JURNAL HUKUM DAN PERJANJIAN INTERNASIONAL · terkait isu-isu hukum dan perjanjian internasional, Direktorat Jenderal Hukum dan Perjanjian Internasional telah menerbitkan Jurnal Hukum

JURNAL HUKUM DAN PERJANJIAN INTERNASIONAL

OPINIO JURIS

VOLUME 24 | 2019

DIREKTORAT JENDERAL HUKUM DAN PERJANJIAN INTERNASIONAL KEMENTERIAN LUAR NEGERI REPUBLIK INDONESIA

2019

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Jurnal Hukum dan Perjanjian Internasional OPINIO JURIS - Volume 24 | 2019

Diterbitkan oleh Direktorat Jenderal Hukum dan Perjanjian Internasional Kementerian Luar Negeri Sejak Oktober 2009

Penanggung Jawab Dr. (iur) Damos Dumoli Agusman Sulaiman

Redaktur Didit Parlambang Harlianto Sukarsono

Penyunting/Editor Theodora Elfani Darmawan Tuah Purba Mutty Ashila Nadira Reza Aldamayo Panadjam Panjaitan Muhammad Abdul Hayyil Al Ayyubi Nabila Virgizia M. Bayu Pramonodjati Citra Yudha Nur Fatihah

Disain Grafis Andre Bramantya Abdul Hayyi

Sekretariat Sutono Uki Subki Siti Namira Djarkasih Aang Saefullah

Alamat Redaksi Sekretariat Direktorat Jenderal Hukum dan Perjanjian Internasional Kementerian Luar Negeri, R.I. Jl. Taman Pejambon No. 6 Jakarta Telp. (021) 384 6633 – 344 1508 Ext. 5747

e-mail: [email protected] Jurnal Opinio Juris versi digital dapat diunduh di website http://pustakahpi.kemlu.go.id

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Tulisan yang dimuat dalam Jurnal Opinio Juris adalah pendapat dan analisis pribadi dari para penulis dan tidak mewakili pandangan/posisi

Kementerian Luar Negeri dan/atau Pemerintah Republik Indonesia

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DAFTAR ISI

Tim Penerbit ………………………………………………………………….. Daftar Isi ………………............................................................................ Pengantar Redaksi ………....................................................................... Tentang Penulis …………........................................................................ Putusan Judicial Review MK atas UU No. 24 Tahun 2000 tentangPerjanjian Internasional: Apa yang berubah? Dr. iur. Damos Dumoli Agusman ............................................................ Separatism in Papua from the Lens of International Law Indra Rosandry ........................................................................................ Alluring Creative Economy: from Indonesia to the World Joannes Ekaprasetya Tandjung ............................................................. The Role of National Contact Points of the OECD in PromotingCorporate Social Responsibility Rahmat Kurniawan ................................................................................. Unilateral Preferential Treatment in Trade/GSP AS Instrument toIncrease Indonesia's Leverage in the Region Malvino Aprialdy Mazni ........................................................................... Global Investment and Airline Alliances Indriati Kusumawardhani dan Giana Matauseja ……………………........

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PENGANTAR REDAKSI Dalam rangka menjalankan tugas dan fungsi diseminasi informasi terkait isu-isu hukum dan perjanjian internasional, Direktorat Jenderal Hukum dan Perjanjian Internasional telah menerbitkan Jurnal Hukum dan Perjanjian Internasional yang diberi nama “Jurnal Opinio Juris”. Dalam Jurnal Opinio Juris Volume 24, enam Penulis menyumbangkan tulisan yaitu : 1. Putusan Judicial Review MK atas UU No. 24 Tahun 2000 tentang

Perjanjian Internasional: Apa yang berubah? (Dr. iur. Damos Dumoli Agusman);

2. Separatism in Papua from the Lens of International Law (Indra Rosandry);

3. Alluring Creative Economy: from Indonesia to the World (Joannes Ekaprasetya Tandjung);

4. The Role of National Contact Points of the OECD in Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility (Rahmat Kurniawan);

5. Unilateral Preferential Treatment in Trade/GSP AS Instrument to Increase Indonesia's Leverage in the Region (Malvino Aprialdy Mazni); dan

6. Global Investment and Airline Alliances (Indriati Kusumawardhani dan Giana Matauseja).

Dalam kesempatan ini, redaksi Opinio Juris ingin mengajak para pembaca untuk turut berkontribusi serta memberikan saran dan masukannya demi peningkatan kualitas Opinio Juris di masa mendatang melalui e-mail [email protected]. Untuk memudahkan para pembaca setia Opinio Juris, Redaksi telah memuat Opinio Juris yang pernah terbit terdahulu pada Perpustakaan Hukum Digital (e-library) Kemlu yang dapat di akses melalui http://pustakahpi.kemlu.go.id. Akhir kata, Redaksi Opinio Juris berharap semoga jurnal ini dapat bermanfaat serta menjadi sarana dalam menyebarluaskan informasi dan wadah sumbangsih pemikiran di bidang hukum dan perjanjian internasional yang berkaitan dengan pelaksanaan hubungan luar negeri. Terima kasih dan selamat membaca.

Redaksi Opinio Juris

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TENTANG PENULIS Dr. iur. Damos Dumoli Agusman

Penulis adalah lulusan dari Fakultas Hukum Universitas Padjajaran Bandung tahun 1987. Penulis menempuh pendidikan lanjutan di University of Hull, Inggris dan memperoleh gelar Master of Arts di bidang Hukum Internasional dan Politik pada tahun 1991. Penulis menjabat Konsul Jenderal RI di Frankfurt pada tahun 2011-2014 dan mendapatkan gelar Doktor dari Geothe-Frankfurt Institute di tahun 2014.

Joannes Ekaprasetya Tandjung Joannes Ekaprasetya Tandjung is an Indonesian diplomat who serves as Deputy Director for Education and Culture at the Directorate for Legal Affairs and Social Cultural Treaties, Directorate General for Legal Affairs and International Treaties in Indonesia's Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He was educated for Master's and Doctoral's degree in The University of Sydney's Law Faculty. This opinion piece is his personal view

Indra Rosandry, SH, LLM Penulis adalah pengamat isu internasional, bekerja di Kementerian Luar Negeri. Tulisan ini merupakan pandangan pribadi penulis.

Rahmat Kurniawan Penulis adalah lulusan Fakultas Hukum Maastricht University tahun 2016-2017, dan Fakultas Hukum Universitas Syiah Kuala 2007-2012. Saat ini bertugas di Dit. Hukum dan Perjanjian Ekonomi menangani isu Pembentukan perjanjian internasional dibidang ekonomi, lingkungan hidup, SDA, bisnis dan HAM

Malvino Aprialdy Mazni Penulis adalah lulusan Hukum lnternasional, Universitas Trisakti dan Master of International Law dari University of Sydney, lulusan Sekdilu 33, Sesdilu 61, pernah bekerja di Dit. Keamanan Diplomatik (2009), Dit Polkam ASEAN (2010-2013), KJRI Frankfurt (2014- 2016) dan Dit. Hukum dan Perjanjian Ekonomi, pernah kursus di Clingendael (2010), The 6th International Future Program, Berlin (2011), Australian Barista School (2012), dan CTBTO course (2016)

Indriati Kusumawardhani Penulis adalah Fungsional Diplomat Muda pada Dit. HP Sosbud, Kementerian Luar Negeri RI dan Mahasiswa Pascasarjana Magister Ilmu Hukum, Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, program Ilmu Hukum Transnasional (semester 2).

Giana Matauseja Penulis adalah Mahasiswa Pascasarjana Magister Ilmu Hukum, Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, program Ilmu Hukum Transnasional (semester 2).

Jurnal Opinio Juris Volume 24 22001199

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PUTUSAN JUDICIAL REVIEW MK ATAS UU NO. 24 TAHUN 2000 TENTANG PERJANJIAN INTERNASIONAL: APA YANG BERUBAH?

Oleh : Dr. iur. Damos Dumoli Agusman*

Sekali lagi MK menyentuh perjanjian internasional. Kali ini pada tanggal 22 November 2018, MK mengeluarkan putusannya atas UU No. 24 Tahun 2000 tentang Perjanjian Internasional yakni menolak 3 dari 4 permohonan pembatalan, yakni terhadap Pasal 2, 9 (2) dan 11 (1).1 Terhadap permohonan yang satu lagi yakni Pasal 10, MK menyatakan bahwa pasal ini bertentangan dengan UUD jika dimaknai bahwa hanya jenis perjanjian tertentu saja yang harus mendapatkan persetujuan DPR (yakni hanya soal politik, perdamaian, hankam, batas wilayah, kedaulatan atau hak berdaulat, HAM, LH, kaidah baru dan pinjaman LN). Dengan putusan ini, maka MK menegaskan kembali bahwa tidak semua perjanjian internasional harus mendapat persetujuan DPR. Dengan demikian suatu kriteria dibutuhkan untuk menentukan perjanjian yang mana yang harus ke DPR. Soal kriteria ini UU telah mengatur hanya 6 jenis perjanjian yang mensyaratkan persetujuan DPR, dan kriteria inilah yang digugat pemohon. Perjanjian yang harus ke DPR tidak bisa dibatasi hanya pada 6 jenis ini, bisa saja di luar keenam jenis ini terdapat perjanjian lain yang membutuhkan persetujuan DPR, demikian dalil pemohon. MK kemudian mengabulkan permohonan yang ini. Dalam perkara uji materi ini, MK pada dasarnya membahas dan menetapkan kriteria baru. Artikel ini mencoba mengungkapkan berbagai dalil baru yang dibuat oleh MK melalui berbagai ratio decidendi-nya, yang menurut Penulis dilakukan melalui proses penafsiran dan rekonstruksi pemaknaan atas kaidah yang selama ini dipahami dan dipraktikkan oleh Indonesia. MK melakukan beberapa terobosan yang membereskan sekaligus menambah (jika tidak “memperkeruh”) beberapa kontroversi akademik selama ini tentang aspek hukum nasional (HTN) dari perjanjian internasional di Indonesia. Problem Kriteria Problem kriteria, yaitu kriteria perjanjian apa saja yang memerlukan persetujuan DPR, adalah persoalan klasik yang ada dalam hampir semua sistem hukum nasional. Di era globalisasi ini tidak mungkin semua

* Penulis adalah Direktur Jenderal Hukum dan Perjanjian Internasional Kementerian Luar

Negeri Republik Indonesia 1 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Putusan Nomor 13/PUU-XVI/2018 tentang

Pengujian Undang-Undang Nomor 24 Tahun 2000 tentang Perjanjian Internasional.


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perjanjian harus disetujui DPR, dan ini telah dikonfirmasi oleh MK. Untuk itu hampir semua negara menetapkan kriteria untuk menentukan mana yang memerlukan persetujuan DPR dan mana yang tidak. Sistem hukum Indonesia sudah mengalami persoalan klasik ini sebelum tahun 1960, yang dibereskan dengan keluarnya Surat Presiden 2826/1960, tertanggal 22 Agustus 1960, kepada Ketua Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. Dalam surat tersebut Presiden Sukarno antara lain menafsirkan bahwa perjanjian internasional yang membutuhkan persetujuan DPR berdasarkan Pasal 11 UUD 1945 tidak mencakup seluruh perjanjian internasional tetapi hanya perjanjian-perjanjian yang bersifat penting saja, yakni yang materi muatannya mengandung hal-hal yang berkaitan dengan politik yang lazimnya dikehendaki berbentuk traktat (treaty). Untuk menjamin kelancaran hubungan antara Pemerintah dengan DPR berdasarkan Pasal 11 UUD 1945, maka Pemerintah hanya akan menyampaikan ”perjanjian-perjanjian yang bersifat penting saja, yakni yang materi muatannya mengandung hal-hal yang berkaitan dengan politik yang lazimnya dikehendaki berbentuk traktat (treaty)”. Sedangkan perjanjian-perjanjian lain (agreement) akan disampaikan kepada DPR sebagai semacam pemberitahuan semata.2 Surat Presiden ini selanjutnya diformalkan dalam UU No. 24/2000 dengan beberapa modifikasi. Menurut UU ini, perjanjian yang memerlukan persetujuan DPR adalah perjanjian yang terkait dengan soal politik, perdamaian, hankam, batas wilayah, kedaulatan atau hak berdaulat, HAM, LH, kaidah baru dan pinjaman LN. Kriteria inilah yang dipersoalkan oleh pemohon dengan dalil bahwa perjanjian di luar kriteria ini bisa saja menimbulkan akibat yang luas dan mendasar, dan seharusnya memerlukan persetujuan DPR. MK setuju dan membongkar kriteria ini serta menggantikannya dengan yang baru. MK selanjutnya memakai kriteria Pasal 11 (2) UUD, yaitu perjanjian harus mendapat persetujuan DPR jika menimbulkan akibat yang luas dan mendasar yang terkait dengan beban keuangan negara dan/atau mengharuskan perubahan atau pembentukan undang-undang. Dengan kriteria ini maka perjanjian tidak lagi terbatas pada 6 jenis perjanjian di atas, namun bisa perjanjian apa saja sepanjang memenuhi kriteria ini. Namun di lain pihak, 6 jenis perjanjian yang biasanya ke DPR tidak lagi otomatis ke DPR jika tidak memenuhi kriteria baru. Dalam hal ini MK telah memperluas kewenangan DPR sekaligus mempersempitnya. 2 Latar belakang lahirnya Surat Presiden No. 2826/1960 dapat dilihat pada buku Damos

Dumoli Agusman, Hukum Perjanjian Internasional: Kajian Teori dan Praktik, (Bandung: Refika, 2010) hal. 11-14.


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Kriteria tersebut tidak lagi bertumpu pada jenis perjanjian namun berdasarkan dampaknya, yaitu jika memenuhi salah satu elemen ini, pertama, menimbulkan akibat yang luas dan mendasar yang terkait dengan beban keuangan negara, kedua, mengharuskan perubahan atau pembentukan undang-undang. Pada dasarnya kriteria ini sangat umum dan akan sulit menguji apakah suatu persetujuan berakibat luas dan mendasar atau membutuhkan perubahan atau pembentukan UU. MK mengakui kesulitan ini sehingga cenderung berpendapat bahwa kriteria ini bersifat dinamis dan tidak dapat ditentukan secara limitatif melainkan harus dinilai secara kasuistis berdasarkan pertimbangan dan perkembangan kebutuhan hukum secara nasional maupun internasional.3 Mengingat kriteria ini bersifat dinamis maka MK selanjutnya mendorong adanya mekanisme konsultasi antara DPR dan Pemerintah guna menentukan apakah suatu perjanjian perlu atau tidak untuk mendapatkan persetujuan DPR. Hasil konsultasi bersifat tidak mengikat namun pada umumnya dihormati oleh Pemerintah.4 Tafsir baru terhadap Pasal 11 UUD Selain persoalan kriteria, MK juga melakukan tafsir baru atas Pasal 11 UUD 1945 khususnya relasi antara ayat (1) dan ayat (2). Pasal 11 ayat (1) menyatakan “Presiden dengan persetujuan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat menyatakan perang, membuat perdamaian dan perjanjian dengan negara lain”. Ayat ini adalah produk dari BPUPKI tahun 1945 dan pada umumnya dimaknai sebagai perjanjian antar negara saja karena pada era ini tidak dikenal perjanjian dengan selain negara. Tidak terdapat kriteria dalam ayat ini sehingga lahirlah Surat Presiden No. 2826 Tahun 1960 kepada DPR yang menetapkan kriteria bahwa perjanjian yang penting saja (yang sering dinamai dengan “traktat”) yang perlu mendapatkan persetujuan DPR.5 Kriteria ini selanjutnya dinormakan dalam UU No. 24 Tahun 2000. Selanjutnya terjadi dinamika pada praktik Indonesia. Penandatangan Letter of Intent antara Indonesia dan IMF tahun 1998 telah melahirkan kontroversi publik tentang perjanjian ini, yang dianggap menimbulkan

3 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Putusan Nomor 13/PUU-XVI/2018, hal. 256. 4 Ibid., hal. 260. 5 Menurut Surat Presiden tersebut maka perjanjian yang harus mendapat persetujuan DPR

adalah yang mengandung materi, antara lain: (i) Hal-hal politik atau hal-hal yang dapat mempengaruhi haluan politik luar negeri; (ii) Ikatan-ikatan yang sedemikian rupa sifatnya sehingga mempengaruhi haluan politik negara; dan (iii) Hal-hal yang menurut UUD atau berdasarkan sistem perundang-undangan harus diatur dengan undang-undang, lihat Damos Dumoli Agusman, Perjanjian Internasional: Kajian Teoritis dan Praktik Indonesia, hal. 16.


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akibat luas dan mendasar yang terkait beban keuangan negara. Namun karena perjanjian ini bukan antara negara melainkan dengan organisasi internasional maka Pasal 11 UUD tidak berlaku, sehingga perjanjian ini diberlakukan tanpa memerlukan persetujuan DPR. Kontroversi ini telah mendorong adanya amandemen pada Pasal 11 sehingga melahirkan ayat (2) yang menyatakan: “Presiden dalam membuat perjanjian internasional lainnya yang menimbulkan akibat yang luas dan mendasar bagi kehidupan rakyat yang terkait dengan beban keuangan negara, dan/atau mengharuskan perubahan atau pembentukan undang-undang harus dengan persetujuan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat”. Berbeda dengan ayat (1), ayat (2) ini telah merumuskan kriteria perjanjian yang harus dengan persetujuan DPR. Kriteria yang sama tidak ada pada ayat (1). Konstruksi kedua ayat ini telah melahirkan pertanyaan tentang apa perbedaan antar perjanjian pada ayat (1) dan pada ayat (2). Catatan rapat MPR saat amandemen pasal ini, yang kemudian diikuti oleh penafsiran para pakar, memaknai frasa “perjanjian internasional lainnya” pada ayat (2) ini sebagai perjanjian antar Indonesia dengan subjek lain selain negara. Frasa ini dikonstruksikan secara logis sebagai perjanjian selain ayat (1) yakni perjanjian selain dengan negara.6 Namun demikian, terdapat anomali pada Pasal 11 ini karena kedua model perjanjian ini memiliki kriteria yang berbeda dalam kaitannya dengan perlu tidaknya persetujuan DPR. Ayat (1) tidak merumuskan kriteria dan menggunakan kriteria yang tercantum pada Pasal 10 UU No. 24 Tahun 2000 sebagai UU penjabarannya. Sedangkan ayat (2) merumuskan kriteria tersendiri yakni “yang menimbulkan akibat yang luas dan mendasar bagi kehidupan rakyat yang terkait dengan beban keuangan negara, dan/atau mengharuskan perubahan atau pembentukan undang-undang harus dengan persetujuan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat”.7 Di lain pihak, kriteria Pasal 10 UU No. 24 Tahun 2000 berlaku baik untuk perjanjian ayat (1) maupun perjanjian ayat (2) UUD. Secara teoritis kriteria yang berbeda ini melahirkan keruwetan tersendiri. MK mendobrak penafsiran ini. Dengan penjelasan yang agak rumit MK menafsirkan secara sistematis Pasal 11 UUD 1945. Menurut MK frasa

6 Pengertian perjanjian internasional “lainnya” adalah perjanjian selain yang dimaksud Ayat

(1) namun tetap dalam kerangka definisi Konvensi Wina 1969 dan 1986, yang berarti perjanjian antara Indonesia dengan subjek hukum internasional lainnya selain negara. Ibid., hal. 25.

7 Damos Dumoli Agusman, Treaties Under Indonesian Law: A Comparative Study, (Rosda: Bandung, 2014), hal. 446-447.


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“perjanjian internasional lainnya” dalam ayat (2) berarti menegaskan bahwa “perjanjian dengan negara lain” pada ayat (1) adalah juga perjanjian internasional. Penegasan ini penting karena menurut MK ada dua konvensi yang berbeda mengatur perjanjian antara negara (Konvensi Wina 1969) dan perjanjian antara negara dengan organisasi internasional (Konvensi Wina 1986). Selanjutnya MK menafsirkan bahwa tidak semua perjanjian internasional yang dibuat oleh Presiden mempersyaratkan adanya persetujuan DPR, melainkan hanya perjanjian-perjanjian internasional yang memenuhi persyaratan umum yang ditentukan dalam Pasal 11 ayat (2) UUD 1945.8 Penafsiran baru MK terhadap Pasal 11 ini mengubah total relasi antara ayat (1) dan ayat (2) yang selama ini dimaknai oleh publik. Kedua ayat ini bukan membedakan antara perjanjian antar negara dengan perjanjian dengan subjek bukan negara, melainkan harus dibaca sebagai satu kesatuan, yang maknanya menjadi: pertama, bahwa “perjanjian dengan negara lain” adalah perjanjian internasional, kedua, tidak semua perjanjian harus ke DPR melainkan yang memenuhi kriteria seperti tertera pada ayat (2). Penafsiran MK ini cukup menarik karena berasumsi bahwa seolah-olah ada persoalan pada kalimat “perjanjian dengan negara lain” pada ayat (1), yang dikuatirkan tidak dimaknai sebagai perjanjian internasional berdasarkan Konvensi Wina 1969. Persoalan ini menurut MK akhirnya diselesaikan oleh ayat (2) dengan frasa “perjanjian internasional lainnya”. Menurut Penulis, dalam praktik selama ini, frasa “perjanjian dengan negara lain” sebenarnya tidak problematik dan selalu dimaknai sebagai perjanjian internasional seperti yang dimaksud oleh Konvensi Wina 1969, sehingga penegasan semacam ini sebenarnya tidak dibutuhkan. Sekalipun diwarnai oleh kontroversi tafsir, upaya MK untuk membereskan anomali Pasal 11 UUD patut diapresiasi. Dengan penafisran ini maka lahirlah kriteria yang sama, baik untuk perjanjian antar-negara maupun untuk perjanjian antara Indonesia dengan subjek bukan negara. Relasi ayat (1) dan (2) UUD yang terkesan tidak kohesif selama ini menjadi lebih terintegrasi. Persetujuan DPR versus Pengesahan? Karena pemohon mendalilkan bahwa istilah “pengesahan” telah menggantikan istilah “persetujuan DPR”, MK akhirnya menyentuh perdebatan tentang makna “pengesahan”. Dalam hal ini yang selalu didebatkan oleh para pakar adalah apakah “persetujuan DPR” dan

8 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Putusan Nomor 13/PUU-XVI/2018, hal. 262-263.


