[A.M. No. P-94-1067.January 30, 1997]CONCERNED CITIZENS OF LAOAG
CITY,complainants,vs. BIENVENIDO ARZAGA and ALFREDO
MAURICIO,respondents.D E C I S I O NPER CURIAM:This administrative
matter arose from two (2) anonymous letters, one dated April 21,
1994 addressed to Judge Federico A. Llanes, MTCC, Branch I, Laoag
City and the other dated April 27, 1994 addressed to Judge Manuel
B. Fernandez, Jr., RTC, Branch 13, Laoag City, charging Bienvenido
Arzaga and Alfredo Mauricio, both process servers of the Office of
the Clerk of Court, MTCC, Laoag City, with influence peddling,
drunkenness, gambling, bribery, extortion and manipulation of bonds
by using the same property for different cases.On June 22, 1994,
Judge Llanes forwarded the said letters, together with the
respondents' comments, to the Office of the Court Administrator.In
a resolution dated September 19, 1994, this Court referred the
matter to Executive Judge Wenceslao Agnir, RTC, Laoag City, for
investigation, report and recommendation.In his investigation
report dated December 16, 1994, Judge Agnir stated, among others,
that both respondents had submitted their written comments denying
the charges; that upon receipt of the complaint, he requested the
local media to announce to the public that anyone who had evidence
against the two respondents could see him; that however, after two
months of waiting, nobody came forward to offer any evidence
against respondents; that he also interviewed the employees of the
City Court to verify the truth of the charges against the
respondents, but he obtained no information to give credence to
said charges.Judge Agnir, however, reported that he received a
certification from the City Prosecutor's Office of Laoag City, to
the effect that Alfredo Mauricio was convicted of Frustrated Murder
on September 29, 1983 in Criminal Case No. 1260-XIII, but was
placed on probation. Alfredo Mauricio had also been charged with
eleven (11) other criminal cases like Illegal Possession of
Firearms, Grave Slander by Deed, Grave Threats, Serious Physical
Injuries, but all of these had been dismissed.Judge Agnir made no
definite recommendation in his report, except to say that he was
leaving it to the Court Administrator to determine whether on the
basis of "such a criminal record, Alfredo 'Boy' Mauricio deserves
to stay in the service of the Judiciary."On February 1, 1995, this
Court referred the Investigation Report of Judge Agnir to the
Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.Accordingly, the Office of the Court Administrator
submitted a memorandum to this Court recommending that the charges
against the two respondents be dismissed for lack of merit.After a
careful examination of the recommendation of the Office of the
Court Administrator, this Court on May 29, 1995, resolved to
dismiss the charges against Benjamin Arzaga as recommended but
referred the case against Alfredo Mauricio to Judge Agnir for
further investigation relative to how said respondent managed to be
appointed to the position of process server despite a previous
record of conviction of the crime of frustrated murder.Judge Agnir
was likewise directed to conduct an inquiry on whether said
respondent made untruthful statements in his application by
suppressing the fact of his conviction as well as other criminal
charges filed against him though subsequently dismissed.In
compliance with the aforementioned resolution, Judge Agnir
submitted his second investigation report dated July 21, 1995.In
his report, Judge Agnir narrated that respondent Mauricio joined
the judiciary on October 4, 1990 as Utility Worker I of MTCC,
Branch 2, Laoag City.His commission was signed by then Court
Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro and certified by Chief
Administrative Officer Adelaida Cabe-Baumann upon recommendation of
Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., then presiding judge of Branch 2,
RTC, Laoag City.On May 5, 1992, respondent was promoted to the
position of process server of the Office of the Clerk of Court,
MTCC, Laoag City.His commission was signed by Romeo P. de Leon in
behalf of Adelaida Cabe-Baumann.Judge Agnir further narrated that
respondent disclosed his conviction of the crime of frustrated
murder and that he was on probation for the same in his
application.When respondent was asked by Judge Agnir why he did not
indicate that other criminal charges were filed against him, he
replied that the question in the application form simply asked for
conviction, not mere charges.The Second Investigation Report also
mentioned the name of two (2) persons from whom respondent Mauricio
allegedly asked favors using the name of Judge Fernandez.The first
was Jimmy Lao, a realtor-businessman of Laoag City who told Judge
Agnir that two (2) years earlier when he had a case pending before
the sala of Judge Fernandez, respondent Mauricio approached him and
asked for two (2) tires allegedly for the car of Judge
Fernandez.Mr. Lao said that when he went to verify the request, he
was not able to talk to Judge Fernandez but a court staff member
told him that Judge Fernandez was not in the habit of asking favors
from litigants and that in all probability, the tires were intended
for Mauricio's owner-type jeep which was then in the process of
being assembled.When he confronted Mauricio about it, the latter
told him that he (Mauricio) was only joking.The second interviewee
was German Reantillo, administrative officer of the City Engineer's
Office of Laoag City who confirmed that sometime ago he gave
Mauricio thirty (30) liters of gasoline on the respondent's
representation that this was for Judge Fernandez; that sometime
later he had the occasion to mention the matter to Judge Fernandez
who denied that he authorized Mauricio to ask gasoline in his
behalf.Both Lao and Reantillo however refused to be placed under
oath or to reduce their statements in writing because they did not
wish to be involved in a formal investigation where they would have
to be confronted by respondent.Furthermore Lao said he did not wish
to incur the ire of the respondent and that anyway he did not give
Mauricio the tires.On July 17, 1995, Judge Agnir called respondent
Mauricio to another hearing and confronted him with these new
charges.Respondent denied them as expected.Judge Agnir further
claimed that respondent is known to be a troublesome fellow. MTC
Judge Llanes even had to file an administrative case against
respondent for serious misconduct and insubordination.Judge Agnir
then strongly recommended the immediate and summary dismissal from
the service of respondent Mauricio for being the "ultimate
undesirable employee and a disgrace to the judiciary."[1]He added
that he was recommending this course of action aware of the
potential danger to his person given respondent's violent nature as
documented by his criminal record.Judge Agnir was "hopeful though
that the respondent's summary dismissal will send a chilling
message to other court employees similarly engaged in nefarious
activities and unethical practices which though petty in many
instances indelibly stain the image of the
judiciary."[2]Thereafter, the case was referred to the Office of
the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.The Deputy Court Administrator to whom the case was
assigned for review submitted the following observations,viz:A
careful scrutiny of the 201 File of respondent Mauricio shows that
he joined the judiciary not on 4 October 1990 as Utility Worker I
but on 1 August 1989 as a Court Aide of MTCC, Branch 2 of Laoag
City as a recommendee of Judge Angelo M. Albano, MTCC, Laoag
City.Respondent's appointment was by virtue of a Supreme Court
Resolution dated 1 August 1989 and his commission was signed by
then Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro and certified by Former
Assistant Chief Administrative Officer Orlando B. Carino and Former
Chairman of the Selection Board Daniel T Martinez.It was also
discovered that on 24 January 1990 Atty. Carino sent a telegram to
Mauricio ordering him to submit a copy of the Order placing him on
probation pending the approval of his appointment as Utility Worker
I. Accordingly respondent sent a copy of the said Order and in his
1st indorsement dated 22 February 1990, Atty. Carino referred the
Probation Order to Atty. Ponciano R. Solosa, Assistant Director of
the Civil Service Commission Field Office for appropriate
action.Per Court Resolution dated 4 October 1990 respondent was
appointed as Utility Worker I and was promoted as Process Server by
