Patricia Sto. Tomas vs Rey SalacThese consolidated cases pertain
to the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995.FACTS: On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act
(R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995 that, for among other purposes, sets the Government policies
on overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of
protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their
families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.G.R. 152642 and G.R.
152710(Constitutionality of Sections 29 and 30, R.A. 8042)Sections
29 and 30 of the Act1rllcommanded the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) to begin deregulating within one year of its
passage the business of handling the recruitment and migration of
overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five years the
regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).On January 8, 2002 respondents Rey Salac,
Willie D. Espiritu, Mario Montenegro, DodgieBelonio, LolitSalinel,
and Buddy Bonnevie (Salac, et al.) filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary restraining
order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against petitioners, the
DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and the Technical Education
and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) Secretary-General before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 96.2rllSalac,
et al. sought to: 1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10 (DOLE DO 10)
and POEA Memorandum Circular 15 (POEA MC 15); 2) prohibit the DOLE,
POEA, and TESDA from implementing the same and from further issuing
rules and regulations that would regulate the recruitment and
placement of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs); and 3) also enjoin
them to comply with the policy of deregulation mandated under
Sections 29 and 30 of Republic Act 8042.RULING OF RTC: On March 20,
2002 the Quezon City RTC granted Salac, etal.s petition and ordered
the government agencies mentioned to deregulate the recruitment and
placement of OFWs.The RTC also annulled DOLE DO 10, POEA MC 15, and
all other orders, circulars and issuances that are inconsistent
with the policy of deregulation under R.A. 8042.On April 17, 2002
the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. intervened in
the case before the Court, claiming that the RTC March 20, 2002
Decision gravely affected them since it paralyzed the deployment
abroad of OFWs and performing artists. The Confederated Association
of Licensed Entertainment Agencies, Incorporated (CALEA) intervened
for the same purpose.4rllOn May 23, 2002 the Courtissued a TRO in
the case, enjoining the Quezon City RTC, Branch 96, from enforcing
its decision.G.R. 167590(Constitutionality of Sections 6, 7, and 9
of R.A. 8042)On August 21, 1995 respondent Philippine Association
of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) filed a petition for declaratory
relief and prohibition with prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction before the RTC of Manila, seeking to annul
Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042 for being unconstitutional.
(PASEI also sought to annul a portion of Section 10 but the Court
will take up this point later together with a related case.)Ruling
of RTC: The RTC of Manila declared Section 6 unconstitutional after
hearing on the ground that its definition of "illegal recruitment"
is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and
non-licensed recruiters11rlland for that reason gives undue
advantage to the non-licensed recruiters in violation of the right
to equal protection of those that operate with government licenses
or authorities.Apparently, the Manila RTC did not agree that the
law can impose such grave penalties upon what it believed were
specific acts that were not as condemnable as the others in the
lists. But, in fixing uniform penalties for each of the enumerated
acts under Section 6, Congress was within its prerogative to
determine what individual acts are equally reprehensible,
consistent with the State policy of according full protection to
labor, and deserving of the same penalties. It is not within the
power of the Court to question the wisdom of this kind of choice.
Notably, this legislative policy has been further stressed in July
2010 with the enactment of R.A. 1002212rllwhich increased even more
the duration of the penalties of imprisonment and the amounts of
fine for the commission of the acts listed under Section 7.G.R.
167590, G.R. 182978-79,and G.R. 184298-9917rll(Constitutionality of
Section 10, last sentence of 2nd paragraph)G.R. 182978-79 and G.R.
184298-99 are consolidated cases. Respondent spouses Simplicio and
Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas) filed a claim for death and insurance
benefits and damages against petitioners Becmen Service Exporter
and Promotion, Inc. (Becmen) and White Falcon Services, Inc. (White
Falcon) for the death of their daughter JasminCuaresma while
working as staff nurse in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.Ruling of NLRC: The
Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the claim on the ground that the
Cuaresmas had already received insurance benefits arising from
their daughters death from the Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA). The LA also gave due credence to the
findings of the Saudi Arabian authorities that Jasmin committed
suicide.Ruling of CA: Becmen and White Falcon appealed the NLRC
Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).On June 28, 2006 the CA held
Becmen and White Falcon jointly and severally liable with their
Saudi Arabian employer for actual damages, with Becmen having a
right of reimbursement from White Falcon. Becmen and White Falcon
appealed the CA Decision to this Court.ISSUE: WON the 2nd paragraph
of Section 10, R.A. 8042, which holds the corporate directors,
officers, and partners of recruitment and placement agencies
jointly and solidarily liable for money claims and damages that may
be adjudged against the latter agencies, is unconstitutional.HELD:
the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that
the liability of corporate directors and officers is not automatic.
To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company,
there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the
affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the
conduct of illegal activities.In the case of Becmen and White
Falcon,while there is evidence that these companies were at fault
in not investigating the cause of Jasmins death, there is no
mention of any evidence in the case against them that
intervenorsGumabay, et al., Becmens corporate officers and
directors, were personally involved in their companys particular
actions or omissions in Jasmins case.As a final note, R.A. 8042 is
a police power measure intended to regulate the recruitment and
deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the
injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work
abroad. The rule is settled that every statute has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot inquire into the
wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative
Department. Hence, in the absence of a clear and unmistakable case
that the statute is unconstitutional, the Court must uphold its
validity.blrlllbrrWHEREFORE, in G.R. 152642 and 152710, the Court
DISMISSES the petitions for having become moot and academic.In G.R.
167590, the Court SETS ASIDE the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court ofManila dated December 8, 2004 and DECLARES Sections 6, 7,
and 9 of Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional.In G.R.
182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 as well as in G.R. 167590, the Court
HOLDS the last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 10 of
Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional. The Court, however,
RECONSIDERS and SETS ASIDE the portion of its Decision in G.R.
182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 that held intervenorsEufrocinaGumabay,
Elvira Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio, and Eddie De Guzman jointly and
solidarily liable with respondent Becmen Services Exporter and
Promotion, Inc. to spouses Simplicia and Mila Cuaresma for lack of
a finding in those cases that such intervenors had a part in the
act or omission imputed to their corporation.rllbrrTEOFILO
EVANGELISTA, v.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,G.R. No.
