruled that the same had been settled when the
contending parties entered into a compromise agreement which was
approved on January 9, 1989 by the Regional Trial Court of Naval,
Branch 16, in another action between them, that is, Civil Case No.
B-0719.8Due to the dismissal of the complaint, petitioners appealed
to the aforementioned Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 22
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Said appellate court, however, did not
find it necessary to pass upon the issue of the alleged
non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 but, instead,
decided the appeal on the merits. Modifying the decision of the
lower court, the Regional Trial Court held that:The case should
have proceeded to its conclusion under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure and the regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of
Court applies to the special cases only in a suppletory capacity
insofar as they are not inconsistent. . . .The claim of the
plaintiff is less than P10,000.00. It properly falls under the Rule
on Summary Procedure. The only pleadings allowed are complaints,
compulsory counterclaims and cross claims pleaded in the answer,
and the answers thereto. The case could have been decided based on
affidavits of the witnesses and other evidence on the factual
issues defined in the order of the Court, after the preliminary
conference, together with the position papers setting forth the law
and the facts relied upon by the parties.The need for a formal
offer, identification and cross-examination on Exhibits "E-1" to
"E-15" was not necessary. The said exhibits were inadmissible
(sic). The receipts constituted evidence of indebtedness and their
possession by the plaintiff at the commencement of the suit gives
rise to the legal presumption that the debts in the total amount of
P7,862.66 have not been paid.Where, under the contract of sale, the
ownership of the goods has passed to the buyer and he wrongfully
neglects or refuses to pay for the goods according to the terms of
the contract of sale, the seller may maintain an action against him
for the price of the goods.9Accordingly, it rendered judgment in
favor of herein petitioners and ordered private respondent Patricia
Pagba to pay the former the amount of P7,862.55 plus legal interest
from July, 1991, P1,000.00 as attorney fees, and the costs of
suit.Private respondents then went to the Court of Appeals, raising
just two issues,viz.: (1) whether or not the Regional Trial Court
erred in not making a factual finding that herein petitioners did
not comply with Presidential Decree No. 1508; and (2) whether or
not said Regional Trial Court erred in not dismissing the appeal or
case for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1508.10Respondent Court of Appeals set
aside the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, on the ground that
there had been no compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508,
with this ratiocination:It is, therefore, clear that if efforts of
the barangay captain to settle the dispute fails, the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo shall be constituted with the end in view of
exploring all possibilities of amicable settlement. If no
conciliation or settlement has been reached pursuant to the
aforesaid rules, the matter may then be brought to the regular
courts.In the case at bar, it has been established that there was
no valid conciliation proceeding between the parties. The efforts
of the barangay captain of Catmon, Naval, Biliran to mediate the
dispute between the parties having failed, the Pangkat ng
Tagapamayapa should have been constituted for purposes of settling
the matter. However, the Pangkat was not constituted, instead, a
Certification to File Action was issued by the barangay captain in
favor of respondent spouses Diu. In the same case ofRamos vs.Court
of Appeals, 174 SCRA 690, the Supreme Court ruled that the "Punong
Barangay has no right to say that referral to the Pangkat was no
longer necessary merely because he himself has failed to work out
an agreement between the petitioner and private respondent. Dispute
should not end with the mediation proceeding before the Punong
Barangay because of his failure to effect a settlement . . . .
InBejer vs.Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 566, it was held that
"failure to avail of conciliation process under P.D. 1508, . . .
renders the complaint vulnerable to a timely motion to dismiss."
Inasmuch as petitioner has pleaded in his answer the lack of cause
of action of respondent, objection to the complaint has been timely
made.11The basic issue to be resolved in the instant petition is
whether or not the confrontations before theBarangayChairman of
Naval satisfied the requirement therefor in Presidential Decree No.
1508. This Court finds for petitioners.It must be noted that
Presidential Decree No. 1508 has been repealed by codification in
the Local Government Code of 199112which took effect on January 1,
1992. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the trial
court on July 10, 1991 before the effectivity of the Local
Government Code. Nevertheless, Sections 4 and 6 of the former law
have been substantially reproduced in Sections 410 (b) and 412,
respectively, of the latter law. The pertinent provisions read as
follows:Sec. 410. PROCEDURE FOR AMICABLE SETTLEMENT. (b) . . . . If
he (lupon chairman) fails in his mediation effort within fifteen
(15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him, he
shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter.Sec. 412.
