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Geert Wilders and the Dutch Party for Freedom: A Turn Towards
the Centre?
By
Justin Crewson
A Major Research Paper Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate
Studies through the Department of Political Science
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts at the University of Windsor
Windsor, Ontario, Canada
2014
2014 Justin Crewson
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Geert Wilders and the Dutch Party for Freedom: A Turn Towards
the Centre?
by
Justin Crewson APPROVED BY:
______________________________________ W. Soderlund
Department of Political Science
______________________________________ J. Sutcliffe, Advisor
Department of Political Science
14 January 2014
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Authors Declaration of Originiality
I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis and
that no part of this thesis has been published or submitted for
publication. I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, my thesis
does not infringe upon anyones copyright nor violate any
proprietary rights and that any ideas, techniques, quotations, or
any other material from the work of other people included in my
thesis, published or otherwise, are fully acknowledged in
accordance with the standard referencing practices. Furthermore, to
the extent that I have included copyrighted material that surpasses
the bounds of fair dealing within the meaning of the Canada
Copyright Act, I certify that I have obtained a written permission
from the copyright owner(s) to include such material(s) in my
thesis and have included copies of such copyright clearances to my
appendix. I declare that this is a true copy of my thesis,
including any final revisions, as approved by my thesis committee
and the Graduate Studies office, and that this thesis has not been
submitted for a higher degree to any other University or
Institution.
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Abstract
The Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) is headed by Geert Wilders,
and has participated in three national Dutch elections. It is
currently the third largest party in the Netherlands, and is
considered by most observers to be located on the far right of the
ideological spectrum. With regards to this, this paper provides an
evaluation of moderation theory and applies it to the case of the
PVV. Moderation theory holds that extreme political parties will
tend to moderate over time as a result of a desire to capture
median voters. A content analysis of the PVVs blog will be used in
order to determine whether language appearing on it has moderated
over the three elections that the party has contested. It will be
shown that there is no evidence of such moderation, and that
moderation theory does not hold true in this instance.
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Aknowledgements Special thanks to my family and friends: Mom,
Dad, Brittany, Alina, Jordan and Jonathan. Extra special thanks to
Dr. Sutcliffe and Dr. Soderlund. Without your help this work would
not have been able to be completed.
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Table of Contents
Authors Declaration of Originality Abstract Acknowledgements
iii iv v
Chapter
I. Introduction: Moderation Theory and Extreme Political
Parties
1
II. Geert Wilders and the PVV
3
III. Literature Review: Radicalism, Populism and Moderation
19
IV.
Methods and Analysis: Directed Qualitative Content Analysis of
Geert Wilders Blog
41
V. Conclusion: Evidence against Moderation Theory? 66
Bibliography Vita Auctoris
69 75
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Chapter I
Introduction: Moderation Theory and Extreme Political
Parties
The 2008 global financial crisis significantly altered the
political landscape of Europe.
Though there has been a growing tide of anti-immigration and
anti-EU sentiment within Western
European countries for some time, 2008 represented a watershed
moment for political parties
appealing to such feelings. Since the crisis the continent has
observed the creation of formal alliances
between many of Europes far-right parties, predicated upon
opposition to immigration and the
European Union.1 Such resentment can be traced to EU policies
regarding immigration and
increasingly to economic policies enacted to combat the global
recession.2 This paper will discern
that these parties are unique in that they have managed to
distance themselves from the crude tactics
of their neo-Nazi predecessors, and are in many ways unique
phenomena. As noted academic Paul
Taggart asserts, such parties have generally relied upon
populism in order to appeal to voters, which
he warns is a dangerous trend for European democracy.3 Such
danger lies in the fact that populism
counters debate informed by empirical observation, by playing
upon uninformed emotional
responses.4 Taggart warns that populism is able to operate
within existing politics while having the
effect of changing the behaviour of other mainstream political
actors, which has led to widespread
frustration in Europe with the complexity of politics.5 In this
manner, these parties are claimed by
many to represent a threat from within, and whose influence many
argue must be curtailed.6
Given such concerns, there has been significant debate regarding
how to best tackle such
threats. Countries like Greece have used legal measures to ban
these parties, while countries such as
1 Gavin Hewitt, 2014: Europes Year of Decision, BBC News
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25547651 (Posted: December
30, 2013 Accessed: December 30, 2013). 2 Hewit, 2014: Europes Year
of Decision, 3 The Observer, Beware this populism sweeping across
Europe, The Guardian Online
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/29/europe-british-politicians-stand-up-anti-eu-populism
(Posted: December 29, 2013 Accessed: December 29, 2013). 4 The
Observer, Beware this populism sweeping across Europe,. 5 Ibid. 6
Ibid.
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Belgium have relied on political means to outcast them.7
However, there are other countries such as
the Netherlands that have continually included these parties in
politics. Adherents to such strategies
generally base them upon moderation theory. They argue that the
inclusion of extremist parties into
electoral politics will serve to moderate them as a result of
the need to contest elections and gain the
support of median voters.8 In recent years though, extreme
political parties have achieved relative
political success in countries such as the Netherlands and
France.9 This raises the question as to
whether moderation theory is valid, and whether political
inclusion can actually lead to the
moderation of such parties.
It is this question that this paper attempts to address. The
Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) has
experienced relatively significant electoral successes in the
three national elections that it has
contested. Nevertheless, the party is still considered by many
to be on the far-right of the political
spectrum. Thus, this paper will focus upon discerning whether
its experience in mainstream politics
has served to moderate the party, or whether it has done the
opposite and actually emboldened the
party. There is also the chance that it has had no effect upon
it. In either case, this paper sets out to
advance research upon moderation theory, and to help determine
whether it is a viable strategy in
which to moderate extreme political parties. This is crucial
information as Europe is currently
confronted with the reality that many of these parties appear to
be on the cusp of power. Moreover,
with EU parliamentary elections coming up in May 2014, many of
these parties have formed
alliances which represents a clear electoral threat to the
legislative effectiveness of more mainstream
political parties. As mentioned, they even threaten to change
the political game, forcing mainstream
parties to adopt elements of their extreme agendas.
7 Joost Van Spanje and Wouter Van der Brug, Being Intolerant of
the intolerant. The exclusion of Western European anti-immigration
parties and its consequences for party choice, Acta Politica 44,
no.4 (2009): 353-384. 8 Gunes Murat Tezcur, The Moderation Theory
Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors, Party Politics 16,
no. 1 (2010): 69. 9 The Observer, Beware this populism sweeping
across Europe,.
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Chapter II
Geert Wilders and the PVV
As mentioned, this paper focuses upon analyzing the change, or
lack thereof, in the ideology
of the PVV over the course of the three national elections that
it has contested. The PVV is headed
by its only official member, Geert Wilders, and was established
in 2005. 10 It is most noted for
shocking many political observers by winning 24 of 150 seats in
the 2010 Dutch national elections.11
Additionally the party has had various members in municipal and
provincial councils, and four
members in the European Parliament.12 The 2010 election resulted
in the PVV becoming the third
largest party in the Dutch national parliament, and was a vast
improvement upon the nine seats the
party gained in the preceding election.13 In the aftermath of
this election the PVV supported the
liberal VVD and the Christian Democratic Party (CDA) allowing
for the formation of a razor-thin
majority-right coalition government.14 However, due to
disagreements over austerity policy, the
PVV withdrew support of this government in the spring of 2012,
leading to a new round of elections
on September 12 2012.15 Compared to the previous election the
PVV had a poor showing, winning
only 15 seats.16 Regardless, this result maintained the PVV in a
tie with the far-left Socialist Party as
the third largest political party in the Netherlands.17
10 Ilse Rooyackers and Maykel Verkuyten, Mobilizing Support for
the Extreme Right: A Discourse Analysis of Minority Leadership,
British Journal of Social Psychology 51, (2012): 134. 11 Barry
Rubin, The Netherlands, the Middle East, and the 2010 Parliamentary
Elections, Middle East Review of International Affairs 14, no. 3
(September, 2010): 65. 12 Koen Vossen, Classifying Wilders: The
Ideological Development of Geert Wilders and His Party for Freedom,
Politics 31, no. 3 (2011): 179. 13 Rubin, 65. 14 Ibid. 15 Country
Forecast, Netherlands: Update, Country Forecast (May, 2012): 1. 16
Janes Intelligence Weekly, Centre-right wins Dutch poll making
centrist grand coalition likely, Janes Intelligence Weekly 4, no.
38 (Sept. 19, 2012): 1. 17 Unnamed Author, Sept. 2012, 2.