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“pengesahan” (UU pengesahan) adalah satu kesatuan proses atau dua proses yang berbeda. Pandangan Pemerintah selama ini berdasarkan UU No. 24 Tahun 2000 mengartikan kedua istilah itu sebagai satu kesatuan proses, yakni bahwa “persetujuan DPR” diekpresikan melalui UU pengesahan.9 Konstruksi ini mengakibatkan “persetujuan DPR” menurut Pasal 11 UUD 1945 adalah dalam rangka syarat terbitnya UU pengesahan seperti yang dimaksud oleh Pasal 20 UUD 1945. Artinya, “persetujuan DPR” seperti yang dimaksud dalam Pasal 11 adalah identik dengan “persetujuan DPR” menurut Pasal 20 UUD 1945. Pandangan pakar juga mendukung penafsiran Pemerintah selama ini. Prof. Natabaya10 menegaskan bahwa “persetujuan DPR” akan selalu melahirkan “Undang-Undang”. Hamid Attamimi juga memiliki pandangan bahwa “persetujuan DPR” sendiri tidak identik dengan Undang-Undang namun jika “persetujuan DPR” tersebut dituangkan dalam bentuk Undang-Undang tidak pula menyalahi UUD 1945 karena praktik Indonesia yang dilakukan sejak dahulu telah melahirkan konvensi ketatanegaraan11. Penjubahan “persetujuan DPR” dalam bentuk UU merupakan tradisi hukum Belanda yang diwarisi oleh Indonesia. MK kelihatannya berpendapat lain dan memaknai kedua istilah ini sebagai dua proses yang berbeda. MK menegaskan perlunya dibedakan, pertama, antara “persetujuan DPR” dengan “persetujuan untuk terikat pada suatu perjanjian (consent to be bound)”. Kedua, di lain pihak, perlu juga dibedakan antara “pengesahan perjanjian menurut hukum internasional” dengan “pengesahan menurut hukum nasional”. MK melalui pembedaan pertama dengan argumentasinya berhasil mengklarifikasi distorsi publik selama ini. Persetujuan DPR yang hasilnya adalah UU selalu dimaknai sebagai persetujuan untuk mengikatkan diri pada suatu perjanjian. Padahal keduanya adalah proses yang berbeda. Persetujuan DPR (proses internal) diberikan terhadap rencana Pemerintah untuk “menyatakan terikat” pada perjanjian (proses eksternal) yang direfleksikan melalui penyampaikan “instrument of ratification” kepada depository perjanjian itu. Artinya, persetujuan DPR bukan dimaksudkan untuk “consent to be bound”

9 Pemahaman Pemerintah selama ini selalu memaknai UU Pengesahan sebagai bentuk

persetujuan DPR sehingga istilah “persetujuan DPR” mengambil format UU. Dipilihnya format UU untuk menjubahi “persetujuan DPR” karena saat itu produk persetujuan DPR hanya dalam bentuk UU, lihat Damos Dumoli Agusman, Perjanjian Internasional: Kajian Teoritis dan Praktik Indonesia, hal. 118.

10 H.A.S. Natabaya, ”Lembaga Presiden dan Pembuatan Perjanjian Internasional”, 70 Tahun Prof. DR. Harun Alrasid (2000), hal. 186.

11 Hamid S. Attamimi, Peranan Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia dalam Penyelenggaraan Negara, (Program Doktoral Pascasarjana FHUI: Jakarta, 1990), hal. 346.


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terhadap perjanjian itu sendiri. Kerancuan ini muncul karena UU No. 24 Tahun 2000 mendefinisikan istilah “pengesahan” sebagai “consent to be bound” (proses eksternal) namun pada bagian lain menggunakan istilah “pengesahan dengan UU (atau Perpres)”12. Konstruksi UU ini telah memberikan makna ganda pada istilah “pengesahan”. Persoalan kedua, MK mencoba membedakan antara “pengesahan perjanjian menurut hukum internasional” dengan “pengesahan menurut hukum nasional”. Dari argumen ini lahir istilah baru yakni “pengesahan menurut hukum nasional”. Istilah ini oleh MK merujuk pada produk legislasi yakni UU atau Perpres.13 Selanjutnya MK memberi makna baru bahwa pengesahan (menurut hukum nasional) terhadap suatu perjanjian internasional adalah sekaligus sebagai instrumen yang menjadikan suatu perjanjian internasional sebagai bagian dari hukum nasional. Sekalipun agak samar, dari alur pikir ini maka MK cenderung membedakan antara “persetujuan DPR” seperti yang dimaksud oleh Pasal 11 UUD 1945 dengan “pengesahan menurut hukum nasional”. Menurut MK Keduanya tampaknya adalah dua proses yang berbeda. Kecenderungan MK membuat pembedaan ini semakin terkonfirmasi dengan argumennya bahwa “persetujuan DPR” dapat diketahui dan bahkan dapat terekspresi dalam mekanisme konsultasi antara Pemerintah dan DPR dalam bentuk rekomendasi (tidak dalam bentuk UU seperti yang dimaknai Pemerintah). Hal ini dindikasikan oleh MK sbb:

Menurut Mahkamah, karena UUD 1945 tidak mengharuskan adanya bentuk hukum tertentu bagi pernyataan persetujuan DPR terhadap substansi suatu perjanjian internasional yang termasuk ke dalam kriteria Pasal 11 ayat (2) UUD 1945, bentuk hukum berupa rekomendasi sebagaimana yang dipraktikkan selama ini tidaklah bertentangan dengan UUD 1945.14

Pandangan baru ini menambah wacana lain pada perdebatan tentang makna “pengesahan” yang selama ini sudah terdistortif. Dengan pandangan MK ini maka lahirnya istilah baru yakni “pengesahan menurut hukum nasional” yang dimaknai sebagai “pengesahan UU/Perpres yang sekaligus memberlakuan perjanjian kedalam hukum nasional. Proses ini berdiri sendiri dan terlepas dari istilah “persetujuan DPR” seperti yang dimaksud oleh Pasal

12 Diskusi perihal kerancuan ini secara rinci dijelaskan dalam buku Damos Dumoli Agusman,

Perjanjian Internasional: Kajian Teoritis dan Praktik Indonesia, (Refika: Bandung, 2002) hal. 74 - 84).

13 Ibid., hal. 79. 14 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Putusan Nomor 13/PUU-XVI/2018, hal. 261.


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11 UUD 1945. Dalam hal ini, persetujuan DPR bisa saja diberikan tanpa harus melakukan pengesahan menurut hukum nasional. Penafsiran ini akan melahirkan dua kali persetujuan DPR, yakni persetujuan seperti yang dimaksud oleh Pasal 11 UUD 1945 dan persetujuan untuk mengesahkan UU sebagaimana dimaksud pada Pasal 20 UUD 1945. Hal ini tentunya menyisakan pertanyaan juridis yakni, dapatkah DPR menolak mengesahkan UU pengesahan sekalipun sudah memberikan persetujuan dalam rangka Pasal 11 UUD 1945? Sebaliknya, dapatkah DPR mengesahkan UU tersebut sekalipun belum ada persetujuan? Problem juridis ini tentunya harus diselesaikan dalam revisi UU No. 24 Tahun 2000. UU Pengesahan sebagai Pemberlakuan Perjanjian kedalam Hukum Nasional? Sekalipun dalam kalimat yang singkat, MK telah memberi makna baru terhadap UU Pengesahan yakni sebagai instrumen yang memberlakukan perjanjian internasional ke dalam hukum nasional. MK menyatakan15:

Tahapan pengesahan (menurut hukum nasional) juga merupakan konsekuensi dari suatu perjanjian internasional yang mempersyaratkan adanya pengesahan (ratifikasi) sebagai pernyataan untuk terikat (consent to bound) pihak-pihak yang menjadi peserta dalam perjanjian internasional yang bersangkutan. Dengan demikian, tahapan pengesahan (menurut hukum nasional) terhadap suatu perjanjian internasional adalah sekaligus sebagai instrumen yang menjadikan suatu perjanjian internasional sebagai bagian dari hukum nasional.16

Penafsiran ini telah membongkar konstruksi yang selama ini dipraktikkan oleh Indonesia. Seperti telah dijelaskan bahwa selama ini, UU pengesahan hanya dimaknai sebagai bentuk perstejuan DPR (tindakan internal) kepada Pemerintah untuk menyatakan terikat pada suatu perjanjian (tindakan ekternal). Manakala perjanjian tersebut telah mengikat Indonesia maka harus dimaknai bahwa perjanjian itu sudah menjadi bagian dari hukum nasional tanpa perlu suatu instrumen yang memberlakukannya. Dalam hal ini tanggal pemberlakuan perjanjian terhadap Indonesia adalah identik dengan tanggal pemberlakuannya kedalam hukum nasional, dan tidak pernah identik dengan tanggal pemberlakuan UU pengesahannya.

15 Ibid., hal. 262. 16 Ibid., hal. 262.


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Itulah sebabnya dalam praktik, pemberlakuan UU pengesahan adalah tersendiri yakni “pada saat diundangkan, sedangkan pemberlakuan perjanjian itu sendiri, dan pemberlakuannya terhadap Indonesia (dalam hal perjanjian multilateral) selalu berbeda dengan tanggal berlakunya UU pengesahan. Sebagai contoh, UNCLOS 1982 disahkan melalui UU No. 17 Tahun 1985 dan UU ini mulai berlaku tanggal 31 Desember 1985. Sedangkan UNLCOS 1982 itu sendiri mulai berlaku, termasuk terhadap Indonesia, tanggal 16 November 1994.17 Dengan praktik ini maka tidaklah mungkin pembuat UU bermaksud memaknai UU pengesahan sebagai memberlakukan perjanjian kedalam hukum nasional karena akibatnya UNCLOS 1982 akan berlaku dalam hukum Indonesia sebelum Konvensi ini sendiri lahir. Dalil baru MK ini telah menambah kontroversi tentang bentuk hukum UU, yang mulai dimaknai berbeda dalam Putusan MK 2013 pada Judicial Review Piagam ASEAN.18 Pemaknaan baru atas UU pengesahan sebagai pengesahan hukum nasional dalam perkara UU Perjanjian Internasional tampaknya mengoreksi pandangan MK terdahulu pada perkara Piagam ASEAN ini. Dalam perkara Piagam ASEAN, MK berpendapat bahwa UU pengesahan adalah memuat suatu perjanjian kedalam format UU. Piagam ASEAN telah dimuat kedalam UU 38/2008 yang mengesahkannya. Dalam hal ini MK tidak membedakan pengesahan Piagam ASEAN dalam level hukum internasional dan level hukum nasional, sehingga pemindahan format treaty kedalam format UU memiliki konsekuensi bahwa negara pihak harus terikat pada UU ini. Dengan demikian, MK ingin menyatakan bahwa Negara lain harus terikat pada UU 38 Tahun 2008. Karena tidak logis maka MK menyarankan agar pilihan bentuk UU untuk Perjanjian Internasional ditinjau kembali.19 Argumentasi MK ini kelihatannya logis dari sisi hukum tatanegara namun menjadi tidak logis dalam hukum internasional. Banyak negara yang memilih bentuk hukum UU untuk mengekpresikan persetujuan DPR (seperti Belanda dan Jerman), namun tidak pernah dimaknai bahwa negara lain harus terikat pada UU ini.20 Kerancuan pada pandangan MK ini diakibatkan tidak dibedakannya mekanisme pemberlakuan kedalam hukum nasional dan pemberlakuannya dalam hukum internasional, sehingga dengan serta merta pemuatannya dalam UU No. 38 Tahun 2008 dianggap sebagai pemberlakuan Piagam ASEAN itu sendiri baik dalam hukum nasional maupun internasional.

17 Diskusi perihal ini secara panjang lebar dijelaskan dalam buku Damos Dumoli Agusman,

Perjanjian Internasional: Kajian Teoritis dan Praktik Indonesia, hal. 83. 18 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Putusan Nomor 13/PUU-XVI/2018. 19 Ibid., hal. 196. 20 Komentar tentang Putusan MK tehadap Piagam ASEAN dapat dibaca pada:

http://perjanjian-internasional.blogspot.com/p/keputusan-mk-tentang-piagam-asean-arti.html


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Namun demikian tafsir MK ini telah menuntaskan perdebatan klasik tentang makna UU pengesahan ini, dan dengan demikian UU ini akan memiliki dua fungsi yakni di satu pihak memberikan otorisasi kepada Pemerintah untuk melakukan tindakan eksternal mengikatkan diri pada suatu perjanjian (consent to be bound) dan di lain pihak juga sebagai instrumen untuk memberlakukan perjanjian itu kedalam hukum nasional. Konstruksi ini mirip (sekalipun tidak sama) dengan usul Penulis agar mengadopsi “order of execution/Vollzuglehre” Jerman yakni,

In this regard, the law approving a treaty should be assigned the function of expressing a formal approval of Parliament (as originally envisaged by the framers of the Constitution) and at the same time it should constitute an order of execution of the treaty in domestic law (as demanded by the subsequent practice).21

Jika pendekatan ini yang akan ditempuh maka MK telah membuka jalan bagi perdebatan tentang monisme dan dualisme di Indonesia dengan memilih pendekatan hybrid yakni dengan tetap menjaga kekentalan monismenya namun mengakomodasi elemen dualismenya. Kompromi yang dicapai adalah di satu pihak ada proses pengesahan hukum nasional (dualisme) namun proses ini terkait dan merupakan satu kesatuan proses dari pengesahan internasional (monisme). Konsekuensi dari pendekatan ini adalah perlunya mengubah bunyi UU pengesahan (seperti yang dirumuskan dalam UU No. 12 Tahun 2011 tentang Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-undangan). Tanggal pemberlakuan UU pengesahan tidak lagi “pada saat diundangkan” namun harus identik dengan tanggal pemberlakuan perjanjian tersebut terhadap Indonesia. Pada Tahapan Mana Persetujuan DPR diberikan MK mengulas tentang tahapan mana sebaiknya persetujuan DPR diberikan. Rubrik ini untuk menjawab pertanyaan Pemohon yang mempersoalkan bahwa partisipasi DPR dalam pembuatan perjanjian internasional hanya pada bagian akhir saja. MK menggambarkan bahwa sesuai Konvensi Wina 1969 proses pembuatan perjanjian bisa ditempuh melalui tahapan yang disepakati oleh para pihak. Namun dalam praktiknya setidak-tidaknya ada model pentahapan. Pertama model dua tahapan, yakni perundingan dan kemudian penandatanganan (serta langsung berlaku). Kedua, model tiga

21 Damos Dumoli Agusman, Treaties Under Indonesian Law: A Comparative Study, hal. 485.


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tahapan, yakni perundingan, pendandatangan dan ratifikasi.22 Selanjutnya MK menyatakan sbb:

Setelah mendapat kejelasan mengenai hal-hal mendasar di atas, persoalan sesungguhnya tidak terletak pada tahapan mana persetujuan DPR diberikan. Persoalan mendasarnya adalah terletak pada perjanjian internasional yang bagaimana yang memerlukan persetujuan DPR sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 11 ayat (2) UUD 1945 yaitu perjanjian internasional yang lazimnya dalam proses pembentukannya melalui tiga tahapan (perundingan, penandatangan, dan pengesahan).23

MK menegaskan praktik Indonesia berdasarkan UU No. 24 Tahun 2000 bahwa maksud persetujuan DPR pada Pasal 11 ayat (1) dan ayat (2) UUD 1945 adalah terhadap perjanjian internasional yang mensyaratkan adanya “ratification/ pengesahan” yakni yang proses pembentukannya melalui 3 tahapan. Sedangkan pertanyaan tentang “pada tahapan mana perjanjian itu diberikan” menjadi tidak relevan, karena persetujuan ini dapat diberikan pada tahapan manapun sepanjang perjanjiannya adalah melalui tiga tahapan. Hal ini membuka peluang bagi DPR untuk memberikan persetujuan pada tahap awal (prior approval) sehingga akan megubah kebiasaan selama ini yang hanya memberikan persetujuan pada tahap akhir (setelah penandatangan dan sebelum pengesahan internasional)24. MK selanjutnya menekankan bahwa pertanyaan yang penting justru pada “tahap mana mekanisme konsultasi itu dilakukan”. Terhadap pertanyaan ini, menurut MK, merupakan kewenangan pembentuk undang-undang untuk merumuskannya dengan menyelaraskannya dengan kebutuhan dan praktik yang berlaku secara universal.25 Jika persetujuan DPR dapat diekspresikan melalui bentuk rekomendasi dari hasil rapat konsultasi, maka persetujuan dimaksud sudah dapat diperoleh pada tahap dimana UU menentukannya. Memang akan terjadi kontradiksi yakni jika terdapat suatu perjanjian yang prosesnya 2 tahapan atau lebih ekstrim lagi, hanya melalui prosedur sederhana seperti “exchange of notes constituting a treaty”, namun materinya memenuhi kriteria Pasal 11 (2) UUD 1945, apakah persetujuan DPR dapat diabaikan?. 22 Damos Dumoli Agusman, “Perjanjian Internasional: Kajian Teoritis dan Praktik Indonesia”,

hal. 80-83. 23 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Putusan Nomor 13/PUU-XVI/2018, hal. 259. 24 Dalam hukum dan praktik negara-negara, prior approval lazimnya diberikan oleh parlemen

tanpa melihat apakah perjanjian itu subject to ratification atau tidak. Secara harafiah, Pasal 11 UUD 1945 dan Surat Presiden 2826/HK/1960 memberi wewenang prior approval terhadap perjanjian internasional.

25 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Putusan Nomor 13/PUU-XVI/2018, hal. 261.


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Problem ini bersumber dari asumsi yang cenderung mencampuradukkan dan tanpa memilah-milah apa yang menjadi dimensi nasional dan apa yang berdimensi internasional. Dalam hal ini syarat “persetujuan DPR” (yang berdimensi nasional) cenderung harus senantiasa, walau tidak seharusnya, dikaitkan dengan apa kehendak perjanjian internasional (yang berdimensi internasional). Artinya, persetujuan ini tidak diperlukan jika perjanjian itu tidak mensyaratkannya. Pasal 19 ayat (1) UU No. 24 Tahun 2000 memang mengindikasikan tafsir ini karena memuat klausula “sweeping”, yang menyatakan bahwa “pengesahan dilakukan sepanjang disyaratkan oleh perjanjian itu”. MK memang memberi pengaman bagi persoalan ini, yakni dalam pembuatan perjanjian internasional Delegasi RI harus menetapkan posisi Delri bahwa perjanjian ini membutuhkan persetujuan DPR dengan cara merumuskan klausula “subject to ratification” dalam perjanjian itu.26 Namun di lain pihak, menggantungkan syarat persetujuan DPR ke klausula perjanjian internasional secara teoritis dapat dimaknai sebagai menggerogoti kewenangan hukum nasional karena menempatkan syarat hukum nasional dalam posisi yang tunduk pada perjanjian internasional itu sendiri. Namun Penulis sepakat bahwa persetujuan DPR sebaiknya didesain dalam rangka pengikatan diri Indonesia terhadap suatu perjanjian yang sudah siap untuk berlaku (biasanya pada tahap adoption of the text/authentification), dan idealnya dilakukan pada saat norma yang diperjanjikan sudah solid dan tidak akan diiubah lagi. Pemberian persetujuan DPR pada awal pembahasan draft materi dikuatirkan akan menimbulkan masalah jika ternyata terjadi perubahan dinamis yang menyimpang dari draft awal, sehingga dasar pemberian persetujuan DPR menjadi berubah sama sekali. Kesimpulan Putusan MK ini telah membereskan beberapa persoalan yang selama ini menyelimuti perdebatan para pakar. Revisi UU No. 24 Tahun 2000 menjadi sangat vital. Diharapkan revisi yang sedang dipersiapkan oleh Pemerintah dapat membereskan kontroversi ini. Pekerjaan akan menjadi mudah jika penyusun revisi UU memiliki pemahaman yang sama tentang kompleksitas persoalan perjanjian internasional ini. MK telah melahirkan wacana baru sekaligus arah baru bagi perkembangan hukum perjanjian internasional di Indonesia. Ratio

26 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Putusan Nomor 13/PUU-XVI/2018, hal. 259.


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decidendi MK setidak-tidaknya menjelaskan beberapa kebutuhan dan lembaga hukum yang harus dipenuhi dalam sistem hukum di Indonesia terkait perjanjian internasonal. Pertama, persoalan kriteria yang lebih solid dan terukur yang tidak lagi didasarkan pada jenis perjanjian melainkan pada dampaknya, yakni yang menimbulkan akibat yang luas dan mendasar bagi kehidupan rakyat yang terkait dengan beban keuangan negara, dan/atau mengharuskan perubahan atau pembentukan undang-undang. Kriteria ini sudah dapat diadopsi sebagai satu-satunya kriteria dalam revisi UU Perjanjian Internasional yang akan datang. Peluang adanya perbedaan tafsir atas kriteria ini juga terbuka, sehingga bisa saja DPR dan Pemerintah memiliki kesimpulan yang berbeda manakala kriteria ini diterapkan pada suatu perjanjian internasional. Untuk itu revisi UU harus memuat pula mekanisme jika terjadi perbedaan penafsiran atas kriteria ini pada suatu kasus konkrit. Kedua, perlunya diselesaikan persoalan dikotomi atau pembedaan antara “persetujuan DPR” dan “pemberlakuan perjanjian ke dalam hukum nasional”. Dengan semangat menghindari adanya duplikasi peran DPR, serta mengurangi birokrasi politik dalam pembuatan perjanjian internasional, maka partisipasi DPR dalam pembuatan perjanjian sebaiknya dalam suatu proses yang sama. Artinya, persetujuan DPR adalah suatu kesatuan proses politik, yang tidak perlu dipisahkan dari proses pembuatan UU pengesahannya. UU pengesahan seharusnya selalu dimaknai sebagai persetujuan DPR untuk, (i) memberlakukan perjanjian dimaksud kedalam hukum nasonal (fungsi legislasi), sekaligus (ii) memberikan otorisasi kepada Pemerintah untuk mengikatkan diri kepada perjanjian itu di level hukum internasional (fungsi kontrol). Ketiga, soal kriteria dan kebijakan tentang status perjanjian internasional di dalam tata urutan perundang-undangan Indonesia adalah materi konstitusional. Sayangnya UUD 1945 belum mengatur soal ini sementara pengaturannya dibebankan pada tingkat UU revisi. Untuk itu, secara pararel sudah harus dipikirkan adanya amandemen UUD 1945 yang mengatur secara tetap kedua persoalan ini, yakni perihal pembagian kewenangan Pemerintah dan DPR dalam pembuatan perjanjian internasional, serta penempatan perjanjian internasional dalam tata urutan perundang-undangan nasional.