CONCILIATION. (a) Precondition to filing of Complaint in Court. No
complaint . . . shall be filed or instituted in court . . . unless
there has been a confrontation of the parties before the lupon
chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has
been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat
secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman . . . .In
the case at bar, it is admitted that the parties did have
confrontations before theBarangayChairman of Naval although they
were not sent to thepangkatas the same was not constituted. Their
meetings with saidbarangaychairman were not fruitful as no amicable
settlement was reached. This prompted the issuance of the following
Certification to File Action.13This is to certify that:Respondent,
Patricia Pagba admitted her indebtedness with complainant but she
refused to pay because according to her, complainant has also an
unsettled accounts (sic) with her husband. Hence no
settlement/conciliation was reached and therefore the corresponding
complaint for the dispute may now be filed in court.Date(d) this
10th day of July 1991.(Sgd.) JHONY C. JEREZLupon Pangkat
ChairmanAttested:(Sgd.) IRENEO DOCALLOSLupon/Pangkat
SecretaryAccording to private respondent, however, the above
certification is "falsified" since nopangkatwas constituted. She,
therefore, insists that petitioners have not complied with the
mandatory provision of Presidential Decree No. 1508 on compulsory
arbitration. We disagree.While nopangkatwas constituted, it is not
denied that the parties met at the office of thebarangaychairman
for possible settlement.14The efforts of thebarangaychairman,
however, proved futile as no agreement was reached. Although
nopangkatwas formed, we believe that there was substantial
compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that under Section 412 of
the Local Government Code aforequoted, the confrontation before
theluponchairman OR thepangkatis sufficient compliance with the
pre-condition for filing the case in court.This is true
notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410 (b) of the same law that
thebarangaychairman shall constitute apangkatif he fails in his
mediation efforts. Section 410 (b) should be construed together
with Section 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and
peculiar to the case. On this score, it is significant that
thebarangaychairman orpunong barangayis himself the chairman of
theluponunder the Local Government Code.15From the foregoing facts,
it is undeniable that there was substantial compliance with
Presidential Decree No. 1508 which does not require strict
technical compliance with its procedural requirements. Under the
factual antecedents, it cannot be said that the failure of the
parties to appear before thepangkatcaused any prejudice to the case
for private respondents considering that they already refused
conciliation before thebarangaychairman and, as will hereafter be
discussed, their sham insistence for a meeting before thepangkatis
merely a ploy for further delay. We are thus forced to remind them
that technicalities should not be made to desert their true role in
our justice system, and should not be used as obstructions
therein.The courta quowas likewise correct in invoking the doctrine
inTijamand, as indicated by the factual scenario in this case,
private respondents are clearly in estoppel to assail the
jurisdiction of the two lower courts. It is also worth stressing
that while the case was filed when Presidential Decree No. 1508 was
still in force, the procedural provisions of the Local Government
Code, which we have earlier noted as being supportive of the
validity of the conciliation proceedings, are also applicable to
this case. Statutes regulating procedure in courts are applicable
to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense.16To indulge
private respondents in their stratagem will not only result in a
circuitous procedure but will necessarily entail undue and further
delay and injustice. This is inevitable if this Court should
dismiss the complaint and require the parties to meet before
thepangkat, only to bring the case all over again through the
hierarchy of courts and ultimately back to us for decision on the
merits. Obviously, this is the game plan of private respondents.
