Kaplan Katzenbach Article

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The Patterns of International Politics and of International Law

Author(s): Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. KatzenbachSource: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Sep., 1959), pp. 693-712Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1951938 .

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THE PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND OFINTERNATIONAL LAW*

MORTON A. KAPLAN AND NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACHUniversityfChicago

The principal im ofthis paper is to relatethenormative tructure f nter-national aw to the underlying atternsof politicalbehaviorthat have charac-terizedthemodern tate system.The political constraint pon thenormativestructure fthe law is only one of many; thereare also economic, ocial, andethicalconstraints, mong others.Nonetheless, t providesmany insights ntothe changing ubstantivecontentof the law and also illustrates he way inwhichtheoryhelpsto provide an understanding f subjectmatter.

A systematic tudy of the structure f the international ocietyhas beenattemptedelsewhereby one of the authors.' Two differentmodels of inter-national ystems elineated herehaveparticular elevance o thepresent opic.These are the balance of power system, modelof the nternational oliticsofthe eighteenthnd nineteenth enturies, nd the loose bipolar system,modelofpresent-daynternational olitics.The twomodels,thoughno doubtless complexthan the actual patternsof action, suffice o demonstrate m-portantdifferencesn system structure nd behaviorthat can be related tonormative tandards.

A modelof the international ociety, ike the model ofany kindofsystem,attempts o relatesome of thesystem'svariables n somesystematicway. In asocial system, ne may look at the kinds ofmembers, he rolefunctions heyperform,heconditions nderwhichtheydo so, and the conditionsnecesssaryto the system'sstability.

I. THE BALANCE OF POWER INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Certain strikingcharacteristics f the balance of power internationalsystem re immediately vident. n the first lace, the membersof the inter-

national societyare nation-states, nlike the loose bipolar system, n whichthere re also blocs, ike NATO and theWarsawPact countries, nd universalorganizationsike the United Nations.

In this systemthenation is thefocusof solidarysentiments or ts citizen-subjects. It is the protector f the values, of the economicprospects,of thehealthand physical safetyof the individual.Within t he belongs nd outsideof it he is an alien. But the nation itselfmust depend largelyupon its ownability o survive.This is notunrestrictedlyruefor ll nation-states s furthermodifications ill demonstrate.Yet it is a centralassumptionupon whichthe

behaviorof mportant articipantsn the balance ofpower systemdepends.* This article will also appear as a chapter in the authors' forthcomingbook, The

PoliticalFoundations f nternational aw.1 See Morton A. Kaplan, SystemndProcess n Internationalolitics,John Wiley and

Sons, 1957.

693



694 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

The failure f Spain towardthe close ofthe period of colonial conquests hada devastating effect pon Spain's internal life. The demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire shatteredAustriannational life and threatenedAustrian

viability.The recentdecline of Britainand France has an easily traced effectupon their nternal societies and upon their ability to protect themselves.On the otherhand,the unification fGermany,n the nineteenth entury, x-cept for he politicalmisuse of Germanpower, urnedGermany nto a flourish-ing and prosperous ountry.All Americans re aware thatwhetherAmericandestinywas manifest r not the policyofnational expansionwas essentialtothe present importance and prosperityof the United States. Today theEuropean Common Market rests upon the belief that only a new supra-national organization an bring back past glories.But in the eighteenth nd

nineteenth enturies, he nation was the essential unit. If one nation did notpursue ts possible gains in the international ystem, notherwould do so, tothe advantage of ts own citizens nd probablyto the detriment f the citizensofthe first.

The relationshipsfnations o oneanother n such a systemmustbe competi-tive, suspicious,and primarilynstrumental.Considerationsof interestandexpediencymust be paramount.The first uleofconductfor ach nationmustbe to seek securityfor tself. t will be ready to move fromone alliance toanotherwhenever his providesmoresecurity.

Since changes n nationalproductivity f an unexpectednaturemightdis-turb the balance, each nation will strivefora marginof security or tself.For this reasonnationswill entercoalitions,partlyto gain prizesofsomesortorother, uch as territory,esources,hipping acilities, nd soforth,nd partlyto prevent ny othernationor combination fthemfrombecomingpowerfulenoughto pose a decisivethreat.

Coalitions n a balance ofpower systemwill tendto becomefragilewhentheybecometoostrong.ftoosuccessful,heymight liminate efeatednationsand thusthreaten he interests ftheweaker members fthe successful oali-

tion,whose ecuritywouldthenbecomeprecarious.Also,weak coalitionsmightmakelargeofferso a powerful ation that was notalignedwith othernations,oreven to a member f theopposed coalition,notforgainbutto protect hem-selvesagainst oss.Moreover,differentssuesmightgiveriseto differentlign-ments.Thereforet is characteristic f the balance ofpower internationalsystemthat previously uncommittednations or even membersof its owncoalitionswing nto the balance againstthe predominant oalition. So theRussian-British-Frenchntentewas consolidatedby 1907,and Italy latersplitoff rom heTripleAlliance.

Restraint n victory s also a characteristicf the balance ofpower inter-national system,not necessarily orany reasonsof altruism,but because re-straintprotects he nterests fthe members fthe nternationalociety.Eachstrongnation has an interestn maintaining he existenceofotherstrongna-tions n order o be confident f future llies n case ofdisagreementsr clasheswith ts present llies. The restoration fFrance after he defeat ofNapoleon



PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 695

was at least partlyresponsive o this need. Even the supportgiven to Germanunification nd to Italian nationalismhad some relationship o this aim.

The balance of power systemwas dependent, mong other things,upon

the maintenance f a minimum umberof arge and strongnations.A systemof three uchwould probablyhave been inherently nstable. It mightbe pos-sible in a three-nation ystemforthe nation defeated in a war to combinewith the weakerof the victoriousnations againstthe stronger ictor.But theriskswould be great and the opportunities o undo mistakes minimal.Such asystemwould place a high premium n striking irst, n takingadvantage ofopportunity, n forming ombinations, nd on betraying llies. In a three-nation system,under conditions of conventionalcapabilities, turmoilandstrifewould be the rule; and the numberwould soon be reduced.

On theotherhand,a greaternumber f argeand important ationspromisea greateropportunityo counter ny individual alliance. Numbersof uncom-mittednations would be available to redress he balance. The opportunityto attracta memberfromone alliance to another would be relativelygreat.With a large numberof great nations,there s a premiumupon delay andmoderation.Whereaswith hreenations, t is better o eliminate heopponentsbefore heycan combine against oneself,with a larger number t is better opreservethem so that they can combine withoneself n the future.With alarge numberofmajor nations, t is easier to find coalition to preventmajor

change. n the FirstWorldWar,fornstance,America ndJapanwere vailableto restore he balance ofEurope. Numbers gave timeforthought nd timeforaction and providedthe nationsneeded to carry out the actions.