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SEPARATISM IN PAPUA FROM THE LENS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

By : Indra Rosandry*

“The United Nations has never adopted the principle of secession” U Thant

I. INTRODUCTION

Self-determination often encapsulates the hopes of ethnic peoples and groups for freedom and independence. This notion continues to evolve, though often in unpredictable fashion – ultimately secession campaign of ethnic peoples or groups from their parent state. In 2008, the members of the Assembly of Kosovo, acting as the “democratically elected leaders of their people”, declared “Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state”.1 This was considered one of the most controversial step, given the international recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia. The recent secession case in Catalonia have also raised tensions between Catalan secessionists and the Spanish government. While the Kosovo Declaration of Independence and Catalan secession campaign arguably present a unique case in a unique situation”, the sui generis aspect of those cases is much disputed, in particular due to the fact that secession campaigns, from historical and legal contexts, mostly pose challenges to state’s sovereignty and less-to-no recognition being internationally awarded. In view of those cases, questions have been raised about the implications for self-determination beyond decolonization. One such case concerns Papua. Since the post-Indonesian independence, numerous campaigns have been flagged by secessionist group to glorify Papua separation from Indonesia. The Papua secessionist group persistently glorify the credo that Papua had never been part of the Indonesian territory when Indonesia gained its independence on 17 August 1945 and continue to question the legitimacy of People’s Act of Free Choice (Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat or PEPERA). They also attempt to spark global attention in justifying for secession, among others; by framing that People of Papua have long been suffered

* the writer is Deputy Director for Political and Law Enforcement Cooperation at the

Directorate of Legal and Political-Security Treaties, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. The views expressed are his own.

1 Kosovo Declaration of Independence, as set out in UNSC Resolution 1244, www.un.org


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from gross violation of human rights; and intensifying the call for global support for self-determination of the Papuans into the United Nations framework and the meetings of sub-regional organizations such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) and Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). The presentation of petition by Benny Wenda in New York and Geneva demonstrates that the move to seek a referendum on independence for Indonesia’s easternmost province never sleeps with one and only agenda; re-establishing Papua’s right for self-determination. This article examines separation campaign in Papua from the lens of international law by assessing whether the Papua secession movement deserves recognition under international law and from the international community.

II. SELF DETERMINATION AND SECESSION The principle of self-determination has been defined as the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of the people. The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples states that self-determination can be interpreted and referred also to the exercise of the people’s free will to determine and pursue their political and economic and socio-cultural development without external interference.2 It is further recognized as a fundamental international norm under the Charter of the United Nations as enshrined under the 1970 UN Friendly Relations Declaration.3 This principle is instrumental for it dr4ebunked the practice of colonialism and imperialism for hundreds of years. In the development, the rights of self-determination in international law has evolved beyond decolonization which gave birth to right of secession. There are arguably three theories that govern the availability of a right to secede, namely national self-determination theory, choice theory, and lastly remedial secession theory. Out of these three doctrines, remedial secession

2 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

states that “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”. M. Pomerance, “Self-Determination in Law and Practice”, The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, p.98, and A. Rigo Sureda, “The Evolution of the Right of Self Determination: A Study of United Nations”, Practice. Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, p. 299.

3 UN Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly relations among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Friendly Relations Declarations), UNGA Res A/RES 2562) 1970 G.A.O.R. 25th Session


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has raised as a possible alternative way to comprehend separatism.4 This right emerges as a response for a serious and continuous suppression to suffering people of a sovereign state. The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, in addition to the United Nations Charter, however, envision self-determination leading to secession as a matter of last resort only within the decolonization paradigm: here, both conditions for a right to self-determination were met insofar as colonized peoples were oppressed and their colonial governments did not adequately represent their interests. Both declarations also confirmed the importance of the principle of territorial integrity of existing states. They embrace the idea that self-determination could lead to the territorial disruption of existing states only in extreme instances of oppression or colonization. Thus, international law still recognizes that the right to self-determination is not to override, nor is it meant to derogate from territorial integrity.5 Right to self-determination has indubitably became an inevitable aspect of any discussion that concerns with secessionist movement of Papua. Such narrative anchored its underlying premise on the argument that Papua’s place in Indonesia is inherently contentious; that Papua had never been part of the Indonesian territory when Indonesia gained its independence on 17 August 1945, and the Act of Free Choice in 1969 was fraudulently exercised and consequently renders another chance for Papua to carry out its right of self-determination.6 It was thus claimed as never truly a part in Indonesia’s journey to nationhood. In addition, racial dimension often augments this narrative as it is asserted that Papuans are racially distinct from the rest of Indonesia.

III. INDONESIA’S PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND UTI POSSIDETIS JURIS

“Papua has never been and will never be a part of Indonesia”. This credo is a continued denial flagged by separatist supporters, claiming that

4 Dimas Kuncoro Jati, “Is there any rights to secede under international law: A case of West

Papua”, the Indonesian Quarterly, Fourth Quarter, 2015, Vol. 43, No.4, CSIS, p. 366 5 This is enshrined in the 1970 United Nations Friendly Relations Declaration which states

‘Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed us authorizing any action which would dismember or impair the territorial integrity of sovereign states, ibid

6 John Saltford, “the United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua: the Anatomy of Betrayal”, Oxon: Routledge Curzon, 2003; Leon Kaulahao and Mehmet Sukru Guzel, “Modus Vivendi Situation of West Papua”, North Carolina: Lulu Publishing Services, 2018; International Lawyers for West Papua, https://www.ilwp.nl/about-ilwp/


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Papua were never part of Indonesia’s nationhood process and therefore Papuans are entitled to self-determination as they are presently still under an occupation and a colony of Indonesia. It is claimed that since 1898, Papua was part of the Dutch under the name of the Dutch New Guinea. In other words, it was alien territory outside the Netherlands East Indies - the current Indonesian territory. This assertion seems contradict with the historical and political reality of Indonesia’s statehood process. The Netherlands Constitution Pre-Proclamation had never excluded Papua from the Netherlands East Indies. Papua (at that time West New Guinea) was included in the territory of the Netherlands East Indies in the Netherlands Constitution of 1938. In the 1948 Constitution, the terms "the Netherlands East Indies" was changed to Indonesia. Back in the late 1880s, the United Kingdom recognized West New Guinea as part of the Netherlands at the agreement between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom on 16 May 1895 which established a Boundary Line between West New Guinea and East New Guinea (now Papua New Guinea).7 Earlier in the 1885 boundary agreement that divided the boundaries of the East New Guinea region between the South (the British territory) and the North (German territory), the United Kingdom and Germany respected and recognized the rule of the Netherlands over West New Guinea.8 The Netherlands rule in West New Guinea at that time was even recognized by Germany even though it did not form a boundary agreement with the Netherlands.9 It is clear that international law recognizes the totality of the Netherlands’s territory stated under the Netherlands Constitution which is referred to as the Netherlands East Indies. Under the Netherlands Constitution 1938, East Indies territory would become Indonesian territory.10 This is when the doctrine of “uti possidetis juris” becomes relevant in affirming that the boundaries of a newly independent state is made of the boundaries of its predecessor state. The principle of uti possidetis juris (you possess under law) refers to the concept of states emerging from

7 H.F van Panhuyst, W.P. Heere, J.W. Josephus Jitta, Ko Swan Sik and A.M. Stuyt,

“International Law in the Netherlands”, Vol.1, Oceana Publications Inc. Dobbs Ferry, New York (1978), p. 151

8 Paul w. Van der veur, “Documents and Correspondence on New Guinea’s Boundaries”, Canberra: ANU Press (1966), p. 120

9 Ibid 10 The 1938 Netherlands Constitution applies to all Netherlands’ colonies including Indonesia,

Dr. iur. Damos D. Agusman, “Treaties Under Indonesian Law: A Comparative Study”, Jakarta: Rosda, p. 219.


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decolonization presumptively inheriting the colonial administrative borders that they held at the time of independence.11 This principle was latent in the many declarations made by African leaders in the dawn of independence, which confirmed the maintenance of the territorial status quo at the time of independence and stated the principle of respect both for the frontiers deriving from international agreements and for resulting from mere internal administrative divisions. The same was discussed by the chamber of the ICJ in Burkina Faso vs. Republic of Mali, where the compromise by the parties specified that the dispute be based on respect for the principle of ‘intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonization.’12 Indonesia's independence in 1945 cannot be separated from 2 (two) important events that preceded it. First, the surrender of the Netherlands (which at that time controlled Indonesia) to Japan on 9 March 1942 which subsequently became the occupying power in Indonesia. Second, the surrender of Japan to the Allies on 14 August 1945. Before World War II, the Dutch controlled a vast colony in Southeast Asia known as the Netherlands East Indies which includes Borneo, Java, Sumatera, and a large number of other islands known as the Great East.13 On 17 August 1945, the nationalists led by Soekarno and Hatta declared Indonesia’s proclamation, covering the entire territory of the Netherlands East Indies.14 This step was followed by the establishment of a central government, the legislative and judicial institutions, as well as the armed forces and the police. In addition, various public facilities such as transportation, health, education, and judicial system were also in place.15 As stated by Benedict Anderson, "By 1945, for the first time in Indonesian history, there were political organizations continuously and fairly efficiently connecting the rural family.”16

11 Uti Possidetis Juris derived from Roman law (“utipossidetis, itapossideatis” or as you

possess, so you may possess”) during the Roman Empire to determine the colonial territories for praetors of the Roman colonies at that time, Steven R. Ratner, “Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States”, Cambridge: American Journal of International Law, p. 590.

12 Case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), 1986 ICJ 554 13 Ali Sastroamidjojo and Robert Delson, The Status of the Republic Indonesia in International

Law, 49 Columbia Law Review, 1 (1949), 14 Ali Sastroamidjojo and Robert Delson, loc. cit..,p. 344. 15 Ali Sastroamidjojo and Robert Delson, loc. cit.., p. 344. 16 Benedict Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation,

IQ44-IQ45, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961, p. 46.


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There are several factors for a state to be born, inter alia the absence of control from a state that previously has been in charged and the owned power from the people who formed a new government.17 Whatever method is chosen, the status of that new state is the same under international law.18 There are no substantive or procedural requirement regarding the formation of a nation. Bierly states that the establishment of a new country is “a pure question of fact.”19 Indonesia’s Proclamation of Independence on 17 August 1945 is considered as the utmost political expression of the Indonesian people against the thrust of colonialism and discriminatory international political order that favors colonial powers. Indonesia’s Proclamation of Independence is importantly a legal expression that independence is a right and not a courtesy. At the time of its pronouncement, independence can only be given by colonial power. This system was embodied by the United Nations Charter and encapsulated in phrases such as “self-determination” and “non-self-governing territories” which means that independence comes from a “negotiated settlement.” Therefore, when asserting the right of independence by proclaiming it, Indonesia defies the discriminatory nature of international system. A pronouncement that may only be matched in history by the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America on 4 July 1776. By proclaiming independence, Indonesia severed its colonial ties and subjugation not only from the Netherlands and Japan, but from any relationship that it might possibly had with Allied Powers at the time.20 When independence was proclaimed, it was intended to encapsulate all territories of Indonesia, including West Irian (Papua), which before 17 August 1945 was colonized by the Netherlands and by Japan.21

17 Ali Sastroamidjojo and Robert Delson, p. 348, fromi Hyde, International Law 22 (2d ed.1947). 18 Ali Sastroamidjojo and Robert Delson, p. 348. 19 D. Didik Suraputra, Revolusi Indonesia dan Hukum Internasional, UI Press, 1991, p. 11. 20 With the capitulation of Japan to the Allied Powers in 1945, the post-war design as planned

by Allied leaders through the Cairo and the Postdam Conferences was that the territories formerly occupied or annexed by Axis Powers (Japan, Germany and Italy) were to be surrendered to the Allied Powers. US Department of State, Office of the Historian https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/war-time-conferences; Yale Law School, the Avalon Project, text of the Cairo Declaration, http://avalon.law.yale. edu/wwii/cairo.asp.

21 President Soekarno, in his speech in Yogyakarta on 19 December 1961 in the preparation of West Irian Liberation, stated that “Yang dinamakan Indonesia ialah apa yang dulu dikenal sebagai perkataan “Hindia Belanda.” Yang dimaksudkan dengan perkataan Indonesia ialah apa yang orang belanda namakan Nederlandsch Indie, segenap kepulauan antara Sabang dan Merauke yang jumlahnya beribu-ribu ini. Itulah yang dinamakan Indonesia! https://www.lintasparlemen.com/ ini-pidato-presiden-soekarno-saat-pembebasan-irian-barat


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The Netherlands strongly opposed Indonesia’s proclamation of independence and considered that Indonesia was still part of them. After the proclamation of independence, the Netherlands returned to Indonesia with the Allied troops and launched military action to reclaim Indonesia. This raised questions on whether Indonesian sovereignty was still maintained. Sastroamidjojo and Delson (1949) argued that “a country does not lose its sovereignty when an invading country controlls all or part of its territory before the invasion is complete. As long as the important efforts aimed at re-establishing control by the Republic of Indonesia are still ongoing and there are opportunities for success, war cannot be said to have ended.”22 Thus, Dutch’s intention to reclaim its sovereignty over the Indonesian territory failed to gain recognition. A proclamation is one of the methods to express self-determination, and it is a clear statement regarding Indonesia's decolonization from the Netherlands. Although, proclamation does not automatically indicate the fulfillment of juridical requirements under international law where an entity become a statehood pursuant to the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of State 1933, namely having a permanent population, defined territories, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. In regards to this, the follow-up from the proclamation was the making of the 1945 Constitution, which reflected the elements of statehood according to the Montevideo Convention 1933. A proclamation was determined to be a unilateral claim by the Indonesian people to the international community regarding the existence of a new state called Indonesia.23 According to Muhammad Yamin, who linked it with the elements of statehood under international law: “A tool of international law, to declare to the people and the whole world, that the Indonesian people have exercised their right of self-determination to embrace all the rights of independence that include the nation, the homeland, the government, and the happiness of the people.”24 In addition, the proclamation as a form of self-determination was also confirmed by President Soekarno in one of his speeches: "We promote our proclamation to the world as our original rights, our nation's rights, our human rights, our right to life, in the sharpest way possible. We promote our proclamation, as the clearest and most direct appeal to the people and our own nation to determine their own destiny with actions of self determination.”25

22 Ali Sastroamidjojo and Robert Delson, pl. 360. 23 D. Didik Suraputra, Revolusi Indonesia dan Hukum Internasional, UI Press, 1991, p. 10. 24 Ibid 25 Ibid


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Moreover, the first and third paragraph of the 1945 Constitution, have the same meaning and the same hold as the right of self-determination and is in line with Article 1 (2) of the UN Charter: “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”26 In line with the uti possidentis juris principle, the legal status of all regions called the Netherlands East Indies, including Papua or West New Guinea, automatically became the territory of Indonesia which stood at the time of the Proclamation of Independence. Uti possidetis juris even reflected the post-independence situation of the Republic of Indonesia when the Netherlands made a breakdown of territory and even when they formed a state. After Aggression I and II, the Netherlands was gradually forced to return Indonesian territories through bilateral negotiations, and Papua was not a territory that was being excluded from Indonesia.

IV. BILATERAL DISPUTE BETWEEN INDONESIA AND THE NETHERLANDS

In the post 17 August 1945, the Netherlands, in a blatant, deliberate and utter denial of political events that took place in Indonesia, intended to recapture Indonesia and hence carried out massive military action against the newly born republic. The military action against Indonesia attracted the United Nations Security Council as tabled by the Ukrainian Delegation under the agenda “the Indonesian Question.” The failure of the military action forced the Dutch to bring Indonesia to the negotiation table. The efforts appears to maintain the status of Indonesia as an independent state, and thus as a subject of international law. It can be seen from the development surrounding Indonesia's negotiations with the Dutch, from the Linggajati Agreement to Renville. West Irian (Papua) was a non-issue until the Netherlands made it in the 1949 Round Table Conference (Konferensi Meja Bundar – KMB). At the KMB on 2 November 1949, the Dutch finally held back the transfer of West Irian, apart from the contents of the KMB to transfer Indonesian sovereignty in an absolute, full, and unconditional manner. In 1956, Indonesia canceled the KMB Agreement because of the inclusion of West Irian as an area of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in its Constitution of 1956. In this

26 Yudha Bhakti Ardhiwisastra, Imunitas Kedaulatan Negara di Forum Pengadilan Asing,

Alumni, 1999, p.62.


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Constitution, the term "the Netherlands Nieuw-Guinea" first appeared. The actions of the Netherlands violated Article 2 of the KMB which states that disputes about Papua will be resolved bilaterally within one year. Because the transfer of Indonesian sovereignty as a whole has not yet been achieved, mainly because Papua has not yet been handed over by the Dutch, the resolution to the Papua problem was finally carried out through the United Nations' good offices, with the establishment of the 1962 New York Agreement. The main objective of the New York Agreement is the transfer of the Dutch administration to Indonesia through the United Nations (United Nations Temporary Executive Authority/UNTEA) and the implementation of the right of self-determination six years after the administration of West Irian was entirely handed over to Indonesia. Administrative transfer from the Netherlands to UNTEA was carried out on 1 October 1962, and the administrative transfer from UNTEA to Indonesia was carried out on 1 May 1963. Later in the Netherlands Constitution of 1963, the name "Netherlands Nieuw-Guinea" was removed long before PEPERA took place. From these series of historical events, the issue of West Irian in the post-KMB was a matter of bilateral dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands and is not the issue of the United Nations related to decolonization, let alone the problem of non-self-governing territory (NSGT). The Netherlands illegally and unfoundedly registered Indonesia in 1946 and subsequently West Irian in 1950 as a non-self-governing territory to the United Nations. The registration was submitted by the Netherlands to the United Nations as a notification under Chapter XI, Article 73 (e), of the United Nations Charter.

V. NEW YORK AGREEMENT AND THE ACT OF FREE CHOICE

a. Towards the Act of Free Choice (PEPERA) The theatre of dispute was then brought by the Indonesian Delegation to the United Nations with the hope that both countries can resolve their difference through peaceful measures. After series of unsuccessful attempts to make the West Irian as an agenda of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the Indonesian Government resolved itself to take military confrontation against the Netherlands that still occupied the West Irian.27

27 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, “The Question of West Irian in the

United Nations: 1954 - 1957”, Endang: Jakarta, 1958.


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Series of military operations were launched against the Netherlands strongholds in West Irian. Nevertheless, it was only due to the craft of Indonesian diplomacy that successfully combine military and diplomatic pressures that enable the United States to push the Netherlands to the negotiating table.28 The resolution of the dispute then reached its peak with the signing of the New York Agreement on 15 August 1962 though UNGA Resolution No. 1752 (XVII), leading to the PEPERA in 1969. The Agreement, with the good offices of the United Nations, was therefore an amicable resolution to the dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The New York Agreement regulates two main things. The first is the termination of the Dutch colonial government in Papua and the transfer of government from the Government of the Netherlands towards UNTEA to later be transferred from UNTEA to the Indonesian government. Second, it regulated the implementation of the principle of self-determination of the Papuan people to choose whether to join or to separate from Indonesia.29 In regards to the PEPERA mechanism, Article XVIII of the New York Agreement stipulates that Indonesia will make arrangements, with the assistance and participation of the United Nations Representative and his staff, to give the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice. Such arrangements will include: (a) Consultations (Musjawarah) with the representative councils on

procedures and appropriate methods to be followed for ascertaining the freely expressed will of the population.

(b) The determination of the actual date of the exercise of free choice within the period established by the present Agreement.

(c) Formulation of the questions in such a way as to permit the inhabitants to decide (a) whether they wish to remain with Indonesia; or (b) whether they wish to sever their ties with Indonesia.

(d) The eligibility of all adults, male and female, not foreign nationals to participate in the act of self-determination to be carried out in accordance with international practice, who are resident at the time of the signing of the present Agreement and at the time of the act of self-determination, including those residents who departed after 1945 and who return to the territory to resume residence after the termination of Netherlands administration.

28 Subandrio, “Meluruskan Sejarah Perjuangan Irian Barat”, Yayasan Kepada Bangsaku:

Jakarta, 2000; Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, “Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945 – 1965”, Mouton & co: Netherlands, 1973.