163267FACTS:In an Information[6]datedJanuary 31, 1996, petitioner
was charged with violation of Section 1 of PD 1866 allegedly
committed as follows:That on or about the 30thday of January 1996,
at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pasay City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control the
following items:1.One (1) Unit 9mm Jericho Pistol,Israelwith SN F
36283 with one (1) magazine;2.One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel
Submachine gun with SN 931864 with two (2) magazines;3.Nineteen
(19) 9mm bullets.bwithout the corresponding permit or license from
competent authority.Version of the ProsecutionIn the morning
ofJanuary 30, 1996, MaximoAcierto, Jr. (Acierto), a Customs Police
assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) District
Command, was informed by his superior that a certain passenger of
Philippine Airlines (PAL) Flight No. 657 would be arriving
fromDubaibringing with him firearms and ammunitions.Shortly after
lunch, Acierto, together with Agents Cuymo and Fuentabella,
proceeded to the tube area where they were met by a crewmember who
introduced to them herein petitioner. Acierto asked petitioner if
he brought firearms with him and the latter answered in the
affirmative adding that the same were bought inAngola.Thereupon,
Acierto was summoned to the cockpit by the pilot, Capt. Edwin
Nadurata (Capt. Nadurata), where the firearms and ammunitions were
turned over to him.Petitioner was then escorted to the arrival area
to get his luggage and thereafter proceeded to the examination room
where the luggage was examined and petitioner was investigated.In
open court, Acierto identified the firearms and ammunitions.During
the investigation, petitioner admitted before Special Agent
ApolonioBustos (Bustos) that he bought the subject items
inAngolabut the same were confiscated by theDubaiauthorities, which
turned over the same to a PAL personnel inDubai.Upon inquiry, the
Firearms and Explosive Office (FEO) inCampCramecertified that
petitioner is neither registered with said office[11]nor licensed
holder of aforesaid firearms and ammunitions.Bustos likewise
verified from the Bureau of Customs, but his effort yielded no
record to show that the firearms were legally purchased.Among the
documents Bustos had gathered during his investigation were the
Arrival Endorsement Form[12]and Customs Declaration Form.[13]A
referral letter[14]was prepared endorsing the matter to the
Department of Justice.Bustos admitted that petitioner was not
assisted by counsel when the latter admitted that he bought the
firearms inAngola.SPO4 Federico Bondoc, Jr. (SPO4 Bondoc), a member
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and representative of the
FEO, upon verification, found that petitioner is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder.His office issued a
certification[15]to that effect which he identified in court as
Exhibit A.After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner, with
leave of court, filed his Demurrer to Evidence,[16]the resolution
of which was deferred pending submission of petitioners
evidence.[17]Version of the DefenseThe defense presented Capt.
Nadurata whose brief but candid and straightforward narration of
the event was synthesized by the CA as follows:x xx On January 30,
1996, he was approached by the PAL Station Manager in Dubai, who
informed him that a Filipino contract worker from Angola who is
listed as a passenger of PAL flight from Dubai to Manila, was being
detained as he was found in possession of firearms; that if said
passenger will not be able to board the airplane, he would be
imprisoned in Dubai; and that the Arabs will only release the
passenger if the Captain of PAL would accept custody of the
passenger [herein petitioner] and the firearms.Capt. Nadurata
agreed to take custody of the firearms and the passenger, herein
appellant, so that the latter could leaveDubai.The firearms were
deposited by the Arabs in the cockpit of the airplane and allowed
the appellant to board the airplane. Upon arrival inManila, Capt.
Nadurata surrendered the firearms to the airport
authorities.Meanwhile, in view of the unavailability of the
defenses intended witness, NiloUmayaw (Umayaw), the PAL Station
Manager inDubai, the prosecution and the defense agreed and
stipulated on the following points:1.That PAL Station Manager Mr.
NiloUmayaw was told by a Dubai Policethat firearms and ammunitions
were found in the luggage of a Filipino passenger coming
fromAngolagoing to thePhilippines;2.That he was the one who turned
over the subject firearms to Captain Edwin Nadurata, the Pilot in
command of PAL Flight 657;3.That the subject firearms [were] turned
over atDubai;4.That the said firearms and ammunitions were
confiscated from the accused Teofilo Evangelista and the same
[were] given to the PAL Station Manager who in turn submitted
[them] to the PAL Pilot, Capt. Edwin Nadurata who has already
testified;5.That [these are] the same firearms involved in this
case.[18]Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:: In view of all the
foregoing, the Court finds accused TEOFILO E. EVANGELISTA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866 as
amended (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions: (One (1)
Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel submachine gun with SN-931864 with two (2)
magazines and nineteen (19) 9mm bullets) and hereby sentences him
to imprisonment of Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months to
Twenty (20) Years.Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:In view of all
the foregoing, the Court finds accused TEOFILO E. EVANGELISTA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866
as amended (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions: One (1)
Unit 9mm Jerico Pistol, Israel with SN F-36283 with one (1)
magazine; One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel submachine gun with
SN-931864 with two (2) magazines and nineteen (19) 9mm bullets and
hereby sentences him to imprisonment of Six (6) Years and One (1)
Day to Eight (8) Years and a fine ofP30,000.00.The above-mentioned
firearms are hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government
and [are] ordered transmitted to the National Bureau of
Investigation,Manilafor proper disposition.Ruling of the Court of
Appeals:On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the trial court
in its Decision datedOctober 15, 2003.It ruled that the
stipulations during the trial are binding on petitioner.As regards
possession of subject firearms, the appellate court ruled that
Capt. Naduratas custody during the flight fromDubaitoManilawas for
and on behalf of petitioner.Thus, there was constructive
possession.Petitioner moved for reconsideration[23]but it was
denied by the appellate court in itsApril 16,
2004Resolution.IssuesWON The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not
acquitting Evangelista from the charge of Presidential Decree No.