virtue of a Court Resolution of 5 May 1992.On 19 January 1993
Police Inspector Felizardo Ellano of the PNP-CIS Command in Camp
Capt. Valentin San Juan, Laoag City, sent a letter addressed to the
Chief Justice through the Record Section requesting that a check be
conducted on the records of Mauricio who was at that time being
charged by their Office with the crimes of Less Serious Physical
Injuries and Resistance and Disobedience Upon Agents of a Person in
Authority. Police Officer Ellano likewise informed the Court that
the respondent has already been charged of several offenses in
different courts in Laoag City which according to him was a clear
showing that Mauricio is a violent man, a habitual offender and
extremely defiant of the law.Records show that the respondent twice
accomplished Personal Data Sheet (Civil Service Commission Form
212, Revised 1982) on two (2) separate occasions: on 5 June 1989
before his appointment as Court Aide and on 13 September 1990 prior
to his appointment as Utility Worker.In both instances, Mauricio
disclosed his conviction of Frustrated Murder and the fact that he
was on probation.The charges against respondent Mauricio for
influence peddling, drunkenness, gambling, bribery, extortion and
manipulation of bonds by using the same property for different
cases do not appear to have been sufficiently established by clear
evidence. The two (2) persons from whom the respondent allegedly
asked favors using the name of Judge Fernandez both refused to be
placed under oath or reduce their statements in writing.But
administrative charges cannot be based on mere conjecture. The
complainant has the burden of proof and such proof must be clear,
solid and convincing to compel the exercise of disciplinary power
over the person indicted.On respondent's conviction of Frustrated
Murder, there was full disclosure of the conviction and apparently
was not a legal obstacle to respondent's appointment because he was
placed on probation. Therefore, respondent's conviction of a crime
should not be taken as a basis of any administrative action against
him.The foregoing notwithstanding we do not see any reason to
disturb the Investigating Judge's finding that respondent is a
troublesome and violent person as shown by his criminal record
certified by the City Prosecutor of Laoag City. There is therefore
merit in Judge Agnir's recommendation of immediate and summary
dismissal of the respondent from the service for being the
"ultimate undesirable employee and a disgrace to the judiciary."It
is commendable that Judge Agnir has opted to resist the temptation
to be silent in the face of what he perceives to be a deleterious
influence in the court.Under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent
Civil Service Laws "being notoriously undesirable" is classified as
a grave offense with a corresponding penalty of dismissal, or
forced resignation under Resolution No. 89-506 dated 20 July 1989
of the Civil Service Commission.Time and again the Court has held
that "A court employee being a public servant must exhibit the
highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance
of his duties but also in his personal and private dealings with
other people to preserve the court's name and standing. Therefore,
it becomes imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the
court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of
justice." (Paredes vs. Padua, 222 SCRA 81).Equally compelling is
the decision of the Court in the case ofMirano vs. Saavedra,225
SCRA 77 which states that "The conduct and behavior of everyone
connected with the office charged with the dispensation of justice
from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility."[3]On the
foregoing antecedents, it was recommended by the Deputy Court
Administrator that respondent be declared notoriously undesirable
and be considered resigned from the service with forfeiture of
leave credits and retirement benefits and disqualification from
employment in the government service for a period of one (1) year.
It was further recommended, however, that respondent be reemployed
in the government service other than the judiciary.In reviewing the
aforesaid report and recommendation submitted for the Court's
consideration, we find the foregoing observations to be correct.
We, nonetheless, find the penalty recommended by the Office of the
Court Administrator to be very light. Consequently, we adopt the
investigating judge's recommendation for respondent's dismissal
from the service, the same being warranted and justified by the
facts attendant to the instant case.Public service requires the
utmost integrity and strictest discipline. Thus, a public servant
must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and
integrity not only in the performance of his official duties but in
his personal and private dealings with other people.[4]No less than
the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is a
public trust, and enjoins all public officers and employees to
serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency.[5]In addition, the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provide that
every public servant shall at all times uphold public interest over
his or her personal interest.[6]By his acts and misdeeds,
respondent has undermined the public's faith in our courts and,
ultimately, in the administration of justice. The same make him
unfit as a court employee.His employment must therefore be
terminated at once. Court personnel must adhere to the high ethical
standards of public service in order to preserve the Court's good
name and standing.[7]Time and again, this Court has emphasized that
the conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge
to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let
them be free from any suspicion that may taint the
judiciary.ACCORDINGLY, respondent ALFREDO MAURICIO is hereby
DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with
prejudice to his reemployment in any branch of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
G.R. No. 116418March 7, 1995
SALVADOR C. FERNANDEZ and ANICIA M. DE LIMA, petitioners,
vs.HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, Chairman, and HON. RAMON B.
ERENETA, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C.
Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail the validity of Resolution
No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission ("Commission") and the
authority of the Commission to issue the same.
Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of
Personnel Inspection and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima
was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations
("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission
in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners were so
serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents
Patricia A.. Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and
Commissioner, respectively, of the Commission, was issued on 7 June
1994. 1 Resolution No. 94-3710 needs to be quoted in full:
RESOLUTION NO. 94-3710
WHEREAS, Section 17 of Book V of Executive Order 292 provides
that ". . . as an independent constitutional body, the Commission
may effect changes in the organization as the need arises;"
WHEREAS, the Commission finds it imperative to effect changes in
the organization to streamline its operations and improve delivery
of public service;
WHEREAS, the Commission finds it necessary to immediately effect
changes in the organization of the Central Offices in view of the
need to implement new programs in lieu of those functions which
were transferred to the Regional Offices;
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby
RESOLVES to effect the following changes in its organization,
specifically in the Central Offices:
1.The OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], OPIA
[Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and OPR [Office of
Personnel Relations] are merged to form the Research and
Development Office (RDO).
2.The Office for Human Resource Development (OHRD) is renamed
Human Resource Development Office (HRDO).
3.The following functions and the personnel assigned to the unit
performing said functions are hereby transferred to HRDO:
a.Administration of the Honor and Awards program under OCSS;
b.Registration and Accreditation of Unions under OPR; and
c.Accreditation of Agencies to take final action on appointments
under OPIA.
4.The Office for Central Personnel Records (OCPR) is renamed
Management Information Office (MIO).