In sucha system, nynationmay at some time have an interestn conquer-ing other nations.But there will be more nations-provided there s a mini-mally argenumberofthem-having a contrarynterestn preventinghis. twould hardly be surprising herefore o discover n such a systemthat na-tional sovereignty ecomesan enforceable ormof thesystem, or t reflectsessentialneedsof the balance ofpower, and is compatiblewiththeorganiza-

tion of domesticpolitics around the unifying oncept of the nation. Eachnation s an independent nit,not subject to conquest,amalgamationor otherforms fpoliticaldominationby othernations;each nationpreserves or tselfmaximumflexibility ithregardto alignments; ach nation is organizedter-ritoriallyn thebasis ofexisting ulturegroups.Any permanentnternationalorganization, r, ndeed,any joint institutional rrangementsuch as we havetoday would be an unwarranted nd undesirabledrag on the flexiblediplo-macythatmaintainspolitical tability mongthegreatnations n the balanceof power system.The membersof the systemhave a joint or cooperative

interestn maintaining he system'snorms. And, although n one sense eachis free to violate the norms,each has an interest n protecting he normsfrom iolationsby others.

Additionalfactors endedto supportthis state ofequilibrium.One we havealready emphasizedwas nationalism.The growthof unifying entiments floyaltytoward thenationgave the nation-state strengthnd coherence hat




otherforms fpolitical organizationhad lacked. The struggle ornational in-dependencedid not,of course, nterfere ith the suppression f minorities, sinHungary,wherethey existedas isolated slandswithin largergeographicalarea. These minority roblems, owever, idcreatea domestic nstabilitywhichaffected he role of such nations internationally,nd as a result producedinternational nstability; he recurrence f the Balkan problem s the primeexample.But where nationalismwas effective omesticallyt tended to limitexpansive nternational bjectives. It is implausibleforpoliticiansto preachthe values of national independenceforthemselveswithoutaccording t toothers.Nationalism tends to differentiateeyondthe area which t can unify,increasing he difficultiesfconquest by force.Hitler'span-Germanism ad noappeal to non-Germans.One may limitnational ndependence fminorities ocivilized countries;one may accept the suppressionofminoritieswithina

nation; one need not refine r stereotype he qualities of the nation-state ofar as to insist upon cultural self-determinationfa Wilsoniansort.But theexistenceofnational identity s the focal point forsentiments f loyaltyathome is bound to legitimize t for otherson principle, nd in fact to increasethe problemsof conquest and annexationof all save border areas ofmixedculturalcontent, ike the Sudetenland.

Anotherfactorcontributingo preserving he balance of power systemstemmedfrom hedifficulty,ncreasedby the ideologyofnationalism, f nyattempt by one nation to extend controlover another.Consider the situationat the end ofthe Franco-PrussianWar. Suppose that Bismarck had desired oestablishGermanhegemony verFrance,howsuccessfulwouldhe have been?Even apartfrom irect ntervention yothernationsonbehalfofFrance, manyconsiderationswouldhave militated gainsta Germanattemptat hegemony.Giventhe state oftechnology ftheperiod, theanswer s, it wouldhave beenverydifficultorBismarck.Factories n the remoteprovincesofFrance wouldhave been capable of producingweapons quite comparable in firepower tothoseused in thePrussianArmy.Garrisoningmajor portions fFrance wouldhave immobilized he PrussianArmy ncase military roblems roseelsewherein theworld nd wouldhave placed a greatstrainuponthePrussianeconomy.Communication nd transportationwerenot efficientnoughto permitthecentralstationingof an occupationforce foruse in the provinceswheneverdisturbancesbrokeout. To occupya colonial area was one thing;to occupymetropolitan rance was distinctlydifferent. n attemptto occupy Francepermanentlywould have weakened Prussia relativeto otherpotentialenemies,and a seemingly uccessful conquest would also have stimulated otherstoenmity s a consequenceoffear.

These factors endedto reinforce social system n whichthe nationas anindependent nd sovereign entityplayed a key role. Still another factorgave particular upportto a society offormally equal and sovereign na-tion-states. he balance ofpower system perateduponthe basis ofalliancesdesignedto adjust immediateand short-termnterests f the major nations.This requireda willingness o consider ny nationan acceptable rolepartnerunderappropriate ircumstances.




Some questionshandled at the Congressof Vienna become clearerwheninterpretedn light of this principle.The quick acceptance of France as a fullmember f theCongress fter he defeat of Napoleon is illustrative. This maybe contrastedwith he treatment fGermany t Versailles.) But thedifficultiesover the fate ofNapoleon reflected genuinedilemmaofthe European states-men of the time. If the nationshad refused o deal withNapoleon, as somestatesmen dvocated, this would have reflected degreeofinterferencen theinternal ffairs f the nation-state nconsistentwith the state system of thetime.On theotherhand, the revolutionaryharacter f theNapoleonicsystemand Napoleon's refusal o limit his objectives made it virtually mpossibletoenterntoshort-termlliances,restrictedo short-termnterests.He challengedthe neutrality ofalignments nd therefore he character fthe state systemitself.Neutralityofalignment-a marriageof conveniencewithoutemotionalinvolvement-is difficultn a revolutionary eriod when state regimesbecomeunstable and when considerable foreignpopular support is available to therevolutionary ation.

Neutralityof alignmentwas an essential characteristic f the balance ofpower nternationalystem; therwise heprocessofformingounterallianceswould have been impeded and the systemwould have developed rigiditiesmakingfor nstability.The feud betweenGermanyand France after theforced ession ofAlsace-Lorraine, orexample,was one ofthemajor circum-stances leading to the breakdownof the balance ofpower systemandtheeruption fvirtually otalwar in 1914.