29 https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ID%20NL_620815_Agreement concerning West New Guinea.pdf


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Based on the results of the consultations by the Indonesian government accompanied by representatives from the United Nations with representatives council from 8 selected districts in West Irian, there was an agreement to use the method proposed by the Indonesian government, namely plebiscite.30 The results of the vote by all members of the PEPERA Deliberation Council affirmed West Irian as part of Indonesia. From this context, it can be inferred that; First, the involvement of the United Nations was aimed at cooling the bilateral tensions between Indonesia and the Netherlands, which resulted in the ceasefire in 1962. This is not new for the United Nations to provide good offices in bilateral disputes.31 Second, The report of PEPERA was submitted separately by the Indonesian Foreign Minister and United Nations special representative to the United Nations Secretary General for the consideration by the UNGA. The Dutch government accepted the results. UNGA was also ‘correct’ in addressing the result of PEPERA by ‘taking note’ of the report of the UNSG.32 Third, the notion of PEPERA as confirming Papua’s integration into Indonesia was shared by many scholars. Rigos-Sureda said that‘ the attitude taken by the UNGA can be assumed to mean that West Irian (Papua) was regarded as an ‘integral part’ of Indonesia and, therefore that there was no need for it to go through the process indicated by the UNGA to achieve self-determination’ under decolonization scheme.33 b. Flawed inthe PEPERA? The separatist supporters claimed that PEPERA was legally flawed because it did not use the one man one vote method, did not involve all Papuans, and was full of intimidation, coercion and other forms of human rights violations. Does this allegation correspond with the facts? First, as referred to in the Charter of the United Nations, it rather, Sukarno said in his speech on 4 May 1963, as an "internal self-determination". Second, the New York Agreement has regulated the matter related to the voting 30 PEPERA was attended by 1026 members of the PEPERA Deliberation Council which

represented 809327 Papuan people in 8 districts, consisting of Merauke, Jayawijaya, Paniani, Fakfak, Sorong, Manokwari, Biak and Jayapura. Andri Hadi, Hak Penentuan Nasib Sendiri dan Penerapannya pada Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat 1969 di Irian Barat menurut Hukum Internasional, Disertasi, Universitas Padjadjaran, p. 227

31 The United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan was established to resolve conflict involving the Soviet Union forces occupation in Afghanistan. The good offices resulted in the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1988 which consisted in the peace agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan. https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/ ungomap/background.html

32 Operating Paragraph 1 UNGA Res No. 2504, https://www.un.org 33 Jamie Trinidad, Self-Determination in Disputed Colonial Territories, Cambridge University,

2018, p.30.


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method. Article XVIII requests for the method be discussed first with traditional leaders. The results of this deliberation are used as the basis for voting in PEPERA, and it is not the "one man one vote" method. Third, the results of PEPERA was accepted by the UNGA under Resolution 2504 (XXIV) and confirms the fact that Papua (West Irian) as part of Indonesia. At the time of the adoption of Resolution 2504 (XXIV), none of the countries opposed it, including the Netherlands. The PEPERA process must be interpreted not as an implementation of UNGA No. 1514 and No. 1541 as is commonly done by the United Nations in the process of decolonization, but as fulfilment of Indonesia's obligations derived from the New York Agreement. The uniqueness of the PEPERA can be distinguished from the case of the French Polynesia or East Timor’s self-determination.

VI. WHAT WENT WRONG WITHPAPUA’S SECESSION CAMPAIGN?

From historical and legal context, justifying the secession campaign of Papua from Indonesia is problematic. Hudson (1986) mentions that several criteria must be met for a right to secession to exist as customary international law: (1) a right must be recognized by a number of states through continuous or repetitious, concordant practice over considerable period of time; and (2) there must be general acquiescence or consent to this practice by other states; and (3) there authority supporting the proposition that a new rule of customary international law can be established within a relatively short period of time. None of these criteria can justify Papua to secede from Indonesia. Rosin (2018) says that international law favors the right to secession only in the following cases: peoples subjected to foreign subjugation, peoples subjected to colonial rule, and peoples subjected to racial-based rule.34 Secessionist states that fit within this model, in theory, should gain justification to become a state. Secession argument on this criteria is very difficult to craft for Papua. The people of Papua have enjoyed meaningful internal self-determination rights. Almost 2.9 million people in Papua and West Papua Provinces currently enjoy development in many areas, from infrastructure, education, and quality of human capital as well as lower unemployment and poverty levels. More importantly, Papua as an integral part of Indonesia since 17 August 1945 serves as an uncontested argument. Thus, international law does not appear to support Papua separatist movement.

34 Samuel Rosin, “the Legality of Catalan Secession”, Institute for Politics and Society Policy

Paper, June 2018


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Furthermore, the accusation from secessionist groups that the 1969 ‘act of free choice was ‘fatally’ flawed exhibits their failure to grasp the importance of the act of free choice as part of integral solution to the Indonesia-Netherlands bilateral conflicts on the basis of the New York Agreement 1962. The result of which confirms the rightful place of Papua as part of Indonesia and hence confirm international recognition on the sovereignty of Indonesia. Were it flawed, had the Netherlands already rejected the result. As the Party to the New York Agreement 1962, the Netherlands was the only party that entitled to invoke such defect. The fact showed that the Netherlands accepted it and no single country voted against the GA Resolution 2504 (XXIV). Kosovo secession from Serbia, Catalan secession attempt from Spain as well as Biafra and Katanga cases, looked upon relatively unfavorably by international law, rather present a controversial move that may not set international precedent. Hence, the legal basis for the remedial secession argument in the case of Papua, is therefore tenuous at best–there is almost no state practice to back up this campaign in the international realm.

VII. CONCLUSION

International recognition on Indonesia’s sovereignty, where Papua is an integral part of the world’s largest archipelagic state, is clear. Problems that might be exploited from the issue of Papua are political issues rather than the issue of self-determination. While there is a possibility that this issue might lead to conditioning of Papua so that it has the potential to become an issue of remedial secession, the demand for re-processing self-determination in Papua has no basis because under international law. Self-determination can only be done once and cannot be repeated. It seems that Papua have long intentionally and mistakenly been framed that they are yet entitled to the right of self-determination. If so, what is being advocated by the separatist supporters? They turned out to be campaigning for "separation of territory" rather than "self-determination". The movement will go nowhere. Separation of territory has no basis under international law. Despite numerous attempts, in practice, the establishment of secession movement as an accepted norm of customary international law, beyond colonization, is not imminent. The failure of the separation of Catalonia from Spain is a lesson-learned that separation campaigns, on whatever grounds for as long as they like, do not receive the recognition they need from both the international law and the international community to form a new state.


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

UN Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly relations among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Friendly Relations Declarations), UNGA Res A/RES 2562) 1970 G.A.O.R. 25th Session.

M. Pomerance, “Self-Determination in Law and Practice”, The Hague:

Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, p.98, and A. Rigo Sureda, “The Evolution of the Right of Self Determination: A Study of United Nations”, Practice. Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff.

Dimas Kuncoro Jati, “Is there any rights to secede under international law:

A case of West Papua”, the Indonesian Quarterly, Fourth Quarter, 2015, Vol. 43, No.4, CSIS.

Supreme Court of Canada, Reference of Secession of Quebec, 1998. Samuel Rosin, “the Legality of Catalan Secession”, Institute for Politics and

Society Policy Paper, June 2018 UNGA Res 1514 (XV)/14 December 1960

http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml Lori F. Damrosch, Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter,

and Hans Smit, “International law: cases and Materials”, 4th ed, American Case Book Series, West Group, 2001.

Steven R. Ratner, “Drawing a Better Line: UtiPossidetis and the Borders of

New States”, Cambridge: American Journal of International Law Case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), 1986 ICJ 554 John Saltford, “the United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West

Papua: the Anatomy of Betrayal”, Oxon: Routledge Curzon, 2003 Leon Kaulahao and Mehmet SukruGuzel, “Modus Vivendi Situation of West

Papua”, North Carolina: Lulu Publishing Services, 2018 Ali Sastroamidjojo dan Robert Delson, The Status of the Republic

Indonesia in International Law, 49 Columbia Law Review, 1949 D. Didik Suraputra, Revolusi Indonesia dan Hukum Internasional, UI Press, 1991


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International Lawyers for West Papua, https://www.ilwp.nl/about-ilwp/ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/30/west-papua-independence

petition- is-rebuffed-at-un US Department of State, Office of the Historian https://history.state.gov/

milestones/ 1937-1945/war-time-conferences; Yale Law School, the Avalon Project, text of the Cairo Declaration,

http://avalon.law. yale.edu/wwii/cairo.asp. https://www.lintasparlemen.com/ini-pidato-presiden-soekarno-saat-

pembebasan-irian-barat/ Dr. iur. Damos D. Agusman, “Treaties Under Indonesian Law: A

Comparative Study”, Jkt: Rosda Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, “The Question of

West Irian in the United Nations: 1954 - 1957”, Endang: Jakarta, 1958. Subandrio, “Meluruskan Sejarah Perjuangan Irian Barat”, Yayasan Kepada

Bangsaku: Jkt, 2000 https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ID%20NL_620815

_Agreement ConcerningWestNewGuinea.pdf Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, “Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy:

1945 – 1965”, Mouton & co: Netherlands, 1973 https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/ungomap/background.html Andri Hadi, “Hak Penentuan Nasib Sendiri dan Penerapannya pada

Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat 1969 di Irian Barat menurut Hukum Internasional”, Bandung: Disertasi Universitas Padjajaran.

UNGA Res No. 2504, https://www.un.org. Jamie Trinidad, Self-Determination in Disputed Colonial Territories,

Cambridge University, 2018. http://dailypost.vu/news/vanuatu-presents-draft-un-resolution-for-west-

papua-to-pacific/article_f57f6701-d92b-5d82-b271-1d18fab80bb3.html


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ALLURING CREATIVE ECONOMY: FROM INDONESIA TO THE WORLD

By : Joannes Ekaprasetya Tandjung1

Indonesia hosted a world-class conference on Creative Economy in Bali last November (November 6-8, 2018). Co-chaired by Creative Economy Agency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, the conference was attended by more than 1500 participants from 50 countries. The Conference addressed four main issues namely social cohesion, regulation and policy, marketing, ecosystem and funding. Before we dwell into the discussion in the Conference, it is a must to understand the concept of creative economy. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development/UNCTAD, creative economy is the sum of all the parts of the creative industries, including trade, labour and production. UNCTAD notes that the creative industries are among the most dynamic sectors in the world economy providing new opportunities for developing countries to leapfrog into emerging high-growth areas of the world economy. Creative Economy in Indonesia The Creative Economy Agency is the focal point on creative economy in Indonesia, as emanating from Presidential Regulation Number 6/2015 on Establishment of Creative Economy Agency. Led by Mr. Triawan Munaf, the agency is tasked to develop creative economy to enhance the country's income. In 2015, President Joko Widodo declared "creative economy era", in which he underlined the importance of creative economy becoming the backbone of Indonesia's economy. This declaration mirrors Indonesia's commitment to promote creative economy sector. The agency addresses 16 sub-sectors of creative economy, namely application and game development, architecture and interior design, visual communication design, product design, fashion, films, video animation, photography, crafts, culinary, music, publishing, advertisement, performing arts, sculpture, television and radio. From the 16, there are 3 champion sub-sectors namely culinary, fashion and crafts which are top three

1 Joannes Ekaprasetya Tandjung is an Indonesian diplomat who serves as Deputy Director

for Education and Culture at the Directorate for Legal Affairs and Social Cultural Treaties, Directorate General for Legal Affairs and International Treaties in Indonesia's Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He was educated for Master's and Doctoral's degree in The University of Sydney's Law Faculty. This opinion piece is his personal view.


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contributors to Indonesia's Gross Domestic Product. Other potential sub-sectors namely animation and video, visual communication design, application and game development. Locally, the creative economy sector gets more productive with each coming year. There is an enhancement of the sector's contribution to Indonesia's GDP from IDR 852 trillion in 2015 to IDR 990.4 trillion in 2017. The sector employs 17.4% of total works force in Indonesia in 2017, an increase from 13.9% in 2015. 14 from 100 Indonesian citizens are now working in the creative economy field. Export of this sector values at USD 22.1 billion in 2017, another major increase from USD 19.4 billion in 2015. At the international stage, in 2015, the total trade flows of creative economy reached USD2.250 billion. The sector employs 29.5 million work force, in which 1 from 100 citizens of the world work in this field. The entertainment sub-sector contributes USD 2.2 trillion to the world economy, equals to 230% oil exports from the OPEC Member States. According to Creative Economy's data, Indonesia is the third creative economy largest exporter, after the US and Republic of Korea. An effective strategy is needed for Indonesia's creative economy to be more competitive These data have shown significant potentials of Indonesia's creative economy. Yet, for exports of creative economy to access international market, the formulation of effective strategy is imperative. This strategy includes regulation, funding and development of human resources, including, Firstly, the enactment of law and regulation on creative economy which aims to provide legal certainty to the creators and workers of the 16 sub-sectors. Since 2015, the draft Law on Creative Economy is still being discussed in the House of Representatives. As the general election will take place less than three weeks, lawyers, creative economy's actors and community have a high expectation that this draft Law could be enacted in a timely manner. Those working in the field are hopeful that the draft Law would be able to serve as legal basis not only on creative economy but also the issues related to field including tax and intellectual property. Vivid differences in tax percentage from movie to fashion from culinary to games and other creative economy sub-sectors make it challenging for the creative economy entrepreneurs. Patent and copyright protection are urgently required by employees and employers working at creative economies, such as film, fashion, radio. In the US, for example, Hollywood's movie industry as well


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as American fashion designers, receive patents and copyrights for their inventions/creations. Secondly, although creative economy is based on culture and creativity, the development still needs funding. Incentives and funding access are normally required by the creative industry business players, particularly the small and medium enterprises. UNCTAD research in 2016 shows that in order to promote its creative economy, including the world famous K-Pop and K-Drama, the Republic of Korea prepared investment as much as USD 176 million and 200 billion Won. Thirdly, with regard to human resources, capacity development program for creative industry's entrepreneurs must be implemented in the far-reaching cities and villages from Sabang to Merauke. This programme must touch the communities living in the remote islands as well as in the border area of Indonesia. A tailor-made and focused capacity building programme that is based upon the potentials of each province or regency will attract younger generation rather than a one-size-fits-all. Millennials who are studying at General and Specific Programme High School could benefit from this programme, for example, craftmanship programme for Papua is different than a similar programme in Sulawesi. This type of programme could also put forward influential mentors who have been successful in leading their business. How does the Foreign Ministry fit in? As I earlier wrote, it was only a few months ago that Indonesia hosted the first ever World Conference on Creative Economy/WCCEin Bali. Foreign Minister, H.E. Mrs. Retno Marsudi, along with Chair of Creative Economy Agency, served as Co-Chairs. At the opening of the Conference, Foreign Minister emphasized that "Creative economy must be truly inclusive and accessible to everyone, all walks of life". The question poses, who would be better placed than a diplomat, who among others are tasked to be marketeers by Indonesian President Joko Widodo, to promote Creative Economy's products to abroad, in order to ensure creative economy be inclusive and accessible? Thus, Indonesia's Foreign Ministry and its diplomats have to play a crucial role in promoting Indonesia's creative economy to the international stage. Within the economic diplomacy framework that is conducted by the Foreign Ministry, the products should be highlighted as one of the most sellable exports to foreign markets. Batik, rendang, bamboo bag, to name a


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limited few. The Foreign Ministry and its 131 Indonesian Embassies/Missions/ Consulates abroad should serve as the bridge that connects not only Creative Economy Agency but also the entrepreneurs of creative economy with their foreign counterparts. Through formulation of a detailed mapping mechanism, Foreign Ministry through its Missions would be able to make a comprehensive report on the potential market for creative economy's products. As an illustration, Indonesian Consulate General in Los Angeles could bridge the Indonesian movie industry's business owners and artists with their Hollywood counterparts. Indonesian embassies located in the world's fashion capitals, such as Paris, London, Rome, New York, Tokyo and Hong Kong, could assess the development of fashion market and report back which type of Indonesian fashion that would be sold out instantly in the foreign markets. As resulted from the WCCE, the Penta-Helix synergy, a synergy of academics, business, community, government and media, must be developed. This synergy aims to develop a sound and enabling environment, regulations and ecosystem. The Foreign Ministry with its massive network could serve as a catalyst for developing this synergy. In other words, Indonesia has to maintain the alluring and captivating effect of its creative economy. While at the same time, this effect has to deliver real and fruitful outcomes to advance the creative industries locally from Sabang to Merauke. It is not an easy job at all. But, yes, there is a way when there is a will. Both Ibu Retno and Bapak Triawan sang Queen's "We will rock you" with the attendees at the finale of the WCCE opening. The world witnessed the closing of WCCE with a bang, through the inception of Bali Agenda for Creative Economy that mandated the establishment of Center for Excellence of Creative Economy in Indonesia. What lies ahead, therefore, is to ensure that the commitments spoken not only by the Government's representatives but also private sector, academics and other related stakeholders are do-able. Let us all now ask ourselves, do we really want our creative economy products to rock the world, or in other words to become number one exports in the global market? If we do, then follow President Joko Widodo's advice wholeheartedly: to start work, work and work in achieving our desired goal.

Jakarta, March 27, 2019


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THE ROLE OF NATIONAL CONTACT POINTS OF THE OECD IN PROMOTING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

By : Rahmat Kurniawan

Abstraks

Keywords: Bisnis dan HAM, CSR.

Sebagai salah satu usaha dalam mengatasi fenomena 'legal vacuum' terhadap tindakan multinational enterprises (MNEs), negara khususnya negara anggota OECD menyusun dan mengadopsi OECD Guidelines for Multinationals on Responsible Business Conduct pada tahun 1976. Salah satu hal yang membuat Guidelines ini menarik adalah adanya kewajiban pembentukan institusi bernama National Contact Points (NCPs) yang salah satunya tugasnya adalah menyediakan wadah mediasi jika ada dugaan pelanggaran substansi Guidelines tersebut. Sehubungan dengan hal tersebut, tulisan ini mencoba menjelaskan peran NCPs dalam mempromosikan Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Tulisan ini diharapkan dalam menjadi lessons learned bagi Pemri dalam penanganan isu bisnis dan HAM secara umum dan isu CRS secara spesifik. Sebagai informasi, OECD Guidelines tersebut terbuka untuk diadopsi oleh non- OECD countries.

I. Introduction Up till now, in the era of globalization when the activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) have increased significantly, there is no direct international legal obligation requires MNEs to respect human rights, social and environmental norms.1 These MNEs are not compelled to abide the international law as they are not classified as the subject of international law.2 In fact, they are also capable of averting legislation enforced by national law due to their mobility.3 These situations make the MNEs are not exposed to adequate regulations4 - a situation commonly described as a "legal vacuum5."

1 Leyla Davamejad, In the Shadow of Soft Law: The Handling of Corporate Social

Responsibility Disputes under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2011, 2011, p. 353.

2 Ibid. 3 Miriam Mafessanti, "Corporate Misbehavior & International Law: Are There Alternatives to

Complicity", South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business, Vol. 6, 2010, p. 167. 4 Leyla Davarnejad, op. cit., p. 354. 5 David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights

Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 44:4, 2004, p. 935.


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As a result, states have worked hard to fill in this "legal vacuum" situation6 by concluding soft laws. One of the soft laws created was Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinationals on Responsible Business Conduct7 in 1976. Governments, adhered8 to this OECD Guidelines, are obliged to suggest the substances of the Guidelines to MNEs operating within or from their territories.9 Thus, the Guidelines could be regarded as a code of conducts that are expected to be performed by MNEs when operating.10 In another word, the MNEs are not legally bound by the Guidelines. However, what makes these OECD guidelines are unique is that they are the only framework with an application mechanism - the National Contact Points (NCPs).11 All adhering governments of the OECD Guidelines have an obligation to set up the National Contact Point in their territory.12 The mandate of the NCPs is to further the effective implementation of the Guidelines.13 In performing its mandate, the NCPs are functioned 1) to conduct dissemination activities on the OECD Guidelines14, and 2) to provide mediation procedure in order to address complaints that arise relating to the breach of the Guidelines implementation by MNEs15, called specific instances.16 With regard to the second function, the NCPs can be regarded as the only non-judicial grievance mechanism institution, giving access to remedy to stakeholders intending to bring complaints related to MNEs' activities within or from the territory of the adhering governments17.

6 Larry Cata Backer, Rights and Accountability in Development (Raid) V Das Air and Global

Witness V A frimex: Small Steps Toward an Autonomous Trans-national Legal System for the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 10,2009, p. 3.

7 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct 2011. 8 Roel Nieuwenkamp, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible

Business Conduct, The Dovenschmidt Quarterly, 2013, p. 172. Currently, the Guidelines have been subscribed by 34 OECD Members and 11 non - OECD countries.

9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., p.171. 11 OECD, Implementing the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: The National

Contact Points from 2000 to 2015, OECD Publishing, 2016, p. 11. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Roel Nieuwenkamp, op. cit., p.l72. 16 OECD, op. cit., p.13. 17 ibid.


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From the introduction above, it can be argued that the NCPs seem to have a role in promoting corporate social responsibility (CSR). However, given the fact that the NCPs derive their power from the OECD guidelines which are non-enforceable toward MNEs - soft law nature18, it is interesting to question 1) have the NCPs played this role effectively through their two functions19 in practice? and 2) what are the challenges faced by the NCPs in performing their two functions so far? In order to answer the questions, this research paper analyzes, in part II, whether the NCPs have run their functions efficiently in a real setting as part of promoting CSR. In part III, this research paper then discusses challenges faced by the NCPs in performing their functions. Finally, Part IV delivers conclusion about the role of the NCPs in promoting CSR. II. Reviewing the Work of NCPs to Promote the OECD Guidelines and

Dealing with the Specific Instances This chapter analyzes whether the NCPs have run their functions efficiently in the real word setting given the fact that their power comes from the OECD Guidelines which are soft law in nature and voluntary for MNEs. This chapter is divided into two subsections. The first subsection discusses the implementation of the NCPs's first function to promote the OECD Guidelines. The next subsection is to consider the NCPs' second function to deal with the specific instances. a. Analyzing the work of the NCPs to promote OECD Guidelines The NCPs' function to promote is inherently essential to increase the profile of the Guidelines.20 Other NCPs; the enterprise community, labor organizations, NGOs; and governments of non-adhering countries are the three targeted groups with regards to the promotion.21 In the real setting, NCPs have known to develop a wide range of materials to promote the Guidelines such as producing brochures, translations of the text of the Guidelines, creating websites and holding conferences.22 An example of an NCP that utilize such materials is the Norway NCP which even goes beyond the materials like creating online advice on human rights due

18 Leyla Davamejad, op. cit., p. 352 19 OECD, op. cit. Two NCPs functions are to conduct dissemination activities on the OECD

Guidelines and to provide mediation procedure in order to address complaints that arise relating to the breach of the Guidelines implementation by MNEs, called specific instances.

20 OECD Guidelines, op. cit., commentary on the procedural guidance for NCPs, para. 13. 21 Ibid. 22 OECD, op. cit., p. 61.