For, when private respondents appealed to respondent court, they
did not at all assail the propriety or correctness of the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court holding them liable to petitioners for
the sum of money involved. Such primary substantive issue,
therefore, has been laid to rest, but private respondents would
wish to keep the case alive merely on a conjured procedural issue
invoking their supposed right to confrontation before
thepangkat.However, from the very start of this action, private
respondents failed to show or evince any honest indication that
they were willing to settle their obligations with petitioners,
notwithstanding the efforts of the latter to submit the matter to
conciliation. It is, therefore, quite obvious that their insistence
on technical compliance with the requirements of
thebarangayconciliation process is a dilatory maneuver. This is an
evident and inevitable conclusion since the main argument of
respondents in this petition is only the supposed failure of
petitioners to comply with thebarangayconciliatory procedure and
not the denial or repudiation of their indebtedness.We do not agree
with the findings of respondent appellate court that inasmuch as
private respondents pleaded in their answer the alleged lack of
cause of action of petitioners, an objection to the complaint had
been timely made. It will be readily observed that said defense was
only one of the six affirmative defenses cryptically alleged in
single short sentences in private respondents' Answer in the courta
quo, running the implausible gamut from supposed defects in parties
tores judicataand up to capacity to sue, without any statement of
the facts on which they would rely to support such drivel. This
calculated travesty of the rules on pleadings betrays the ulterior
motives of private respondents and cannot be countenanced.The
failure of private respondents to specifically allege that there
was no compliance with thebarangayconciliation procedure
constitutes a waiver of that defense. All that they alleged in
their Answer in the trial court was that "the complaint states no
cause of action" without giving even the semblance of any reason to
support or explain that allegation. On the other hand, they
admitted the confrontations before thebarangaychairman in paragraph
13 of their Answer.17Since private respondents failed to duly raise
that issue, their defense founded thereon is deemed waived,
especially since they actually did not pursue the issue before the
case was set for hearing. Also, the conciliation procedure under
Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement
and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which
the lower courts had already acquired over the subject matter and
private respondents as defendants therein.18ACCORDINGLY, the
instant petition is GRANTED. The judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 30962 is hereby SET ASIDE, and the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16,
in Civil Case No. B-0842 is hereby REINSTATED, with costs against
private respondents.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and
Francisco, JJ., concur
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND
DIVISIONG.R. No. 96914 July 23, 1992CECILIA U.
LEDESMA,petitioner,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and JOSE T.
DIZON,respondents.NOCON,J.:Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma prays
before this Court for the reversal of the Decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals of August 30, 19901ordering the
dismissal of her ejectment complaint before the Manila Metropolitan
Trial Court for lack of cause of action due to non-compliance with
Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law) as well
as the Resolution of January 7, 19912denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration of said Decision.The facts of this case as
summarized by thepetitioner in her Memorandum are as
follows:Petitioner is the owner-lessor of an apartment building
located at 800-802 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila. Two (2) units
of said apartment building were leased (now being unlawfully
occupied) to private respondent at monthly rates of P3,450.00 for
the unit/apartment located at 800 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila
and P2,300.00 for the unit/apartment located at 802 Remedios
Street, Malate, Manila, respectively. . . .Said lease was
originally covered by written contracts of lease both dated
December 10, 1984 and except for the rates and duration, the terms
and conditions of said contracts were impliedly renewed on a
"month-to-month" basis pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil
Code.One of the terms and conditions of the said Contract of Lease,
that of monthly rental payments, was violated by private respondent
and that as of October 31, 1988, said private respondent has
incurred arrears for both units in the total sum of P14,039.00 for
which letters of demand were sent to, and received by, private
respondent.Upon failure of private respondent to honor the demand
letters, petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay for
conciliation which eventually issued a certification to file
action. Petitioner was assisted by her son, Raymond U. Ledesma,
(who is not a lawyer) during the barangay proceeding as she was
suffering from recurring psychological and emotional ailment as can
be seen from the receipts and prescriptions issued by her
psychiatrist, copies of which are attached as Annexes "E-E10" of
the said Petition.Due to the stubborn refusal of the private
respondent to vacate the premises, petitioner was constrained to
retain the services of counsel to initiate this ejectment
proceeding.3The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 10, Manila,
rendered a decision on June 21, 1989 ordering private respondent to
vacate the premises, to pay rentals falling due after May 1989 and
to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P2,500.00.4The Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, on appeal, affirmed the MTC
ruling except for the award of attorney's fees which it reduced to
P1,000.00.5Private respondent, however, found favor with the
respondent Court of Appeals when he elevated the case in a Petition
for Review, when it ruled, thus:IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision dated
October 13, 1989 of the RTC of Manila, Br. IX in Civil Case No.
89-49672 is reversed and set aside and the Complaint for Ejectment
against petitioner is dismissed for lack of cause of action. No
costs.6Thus, this appeal, raising several assignments of error,
namely, that the Court of Appeals erred 1. In holding that private
respondent raised the issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9
of P.D. 1508 in the lower court when in fact and in truth his
answer and position paper failed to do so, contrary to evidence on
record;2. In failing to consider that private respondent had waived
his right to question the lack of cause of action of the complaint,
if there is any, contrary to law, established jurisprudence, and
evidence on record;3. In giving undue weight and credence to the
self-serving allegations of the private respondent that summons was
not served him, contrary to law, established jurisprudence and
evidence on record.4. In disregarding the well-known principle of
law that barangay authorities are presumed to have performed their
official duties and to have acted regularly in issuing the
certificate to file action and grossly and manifestly erred in
making an opposite conclusion to this effect, contrary to law,
established jurisprudence and evidence on record.5. In not holding
that the settlement was repudiated, contrary to law and evidence on
record.6. In not affirming the judgment rendered by the
Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court below.Petitioner
assails private respondent for raising the issue of non-compliance
with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 only in his petition for review
with the appellate court and which mislead the court to erroneously
dismiss her complaint for ejectment.Section 6 of P.D. 1508
states:Sec. 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint.