If hostility etweennationscould impedeoperationoftheprinciple fneu-trality falignment, ontrol fone nationby anotherwould also frustratehesameprinciple.ndependenceofthenationtherefore as a prerequisite f thissystem.And,although ny nation mighthave an individual nterestn violat-ing this rule orprinciple, ach nation had an even stronger ommon nterestnsupportingt against the encroachments f all othernations.Moreover,theappeal to othernations to preventan encroachmentwould characteristicallybe phrased n termsofthe egitimate alue of national ndependence.n short,thiswas necessarily guidingnormwhichthe existing oliticalcircumstancessupported against violation and which almost automatically guaranteedtheoutragedresentment f the community fnations against any violator. t wastherefore keyto the legal code ofthe international ocietyof the late nine-teenthcentury.Fear oftherevolutionaryharacterofdemocracy, o be sure,coupled perhapswith a desireto maintainthe old social order,did lead theHoly Alliance to proclaima doctrineof collective intervention gainst de-mocracy.Had thecases ofapplicationprovedhighly xceptional, his imitationmighthave been maintained.However, n thenineteenth enturyworld, uchan effortwas inconsistentwithmorebasic needs of the balance of powersystem.And thisexception o the ruleproved potentially o dangerousthatitwas abandoned,despitethe fact thatthecollective lementof the interventionwas designedto minimize ts unstabilizing ffects.

Non-interferencen the internal ffairs f anothernationcharacterized hebalance ofpower international ystem.The aims ofwarmuststop shortof




such interferencexceptwhennationswere confrontedwiththe kind of di-lemmaNapoleonposed. Influence ponminorprincipalities, hichoften ouldnotbe avoided,representeduchviolationsofthecodethattheyweredisguised

lestthe generalprinciple e called intoquestion.Even the troubleswithin heOttomanEmpireweretreatedwith relativerestraint.And British nd Frenchinterferencen Egypt-which was not at theheartof theEuropeanworld-atleast maintainedthe legal formalities.Americandollar diplomacyrestrictedinterventiono certaindefinitend limitedobjectives.Even so, it was difficultto accommodatetheseactionswithin he normsof the balance of power in-ternational ystem nd the fiction fthe dependent tatehad to be adopted tosquarethecircle.

At least withrespectto the major nations,the factsconformed airlywell

withthe egalnorms.No nationhad such predominance hat t interfered iththeinternal ifeofothernations n any substantialway,whether y designorsimplybecause oftheimmutablefact of ts existence nd weight n the inter-nationalpicture.Since mostactionswhichhad any influence pon citizensassuchweresettledwithin he territorialtate by thegovernment f that state,themythofsovereigntys unlimited nd indivisible urisdictionwas a fictionthe logical difficultiesf which did not affect ts practical adequacy in ex-plainingwhattookplace; it was a fictionwhicheach nationhad an interestnmaintainingnd fostering. he absurdity f auto-limitations an explanation

of nternationalaw shouldnot obscure thefact thatthe conceptreflectedhereal needs which the communityof nations had in protecting he mythofsovereignty.

Now thedoctrine pawnedfrom hebasic idea of a sovereign tate (howeverfictional, lmostmystical, nd useless for analytical or even descriptivepur-poses) was realisticallymore applicable to the large states than to smallerones, for t was the formerwho made or redressed he balance of power,whose ndependencewas essentialto themaintenanceoftheminimalnumberofstatesnecessary o balance, and whoseequalitywithin hat system ame

moderately lose to accuratedescription-not,ofcourse,on a one-to-one asis,but in the abilityofeach to equalize the balance. Its extension o a numberof maller tates within urope and LatinAmerica after heMonroeDoctrine,at least) served essentially he same purposeofpreservinghestatusquo. Therecognition f smallerstates on termsof formalequalitywas not, as in thecase ofthegreatnations,primarily elatedto theirutility s military llies oreven to theirdirect mpacton the politicalormilitary apabilitiesof the im-portant ctors. n effect,heir sovereign tatuswas guaranteedbythemajornations, nd for wo reasons. n a system fflexiblelliances twas notpossible

to agreeupon any workableor viable divisionof smallerEuropean countries;and the difficultyfacquisitionby military orcewas considerablebecause ofthedifficultiesfassimilatingheconquered ntodifferentationalcultures-itwas scarcelyworth heeffortfotherscould be persuadednot to do so. Undersuch circumstances he best commonpolicy usually was to neutralizethesmaller tates,and extending octrine pplicableto the majornationswas well




suitedto thispurpose.Statesmenof minorEuropean nationswerequite awarethat their ndependencewas the product of a balance they could not di-rectly lter,and which t was to their dvantage to preserve.They could best

avoid dominationby any particular nation by insisting pon their rights s(sovereign ntities,while, for their own part, scrupulously dheringto thecode. The stalemate among thegreat nationsgave the minornationsconsider-able freedom faction so long as they nvoked tandardswhichwere mpartial.Theirinterest n preserving heir ndependence nd neutrality oincided withthatof thegreat nations, nd so was converted nto a forcefor aw and order.In Europe, at least, the balance was at all timessufficientlyragile o makeminor tatesmen responsible.

Although he sovereignty fthese smaller tateshad, as in the case ofthe

great nations, an obvious relationto nationalism, it had littleto do withanyuniversalized rinciple f selfdetermination -at least in Europe-untila much aterperiod.UntilWilsonian dealismcoincidedwith the break-upofthe balance system, here was no inconsistencycknowledgedbetweenthesovereigntynd independence fstates and theexistence fcoloniesand otherforms f dependent states. The hegemony f the greatnationsovermuch ofthe world was simplytaken forgranted and remainedundisturbed.Equalityof rightsand freedomfrom nterventionwere necessities only where theyaffected he political positions of the greatnations; principally, herefore,n

Europe. Military ntervention r even lesserforms f interferencen the ad-ministration f otherstates could not be toleratedwhere they had a directeffectn military apability. n otherparts ofthe world nterventionouldbetolerated, nd might,ndeed,be indispensable o thepursuit fother bjectives.The greatnations had no hesitation n imposing heir ystemsofvalues, theircultures, nd in forwarding he interests f theirnationals, n thoseparts ofthe worldwhere nterventionwas tolerableto othergreat nations. Colonialclaimswererecognized nd conceded on a status quo basis; furthernterventionwas tolerated and incorporated nto the doctrine of dependent statehood to

minimize hepotentiallyunfortunate eedback of intervention s a precedentinvalidatingthe general rule in areas where t was necessaryforthe generalrule againstinterventiono apply.

Doctrine withregard o the rights nd duties of states accordingly ecamea matterofdefiningwhatconstituted state, and here therewas no refer-ence to nationalself-determinations a principle.nevitably the definition astautological,for t included as one essential a capacity to enter ntorelationswithother tates-a capacitywhichdependedupon its beinga state -thatis, upon its ability to act independently f any of the great nations.A new

state came into being only with the acquiescence of the great nations,anacquiescencewhichmightcomefrom greement mongthemnot to interveneorfrom geographicalocationsuchthat nterventionya singlenationwouldbe opposed forcibly yothers.An analogoussituation occurredwithregardtotherecognitionfnew governments f old states whenever rownedheadsfellbefore opularrevolutions.Although henotion fpopular sovereignty as




anathema to the various governmental lites, and therewas a common n-terest n suppressing adical ideas, intervention onstituted n even greaterdanger.One couldsupport n existing overnmentnvarious ndirectways,but

such assistance had to stop short of measures which would threaten itsindependence.