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Figure 1: PVV Seat Allocations in the House of Representatives
by Election:
Despite having had as many as 24 members in parliament, Wilders
has maintained tight
control over the PVV in terms of selecting and training
candidates, preparing political strategy and
articulating the partys platform and ideology.18 Since 2005 the
party has become known for
displaying a fierce opposition to Islamic culture.19 This is
demonstrated in Wilders frequent
references to Islam as a backward and fascist religion.20 As a
Member of Parliament, Wilders has
lobbied for a ban on immigration from Islamic countries, a
prohibition on the building of new
Mosques, the closing of Islamic schools, and the legal
prohibition of the Quran.21 However, Wilders
most well-known anti-Islamic action was the release of a
seventeen-minute film in 2008 called
Fitna.22 Fitna juxtaposes images of September 11 and other
terrorist acts with verses from the Quran
in order to project Wilders assertion that the text is no
different than Mein Kampf.23
Wilders anti-Islamic message has increasingly been intertwined
with anti-establishment
and Eurosceptic rhetoric.24 With regards to this, Wilders
increasingly considers one of his primary
enemies to be a progressive elite, which he believes to be made
up of most political parties, nearly
all politicians, large parts of the media, the courts, the
universities and the bureaucracy of the
18 Sarah De Lange and David Art, Fortuyn versus Wilders: An
Agency-Based Approach to Radical Right Party Building, West
European Politics 34, no. 6 (November, 2011): 1232. 19 Rooyackers
and Verkuyten, 134. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Liz Fekete, The Muslim
Conspiracy Theory and the Oslo Massacre, Race and Class 53, no. 3
(2011): 36. 23 Fekete, 36. 24 Koen Vossen, Populism in the
Netherlands after Fortuyn: Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders Compared,
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11, no. 1 (April,
2010): 27.
Election Year Percentage of Overall Vote Number of Seats Won
2006 5.9% 9 of 150
2010 15.5% 24 of 150
2012 10% 15 of 150
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Netherlands.25 Central to his arguments are his reservations
with what he considers to be the doctrine
of cultural relativism, which he claims is supported by the
Netherlands progressive elite.26 Cultural
relativism is considered to entail the belief that all cultures
are equal in their own right, which
Wilders claims has allowed for the rise of a violent,
expansionist and fascist Islamic culture in
Western countries.27 In this manner, the establishment is
portrayed as the enemy within by
Wilders, as he claims that it is committed to a policy of
multiculturalism that is destroying the
Netherlands.28 In recent years Wilders has also focused on
making Euroscepticism a central tenant of
his political strategy, with opposition to EU-supported
austerity measures, as well as resistance to
bailing out other EU member states being of particular note.29
Indeed, it was his opposition to
proposed budget savings measures that forced the downfall of the
centre-right Rutte coalition
government in April 2012.30 This resulted in the election on
September 12 2012, in which the PVV
gained 15 seats.31 The big winner of this election was Ruttes
center-right VVD, which captured 41
seats, followed by the center-left Labour Party with 39 seats.32
Tied with the PVV for third was the
far-left Socialist Party (SP), which was the only other major
Eurosceptic party in the election.33
According to analysts, this result paved the way towards a
grand, centrist coalition [] rejecting the
main Eurosceptic parties and reaffirming the Netherlands
commitment to the EU.34 Nevertheless,
while this coalition still exists there are increasing levels of
Euroscepticism in the Netherlands. These
have led to a recent surge in support for the PVV.
25 Vossen 2010, 27. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Bas Heijne, The
Netherlands: Prosperity and Populism, World Policy Journal 28, no.
2 (Summer, 2011): 32. 29 Country Forecast, Netherlands: Update, 1.
30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Janes Intelligence Weekly, Centre-right wins
Dutch poll making centrist grand coalition likely, 2. 33 Ibid. 34
Ibid.
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Figure 2: Party Seat Projections for the House of
Representatives Throughout the 2012 Campaign35
Figure 3: September 2012 Election Outcomes in the House of
Representatives
There is little formal academic research on the ideology of
Geert Wilders and the PVV.36
Vossen argues that this is likely due to the recent emergence of
the PVV as a meaningful political
entity, and because of Geert Wilders unique ideological
development.37 Nonetheless, scholars
generally classify the party as populist in terms of its
political strategy and locate it on the far,
extreme or radical right of the political ideological
spectrum.38 Additionally, analysts generally
classify the PVV as belonging to a group of populist radical
right (PRR) parties that have grown
throughout Europe in recent decades.39 Scholars such as Mudde
claim that this grouping includes the
35 Maurice De Honde, Ontwikkeling Politieke Voorkeur in 2012,
www.peil.nl (Accessed: September 26, 2012). 36 Vossen 2011, 180. 37
Ibid. 38 Heijne, 31. 39 Cas Mudde, Whos Afraid of the European
Radical Right? Dissent 58, no. 4 (Fall, 2011): 7.
Party Percentage of Overall Vote Number of Seats Won
Centre-Right VVD 26.6% 41 of 150
Centre-Left PvdA 24.8% 39 of 150
Far-Right PVV 10.1% 15 of 150
Far-Left SP 9.7% 15 of 150
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French National Front (FN), the German Republicans (REP), the
Flemish Bloc in Belgium (VB), the
Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) and the Swiss Peoples Party
(SVP).40 This phenomenon will be
covered in greater detail in the literature review, nevertheless
many scholars see the PVV as having
followed many of the policies and practices developed by these
other populist radical right parties.41
Vossen claims that despite Wilders contemporary self portrayal
as an outsider politician, he
might be better characterized as a professional politician, who
has worked in the Dutch House of
Parliament most of his adult life.42 In 1990, at the age of 27,
Wilders entered politics as a
speechwriter and assistant for the parliamentary group of the
Liberal party, the VVD.43 After years of
climbing the ranks of the party, Wilders became a member of the
VVD parliamentary group in
1998.44 According to Vossen, Wilders quickly came to portray
himself as a whistle-blower, the
most notable action in support of this image being his
presentation of a report to parliament in 1999
on Islamic terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in the
Middle East.45 In an interview
regarding the report Wilders is quoted as claiming:
The extremism in the Middle East is a threat to the stability of
Europe and the Netherlands. It will even be the most urgent problem
of the next ten years since this extremism will also come to the
Netherlands as a result of immigration. This is already happening
but everybody is silent about this.46
By 2000 many Dutch political commentators considered Wilders to
be a viable candidate for the
leadership of the VVD.47 Nonetheless, in 2004 Wilders left the
VVD after a conflict with the
parliamentary leader over the issue of admitting Turkey into the
EU.48 Following this Wilders
became an independent Member of Parliament, and quickly began
forming a new right-wing party,
beginning what Vossen considers to be the neoconservative phase
of Wilders ideological
40 Mudde 2011, 7. 41 Ibid, 7-8. 42 Vossen, 180-181. 43 Ibid,
181. 44 Ibid. 45 Vossen 2011, 181. 46 Ibid, 181-182. 47 Ibid, 182.
48 Stijn Van Kessel, Explaining the Electoral Performance of
Populist Parties: The Netherlands as a Case Study, Perspectives on
European Politics and Society 12, no. 1 (April, 2011): 75.
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development.49 During this period Wilders contacted chairman of
the Edmund Burke foundation,
Bart Jan Spruyt, and the two toured Israel and the United States
meeting with leading conservative
figures and think tanks.50 During this time Vossen asserts that
Wilders rhetoric changed to that of
a fierce supporter of the American war on terror and all its
policy measures, such as the opening of
Guantanamo Bay and the military invasion of Afghanistan and
Iraq.51 At this time Wilders also
began advocating for radical measures against those he perceived
to threaten Dutch security.52 This
included identifying the whole Dutch elite as one homogenous and
self-serving progressive caste
which had hijacked democracy through a policy of subsiding
progressive indoctrination and
demonizing all dissenters.53 Finally, during this period Wilders
also developed a much fiercer
animosity towards Islam and Muslims.54 As Vossen claims,
Following neoconservatives such as
Daniel Pipes and Norman Podhoretz () Wilders began identifying
Islam as a totalitarian ideology,
which after communism and fascism posed the third greatest
threat to Western modernity.55
It is important to note that Wilders was not the first political
figure to support such radical
ideals in the Netherlands. The Dutch Peoples Union (NVU), was a
neo-fascist political party in the
country in the 1970s, and was made up of a significant number of
former Nazi collaborators and
sympathizers.56 Despite a relatively consistent level of support
for the NVU, the party never
garnered more than marginal levels of electoral support.57 In
the 1980s and 1990s, the Centre Party
(CP) and the Centre Democrats (CD) succeeded the NVU.58 However,
these parties never gained
more than three members in parliament.59 According to Dorussan,
established political parties in the
49 Vossen 2011, 182. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid, 183. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54
Ibid. 55 Ibid, 183. 56 Han Dorussan, Pim Fortuyn and the New Far
Right in the Netherlands, Representation 40, no.2 (2004) : 135. 57
Dorussan, 135. 58 Dorussan, 35. 59 Ibid.