5.The Information technology functions of OPM and the personnel
assigned to the unit are transferred to MIO.
6.The following functions of OPM and the personnel assigned to
the unit performing said functions are hereby transferred to the
Office of the Executive Director:
a.Financial Audit and Evaluation;
b.Internal Management and Improvement;
c.Research and Statistics; and
d.Planning and Programming.
7.The library service and its personnel under OCPR are
transferred to the Central Administrative Office.
8.The budget allocated for the various functions shall be
transferred to the Offices where the functions are transferred.
Records, fixtures and equipment that go with the functions shall be
moved to where the functions are transferred.
Annex A contains the manning list for all the offices, except
the OCES.
The changes in the organization and in operations shall take
place before end of July 1994.
Done in Quezon City, July 07, 1994.
(Signed)Patricia A. Sto. TomasChairman
(Signed)Did not participateRamon P. Ereneta, Jr.,Thelma P.
GamindeCommissionerCommissioner
Attested by:(Signed)Carmencita Giselle B. DaysonBoard Secretary
V 2
During the general assembly of officers and employees of the
Commission held in the morning of 28 July 1994, Chairman Sto.
Tomas, when apprised of objections of petitioners, expressed the
determination of the Commission to implement Resolution No. 94-3710
unless restrained by higher authority.
Petitioners then instituted this Petition. In a Resolution dated
23 August 1994, the Court required public respondents to file a
Comment on the Petition. On 21 September 1994, petitioners filed an
Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order,
alleging that petitioners had received Office Orders from the
Commission assigning petitioner Fernandez to Region V at Legaspi
City and petitioner de Lima to Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga
and praying that public respondents be restrained from enforcing
these Office Orders. The Court, in a Resolution dated 27 September
1994, granted this Motion and issued the Temporary Restraining
Order prayed for by petitioners.
The Commission filed its own Comment, dated 12 September 1994,
on the Petition and then moved to lift the Temporary Restraining
Order. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a separate Comment
dated 28 November 1994, defending the validity of Resolution No.
94-3710 and urging dismissal of the Petition. Petitioners filed
separate Replies to these Comments. The Commission in turn filed a
Rejoinder (denominated "Comment [on] the Reply").
The principal issues raised in this Petition are the
following:
(1)Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal
authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged
the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office
of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel
Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development Office];
and
(2)Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners'
constitutional right to security of tenure.
I.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292
dated 25 July 1987) sets out, in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A,
Chapter 3, the internal structure and organization of the
Commission in the following terms:
Sec. 16.Offices in the Commission The Commission shall have the
following offices:
(1)The Office of the Executive Director . . .
(2)The Merit System Protection Board . . .
(3)The Office of Legal Affairs . . .
(4)The Office of Planning and Management . . .
(5)The Central Administrative Office . . .
(6)The Office of Central Personnel Records . . .
(7)The Office of Position Classification and Compensation . .
.
(8)The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement . .
.
(9)The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide
leadership and assistance in the formulation and evaluation of
personnel systems and standards relative to performance appraisal,
merit promotion and employee incentive benefits and awards.
(10)The Office of Human Resource Development . . .
(11)The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop
policies, standards, rules and regulations for the effective
conduct of inspection and audit of personnel and personnel
management programs and the exercise of delegated authority;
provide technical and advisory services to Civil Service Regional
Offices and government agencies in the implementation of their
personnel programs and evaluation systems.
(12)The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership
and assistance in the development and implementation of policies,
standards, rules and regulations governing corporate officials and
employees in the areas of recruitment, examination, placement,
career development, merit and awards systems, position
classification and compensation, performance appraisal, employee
welfare and benefits, discipline and other aspects of personnel
management on the basis of comparable industry practices.
(13)The Office of the Corporate Affairs . . .
(14)The Office of Retirement Administration . . .
(15)The Regional and Field Offices. . . . (Emphases in the
original)
Immediately after the foregoing listing of offices of the
Commission and their respective functions, the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code goes on to provide as follows:
Sec. 17.Organizational Structure. Each office of the Commission
shall be headed by a Director with at least one (1) Assistant
Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary to carry out
their respective functions. As an independent constitutional body,
the Commission may effect chances in the organization as the need
arises.
xxxxxxxxx 3
(Emphasis supplied)
Examination of the foregoing statutory provisions reveals that
the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, and as well each of the other Offices
listed in Section 16 above, consist of aggregations of Divisions,
each of which Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections. Each
Section, Division and Office comprises a group of positions within
the agency called the Civil Service Commission, each group being
entrusted with a more or less definable function or functions.
These functions are related to one another, each of them being
embraced by a common or general subject matter. Clearly, each
Office is an internal department or organizational unit within the
Commission and that accordingly, the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, as well as
all the other Offices within the Commission constitute
administrative subdivisions of the CSC. Put a little differently,
these offices relate to the internal structure of the
Commission.
What did Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Commission do?
Examination of Resolution No. 94-3710 shows that thereby the
Commission re-arranged some of the administrative units (i.e.,
Offices) within the Commission and, among other things, merged
three (3) of them (OCSS, OPIA and OPR) to form a new grouping
called the "Research and Development Office (RDO)." The same
Resolution renamed some of the Offices of the Commission, e.g., the
Office for Human Resource Development (OHRD) was renamed Human
Resource Development Office (HRDO); the Office for Central
Personnel Records (OCPR) was renamed Management Information Office
(MIO). The Commission also re-allocated certain functions moving
some functions from one Office to another; e.g., the information
technology function of OPM (Office of Planning and Management) was
transferred to the newly named Management Information Office (MIO).
This re-allocation or re-assignment of some functions carried with
it the transfer of the budget earmarked for such function to the
Office where the function was transferred. Moreover, the personnel,
records, fixtures and equipment that were devoted to the carrying
out of such functions were moved to the Offices to where the
functions were transferred.
The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution
No. 94-3710 were described in that Resolution in broad terms as
"effect[ing] changes in the organization to streamline [the
Commission's] operations and improve delivery of service." These
changes in internal organization were rendered necessary by, on the
one hand, the decentralization and devolution of the Commission's
functions effected by the creation of fourteen (14) Regional
Offices and ninety-five (95) Field Offices of the Commission
throughout the country, to the end that the Commission and its
staff may be brought closer physically to the government employees
that they are mandated to serve. In the past, its functions had
been centralized in the Head Office of the Commission in
Metropolitan Manila and Civil Service employees all over the
country were compelled to come to Manila for the carrying out of
personnel transactions. Upon the other hand, the dispersal of the
functions of the Commission to the Regional Offices and the Field
Offices attached to various governmental agencies throughout the
country makes possible the implementation of new programs of the
Commission at its Central Office in Metropolitan Manila.