Now it is clearthata doctrine uthorizing rinhibiting orciblenterventionor directcontrolof the political institutions f anotherentity-whateveritsjustification-is a limitationonlyupon the greatnations. All states may beequally governedby the same generalrule against intervention, ut its biteis onlyagainstthosewhohave thecapacityto intervene. imilarly heappealofthose ntervened gainstmust be to thosewhohave thecapacityto protectthem.Small states do not intervene gainstlargestates,whatevertheprovo-

cation,and no rule of aw is necessary o prevent t. Because the balance ofpower dependedupon the large nations-and was the limitupon their n-dependentacts-they occupied a special social position n the familyof na-tions.The positionof smallnationsdependedupon howspecific pplicationsofpolicyaffectedhecompetitive ositionofthegreat nations.The greatnationswere, o to speak,theinformalfficeholdersn the balance ofpower system.They wouldintervene, ut notbe intervened gainst.Legal normswerethosewhichtheypromulgated r acquiesced in.

The special position of the great nationsin establishing nd enforcingn-

ternationalaw meant thatthe law established ould not runcontrary o theirfelt nterestsor-to the extenta pluralistic ystempermitted-to the capa-bilitiesto each. To say thisis not to say that the normsestablishedwere n-compatiblewiththeinterests f smallnationsor, ndeed, withthe interests findividualswho werenot citizens of one of the greatnations. Undoubtedlytherewereadvantages to being bornan Englishman ust as thereare advan-tagesto beingbornof a wealthyfamily.But the rules whichthegreat nationspromulgated t leasthad themerits fformal eneralitynd equality.English-mendid nothave formal rivilegesnternationallyecause theywereEnglish-

men, any morethanthey did domesticallybecause they wererich.True,suchrulesmighthave thedefect hatAnatoleFrance sardonicallynoted in thelawwhich quallyforbids ichand poor alike to sleep n ditches nd underrailroadbridges.But formal quality,howeverunequal in fact, s preferable-at leastto the small states-to formal nequality. Nor were the great nations, intheoryor in fact,altogetheroutside or above the rules they put forward sbindingon all nations.They put forward s rulesgoverning he internationalcommunitywhattheyregarded s desirablefor heworld ommunity nd whattheywerewilling o abide by themselves-providedothersdid likewise.Like

all law, it was subject to changewhereconditions hanged.During the nineteenth enturythe great nations came to share a similareconomicphilosophy, similarregardforthe individual, similarviews as todomesticpolitics-the principalvalues of a commoncivilization, commonlegalheritage, commonfaith n laissez-faireconomics.Theywerequite will-




ing to impose the essentials of this system on the world at large wherever ttouched their nterests, r the interests f theirnationals.Amongthemselvestherewas little need to insiston such standardsbecause each was committed

to the beliefthat these principles erved its national interest.There was-despite ome notableexceptions-little desireto bring hebenefits fEuropeancivilizationto the non-European world; administrationwas the white man'sburden. But the great European nations did desire to makethenon-Europeanworlda safe place forEuropeans to trade wherever radewas profitable. hisinvolvedvariousdegreesof nterventionn less technologically eveloped partsofthe world: ntervention o insistupon the paymentofdebts,to protect ne'snationals or theirproperty, o insureforone's nationalsminimum tandardsofwestern ustice. Depending on the circumstance-thewillingnessnd capacity

of local governments o insure these objectives-the formsof interventionvaried from n ad hoc anding of troops or the threatofa Britishgunboat) tovarious continuing ormsof control: colonies, dominions,dependencies,pro-tectorates,mandates, trusteeships, nd so forth. nterventionwas possibleonlywhere t did notaffect o an important egree mmediate nterests fothergreat nations-but for much of the nineteenth entury his took in much ofthe world. Since it was almost always justifiedby economicobjectives widelyshared as right, since n generalthe areas administeredwere open to all forpurposes of trade on formally qual terms, nd since it did not appear to en-

danger the security fother major nations, nterventionwas tolerated. Sincethe interventionwas justified n principle, he law was enforced. t was en-forceablebecause it did not threaten he security fothermajor nations anddid not appear to affect heirpolitical positions adversely.

Thus, despite the conflictsbetween the great nations, in behavior thatmightbe analyzed in termsof a competitive ame, these conflictsweremod-eratedby a non-zero-sumooperative supergame.The supergame stablishednorms that bounded the play of the competitivegame. The nations of thebalance ofpower system hus had an interestnmaintaininghe ntegrityf

the great nations; there was an interest n maintaining he integrity f thenation's sovereign urisdiction ver its internal ffairs, orotherwiset wouldnotbe a free gent n its international ealings. Such a lack offreedomwouldinterfere ith theneutrality f alignment ecessary or he stable operationofthe balance of power international ystem. Even nations at war with oneanotherwereboundbycommon nterests, or heymightbe alliesat some aterdate and so had an interest n behaving n ways that would leave room forsuchfuture ooperation.At least minimalconfidencen thepossibility fthatdegreeoffuture ooperationwas required. Declarationsofwar, imitations f

objectives n war,and rules governing he conductofwar all played a role inmaintaining hat confidence, hat is, in maintaining social structurewithinwhichthe stable balancing of the systemcould be effected. he alternativewas an unlimited nd unstable war of all against all, inwhich ll mightbe lostand in which ll wouldhave to contemplate recarious nd dangerousfutures.




II. THE BREAKDOWN OF BALANCE OF POWERy

SYSTEM

For reasons which cannotbe discussed n full herethe balance of powerinternational ystem fell nto unstable equilibrium owardthe latterpart of

thenineteenth entury nd was replacedby the loose bipolar system fter heSecond World War. Perhaps one of the most importantevents makingtheold system unstable was the cession of Alsace-Lorraineafterthe Franco-PrussianWar. The inflammationfnationalsentiment roduced by thiseventmade it impossibleduringthe nexteightyyears forFrance and Germanytoenter ntoalignmentwith each other.Hostility nd suspicionbetween hetwonations nduced the formation fstrong lliancesdirected gainst each other.But thesealliances necessarilyweresomewhatrigid,forthe almost automaticbalancing and counter-balancing f the old systemwas precludedby the

Franco-Germanhostility.As a consequence,the interest f eitherparty n preserving he other as a

majornation or of imitingts objectives nwar was also vitiated. The mecha-nismsmakingforequilibrium huswere gravelyweakened.The range of spe-cial treaties, rbitration greements, nd the establishment f the Hague tri-bunal may be viewed as vague responsesto the need for some other sort ofmediatorymechanism o protect the interests f the nations. In the absenceoftheself-movementfnations,treaties nd special agencieswere designedtofill he old international ole of theshiftingf alignments.