No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter
within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof
shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government
office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of
the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the
Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or
Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. . .
.xxx xxx xxxwhile Section 9 states that:Sec. 9. Appearance of
parties in person. In all proceedings provided for herein, the
parties must appear in person without the assistance of
counsel/representative, with the exception of minors and
incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not
lawyers.Petitioner submits that said issue, not having been raised
by private respondent in the court below, cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal, specially in the Court of Appeals,
citingSaludes vs.Pajarillo.7Private respondent had waived said
objection, following the line of reasoning inRoyales
vs.Intermediate Appelate Court.8Private respondent denies having
waived the defenses of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D.
1508. His Answer before the Metropolitan Trial Court, specifically
paragraphs 4, 7, & 8, substantially raised the fact of
non-compliance by petitioner with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 and
consequently, subjected petitioner's complaint to dismissal for
lack of cause of action, to wit:xxx xxx xxx4. Answering defendant
denies the allegations of paragraph 8, the truth of the matter
being that he was not duly summoned nor subpoenaed by the Barangay
Chairman, who issued the alluded certification, to appear for
hearing.9xxx xxx xxx7. Plaintiff has no cause of action against
answering defendant.8. The certification to file action (annex D of
the complaint) was improperly or irregularly issued as the
defendant was never summoned nor subpoenaed by the Barangay
Chairman to appear for hearing in connection with the alleged
complaint of the plaintiff. In effect the mandatory provision of
P.D. 1508 was not complied with warranting the dismissal of the
instant complaint.xxx xxx xxx10We do not agree with petitioner that
the issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 was
raised only for the first time in the Court of Appeals. When
private respondent stated that he was never summoned or subpoenaed
by the Barangay Chairman, he, in effect, was stating that since he
was never summoned, he could not appear in person for the needed
confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman for
conciliation and/or amicable settlement. Without the mandatory
personal confrontation, no complaint could be filed with the MTC.
Private respondent's allegation in paragraph 4 of his Answer that
he was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman; that
plaintiff has no cause of action against him as alleged in
paragraph 7 of the Answer; and that the certification to file
action was improperly issued in view of the foregoing allegations
thereby resulting in non-compliance with the mandatory requirements
of P.D. No. 1508, as stated in paragraph 8 of the Answer are in
substantial compliance with the raising of said issues and/or
objections in the court below.Petitioner would like to make it
appear to this Court that she appeared before the Lupon Chairman to
confront private respondent. She stated in her Petition11and her
Memorandum12that:Upon failure of private respondent to honor the
demand letters, petitioner referred the matter to the barangay for
conciliation which eventually issued a certification to file
action. Petitioner was assisted by her son, Raymond U. Ledesma,
(who is not a lawyer) during the barangay proceeding as she was
suffering from recurring psychological and emotional ailment as can
be seen from the receipt and prescriptions issued by her
psychiatrist copies of which are attached herewith as
Annexes"E-E10."However, as found out by the respondent court:We
agree with the petitioner that private respondent Cecile Ledesma
failed to comply with section 6 of P.D. 1508. The record of the
case is barren showing compliance by the private respondent.
Indeed, the documentary evidence of the private respondent herself
attached to the complaint buttresses this conclusion. They show
that it is not the private respondent but her son. Raymund U.
Ledesma, and her lawyer, Atty. Epifania Navarro who dealt with the
petitioner regarding their dispute. Thus, the demand letter dated
October 18, 1988 sent to the petitioner for payment of rentals in
the sum of P14,039.00 was signed by Raymund Ledesma. On the other
hand, the demand letter dated November 14, 1988 was signed by Atty.