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diligence.23 In this method, the Norway NCP assigned a research organization to produce a report providing human rights due diligence advice to businesses which then will be issued online.24 Moreover, the purpose of promoting the guidelines is turned out not only to raise awareness of amongst multi-stakeholders but also to encourage policy coherence on responsible business conduct.25 For instance, the NCP of Switzerland in 2015 helped its government to produce a CSR position paper and action plan which emphasize the OECD Guidelines as an essential tool of the CSR strategy of its country.26 Following the production of the CSR action plan, there are two large Swiss business associations published a CSR brochure using the CSR action plan as their reference.27 Having knowledge about the work of the NCPs in performing the function above, it can be argued that their contribution is significant in disseminating the importance of the Guidelines for responsible corporate conduct. Some of the NCPs like the Norway NCP even performs this function creatively by providing a various method of promotions including an online advice on human rights due diligence. If this creative promotion can be implemented properly in all adhere governments, it could be argued that the NCPs may attract not only large enterprises but also small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which known to have limited resources. By taking advantage of such creative promotions, the SMEs may implement the guidelines in their operation without costing a large amount of money. Also, by helping its government to produce the CSR action plan, the NCP in the Switzerland has indirectly promoted the guidelines resulting in the adoption of the CSR action plan by the Swiss businesses. Thus, these examples could prove the NCPs has performed their function efficiently as part of promoting CSR by making MNEs implement the guidelines even though the guidelines does not bind the MNEs. Furthermore, as a suggestion, the target ofNCPs' promotional activities should not only be directed to the three groups targeted mentioned above

23 Responsible Business Initiative, Norway National Contact Point Peer Review Process 2013,

available at http://www.responsiblebusiness.no/files/2014/02/Peer-review-reportNCPNorway.pdf, visited on 28 February 2017.

24 Ibid. 25 OECD, op. cit., p. 62. 26 Switzerland NCP, Annual Swiss NCP Report to OECD 2015, available at https://www.seco.

admin.chldam/seco/en/dokumente/Aussenwirtschaft/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/NKP/Jahresberichte/Jahresbericht_2015.pdf.download.pdf/Annual_Report_Swiss_NCP_2015.pdf, visited on 28 September 2017.

27 OECD, op. cit., p. 62.


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but also to individuals. This extension could be crucial because individuals could give more pressure toward MNEs to adopt responsible business conduct.28 For instance, after receiving information on the importance of the Guidelines from the NCPs, these individuals, who are mostly the consumers of MNEs' product, may help to put more pressure by purchasing only the goods that are produced in accordance with the Guidelines.29 b. Analyzing the work of the NCPs to address specific instances Another function of the NCPs is to provide a platform called the specific instance mechanism with the purpose of resolving issues that emerge relating to the implementation of the Guidelines.30 The NCPs provide the opportunity to the business community, worker organizations, other nongovernmental organizations, and other interested parties to become the parties to the specific instance mechanism.31 Concerning its procedure, the specific instance mechanism could be initiated when the NCPs receive a complaint.32 Following receipt of the complaint, the NCPs then will determine whether the issue of the complaint raised merit further examination by issuing a statement.33 In case the issue raised merit further examination, the NCPs will continue the process by offering good offices such as mediation to help the parties in solving the issue.34 If the agreement reached by the parties, the NPCs will publish a report describing at least about the issue and the substance of the agreement.35 Meanwhile, if there is no agreement reached or when a party does not show its willingness to participate in the procedures, the NCPs then will issue a statement.36 The statement should describe at least why the issues raised merit further examination, the recommendations to implement the Guidelines as well as why the agreement could be failed.37 Nevertheless, having known the procedures above, it is important to stress that specific instances must not be classified as legal cases.38 The NCPs are not like courts in national judicial system meaning that they have no power to force parties to involve in the mediation process or to give

28 Doren McBarnet, Corporate Social Responsibility beyond Law, through Law for Law,

University of Edinburgh, School of Law, Working Paper, 2009, p.ll. 29 Ibid. 30 OECD Guidelines, op. cit., implementation in specific instances. 31 Ibid., para 1. 32 Ibid., para 2. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., para 3b. 36 Ibid., para 3c. 37 Ibid. 38 OECD, op. cit., p. 29.


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sanctions.39 However, they can still provoke significant consequences through their statements after concluding specific instances process.40 This could happen because their statements, as discussed in the previous paragraph, may include determination of the NCP's views whether the MNEs follow the Guidelines or not.41 Hence, the reputation of the MNEs may be effected when the NCP publicly states that their activities have not met the expected standard of responsible corporate conduct under the Guidelines.42 This condition has forced the MNEs to engage with the procedures of the specific instances and to adjust their behavior as expected under the Guidelines.43 An example of this situation could be found in the UK NCP in 2014 in the case of Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB) v Formula One World Championship Ltd.44 This claim was brought by the ADHRB to the UK NCP concerning the non-adherence of the Formula One (Fl) Grand Prix under human rights chapter of the Guidelines in Bahrain. Through mediation provided by the UK NCP, both parties agreed that the Formula One would adjust its policy by committing to honor the human right norms in its activity and to adopt a due diligence policy in Bahrain.45 Furthermore, when an MNE does not show its willingness to participate in the meditation, the NGOs often use the statements issued by the NCPs as a tool to damage the trust of its investors.46 For instance, in 2008, the UK NCP received a complaint by an NGO named Survival International accusing that Vedanta (UK based enterprise) had violated the Guidelines.47 Having offered a mediation by the NCP, the Vedanta rejected it.48 A final statement then was issued by the NCP stating the Vedanta refused to engage in the mediation and violated the provision of the guidelines on

39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 United Kingdom NCP, Final Statement following agreement reached in complaint from Americans

for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB) against Formula One Group companies 2015, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment datalfile/ 440231/bis-15-305finalstatement-following-agreement-reached-in-complaint-from-adhrb-against-formula-one-group-companies.pdf, visited on 01 March 2017; OECD, op. cit., p. 43.

45 Ibid. 46 Roel Nieuwenkamp, op. cit., p.171. 47 OECD, Final Statement by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for

Multinational Enterprises, available at https://www.oecd.org/cmporate/mne/43884129.pdf, visited on 01 March 2017.

48 Roel Nieuwenkamp, op. cit., p.l71.


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human rights.49 Other NGOs then utilized the statement to lobby the investors of Vedanta resulting in them selling their shares.50 Hence, from all explanations above, it could be argued once again that the NCPs have played their roles effectively in promoting CSR. Even though they are non-binding toward them MNEs, the statements of the NCPs could have an influence on the credibility of the MNEs. The impact of the statements thus has forced the MNEs to change their behavior as expected under the Guidelines. It can also be argued that the existence of the NCPs has become a bridge in the embodiment of the concept of CSR beyond the law51. Through its work, the NCPs have indirectly forced the MNEs to not only abide the prevailing national legislations but also to address the social, environmental, ethical and other important issues in order to maintain the reputation.52 Besides, when failing to reach an agreement or refusing a mediation offer, the statements issued by the NCPs will be utilized by the NGOs to lobby the investors of the MNEs resulting in them selling their shares. Hence, despite their not binding toward MNEs, the statements could present grave consequences on the existence of such MNEs.53 III. Examining Challenges Faced by the NCPs in Performing their

Functions Having analyzed in the previous part whether the NCPs run their functions effectively, this part examines any challenges that the NCPs faced in conducting their functions as part of promoting CSR. Specifically, this part focuses on challenges faced by the NCPs that relate to the soft law nature of the Guidelines which does not bind the MNEs. Regarding their first function to promote the Guidelines, this paper finds that there are no significant challenges that emerge due to the soft law nature of the OECD. However, there is one challenge faced by the NCPs that is worth mentioning in this paper even though it indirectly relates to the soft law nature of the OECD. It turns out that some NCPs are confronted with an image problem.54 In practice, they find it difficult to explain their role in front of audiences from various backgrounds.55 This could happen due to

49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Doren McBamet, op. cit., p.S. 52 Ibid., p. 11. 53 Roel Nieuwenkamp, op. cit., p.l71. 54 OECD, op. cit., p. 65. 55 Ibid.


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several reasons.56 The first one is because the NCPs have distinct nature in which they are often stationed in a government's institution that has no direct relation to the core of OECD guidelines and have non-judicial dispute settlement functions.57 The second is due to the name given in the Guidelines (national contact point) and the phrasing of their functions (especially the word specific instances).58 In order to overcome this challenge, there are some NCPs have put an additional explanation in their names or even have changed the names.59 For instance, the name of the Denmark NCP has been transformed to the Mediation and Complaints Handling Institution for Responsible Business Conduct.60 Meanwhile, with regard to the second function to deal with the specific instance, this paper find that there is one significant challenge faced by the NCPs that relate to the soft law nature of the OECD which are soft law in nature and voluntary for MNEs. The problem concerns the situation of the parallel proceeding in which the NCPs and the formal judicial institution are examining the same case.61 In this situation, the NCPs systematically rejects the request to initiate the specific instances mechanism when parallel proceedings are ongoing or could be initiated.62 Thus, it can be argued that the NCPs tend to prioritize the judicial system which are based on hard law over the Guidelines which are based on the soft law. In 2011, the adhering government addressed this challenge when revising the Guidelines.63 The governments, through the revised Guidelines, have clarified that the NCPs could not use the ground of the parallel proceedings to refuse the request of specific instances unless acceptance of the request would impair the outcome of those judicial process.64 However, there are still some NCPs that continue rejecting the request of specific instances based on parallel proceedings situation.65 These NCPs stated that if they accept the application for specific instance in the middle of a legal proceeding, it might have influence toward such proceedings.66 It might also undermine the integrity of the NCPs if their

56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Denmark NCP, the Mediation and Complaints-Handling Institution for Responsible Business

Conduct, available at http://businessconduct.dk/about, visited on 3 March 2017. 61 OECD, op. cit., p. 51. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid.


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statement and the decision of the legal proceeding are turned out to be contrasting.67 Hence, based on the explanations above, it can be identified that there are some challenges faced by the NCPs in their efforts to promote CSR. Concerning their function to promote the Guidelines, the NCPs are faced with the image problem resulting them to change the name. An example of this obstacle is found in Denmark that requires the name of its NCP to be turned into the Mediation and Complaints Handling Institution for Responsible Business Conduct. To some extent, the solution used by the NCPs to address this challenge is quite useful. However, it can be argued that this solution might indirectly lead to creating another obstacle if all adhering governments decide to change the name of their NCPs without a uniform standard. All of the efforts to familiarize the Guidelines will be contra productive when the audience get more confused with each adhering government has a different name for its NCP. Thus, this paper suggests that the adhering governments should resolve this challenge together and come up with a new uniformed name for their NCPs. Regarding their second function to deal with the specific instances, it is found that the NCPs was confronted with the challenge on the parallel proceedings scenario and it is argued that they tend to prioritize the judicial system over the Guidelines which are based on the soft law. This paper argues that those NCPs should not consider the parallel proceeding issue as a challenge. The reason is that it could weaken the spirit and the efforts of promoting CSR. It is important to remember that the formal legal proceeding is based on laws made by states. These states, especially their officials, are prone be influenced by the lobby of MNEs.68 Through their influence, the MNEs can control the substance of the laws made by the States.69 In fact, the MNEs are known to use creative compliance strategy in which they can find loopholes in the laws and thus make their activity is still legal.70 Thus, these formal legal proceedings could not always be relied on to promote CSR. The conditions above surely could emphasize the argument why the NCPs should keep performing their function to deal with specific instances even though the Guidelines are soft law and do not bind the MNEs. As discussed in part III, the specific instances open the possibility for stakeholders like NGOs to have a dialogue with the MNEs and solve the

67 Ibid. 68 Doren McBarnet, op. cit., p.49. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid., p.51.


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case together. Also, the statements of the NCPs could also present grave consequences toward the MNEs resulting them to behavior more responsible in their activities. Hence, the function of the NCPs in addressing specific instances is too important to be ignored due to the parallel proceeding issue. IV. Conclusion This paper argues that the soft law nature of the OECD Guidelines does not seem much preclude the NCPs to implement the Guidelines effectively as part of promoting CSR. In their function to disseminate the Guidelines, the NCPs have given significant contribution through the application of creative promotion method. In the future, the creative method may attract not only large enterprises but also the SMEs without costing them a significant amount of money. Another important contribution of the NCPs in the promotion is through assisting their governments in producing CSR policy. In here, the NCPs have indirectly promoted the guidelines resulting in the adoption of the CSR action plan by the businesses. Furthermore, as a suggestion, the target of NCPs' promotional activities should be extended to individuals. The reason is that individuals, who are mostly the consumers of MNEs' product, could give more pressure toward MNEs to adopt responsible business conduct by purchasing only the goods that are produced in accordance with the Guidelines. The specific instances mechanism of the NCPs has also been considered to give a contribution to promoting CSR. Although they are non-binding toward MNEs, the statements issued by the NCPs in the specific instance could be proved to have an impact on the credibility of and present grave consequences to the MNEs. Those effects have resulted in the MNEs to change their behavior as expected under the Guidelines. Thus, it can be concluded that the existence of the NCPs has become the bridge for the embodiment of the concept of CSR beyond the law in the activities of the MNEs. Besides arguing their effective contributions in promoting CSR, it finds there are some challenges faced by the NCPs. They are confronted with the image problem resulting them to change the name. It is argued that this solution might indirectly lead to creating another obstacle if all adhering governments decide to alter the name of their NCPs without a uniform standard. Thus, this paper suggests that the adhering governments should


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resolve this challenge together and come up with a new uniformed name for their NCPs. It is also found that the NCPs was confronted with the challenge on the parallel proceedings scenario in which they tend to prioritize the judicial system over the Guidelines which are based on the soft law. It argues that those NCPs should not consider the parallel proceeding issue as a challenge. The reason is that the formal legal proceedings could not always be relied on to promote CSR due to the creative compliance strategy of the MNEs. This paper argues that the specific instances could be more reliable to address the CSR case as the Guidelines opens the possibility for the involvement of various stakeholder like the NGOs in settling the case. Also, the statements of the NCPs could also present grave consequences toward the MNEs resulting them to behavior more responsible in their activities. Hence, the function of the NCPs in addressing specific instances is too important to be ignored due to the parallel proceeding issue.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Journal, Articles and Reports Backer, Larry Cata, Rights and Accountability in Development (Raid) V Das

Air and Global Witness V Afrimex: Small Steps Toward an Autonomous Transnational Legal System for the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 10,2009, 1 - 46.

Davamejad, Leyla, In the Shadow of Soft Law: The Handling of Corporate

Social Responsibility Disputes under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2011,2011, 351 - 385.

Kinley, David & Tadaki, Junko, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, Virginia Journal of International Law, VoL 44:4, 2004, 933-1023.

Mafessanti, Miriam, "Corporate Misbehavior & International Law Are There Alternatives to Complicity," South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business, Vol. 6, 2010, 167- 252.

McBarnet, Doren, Corporate Social Responsibility beyond Law, through

Law for Law, University of Edinburgh, School of Law, Working Paper, 2009


44

Nieuwenkamp, Roel, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct, The Dovenschmidt Quarterly, 2013, 171 - 175.

OECD, Implementing the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises:

The National Contact Points from 2000 to 2015, OECD Publishing, 2016. International Framework Source OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business

Conduct, 2011. Websites Website of Denmark National Contact Point, 2016. Website of OECD, 2016. Website of Responsible Business Initiative, 2016. Website of Switzerland National Contact Point, 2016. Website of the United Kingdom National Contact Point, 2016.


45

UNILATERAL PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN TRADE/GSP AS INSTRUMENT TO INCREASE INDONESIA'S LEVERAGE IN THE

REGION

By : Malvino Aprialdy Mazni

ABSTRACT

The granting of non-reciprocal trade preferences to developing and less-developed countries on a unilateral basis has been a mechanism for promoting trade and development. Such scheme is well known as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). To this date, most provider countries of unilateral preferential treatment are developed countries, only several developing countries, such as Turkey and Thailand, have taken role as provider countries. Bearing in mind that Indonesia's global status as a member of G20 as well as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (2019-2020) have to be maintained and nurtured, Indonesia should change its approach from a beneficiary country to a GSP provider country. GSP/unilateral preferential treatment to selected less developed countries (LDCs) can be part of Indonesia's foreign policy. Politically, it will strengthen Indonesia's influence in beneficiary countries, and also complementary with the existing Indonesian Technical Cooperation Programs to the various countries. Economically, this scheme will reduce prices in Indonesia's domestic market which will further enhance economic competitiveness in the domestic market. This paper will elaborate on the 'dilemma' within national legislation to grant unilateral preferential treatment. Moreover, this paper will also address the role of Ministry of Foreign Affairs to solve the challenges to implement the GSP, particularly to address the issue of national legislation, and also to determine the beneficiary countries of Indonesia's unilateral preferential treatment. Later, this paper recommends using the unilateral preferential treatment as an integral part of Indonesia's diplomacy to support its national interest.

I. INTRODUCTION In recent years, Indonesia has increased its stance in many international fora in various aspects. While traditionally Indonesia's political stance in global forum has always been more advanced than other aspects such as economy, nowadays both political and economic postures are equally important.


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President Joko Widodo has repeatedly instructed the Government to pursue greater access to non-traditional markets as one of Indonesia's priorities in trade. For traditional markets, Indonesia has concluded bilateral and regional free trade agreements such as Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPA). For the non-traditional markets, particularly African countries, Indonesia has focused on trade in goods. Therefore, Indonesia is now pursuing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with various African countries to realise the aforementioned objectives. Trade agreements are made to reciprocally lower barriers (tariff and non-tariff) among countries by way of reducing or eliminating existing tariffs/ Most Favoured Nations (MFN) tariffs1. However, preferential treatment in trade can also be done unilaterally, commonly known as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Unilateral preferential treatment or GSP is basically a unilateral preferential treatment given by provider country to beneficiary country in form of reducing or eliminating MFN Tariffs or duty-free entry of eligible products exported by beneficiary country to the markets of provider country. The GSP is intended to help developing countries and Less Developed Countries/LDCs through trade rather than foreign aid. To this date, Indonesia is a beneficiary of the unilateral preferential treatment/GSP from several countries such as the United States of America, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand2. With its current global status as G20 member and upcoming Non-Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council (2019-2020), Indonesia should seriously consider to shift its status from beneficiary countries to GSP provider country. This paper will further analyse that unilateral preferential treatment to select LDCs and products can play a huge part in promoting Indonesia's foreign policy. Politically, it will strengthen Indonesia's overall influence in beneficiary countries, and also complement the existing Indonesian Technical Cooperation Programs to various countries. Economically, the unilateral preferential treatment will enhance economic competitiveness in domestic market.

1 Understanding the WTO. Geneva: WTO, 2011 2 WTO Database, "Indonesia". www.wto.org. http://ptadb.wto.org/Country.aspx?code=360

(accessed August 8th 2018)


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II. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS A. International Instrument Unilateral preferential treatment was firstly established in Resolution 21 (II) under the 2nd UNCTAD Conference in 1968 which called for the establishment of a "generalized, nonreciprocal, non-discriminatory system of preferences in favour of the developing countries, including special measures in favour of the least advanced among the developing countries"3. The objective of unilateral preferential treatment is to help developing countries, especially Less Developed Countries (LDCs) to increase their trade and promote productive capacity development. Initially, the concept of unilateral preferential treatment was not widely supported by most of developed countries. This concept was also regarded as a violation of Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) principle under Article 1(1) of the GATT 1994. However, the decision of UNCTAD later was endorsed by the WTO in 1979 by the so-called Enabling Clause that creates legal basis for granting trade preferences to developing countries and LDCs4. While the Enabling Clause specifically states that developed countries can grant unilateral preferential treatment, there's no prohibition for developing countries for doing so5. For example Thailand has granted unilateral duty free for LDCs for the 2015-20206 period. B. National Instruments Indonesian national law has actually accommodated the non-reciprocal preferential treatment. It is clearly stipulated under Law no. 7 year 2014 on Trade7: "Article 87:

(1) The government can give unilateral trade preferences to less developed countries while still prioritizing national interests.

3 UNCTAD I Preferential Market Access and the Generalized System of Preferences."

UNCTAD I Press Release. Accessed August 05, 2018. http://unctad.org/en/Pages/ DITC/GSP/Generalized-System-of-Preferences.aspx

4 Bossche, Peter Van Den., and Denise Prevost. Essentials of WTO Law. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2016.

5 Guzman, Andrew T., and A. 0. Sykes. Research Handbook in International Economic Law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008.

6 WTO Database, "Duty-free treatment for LDCs Thailand". www.wto.org. http://ptadb.wto.org/ptaBeneficiaries. aspx (accessed August 5th 2018)

7 Law no. 7 year 2014 on Trade


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(2) Provisions concerning the procedures for giving preference are governed by the Presidential Regulation."

While the paragraph 1 clearly states that the Government can grant unilateral preferential to LDCs based in national interest, it still has difficulties to apply for following reasons: a. The absence of Presidential Regulation as mandated by Article

87(2); b. Potential inconsistency with Article 13 of the Law no. 17 year 2006

on the Amendment to Law no. 10 Year 1995 on Customs, which stipulates that the exemption of import duty tariff can only be done based on international agreements.

III. ANALYSIS A. Developing Countries as a Provider Country As mentioned earlier the enabling clause provides a legal basis for developed countries to grant unilateral preferential treatment, but it does not prohibit developing countries to provide such treatment. Some developing countries, such as Turkey8 and Thailand9, have already granted non-reciprocal preferential treatment. In terms of legal basis, as mentioned earlier, national instruments have their own set of challenges: a) the absence of a presidential regulation, and b) potential inconsistency with Law no. 17 Year 2006. The absence of a presidential regulation to provide procedure of unilateral preferential treatment as mandated by Law no. 7 year 2014 implies that the government has not yet utilized a unilateral preferential treatment as part of Indonesia's foreign policy. However, this does not necessarily mean that the government cannot grant preferential treatment. It was proven when Indonesia granted unilateral preferential treatment to Palestine through the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the State of Palestine on Trade Facilitation for Certain Products Originating from Palestinian Territories that was signed on 12 December 2017. Through this MoU, Indonesia will

8 WTO Database, "Generalized System of Preferences Turkey". http://ptadb.wto.org/pta

HistoryExplorer. aspx (accessed August 6th 2018) 9 WTO Database, "Duty-free treatment for LDCs Thailand". www.wto.org.

http://ptadb.wto.org/ptaBeneficiaries. aspx accessed August 5th 2018)


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unilaterally eliminate import duties on dates and virgin olive oil originating from Palestinian territories. There are some interesting facts that surfaced from this MoU:

a) In the absence of a presidential regulation, the government decided to establish a bilateral agreement/MoU to be a basis for granting unilateral preferential treatment. As a consequence, this action falls under Law no. 24 no. 2000 on International Treaty. Therefore, the Government will need the completion of internal procedure or ratification process to implement this MoU;

b) From the perspective of customs officials, this action is deemed more consistent with Article 13 of the Law no. 17 year 2006 on Customs since the basis to unilaterally eliminate import duties is a bilateral agreement/MoU.