After heFirst World War, the League of Nationswas broughtnto beingasa more generalizedremedy.This developmentwas in itselfevidence of thegrowing igidity nd rapiddeclineof balance of power international ystem.In the eyesof ts sponsors nd underthe influence fWilsonian dealism, theLeague ofNations was viewedas a breakwiththe powerpolitics of the past.Collective securitywas to replace the insecurityof the systemof nationalalliances.War was notyetrenounced s an instrumentfnational policy.Butthe old diplomacy, condemnedas insidious because it was secretand selfishbecause it was generatedby a class-bounddiplomatic ervice,was renounced.

National self-determinationas the orderofthe day and everynationwas tobe the egal equal ofeveryothernation.The dynamicforce orpeace was to befound n thedemocratic entiments fthefree itizensof ndependentnation-states,whose interestswereharmonious nd whose energiesforconstructivepeace would be mobilizedby national independence nd democraticpoliticalprocesses.

Not all nations ubscribed o this newand fanciful iewof the world.Francesoughtvainlyfor ecurity uarantees rom nglandand theUnitedStatesand,in desperation, onstructedn ineffectiveordon anitaire roundthedefeated

Reich. This was not to be. Attempts o enforce ollective ecurity ia thepro-jected Geneva Protocolsweretransmutednto the ambiguousLocarno Pact.The 1920ssaw a ridiculous nd possiblydisastrous eriesof disarmament on-ventions,whileeventually he United States sank its fleet nd agreedtonavallimitations hatmade little sensefrom he standpointofsecurity.Meanwhile




efforts o outlaw war eventuated n the suprememonument o human futility,the Kellogg-BriandPact.

If the efforts ollowing he First World War to compensatefor he rigidities

of the dying balance of power system responded to a genuine need of theinternational ommunity, he means employedwere n utter conflictwith therequirements f the situation. f the system of alliances beforethe war wasrigid nd thereforemade it difficulto prevent ny war frombecoming warto the finish,t at least encouraged ffective ction. The weaknessof collectivesecurity, owever, ay in its fatal tendency o fragment he oppositionto anexpandingnation. It placed an emphasis on collectiveaction within formalorganizationwhen it was to the advantage of some not to act at all and ofothers o replyupon still others o act for hem. Unlike the situation n Korea

in 1950, when the United States felt obliged to act since no othernationhadthe capability, herelativeequality of the greatnations n the interwar eriodforeclosed he fixing f responsibility pon a singlegreat nation. n the absenceof an alliance that assumed responsibility utomatically, herefore, veryna-tion ooked to some othernation to act. In the absence of formal greementnadvance,it was difficulto arrange ffective ction when troublebrokeout. Inthe absence ofclearlydelineatedaims clearlyrelatedto thenationalinterest,the reasonsforprocrastination eemed stronger han the reasons for action.And collective ecurity urned ntocollective nsecurity.

The complete roster of disappointments oes not need to be called; it in-cludesEthiopia, the Rhineland,Manchuria,Austria, he Sudetenland, ndso on.If the failure fthe League cannot ustly be ascribedto a single ause,it wouldnevertheless e a serious mistake to underestimate he degree to whichthefragmentation esulting rom he collective ecurity ystemwas decisive. Butotherfactors lso entered n. The refusal f Britainand France,until too late,to cooperatewith he SovietUnion (assuming he Russians wouldhavemoved)was a freshviolation of a cardinal rule of the balance of power system,namely,neutrality falignment.The failureof Frenchand British eadersto

recognize he need to move against expansive nations was an element.And sodid the pacifismwhichregardedwar as an inherent vil and alliances as theprelude o war. The actions of the BritishLabour Party n callingfor halt toNazi aggression t the same time that its membersopposed increasedarmsbudgets n Commons llustrates he curiousschizophrenia ftheperiod.

The transitionfromthe balance of power to the loose bipolar system,from he FirstWorld War to the close of World War II, did notproduce anyvariationswithreasonableprospectsfor tability.Nor did the period producestandardsof nternationalaw whichhad reasonableprospectsfor cceptance.

The instability nd transitional haracterofthe international ocial structurein theperiodweredirectly esponsible orthe confusion nd instabilityn thestandardsof aw.No law without upport;nosupportwithout social structurethat can provide support.But law is usually ineffective ithinnations too,duringperiodsofrapidand revolutionary hange. Law, byitsverynature, on-




servesthe values of a goingor past social system.And whenthe values arethemselves ntransition,hesystemof aw gives wayto politicalorquasi-legalactivity.RevolutionaryCommunisttribunals were the productof the effort

to build a new social system,not the conservators f an existing ocial system.What was legal in Hungary duringOctober1956? The answernecessarilyde-pendedon who won.But, evenso,bothsides found tdifficultfnotimpossibleto abidebytheprocedures fanyestablished ystem f aw.When thedirectionofchange s visibleone may at least hope to discoverthe seed ofthenew lawin the innovationsofthe legal process.But when the transitions luctuate nseveral directions n rapidsuccession, rder ppears lacking.

Thus the periodfrom1870 to 1945,withbrief nterludes,was a period inwhichconflictingtandardsof aw were assertedbynationswhich ctedwithin

a changing nd transitoryocial structure.There was inconsistency etweengeographic egions nd lack ofregularitywithinregions, t least withrespectto themore mportant oliticalaspectsof nternational aw. Some ofthe normsthat dependedupon economicvalues fared better.But it cannot be said thatthe periodoftransition ameto an end with heconclusion fthe Second WorldWar in 1945. The structure f nternational ctionstill acked the consistencywhichpermits, f it does not guarantee,social stability. Many of the beliefsand activities of the time were foundedon premises divorcedfrompoliticalrealityand therefore ivorcedfrom hemeanswhereby egal normsgain sup-

portfrom he community fnations.For example, the Nuremberg rials could only be justified n the assump-tionthattheuse offorce or ggressive urposeswas reallyoutlawed; that thenations of the worldhad no conflictingnterestsof a scope great enough toprevent greement pon a standardoutlawing ggressivewar,and that suffi-cient consensusexistedto make the trials of aggressive eaders an objectiveprocess notmerelydependentupon the wills of thevictoriousparties.