The Commission's Office Order assigning petitioner de Lima to
the CSC Regional Office No. 3 was precipitated by the incumbent
Regional Director filing an application for retirement, thus
generating a need to find a replacement for him. Petitioner de Lima
was being assigned to that Regional Office while the incumbent
Regional Director was still there to facilitate her take over of
the duties and functions of the incumbent Director. Petitioner de
Lima's prior experience as a labor lawyer was also a factor in her
assignment to Regional Office No. 3 where public sector unions have
been very active. Petitioner Fernandez's assignment to the CSC
Regional Office No. 5 had, upon the other hand, been necessitated
by the fact that the then incumbent Director in Region V was under
investigation and needed to be transferred immediately to the
Central Office. Petitioner Fernandez was deemed the most likely
designee for Director of Regional Office No. 5 considering that the
functions previously assigned to him had been substantially
devolved to the Regional Offices such that his reassignment to a
Regional Office would result in the least disruption of the
operations of the Central Office. 4
It thus appears to the Court that the Commission was moved by
quite legitimate considerations of administrative efficiency and
convenience in promulgating and implementing its Resolution No.
94-3710 and in assigning petitioner Salvador C. Fernandez to the
Regional Office of the Commission in Region V in Legaspi City and
petitioner Anicia M. de Lima to the Commission's Regional Office in
Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga. It is also clear tothe Court
that the changes introduced and formalized through Resolution No.
94-3710 re-naming of existing Offices; re-arrangement of the
groupings of Divisions and Sections composing particular Offices;
re-allocation of existing functions (and related personnel; budget,
etc.) among the re-arranged Offices are precisely the kind of
internal changes which are referred to in Section 17 (Book V, Title
I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3) of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code),
quoted above, as "chances in the organization" of the
Commission.
Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the
"abolition" of public offices, something which may be done only by
the same legislative authority which had created those public
offices in the first place.
The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this case, to
accept this argument. The term "public office" is frequently used
to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by
law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring
at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be
exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public. 5 We
consider that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public
office as that term is used in the law of public officers. 6 It is
essential to note that none of the "changes in organization"
introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily
involved the termination of the relationship of public employment
between the Commission and any of its officers and employees. We
find it very difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code having mentioned fourteen (14) different
"Offices" of the Civil Service Commission, meant to freeze those
Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal
organization of the commission until it might please Congress to
change such internal organization regardless of the ever changing
needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary, the
legislative authority had expressly authorized the Commission to
carry out "changes in the organization," as the need [for such
changes] arises." 7 Assuming, for purposes of argument merely, that
legislative authority was necessary to carry out the kinds off
changes contemplated in Resolution No. 94-3710 (and the Court is
not saying that such authority is necessary), such legislative
authority was validly delegated to the Commission by Section 17
earlier quoted. The legislative standards to be observed and
respected in the exercise of such delegated authority are set out
not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but
also in the Declaration of Policies found in Book V, Title I,
Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code which
required the Civil Service Commission
as the central personnel agency of the Government [to] establish
acareer service, adopt measures to promote efficiency [and]
responsiveness . . . in the civil service . . . and that personnel
functions shall be decentralized, delegating the corresponding
authority to the departments, offices and agencies where such
functions can be effectively performed. (Emphasis supplied)
II.
We turn to the second claim of petitioners that their right to
security of tenure was breached by the respondents in promulgating
Resolution No. 94-3710 and ordering petitioners' assignment to the
Commission's Regional Offices in Regions III and V. Section 2(3) of
Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution declared that "no officer or
employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause provided by law." Petitioners in effect contend that they
were unlawfully removed from their positions in the OPIA and OPR by
the implementation of Resolution No. 94-3710 and that they cannot,
without their consent, be moved out to the Regional Offices of the
Commission.
We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the
Commission are not appointments to a specified public office but
rather appointments to particular positions or ranks. Thus, a
person may be appointed to the position of Director III or Director
IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the
position of Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth.
In the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the
position of Director IV, without specification of any particular
office or station. The same is true with respect to the other
persons holding the same position or rank of Director IV of the
Commission.
Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code recognizes reassignment as a management
prerogative vested in the Commission and, for that matter, in any
department or agency of government embraced in the civil
service:
Sec. 26.Personnel Actions. . . .
xxxxxxxxx
As used in this Title, any action denoting the movement or
progress of personnel in the civil service shall be known as
personnel action. Such action shall include appointment through
certification, promotion, transfer, re-instatement, re-employment,
detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation. All personnel
actions shall be in accordance with such rules, standards, and
regulations as may be promulgated by the Commission.
xxxxxxxxx
(7)Reassignment. An employee may be re-assigned from one
organizational unit to another in the same agency, Provided, That
such re-assignment shall not involve a reduction in rank status and
salary. (Emphasis supplied)
It follows that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de
Lima from their previous positions in OPIA and OPR, respectively,
to the Research and Development Office (RDO) in the Central Office
of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila and their subsequent
assignment from the RDO to the Commission's Regional Offices in
Regions V and III had been effected with express statutory
authority and did not constitute removals without lawful cause. It
also follows that such re-assignment did not involve any violation
of the constitutional right of petitioners to security of tenure
considering that they retained their positions of Director IV and
would continue to enjoy the same rank, status and salary at their
new assigned stations which they had enjoyed at the Head Office of
the Commission in Metropolitan Manila. Petitioners had not, in
other words, acquired a vested right to serve at the Commission's
Head Office.
Secondly, the above conclusion is compelled not only by the
statutory provisions relevant in the instant case, but also by a
long line of cases decided by this Court in respect of different
agencies or offices of government.
In one of the more recent of these cases, Department of
Education Culture and Sports, etc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al., 8 this Court held that a person who had been appointed as
"Secondary School Principal II" in the Division of City Schools,
District II, Quezon City, National Capital Region, and who had been
stationed as High School Principal in the Carlos Albert High School
in Quezon for a number of years, could lawfully be reassigned or
transferred to the Manuel Roxas High School, also in Quezon City,
without demotion in rank or diminution of salry. This Court
held:
The aforequoted provision of Republic Act No. 4670 particularly
Section 6 thereof which provides that except for cause and in the
exigencies of the service no teacher shall be transferred without
his consent from one station to another, finds no application in
the case at bar as this is predicated upon the theory that the
teacher concerned is appointed not merely assigned to a particular
station. Thus:
The rule pursued by plaintiff only goes so far asthe appointed
indicates a specification. Otherwise, the constitutionally ordained
security of tenure cannot shield her. In appointments of this
nature, this Court has consistently rejected the officer's demand
to remain even as public service dictates that a transfer be made
in a particular station. Judicial attitude toward transfers of this
nature is expressed in the following statement in Ibaez, et al. vs.
Commission on Elections, et al. (G.R. No. L-26558, April 27, 1967;
19 SCRA 1002 [1967]);
That security of tenure is an essential and constitutionally
guaranteed feature of our Civil Service System, is not open to
debate. The mantle of its protection extends not only against
removals without cause but also against unconsented transfer which,
as repeatedly enunciatEd, are tantamount to removals which are
within the ambit of the fundamental guarantee. However, the
availability of that security of tenure necessarily depends, in the
first instance, upon the nature of the appointment (Hojilla vs.