1866, Illegal Possession of Firearms.WONThe Court of Appeals
gravely erred in not holding that Evangelista was never in
possession of any firearm or ammunition within Philippine
jurisdiction and he therefore could not have committed the crime
charged against him.WON The Court of Appeals gravely erred in
holding that Evangelista committed a continuing crime.WONThe Court
of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the result of the
preliminary investigation.[24]Ruling of the Supreme Court: We find
the appeal devoid of merit.At the outset, we emphasize that under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review
oncertiorarishall only raise questions of law considering that the
findings of fact of the CA are, as a general rule, conclusive upon
and binding on the Supreme Court.[25]In this recourse, petitioner
indulges us to calibrate once again the evidence adduced by the
parties and to re-evaluate the credibility of their witnesses.On
this ground alone, the instant petition deserves to be denied
outright.However, as the liberty of petitioner is at stake and
following the principle that an appeal in a criminal case throws
the whole case wide open for review, we are inclined to delve into
the merits of the present petition.In his bid for acquittal,
petitioner argues that he could not have committed the crime
imputed against him for he was never in custody and possession of
any firearm or ammunition when he arrived in thePhilippines.Thus,
the conclusion of the appellate court that he was in constructive
possession of the subject firearms and ammunitions is
erroneous.Petitioner contends that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the case filed against him.He claims that his
alleged possession of the subject firearms transpired while he was
at theDubaiAirportand his possession thereof has ceased when he
left for thePhilippines.He insists that sinceDubaiis outside the
territorial jurisdiction of thePhilippinesand his situation is not
one of the exceptions provided in Article 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, our criminal laws are not applicable.In short, he had not
committed a crime within thePhilippines.Indeed it is fundamental
that the place where the crime was committed determines not only
the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction.[29]In order for the courts to acquire jurisdiction in
criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one
of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.If the evidence adduced
during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.[30]Contrary to the arguments put forward by
petitioner, we entertain no doubt that the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition for which he was charged was
committed in thePhilippines.The accomplishment by petitioner of the
Customs Declaration Form upon his arrival at the NAIA is very clear
evidence that he was already in possession of the subject firearms
in thePhilippines.And more than mere possession, the prosecution
was able to ascertain that he has no license or authority to
possess said firearms.It bears to stress that the essence of the
crime penalized under PD 1866, as amended, is primarily the
accuseds lack of license to possess the firearm.The fact of lack or
absence of license constitutes an essential ingredient of the
offense of illegal possession of firearm. Since it has been shown
that petitioner was already in thePhilippineswhen he was found in
possession of the subject firearms and determined to be without any
authority to possess them, an essential ingredient of the offense,
it is beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was perpetrated and
completed in no other place except thePhilippines.Moreover, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information.In this case, the
information specifically and categorically alleged that on or
aboutJanuary 30, 1996petitioner was in possession, custody and
control of the subject firearms at
theNinoyAquinoInternationalAirport,Pasay City,Philippines,
certainly a territory within the jurisdiction of the trial court.In
contrast, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and
competent evidence that the present charge happened inDubai.It may
be well to recall that while inDubai, petitioner, even in a
situation between life and death, firmly denied possession and
ownership of the firearms.Furthermore, there is no record of any
criminal case having been filed against petitioner inDubaiin
connection with the discovered firearms.Since there is no pending
criminal case when he leftDubai, it stands to reason that there was
no crime committed inDubai.The age-old but familiar rule that he
who alleges must prove his allegation applies.[31]Petitioner
finally laments the trial courts denial of the Motion to Withdraw
Information filed by the investigating prosecutor due to the
latters finding of lack of probable cause to indict him.He argues
that such denial effectively deprived him of his substantive right
to a preliminary investigation.Still, petitioners argument fails to
persuade.There is nothing procedurally improper on the part of the
trial court in disregarding the result of the preliminary
investigation it itself ordered.Judicial action on the motion rests
in the sound exercise of judicial discretion.In denying the motion,
the trial court just followed the jurisprudential rule laid down
inCrespo v. Judge Mogul[32]that once a complaint or information is
filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the sound
discretion of the court.The court is not dutifully bound by such
finding of the investigating prosecutor.InSolar Team Entertainment,
Inc v. Judge How[33]we held:It bears stressing that the court is
however not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice since the court is mandated to independently evaluate or
assess the merits of the case, and may either agree or disagree
with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.Reliance alone
on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an
abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to
determineprima faciecase.Consequently, petitioner has no valid
basis to insist on the trial court to respect the result of the
preliminary investigation it ordered to be conducted.WHEREFORE,the
petition isDENIED.The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 21805 affirming the January 23, 1998 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated January 23,
1998, convicting petitioner Teofilo Evangelista of violation of
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six years
and one day to eight years and to pay a fine ofP30,000.00
isAFFIRMED.
Bonifacio, et al. vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
129, et al. G.R. No. 184800; 5 May 2010Facts: Upon the complaint
filed by Jessie John P. Gimenez (Gimenez) on behalf of the
Yuchengco Family (particularly, former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco
and Helen Y. Dee) and the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), 13
Informations for libel were filed with the Makati Regional Trial
Court (RTC) against officers, trustees and a member of the Parents
Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), and a certain John Doe,
the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com, which
provides a forum for planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. a wholly
owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also
owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies to seek redress for being
unable to collect under their pre-need educational plans after PPI,
due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with
prayer for suspension of payments. The Informations alleged that
the accused, holding legal title to the said website, maliciously
published therein the following defamatory article against the
Yuchengco Family and Malayan:Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga
Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng
negotiation. x x x x x x x x xFor sure may tactics pa silang
nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had
successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na.
x x xHowever, on appeal, the Secretary of Justice directed the
withdrawal of the Informations for lack of probable cause, opining
that the crime of internet libel was non-existent. On motion of the
accused, the RTC, albeit finding probable cause, quashed the
Informations for failure to allege that the offended parties were
actually residing in Makati at the time the offense was committed
as in fact they listed their address in Manila, or to allege that
the article was printed and first published in Makati. The
prosecution moved for reconsideration, arguing that even assuming
the Information was deficient it merely needed a formal amendment.
The RTC granted the motion and ordered the prosecution to amend the
Information to cure the defect of improper venue. The prosecution
amended the Information to show that the website was accessible in
Makati City and the defamatory article was first published and
accessed by the private complainant in Makati City. After the RTC
admitted the Amended Information, several of the accused
(petitioners) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
the Supreme Court faulting the RTC.Issues: (1) Whether or not
petitioners, in filing the petition directly to the Supreme Court,
violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the
petition dismissible; and(2) whether or not the RTC gravely abuse
its discretion when it admitted the Amended Information.Held: (1)
Strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts requires that
recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. Thus, petitions for
the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTC should be filed
in the Court of Appeals. The rule, however, admits of certain
exceptions as when the case involves purely legal questions. In
this case, petitioners raised a pure question of law involving
jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No.
4363.(2) The Amended Information was insufficient to vest
jurisdiction in Makati.Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions
such that the place where the crime was committed determines not
only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element
of jurisdiction. Venue of libel cases where the complainant is a
private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely:
(a) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or (b) where the alleged defamatory
article was printed and first published. The prosecution chose the
second.Before Article 360 of the RPC was amended, the rule was that
a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction
where the libelous article was published or circulated,
irrespective of where it was written or printed. Under that rule,
the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a
choice of venue. Article 360 was amended by RA 4363 to state that
such action should be brought where the article was printed and
first published. The evil sought to be prevented by the amendment
was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel
cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish
nothing more than to harass or intimidate an accused, especially
when the offended party is a person of sufficient means or
possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for
revenge.If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and
first published are used by the offended party as basis for the
venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with
particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first
published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address
of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers,
magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes
necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.The same
measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to
defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there
would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first
publication. To equate first access to the defamatory article on
petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication
would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the
RPC sought to discourage and prevent. For the Court to hold that
the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the
courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed
therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in
all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise
accessed or capable of being accessed.Contrary to petitioners
claim, the venue requirements, under Article 360 of the RPC, for
libel actions filed by private persons cannot be considered unduly
oppressive as they still allow such persons to file the civil or
criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in
which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine
with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first
publishedDisposition: The RTC was directed to quash the Amended
Information and to dismiss the case. Ponente: J. Conchita
Carpio-MoralesVote: 5-0UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 192565. February 28, 2012.Facts: Union
bank filed two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ
of replevin against spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John
Doe. The first complaint was filed before the RTC, Branch 109,
Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint was filed on
March 15, 2000 and was raffled in the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay
City.
In both cases, Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification
against Forum Shopping. Then, she was charged of deliberately
violating Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) "by falsely declaring
under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second
complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding
involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency". The
Certification was notarized in Makati City but was submitted and
used in Pasay City, while the Information against Union Bank and
Tomas was filed in Makati.Tomas filed a Motion to Quash on the
grounds that the venue was improperly laid and that the facts do
not constitute an offense. On the first ground, Tomas argued that
since it is the Pasay City Court where the Certificate was
submitted and used, it should have the jurisdiction over the case
against her. The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash,
ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate
was notarized there and the allegations in the Information
sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. Her subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration was denied.When the case was elevated to the
RTC-Makati City, the petitioners prayed that the ruling of the
MeTC-Makati City be annulled and set aside on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion. They also cited the rulings in US vs. Canet
and Ilusorio v. Bildner which state that "venue and jurisdiction
should be in the place where the false document was presented".