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Netherlands unanimously condemned such actors.60 Voting for
these extremist parties was generally
associated with collaboration with the Nazis during the Second
World War.61
This trend continued until the spring election of 2002.62 The
List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), which
had only been created three months earlier, managed to win 26
seats in the national parliament
making it the second largest party in the country.63 The leader
of the LPF, Pim Fortuyn, entered
politics on a platform emphasizing opposition to immigration,
support for law and order, and the
defense of 'typical' Dutch or Western values.64 Only nine days
prior to the 2002 national election
Dutch citizens were shocked to hear that Fortuyn had been
assassinated.65 Many commentators
viewed the subsequent success of the LPF to be caused by a
temporary emotional reaction by the
Dutch electorate to Fortuyns assassination.66 Contrastingly,
others considered it just another
example of the rise of the radical right in Europe.67 Hosteyn et
al. claim that there is empirical
evidence to support the assertion that a majority of voters
recognized the rightness of the LPFs
primary issues, and in turn supported it regardless of the
murder.68
Nonetheless, the collapse of the ruling coalition that resulted
from the 2002 election, caused
another election to be held in 2003. Without the presence of
Fortuyn, the LPF secured only eight
seats.69 Following this, the LPF suffered from severe internal
dissent, and eventually disbanded.70
For many though, the LPF served as an inspiration for the
radical right in the Netherlands. Dorussan
asserts that the party could be identified as radical right on
immigration and law and order issues,
however it was much more left on economic and other social
issues.71 In fact, Pim Fortuyn was
60 Dorussan, 35. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid, 131. 63 Joop Van Holsteyn,
Galen Irwin and Josje Ridder, In the Eye of the Beholder: The
Perception of the List Pim Fortuyn and the Parliamentary Elections
of May 2002, Acta Politica 38 (2003): 70. 64 Dorussan, 131. 65
Holsteyn et al., 69. 66 Ibid, 70. 67 Dorussan, 131. 68 Holsteyn et
al., 69. 69 Ibid, 70. 70 Ibid. 71 Dorussan, 138-139.
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known to be an open homosexual,72 and was legitimized through
his role as a respected sociology
professor.73 Regardless, it was the LPFs anti-immigrant and
pro-law and order rhetoric that made
many consider it to be a precursor to parties such as the PVV.74
The LPF became known for
supporting anti-immigrant measures that were later mimicked by
the PVV.75 For instance, Fortuyn
often referred to Islam as a backward culture, and routinely
warned of the alleged dangers of
Muslim immigration.76 One example of this was the LPFs request
for a parliamentary debate on
religious symbolism in the public service, which they justified
by arguing:
My faction worries about the gradual Islamization of the Dutch
society. Some of our fundamental values are undermined: the equal
treatment of men and women, of homosexuals and heterosexuals, and
last but not least the separation of church and state. The LPF
faction thinks that the Dutch citizen has a right to a neutral
state. The right, derived from modernity, is one of our basic
citizenship rights.77
Such sentiment was arguably the inspiration for Wilders 2005
motion to Dutch parliament that the
burqa be banned in all public spaces.78 He argued that the burqa
was a symbol of gender inequality,
which was diametrically opposed to Dutch cultural values.79
Wilders Turn to the Radical Right
Vossen and Mudde note that since 2006, and largely influenced by
the LPF, Wilders has
made a clear turn from neoconservative values, towards those of
the populist radical right.80 Vossen
considers this development to have began in 2006, and to be
marked by:
on the one hand a strong resistance against immigration and
supranational cooperation because both would threaten national
identity, and on the other hand a populist framing of politics as a
moral conflict between the corrupt
72 John Gee, The Political Uses of Islamophobia in Europe, The
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 30, no. 9 (Dec., 2011):
34. (34-35) 73 Dorussan, 138-139. 74 Ibid. 75 Doutje Lettinga and
Sawitri Saharso, The political debates on the veil in France and
the Netherlands: Reflecting national integration models?
Comparative European Politics 10, no. 3 (2012): 323-324. 76 Gee,
34. 77 Lettinga and Saharso, 323-324. 78 Ibid, 324-325. 79 Ibid. 80
Vossen, 184.
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elite and the virtuous people and the aspiration to build a
polity in which the voice of the virtuous people would
prevail.81
Vossen claims that this sentiment was articulated in Wilders
interviews and speeches where he
expressed a much more radical form of Islamophobia, based on
conspiracy theories predicting
the coming Islamification of Europe.82 Gee contends that such
pronouncements have been
significantly more radical than those of the LPF.83 According to
Mudde, Wilders aggressive
Islamophobia has become similar to that of the FN in France, the
FPO in Austria and other PRR
parties in Europe.84 However, for tactical reasons Wilders has
often been careful to eschew contact
with many of these parties.85 As Gee points out, in this regard
Wilders has also followed Fortuyns
lead.86 As a case in point, the LPF was careful to disassociate
itself with many other parties of the
radical right, which had been discredited by being seen as
carrying Nazi baggage.87 However, in
recent years this has changed, which will be discussed
later.
Aside from Wilders distaste for Muslims, he has also capitalized
upon more generalized
discontent with immigration.88 Lindeboom claims that such
general disgruntlement with immigration
has contributed strongly to the electoral performance of the
PVV, with the 2010 election result being
of particular note.89 Evidence of this is the fact that Wilders
has recently been directing his attacks on
other groups such as Polish, Bulgarian and Romanian workers.90
The PVV also directed criticism
towards immigrants from the Dutch Antilles.91 An example of this
turn can be seen in proposals in
the PVVs 2010 election program to close the Dutch labour market
to Eastern Europeans, and to
81 Vossen, 85. 82 Ibid. 83 Gee, 35. 84 Mudde 2011, 8. 85 Ibid.
86 Gee, 34-35. 87 Ibid, 34. 88 Gert-Jan Lindeboom, Public
Priorities in Governments Hands: Corresponding Policy Agendas in
the Netherlands? Acta Politica 47, no. 4 (2012): 458-459. 89
Lindeboom, 459. 90 Vossen 2011, 185. 91 Ibid.
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sell the Antilles.92 Wilders has also incorporated a stronger
form of nationalism into his views, and
a stronger dislike of supranational collaboration.93
Demonstrative of this have been the PVVs calls
for increased national pride in schools.94 Moreover, in May 2009
Wilders was reported as demanding
government measures that would aid in the dismemberment of
Belgium, in order that the Dutch
speaking Flanders region could be incorporated into the
Netherlands.95
In regards to the September 2012 election, the PVV increasingly
positioned itself in
opposition to the EU.96 Such Euroscepticism is well documented
in PRR parties across Europe.97
Indeed, traces of this position within the PVV can be identified
as early as May 2005, when The
Economist reported that Geert Wilders had created a
Eurosceptical party.98 However, what is
important to note is that at this time, the Eurosceptical stance
that the PVV held was primarily
directed against the inclusion of Turkey (a Muslim country) into
the EU.99 Moreover, it was
specifically concerned with the effects that the EU had on Dutch
culture, as it pertains to Islamic
immigration.100 Such concerns were displayed in June 2005, when
Wilders served as one of the most
influential actors in the campaign against the European Unions
Constitutional Treaty.101 This treaty,
which would have created a single unified constitution for the
EU, was eventually rejected in a
national referendum on 1 June 2005.102
As has already been mentioned, Wilders has largely come to be
known for concentrating
upon cultural and immigration issues, albeit while intertwining
them with other subjects. An example
of this is Wilders opposition to cuts in pension coverage in the
Netherlands, suggesting instead that 92 Vossen 2011, 185. 93 Ibid.
94 Ibid. 95 The Brussels Journal, Wilders Hopes for Flemish
Independence, www.brusselsjournal.com/node/3919 (Accessed: August
1, 2012). 96 Timothy Garton, The Crisis of Europe: How the Union
Came Together and Why Its Falling Apart, Foreign Affairs 91, no. 5
(Sept./Oct., 2012): 6. 97 Sofia Vasilopoulou, Varieties of
Euroscepticism: The Case of the European Extreme Right, Journal of
Contemporary European Research 5, no. 1 (2009): 3. 98 The
Economist, The New Dutch Model? The Economist (March 31, 2005): 10.
(10-11) 99 The Economist, The New Dutch Model?, 11. 100 Ibid. 101
De Lange and Art, 1235. 102 Ibid, 1235.
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immigration programs be cut.103 Aside from this, Geert Wilders
has made an effort to broaden his
election platform in recent years. One of the main methods that
he has used to achieve this has been
the use of increasing levels of anti-EU sentiment.104 This is
evidenced by the transformation of
Wilders stance against the admittance of Turkey into the EU in
2005 into a more general call against
EU enlargement by early 2010.105 Such efforts were intensified
so that by June 2011, the PVV
opposed the EU on many issues, the most notable of which was the
financial support of bankrupt
Greece.106 It is interesting to note that by May 2011, Wilders
Euroscepticism had been steered away
from cultural issues per se, and towards the effects that EU
provisions would have upon Dutch social
programs.107 In the September 2012 election Wilders continued
this focus upon Euroscepticism,
attempting to capitalize upon anti-EU sentiment throughout
Europe and the Netherlands.108 This was
caused by a number of factors the most significant of which was
opposition to EU-supported
austerity measures and the aforementioned financial support of
Greece.109 Notably, the PVV became
one of the first non-marginal parties in Europe to call for a
withdrawal from the European Union
and currency.110 Worthy of note is the fact that while sceptical
of the EU, neither the Austrian FPO
nor the Belgian (VB) have gone so far as to call for the exit of
their respective countries from the
EU.111 Regardless, the PVV campaigned hard on such
Euroscepticism, demonstrated by tactics such
as the creation of an online petition, which led with the
opener: Join our protest against the
103 DutchNews.nl, FNV will not talk pensions with Wilders,
www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2009/10/fnv_will_not_talk_pensions_wit.php
(Accessed: August 1, 2012). 104 The Economist, Wild Things: The Far
Right Promises to do Disturbingly Well on June 9th, The Economist
(Feb. 25, 2010): 1. 105 The Economist, Wild Things: The Far Right
Promises to do Disturbingly Well on June 9th, 1. 106 The Economist,
With irresponsibility comes power, The Economist (June 13, 2011):
2. 107 The Economist, Keeping government hands off their benefits,
The Economist (May 27, 2011): 23. (23-25) 108 Cas Mudde, The Dutch
Elections and the Eurosceptic Paradox,
www.extremisproject.org/2012/09/the-dutch-elections-and-the-eurosceptic-paradox
(Accessed: September 2, 2012). 109 Mudde, The Dutch Elections and
the Eurosceptic Paradox. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid.