It can be argued that, in the absence of a presidential regulation as mandated by Law no. 7 year 2014, a bilateral agreement is the only solution to provide legal basis for granting unilateral preferential treatment. However this action is also time consuming as the Government will need to take ratification process in every unilateral preferential treatment that is made through a bilateral agreement. B. Unilateral Preferential Treatment and National Interest As mentioned earlier, the main objectives of the unilateral preferential treatment are10: a) to increase their export earnings; b) to promote their industrialization; and c) to accelerate their rates of economic growth. The following question will be whether or not the providing country benefits from such scheme, in terms of foreign policy. It is quite clear that the economy benefits of a unilateral preferential treatment are mainly possessed by beneficiary countries. While political benefits are mainly possessed by the provider countries by increasing its profile for committing to assist to develop trade and economic growth in developing/LDCs. Indonesia has proven to be a true friend for the LDCs, particularly through its Indonesian Technical Cooperation Programs (ITCP). The main

10 UNCTAD, "About GSP", www.unctad.org, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/GSP/About-

GSP.aspx (accessed 6 August 2018)


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objective of ITCP is to share the Indonesia’s experience among the developing countries in the effort to develop knowledge, expertise and development vision to address common critical needs and problems in development. Further, Indonesia has also granted several technical cooperation to further assist developing countries and LDCs. At present, ITCP has covered more than 90 countries and more than 4000 participants from Asia Pacific, Africa and Latin America11. The result of ITCP is similar with unilateral preferential treatment, it is more political and intangible for the provider country. For example, the unilateral preferential treatment can be firstly granted to Pacific islands countries for several reasons, such as: a) to maintain and improve Indonesia's present at the region, which

consequently will benefit Indonesia to further gain influence on the issue of Papua in Pacific islands;

b) to be a complementary aspect of existing ITCP or other technical program in the region.

Unilateral preferential treatment is essentially about an investment in political capital. However, the provider country can also gain economic benefits, the case of granting exemption of import duty of Palestinian dates and virgin olive oil can be a good example. Both products are not competitive with Indonesia's local products, it creates diversification of dates and olive oil in Indonesia's market. More choices, more competition, lesser prices, happier customers. C. Target Beneficiary Countries If the unilateral preferential treatment is doable for Indonesia then who should be the beneficiary countries? This simple question demands comprehensive explanation. According to the practices there are two approaches to determine the beneficiary countries: a) Complex requirements

The United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU) are two best examples of provider countries that apply strict requirements for GSP. Apart of list of beneficiary countries and eligible products both of them also require extra requirements for beneficiary countries. USA requires high-level protection of intellectual property, visible efforts to combat corruption, strong policies to reduce poverty, robust protection of human rights and worker rights, and elimination of certain practices

11 Ibid.


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of child labour as GSP requirements12. Meanwhile, EU also requires strong protection of labour rights, significant protection of environment, and increased commitment in combating drugs and trafficking.13

b) Simple requirements Different with USA and EU, developing countries such as Turkey and Thailand offer only the following requirements: 1) the exporting country must be designated as the beneficiary country; 2) the product must be eligible for the GSP treatment; and 3) the product must meet the origin criteria.14 15

Between those two approaches, it is very unlikely that Indonesia will impose a complex requirements like USA and EU in order to be a provider of unilateral preferential treatment. Both USA and EU use the unilateral preferential treatment as a “carrot and stick” approach to achieve their human rights interest16. To this date, if Indonesia addresses human rights issues in other countries, Indonesia conduct it in constructive and persuasive manner. Taking all of the above into account, the most logical approach to be taken by the government is to apply the second option, which is the simple requirements. To determine beneficiary countries, it is advisable that Indonesia should start to focus on selecting developing countries or LDCs. According to the United Nations, there are currently 47 countries listed as LDCs17. Indonesia can grant unilateral preferential treatment to all LDCs or only selected LDCs, this shall be decided with the Indonesian national interest fully taken into account. One shall also keep in mind that the unilateral preferential treatment can potentially increase trade between the countries by creating better framework and opportunity for business sectors. However, to be able to 12 UNCTAD, Generalized System of Preferences Handbook on the Scheme of United States

of America, New York: 2006. 35. 13 UNCTAD, Generalized System of Preferences Handbook on the Scheme of European

Union, New York: 2015. 14 UNCTAD, Generalized System of Preferences Handbook on the Scheme of Turkey, New

York: 2007. 7. 15 WTO Database, "Duty-free treatment for LDCs-Thailand". www.wto.org.

http://ptadb.wto.org/ptaBeneficiaries. aspx (accessed August 5th 2018) 16 Joseph, Sarah. Blame It on the WTO? a Human Rights Critique. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2013. 17 UNCTAD, "UN list of Least Developed Countries", www.unctad.org, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/

ALDC/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-Iist-of-Least-DevelopedCountries.aspx (accessed 7 August 2018)


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substantially increase trade, it very much depends on the exporter-importer relations.18 Governments may create pathways and corridors to ease market access and boost the flow of goods, but ultimately it is the business sectors that need to thrive and utilize that preferential treatment. IV. POLICY CHOICES This paper suggests that there are several policy choices for the Indonesian government to grant unilateral preferential treatment. These policy choices are divided into 2 aspects, as follows: a) Policy options on legal instruments:

1) Finalization of presidential regulation to implement Article 87 of the Law no 7 year 2014; or

2) Case to case basis: to establish bilateral agreement to related beneficiary country in providing unilateral preferential treatment.

b) Policy options on beneficiary countries

1) Unilateral preferential treatment to all LDCs; 2) Unilateral preferential treatment to selected LDCs

A. Policy options on legal instruments 1) Finalization of presidential regulation to implement Article 87 of the Law

no 7 year 2014: presidential regulation on the mechanism of unilateral preferential treatments;

To this date, the absence of presidential regulation as mandated by article 87 of Law no. 7/ 2014 suggests that unilateral preferential treatment is not yet seen as an important part of Indonesia's diplomacy. The establishment of this presidential regulation is important at least for several reasons, such as: a. to provide legal basis and clarity for the Government of Indonesia

to utilize the use of unilateral preferential treatment as tool of diplomacy at present and in the future;

b. to reduce further discussion on the inconsistency of with Article 13 of the Law no. 17 year 2006 on the Amendment to Law no. 10 year 1995 on Customs, which stipulates that the exemption of import duty tariff can only be done based on international agreements;

18 Stephan Klasen, lnmaculada Martinez-Zarzoso, Felicitas Nowak-Lehmann and Matthias

Bruckner. "Trade preferences for LDCs. Are they effective? Preliminary econometric evidence" CDP Policy Review Series (2006).9


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Challenges: a. many technical issues that should be taken into account to finalize

this presidential regulation, such as determining the focal point or the coordinating ministry,

b. reducing or eliminating import tariffs can be seen as a potential revenue loss by several ministries.

To expedite the finalization of this presidential regulation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), as the coordinator of Indonesia's foreign policy, should enhance its close cooperation with related ministries. Moreover, the MoFA, through its minister can also bring this issue to the attention to the President (top-down approach).

2) Case to case basis: to establish bilateral agreement to related

beneficiary country in providing unilateral preferential treatment.

In the recent practice, in the absence of the presidential regulation as mandated by Law no. 7 year 2014, the Government unilaterally granting preferential treatment to Palestine through a bilateral agreement so called Memorandum of Understanding (Mo U) between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the State of Palestine on Trade Facilitation for Certain Products Originating from Palestinian Territories. With this MoU the Government of the Republic of Indonesia unilaterally eliminating import tariff of dates and olive oil originating from Palestinian territories. This practice has several advantages, such as: a. This practice is proven to be feasible to be implemented:

Palestinian case; b. A form of bilateral agreement is deemed more attractive in the

public rather than just a unilateral action by Indonesia. However, this practice also has several challenges, as follows: a. Time consuming: every unilateral preferential that is made through

a bilateral agreement will need ratification process; b. Granting unilateral preferential treatment through a bilateral

agreement is regarded as uncommon practice of international treaty.

The role of MoFA for this policy options is mostly in the negotiating (including drafting process) until the ratification process of the bilateral agreement. As mandated by Law no. 24 year 2000 on International


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Treaty, every international treaty, including its ratification process, has to be consulted with MoFA.

B. Policy options on beneficiary countries 1) Unilateral preferential treatment to All LDCs;

Granting unilateral preferential treatment to all LDCs will eventually reflect Indonesia's strong will to assist LDCs to be able to grow their economy and trade. However, there are some considerations that need to be made if Indonesia is about to embark on this policy: a. Indonesia is already in the negotiation process of preferential trade

agreements (PTAs) with some LDCs, such as Mozambique and Bangladesh;

b. In Africa region, Indonesia has already expanded its strategies to have PTA (Angola) or FTA with African countries and custom unions in Africa;

c. Indonesia may have different level of national interest in every LDCs.

2) Unilateral preferential treatment to selected developing countries or

LDCs

In this policy option, Indonesia can begin focus on selected developing countries or LDCs, for example Indonesia can focus on Pacific islands countries and Timor Leste for several reasons: a. Those countries are our closest neighbours; b. Most of them are LDCs, they still need assistance from other

countries to boost their capacity in trade and economy; c. the need for Indonesia to increase its political and economy stance

in those regions: i. Pacific islands: to gain support on the issue of Indonesia’s

territorial integrity; ii. Timor Leste: to increase Indonesia's stance in Timor Leste, to

balance China's growing influence in Timor Leste.

All of these policy actions require the MoFA to play the main role, particularly to coordinate with Indonesia's relevant missions abroad for determining the beneficiary countries for Indonesia's unilateral preferential treatment.


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MoFA should also enhance its close collaboration with related ministries to identify the products eligible for unilateral preferential treatment.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION In terms of unilateral preferential treatment, Indonesia should start to shift its status from beneficiary country to provider country. The global status of Indonesia such as member of G20 and the upcoming Non-Permanent Member of the UNSC (2019-2020) has to be maintained and nurtured. Politically, being a provider country of the unilateral preferential treatment will increase Indonesia's stance globally, especially in beneficiary countries. It can play a massive role in promoting Indonesia's contribution to global peace and development. Economically, the unilateral preferential treatment will potentially increase trade with beneficiary countries, it will also enhance competitiveness and diversification of products in domestic market and reduce the price in Indonesia's domestic market, which will also affect the price competitiveness of related products. Conclusion Finalizing Presidential Regulation This paper suggests that in order to implement unilateral preferential treatment, presidential regulation as mandated by article 87 of Law no 7 year 2014 should be finalized accordingly. This will help to create comprehensive and effective strategy to implement unilateral preferential treatment. The procedural process should be codified into a presidential regulation. A bilateral agreement may be proven to be feasible to be implemented. However, it only addresses a small part of the problem of the procedure of granting unilateral preferential treatment within national framework. Relying on a bilateral agreement to grant unilateral preferential treatment may result in different practices, for example, according to Law no. 7 year 2014 on Trade, before the ratification process of a bilateral agreement on trade, such agreement shall be submitted to the House of Representative (DPR) to obtain DPR's views whether this agreement


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should be approved by the DPR or not. There will be uncertainty in every a bilateral agreement to grant unilateral preferential treatment, whether the ratification process will need the approval of DPR or not. Selected countries or LDCs At first, unilateral preferential treatment should be provided to selected countries. This paper suggests that Pacific islands countries and Timor Leste should be prioritized for following reasons: a. Both countries/region relatively not ready to conclude reciprocal trade

agreements. Unilateral preferential treatment can be first step for creating trade agreements/ PTA in the future;

b. There is a need to further strengthen Indonesia's stance politically and economically towards this region.

c. Both beneficiary countries of the Indonesian Technical Cooperation Programs. The unilateral preferential treatment can complement the existing ITCP;

d. Unilateral preferential treatment can be a political investment for Indonesia to further gain positive influence both in Timor Leste (to balance China's growing influence) and Pacific island countries (to gain support on the issue of Papua).

e. Provide a framework to boost trade among the countries/region; Recommendation Finalizing Presidential Regulation To expedite the finalization of this presidential regulation, MoFA as the ministry in charge of Indonesia's Foreign Policy can take following steps: a. MoFA initiates to hold inter-ministries meeting, particularly with Ministry

of Trade, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Law and Human Rights, and Ministry of Secretariat of State.

b. If needed, MoFA through its policy planning agency also can provide brief study on the importance of unilateral preferential treatment on foreign policy.

c. To speed up and solidify the process, the Minister of Foreign Affairs should have a coordination meeting with Minister of Trade and Minister of Finance.

d. Finally, a top down approach should also be considered. The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall bring this issue to the President. This step will help assure the firm commitment of relevant ministries/institutions, once the President provides direct instruction on this matter.


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Selected countries or LDCs The government through MoFA, to firstly focus on granting unilateral preferential treatment to Timor Leste and Pacific Island countries, may consider the following recommendations: a. MoFA to instruct Embassies in Pacific islands countries and Timor

Leste to study the potential of providing unilateral preferential treatment to selected countries. Embassies may also come up also with proposed or indicative list of products for unilateral preferential treatment;

b. Further, to instruct Indonesian mission abroad to help identify specific national interest to selected LDCs potential for unilateral preferential treatment.

c. MoFA to form a concerted effort within the Ministry to develop a study involving relevant directorates within the MoFA.

d. If needed, MoFA may establish a special task force consisted inter-ministries on unilateral preferential treatment, which will evaluate the implementation of unilateral preferential treatment for selected countries.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books Understanding the WTO. Geneva: WTO, 2011 Matsushita, Mitsuo, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Petros C. Mavroidis, and

Michael J. Hahn. The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Bossche, Peter Van Den., and Denise Prevost. Essentials ofWTO Law.

Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2016. Guzman, Andrew T., and A. 0. Sykes. Research Handbook in International

Economic Law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008. Joseph, Sarah. Blame It on the WTO? a Human Rights Critique. Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2013. UNCTAD, Generalized System of Preferences Handbook on the Scheme

of United States of America, New York: 2006. 35. UNCTAD, Generalized System of Preferences Handbook on the Scheme

of European Union, New York: 2015. 2.


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UNCT AD, Generalized System of Preferences Handbook on the Scheme of Turkey, New York: 2007. 7.

Journals Stephan Klasen, Inmaculada Martinez-Zarzoso, Felicitas Nowak-Lehmann

and Matthias Bruckner. "Trade preferences for LDCs. Are they effective? Preliminary econometric evidence" CDP Policy Review Series (2006).9

Websites WTO Database, '4Indonesia". www.wto.org. http://ptadb.wto.org/Country.aspx?code=360 (accessed August 81h 20

18) WTO Database, "Duty-free treatment for LDCs- Thailand". www.wto.org. http://ptadb.wto.org/ptaBeneficiaries.aspx (accessed August 5th 2018) WTO Database, "Generalized System of Preferences- Turkey". http://ptadb.wto.org/ptaHistoryExplorer.aspx (accessed August 6th 2018) WTO Database, "Duty-free treatment for LDCs - Thailand". www.wto.org. http://ptadb.wto.org/ptaBeneficiaries.aspx (accessed August 5th 2018) UNCTAD, "About GSP", www.unctad.org, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/GSP/AboutGSP.aspx (accessed 6

August 2018) UNCTAD, "UN list of Least Developed Countries", www.unctad.org, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/ALDC/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-

list-of-LeastDeveloped-Countries.aspx (accessed 7 August 2018)


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GLOBAL INVESTMENT AND AIRLINE ALLIANCES

Oleh : Indriati Kusumawardhani* dan Giana Matauseja**

Abstract

This paper discusses the topic of Airline Investment and Airline Alliances as a cooperative scheme in the field of international civil aviation that supports international civil aviation activities, which is not only beneficial for producers of international civil aviation service providers, but also for the user (e.g. travellers and tourists). The development of civil aviation industries was triggered by freedom of the air under Chicago Convention 1944, the increase of travellers’ demand to provide not only vary of flight’s schedule and destination but also excellent service with lower price. These facts have become the background of the development of global alliances. Global alliances have become one of the ways out for civil aviation industries to fulfill those demands while increasing its income, earning greater profits with low operating costs, in line with the provisions of international law in the field of civil aviation and aviation safety. Keywords: civil aviation, global airline alliances, Chicago Convention

A. Latar Belakang Sejak dilaksanakannya Konferensi Negara-Negara di dunia dalam bidang penerbangan sipil pada tahun 1944, telah diprediksi bahwa pertumbuhan penerbangan sipil dapat dimanfaatkan sebagai sarana untuk meningkatkan persahabatan; memelihara perdamaian dan saling mengerti antar-Bangsa; dan sebagai sarana untuk memelihara perdamaian dunia1. Pada perkembangannya, aktivitas transportasi udara memiliki peran penting, salah satunya dalam mendorong kemajuan ekonomi dan sosial dengan cara menghubungkan negara dan orang; mendukung pertumbuhan perdagangan dan pariwisata; serta menjembatani hubungan antara negara maju dengan negara berkembang2.

* Fungsional Diplomat Muda pada Dit. HP Sosbud, Kementerian Luar Negeri RI dan

Mahasiswa Pascasarjana Magister Ilmu Hukum, Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, program Ilmu Hukum Transnasional (semester 2).

** Mahasiswa Pascasarjana Magister Ilmu Hukum, Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, program Ilmu Hukum Transnasional (semester 2).

1 H.K. Martono, Pengantar Hukum Udara National dan Internasional, Jakarta : PT. Raja Grafindo Persada, hal. 16.

2 Maria João Peixoto Braga Bianchi de Aguiar, Master’s Thesis, “Competitive Effects of International Airline Alliances: Impacts on Airports-Airlines Relationship”, Portugal: University of Porto, 2015, hal. 1.


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Dalam praktik penerbangan sipil, sebagai konsekuensi atas prinsip kedaulatan negara di wilayah udaranya, maka tidak ada pesawat udara suatu negara dapat terbang di atas atau melalui ruang udara nasional negara lain tanpa memperoleh izin terlebih dahulu dari negara yang akan dilalui wilayah udaranya. Hal ini sebagaimana diatur dalam Pasal 1 Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation 1919 (Konvensi Paris 1919)3, yang juga diadopsi oleh Pasal 1 Konvensi Chicago 19444. Konferensi Chicago 1944 menghasilkan tidak saja Konvensi Chicago 1944, melainkan juga menghasilkan kesepakatan-kesepakatan yang mengatur tentang Freedom of the Air. Pelaksanaan freedom of the air umumnya dituangkan dalam Perjanjian Pengangkutan Udara antar-negara secara timbal balik, baik yang bersifat Bilateral maupun Multilateral (Bilateral or Multilateral Air Transport Agreement). Seiring dengan perkembangan dunia penerbangan sipil dan juga keberlakuan prinsip freedom of the air, industri penerbangan sipil telah menghadapi tantangan globalisasi dan liberalisasi yang berdampak pada semakin meningkatnya persaingan usaha penerbangan sehingga mendorong para pelaku usaha industri penerbangan untuk melakukan restrukturisasi dan inovasi bagi pengembangan usaha penerbangan. Tulisan ini membahas topik Airline Investment dan Airline Alliances bahwa bentuk Airline Alliances dalam dunia penerbangan sipil internasional merupakan suatu skema kerja sama bidang penerbangan sipil internasional yang dianggap sebagai pendukung bagi kegiatan penerbangan sipil internasional, yang tidak saja bermanfaat bagi produsen penyedia jasa penerbangan sipil internasional, namun juga bagi pengguna jasanya. Salah satu literatur yang menjadi sumber bagi penulisan makalah ini dan memberi gambaran pentingnya topik Airline Investment dan Airline Alliances adalah tesis dari Maria João Peixoto Braga Bianchi de Aguiar, dengan judul: “Competitive Effects of International Airline Alliances: Impacts on Airports-Airlines Relationship”, pada University of Porto, Portugal, pada tahun 2015. De Aguiar menganalisa dampak yang timbul dari airline alliances terhadap pengguna jasa penerbangan sipil; maskapai penerbangan sipil internasional baik yang bergabung maupun yang tidak bergabung di dalam suatu alianasi penerbangan sipil internasional; dan akses serta fasilitas di bandar udara.

3 Pasal 1 Konvensi Paris 1919 mengatur “The High Contracting Parties recognize that every

power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory”. 4 Pasal 1 Konvensi Chicago 1944: “The Contracting Parties recognize that every sovereign

state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory”.