The petition, however, was found to have no merit as a recent
jurisprudence, Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy. In the Sy Tiong Shiou case,
the high court ruled that the criminal action shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the municipality where the perjury was
committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occured. The
petitioners then filed this petition to the Supreme Court to
address the seeming conflict between the rulings in Illusorio v.
Bildner and Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy.Issue:Where is the proper venue of
perjury under Art. 183 of the RPC - the place, where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized or where the
Certification was presented to the trial court?Held:The place where
the Certificate was notarized, the MeTC-Makati City, is the proper
venue for the criminal action.The criminal act charged was for the
execution of an affidavit that contained a falsity. Art. 183 of the
RPC is the applicable provision for this case; and following so,
the jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of
this article which penalizes one who makes an affidavit upon any
material matter before a competent person authorized to administer
an oath in cases in which the law so requires. The constitutive act
of the offense is the making of an affidavit, so, the criminal act
is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is
subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.'The SC finds
the ruling in Sy Tiong as more in accord with Art. 183 of the RPC.
The Court ruled that the crime of perjury committed through the
making of a false affidavit under Art. 183 of the RPC is committed
at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her
affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the
crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through
false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal
nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is
given.
If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sown
statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the
sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the
taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients
of the crime committed. In all cases, the determination of venue
shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be
constitutive of the crime committed.CUENCA VS. PCGGThe
FactsRespondent UHC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Independent
Realty Corporation (IRC). UHC had an authorized capital stock of
PhP 200,000,000 of which 401,995 shares worth PhP 40,199,500 were
subscribed and PhP 10,050,000 was paid up by IRC. Five stockholders
of IRC held qualifying shares in UHC and served in its Board of
Directors. UHC became an inactive holding company until the later
months of 1978.In 1978, petitioner Rodolfo M. Cuenca and his
familys holding company, petitioner CIC, negotiated and reached an
agreement with respondents IRC and UHC, whereby petitioners Cuenca
and CIC would purchase all the shares of stock and subscription
rights of IRC in UHC for PhP 10,000,000 and assume IRCs unpaid
subscription of PhP 30,000,000. Petitioners Cuenca and CIC were
then the controlling stockholders of the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), now the
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), Sta. Ines
Melale Forest Products Corporation (Sta. Ines), and Resort Hotels
Corporation (Resort Hotels). In order to build up UHC as his
flagship company, petitioner Cuenca transferred to UHC the shares
of stocks in CDCP, Sta. Ines, and Resort Hotels worth PhP
67,233,405, with UHC assuming Cuencas various bank obligations,
some or all of which were secured by pledges or liens on the
stocks.On October 21, 1978, petitioner Cuenca was elected
Chairperson and President of UHC at a special stockholders meeting
in accordance with the acquisition plan, and through UHC, Cuenca
continued to control and manage CDCP, Sta. Ines, and Resort Hotels.
Pursuant to the acquisition plan and agreement with IRC, Cuenca and
CIC transferred their shares of stock in CDCP, Sta. Ines, and
Resort Hotels to UHC, which in turn paid PhP 10,000,000 to IRC. In
addition, petitioners assumed IRCs unpaid subscription of PhP
30,000,000 in UHC. The only remaining matter to be accomplished was
the transfer of the stocks and subscription rights of IRC in UHC to
petitioners, but despite demand, IRC did not comply.In 1986, the
instant controversy between petitioners and respondent IRC was
overtaken by dramatic political events. President Marcos was ousted
in a bloodless revolution and left behind an unbelievably large
amount of funds and assets that were sequestered by the new
government of President Aquino through PCGG. In July 1987, because
of Marcos nominee Jose Yao Campos sworn statement, respondent PCGG
directed Santos Luis Diego, President of IRC, to dissolve all the
boards of directors of IRCs fully-owned subsidiaries. A year later,
it turned over IRC and its subsidiary, UHC, to the Asset
Privatization Trust (APT) for rehabilitation, conservation, or
disposition, enabling APT to assign one share of stock in IRC and
in each of its 25 subsidiaries, including UHC, to PaternoBacani,
Jr.Amidst this state of affairs, petitioners filed the October 2,
1991 Complaint6against IRC, UHC, APT, and Bacani before the Makati
City RTC, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 91-2721, to compel
IRC to transfer all its stock and subscription rights in UHC to
them or order IRC and UHC to return and re-convey to them all the
assets and shares of stock in CDCP, Sta. Ines, and Resort Hotels
that they had transferred to UHC.The Ruling of the Regional Trial
CourtAccordingly, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiffs and as against defendants IRC and UHC, who are hereby
ordered to immediately return and reconvey to plaintiffs all of the
shares of stocks and stock subscriptions in Philippine National
Construction Corporation (formerly known as Construction and
Development [Corporation] of the Philippines), Resort Hotels
Corporation and Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products Corporation,
including those transferred by plaintiffs to UHC such as the
24,780,746 shares in CDCP/PNCC, the 468,062 shares in Resort Hotels
Corporation and the 23,748,932 shares in Sta. Ines Melale Forest
Products Corporation plus all fruits thereof such as stock and cash
dividends and stock splits.The plaintiffs prayer for damages and
attorneys fees are hereby DENIED.The counterclaim of defendants UHC
and IRC for damages and attorneys fees is hereby DENIED for lack of
evidence.The appointment of JAIME C. LAYA as Receiver of defendant
UHC is hereby MAINTAINED until finality of this Decision and full
execution of this Decision or full compliance herewith by
defendants.24The Ruling of the Court of AppealsThrough its assailed
Decision, the appellate court reversed the Makati City RTCs
Decision, granted the petition filed by PCGG, and dismissed the
instant case for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court
ratiocinated that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction to
hear the instant case involving petitioners and the sequestered
respondents corporations. It held that the recourse of parties,
petitioners in the instant case, who wish to challenge respondent
PCGGs acts or orders, would be to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to
Executive Order No. (EO) 14 issued on May, 7, 1986,27which ordained
that this body alone had the original jurisdiction over all of
respondent PCGGs cases, civil or criminal, citingPCGG v. Pea28as
authority. The appellate court appliedRepublic v. Sandiganbayan29on
the issue of sequestration by respondent PCGG of UHC, CIC, and CDCP
(now PNCC) against petitioner Cuenca, the Marcos spouses, their
relatives, friends, and colleagues.The CA applied the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment that any rule which had already been
authoritatively established in a previous litigation should be
deemed the law of the case between the same parties. As such, the
appellate court adopted the ruling inRepublicon the continuing
force of the order of sequestration and concluded that, indeed,
respondent UHC is a sequestered company. The CA did not find merit
in petitioners contention that sequestration did not affect their
transaction with respondents as it arose before PCGG was
created.Even if petitioners had initially a cause of action, the CA
ruled that the complaint was certainly affected by the passage of
the law charging respondent PCGG with the performance of certain
tasks over the subject matter of the action; and that the same
subject matter had become subject to the new exclusive jurisdiction
vested in the Sandiganbayan at the time petitioners filed the