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14
profiteering eurocrats.112 Visitors are invited to digitally
sign a petition opposing the salaries of
European commissioners and other EU bureaucrats.113
Regardless, it is important to mention that there are some
programmatic differences that
many argue separate the PVV from other PRR parties in Europe.114
Foremost, traditionally Wilders
has sought his primary political allies in Israel and the United
States, not in Europe.115 This focus on
the US and Israel is quite uncommon amongst PRR parties, and is
useful in distancing the PVV from
Nazism, which is an especially sensitive topic in the
Netherlands.116 Close inspection of the PVV
indicates that Wilders pro-Israeli stance is far from solely an
attempt to distance himself from
Nazism. As Gee points out, Wilders is strongly supportive of
Zionism of a far-right variety.117 This
is evidenced by Wilders frequent visits to Israel, the most
notable of which was his December 2008
participation in the Facing Jihad conference in Jerusalem.118
This conference was held by National
Union Knesset member Aryeh Eldad, whose party favours the
expulsion of all Palestinians from
Israeli-controlled territory.119 This is a position advanced by
Wilders as well.120
Wilders is also extremely pro-US, which can be attested to by
his praise of US foreign policy,
and his September 11 2010 speech at ground zero in New York.121
In this speech he extended
support for the US and denounced the building of a mosque in the
area.122 Notably, former US
presidential candidate Newt Gingrich was also in attendance. 123
Wilders can also be linked
financially to American and Israeli conservative groups. Unlike
other Dutch political parties, the
PVV is self-funded, therefore it does not have to meet the same
disclosure requirements as other 112 Party for Freedom, Join our
protest against the profiteering eurocrats,
www.stopeuprofiteers.com (Accessed: August 1, 2012). 113 Party for
Freedom, Join our protest against the profiteering eurocrats. 114
Vossen, 186. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 Gee, 34. 118 Ibid, 35. 119
Ibid. 120 Ibid. 121 Geert Wilders, NYC Speech Geert Wilders, Geert
Wilders Weblog
www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/article/80-geertwildersnl/1712-nyc-speech-geert-wilders
(Posted: September 11, 2010, Accessed: August 1, 2012). 122
Wilders, NYC Speech Geert Wilders. 123 Ibid.
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15
parties.124 Nevertheless, in September 2012 Reuters reported
that notable American conservative
thinkers such as Daniel Pipes and David Horowitz had
acknowledged that they paid for expenses and
visits by Wilders.125 Furthermore, they also admitted making
contributions to Wilders fundraising
efforts.126 Despite such backing there are indications that the
PVV is not always in line with the
interests of its supporters. An example of this is the PVVs
recent stance against ritual slaughter,
which was originally meant to pester Muslims, and appease animal
rights activists.127 In this manner
Cohen argues that Wilders has been one of the most outspoken
supporters of Israel.128 Yet he
claims that the Dutch government arrived at an agreement to
allow Muslims to sedate animals before
performing ritual slaughter, while neglecting Jews who are bound
by their religion to perform ritual
slaughter on conscious animals.129 Nevertheless, the PVV
continued to support the measures. As
Cohen claims:
Wilders realized that opposing Islam and supporting Israel wasnt
going to muster sufficient votes; accordingly, he seized upon the
traditional conservative rejection of the European Union as the
centerpiece of his platform, extending his reach to people who did
not share his opinion of Israel as a privileged ally in the war on
Islamism.130
PVV opposition to ritual slaughter, and the events that were
described above all occurred just prior to
the September 2012 election.131 This demonstrates an instance in
which Cohen asserts that the PVV
moved towards the centre of the ideological spectrum in order to
draw more mainstream voters.132
Despite this, the PVV has remained relatively pro-Israel which
serves to distinguish them from many
PRR parties in Europe.
124 Anthony Deutsch and Mark Hosenball, Exclusive: U.S. groups
helped fund Dutch anti-Islam politician Wilders. www.reuters.com
(Posted: September 10 2012, Accessed: September 20, 2012). 125
Deutsch and Hosenball. 126 Ibid. 127 Ben Cohen, Europes Assault on
Jewish Ritual: Is Judaism Just Collateral Damage, or the Target
Once Again? Commentary 134, no. 4 (November, 2012): 17. 128 Cohen,
18. 129 Cohen, 18. 130 Ibid, 19. 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid.
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16
Moreover, Wilders libertarian views on ethical issues are also
quite unique for PRR parties.
He supports the right to abortion, euthanasia and embryo
selection, while the party also presents
itself as a defender of women and gays in the face of the
advance of an intolerant and backward
Islam.133 Nevertheless, academics such as Wolin warn that one
should not be fooled by Wilders
frequent appeals on behalf of seemingly liberal values such as
freedom of speech, gay rights and
womens rights.134 He argues that the PVVs previously mentioned
objection to immigration and
Islamic culture departs from the idea of universal equality,
which is the foundational precept of the
rule of law, in favour of the idea of ethnic and racial
hierarchy.135 Gee agrees with this stance as he
considers it highly problematic to label an entire culture based
on the actions of a small minority of
extremist Muslims.136 He claims, similar expressions of
hostility toward Jewish, Asian or Black
people would not be accepted.137 Mudde refers to the reasoning
behind such claims as nativism,
which he describes as an ideology that holds that states should
be inhabited exclusively by members
of the native group and that non-native elements are
fundamentally threatening to the homogenous
nation-state.138 Thus, it is these nationalist, anti-immigrant,
and populist traits that many assert
connect the PVV to other PRR parties and place it on the far
reaches of the political spectrum.139
The proceeding analysis uses Wilders and the PVV as a case study
in investigating the
common assertion made by researchers that political inclusion
serves to moderate radical political
parties. 140 Anthony Downs seminal work on party ideology
titled, An Economic Theory of
Democracy, is the primary influence for this hypothesis.141 In
this work Downs argues that ideology
essentially serves as a political tool that parties use to
combat the uncertainties involved in the
133 Vosen, 187. 134 Richard Wolin, Ghosts of a Tortured Past:
Europes Right Turn. Dissent 58, no. 1 (Winter, 2011): 62. 135
Wolin, 65. 136 Gee, 34. 137 Ibid. 138 Wolin, 65. 139 Ibid. 140
Jillian Schwedler, Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the
Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis, World Politics 63, no. 2 (April,
2011): 348. 141 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).
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17
struggle for political office.142 His argument rests on the
basic theory that political parties are
primarily interested in securing political office, as opposed to
promoting a better or an ideal
society per se.143 In line with this theory, he asserts that in
multi-party systems such as the
Netherlands, parties on opposite sides of the political spectrum
are likely to be farther apart
ideologically than in two party systems.144 Nevertheless, in
order to gain power, parties on the left
and right of the political spectrum are more likely to work
together in order to gain power for their
side of the spectrum.145 Thus, Downs argues that, Since it is
very difficult to attract enough support
with narrowly targeted extremist or sectarian appeals, over time
the competition for votes will force
extremist parties to jettison radical positions and adopt
broader, more centrist platforms capable of
attracting support outside their original core constituency.146
In addition to Downs arguments, two
other theories have contributed to the moderation
hypothesis.
A second theory relates to party institutional structure, and is
largely based on the work of
German sociologist Robert Michels.147 Michels found that when
highly controversial parties decide
to participate in elections, they find themselves forced to set
up formal, bureaucratic organizations
capable of mounting public campaigns, raising and disbursing
funds, and developing policies.148 He
claims that this draws energy and resources away from
traditional radical activities, which serves to
moderate the party.149 This paper will also consider what Berman
and others refer to as pothole
theory.150 This is essentially the proposition that extremist
parties become more moderate as a result
of being concerned with the daily functions of government upon
inclusion into a democratic
system.151 Thus, all three theories are similar in that they
argue that the inclusion of radical parties in
142 A. Downs 1957, 96. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid, 163. 145 Ibid. 146
Sheri Berman, Taming Extremist Parties: Lessons From Europe,
Journal of Democracy 19, no. 1 (January, 2008): 6. 147 Robert
Michels, A Sociological Study if the Oligarchical Tendencies of
Modern Democracy trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York.: Free Press,
1962): 333-341. 148 Michels, 333-341. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 151
Michels, 334-341.