Epifania Navarro. More telling is the Certification to File Action
signed by Barangay Chairman, Alberto A. Solis where it appears that
the complainant is Raymund U. Ledesma and not the private
respondent.13As stated earlier, Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates
personal confrontation of the parties because:. . . a personal
confrontation between the parties without the intervention of a
counsel or representative would generate spontaneity and a
favorable disposition to amicable settlement on the part of the
disputants. In other words, the said procedure is deemed conducive
to the successful resolution of the dispute at the barangay
level.14Petitioner tries to show that her failure to personally
appear before the barangay Chairman was because of her recurring
psychological ailments. But for the entire year of 198815
specifically September to December 6 there is no indication at all
that petitioner went to see her psychiatrist for consultation. The
only conclusion is that 1988 was a lucid interval for petitioner.
There was, therefore, no excuse then for her non-appearance at the
Lupon Chairman's office.Petitioner, not having shown that she is
incompetent, cannot be represented by counsel or even by
attorney-in-fact who is next of kin.16As explained by the Minister
of Justice with whom We agree:To ensure compliance with the
requirement of personal confrontation between the parties, and
thereby, the effectiveness of the barangay conciliation proceedings
as a mode of dispute resolution, the above-quoted provision is
couched in mandatory language. Moreover, pursuant to the familiar
maxim in statutory construction dictating that "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius", the express exceptions made regarding minors
and incompetents must be construed as exclusive of all others not
mentioned.17Petitioner's non-compliance with Secs. 6 and 9 of P.D.
1508 legally barred her from pursuing the ejectment case in the MTC
of Manila.18Having arrived at this conclusion, there is no need for
Us to discuss the other issues involved.WHEREFORE, the questioned
decision and resolution of the respondent Court are affirmedin
totowith treble costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J.,
Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.Republic of the
PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 117005 June
19, 1997CARLITO D. CORPUZ,petitioner,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
(SIXTEENTH DIVISION) and JUANITO
ALVARADO,respondents.ROMERO,J.:Petitioner Carlito Corpuz questions
the decision of the Court ofAppeals1affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 10, dismissing the petition
for review in Civil Case No. 92-62869.Corpuz filed an action for
unlawful detainer against private respondent Juanito Alvarado with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, docketed as Civil
Case No. 138532, for recovery of possession of the room being
occupied by the latter, which Corpuz' children allegedly needed for
their own use.Alvarado and Corpuz were two of the tenants of a
certain Lorenzo Barredo who, in May 1988, decided to sell his
property to the tenants. Due to economic difficulties, however,
Alvarado and the other lessees executed an "Affidavit of Waiver"
granting Barredo the right to sell his house to any person who can
afford to purchase the same. Consequently, Barredo sold his house
to Corpuz for P37,500.00. As a result of the sale, a tenancy
relationship was established between Corpuz and Alvarado.In October
1991, Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarado demanding that he
vacate the room which he was occupying because the children of
Corpuz needed it for their own use. Alvarado refused to vacate the
room as demanded, prompting Corpuz to seek his ejectment.In his
answer, Alvarado raised two major defenses, to wit: (1) the alleged
"Affidavit of Waiver" executed between him and Barredo was a
forgery; and (2) the dispute was not referred to the Lupong
Tagapayapa.Finding the defenses of Alvarado to be without merit,
the MTC of Manila handed down on August 11, 1992 a decision
ordering Alvarado to vacate the room.2Feeling aggrieved, Alvarado
appealed to the RTC. On March 11, 1993, said court rendered its
decision3which, in effect, reversed the MTC's decision on the
ground that the purported sale between Corpuz and Barredo was the
subject of a controversy pending before the National Housing
Authority (NHA) which must be resolved first by said agency. It
also concluded that the "Affidavit of Waiver" executed by Alvarado
and Barredo was a forgery. Consequently, it ordered the dismissal
of the case for unlawful detainer, and ruled that Alvarado cannot
be legally expelled from the subject premises.His motion for
reconsideration of said decision having been denied for lack of
merit by the RTC4on July 16, 1993, Corpuz elevated his case to the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, found no reversible
error in the assailed judgment and affirmed the same in its
entirety in its assailed decision dated July 14, 1994.5A subsequent
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution dated September 1, 1994.6Hence, this
petition.The main issues presented in this petition is whether
Corpuz' unlawful detainer suit filed before the MTC against
Alvarado should be suspended until the resolution of the case
lodged in the NHA impugning the sale of said property, and whether
the "Affidavit of Waiver" between Corpuz and Barredo was authentic.