The old conceptof just warshad been rejected n the age ofthe modernnation-state,beginningwith the Renaissance, precisely because it was in-

compatiblewiththe effectiveimitation fwar. After he ThirtyYears' Warthe nations of the seventeenth entury tate systemwanted to regulate theconductand conclusionofwars; theytherefore ave up the efforto judge thejustness of wars, an effort hat would have interferedwithmore importantgoals. Given the difficultiesf gettingwarring arties to agree whohad a justmotive,the attemptto imposesuch a standard nterfered iththe limitationand regulation fthewarprocess.Each nationassertedthe usticeof ts causeand insistedon its rightto use the means necessaryto bringthe war to afavorableconclusion.The balance ofpower systemrequiredfor ts stability

standards ndependent fthe usticeof a cause, and the members fthe systemhad an interest n endorsing uch standards.The Nuremberg rials are incomprehensible, part fromtheirfunction n

satisfyingworldopinionby thepunishment fthefascist eaders, fthead hoctribunals mployed ohearthe cases were expectedto function s thestandardmethodfortrying uch cases ratherthan as an expedient designedto meet




immediateneeds; in shortthey werecomprehensiblenly fthe reasons whichled to thedemise of the concept of the just warno longeroperated.To makesense, these tribunalshad to representa developmenttoward an ordered

world ommunityn which he use offorce y nationalauthoritieswithout anc-tion from ome internationalbody was outlawed and in whicheffectiveri-bunals forpunishing ransgressors ere established or alternatively worldinwhichnationshad no joint orcooperative nterests-a worldrepresented ya zero-sum ame). Such an orderedworld community id not exist,couldnotexistunderthe conditions henprevailing, nd had not existedat the timeoftheoffense.

The United Nations represented he effort o create such a world. TheUnited Nations represented concession, n the mindsof its authors,to the

realities of internationalpolitics. They recognizedthat the major militarycapabilities ofthe worldwould be controlled y the United States, the SovietUnion, and Great Britain. It would take militaryforceto keep the peace.Therefore,he mainresponsibility as given to thenew superpowers o keepthe peace. The United Nations restedupon the hypothesis that the greatnationswould unite to keep the peace and therefore pon the corollary hatthe peace was to be kept against the encroachments f the smallernationswhilethedefeatedfascistnations would be prevented rom veragain buildingmilitarymachineswithwhichthey could threaten hepeace of theworld.

There is much to be said forthe view that at least the European aspects ofthe Second World War werea direct consequence of the aggressive nd eveninsaneambitions f AdolfHitler. There s somewhat ess to be said for he viewthatdictatorships re naturally ggressive, nd even less forthe view that thedisarmament f Germany nd Japan would eliminate he focalpoints of worlddanger.But the view that international onflicts f interest tem primarilyfrom he psychologies fnational leaders and from he culturesofparticularnations s a greatoversimplificationf the situation.

Specific conflicts f interest may stem fromany of the aforementioned

sources.But it mustbe recognized hat theinternational ociety s, in part atleast,a competitive-and notnecessarily eacefully ompetitive-society.Thelives of ndividualsand theexistence fsocial institutionsre boundprimarilyto the argestunit ofeffectivend inclusiveorganization.Within hisorganiza-tionhopes are satisfied, alues fulfilled,nd lives lived. Within t loyaltiesareorganizedand to it loyalties are pledged. For most of moderntimes, thislargestand most effectivelynclusiveorganizationhas been the nation. Thegreatest danger to any nation must stem from some other nation and thegreatestdeprivationmost ndividualscan sustainmust followfrom he defeat

oftheirnationby an enemy nation.The United Nations was foundedupon the hypothesis hat the great na-tions would cooperate in keepingthe peace through he machinery f inter-national organization.But two great nationswere eliminated by defeatanddisarmamentGermany nd Japan). Chinahad neverbeena greatnationeffec-tively,whatever t may some day become underCommunistrule.France had




lost ts greatnessn defeat.And a fewyearswere to demonstrate he reductionofEngland to second-class tatus. In effect,wo superpowers remained, heUnitedStates and the SovietUnion.But each ofthesetwo nationsconstituted

the greatestpotentialdangerto theother.No substantialpolitical oreconomicchange could occur anywhere n the world withoutaffecting heirrelativepositions.Nor could any barrier o changebe maintainedwithout nfluencingtheirrelativepositions. n short, hese two nationswereplaced in facingposi-tions in perhaps the greatestconflict f interest he worldhas ever known.Almostany disputewouldrangethemon oppositesides.Yet thepeace oftheworld was supposed to restupon their harmonious ooperation.Perhaps theexpansivegoals of Stalin worsened his condition.But one mustcome to theconclusionthat the organizing onceptofthe UnitedNations was hopelessly

inadequate.In effect,wo gravitationalpoles forworldpoliticalorganization ame intobeing.They were n necessaryconflictwithrespectto manyimportantprob-lems.Moreover,othernations nevitablymustbe attractedto one or anotherofthe poles, formanywould findtheirgreatest afety against the encroach-mentsof one in the protective helterof the other. It took a long time torecognize his,for ll werenot as prescient s WinstonChurchill n his Fultonspeech. Nor did the awakeningcome all at once; and perhaps it came at allonlyforextraneous r not quite relevantreasons.

The storyneed onlybriefly e sketchedhere,forthese sketchydetails arealreadywell known.Developmentsin Eastern Europe led to great angerinthe West. When the rebellion n Greece and the threatagainst Turkey ap-peared to endangerthe strategicpositionof the United States, the Trumandoctrinewas enunciated.A major objectiveoftheMarshall Plan was to reducethe dangerof Communism n WesternEurope and, in accordance withthisobjective, the steel capacity of Western-occupiedGermanywas increasedenormously. y theend of1947,and possibly n response, he Cominform asorganized,ambitious economic plans for Poland and Czechoslovakia were

organized, nd, early n 1948,the couptookplace in Czechoslovakia.One may view the process as one of successiveresponsesand counter-re-sponses.Russian control fEasternEurope and thewarin Greececonstituteda threat o the West. The TrumanDoctrine ooked ikea military hreat o theCommunist bloc and the Marshall Plan threatenedthe unity of the Com-munist Nations. Cominform nd Czechoslovakiancoup seemed to herald thethreatof mminentwar,althoughthere s nowconsiderable vidence thatwarwas the last thingStalin wantedthen.