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18
democratic systems serves to bring them towards the center in
terms of the extremity of their
ideology, issues and policy. This paper will focus on testing
these assertions as they pertain to Geert
Wilders and the PVV, through analysis of Geert Wilders official
blog.152 Directed content analysis
will be used in order to test the hypothesis that extreme
parties will tend to moderate as a result of
contesting political elections and participating in
parliamentary politics.
152 Geert Wilders, Geert Wilders Weblog www.geertwilders.nl
(Accessed: August 1, 2012).
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19
Chapter III
Literature Review: Radicalism, Populism and Moderation
Vossen asserts that Dutch journalists, scientists and fellow
politicians alike seem to agree
that Wilders and his PVV are best qualified (to at least some
degree) as populists.153 Populism is an
inexact term though, and there is much discussion as to exactly
what it entails.154 Albertazzi and
McDonnell argue that historically populism has been employed in
a loose, inconsistent and
undefined manner, as a way of denoting appeals to the people,
demagogy and catch-all
politics.155 They further define populism as pitting a virtuous
and homogenous people against a set
of elites and dangerous others who are depicted as depriving (or
attempting to deprive) the
sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity
and voice.156 Albertazzi and McDonnell
argue that populism can mend itself to any ideology, left or
right.157 What these two academics see
as critical is the fact that populists always appear to be
fighting to reclaim the peoples
sovereignty, be it from politicians, the elite or immigrants.158
Similarly, Vossen claims that most
academics generally consider populism to be built on the
perception of current politics as being a
conflict between two homogenous and antagonistic groups, a
virtuous people and a malicious elite
and on the aspiration to build a polity in which the will of the
virtuous people prevails.159 This has
come to be termed the discursive definition of populism.160 As
mentioned above, this definition
depicts populism as being a Manichaean discourse that identifies
Good with a unified will of the
people and Evil with a conspiring elite.161 As Hawkins claims,
these Manichaean aspects of
populism are central to it as a discourse, since it attempts to
assign everything a moral dimension 153 Vossen 2010, 26. 154 Ibid,
24. 155 Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, Introduction: The
Sceptre and the Spectre, In Twenty-First Century Populism: The
Spectre of Western European Democracy, ed. Daniele Albertazzi and
Duncan McDonnell (New York: Palgrave, 2002): 2. 156 Albertazzi and
McDonnell 2002, 2. 157 Ibid. 158 Ibid. 159 Vossen 2010, 24. 160
Kirk A. Hawkins, Is Chavez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse
in Comparative Perspective, Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 8
(August, 2009): 1042. 161 Hawkins, 1042.
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20
and interprets it as part of a cosmic struggle between good and
evil. 162 Roger Eatwell
acknowledges this tendency to be one of the central pillars of
populism.163 Testament to this is the
noted tendency for populists to dichotomize issues into black
and white.164 He argues that this
explains populist parties preference for referendums on
subjects, as opposed to parliamentary forms
of democracy.165 According to Eatwell, this indicates the
majoritarian character of populism.166
Like Albertazzi and McDonnell, Eatwell argues that populism is
best seen in Europe as a
political style rather than a specific body of thought.167 As
will be touched upon, the term populism
is often used synonymously with the phrases extreme-right or
radical right, which Eatwell
claims can be misleading.168 In support of this, he points out
that there is populism of not only the
right, but the left as well, since it is a language and style
that can also be used by groups which
genuinely support a radical redistribution of income and power
within society.169 Hanz-Georg
Betzs assertions are similar to Eatwells as he describes
populism as a form of political rhetoric that
is designed to tap feelings of resentment, and exploit them
politically.170 Like Eatwell, Betz
considers populism to be largely a political strategy, whose
political rhetoric is the evocation of
latent grievances and the appeal to emotions provoked by them,
rather than an ideology per se.171 In
order to stress this difference it is important to first define
exactly what constitutes an ideology.
Hainsworth defines political ideologies as bodies of
interconnected ideas or systems of thought that
constitute the basis for political action, reflection and
debate.172 In light of this definition, populism
is something different from ideology that is difficult to
discern because parties such as the PVV have 162 Hawkins, 1043. 163
Roger Eatwell, The New Extreme Right Challenge, In Western
Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge, ed. Roger Eatwell
and Cas Mudde (New York: Routledge, 2004): 12. 164 Eatwell, 12-13.
165 Ibid. 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid, 12. 168 Eatwell, 12. 169 Eatwell, 12.
170 Hanz-Georg Betz, Conditions Favouring the Success and Failure
of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies,
In Democracies and the Populist Challenge, ed. Yves Meny and Yves
Surel (New York: Palgrave, 2002): 198. 171 Betz, 198. 172 Paul
Hainsworth, The Extreme Right In Western Europe (New York:
Routledge, 2008): 67.
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21
been keen to use anti-establishment populism as a manner of
expressing their ideology.173
Taggart refers to this form of populism as new populism, and
acknowledges that while it is not
necessarily an ideology in itself, it has tended to be used in
Europe by far-right parties.174 He claims
that:
new populism is a contemporary form of populism that emerged,
primarily though not exclusively in Western Europe, in the last
part of the twentieth century. It is a populism that has been
advocated by a number of parties on the far-right of the political
spectrum as a reaction against the political dominance and the
agenda of certain key parties of government in their party systems,
and which is usually associated with particular political
leaders.175
The Right and the Radical-Right
Historically, left/right ideological polarity arose from the
seating arrangement of the first
French General Assembly, where the supporters of the political
ideas inspired by the enlightenment
were seated on the left, while those who backed the ancien
regime were seated at the right side of the
president of the Assembly.176 According to Cole, the term right
is used to describe styles of
thought having emerged as a response to the left dating back to
the values of 1789: egalitarianism,
brotherhood and fraternity.177 With regards to this, oriented to
the new and the modern has come
to be associated with the left and conservative with the
right.178 This is far from an exact
classification though. For instance, supporters of nuclear
energy, a modern solution to energy
problems, are generally considered to be on the right.179
Meanwhile, those who wish to preserve
nature are often placed on the left of the political
spectrum.180 Regardless, over the years the right
has become synonymous with conservatism.181 As Shannon famously
points out, conservatism as a
173 Hainsworth, 69. 174 Paul Taggart, Populism (Buckingham: Open
University Press, 2000): 20. 175 Taggart, 2 176 H. F. Bienfait and
W. E. A. Van Beek, Right and Left As Political Categories: An
Exercise in Not-So-Primitive Classification Anthropos 96 (2001):
169-170. 177 Cole, 205. 178 Ibid, 170. 179 Ibid. 180 Ibid. 181
Ibid.
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22
term is approximately 170 years old, and came into usage after
the Great Reform Act of 1832 in
Great Britain.182 It referred to opposition to reform, and has
since become associated with wishes to
preserve present or past values rather than to create or adopt
new ones.183 Moreover, historically
conservative parties in Europe have generally stood for loyalty
to the monarchy, and the traditional
way of doing things.184 The right of the political spectrum has
also become associated with the
ideological presence of authoritarianism.185 Authoritarianism is
the belief that infringements of
authority should be punished severely, and that there should be
a focus on a law and order agenda.186
Indeed, as argued by Layton-Henry, such authoritarianism is
characteristic of many ideologies of the
right.187
In regards to this, Mudde asserts that the PVV is part of a
grouping of radical right political
parties that have enjoyed electoral success in Europe since the
1980s partly through the use of
populist discourse and its incorporation with authoritarian
elements.188 As Zaslove confirms, such
parties have participated in coalition governments in Austria,
Switzerland and Italy, and have
supported center-right coalition governments in Denmark, Norway
and the Netherlands.189 Mudde
refers to such parties collectively as the populist radical
right.190 The other parties that Mudde
considers to make up this grouping include the French National
Front (FN), the German Republicans
(REP), the Flemish Block in Belgium (VB), the Freedom Party of
Austria (FPO) and the Swiss
Peoples Party (SVP).191 Muddes label populist radical right
recognizes the fact that these parties,
as previously mentioned, use populism as one of their primary
political tools. As Zaslove remarks,
182 Jasper B. Shannon, Conservatism, Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 344 (Nov., 1962): 13-24.
183 Shannon, 14. 184 Ibid. 185 Mudde 2010, 1174. 186 Cas Mudde,
Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007): 23. 187 Zig Layton-Henry, Conservatism and
Conservative Politics, Introduction In Zig Layton-Henry (ed.)
Conservative Politics in Western Europe (New York: St. Martens
Press, 2007): 1. 188 Mudde 2011, 8. 189 Andrej Zaslove, The
Populist Radical Right in Government: The Structure and Agency of
Success and Failure, Comparative European Politics 10, no. 4
(2012): 421. 190 Ibid. 191 Ibid, 7.