instant case..The IssuesPetitioners raise the following grounds for
our consideration:THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 91-2721 BELOW ON THE GROUND THAT THE
SANDIGANBAYAN HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF
THE CASE.A. THE FACT ALONE THAT RESPONDENT UHC MAY HAVE BEEN
SEQUESTERED DID NOT DIVEST THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ITS
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF PETITIONERS COMPLAINT IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 91-2721 BELOW.B. THE COURT OF APPEALS RELIANCE ON
THE CASE OFREPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 240 SCRA 376 (1995), IS
MISPLACED.C. THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT IS ERRONEOUS.32The Courts RulingThe
petition must fail.The core issue before us is that of
jurisdiction. In gist, petitioners argue that UHC was not
sequestered, and even if it was sequestered, the trial court still
has the jurisdiction to hear the case for rescission of contract or
specific performance, and conclude that the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment does not apply in the instant case.Issue
of JurisdictionJurisdiction is defined as the power and authority
of a court to hear, try, and decide a case.33Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law while
jurisdiction over the person is acquired by his/her voluntary
submission to the authority of the court or through the exercise of
its coercive processes. Jurisdiction over the res is obtained by
actual or constructive seizure placing the property under the
orders of the court.34We are primarily concerned here with the
first kind of jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction over the subject
matter.Petitioners contend that even if UHC was indeed sequestered,
jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioners Complaint for
enforcement or rescission of contract between petitioners and
respondents belonged to the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners citedPhilippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,35involving Philippine Casino Operators
Corporation (PCOC) which was sequestered on March 19, 1986. In said
case, this Court held that the fact of sequestration alone did not
automatically oust the RTC of jurisdiction to decide upon the
question of ownership of the disputed gaming and office equipment
as PCGG must be a party to the suit in order that the
Sandiganbayans exclusive jurisdiction may be correctly invoked, and
as Section 236of EO 14 was duly applied inPCGG v. Pea37andPCGG v.
Nepomuceno,38which ineluctably spoke of respondent PCGG as a
party-litigant.Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the
instant caseA rigorous examination of the antecedent facts and
existing records at hand shows that Sandiganbayan has exclusive
jurisdiction over the instant case.Thus, the petition must fail for
the following reasons:First, it is a fact that the shares of stock
of UHC and CDCP, the subject matter of Civil Case No. 91-2721
before the Makati City RTC, were also the subject matter of an
ill-gotten wealth case, specifically Civil Case No. 0016 before the
Sandiganbayan. In Civil Case No. 91-2721 of the Makati City RTC,
petitioners prayed for a judgment either transferring the UHC
shares or restoring and reconveying the PNCC shares to them. In the
event a final judgment is rendered in said Makati City RTC case in
favor of petitioners, then such adjudication tends to render moot
and academic the judgment to be rendered in Sandiganbayan Civil
Case No. 0016 considering that the legal ownership of either the
UHC or PNCC shares would now be transferred to petitioners Rodolfo
Cuenca and CIC. Such adverse judgment would run counter to the
rights of ownership of the government over the UHC and PNCC shares
in question. It must be remembered that on March 21, 1986, a Sworn
Statement41executed by Mr. Jose Y. Campos in Vancouver, Canada,
whereby Mr. Campos, a crony and close business associate of the
deposed President Marcos, named and identified IRC and UHC (a
wholly-owned subsidiary of IRC) as among the several corporations
organized, established, and managed by him and other business
associates for and in behalf of the former President Marcos.
Subsequently, the UHC and IRC shares were surrendered and turned
over by Mr. Campos to PCGG, transferring, in effect, the ownership
of the shares to the Government.Moreover, inasmuch as UHC was
impleaded in Civil Case No. 0016 as a defendant and was listed
among the corporations beneficially owned or controlled by
petitioner Cuenca, the issue of the latters right to acquire
ownership of UHC shares is inexorably intertwined with the right of
the Republic of the Philippines, through PCGG, to retain ownership
of said UHC shares.It must be borne in mind that the Sandiganbayan
was created in 1978 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1606.42Said law has been amended during the interim period after
the Edsa Revolution of 1986 and before the 1987 Constitution was
drafted, passed, and ratified. Thus, the executive issuances during
such period before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution had
the force and effect of laws. Specifically, then President Corazon
C. Aquino issued the following Executive Orders which amended PD
1606 in so far as the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over civil
and criminal cases instituted and prosecuted by the PCGG is
concerned,viz:a) EO 1, entitled "Creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government," dated February 28, 1986;b) EO 2,
entitled "Regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties
Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, Their Close Relatives,
Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees,"
dated March 12, 1986;c) EO 14, entitled "Defining the Jurisdiction
over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Members of their
Immediate Family, Close Relatives, Subordinates, Close and/or
Business Associates, Dummies, Agents and Nominees," dated May 7,
1986; andd) EO 14-A, entitled "Amending Executive Order No. 14,"
dated August 18, 1986.Bearing on the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over cases of ill-gotten wealth, EO 14, Secs. 1 and 2
provide:SECTION 1. Any provision of the law to the contrary
notwithstanding, thePresidential Commission on Good Governmentwith
the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other
government agencies, is herebyempowered to file and prosecute all
cases investigated by it underExecutive Order No. 1, dated February
28, 1986 andExecutive Order No. 2, dated March 12, 1986, as may be
warranted by its findings.SECTION 2. ThePresidential Commission on
Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or
criminal, with theSandiganbayan, which shall haveexclusive and
original jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)Notably, these
amendments had been duly recognized and reflected in subsequent
amendments to PD 1606, specifically Republic Act Nos. 797543and
8249.44In the light of the foregoing provisions, it is clear that
it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Makati City RTC that has
jurisdiction over the disputed UHC and PNCC shares, being the
alleged "ill-gotten wealth" of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
and petitioner Cuenca. The fact that the Makati City RTC civil case
involved the performance of contractual obligations relative to the
UHC shares is of no importance. The benchmark is whether said UHC
shares are alleged to be ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and
their perceived cronies. More importantly, the interests of orderly
administration of justice dictate that all incidents affecting the
UHC shares and PCGGs right of supervision or control over the UHC
must be addressed to and resolved by the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the
law and courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant
multiplicity of suits, which result in much lost time, wasted
effort, more expenses, and irreparable injury to the public
interest.Second, the UHC shares in dispute were sequestered by
respondent PCGG. Sequestration is a provisional remedy or freeze
order issued by the PCGG designed to prevent the disposal and
dissipation of ill-gotten wealth.45The power to sequester property
means toplace or cause to be placed under [PCGGs] possession or
control said property, or any building or office wherein any such
property or any records pertaining thereto may be found, including
business enterprises and entities, for the purpose of preventing
the destruction of, and otherwise conserving and preserving the
same, until it can be determined, through appropriate judicial
proceedings, whether the property was in truth ill-gotten.