It was notthethreatofwarthatendangered he West-at least until1955-

but the attractivepowerofthe Communist loc. It was notthevisible Comin-form,whichprobablyneverundertook ny major activity,but the organiza-tional character ftheCommunist loc that constituted hetruedanger.Oncea nation joined that bloc, it would find t difficulto leave, the example ofYugoslavia to the contrarynotwithstanding.t would be attached by partycontrols, hatis, by thepowerofMoscow to intervene etweencompetingna-




tional Communistfactions o maintain control nd also by the factthat thenational Communist egimewouldfind t difficultfnot impossible o remainin power withoutthe support of the Soviet Union. In this way the external

unity of the Communistnations s maintained.On the otherhand, fthe Westernnations were to behave as they appropri-ately had in the balance of power period,on the basis of mmediate nterest,they would be fragmentednd the Communistbloc wouldgain a decisive n-fluencen internationalffairs. nlya unitybased upon long-term ather hanupon short-termdvantage couldsuffice o maintainthe nterests fthe West-ernnations. f thisunitywas purchasedbya falsebelief nthe threat f mmi-nentwar, t nevertheless onstituted response o a realneed in the newloosebipolar nternationalystem.

NATO, thatunprecedented rganizationwhichestablisheda supranationalcommandand joint militaryfacilities n peace time, a new kind of supra-national organization,was the Westernresponseto the Soviet bloc. Althoughefforts eremade to relateNATO to the UnitedNations,clearlyNATO repre-senteda break withprevious conceptions fthe roleofthe United Nations inthe world ommunity. erhapsfor easonsofpublic opinionorperhapsbecausetheformulatorsfpolicydid notthemselves learly ee therevolutionaryon-sequences of theiractions, efforts eremade to mute or to camouflage ndi-cationsofthe change. But it representedn adequate and necessary tep to a

potentially table structure f nternational elations.The new loose bipolar systemduring ts early stages reflectedhe develop-ment of the new supranational blocs. There was a sharpgravitation owardthe two poles of nternational nfluence. he devastation oftheworld fter heSecondWorldWar, the economic mpoverishmentf argeareas oftheworld,the economicpower ofthe United States, Soviet conventionalmilitary apa-bilities and Americanmonopolyofatomic weapons, disorganizationn newlyindependent x-colonial areas, and the Korean War aided and affected hisdevelopment.With economicrecoveryn WesternEurope, continuedcolonial

unrest and the growthof governmental xperience n the new nations, thestalemate n Korea, approachingSoviet nuclearparity, nd the consolidationofCommunist ontrol n China, the situation achievedrelative stabilityandsome stresses n the oppositedirectionbegan to appear. The positionoftheuncommitted ationswas strengthenednd the members fthetwo blocs be-gan to exercise omewhatgreater ndependencen policy.2

The normative aw that characterized he balance ofpower system ouldhardly be expectedto survive unchanged during ts periodof nstability ndfailure.The Hague tribunals nd theLeague ofNations had provided ufficient

evidencethatthe old systemwas collapsing nd representedffortsopatchuptheold system nd to maintain ts normative ules.But it was notreally pos-sibletokeep ntheir ullness he rulesgoverning on-interferencenthe nternal

2 This storyhas beentold in detail n WilliamReitzel, MortonA. Kaplan, and Con-stanceG. Coblenz, United tates Foreign olicy:1945-1956,Washington, he BrookingsInstitution, 956.




affairs f othernations, imitations n objectives,rules governingdeclarationsof war and practices n occupied territory,nd so forth, or hese rules weretoodirectly elatedto a systemnwhichneutrality falignmentwas a major char-

acteristic. These were rules for dealing with opponents who might soon beallies. Even the rules governing he treatment fprisoners f war,so recentlysanctifiedn treaty,no longerhad as much supportas earlier.They wouldstillbe observedwhennationaland culturalvalues supported hemorwhentheother ide couldtakemeasures n reprisal nd one still wantedto protectone'sownnationals.But this ast reason stemmed rom xpediency ather hanfroman interest n a normative ule. These changes n international ormative aw,like thepolitical changesthatgave riseto them,preparedtheway forthenewbipolar system.

III. THE BIPOLAR INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The loose bipolar international ystem-composed of two major blocs, alarge numberofuncommittednations, and a universal organization ike theUnited Nations-came into beingas a consequence of the events recountednthe previous section. It differed romthe balance of power internationalsystem n many important espectsthat have consequencesforthe operationof nternational aw. In the first lace, the blocs are more than alliances; theyhave supranational characteristics. n the second place, the system is not

stabilizedby thealmost automatic operationof mmediate nterest hat leadsto the formation f alliance and counter-alliance. n the loose bipolar systemalignmentmust be on the basis of long-term nterest nd the blocs becomestable patternsofalignmentwithinwhich conflicts f short-termnterest endto be subordinated. ince the membersof the blocs lack an interest n main-tainingthe independence of the members of the opposingbloc in ordertomaintainthe possibilityof futurecombinationsor coalitions, the particularmotivesfor imitation f objectives and non-interferencen the internal ffairsofothernationsthat operated n the balance ofpower systemdo not operate

in the loose bipolar system. ndeed, apart from the positive motivationstointervene, he negativefactor fthe concentration f capabilities n the eadingmembers fthe blocs makes it difficultf not impossible o refrain rom nter-vening. Almost any decisionof the United States or the Soviet Union musthave important onsequencesfor he othermembers f theirblocs and forun-committed ations.

Interdependences especiallygreat n the modernworld.The UnitedStatescannot ship wheat to Yugoslavia without ffectinghe Canadian wheat farmer.It cannot ship arms to Pakistan without effect pon the Indian budgetand

Indian politics.American id programs ffect he nternalpolitics of the coun-tryto whichthey are addressed regardless f the termsofthe program.Andtheabsence ofaid also has its effects. nterference oes not have to be overt,forthe knowledge that the activities of a nation will affect he judgment ofthe American Congress n voting funds will itselfhave an influence.There isno way to avoid this nfluencewith the best will in the world,forno govern-




mentcan vote fundswithout onsideringhe possible consequencesofthe oan.Even Soviet loans, technically reefrom ll strings, have important oliticalrepercussionswithin he countries o whichthey are made.

Soviet interventionnthe nternal ffairs fHungary s brutal and inPolandis obvious.But can the UnitedStates avoid all such nterference? oes notthesituation in Algeria necessitate efforts o influenceFrench governmentalpolicy?Obviously,but there re so many nternal onstraints hat it is done ina halting nd ineffective anner.And,if governmental hanges may influencethe viabilityofNATO, can the UnitedStates remain ndifferent?nterferencemay notordinarily e as obvious as in the talian elections f 1948,but one eyemust always be alert to the effect f policy upon friendly olitical partieswithin llied bloc countries.