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23
thanks to Muddes contributions, The PRR is now accepted as a
party family that combines nativist
nationalism, authoritarianism and populism. The PRR also
combines charismatic and populist
leadership, and a number of these parties combine these features
with a well-organized political
party.192
Mudde stops short of using the term extreme to describe such
parties, as many scholars
specify that extreme-right generally refers to the desire for
the overthrow of democratic
institutions, and the instalment of a totalitarian based system
of governance.193 As Hartleb observes,
the fact that parties such as the PVV approve of the democratic
system serves to separate them from
the extreme-right.194 Moreover, extreme-right is considered by
many scholars to infer a connection
or affinity with postwar neofascist organizations.195 This
distinction can be made most clear when
one looks at the Greek party, Golden Dawn. Golden Dawn came to
prominence in Greece following
the global economic crisis in 2008, and is classified by most
scholars as an extreme neo-fascist
party.196 This is largely due to the partys use of Nazi-like
symbolism, links to neo-fascist groups and
various anti-Semitic statements.197 Meindert Fennema makes a
similar argument in claiming that the
categorization extreme-right is a misleading term for parties
such as the PVV, as most of them do
not call for the destruction of democratic institutions.198 In
order to rectify this, many scholars
combine the terms radical-right and populist to denote that
these parties are both populist in
style, and located on the far right of the political spectrum
ideologically.199 While populism has
generally been acknowledged by most scholars to be a defining
component of these political parties,
their ideological components have been less clear. Instead, some
scholars refer to these parties as
192 Zaslove 2012, 423. 193 Hainsworth, 19. 194 Florian Hartleb,
After their establishment: right-wing populist parties in Europe,
European View 10 (2011): 267. 195 Hainsworth, 19. 196 Alexandra
Koronaiou and Alexandros Sakellariou, Reflections on Golden Dawn,
community organizing and nationalist solidarity: helping (only)
Greeks, Community Development Journal 48, no. 2 (April, 2013): 336.
197 Koronaiou and Sakellariou, 335. 198 Meindert Fennema, Populist
Parties of the Right, In Movements of Exclusion: Radical Right-Wing
Populism in the Western World, ed. Jens Rydgren (New York: Nova
Science, 2005): 1. 199 Hainsworth, 22.
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24
anti-immigration parties200 or simply populist parties.201
Regardless, most scholars generally
agree these parties are best classified as sitting on the right
reaches of the political ideological
spectrum.202
As mentioned, while there is much agreement that populist
parties such as the PVV can
generally be situated on the right of the ideological spectrum,
many scholars consider such parties to
be misclassified as extreme-right due to a lack of connection to
historical fascism. With regards to
this, Nolte argues that fascism can be described as a phenomenon
that can be limited to between the
years 1920 and 1945.203 Nolte proposes the following definition
of fascism. Fascism [] is anti-
marxism which seeks to destroy the enemy by the evolvement of a
radically opposed and yet related
ideology and by the use of almost identical and yet typically
modified methods, always, however,
within the unyielding framework of national self-assertion and
autonomy.204 Fennema makes
similar claims as she considers a fascist party to be an
extreme-right party in a specific time period,
and with a specific party organization.205 Most notably she
argues that fascism can be embodied in
the Fuhrer principle in Nazi Germany.206 In consideration of
this, Fennema proposes [] to
define the term extreme-right as a concept that refers only to
ideology and not to political practices.
Only on the level of ideology, does extreme-right equal
fascism.207 Therefore, Fennema views the
primary difference between the two terms to be that fascism is
always a certain type of mass
movement, while the extreme-right does not necessarily have to
be a mass movement.208
Hainsworth argues that part of the cause for such debate over
terminology is due to the fact
that many of the terms used to describe these parties are not
labels readily accepted or espoused by
200 Fennema, 2. 201 Albertazzi and McDonnell 2002, 10-11. 202
Alexandra Cole, Old right or new right? The ideological positioning
of parties of the far right, European Journal of Political Research
44 (2005): 203. 203 Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism: Action
Francaise, Italian Fascism and National Socialism, (New York: Henry
Holt & Company, 1966) 27. 204 Nolte, 40. 205 Fennema, 4. 206
Fennema, 4. 207 Ibid. 208 Ibid.
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25
the parties that they are considered to reference.209 Paxton
argues that another cause of this is the
repugnancy that Hitlers form of fascism inspired in European
society.210 He claims that out of
necessity fascism changed its stripes in an attempt to remain
politically viable.211 He believes that
fascism has transformed into the movements that we now see as
radical-right or extreme-
right.212 He warns that this is a worrisome situation as all
that is needed is the lawless treatment of
national enemies for fascism to emerge.213 Similar to Paxton,
Griffin asserts that fascism simply
changed its face in the post-war period.214 He claims, once
fascism is teased free from its
contingent expression as a specific type of historical movement
and regime, it can be conceptualized
[] as a particular politico-cultural project.215
Bar-On shares a similar analysis. 216 He claims that the
intellectual roots for modern
extreme-right parties can be traced to the French Nouvelle
Droite (ND).217 He describes the ND as
a cultural school of thought and a metapolitical movement that
began in France, but had far-
reaching effects throughout Europe.218 Bar-On states that The ND
helped to create a sophisticated
European-wide political culture of the revolutionary right in an
anti-fascist age and nurtured the
politically correct discourse of extreme right-wing political
parties.219 According to Bar-On,
ultranationalist Alain de Benoist was pivotal to this movement
as he and forty other ultranationalists
with ties to neo-fascist organizations formed the Research and
Study Group for European
Civilization (GRECE).220 GRECE serves as the principle
think-tank for the ND.221 Bar-On observes
that one of the NDs primary contentions is that a right to
difference exists that dictates that 209 Fennema, 4. 210 Robert O.
Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Random House, 2004): 172.
211 Paxton, 172-173. 212 Ibid. 213 Ibid. 214 Roger Griffin, Another
Face? Another Mazeway? Reflections on the Newness and Rightness of
the European New Right, In Tamir Bar-On, Where Have All the
Fascists Gone (New York: Ashgate, 2007): i. 215 Griffin, i. 216
Tamir Bar-On, Transnationalism and the French Nouvelle Droite,
Patterns of Prejudice 45, no. 3 (2011): 200. 217 Bar-On, 200. 218
Bar-On, 200. 219 Ibid. 220 Ibid, 203. 221 Ibid.
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26
communities must constantly be nourished and promoted in order
to allow all world cultures to
maintain their uniqueness and distinctiveness.222 Moreover, he
asserts that the ND pushes for a right
to preserve cultural, regional and national identities, and that
the best place to do so is within national
territories.223 This point is especially worthy of note as it
mirrors the logic espoused by Wilders that
was mentioned earlier. It is these traits that many argue serve
as the ideological connections to
historical fascism.
Andrej Zaslove supports Bar-Ons findings, as he claims that the
ND has based much of its
ideology of exclusion upon cultural, as opposed to historically
discredited racial differences.224
According to Zaslove the far-right proceeds on the line of
argument that since there are no
biological distinctions between races, culture makes us
distinctly human and gives us our
identity.225 He asserts that this concept is used as the
philosophical justification for the opposition to
uncontrolled immigration,226 that is one of the primary
programmatic issues which all of the
previously mentioned parties share.227 Thus, it can be seen from
this that scholars such as Bar-On,
Eatwell, Paxton and Zaslove consider parties such as the PVV to
share an ideological connection to
fascism and neo-fascism, and are generally more apt to classify
these parties as extreme-right.
Academics such as Mudde do not deny the influence of such
thought.228 However, they stipulate that
extremism requires the desired and expressed overthrow of the
institutional arrangement for
arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good
by making the people itself decide
issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble
to carry out its will.229 Far from
being anti-democratic though, Mudde points out that many of
these parties are majoritarian, and
222 Bar-On, 203. 223 Ibid, 207. 224 Andrej Zaslove, Exclusion,
Community, and a Populist Political Economy: The Radical Right as
an Anti-Globalization Movement, Comparative European Politics 6
(2008): 179. 225 Ibid. 226 Ibid. 227 Fennema 1. 228 Cas Mudde, The
Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy, West European
Politics 33, no. 6 (November, 2010): 1167-1186. 229 Mudde 2010,
1168.
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27
opposed instead to the liberal basis of their respective
democracies.230 Nevertheless, for ease of
clarity this paper will hitherto follow Muddes assertions and
refer to this grouping of parties as the
populist radical right (PRR).
A Winning Formula for the PRR
In addition to anti-immigrant, and particularly anti-Muslim
sentiment, increasingly parties of
the PRR have also used Euroscepticism to create a winning
formula,231 though the nature and form
of such scepticism has varied over time.232 In 1998 Paul Taggart
noted that since the signing of the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, there had been a significant rise in
levels of Euroscepticism in all EU
member nations.233 This included those countries most supportive
of EU integration, such as France
and the Netherlands.234 He notes that PRR parties had been keen
to latch onto this issue, as was
evidenced by the FN in Frances and the VB in Belgiums
Eurosceptical tendencies.235 Nevertheless,
he was careful to point out that in none of these countries was
Euroscepticism found to be the central
tenant of PRR party policy, but rather was secondary to cultural
issues.236 Moreover, Taggart was
careful to use the word Eurosceptical to describe these parties
policies, as he points out that not all
of them opposed the EU per se.237 With regards to the term
Eurosceptical, he claims that it is used
because it is more inclusive as, All opponents of the EU are, at
least, sceptical, but not all sceptics
are opponents.238
In the 1990s Taggart asserts that Euroscepticism generally
revolved around the ratification
process of the Maastricht treaty. 239 Since the debate over the
ratification of this treaty,
230 Mudde 2010, 1169. 231 Hartleb, 267. 232 Vasilopoulou, 3. 233
Paul Taggart, A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in
Contemporary Western European Party Systems, European Journal of
Political Research 33 (1998): 363-364. 234 Taggart 1998, 364. 235
Ibid, 365. 236 Taggart 1998, 365-366. 237 Ibid, 366-367. 238 Ibid,
366. 239 Ibid, 366-367.