Marino, 121 Phil. 280 [1965].) Such that the rule which proscribes
transfers without consent as anathema to the security of tenure is
predicated upon the theory that the officer involved is appointed
not merely assigned to a particular station (Miclat v. Ganaden, et
al., 108 Phil. 439 [1960]; Jaro v. Hon. Valencia, et al., 118 Phil.
728 [1963]). [Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138 (1969)]
The appointment of Navarro as principal does not refer to any
particular station or school. As such, she could be assigned to any
station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific
school. (Bongbong v. Parado, 57 SCRA 623) When she was assigned to
the Carlos Albert High School, it could not have been with the
intention to let her stay in said school permanently. Otherwise,
her appointment would have so stated. Consequently, she may be
assigned to any station or school in Quezon City as the exigencies
of public service require even without consent. As this Court ruled
in Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138,143
Plaintiff's confident stride falters. She took too loose a view
of the applicable jurisprudence. Her refuge behind the mantle of
security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution is not
impenetrable. She proceeds upon the assumption that she occupies
her station in Sinalang Elementary School by appointment. But her
first appointment as Principal merely reads thus: "You are hereby
appointed a Principal (Elementary School) in the Bureau of Public
Schools, Department of Education", without mentioning her station.
She cannot therefore claim security of tenure as Principal of
Sinalang Elementary School or any particular station. She may be
assigned to any station as exigency of public service requires,
even without her consent. She thus has no right of choice. 9
(Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)
In the very recent case of Fernando, et al. v. Hon. Sto. Tomas,
etc., et a1., 10 the Court addressed appointments of petitioners as
"Mediators-Arbiters in the National Capital Region" in dismissing a
challenge on certiorari to resolutions of the CSC and orders of the
Secretary of Labor. The Court said:
Petitioners were appointed as Mediator Arbiters in the National
Capital Region. They were not, however, appointed to a specific
station or particular unit of the Department of Labor in the
National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR). Consequently, they can always
be reassigned from one organizational unit to another of the same
agency where, in the opinion of respondent Secretary, their
services may be used more effectively. As such they can neither
claim a vested right to the station to which they were assigned nor
to security of tenure thereat. As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, petitioners' reassignment is not a transfer for
they were not removed from their position as med-arbiters. They
were not given new appointments to new positions. It indubitably
follows, therefore, that Memorandum Order No. 4 ordering their
reassignment in the interest of the service is legally in order. 11
(Emphases supplied)
In Quisumbing v. Gumban, 12 the Court, dealing with an
appointment in the Bureau of Public Schools of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, ruled as follows:
After a careful scrutiny of the records, it is to be underscored
that the appointment of private respondent Yap is simply that of a
District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools which does not
indicate a specific station (Rollo, p. 13). A such, she could be
assigned to any station and she is no entitled to stay permanently
at any specific station (Bongbong v. Parado, 57 SCRA 623 [1974];
Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. Court of Appeals
[G.R. 81032, March 22, 1990] citing Brillantes v. Guevarra [27 SCRA
138 [1969]). 13
Again, in Ibaez v. Commission on Elections, 14 the Court had
before it petitioners' appointments as "Election Registrars in the
Commission of Elections," without any intimation to what city,
municipality or municipal district they had been appointed as such.
15 The Court held that since petitioners "were not appointed to,
and consequently not entitled to any security of tenure or
permanence in, any specific station," "on general principles, they
[could] be transferred as the exigencies of the service required,"
and that they had no right to complain against any change in
assignment. The Court further held that assignment to a particular
station after issuance of the appointment was not necessary to
complete such appointment:
. . . . We cannot subscribe to the theory that an assignment to
a particular station, in the light of the terms of the appointments
in question, was necessary to complete the said appointments. The
approval thereof by the Commissioner of Civil Service gave those
appointments the stamp of finality. With the view that the
respondent Commission then took of its power in the premises and
the demand of the mission it set out to accomplish with the
appointments it extended, said appointments were definitely meant
to be complete as then issued. The subsequent assignment of the
appointees thereunder that the said respondent Commission held in
reserve to be exercised as the needs of each locality justified did
not in any way detract from the perfection attained by the
appointments beforehand. And the respective appointees were
entitled only to such security of tenure as the appointment papers
concerned actually conferred not in that of any place to which they
may have been subsequently assigned. . . . As things stand, in
default of any particular station stated in their respective
appointments, no security of tenure can be asserted by the
petitioners on the basis of the mere assignments which were given
to them. A contrary rule will erase altogether the demarcation line
we have repeatedly drawn between appointment and assignment as two
distinct concepts in the law of public officers. 16 (Emphases
supplied)
The petitioner, in Miclat v. Ganaden, 17 had been appointed as a
"Welfare Office Incharge, Division of Urban, Rural and Community
Administration, Social Welfare Administration." She was assigned as
Social Welfare Incharge of the Mountain Province, by an office
order of the Administrator, Social Welfare Administration. After a
little more than a year; petitioner was assigned elsewhere and
respondent Ganaden transferred to petitioner's first station in
Baguio City. The Court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to
remain in her first station, In Jaro v. Hon. Valencia, et al., 18
petitioner Dr. Jaro had been appointed "Physician in the Municipal
Maternity and Charity Clinics, Bureau of Hospitals." He was first
assigned to the Municipal Maternity and Charity Clinics in
Batulati, Davao, and later to the corresponding clinic in Saug,
Davao and then to Catil, Davao. He was later assigned to the
Municipality of Padada, also of Davao Province. He resisted his
last assignment and brought mandamus against the Secretary of
Health to compel the latter to return him to his station in Catil,
Davao as Municipal Health Officer thereof. The Court, applying
Miclat v. Ganaden dismissed this Petition holding that his
appointment not being to any specific station but as a physician in
the Municipal Maternity and Charity Clinics, Bureau of Hospitals,
he could be transferred or assigned to any station where, in the
opinion of the Secretary of Health, his services may be utilized
more effectively. 19
Also noteworthy is Sta. Maria v. Lopez 20 which involved the
appointment of petitioner Sta. Maria as "Dean, College of
Education, University of the Philippines." Dean Sta. Maria was
transferred by the President of the University of the Philippines
to the Office of the President, U.P., without demotion in rank or
salary, thereby acceding to the demands of student activists who
were boycotting their classes in the U.P. College of Education.
Dean Sta. Maria assailed his transfer as an illegal and
unconstitutional removal from office. In upholding Dean Sta.
Maria's claim, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez,
laid down the applicable doctrine in the following terms:
4.Concededly, transfers there are which do not amount to
removal. Some such transfer can be effected without the need for
charges being preferred, without trial or hering, and even without
the consent of the employee.