In the balance ofpower system, nterventionsuallyoccurredn colonial,dependent, rminor reas; in the loose bipolar systempositive nterventionsmore ikelyto occur within llied bloc nationsthan in uncommited reas. Thecompetition etweenthe two leading bloc nations willbe effectiven reducingdirect nterventionn the ex-colonialareas, as will the proud and new na-tionalism fthese nations.The organicforms funionamongthebloc nationswill reduce the barriersbetween membersof the blocs and lead to greatersharingof urisdictionwhile the most zealous guardingof the nation's sov-ereignpowers will occur within he newnations.

The fact that the loose bipolar systemhas two blocshas a directbearingonthe operationof the system. n the balance of power systema minimumnumber of fivemajor nations probably was necessaryfor stability.The twoblocsofthe bipolar system,however, re in direct ompetition.Neitherhas anincentive o maintain the other. Rivalry is directand is limited primarily ythe horrors f thermonuclearwar. No balancing role existsin this systemand thereforemediationis not a functionof the momentaryfreedomfromcommitmentfa particularnation.Nor is alignmentneutral.Communistna-tions necessarily end toward the Soviet bloc. CommunistChina,for nstance,

although n many respectsphysically apable ofasserting ts independence fMoscow, takes great pains tomaintain the priority ftheSoviet Unionas theleading member f thebloc. And within he free world there s a naturalpro-clivity, xcept amongthosewhosememories fcolonialcontrolremainactive,to associate in somewaywiththeUnitedStates.

Mediation s thus nota generalroleofall nations ofthe oose bipolarsystembut is a specializedrole. Uncommittednationsare often ble to exercisethisrole in the same way in which uncommitted artiesare oftenmost usefulformediatory urposes n industrialbargaining.The processofaccommodation s

a difficultne. The blocs would be in considerablygreatertroublewitheachother ftheydid not have to appeal to uncommittedisteners r iftheycouldnot turn to such uncommitted ationsto mediatea compromise.Withdrawalfrom n announcedpositionmay be both difficultnd painful fnot eased bymoral pressure nd suasionfromndependent nd neutralbystanderswho areable to invokelarger principles s well as theirown independent udgment.




Sometimes he mostdifficulthing s to get contending arties to talk to eachother.The uncommitted ations oftenperform eomanworkhere. This taskmay be done irresponsibly s well as responsibly nd it is possible that the

greater esponsiveness f the democraticnations to world public opinion mayyetweighheavily and negatively n theracefor urvival.The mediatory unc-tion of the uncommittednationsis nonetheless,n principle t least, an im-portant one forthe stabilityof the loose bipolarsystem.

The positionoftheuncommitted ations s protectedboth by itsusefulnessto the blocs from mediatorypointofviewand by thedesireofeach bloc tokeepthese areas out of thegrasp of the other.Although heuncommitted a-tions themselves ack importantmilitary apabilities, they are oftenforpo-litical,economic,orgeographic easons ofconsiderablemportancen the con-

testbetween hetwo blocs. The accessionto theSovietbloc ofSoutheastAsia,the Near East, or NorthAfricawould be seriousforNATO.Another mportant gencywhichperformsmediatory unctionss the United

Nations. Removed from ts role as thekeeper ofpeace, a roleperformedmoreadequately by the two blocs and the conditionofthermonuclearquilibrium,the United Nations can more effectivelyerform ts two remainingroles inthe loose bipolar international ystem,that of mediatorand that of forum.In these it helps to reduce tensionbetween the blocs. It may also, under ex-ceptionalcircumstances, nd with the aid of the other bloc, mobilize the in-

ternational ommunitygainst one bloc thatthreatensmmediately o under-mineworld peace. Even here t will play a supporting ole to the bloc, as, inthe case ofKorea, the UnitedNations played a supporting ole to that oftheUnited States.

It is in the nature of the oose bipolarsystem or he bloc to subordinate heinterests f theUnitedNations to its own interests, or, n the finalanalysis,theblocmustdepend upon its own political and military esourcesn order osurvive.However, t is also to the nterest f a bloc to subordinate he nterestsoftheotherbloc to those ofthe UnitedNations, for n thisfashion t can hope

to mobilize upport gainst that otherbloc. In thisway it can best appeal notonly to the uncommitted ut also to its own bloc members nd to the citizenswithin he nations of thebloc. And theuncommitted ations, ofcourse,havea particularly trong nterest n subordinating he interests f both blocs tothoseoftheUnitedNations, for by thismeans they can best compensatefortheirweaknessin order to strengthenheir position n the international ys-tem.

Unlike the major nations in the balance ofpower international ystem,theparticipants n the loose bipolarsystemdo not have a uniformnterest r

lack of nterestn fostering iven principles f nternational aw. Instead theirinterest arieswith the role they occupy n the system.The uncommitted a-tionshave the strongestnterest n maintaining he normativeruleswithoutdistinction s torole or size ofnations,for bservanceofthese rulescorrespondsbest with the requirements or their safety. So they support doctrines ofnon-interference,sovereignty, bsence of force, nd similarnorms.Reliance






it is withoutthe consequencesAmerican nterventionwould have had duringthe Hungarian uprising.

Non-intervention herefore pplies primarily o the minoruncommitted

areas rather hantothe major areas oftheworld.Andeven nthe uncommittedareas it is not supportedby a strong anction but rests only upon a tenuousand relative balance between he United States and the SovietUnion whichmay collapse at any moment.As a consequence,the legal values associatedwithnon-interventionnd those associatedwith sovereignty have less placein the present nternationalworld than they had under earlier conditions.Moreover, despite the strong tand of the uncommittednations in favor oftheseoldervalues, their tronger bjectionsto thevestigesofcolonialismhavethe function ffurther estricting ational urisdictions.Although he United

Nations is stillhedging n thecases ofAlgeriaand Cyprus,the pressuresforsomeform fextra-nationalnterventionre growing.Withthe decline n theimportance f the one nation, the miraclesof transportationnd communica-tion, nd the spreadofAmerican-Sovietivalry o all areas ofthe world, lmosteverysituation s investedwith an international nterest. t is ironicthat thewriters fthe Charterwere more conservative hantheauthorsofthe Leagueof Nations Covenant in protecting he inviolabilityof national jurisdiction.Their realism has not prevailed, however, gainst the requirementswhichinevitably low rom he new structuref nternational olitics.Neitherwill the

restrictions gainst the use of force nd of reprisalhave the same importancewhichthe Charter writersntended.

Kaplan Katzenbach Article

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