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Euroscepticism has continued to rise in relation to pivotal
periods of EU expansion. 240 As
Halikiopoulou et al. attest, examples of this can be seen during
the debates over the failed ratification
of the European Constitution and the protracted progress of the
Lisbon Treaty.241 Since the
beginning of the 2008 global recession, the European financial
crisis has led to another significant
increase in Euroscepticism, caused largely by discontent with
EU-supported financial assistance
packages being given to Greece, and the imposition of
EU-mandated austerity measures on member
nations.242
Taggart has observed that parties peripheral to their party
systems are generally more
predisposed to incorporating Euroscepticism into their
platforms.243 This is a tendency that has been
noted by a number of scholars, and is evidenced by the presence
of increased levels of support for
Euroscepticism by both far-right and far-left parties across
Europe.244 This was also the case in the
September 2012 Dutch election, where both the PVV and the
far-left SP incorporated
Euroscepticism into their platforms.245 With regards to this,
Taggart contends that the protest
nature of peripheral parties produces the need for them to
distinguish themselves from more
mainstream elements, and that this leads them to be more prone
to adopting Eurosceptic views.246
Scholars adhering to this logic maintain that all parties
attempt to strategically manipulate the
European integration issue.247 Hooghe et al. argue that:
Parties that are successful in the existing structure of
contestation have little incentive to rock the boat, while
unsuccessful parties, that is, parties with weak electoral support
or those that are locked out of government, have an interest in
restructuring contestation. The same strategic logic that leads
mainstream parties to assimilate the issues raised by European
integration
240 Daphne Halikiopoulou, Kyriaki Nanou and Sofia Vasilopoulou,
The Paradox of Nationalism: The Common Denominator of Radical Right
and Radical Left Euroscepticism, European Journal of Political
Research 51 (2012): 506. 241 Halikiopoulou et al., 506. 242 The
Economist, Leftward Tilt: As Voters Lean Left, the Next Government
May be Awkward Over the Euro, The Economist (August, 25, 2012):
1-2. 243 Taggart 1998, 372. 244 Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and
Carole Wilson, Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on
European Integration Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 8
(October, 2002): 968. 245 The Economist, August 2012, 1. 246
Taggart 1998, 382. 247 Hooghe et al., 968.
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29
into the Left/Right dimension of party competition leads
peripheral parties to exploit European integration to shake up the
party system.248
Similar to this line of reasoning, many academics claim that
peripheral opposition to the
project of European integration also lies in the fact that the
EU is a creation of the Centre-Right,
Centre, and to a lesser extent, the Centre-Left which has
dominated European decision making for
the past half century.249 Therefore, such scholars not only view
Euroscepticism as an inevitable
reaction to the EUs policies, but also see it as a rejection of
the ideological foundation of the
organization.250 However, scholars such as Halikiopoulou et al.
argue that there are other factors that
can explain this occurrence.251 They assert that the importance
of nationalism in the peripheral
regions of the ideological spectrum helps to account for
far-right and far-left parties tendency
towards Euroscepticism.252 Halikiopoulou et al. recognize that
definitions of nationalism vary, but
argue the key promise of any nationalism is the right of the
nation to act as independent, free and
sovereign.253 According to these scholars, PRR parties seek to
portray the nation to be an organic
pre-modern community and defend its homogeneity by promoting
differences and exclusivity.254
Therefore, since the EU is fundamentally heterogeneous in
nature, these elements put the PRR
naturally at odds with the EU.255
Similarly, Halikiopoulou et al. also consider nationalist
impulses to drive a degree of the far-
lefts Euroscepticism.256 They argue that these parties
fundamental distrust of great powers causes
them to equate freedom from such countries with the emancipation
of the popular classes.257 Thus,
the integrative nature of the EU is what is seen to be
threatening by such parties.258 Additionally,
248 Hooghe et al., 968-969. 249 Ibid, 969-970. 250 Ibid, 969.
251 Halikiopoulou et al., 506. 252 Ibid, 504. 253 Ibid, 509. 254
Halikiopoulou et al., 510. 255 Ibid, 509-510. 256 Ibid, 512. 257
Ibid. 258 Ibid.
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Conti and Memoli argue that the far-left is also often opposed
to the largely economic basis of the
EU, and wants to see it transformed from a Common market into a
social market economy.259
Notably, this highlights the differing nature of
Euroscepticism.260 As Conti and Memoli point out,
PRR parties are much more apt than far-left parties to
unconditionally oppose the EU.261 As was
mentioned, this is largely attributed to concerns over EU
infringement of national sovereignty.262 In
light of such tendencies, Taggart and Szczerbiak make a
distinction between hard and soft
Euroscepticism.263 They define hard Euroscepticism as outright
rejection of the entire project of
European political and economic integration and opposition to
their country joining or remaining
members of the EU.264 Contrastingly, soft Euroscepticism is
described as qualified opposition or
disagreement on one or more policy areas associated with the
project of European integration.265 In
lieu of these categorizations, in the months leading up to the
2012 election the PVV can be
categorized as hard Eurosceptics, since they called for a full
Dutch withdrawal from the EU.266
Electoral Support for the PRR
Traditionally across Europe PRR voters have been
disproportionately lower-class males.267
This holds true in the Netherlands, as males have consistently
supported PRR parties more than
females, and have been largely from the working class.268 There
has also been a tendency for
unemployed persons to be more likely to vote for PRR parties
than other segments of the
259 Nicolo Conti and Vincenzo Memoli, The multi-faceted nature
of party-based Euroscepticism, Acta Politica, 47, no. 2 (2012):
105. 260 Conti and Memoli, 105. 261 Ibid. 262 Ibid. 263 Paul
Taggart and A. Szczerbiak, Parties, Positions and Europe:
Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern
Europe, Opposing Europe, Sussex European Institutional Working
Paper no. 46 (2001): 10. 264 Taggart and Szczerbiak, 10. 265 Ibid.
266 The Economist, August 2012, 2. 267 Mudde 2010, 1169. 268
Hainsworth, 91-99.
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31
population.269 First-time voters have also been shown to support
PRR parties in disproportionate
numbers.270 In regards to the causes of such support, Mudde and
Holsteyn claim that there are two
traditional hypotheses.271 These are known as the support
thesis, and the protest thesis.272 The
support thesis argues that voters support radical-right parties
because they consider their platforms to
best represent their ideas.273 As has been discussed, many
consider populism to be one of the primary
methods employed by radical right parties in order to attract
such support.274 As Betz claims, this
strategy is designed to mobilize people to act politically by
appealing to grievances and
resentments.275 In relation to this, many PRR parties, including
the PVV, have campaigned on anti-
immigration rhetoric.276 Geert Wilders has largely focused on
Muslim immigrants, claiming that they
commit crimes, drain the social-welfare system, are a drag on
the standard of living and are part of a
barbaric culture.277 According to Richard Wolin, in this manner
PRR parties excel at playing on
the cultural and economic anxieties of average citizens,
especially those of the lower middle classes
who have been unable to keep pace with the demands of a
globalized, information-based economy
and whose employment prospects have grown correspondingly
precarious.278 This line of thinking
essentially argues that the PVV and other PRR parties succeed in
gaining the support of the losers
of modernity, who are threatened by rapid social change and lend
their support to these parties out
of general discontent.279 The process that leads to the creation
of such support has come to be known
as modernization theory, and considers support for radical
right-wing movements to be a
269 Marcel Lubbers, Merove Gijsberts and Peer Scheepers,
Extreme-right-wing Voting in Western Europe, European Journal of
Political Research 41 (2002): 370. 270 Hainsworth, 101-102. 271 C.
E. Mudde and J.J.M. Van Holsteyn, Over the Top: Dutch Right-Wing
Extremist Parties in the Elections of 1994, Politics 14, no. 3
(1994): 131. 272 Mudde and Holsteyn, 131. 273 Ibid. 274 Betz, 198.
275 Ibid, 200. 276 Wouter Van Der Brug, Meindert Fennema and Jean
Tillie, Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail and Others Suceed: A
Two-Step Model of Aggregate Electoral Support, Comparative
Political Studies 38, no. 5 (June, 2005): 537-538. 277 Heijne, 31.