Corpuz maintains that the mere assertion challenging his ownership
over the said property is not a sufficient ground to divest the MTC
of its exclusive jurisdiction.7The petition is impressed with
merit.It is elementary that the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over
ejectment cases.8As the law now stands, the only issue to be
resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is the
physical or material possession over the real property, that is,
possessionde facto.9In the recent case ofRefugia v.Court of
Appeals,10however, we ruled that:In the case ofDe la Santa vs.Court
of Appeals, et. al., this Court, in making a distinction between
the reception of evidence and the resolution of the issue of
ownership, held that the inferior court may look into the evidence
of title or ownership and possession de jure insofar as said
evidence would indicate or determine the nature of possession. It
cannot, however, resolve the issue of ownership, that is, by
declaring who among the parties is the true and lawful owner of the
subject property, because the resolution of said issue would effect
an adjudication on ownership which is not sanctioned in the summary
action for unlawful detainer. With this as a premise and taking
into consideration the amendment introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, it may be suggested that inferior courts are now conditionally
vested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title or ownership
raised by the parties in an ejectment suit.Consequently, since the
present petition involves the issue of possession intertwined with
the issue of ownership (i.e., the controversy pending in the NHA),
the doctrinal pronouncement inRefugiais applicable.Parenthetically
speaking, the issue raised in this petition is far from novel. The
prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the annulment of
sale, title or document do not abate any ejectment action
respecting the same property.11InWilmor Auto Supply Construction
Company Corporations, et al.v.Court of Appeals,12Justice (now Chief
Justice) Andres Narvasa outlined the following cases involving the
annulment of the title or document over the property which should
not be considered in the abatement of an ejectment suit, to
wit:Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document
affecting property operate to abate ejectment actions respecting
the same property (Salinas v. Navarro [annulment of deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage and/or to declare the same an equitable
mortgage], 126 SCRA 167 [1983]; Ang Ping v. RTC [annulment of sale
and title], 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Caparros v. CA [annulment of
title], 170 SCRA 758 [1989]; Dante v. Sison [annulment of sale with
damages], 174 SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
[annulment of document] , 177 SCRA 288 [1989].Clearly, the
underlying reason for the above rulings is for the defendant not to
trifle with the ejectment suit, which is summary in nature, by the
simple expedient of asserting ownership thereon. Thus, the
controversy pending before the NHA for the annulment of the Deed of
Sale and assailing the authenticity of the "Affidavit of Joint
Waiver" cannot deter the MTC from taking cognizance of the
ejectment suit merely for the purpose of determining who has a
better possessory right among the parties.It may be stressed that
Alvarado is not without remedy. We have ruled that a judgment
rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action between the
same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it
be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the
same parties upon a different cause of action involving
possession.13Furthermore, Alvarado raises the issue in the instant
petition that the ejectment suit was not referred to the Lupon
Tagapayapa as required by Presidential Decree No. 1508.We are not
persuaded. This defense was only stated in a single general short
sentence in Alvarado's answer. We have held inDui v.Court of
Appeals14that failure of a party to specifically allege the fact
that there was no compliance with the Barangay conciliation
procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. A perusal of
Alvarado's answer reveals that no reason or explanation was given
to support his allegation, which is deemed a mere general
averment.In any went, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a
jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot
affect the jurisdiction which the lower court had already acquired
over the subject matter and the parties therein.WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated July 14,
1994, of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila,
Branch 6, in Civil Case No. 138532-CV dated August 11, 1992, is
hereby REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R.