The clue to such transfers may be found in the "nature of the
appointment." Where the appointment does not indicate a specific
station, an employee may be transferred or reassigned provided the
transfer affects no substantial change in title, rank and salary.
Thus one who is appointed "principal in the Bureau of Public
Schools" and is designated to head a pilot school may be
transferred to the post of principal of another school.
And the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to
security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed not
merely assigned to a particular station. Such a rule does not
prescribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that
empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the
employees and officers in order to improve the service of the
agency. The use of approved techniques or methods in personnel
management to harness the abilities of employees to promote optimum
public service cannot-be objected to. . . .
5.The next point of inquiry is whether or not Administrative
Order 77 would stand the test of validity vis-a-vis the principles
just enunciated.
xxxxxxxxx
To be stressed at this point, however, is that the appointment
of Sta. Maria is that of "Dean, College of Education, University of
the Philippines." He is not merely a dean "in the university." His
appointment is to a specific position; and, more importantly, to a
specific station. 21 (Citations omitted; emphases supplied)
For all the foregoing we conclude that the reassignment of
petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their stations in the OPIA
and OPR, respectively, to the Research Development Office (RDO) and
from the RDO to the Commissions Regional Offices in Regions V and
III, respectively, without their consent, did not constitute a
violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued by this Court on 27 September 1994 is hereby LIFTED.
Costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. 145368 April 12, 2002
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs.HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in
his capacity as Ombudsman, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Administrative Order No. 223 "constituting a Committee for the
preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998." The
Committee was mandated "to take charge of the nationwide
preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the
Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."1
Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order
No. 128, "reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the
National Centennial Celebrations in 1988." It renamed the Committee
as the "National Centennial Commission." Appointed to chair the
reconstituted Commission was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel.
Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named
Honorary Chairpersons.2
Characterized as an "i body," the existence of the Commission
"shall terminate upon the completion of all activities related to
the Centennial Celebrations."3 Like its predecessor Committee, the
Commission was tasked to "take charge of the nationwide
preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the
Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."
Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also
charged with the responsibility to "prepare, for approval of the
President, a Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial Celebrations
within six (6) months from the effectivity of" the Executive
Order.
E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and
funding:
Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and
administrative staff support by a Secretariat to be composed of,
among others, detailed personnel from the Presidential Management
Staff, the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, and the
National Historical Institute. Said Secretariat shall be headed by
a full time Executive Director who shall be designated by the
President.
Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to
be drawn from the Department of Tourism and the presidents
Contingent Fund, in an amount to be recommended by the Commission,
and approved by the President. Appropriations for succeeding years
shall be incorporated in the budget of the Office of the
President.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo
98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created.4 Petitioner was among the
nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9)
directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive
Officer.
On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a
privilege speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the
construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at
the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of Senator Franklin
Drilon, Senator Cosetengs privilege speech was referred to the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation
(The Blue Ribbon Committee) and several other Senate Committees for
investigation.
On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued
Administrative Order No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent
citizens committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the Philippine centennial projects, including its
component activities. Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag was
appointed to chair the Committee.
On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with
the Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final Report No. 30 dated
February 26, 1999. Among the Committees recommendations was "the
prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of
NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding,
relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia
Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias
in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct
the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that
has caused material injury to government and for participating in
the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the
government for the implementation of the said contracts all in
violation of the anti-graft law."5
Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued its
own report. It recommended "the further investigation by the
Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of," among others, NCC
Chair Salvador H. Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, and
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee
were apparently referred to the Fact-finding and Intelligence
Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. On January 27, 2000, the
Bureau issued its Evaluation Report, recommending:
1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary
investigation be conducted before the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman against former
NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP
President Teodoro Q. Pea and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for
violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended in
relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and Regulations;
2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office,
act as the nominal complainant.6
In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol,
OIC-Director of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau, directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and
those of his witnesses.
On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of said
office.
In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied
petitioners motion to dismiss.
On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the
June 13, 2000 Order but the motion was denied in an Order dated
October 5, 2000.
On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the present petition for
certiorari.
On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau issued a resolution finding "probable cause to
indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q. PEA before the
Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1594." The resolution
also directed that an information for violation of the said law be
filed against Laurel and Pea. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved
the resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the charge
against Pea.
In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order, commanding respondents to desist from
filing any information before the Sandiganbayan or any court
against petitioner for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On November 14, 2001, the Court, upon motion of petitioner,
heard the parties in oral argument.
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the
ground that he is not a public officer because:
A.
EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH
UNDERTOOK THE FREEDOM RING PROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH
VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES WERE ALLEGEDLY
COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE CORPORATION, NOT A GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR
CONTROLLED CORPORATION.
B.
THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC
OFFICE.
C.
PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS NOT
A "PUBLIC OFFICER" AS DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT.7
In addition, petitioner in his reply8 invokes this Courts
decision in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,9 where it was held that the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was limited to cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, i.e., over public officers of Grade 27 and
higher. As petitioners position was purportedly not classified as
Grade 27 or higher, the Sandiganbayan and, consequently, the
Ombudsman, would have no jurisdiction over him.
This last contention is easily dismissed. In the Courts decision
in Uy, we held that "it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who
has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against
petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises
prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan."
In its Resolution of February 22, 2000, the Court expounded:
The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the
authority of the State and regular provincial and city prosecutors
under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The
investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to
cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 ("An Act Providing
for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman, and for other purposes") which vests upon the Ombudsman
"primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan"
And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770
which emphasizes that the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall
have the power to "conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan." Thus,
repeated references to the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction clearly
serve to limit the Ombudsmans and Special Prosecutors authority to
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. [Emphasis in the
original.]
The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon
motion for clarification by the Ombudsman in the same case, the
Court set aside the foregoing pronouncement in its Resolution dated
March 20, 2001. The Court explained the rationale for this
reversal:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or
omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been
held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public
official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a
public officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be
construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such
primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not
necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases
involving public officers and employees by other courts. The
exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the
discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses
committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be
stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the
Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and
employees during their tenure of office.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should
not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor
under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only
act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the
Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to
confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to
these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on
all complaints against officers and employees of the government and
to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in
every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the
law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or
designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government
service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in
the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those
designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision
and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special
Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and
employees is one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman.
In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman
with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of
the people in ensuring accountability in public office. A review of
the development of our Ombudsman law reveals this intent. [Emphasis
in the original.]
Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal
grounds upon which petitioner relies. We first address the argument
that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not a public officer.
The Constitution10 describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as
"protectors of the people," who "shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees
of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations."
Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the
Constitution11 upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to
"[i]nvestigate any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."
The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially
reproduced in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the "Ombudsman Act
of 1989." Sections 13 and 15(1) of said law respectively
provide:
SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors
of the people shall act promptly on complaints file in any form or
manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where
the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the
Government to the people.