278 Ibid. 279 Brug, Fennema and Tillie, 540.
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32
pathological normalcy.280 That is, [i]n all fast-growing
modernizing countries, there are people
who cannot cope with rapid economic and cultural developments
and who react to the pressures of
readjustment with rigidity and closed-mindedness.281 Supporters
of this argument generally attach
such discontent to disgruntlement with globalization more
generally. As Zaslove points out:
fear and skepticism towards economic liberalization,
immigration, and European integration have been linked to the
process of globalization. As with other parties that oppose
globalization, the radical right does not speak to deaf ears. There
is considerable evidence that a significant portion of Europeans
are concerned and sceptical of economic liberalization, they are
apprehensive about surrendering their national sovereignty, and
they are concerned about immigration.282
In the Dutch case, Heijne argues that this process is further
aided by the fact that the country
has developed a reputation for practicing an almost radical form
of tolerance.283 He argues that while
this has undoubtedly aided the emancipation of immigrants, women
and gays, it has undermined
national social cohesion.284 Heijne contends that this has
created a vacuum that PRR politicians
such as Wilders have capitalized on.285 Moreover, he claims that
this has allowed Wilders to largely
avoid economic solutions to the countrys ills, by using
immigrants and European integration as
scapegoats for the countrys problems.286 Nevertheless, academics
such as Heijne are careful to note
that while parties like the PVV succeed in capitalizing upon
fears related to a perceived loss of social
identity, support for Wilders should not necessarily be
associated with economic hardship.287 The
irony is, he argues, that the rise of Wilders and the PVV is
evidence of the prosperity and economic
stability of the Dutch middle class.288 Testament to this is the
fact that only a relatively prosperous
280 Michael Minkenberg, The West European Radical Right as a
Collective Actor: Modeling the Impact of Cultural and Structural
Variables on Party Formation and Movement Mobilization, Comparative
European Politics 1 (2003): 150-151. 281 Minkenberg, 150-151. 282
Zaslove 2008, 181-182. 283 Heijne, 32. 284 Ibid. 285 Heijne, 31.
286 Ibid. 287 Heijne, 31-32. 288 Ibid, 32.
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33
electorate could afford to become obsessed with the Islamization
of the Netherlands and the
bureaucratic wastefulness of the European Union.289
However, as Mudde points out, this only explains the demand side
of support for the PVV
and other PRR parties.290 He argues that one must also consider
the actions of mainstream parties,
and the effects that these have upon support for the PRR.291 As
a case in point, he notes that the PRR
has only grown where mainstream parties ignore issues that large
parts of the population care
about.292 Examples of these are crime, corruption, European
integration and immigration.293 In light
of this, many argue that PRR voters do not vote for these
parties as the support thesis suggests, but
support them in order to punish mainstream parties.294 This has
become known as the protest
thesis.295 The protest thesis argues that voters use PRR parties
to channel their discontent with more
mainstream parties.296 This suggests that these voters are not
necessarily in favour of PRR parties,
nor do they support them, but that they use their vote to signal
political discontent.297 Mudde and
Holsteyn argue that this helps to explain the relatively strong
support for PRR parties in the first
rounds of parliamentary voting in many countries.298 They note
that PRR parties often receive much
weaker support in subsequent rounds, when voters are hesitant to
to waste their vote on a PRR
party.299
Taming PRR Parties
Regardless of the causes of support, William Downs claims that,
Traditional conservative
parties throughout Europe face the reality that radical
right-wing parties are winning representation
289 Heijne, 32. 290 Mudde 2011, 9. 291 Ibid. 292 Ibid. 293 Ibid.
294 Mudde and Holsteyn, 131. 295 Ibid. 296 Ibid. 297 Ibid, 132. 298
Ibid. 299 Ibid.
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34
across all levels of the polity: subnational councils, national
legislatures, and the European
Parliament.300 W. Downs argues that mainstream parties have
generally adopted five distinct
strategic reactions to the presence of PRR parties in
legislatures. These have been to ignore, isolate,
co-opt, collaborate and impose legal restrictions.301 The
strategies of ignoring, isolating and
imposing legal restrictions seek to deprive PRR parties of any
legitimacy or importance that could be
gained by being the subject of attention.302 Starved of both
power and publicity, the logic goes, the
pariahs allure would soon whither and fade.303 However, Downs
warns that these are risky
strategies since the failure to address the sources of PRR party
success can result in continued or
increased levels of support.304 In accordance with these
findings, Spanje and Van der Brug find that
ignoring or excluding a PRR party has mixed effects on their
level of support depending on the
context of the situation.305 In cases such as Belgium, they
found that the Flemish Bloc actually
benefitted from exclusion, and the Northern League in Italy
would have benefitted if it had been
excluded.306 Conversely, they found that the Progress Party in
Denmark would have suffered
electorally had it been excluded.307 While the broader effects
of exclusion are found to be mixed,
exclusion using electoral laws specifically have been found by
many academics to be largely
ineffective. For example, Ezrow claims that there is little
evidence to suggest that electoral law
(specifically the proportionality of the electoral system) exert
an effect either directly or indirectly on
parties tendencies to propose extreme as opposed to moderate
policy positions.308
300 William M. Downs, Pariahs in their Midst: Belgian and
Norwegian Parties React to Extremist Threats, West European
Politics 24, no. 3 (July, 2001): 23-42. 301 Downs 2001, 24. 302
Ibid, 26. 303 Ibid. 304 Ibid. 305 Spanje and Brug, 353-384. 306
Ibid, 375. 307 Ibid, 353. 308 Lawrence Ezrow, Parties Policy
Programmes and the Dog that Didnt Bark: No Evidence that
Proportional Systems Promote Extreme Party Positioning, British
Journal of Political Science 38 (2008): 480.
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35
However, as mentioned, political inclusion itself has been
argued to moderate radical
political parties. Tezcur asserts this is known as moderation
theory.309 This line of thinking is present
in the works of Downs, Michels and Berman. Prior to testing
these theories as they pertain to the
PVV, it is important to first specify what is meant by the term
moderation. As Sanchez-Cuenca
asserts, moderation is best understood as another name for
convergence to the position of the
median voter. 310 In light of this, she views moderation as
being similar to a loosening of ideological
rigidity, which is best measured by a shift in a partys ideology
towards the position of the median
voter in an electorate.311 Schwedler contends that moderation
broadly refers to movement along a
continuum from radical to moderate, with the term moderate being
tied to liberal notions of
tolerance, pluralism, and cooperation.312 In the literature
though, there are generally considered to
be two types of political parties.313 The first are office
seeking parties, which Downs claim never
seek office as a means of carrying out particular policies;
their only goal is to reap the rewards of
gaining office per se.314 As was covered, by Downs logic, these
parties are primarily interested in
maximizing the utility of gaining public office and are
therefore more likely to move towards the
median voter.315 Office seeking parties are more likely to
converge towards the median voter because
the possible electoral gains are more valuable to the party.316
The second type of parties are referred
to as policy seeking parties, which Sanchez-Cuenca considers to
be primarily interested in policy
making, and value the creation of policies in themselves.317
For policy seeking parties there may be times when the party may
want to be faithful to its
constitutive ideological principles, even if by doing so it
forgoes the gains of a more preferred
309 Tezcur, 69. 310 I. Sanchez-Cuenca, Party Moderation and
Politicians Ideological Rigidity, Party Politics 10, no. 3 (May,
2004): 327. 311 Sanchez-Cuenca, 327. 312 Schwedler, 352. 313 Ibid,
328. 314 A. Downs, 28. 315 Ibid, 96. 316 Sanchez-Cuenca, 329-330.
317 Ibid, 328.
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policy.318 Sanchez-Cuenca contends that this thinking is
diametrically opposed to Downsian
logic, as it supposes that voters preferences are not
exogenous.319 Rather, it considers voters
decisions to be a result of the very activities of the party.320
Thus, through this lens parties may think
that their ideologically driven policies are the cause for their
popularity, and hope that the party will
attract progressively more votes without renouncing its basic
ideological tenants.321 There is another
explanation for this tendency though, and that is the
observation by Sanchez-Cuenca that there are
parties that seem to exist in order to defend certain
principles, regardless of policy outcomes.322
This phenomenon is generally attributed to parties that derive
expressive utility from defending
principles.323
In studying socialist parties in Europe during the twentieth
century Michels produced what he
termed to be the iron law of oligarchy, which found that most
political parties are controlled by a
small group of leaders who develop strategies with minimum input
from the masses.324 In relation to
this, he argues that there tends to be two primary ways in which
radical socialist parties moderate:
the pursuit of votes, and organizational survival.325 With
regards to the former, he found that when
party elites participate in elections they quickly realize that
espousing radical ideological policies
alienates large segments of the electorate.326 As a result, the
party in question will seek to transform
into a vote-maximizing electoral party in order to remain
politically viable.327 As Tezcur points out
though, this causal process is based on the assumption that
vote-maximization entails developing
centrist political platforms rather than radical ones.328 As
pertains to the latter, Michels also found
that political parties concern with organizational survival
often serves to lessen their radical
318 Sanchez-Cuenca, 330. 319 Ibid. 320 Ibid. 321 Sanchez-Cuenca,
330. 322 Ibid. 323 Ibid. 324 Michels, 18. 325 Ibid, 333. 326 Ibid,
334. 327 Ibid. 328 Tezcur, 71.
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ideological commitment.329 This is a result of the tendency for
electoral partic