(Silverio v. PCGG, 155 SCRA 60 [1987]).46Considering that the UHC
shares were already sequestered, enabling the PCGG to exercise the
power of supervision, possession, and control over said shares,
then such power would collide with the legal custody of the Makati
City RTC over the UHC shares subject of Civil Case No. 91-2721.
Whatever the outcome of Civil Case No. 91-2721, whether from
enforcement or rescission of the contract, would directly militate
on PCGGs control and management of IRC and UHC, and consequently
hamper or interfere with its mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth.
As aptly pointed out by respondents, petitioners action is
inexorably entwined with the Governments action for the recovery of
ill-gotten wealththe subject of the pending case before the
Sandiganbayan. Verily, the transfer of shares of stock of UHC to
petitioners or the return of the shares of stock of CDCP (now PNCC)
will wreak havoc on the sequestration case as both UHC and CDCP are
subject of sequestration by PCGG.Third,Philippine Amusement and
Gaming CorporationandHoliday Inn (Phils.), Inc.47are not analogous
to the case at bar. The first dealt with ownership of gaming and
office equipment, which is distinct from and will not impact on the
sequestration issue of PCOC. The second dealt with an ordinary
civil case for performance of a contractual obligation which did
not in any way affect the sequestration proceeding of NRHDCI; thus,
the complaint-in-intervention of Holiday Inn (Phils.), Inc. was
properly denied for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.In
both cases cited by petitioners, there was a substantial
distinction between the sequestration proceedings and the subject
matter of the actions. This does not prevail in the instant case,
as the ownership of the shares of stock of the sequestered
companies, UHC and CDCP, is the subject matter of a pending case
and thus addressed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.Sec. 2 of EO 14 pertinently provides: "The
Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such
cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which
shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof."The above
proviso has been squarely applied inPea,48where this Court held
that the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Sandiganbayan
would evidently extend not only to the principal causes of action,
that is, recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, but also to all
incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases,
including a dispute over the sale of the shares, the propriety of
the issuance of ancillary writs of relative provisional remedies,
and the sequestration of the shares, which may not be made the
subject of separate actions or proceedings in another forum.
Indeed, the issue of the ownership of the sequestered companies,
UHC and PNCC, as well as IRCs ownership of them, is undeniably
related to the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth and can be
squarely addressed via the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.Fourth, while it is clear that the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only encompasses cases where PCGG
is impleaded, such requirement is satisfied in the instant case.
The appellate court clearly granted PCGGs petition for certiorari
in CA-G.R. SP No. 49686, assailing the trial courts denial of its
Motion for Leave to Intervene with Motion to Dismiss. Thus, the
trial courts April 20, 1998 Order was reversed and set aside by the
appellate court through its assailed Decision. Consequently, PCGG
was granted the right to intervene and thus became properly
impleaded in the instant case. Without doubt, the trial court has
no jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No.
91-2721..Respondent UHC duly sequestered by PCGGThe trial court
ruled that respondent PCGG could not stop the transfer of the
shares of respondent UHC in CDCP to petitioners as there was no
proof of sequestration except a writ of sequestration of Cuencas
stocks in CDCP. On the other hand, petitioners contend that the
appellate courts reliance onRepublic49is misplaced. They point out
that neither PCGG nor respondent corporations relied on said case.
Besides, petitioners contend that the Courts statements in said
case did not constitute a ruling but mere references to unproven
allegations by PCGG in its complaint against Cuenca in
Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0016; and as such, it cannot be relied
upon to hold that UHC was a sequestered corporation. As it is,
petitioners conclude that it was a mereobiter dictumwhich was not
essential to the disposition of the aforecited case and thus, it is
not binding upon the parties for purposes ofres judicataor
conclusiveness of judgment.We are not moved by petitioners
submission.While it may be true that inRepublic, our statement on
Civil Case No. 0016, as cited by PCGG, refers to the allegations in
the complaint filed by PCGG against petitioner Cuenca,50we
nonetheless stated in said case the fact of the sequestration of
the assets and records of Rodolfo Cuenca, UHC, CIC, CDCP, San
Mariano Mining Corp., etc. on May 23, 1986 and July 23, 1987. We
took factual notice of the sequestration of various companies and
properties in said case, thus:aIII. Orders of Sequestration issued
by PCGGDuring 1986 and 1987 numerous orders of sequestration,
freezing or provisional takeover of companies or properties, real
or personal, were issued and implemented. Among those were the
orders handed out against the firms or assets hereunder listed,
with the dates of sequestration, freezing or take-over, to
wit:SUBJECTS/OBJECTS OF SEQUESTRATION DATEi. Assets and records of
Rodolfo Cuenca, May 23, 1986,Universal Holdings Corp., Cuenca July
23, 1987Investment Corporation, PhilippineNational Construction
Corp. (formerlyCDCP), San Mariano Mining Corp., etc.51From the
foregoing account, we concluded that UHC had indeed been
sequestered by the PCGG in 1986 and 1987. Consequently, the
appellate court properly applied Republic as basis for its finding
that UHC was a sequestered company. Since the issue of
sequestration has been resolved, we see no need to delve into the
issue of conclusiveness of judgment. Suffice it to say that with
the unequivocal finding that UHC was indeed sequestered, then it is
the Sandiganbayan, not the Makati City RTC, that has exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No.
91-2721.WHEREFORE, the instant petition isDISMISSEDfor lack of
merit. The January 6, 2003 Decision and July 15, 2003 Resolution of
the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 60338 and CA-G.R. SP No. 49686
areAFFIRMEDin toto. No costs.Asia Intl Auctioneers, Inc. vs.
Parayno, Jr G.R. No. 163445FACTS: Congress enacted Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7227 creating the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and
extending a number of economic or tax incentives therein.On June 3,
2003, then CIR Guillermo L. Parayno, Jr. issued Revenue Memorandum
Circular (RMC) No. 31-2003 setting the "Uniform Guidelines on the
Taxation of Imported Motor Vehicles through the Subic Free Port
Zone and Other Freeport Zones that are sold at Public Auction."
This was later amended by RMC No. 32-2003, to wit:II. The imported
motor vehicles after its release from Customs custody are sold
through public auction/negotiated sale by the consignee within or
outside of the Freeport Zone:A. The gross income earned by the
consignee-seller from the public auction/negotiated sale of the
imported vehicles shall be subject to the preferential tax rate of
five percent (5%) in lieu of the internal revenue taxes imposed by
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, provided that the
following conditions are present:1. That the consignee-seller is a
duly registered enterprise entitled to such preferential tax rate
as well as a registered taxpayer with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR).2. That the total income generated by the
consignee-seller from sources within the customs territory does not
exceed thirty percent (30%) of the total income derived from all
sources.B. In case the consignee-seller is a registered enterprise
and/or locator not entitled to the preferential tax treatment or if
the same is entitled from such incentive but its total income from
the customs territory exceeds thirty percent (30%) of its entire
income derived from the customs territory and the freeport zone,
the sales or income derived from the public auction/negotiated sale
shall be subjected to the regular internal revenue taxes imposed by
the Tax Code. The consignee-seller shall also observe the
compliance requirements prescribed by the Tax Code. When public
auction or negotiated sale is conducted within or outside of the
freeport zone, the following tax treatment shall be observed:1.