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases;
x x x.
The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section
16, in relation to Section 13, supra:
SEC 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to
all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance that have
been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section
13 hereof, during his tenure of office.
In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or
employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.12
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however,
defines who public officers are. A definition of public officers
cited in jurisprudence13 is that provided by Mechem, a recognized
authority on the subject:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
The individual so invested is a public officer.14
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem,
include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law
and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position,
scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an
office.15
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not
present in the position of NCC Chair, namely: (1) the delegation of
sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not
receive any compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the
NCC being temporary.
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the
sovereign functions of government as "[t]he most important
characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public
office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office
from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring
of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the
sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the
country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for
the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the
powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public
officer.16
Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign
functions of government? Certainly, the law did not delegate upon
the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or judicial.
May the functions of the NCC then be described as executive?
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive
power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer
the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance."17 The executive
function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as
set forth by law.
The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and
Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports) thereof:
Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the
State. The State shall conserve, promote, and popularize the
nations historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well as
artistic creations.
In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the
creation of the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations
in 1998:
Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is to be
celebrated in 1998, and the centennial presents an important
vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino
identity;
Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase Filipino
heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values;
Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations may be
insured only through long-range planning and continuous
developmental programming;
Whereas, the active participation of the private sector in all
areas of special expertise and capability, particularly in
communication and information dissemination, is necessary for
long-range planning and continuous developmental programming;
Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall initiate
and undertake the primary task of harnessing the multisectoral
components from the business, cultural, and business sectors to
serve as effective instruments from the launching and overseeing of
this long-term project;
x x x.
E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National
Centennial Celebrations in 1998, cited the "need to strengthen the
said Committee to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized
celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation
from the government and non-government or private organizations."
It also referred to the "need to rationalize the relevance of
historical links with other countries."
The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies
and objectives, to carry them into effect. Thus, the Commission was
vested with the following functions:
(a) To undertake the overall study, conceptualization,
formulation and implementation of programs and projects on the
utilization of culture, arts, literature and media as vehicles for
history, economic endeavors, and reinvigorating the spirit of
national unity and sense of accomplishment in every Filipino in the
context of the Centennial Celebrations. In this regard, it shall
include a Philippine National Exposition 98 within Metro Manila,
the original eight provinces, and Clark Air Base as its major
venues;
(b) To act as principal coordinator for all the activities
related to awareness and celebration of the Centennial;
(c) To serve as the clearing house for the preparation and
dissemination of all information about the plans and events for the
Centennial Celebrations;
(d) To constitute working groups which shall undertake the
implementation of the programs and projects;
(e) To prioritize the refurbishment of historical sites and
structures nationwide. In this regard, the Commission shall
formulate schemes (e.g. lease-maintained-and-transfer,
build-operate-transfer, and similar arrangements) to ensure the
preservation and maintenance of the historical sites and
structures;
(f) To call upon any government agency or instrumentality and
corporation, and to invite private individuals and organizations to
assist it in the performance of its tasks; and,
(g) Submit regular reports to the President on the plans,
programs, projects, activities as well as the status of the
preparations for the Celebration.18
It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is
vested,19 created the NCC by executive order. Book III (Office of
the President), Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Section 2 describes
the nature of executive orders:
SEC. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for
rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or
execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders. [Underscoring ours.]
Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the countrys
economic development, especially in Central Luzon. Petitioner
himself admitted as much in the oral arguments before this
Court:
MR. JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO:
And in addition to that expounded by Former President Ramos,
dont you agree that the task of the centennial commission was also
to focus on the long term over all socio economic development of
the zone and Central Luzon by attracting investors in the area
because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.
FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR H. LAUREL:
I am glad Your Honor touched on that because that is something I
wanted to touch on by lack of material time I could not but that is
a very important point. When I was made Chairman I wanted the Expo
to be in Batangas because I am a Batangeo but President Ramos said
Mr. Vice President the Central Luzon is suffering, suffering
because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo let us try to catalize
[sic] economic recovery in that area by putting this Expo in Clark
Field and so it was done I agreed and Your Honor if I may also
mention we wanted to generate employment aside from attracting
business investments and employment. And the Estrada administration
decided to junk this project there 48, 40 thousand people who lost
job, they were employed in Expo. And our target was to provide 75
thousand jobs. It would have really calibrated, accelerated the
development of Central Luzon. Now, I think they are going back to
that because they had the airport and there are plan to revive the
Expo site into key park which was the original plan.
There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of
industrialization and full employment is a fundamental state
policy.20
Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs.
Fontanilla21 that the holding by a municipality of a town fiesta is
a proprietary rather than a governmental function. Petitioner
argues that the "holding of a nationwide celebration which marked
the nations 100th birthday may be likened to a national fiesta
which involved only the exercise of the national governments
proprietary function."22 In Torio, we held:
[Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised
Administrative Code] simply gives authority to the municipality to
[celebrate] a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty
to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to
commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in
essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for
the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a
policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as
claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide
entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For
instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for
the town, nonetheless it is [a] private undertaking as
distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and
the like which are for public service.
As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for
purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or
function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a
particular case are to be considered and will be decisive. The
basic element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking may
be, is that it is government in essence, otherwise, the function
becomes private or propriety in character. Easily, no governmental
or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a
town fiesta.
Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-encompassing
doctrine. Note that the Court cautioned that "there can be no hard
and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an
undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding
circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be
decisive." Thus, in footnote 15 of Torio, the Court, citing an
American case, illustrated how the "surrounding circumstances plus
the political, social, and cultural backgrounds" could produce a
conclusion different from that in Torio:
We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding
circumstances plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds
may have a decisive bearing on this question. The case of Pope v.
City of New Haven, et al. was an action to recover damages for
personal injuries caused during a Fourth of July fireworks display
resulting in the death of a bystander alleged to have been caused
by defendants negligence. The defendants demurred to the complaint
invoking the defense that the city was engaged in the performance
of a public governmental duty from which it received no pecuniary
benefit and for negligence in the performance of which no statutory
liability is imposed. This demurrer was sustained by the Superior
Court of New Haven Country. Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint
to allege that the celebration was for the corporate advantage of
the city. This was denied. In affirming the order, the Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut held inter alia:
Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the
negligent performance of purely public governmental duties, unless
made liable by statute.
A municipality corporation, which under permissive authority of
its charter or of statute, conducted a public Fourth of July
celebration, including a display of fireworks, and sent up a bomb
intended to explode in the air, but which failed to explode until
it reached the ground, and then killed a spectator, was engaged in
the performance of a governmental duty. (99 A.R. 51)
This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two
dissented.