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De Aguiar juga menyatakan bahwa isu ini juga penting dalam praktik dunia penerbangan sipil internasional dikarenakan fakta bahwa transportasi udara telah menjadi penggerak perekonomian dunia; menjadi salah satu alat untuk meningkatkan konektivitas masyarakat dunia dan negara; mendorong pengembangan industri perdagangan dan pariwisata; serta menjadi “forging links” antara negara berkembang dengan negara maju. Berdasarkan hal-hal yang telah diuraikan di atas, maka makalah ini akan membahas optimalisasi Global Airline Alliances (GALs) dengan kebutuhan perusahaan penerbangan sipil untuk memperluas jaringan, rute, frekuensi, dan meningkatkan pendapatan serta keuntungan dengan biaya rendah bagi aktivitas penerbangan sipil internasional. Selain itu, juga akan membahas manfaat yang diperoleh dari optimalisasi GALs, baik bagi pelaku usaha maskapai penerbangan sipil, maupun bagi konsumen. Kemudian, makalah ini juga mencoba untuk menjawab bilamana melalui optimalisasi GALs akan membuka peluang lintas penerbangan sipil internasional di wilayah udara suatu negara dan operasionalnya di bandara setempat yang terbatas oleh prinsip kedaulatan negara di wilayah udaranya serta ketentuan nasionalnya mengenai keamanan dan keselamatan penerbangan, sebagaimana diatur dalam Konvensi Chicago 1944. GALs dalam makalah ini terbatas pada Star Alliance; One World; dan Sky Team. B. Praktik dan Industri Penerbangan Sipil Berkembangnya industri penerbangan tidak lepas dari pengaruh semakin meningkatnya kebutuhan akan transportasi udara, sehingga kebutuhan penyediaan rute dan frekuensi penerbangan juga akan meningkat, tidak saja di dalam suatu negara, namun juga yang sifatnya lintas negara. Transportasi udara merupakan industri yang menghasilkan keuntungan minimal 1% dari GDP Nasional suatu negara5 dan mendorong pertumbuhan ekonomi nasional6. Semakin meningkatnya jumlah rute dan frekuensi penerbangan maka semakin meningkat kebutuhan untuk menyediakan pesawat udara oleh suatu perusahaan penerbangan. Hal ini juga berdampak terhadap biaya produksi dalam bidang usaha penerbangan dan transportasi udara. Adanya pembatasan wilayah udara

5 Antonio Tugores-García, “Analysis of Global Airline Alliances as a Strategy for International

Network Development”, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012, pg. 13. 6 Transportasi udara juga diakui secara luas memiliki dampak terhadap perkembangan

perdagangan dan pariwisata dunia. Lebih luas lagi, transportasi udara yang memberikan pelayanan cepat dan aman bagi perpindahan orang maupun barang dari satu tempat ke tempat yang lain, menjadi salah satu fasilitas bagi perubahan ekonomi, politik, dan sosial.


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suatu negara yang diatur dalam Konvensi Chicago 1944, dan pengaturan di antara negara-negara secara timbal balik dalam hal penerbangan, baik dalam bentuk bilateral maupun multilateral (Bilateral or Multilateral Air Transport Agreement) juga menjadi tantangan bagi industri penerbangan dan transportasi udara dalam memenuhi kebutuhan pasar. Konferensi Chicago 1944 menghasilkan tidak saja Konvensi Chicago 1944, melainkan juga menghasilkan kesepakatan Persetujuan Penerbangan Lintas Internasional (International Air Services Transit Agreement – IASTA)7 dan Persetujuan Transportasi Udara Internasional (International Air Transport Agreement –IATA) pada 7 Desember 1944 di Chicago8. IASTA adalah perjanjian internasional yang bersifat multilateral dengan tujuan menukarkan hak-hak penerbangan, termasuk juga hak-hak kebebasan udara, yaitu9: 1. 1st Freedom of the air, yaitu hak untuk terbang melintasi (over fly)

negara lain tanpa melakukan pendaratan. 2. 2nd Freedom of the air, yaitu hak untuk melakukan pendaratan di

negara lain untuk tujuan keperluan operasional (technical landing), namun tidak berhak mengambil dan/atau menurunkan penumpang dan/atau kargo secara komersial.

Persetujuan IATA juga merupakan perjanjian multilateral yang mempertukarkan hak-hak kebebasan di wilayah udara, yaitu10: 1. 3rd Freedom of the air, yaitu hak untuk mengangkut penumpang,

barang, dan pos dari negara tempat register/pendaftaran Pesawat udara ke negara pihak lainnya.

2. 4th Freedom of the air, yaitu hak untuk mengangkut penumpang, kargo, dan pos secara komersial dari negara pihak lainnya ke negara tempat register/pendaftaran Pesawat.

3. 5th Freedom of the air, yaitu hak pengangkutan penumpang, kargo, dan pos secara komersial dari atau menuju negara ketiga di luar negara pihak.

7 Dalam perjanjian ini diatur bahwa pesawat udara yang berasal dari negara anggota

Konvensi, dapat terbang di atas wilayah udara negara anggota Konvensi dan dapat mendarat di wilayah tersebut tidak untuk tujuan mengangkut atau menurunkan penumpang. Hal ini dikenal dengan istilah Two Freedom of the Air.

8 Pengaturan di dalamnya dikenal dengan Five Freedom of the Air yang terkait dengan hak-hak dalam transportasi udara internasional.

9 H.K. Martono dan Amad Sudiro, Hukum Udara Nasional dan Internasional Publik, Jakarta: PT. Raja Grafindo Persada, hal. 61.

10 Ibid., hal. 62.


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Gambar 1. Ilustrasi Penerapan Freedom of the Air11

Selain 5 (lima) freedom of the air tersebut di atas yang mana dipraktikkan sehari-hari, masih terdapat kebebasan lainnya yaitu 6th Freedom of the air (pengangkutan penumpang, barang, dan pos secara komersial dari negara ketiga melalui negara tempat registrasi/pendaftaran pesawat menuju ke negara tujuan); 7th Freedom of the air (pengangkutan penumpang, barang, dan pos secara komersial yang dilaksanakan di luar negara pihak perjanjian); dan 8th Freedom of the air (pengangkutan penumpang, barang, dan pos secara komersial dari satu tempat ke tempat lainnya dalam satu wilayah negara berdaulat, atau biasa disebut cabotage12. Kondisi yang demikian, telah mendorong para pelaku industri penerbangan dan transportasi udara untuk melakukan kerjasama dalam industri transportasi udara yang bersifat global, yaitu dengan membentuk airline global alliances. Melalui airline global alliances, permasalahan keterbatasan rute, frekuensi penerbangan, kualitas pelayanan dapat teratasi. Meskipun demikian, dengan bergabung dalam suatu aliansi penerbangan internasional, perusahaan transportasi udara juga menghadapi tantangan, antara lain sistem dan pengaturan penerbangan dari negara tujuan dan atau negara transit, serta ketentuan hukum nasional dari negara tempat pendaftaran suatu maskapai yang adalah salah satu anggota aliansi.

11 Rodrigue, J-P et al, “The Geography of Transport Systems, Hofstra University, Department

of Global Studies & Geography”, 2012, http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans, diakses pada 3 Oktober 2018.

12 Martono dan Amad Sudiro, Hukum Udara Nasional..., hal. 63.


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Sesuai dengan prinsip dasar ekonomi, bagi setiap perusahaan transportasi udara untuk dapat mencapai keuntungan yang maksimal dalam bidang usahanya, maka suatu perusahaan transportasi udara harus dapat mencapai rute penerbangan terjauh. Hal ini tidak terbatas pada capaian rute penerbangan terjauh, namun juga perlu untuk memenuhi standar operasional bidang transportasi udara, yang meliputi loading, unloading, reloading, refuelling13. Selain itu, perolehan keuntungan dari perusahaan transportasi udara tidak hanya ditentukan oleh jarak rute penerbangan saja, melainkan juga ditentukan oleh faktor-faktor lainnya, seperti jumlah populasi di antara titik-titik penerbangan dan pendaratan; kompetisi dari bentuk-bentuk jasa transportasi lainnya pada titik-titik tersebut; dan standar biaya hidup pada titik-titik tersebut14. Dalam rangka mencapai tujuan ekonomis dari kegiatan usaha penerbangan dan transportasi udara, pada praktiknya, kerjasama diantara para pelaku usaha di bidang penerbangan sipil telah dibentuk dengan ruang lingkup penetapan tarif; jadwal penerbangan; pengumpulan biaya dan sumber pendanaan; serta ground handling and maintenance. Kerjasama tersebut juga sebagai opsi atas ketentuan dalam Pasal 6 Konvensi Chicago 194415 yang mengatur bahwa “special permission” harus diberikan untuk lalu lintas penerbangan sipil internasional di suatu wilayah negara. Pada faktanya, semua bentuk kerjasama di antara para pelaku usaha penerbangan sipil memiliki tujuan utama untuk menghasilkan keuntungan dan pendapatan yang tinggi. Sehingga, bentuk kerjasama yang dibentuk pada mulanya, dikenal dengan istilah “pooling arrangements”. “Pooling arrangements” sedikitnya melibatkan dua (2) perusahaan penerbangan sipil dimana keduanya menyepakati dan mengkoordinasikan jadwal penerbangan dan pembagian hasil yang diperoleh dari jasa penerbangan yang telah dioperasikan bersama pada rute penerbangan yang sama, sesuai dengan formula bagi hasil yang telah ditetapkan oleh kedua perusahaan tersebut16. Terkait dengan adanya pengaturan “special permission” dalam lalu lintas penerbangan sipil internasional, maka negara-negara selain membentuk kesepakatan yang berfokus pada tujuan akhir yang bersifat

13 Cf. J.E. Hollander, “International Traffic Law: Its Form and Requirements”, 17 American

Journal of International Law, 1923, hal. 471 – 472. 14 Pablo Mendes de Leon, “Cabotage in Air Transport Regulation”, Martinus Nijhoff

Publishers, The Netherlands, 1992, hal. 107-108. 15 Pasal 6 Konvensi Chicago 1944: “No scheduled international air services may be operated over

or into the territory of a contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization of that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or authorization”.

16 Hikmahanto Juwana, “Modul, Bahan Bacaan, dan Dokumen Hukum Udara HIN”, Fakultas Hukum, Universtitas Indonesia, 2014/2015, hal 55.


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komersial, juga membentuk kesepakatan dengan tujuan untuk menjembatani “hambatan” yang disebut “special permission” dalam lalu lintas penerbangan sipil internasional. Kesepakatan tersebut dikenal dengan Bilateral Air Services Agreements (ASAs)17. Pengaturan mengenai materi muatan yang diatur dalam ASAs, telah ditetapkan oleh International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) yang dikenal dengan istilah The ICAO Template Air Service Agreements (TASAs). TASAs diharapkan menjadi jalan keluar bagi pembatasan dari masing-masing negara dalam kaitannya dengan aktivitas dan lalu lintas penerbangan sipil internasional di wilayah suatu negara, khususnya dalam menjembatani peluang investasi yang bersifat lintas batas negara. Selain itu, TASAs menjadi suatu kerangka kerjasama negara-negara dalam bentuk perjanjian kerjasama bidang penerbangan sipil internasional yang bersifat komprehensif dan menjadi panduan bagi seluruh negara anggota Konvensi Chicago 1944 yang bersifat optional dalam membentuk perjanjian kerjsama pernerbangan sipil internasional18. C. Alternatif Peningkatan Akses Pasar Penerbangan Sipil Internasional Selain membentuk kerangka kerjasama dalam bentuk ASAs, negara-negara mencari alternatif bagi upaya peningkatan akses pasar dari perusahaan penerbangan sipil, baik di suatu negara dimana perusahaan tersebut mendapatkan akses penerbangan, maupun di negara dimana perusahaan tersebut tidak secara resmi melakukan kegiatan penerbangan sipil19. Alternatif tersebut antara lain dilaksanakan melalui: 1. Code-sharing20 Code-sharing didefinisikan sebagai suatu kesepakatan di antara dua atau lebih perusahaan penerbangan sipil untuk mengkombinasikan kode dari perusahaan penerbangan sipil tersebut atau penggunaan satu kode dari salah satu perusahaan penerbangan untuk satu rute tertentu. Hal mendasar pada pelaksanaan code-sharing adalah transparansi dimana kode yang menjadi code-shared flight harus dengan jelas dipahami oleh customer, baik pada saat pembelian tiket maupun pada saat proses

17 Leon, Sabotage in Air…, hal 45. 18 ICAO; Economic Development; Template Air Services Agreement https://www.icao.int/

sustainability/ pages/eap_ep_tasa.aspx, diakses pada 3 Oktober 2018. 19 Partnerships Between Airlines: The Strategy to Win the Asian Market, http://transport.sia-

partners.com/ 20180629/partnerships-between-airlines-strategy-win-asian-market, diakses 3 Oktober 2018.

20 Pablo Mendes de Leon, “Introduction to Air Law”, 10th Edition, Kluwer Law International, Belanda, 2017, hal. 84.


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perjalanan. Dalam format ASAs, code-sharing dikenal dengan commercial opportunities. 2. Franchising21 Franchising merupakan salah satu bentuk kerja sama penerbangan sipil untuk tujuan pemasaran jasa penerbangan sipil. Dalam hal ini, tidak selalu terjadi code-shared namun berdasarkan perjanjian franchise, suatu perusahaan penerbangan dapat memberikan lisensi terhadap hak cipta dan proses bisnisnya kepada perusahaan penerbangan lainnya yang menjadi pihak dalam perjanjian franchise tersebut. Dalam prakteknya, perusahaan penerbangan pembeli lisensi berhak untuk melakukan pengawasan. 3. Investasi Asing22 Secara tradisional, kerjasama antarnegara dalam bidang penerbangan bertujuan untuk meningkatkan pendapatan dan keuntungan; koordinasi dalam hal tarif; rute dan jadwal penerbangan, serta pemeliharaan pesawat. Seiring dengan perubahan jaman dan kebutuhan dari masing-masing perusahaan maskapai penerbangan, maka kerjasama yang dilaksanakan, dibentuk dalam kerangka investasi. Pada faktanya, praktik investasi asing ini dibatasi oleh persyaratan nasional dari masing-masing negara. Pada praktiknya, hal-hal yang disepakati dalam ASAs, masih belum dapat memenuhi kebutuhan para pelaku usaha transportasi udara dan penerbangan sipil di dunia untuk memperluas jaringan penerbangannya. Oleh karenanya, dibentuklah suatu strategic partnership yang dikenal dengan Global Airline Alliances (GALs). D. Lahirnya Global Airline Alliances (GALs) GALs didefinisikan sebagai perjanjian bilateral atau multilateral yang mana didalamnya para perusahaan maskapai penerbangan sipil dari berbagai negara saling berbagi tujuan usaha nya dan saling berkoordinasi untuk mencapai tujuan masing-masing yang serupa dalam dunia usaha penerbangan sipil23. GALs merepresentasikan suatu bentuk kerjasama dan integrasi layanan penerbangan internasional, sehingga setiap maskapai penerbangan memiliki jaringan mendunia yang tidak dapat dicapai melalui usaha secara mandiri. Lebih lanjut, GALs membuka peluang bagi akses pasar dan pemanfaatan sumber daya pendukung dunia usaha penerbangan sipil internasional melalui jaringan aliansi dimana hal tersebut tidak dapat dilakukan karena keterbatasan secara ekonomi, geografis, dan pembatasan hukum nasional negara-negara setempat.

21 Ibid. hal. 85. 22 Leon, Introduction to Air Law…, hal. 85 23 S. Wang, “Do Global Airline Alliances Influence the Passanger’s Purchase Decision?”,

Journal of Air Transport Management, Vol. 37, 2014, hal. 53 – 59.


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GALs dianggap sebagai solusi bagi pembentukan jaringan transportasi udara internasional yang mampu menjangkau hampir seluruh titik penerbangan global, dengan sumber daya minimal, yang mana tidak dapat dicapai secara mandiri oleh suatu perusahaan maskapai penerbangan sipil24. GALs juga dianggap berpotensi sebagai sarana untuk mendapatkan fasilitas dan manfaat yang timbul dari suatu kerjasama bidang penerbangan sipil antar-negara25. Namun, sejalan dengan lahir dan berkembanganya GALs, tidak dapat dipungkiri bahwa GALs tidak lepas dari ketentuan kerangka kerjasama serta permasalahan persaingan usaha yang terdapat di dalam suatu negara asal dari suatu maskapai penerbangan sipil internasional. Masing-masing negara pada faktanya berupaya membatasi bentuk kerjasama bidang penerbangan sipil internasional, selain daripada GALs, melalui pembatasan kepemilikan; pembatasan kontrol operator penerbangan nasional oleh pihak asing; serta pembatasan penggunaan bandar udara internasionalnya bagi maskapai asing26. Berdasarkan penjelasan di atas, secara garis besar, latar belakang terbentuknya GALs antara lain sebagai berikut: 1. Globalisasi27 Globalisasi mendorong perusahaan penerbangan sipil untuk membentuk suatu strategi baru yang memberikan jalan keluar bagi permasalahan dalam industri penerbangan internasional, khususnya dalam hal pembatasan kepemilikan asing, peraturan nasional suatu negara, dan tantangan dalam jaringan kerja sama penerbangan sipil internasional28. Selain itu, GALs juga dilatarbelakangi dengan semakin meningkatnya permintaan penerbangan sipil yang bersifat lintas batas negara. 2. Peningkatan Traveller’s Demand29 Semakin meningkatnya teknologi dan informasi, maka semakin mudah akses informasi mengenai tempat-tempat di berbagai belahan dunia, terutama tempat destinasi wisata. Hal ini berdampak pada meningkatnya

24 Maria João Peixoto Braga Bianchi de Aguiar, Master’s Thesis, “Competitive Effects of

International Airline Alliances: Impacts on Airports-Airlines Relationship”, Portugal: University of Porto, 2015, hal. 4.

25 García, Analysis of Global…, hal. 44. 26 García, Analysis of Global…, hal 87. 27 Partnerships Between Airlines: The Strategy to Win the Asian Market, www.transport.sia-

partners.com, diakses pada 3 Oktober 2018. 28 Clive L. Morley, Asia Pasific Journal of Tourism Research Volume 8; Globalisation, Airline

Alliances and Tourism: A Strategic Perspective, 2013, www.tandfonline.com, diakses pada 3 Oktober 2018.

29 Partnerships Between Airlines: The Strategy to Win the Asian Market, www.transport.sia-partners.com, diakses pada 3 Oktober 2018.


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permintaan penyediaan jasa penerbangan sipil dengan jangkauan rute yang lebih luas, namun berbiaya rendah. Oleh karenanya, perusahaan penerbangan sipil perlu memperluas jaringan kerjasama dengan maskapai penerbangan dari negara lain untuk mendapatkan rute penerbangan yang lebih luas dengan biaya rendah.

Gambar 2. Passenger load factor of commercial airlines worldwide from

2005 to 201830 3. Ketentuan Nasional Bidang Penerbangan Sipil31 Meskipun telah dibentuk perjanjian bilateral maupun multilateral bidang penerbangan sipil di antara negara-negara, kedaulatan negara atas ruang udara di wilayahnya serta ketentuan nasionalnya tetap menjadi tantangan tersendiri bagi negara-negara lain dalam praktik penerbangan sipil internasional, diantaranya (i) peraturan/kebijakan nasional terkait pengawasan dan kontrol terhadap investasi asing bidang penerbangan sipil; dan (ii) peraturan/kebijakan nasional yang membatasi kesepakatan bilateral penerbangan sipil dalam hal pembatasan pengoperasian pesawat asing di wilayah udaranya kecuali dengan menerapkan sistem code sharing atau airline alliances. Perhatian dari suatu negara selain terhadap masalah kedaulatan di ruang udaranya, juga terhadap keamanan dan keselamatan penerbangan sipil ditetapkan dengan standar tertentu yang tunduk pada ketentuan dalam

30 Statista: Passenger load factor of commercial airlines worldwide from 2005 to 2018, https://www.

statista.com/statistics/658830/passenger-load-factor-of-commercial-airlines-worldwide/, diakses pada tanggal 3 Oktober 2018.

31 Britton, Rob, 2011, Airline Alliances: Why They Form, How They Work https://www.mcgill. ca/iasl/files/iasl/ASPL614-Airline-Alliances-Nov11.pdf, diakses pada tanggal 3 Oktober 2018.


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Konvensi Chicago 1944 dan standar ICAO, yang wajib dipenuhi oleh semua aktivitas penerbangan yang akan masuk ke wilayah suatu negara. 4. Nilai Ekonomis Jasa Penerbangan Sipil Internasional32 Adanya penilaian dari pelaku usaha penerbangan sipil internasional bahwa untuk memenuhi kebutuhan para pengguna jasa penerbangan sipil internasional dengan jangkauan yang luas namun berbiaya rendah, hanya dapat dilaksanakan melalui kerjasama dengan perusahaan penerbangan sipil asing lainnya. Dengan kata lain bahwa semakin luas jaringan penerbangan sipil internasional maka semakin menguntungkan dari segi biaya, perawatan, dan akses termasuk rute dan frekuensi penerbangan sipil internasional. Oleh karenanya akan meningkatkan keuntungan dengan pengeluaran yang lebih rendah. E. Airline Alliances: Star Alliance, One World, Sky Team Dalam dunia penerbangan sipil internasional, dikenal tiga (3) aliansi maskapai penerbangan yang bersifal global, yaitu Skyteam, Oneworld, dan Star Alliance. Gambaran sejarah perkembangan GALs sejak tahun 1996 hingga tahun 2012 adalah sebagaimana tergambar dalam grafik di bawah ini:

Gambar 3. Evolution in the number of members of the Global Airline

Alliances until February 201233 Pada akhir tahun 1990an, hampir seluruh perusahaan maskapai penerbangan di dunia tergabung dalam GALs. Pada tahun 2011, dilihat

32 Ibid. 33 Antonio Tugores-García: “Analysis of Global Airline Alliances as a Strategy for International

Network Development”, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/10127599.pdf, diakses pada 24 September 2018.


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dari aktivitas pengangkutan orang oleh penerbangan sipil yang tergabung dalam GALs telah mencapai coverage dua per tiga rute lalu lintas penerbangan internasional34. Uraian singkat mengenai masing-masing GALs dan perhitungan keuntungan serta pendapatan dari masing-masing aliansi adalah sebagai berikut: 1. Star Alliance Star Alliance dibentuk pada 14 Mei 1997 oleh United Airlines, Lufthansa, Air Canada, Thai Airways Company, dan SAS Group35. Star Alliance hingga saat ini memiliki anggota berjumlah 28 perusahaan penerbangan dunia dengan jumlah layanan penerbangan di 193 negara dan 1.317 bandara di dunia dengan jumlah penerbangan lebih dari 18.800 keberangkatan. Maskapai penerbangan sipil dunia yang tergabung dalam Star Alliance yaitu Adria, Aegean, Air Canada, Air China, Air India, Air New Zealand, ANA, Asiana Airlines, Austrian, Avianca, Brussels Airlines, Copa AIrlines, Croatia Airlines, Egypt Air, Ethiopian, Eva Air, Polish Airlines, Lufthansa, SAS, Shenzhen Airlines, Singapore Airlines, South African Airways, Swiss Air, Air Portugal, Thai Air, Turkish Airlines, dan United36. Perkembangan besaran penerimaan pendapatan Star Alliance dalam rentang waktu tahun 2015 - 2017 adalah sebagai berikut37:

Tabel 1. Pendapatan Star Alliance Tahun 2015-2017

34 Ibid. 35 Star Alliance: Member Airlines: 28 Airlines Working In Harmony, https://www.staralliance.

com/en/member-airlines, diakses 3 Oktober 2018. 36 Ibid. 37 Statista: Revenue of Star Alliances from 2015 to 2017 https://www.statista.com/

statistics/738525/ star-alliance-revenue/, diakses 4 Oktober 2018. 38 Star Alliance: About, https://portal.staralliance.com/employees/about/bottom-left/the-star-

alliance-network, diakses pada 3 Oktober 2018.