No. 132624 March 13, 2000FIDEL M. BAARES II, LILIA C. VALERIANO,
EDGAR M. BAARES, EMILIA GATCHALIAN and FIDEL
BESARINO,petitioners,vs.ELIZABETH BALISING, ROGER ALGER, MERLINDA
CAPARIC, EUSTAQUIO R. TEJONES, ANDREA SAYAM, JENNY ISLA, WILMA
ROGATERO, PABLITO ALEGRIA, ROLANDO CANON, EDITHA ESTORES, EDMUNDO
DOROYA, TERESITA GUION, DANNY ANDARAYAN, LOURDES CADAY, ROGELIO
MANO, EVANGELINE CABILTES AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF RIZAL, Antipolo,
Rizal,respondents.KAPUNAN,J.:This is a petition for review
oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71 dated August 26, 1997.1The
antecedent facts are as follows:Petitioners Fidel M. Baares II,
Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Baares, Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel
Besarino were the accused in sixteen criminal cases for
estafa2filed by the private respondents. The cases were assigned to
the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II.After the
petitioners were arraigned and entered their plea of not
guilty,3they filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned cases on
the ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of
the failure of the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings
before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo,
Rizal.4Petitioners averred that since they lived in the same
barangay as private respondents, and the amount involved in each of
the cases did not exceed Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), the said
cases were required under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of
the Local Government Code of 19915and Section 18 of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure6to be referred to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay concerned
for conciliation proceedings before being filed in court.7The
municipal trial court issued an Order, dated July 17, 19958denying
petitioners' motion to dismiss on the ground that they failed to
seasonably invoke the non-referral of the cases to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It added that such
failure to invoke non-referral of the case to the Lupon amounted to
a waiver by petitioners of the right to use the said ground as
basis for dismissing the cases.9Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, claiming that nowhere
in the Revised Rules of Court is it stated that the ground of
prematurity shall be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a
motion to dismiss.10On November 13, 1995, the municipal trial court
issued an Order dismissing the sixteen criminal cases against
petitioners without prejudice, pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.11More than two months later, on
February 26, 1996, private respondents through counsel, filed a
motion to revive the abovementioned criminal cases against
petitioners, stating that the requirement of referral to the Lupon
for conciliation had already been complied with.12Attached to the
motion was a Certification, dated February 13, 1996 from the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal13stating that the
parties appeared before said body regarding the charges of estafa
filed by private respondents against petitioners but they failed to
reach an amicable settlement with respect thereto. Petitioners
filed a comment and opposition to motion to revive claiming that
the Order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995
dismissing the cases had long become final and executory; hence,
private respondents should have re-filed the cases instead of
filing a motion to revive14.On March 18, 1996, the municipal trial
court issued an Order15granting private respondents' motion to
revive. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration16of the
aforementioned Order which was denied by the municipal trial
court.17Petitioners thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Antipolo, Rizal, a petition forcertiorari, injunction and
prohibition assailing the Order, dated March 18, 1996 of the
municipal trial court. They claimed that the said Order, dated
November 13, 1995 dismissing the criminal cases against them had
long become final and executory considering that the prosecution
did not file any motion for reconsideration of said Order.18In
response thereto, private respondents filed their Comment,19arguing
that the motion to revive the said cases was in accordance with
law, particularly Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.20After the parties submitted additional pleadings to
support their respective contentions21, the regional trial court
rendered the assailed decision denying the petition forcertiorari,
injunction and prohibition, stating as follows:Evaluating the
allegations contained in the petition and respondents' comment
thereto, the Court regrets that it cannot agree with the petitioner
(sic). As shown by the records the 16 criminal cases were dismissed
without prejudice at the instance of the petitioners for failure of
the private respondent to comply with the mandatory requirement of
PD 1508. Since the dismissal of said cases was without prejudice,
the Court honestly believes that the questioned order has not
attained finality at all.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.22The
regional trial court, likewise, denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration23of the aforementioned decision for lack of
merit.24Hence, this petition.Petitioners raise the following
questions of law:1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or
action without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within
the reglementary period, as in the present case;2. Whether or not
the action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice may be
revived by motion after the order of dismissal had become final and
executory; and3. Whether or not the court that had originally
acquired jurisdiction of the case that was dismissed without
prejudice still have jurisdiction to act on the motion to revive
after the order of dismissal has become final and
executory.25Petitioners contend that an order dismissing a case or
action without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within
the reglementary period. Hence, if no motion to revive the case is
filed within the reglementary fifteen-day period within which to
appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's
order, the order of dismissal becomes final and the case may only
be revived by the filing of a new complaint or
information.26Petitioners further argue that after the order of
dismissal of a case attains finality, the court which issued the
same loses jurisdiction thereon and, thus, does not have the
authority to act on any motion of the parties with respect to said
case.27On the other hand, private respondents submit that cases
covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure such as the
criminal cases against petitioners are not covered by the rule
regarding finality of decisions and orders under the Revised Rules
of Court. They insist that cases dismissed without prejudice for
non-compliance with the requirement of conciliation before the
Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay
concerned may be revived summarily by the filing of a motion to
revive regardless of the number of days which has lapsed after the
dismissal of the case.28Petitioners' contentions are meritorious.A
"final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done
but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the
court.29As distinguished therefrom, an "interlocutory order" is one
which does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something
more to be adjudicated upon.30This Court has previously held
that