Value Added Tax (VAT)/ Percentage Tax (PT) VAT or PT shall be
imposed on every public auction or negotiated sale.2. Excise Tax
The imposition of excise tax on public auction or negotiated sale
shall be held in abeyance pending verification that the importers
selling price used as a basis by the Bureau of Customs in computing
the excise tax is correctly determined.Petitioners Asia
International Auctioneers, Inc. (AIAI) and Subic Bay Motors
Corporation are corporations organized under Philippine laws with
principal place of business within the SSEZ. They are engaged in
the importation of mainly secondhand or used motor vehicles and
heavy transportation or construction equipment which they sell to
the public through auction.Petitioners filed a complaint before the
RTC of Olongapo City, praying for the nullification of RMC No.
31-2003 for being unconstitutional and anultra
viresact.Subsequently, petitioners filed their "First Amended
Complaint to Declare Void, Ultra Vires, and Unconstitutional [RMC]
No. 31-2003 dated June 3, 2003 and [RMC] No. 32-2003 dated June 5,
2003, with Application for a Writ of Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction"to enjoin respondents from implementing
the questioned RMCs while the case is pending.The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its "Comment (In Opposition to
the Application for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction)."Respondents CIR, Regional Director and Revenue
District Officer submitted their joint "Opposition (To The Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order by
Petitioners)."Then Secretary of Finance Jose Isidro N. Camacho
filed a Motion to Dismiss the case against him, alleging that he is
not a party to the suit and petitioners have no cause of action
against him. Respondents CIR, BIR Regional Director and BIR Revenue
District Officer also filed their joint Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds that "the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint" and "a condition precedent, that is,
exhaustion of administrative remedies, has not been complied
with."TRIAL COURT: Petitioners application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction is hereby GRANTED with an injunction
bond in the amount of Php 1 Million.PETITIONERS: filed with the CA
a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
to enjoin the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the
case.Meantime, BIR Regional Director Danilo A. Duncano sent a
Preliminary Assessment Noticeto the President of AIAI, informing
him of the VAT due from the company for the auction sales conducted
on June 6-8, 2003 as per RMC No. 32-2003, plus surcharge, interest
and compromise penalty. Thereafter, a Formal Letter of Demand19 was
sent.CA: Granted the petition of respondents. Public respondent
Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, of Olongapo City is hereby
declared bereft of jurisdiction. Accordingly, said Civil Case No.
275-0-2003 is herebyDISMISSEDand the assailed Order dated August 1,
2003,ANNULLEDandSET ASIDE.AIAI: Petition for Review on Certiorari
with an application for a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin respondents "from pursuing sending
letters of assessments to petitioners."SC: Petitioners (AIAI)
contend that there were fatal procedural defects in respondents
petition for certiorari with the CA. They point out that the CA
resolved the issue of jurisdiction without waiting for the lower
court to first rule on the issue. Also, respondents did not file a
motion for reconsideration of the trial courts order granting the
writ of preliminary injunction before filing the petition with the
CA.The arguments are unmeritorious.Jurisdiction is defined as the
power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case. The
issue is so basic that it may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal.In fact, courts may take cognizance of
the issue even if not raised by the parties themselves. There is
thus no reason to preclude the CA from ruling on this issue even if
allegedly, the same has not yet been resolved by the trial court.As
to respondents failure to file a motion for reconsideration, we
agree with the ruling of the CA, which states:It is now settled
that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is not always sine
qua non before availing of the remedy of certiorari. Hence, the
general rule of requiring a motion for reconsideration finds no
application in a case where what is precisely being assailed is
lack of jurisdiction of the respondent court. And considering also
the urgent necessity for resolving the issues raised herein, where
further delay could prejudice the interests of the government, the
haste with which the Solicitor General raised these issues before
this Court becomes understandable.Now, to the main issue: does the
trial court have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this
case?Petitioners contend that jurisdiction over the case at bar
properly pertains to the regular courts as this is "an action to
declare as unconstitutional, void and against the provisions of
[R.A. No.] 7227" the RMCs issued by the CIR. They explain that they
"do not challenge the rate, structure or figures of the imposed
taxes, rather they challenge the authority of the respondent
Commissioner to impose and collect the said taxes." They claim that
the challenge on the authority of the CIR to issue the RMCs does
not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA).Petitioners arguments do not sway. R.A. No. 1125, as amended,
states:Sec. 7. Jurisdiction.The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein
provided(1)Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in
cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation
thereto, orother matters arising under the National Internal
Revenue Code or other laws or part of law administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue; (emphases supplied)In the case at bar,
the assailed revenue regulations and revenue memorandum circulars
are actually rulings or opinions of the CIR on the tax treatment of
motor vehicles sold at public auction within the SSEZ to implement
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 which provides that "exportation or
removal of goods from the territory of the [SSEZ] to the other
parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs
duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other
relevant tax laws of the Philippines." They were issued pursuant to
the power of the CIR under Section 4 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, Section 4. Power of the Commissioner to Interpret Tax
Laws and to Decide Tax Cases.The power to interpret the provisions
of this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by the
Secretary of Finance.The power to decidedisputed assessments,
refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties
imposed in relation thereto, orother matters arising under this
Code or other laws or portions thereof administered by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue is vested in the Commissioner, subject to the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.