TAHUN JUMLAH

PENDAPATAN KETERANGAN

2015 184 milyar USD -

2016 181 milyar USD Mengalami penurunan sekitar 3 milyar USD dari tahun 2015

2017 194 milyar USD Mengalami peningkatan pendapatan sebesar 13 milyar USD dari tahun 2016

2018 170.95 milyar USD38 Perhitungan per April 2018


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Gambar 4. Revenue generated by Star Alliance from 2015 to 2017 (in

billion U.S. dollars)39 2. Oneworld Oneworld dibentuk pada tanggal 1 Februari 1999 oleh American Airlines, British Airways, dan Cathay Pacific40. Dalam perkembangannya, Oneworld adalah aliansi dari 13 maskapai penerbangan besar di dunia, dengan anggota American Airlines, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, Finnair, Iberia, Japan Airlines, LATAM Airlines, Malaysia Airlines, Qantas, Qatar Airways, Royal Jordanian, S7 Airlines dan SriLanka Airlines. Selain itu juga berafiliasi dengan 30 perusahaan pengangkutan udara di dunia41. Oneworld dengan aliansi dan afiliasi tersebut, melayani 14.000 jadwal penerbangan ke lebih dari 1000 destinasi dalam sehari; melayani lebih dari 550 juta penumpang per tahun dengan gabungan 3.500 pesawat; dengan jumlah pendapatan tahunan lebih dari 130 miliar USD42.

39 Statista: Revenue of Star Alliances from 2015 to 2017 https://www.statista.com/statistics/

738525/ star-alliance-revenue/, diakses 5 Oktober 2018. 40 One World: Introducing One World Connect - A New Way For Airlines To Link The World’s

Premier Alliance, https://www.oneworld.com/news-information/oneworldnews/assetpublisher/ QtTQ7EuCzxhd/content/introducing-oneworld-connect-a-new-way-for-airlines-to-link-to-theworld- s-premier-alliance/maximized, diakses 3 Oktober 2018

41 One World: About, https://www.oneworld.com/general/about-oneworld, diakses pada 3 Oktober 2018.

42 One World: Introducing One World Connect - A New Way For Airlines To Link The World’s Premier Alliance https://www.oneworld.com/news-information/oneworldnews/-/assetpublisher/ QtTQ7EuCzxhd/content/introducing-oneworld-connect-a-new-way-for-airlines-to-link-to-theworld-s-premier-alliance/maximized, diakses 3 Oktober 2018


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Gambar 5. Revenue generated by One World from 2015 to 2017 (in billion

U.S. dollars)43 Perkembangan besaran pendapatan One World dalam rentang tahun 2015 - 2017 adalah sebagai berikut44:

Tabel 2. Pendapatan One World Tahun 2015-2017

TAHUN JUMLAH PENDAPATAN KETERANGAN


2016 134 milyar USD mengalami penurunan sekitar 3 milyar USD dari tahun 2015

2017 132 milyar USD Mengalami penurunan kembali sebesar 2 milyar USD dari tahun 2016

3. Sky Team Sky Team dibentuk pada Juni 2000 oleh Aeroméxico, Air France, Delta Air Lines and Korean Air45. Hingga saat ini, Sky Team telah melayani sebanyak 17.343 jadwal penerbangan dalam satu hari untuk 1.074 destinasi di 177 negara46, termasuk penerbangan nonstop dengan destinasi di antara Amerika Serikat dan Eropa47. Maskapai anggota Sky Team yaitu Aeroflot, Aerolinas Argentinas, Aero Mexico, Air Europa, Air France, Alitalia, China Airlines, China

43 Ibid. 44 Statista: Revenue generated by One World from 2015 to 2017, https://www.statista.com/

statistics/ 738542/oneworld-alliance-revenue/. Diakses 4 Oktober 2018. 45 Sky Team: A History of Excellence, https://www.skyteam.com/en/about/history/, diakses

pada 3 Oktober 2018 46 Sky Team: Facts and Figures, https://www.skyteam.com/en/about/, diakses pada 3 Oktober

2018. 47 Sky Team: History – 2000, https://www.skyteam.com/en/about/history/2000/, diakses pada

3 Oktober 2018.


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Eastern, China Southern, Czech Airlines, Delta, Garuda Indonesia, Kenya Airways, KLM, Korean Air, MEA, SAUDIA, TAROM (Romanian Air), Vietnam Airlines, dan Xiamen Air48. Perkembangan pendapatan Sky Team dalam rentang waktu tahun 2015 – 2017 adalah sebagai berikut49:

Tabel 3. Pendapatan Sky Team Tahun 2015-2017 TAHUN JUMLAH

PENDAPATAN KETERANGAN


2016 147 milyar USD mengalami penurunan sekitar 2 milyar USD dari tahun 2015

2017 156 milyar USD Mengalami kenaikan sebesar 9 milyar USD dari tahun 2016

Gambar 6. Revenue generated by SkyTeam from 2015 to 2017 (in billion

U.S. dollars)50 F. Manfaat Global Airline Alliances (GALs) Dalam perkembangannya, melalui keikutsertaan dalam GALs sebagai bentuk kemitraan (partnership), keuntungan yang didapat bagi para pelaku usaha transportasi udara dan penerbangan sipil dan juga para pengguna jasa penerbangan, antara lain51: 48 Sky Team: Frequent Flyers, https://www.skyteam.com/en/frequent-flyers/, diakses pada 3

Oktober 2018. 49 Statista: Revenue generated by SkyTeam from 2015 to 2017, https://www.statista.com/

statistics/ 738541/sky-team-revenue/, diakses 4 Oktober 2018. 50 Ibid. 51 The Manager’s Resource handbook, Understanding the Business Benefits of Airline

Alliances, http://www.managersresourcehandbook.com/airlines-as-business-partnerships/, diakses pada 3 Oktober 2018.


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1. Meningkatnya Tingkat Kepuasan Pengguna Jasa Penerbangan Sipil Melalui kemitraan strategis dalam bentuk GALs, para pengguna jasa penerbangan sipil mendapat tawaran kenyamanan, fleksibilitas, dan pilihan penerbangan. Hal ini dikarenakan melalui GALs tersedia tawaran pilihan rute, jadwal52, dan maskapai penerbangan melalui satu (1) pemesanan. Lebih lanjut, fasilitas frequent flyer yang bersifat worldwide umumnya dikenali oleh berbagai pihak selama proses perjalanan menggunakan penerbangan sipil sehingga memberikan kesempatan menggunakan fasilitas frequent flyer terlepas dari operator penerbangan sipil yang digunakan. Terkait status dan seluruh informasi penerbangan yang sedang digunakan, penumpang dapat mengakses informasinya melalui satu jaringan sistem informasi terintegrasi. 2. Meningkatnya Pendapatan dari Perusahaan Penerbangan Sipil Prinsip dasar dalam industri penerbangan sipil adalah bahwa keuntungan berasal dari pendapatan yang dihasilkan dari jumlah penjualan kursi pesawat. Oleh karenanya, besarnya pendapatan perusahaan dari penjualan kursi pesawat menjadi perhatian utama, tanpa memperhatikan perusahaan penerbangan manakah yang mengoperasikan suatu rute dan jadwal penerbangan tertentu53. Melalui partnership, maka dapat membuka peluang optimalisasi penjualan kursi dan pemasaran jasa penerbangan penerbangan sipil internasional. 3. Efisiensi Melalui kemitraan dalam bentuk GALs, terbuka peluang optimalisasi penggunaan satu pesawat untuk satu destinasi/rute bagi penerbangan lanjutan (conneting flight) dengan menggunakan pesawat dari perusahaan penerbangan lainnya yang tergabung dalam satu alliance. Sedangkan pesawat lain dari perusahaan penerbangan tersebut dapat melayani destinasi/rute lainnya, sehingga diperoleh kesempatan untuk mendapatkan keuntungan dari dua rute yang berbeda54. G. Indonesia dan Airline Alliances Indonesia melalui Garuda Indonesia, pada tanggal 5 Maret 2014 telah resmi bergabung dengan Sky Team Global Alliance55. Bergabungnya

52 Para penumpang berkesempatan untuk mendapat pilihan dan memilih jadwal dan

maskapai penerbangan yang tergabung dalam satu alliance sesuai dengan kebutuhannya. 53 Salah satu upaya yang dilakukan oleh para pelaku usaha penerbangan sipil dalam hal ini

adalah melalui code sharing. 54 Efisiensi ini juga dapat diterapkan dalam hal pelayanan selama perjalanan untuk satu rute

penerbangan dari titik terbang, transit, dan akhir destinasi yang meliputi fasilitas ruang tunggu di airport, fasilitas check-in, dan fasilitas frequent flyer.

55 Antara News: Garuda Indonesia Resmi Masuk Skyteam, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/ 422401/garuda-indonesia-resmi-masuk-skyteam, diakses pada tanggal 4 Oktober 2018.


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Garuda Indonesia ke dalam aliansi SkyTeam dilatarbelakangi oleh kondisi bahwa terdapat maskapai dari beberapa negara di Asia Tenggara dan Asia Pasifik dengan rute penerbangan internasional dan memiliki kualitas seperti Gadura Indonesia, telah bergabung dalam Star Alliance dan One World. Sebagai upaya untuk mengimbangi hal tersebut maka keputusan untuk bergabung dengan aliansi SkyTeam menjadi salah satu peluang56. Perluasan Garuda Indonesia sebagai maskapai nasional dengan bergabung dalam aliansi SkyTeam sejalan juga dengan Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2009 tentang Penerbangan Pasal 88 ayat (2)57. Selama proses bergabung dalam aliansi SkyTeam, Garuda Indonesia memperkuat kemampuan internalnya melalui transformasi internal sebagai upaya peningkatan kualitas pelayanan penerbangan sipil untuk layanan penerbangan internasional, sesuai dengan standar yang ditetapkan oleh SkyTeam dengan. Upaya tersebut dilaksanakan dengan tetap memperhatikan persayaratan keamanan dan keselamatan penerbangan nasional sebagaimana diatur dalam Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 3 Tahun 2001 tentang Keamanan dan Keselamatan Penerbangan; serta Peraturan Presiden Nomor 70 Tahun 2001 tentang Kebandarudaraan. Dengan kata lain, meskipun Garuda Indonesia harus memenuhi persyaratan standar yang ditetapkan oleh SkyTeam, Garuda Indonesia juga wajib melaksanakan ketentuan nasional bidang penerbangan sipil dan keselamatan penerbangan sipil. Proses tersebut dilaksanakan dalam waktu tiga (3) tahun. Dengan demikian, Garuda Indonesia mendapat peluang dan keuntungan lebih dalam memberikan pelayanan rute internasional58. Salah satu persyaratan yang harus dipenuhi oleh Garuda Indonesia untuk bergabung dalam Sky Team adalah kewajiban Garuda Indonesia untuk terlebih dahulu memenuhi standar keselamatan; standar kualitas; pemenuhan sistem teknologi dan informasi; serta sistem layanan pelanggan59. Selain itu, Garuda Indonesia juga harus tergabung dalam 56 SWA: Di Balik Misi Khusus Keikutsertaan Garuda Dengan Skyteam, https://swa.co.id/swa/ceo-

interview/ di-balik-misi-khusus-keikutsertaan-garuda-dengan-skyteam, diakses pada tanggal 4 Oktober 2018.

57 Pasal 88 Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2009: (2) Badan usaha angkutan udara niaga berjadwal nasional dapat melakukan kerjasama dengan perusahaan angkutan udara asing untuk melayani angkutan udara luar negeri.

58 Pernyataan Direktur Utama Garuda Indonesia, Emirsyah Satar, dalam peresmian Garuda sebagai anggota Sky Team di Nusa Dua Bali, pada tanggal 5 Maret 2014.

59 Deo Rizky Sebayang, Upaya Maskapai Garuda Indonesia Bergabung Dengan Aliansi Global Skyteam Dalam Pemasaran Brand, http://download.portalgaruda.org/article.php?article=349421 &val=6444&title=UPAYA%20MASKAPAI%20GARUDA%20INDONESIA%20BERGABUNG%20DENGAN%20ALIANSI%20GLOBAL%20SKYTEAM%20DALAM%20PEMASARAN%20BRAND diakses 9 Oktober 2018.


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IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) serta lounge akses. Perbedaan keuntungan yang diperoleh Garuda Indonesia setelah bergabung dan sebelum bergabung dengan Sky Team adalah sebagai berikut:

Keuntungan Garuda Indonesia Periode Juli – September 2014 dan 201560

Tahun 2014 (Sebelum Masuk

SkyTeam)

Tahun 2015 (Sesudah Masuk

SkyTeam) Penumpang 20.89 juta

penumpang. 24.55 juta penumpang

Frekuensi Penerbangan 165,642 penerbangan

186,105 penerbangan

Kapasitas produksi (Availability Seat Kilometer/ASK)

36.9 miliar 38.75 miliar

Market Share (Domestik) 37% 44% Market Share (Internasional) 22% 28% tingkat isian penumpang (Seat Load Factor/SLF)

70.7% 77.3%

Total Revenues 2,831 miliar USD 2,845 miliar USD Total Expenses 3.08 miliar USD 2.72 miliar USD

Catatan: Tabel ini hanya menggambarkan perbedaan pada saat sebelum bergabung dan sesudah bergabung dengan SkyTeam.

Dalam perjalanannya setelah bergabung dengan Sky Team, Garuda Indonesia trus mengalami peningkatan pendapatan pada tahun-tahun berikutnya, dengan data sebagai berikut:

Tahun 2015 2016 2017

Total Revenue 2,845 miliar USD 2,865 miliar USD61 3,111 miliar USD62

60 Garuda Indonesia: Garuda Bukukan Laba Bersih 51,4 Juta Dolar Hingga Kuartal 3,

https://www.garuda-indonesia.com/id/id/news-and-events/garuda-bukukan-laba-bersih-51-juta-dolar-hingga-kuartal-3.page, diakses 9 Oktober 2018.

61 Garuda Indonesia, Garuda Bukukan Laba Bersih 19,6 Juta USD Di Q3 Tahun 2016, https://www.garuda-indonesia.com/id/id/news-and-events/garuda-bukukan-laba-bersih-q3.page, diakses pada 25 Oktober 2018.

62 Surabaya Tribun News: Kuartal III, Laba Bersih Garuda Indonesia Capai 61,9 Juta Dolar AS, Kuncinya Penerapan Strategi Ini http://surabaya.tribunnews.com/2017/10/25/kuartal-iii-laba-bersih-garuda-indonesia-capai-619-juta-dolar-as-kuncinya-penerapan-strategi-ini, diakses pada 25 Oktober 2018


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Dengan bergabungnya Garuda Indonesia dalam Sky Team telah menunjukkan Indonesia memiliki posisi yang patut dipertimbangkan dalam peta industri penerbangan dunia; sekaligus memperkuat Indonesia sebagai salah satu World-Class Airline. Keuntungan yang diperoleh, yaitu63: 1. Jaringan layanan penerbangan ke 1.064 destinasi di 178 negara

dengan frekuensi penerbangan sebanyak 15.723 per hari. Selain itu, mendapat akses ke sebanyak 564 lounge terbaik di dunia.

2. Peluang akses pengguna jaringan maskapai dalam aliansi SkyTeam di seluruh dunia sebanyak 588 juta, termasuk diantaranya 189 juta anggota frequent flyer64.

3. Peluang bagi Garuda Indonesia untuk menyebarluaskan branding “Garuda Indonesia Experience” kepada para konsumen di seluruh dunia sehingga menempatkan Indonesia dalam peta industri penerbangan dunia.

4. Memperkuat reputasi dan branding Garuda Indonesia sebagai world class airline dan setara dengan maskapai internasional lainnya.

5. Memberikan peluang bagi maskapai asing dalam aliansi Sky Team untuk menjangkau destinasi bisnis dan wisata yang dilayani oleh Garuda Indonesia melalui layanan penerbangan nonstop dari Jakarta ke enam hub SkyTeam di Seoul, GuangZhou, Beijing, Shanghai, Taipei, dan Amsterdam.

6. Memperkuat jaringan penerbangan SkyTeam di Australia melalui layanan penerbangan langsung Garuda ke Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth, dan Sydney.

7. Memperkuat jaringan penerbangan SkyTeam di Jepang melalui layanan Garuda ke Haneda Tokyo; dan Narita Tokyo

H. Kesimpulan Berdasarkan uraian yang disampaikan dan hasil penelusuran literatur, maka kesimpulan yang diperoleh adalah sebagai berikut: 1. Prinsip freedom of the air dan kebijakan open sky dalam Konvensi

Chicago 1944, mendorong peningkatan aktivitas penerbangan sipil dunia.

2. Prinsip kedaulatan mutlak dari suatu negara terhadap pemberian izin bagi lalu lintas di wilayah udaranya, tidak menjadi halangan bagi aktivitas lalu lintas penerbangan sipil internasional, bahkan membuka

63 Detik Finance: Keuntungan Garuda Indonesia Masuk Skyteam https://finance.detik.com/industri/

d-2516817/ini-dia-keuntungan-garuda-masuk-skyteam, diakses pada 24 September 2018. 64 SWA: CEO Interview: Di Balik Misi Khusus Keikutsertaan Garuda Indonesia dengan

Skyteam, https://swa.co.id/ swa/ceo-interview/di-balik-misi-khusus-keikutsertaan-garuda-dengan-skyteam, diakses 24 September 2018.


78

akses pasar bagi maskapai penerbangan asing melalui ASAs, baik bilateral maupun multilateral (Code Sharing dan Franchising).

3. Perkembangan industri penerbangan sipil dunia yang didorong dengan adanya demand dari para travellers untuk menyediakan layanan penerbangan dengan destinasi yang lebih luas namun berbiaya rendah, menjadi salah satu latar belakang lahirnya GALs.

4. Tujuan bergabungnya suatu maskapai penerbangan internasional ke dalam suatu GALs adalah menjawab tantangan globalisasi; peningkatan demand jumlah penumpang, destinasi, dan frekuensi penerbangan; upaya meningkatkan penghasilan dan memperoleh keuntungan yang lebih besar dengan biaya operasional rendah.

5. Manfaaat GALs bagi para pelaku usaha industri penerbangan sipil internasional : a. Menjadi jalan keluar bagi pemenuhan persyaratan nasional suatu

negara terhadap perizinan lalu lintas udara internasional. b. Memudahkan pemenuhan atas persyaratan keselamatan dan

keamanan penerbangan dan kebandarudaraan suatu negara terhadap maskapai negara lain yang akan melintas atau berhenti di negara tersebut.

c. Peluang pengurangan biaya operasional kegiatan usaha transportasi udara yang bersifat internasional meskipun jangkauan penerbangan semakin luas demikian juga dengan frekuensi penerbangan yang bertambah, karena adanya fasilitas perawatan dan operasional di bandara udara, serta adanya mekanisme investasi.

d. Potensi perluasan jangkauan rute dan destinasi penerbangan dengan biaya operasional yang lebih rendah sehingga mendorong peningkatan pendapatan.

e. Bertambahnya waktu operasional maskapai penerbangan internasional dikarenakan meningkatnya jumlah destinasi penerbangan.

f. Semakin singkatnya waktu perjalanan ke suatu destinasi tertentu karena adanya mekanisme optimalisasi transfer di bandara udara.

g. Mendapatkan portofolio yang seragam di bawah salah satu aliansi penerbangan global yang menjadi nilai jual bagi suatu maskapai penerbangan.

h. Peningkatan kualitas pelayanan di bandara udara sesuai dengan standar suatu aliansi maskapai penerbangan yang telah ditetapkan.

6. Manfaat GALs bagi konsumen pengguna jasa penerbangan sipil internasional, antara lain:


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a. Mendapat kesempatan untuk memilih jadwal penerbangan dan maskapai operator untuk satu destinasi akhir melalui sistem layanan yang terintegrasi.

b. Mendapat fasilitas layanan dengan standar yang sama untuk seluruh maskapai dalam satu aliansi, dari sejak pembelian tiket, layanan di bandara, layanan lounge; dan fasilitas mileage.

c. Mendapat kesempatan untuk memilih rute perjalanan dengan rute penerbangan dari maskapai tertentu dengan harga yang bervariasi. Umumnya, harga yang ditawarkan dimulai dari harga minimal bagi pengoperasian penerbangan sipil internasional untuk satu destinasi tertentu dengan menggunakan jalur, waktu, dan maskapai yang berbeda namun dengan standar yang sama (dalam satu aliansi penerbangan sipil internasional).

Manfaat GALs bagi Garuda Indonesia adalah: 1. Pemanfaatan GALs melalui Sky Team untuk perluasan destinasi; rute;

frekuensi penerbangan; peluang investasi bidang penerbangan; dan branding Indonesia di luar negeri.

2. Kesempatan untuk menunjukkan kepada dunia bahwa Maskapai Penerbangan Nasional Indonesia memiliki posisi yang patut dipertimbangkan dalam peta industri penerbangan dunia; sekaligus memperkuat Indonesia sebagai salah satu World-Class Airline.

3. Perhatian terhadap kepentingan nasional melalui penerapan dan ketaatan pada ketentuan nasional bidang penerbangan sipil serta keselamatan dan keamanan penerbangan sipil, tetap menjadi prioritas meskipun Indonesia bergabung dalam SkyTeam melalui Garuda Indonesia.

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