At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident
from [this] excerpt:
"July 4th, when that date falls upon Sunday, July 5th, is made a
public holiday, called Independence Day, by our statutes. All or
nearly all of the other states have similar statutes. While there
is no United States statute making a similar provision, the
different departments of the government recognize, and have
recognized since the government was established, July 4th as a
national holiday. Throughout the country it has been recognized and
celebrated as such. These celebrations, calculated to entertain and
instruct the people generally and to arouse and stimulate patriotic
sentiments and love of country, frequently take the form of
literary exercises consisting of patriotic speeches and the reading
of the Constitution, accompanied by a musical program including
patriotic air sometimes preceded by the firing of cannon and
followed by fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage to
the general public and their promotion a proper subject of
legislation can hardly be questioned. x x x"
Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial
Celebrations. The Centennial Celebrations was meant to commemorate
the birth of our nation after centuries of struggle against our
former colonial master, to memorialize the liberation of our people
from oppression by a foreign power. 1998 marked 100 years of
independence and sovereignty as one united nation. The Celebrations
was an occasion to reflect upon our history and reinvigorate our
patriotism. As A.O. 223 put it, it was a "vehicle for fostering
nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity," an opportunity
to "showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino
values." The significance of the Celebrations could not have been
lost on petitioner, who remarked during the hearing:
Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity of the
people, we wanted to rekindle the love for freedom, love for
country, that is the over-all goal that has to make everybody feel
proud that he is a Filipino, proud of our history, proud of what
our forefather did in their time. x x x.
Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore,
a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public
officer.
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation
during his tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but
not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the
position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and
forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the
office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is
supposed to be accepted merely for the public good.23 Hence, the
office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an
honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of
profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are
attached.24 But it is a public office, nonetheless.
Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No.
128 as an "ad-hoc body" make said commission less of a public
office.
The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and
duration, and certainly a position which is merely temporary and
local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. "But," says Chief
Justice Marshall, "if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined
by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an
individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the
duties pertaining to his station without any contract defining
them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it
seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment
from an office of the person who performs the duties from an
officer."
At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not
be considered as indispensable, for, if the other elements are
present "it can make no difference," says Pearson, C.J., "whether
there be but one act or a series of acts to be done, -- whether the
office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held for
years or during good behavior."25
Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support
in In Re Corliss.26 There the Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled
that the office of Commissioner of the United States Centennial
Commission is an "office of trust" as to disqualify its holder as
elector of the United States President and Vice-President. (Under
Article II of the United States Constitution, a person holding an
office of trust or profit under the United States is disqualified
from being appointed an elector.)
x x x. We think a Commissioner of the United States Centennial
Commission holds an office of trust under the United States, and
that he is therefore disqualified for the office of elector of
President and Vice-President of the United States.
The commission was created under a statute of the United States
approved March 3, 1871. That statute provides for the holding of an
exhibition of American and foreign arts, products, and
manufactures, "under the auspices of the government of the United
States," and for the constitution of a commission, to consist of
more than one delegate from each State and from each Territory of
the United States, "whose functions shall continue until close of
the exhibition," and "whose duty it shall be to prepare and
superintend the execution of the plan for holding the exhibition."
Under the statute the commissioners are appointed by the President
of the United States, on the nomination of the governor of the
States and Territories respectively. Various duties were imposed
upon the commission, and under the statute provision was to be made
for it to have exclusive control of the exhibit before the
President should announce, by proclamation, the date and place of
opening and holding the exhibition. By an act of Congress approved
June 1st, 1872, the duties and functions of the commission were
further increased and defined. That act created a corporation,
called "The Centennial Board of Finance," to cooperate with the
commission and to raise and disburse the funds. It was to be
organized under the direction of the commission. The seventh
section of the act provides "that the grounds for exhibition shall
be prepared and the buildings erected by the corporation, in
accordance with plans which shall have been adopted by the United
States Centennial Commission; and the rules and regulations of said
corporation, governing rates for entrance and admission fees, or
otherwise affecting the rights, privileges, or interests of the
exhibitors, or of the public, shall be fixed and established by the
United States Centennial Commission; and no grant conferring rights
or privileges of any description connected with said grounds or
buildings, or relating to said exhibition or celebration, shall be
made without the consent of the United States Centennial
Commission, and said commission shall have power to control,
change, or revoke all such grants, and shall appoint all judges and
examiners and award all premiums." The tenth section of the act
provides that "it shall be the duty of the United States Centennial
Commission to supervise the closing up of the affairs of said
corporation, to audit its accounts, and submit in a report to the
President of the United States the financial results of the
centennial exhibition."
It is apparent from this statement, which is but partial, that
the duties and functions of the commission were various, delicate,
and important; that they could be successfully performed only by
men of large experience and knowledge of affairs; and that they
were not merely subordinate and provisional, but in the highest
degree authoritative, discretionary, and final in their character.
We think that persons performing such duties and exercising such
functions, in pursuance of statutory direction and authority, are
not to be regarded as mere employees, agents, or committee men, but
that they are, properly speaking, officers, and that the places
which they hold are offices. It appears, moreover, that they were
originally regarded as officers by Congress; for the act under
which they were appointed declares, section 7, that "no
compensation for services shall be paid to the commissioners or
other officers, provided for in this act, from the treasury of the
United States." The only other officers provided for were the
"alternates" appointed to serve as commissioners when the
commissioners were unable to attend.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive
functions and is, therefore, a public office, we need no longer
delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or a
public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private
corporation, petitioners position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently,
his acts or omissions as CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the
light of his powers and functions as NCC Chair.27
Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did
not receive any compensation for his services as NCC or Expocorp
Chair, he is not a public officer as defined in Republic Act No.
3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and is, therefore,
beyond the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Respondent seeks to charge petitioner with violation of Section
3 (e) of said law, which reads:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to
acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
A "public officer," under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2
of said law as follows:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term
x x x
(b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials
and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or
unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even
nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph.
[Emphasis supplied.]
It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a
"public officer" is expressly limited to the application of R.A.
No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of
determining the Ombudsmans jurisdiction, as defined by the
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer
under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act involves the
appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law, matters that
are best resolved at trial.
To illustrate, the use of the term "includes" in Section 2 (b)
indicates that the definition is not restrictive.28 The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define
"public officers." Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for
example, provides that a public officer is:
x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular
election or appointment by competent authority, takes part in the
performance of public functions in the Government of Philippines,
or performs in said Government or in any of its branches public
duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank
or class.
Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987,29 on the other hand, states:
Officer as distinguished from "clerk" or "employee", refers to a
person whose duties not being of a clerical or manual nature,
involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the
functions of the government. When used with reference to a person
having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular
person in the exercise of governmental power, "officer" includes
any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the
act or exercise that function.
It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No.
6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees), one may be considered a "public official"
whether or not one receives compensation, thus:
"Public Officials" include elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or
non-career service including military and police personnel, whether
or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.
Which of these definitions should apply, if at all?
Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019
is exclusive, the term "compensation," which is not defined by said
law, has ma