(emphases supplied)Petitioners point out that the CA based its
decision on Section 7 of R.A. No. 1125 that the CTA "shall exercise
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to reviewby appeal" decisions of
the CIR. They argue that in the instant case, there is no decision
of the respondent CIR on any disputed assessment to speak of as
what is being questioned is purely the authority of the CIR to
impose and collect value-added and excise taxes.Petitioners failure
to ask the CIR for a reconsideration of the assailed revenue
regulations and RMCs is another reason why the instant case should
be dismissed. It is settled that the premature invocation of the
court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. If a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must
first be exhausted before the courts power of judicial review can
be sought. The party with an administrative remedy must not only
initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief
but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking
judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an
opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the court. PETITION DENIEDHeirs
of Santiago Nisperas vs Nisperas-Ducusin G.R. No. 189570Before the
Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the July 13,
2009 Decisionand Resolutionof the Court of Appeals The appellate
court affirmed the Decisionof the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) upholding the validity of the Deed of
Voluntary Land Transfer and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
CLOA-623 issued in favor of respondent Marissa Nisperos-Ducusin.The
instant case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioners with the
DARAB alleging:The 15,837-square-meter parcel of land subject of
the instant case is part of the 58,350-square-meter agricultural
land in Pao Sur, San Fernando City, La Union acquired by Santiago
Nisperos, the predecessor of petitioners, during his lifetime. He
declared said property for taxation purposes starting December
1947.When Santiago and his wife Estefania died, they were survived
by their nine children: Tranquilino, Felix, Olling, Maria, Lenardo,
Millan, Fausto, Candido and Cipriana. The heirs of Santiago,
petitioners herein, claim that the subject property was occupied,
controlled and tilled by all nine children of Santiago.During the
time when Maria and Cipriana were overseeing the property, Maria
took respondent Marissa Nisperos-Ducusin, a daughter of their
cousin Purita, as her ward and raised her like her own child.On
February 12, 1988, Maria and Cipriana, acting as representatives of
their other siblings, executed a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa in
favor of petitioners over the 58,350-square-meter property and
another 46,000-square-meter propertyOn April 28, 1992, a Deed of
Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT) over the subject property was
executed between Maria and Cipriana as landowners, and respondent,
who was then only 17 years old, as farmer-beneficiary. Deed was
notarized by Notary public Atty. Caoayan.Certificate of Land
Ownership Award. was issued to respondent by the DAR over the
subject property.Alleging fraud on the part of respondent which
petitioners claim to have discovered only in August 2001,
petitioners filed a complaint on September 6, 2001 with the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of San Fernando City, La
Union. Unfortunately, no settlement between petitioners and
respondent was reached prompting the MARO to issue a Certificate to
File Action.Petitioners filed with the DARAB a complaint for
annulment of documents and damages against respondent. Petitioners
contended that the transfer of ownership over the subject land was
made without the consent of the heirs of Santiago and that
respondent took advantage of Marias senility and made it appear
that Maria and Cipriana sold said property by virtue of the VLT.
They further alleged that said document was falsified by respondent
because Maria could not anymore sign but could only affix her
thumbmark as she did in a 1988 Deed of Donation.Respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss petitioners complaint. She argued that the action
for annulment has already prescribed.DARAB Regional Adjudicator:
the DARAB Regional Adjudicator denied respondents Motion to Dismiss
and ordered her to file her answer to the complaint. Respondent
denied the allegations of fraud and falsification, and insisted
that she is a bona fide beneficiaryDARAB Regional Adjudicator:
Annuled VLT and OCT/CLOA in respondents name.Respondent: Respondent
contested the Regional Adjudicators decision before the DARAB
alleging that the Regional Adjudicator committed grave abuse of
discretion. She added that the Regional Adjudicator went beyond the
scope of his authority by directing the parties to litigate the
issue of ownership before the court.DARAB: rendered a Decision
reversing the decision of the Regional Adjudicator and upholding
the validity of the VLT and respondents title. Dismissed
petitioners claim of fraud since the VLT was executed in the
presence of DAR-MARO Susimo Asuncion, signed by three instrumental
witnesses and notarized by Atty. Roberto E. Caoayan of the
DAR.PETITIONER: Aggrieved, elevated the case to the CA via a
petition for review.CA: 7/13/2009 Held that petitioners failed to
discharge their burden of proving that fraud attended the execution
of the VLT. It also agreed with the DARAB that considering a
certificate of title was already issued in favor of respondent, the
same became indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time
petitioners instituted the case in January 2002, and thus may no
longer be judicially reviewed.PETITIONER: CA erred in their
ruling.SC: We set aside the assailed Decision and Resolution.The
complaint should have been lodged with the Office of the DAR
Secretary and not with the DARAB.Section 1, Rule II of the 1994
DARAB Rules of Procedure, the rule in force at the time of the
filing of the complaint by petitioners in 2001, provides:SECTION 1.
Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The
Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos.
228, 229 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic
Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws
and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such
jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases involving
the following:f) Those involving the issuance, correction and
cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and
Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land
Registration Authority;However, it is not enough that the
controversy involves the cancellation of a CLOA registered with the
Land Registration Authority for the DARAB to have jurisdiction.
What is of primordial consideration is the existence of an agrarian
dispute between the parties. Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines
an agrarian dispute as "any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements" and includes
"any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under
this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership
from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or
lessor and lessee."It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a
tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency,
over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is
determined by the material allegations therein and the character of
the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or
complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction
over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the
parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over
the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired
through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties.
Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a
tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the
parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent
the court from addressing the issue, especially where the DARABs
lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or
petition. Considering that the allegations in the complaint negate
the existence of an agrarian dispute among the parties, the DARAB
is bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same as it is
the DAR Secretary who has authority to resolve the dispute raised
by petitioners
G.R. No. 180705 November 27, 2012EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESFacts:(Background case: Cocofed v
Republic)In 1971, Republic Act No. ("R.A.") 6260 was enacted
creating the Coconut Investment Company ("CIC") to administer the
Coconut Investment Fund ("CIF"), which, under Section 8 thereof,
was to be sourced from a PhP 0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg.
of copra. Of the PhP 0.55 levy of which the copra seller was or
ought to be issued COCOFUND receipts, PhP 0.02 was placed at the
disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut
producers declared by the Philippine Coconut Administration
("PHILCOA" now "PCA") as having the largest membership.The
declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the issuance of
several presidential decrees ("P.D.") purportedly designed to
improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the
coconut levy fund. While coming generally from impositions on the
first sale of copra, the coconut levy fund came under various names
x x x. Charged with the duty of collecting and administering the
Fund was PCA. Like COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage, the
PCA, by statutory provisions scattered in different coco levy
decrees, had its share of the coco levy.Through the years, a part
of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to finance
various projects and/or was converted into various assets or
investments.11Relevant to the present petition is the acquisition
of the First United Bank ("FUB"), which was subsequently renamed as
United Coconut Planters Bank ("UCPB").Apropos the intended
acquisition of a commercial bank for the purpose stated earlier, it
would appear that FUB was the bank of choice which Pedro Cojuangcos
group (collectively, "Pedro Cojuangco") had control of. The plan,
then, was for PCA to buy all of Pedro Cojuangcos shares in FUB.
However, as later events unfolded, a simple direct sale from the
seller (Pedro) to PCA did not ensue as it was made to appear that
Cojuangco had the exclusive option to acquire the formers FUB
controlling interests. Emerging from this elaborate, circuitous
arrangement were two deeds. The first one was simply denominated as
Agreement, dated May 1975, entered into by and between Cojuangco
for and in his behalf and in behalf of "certain other buyers", and
Pedro Cojuangco in which the former was purportedly accorded the
option to buy 72.2% of FUBs outstanding capital stock, or 137,866
shares (the "option shares," for brevity), at PhP 200 per share. On
its face, this agreement does not mention the word "option."The
second but related contract, dated May 25, 1975, was denominated as
Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit
of the Coconut Farmers of the Philippines. It had PCA, for itself
and for the benefit of the coconut farmers, purchase from Cojuangco
the shares of stock subject of the First Agreement for PhP200.00
per share. As additional consideration for PCAs buy-out of what
Cojuangco would later claim to be his exclusive and personal
option, it was stipulated that, from PCA, Cojuangco shall receive
equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22%, of the 72.2%, or fully
paid shares. And so as not to dilute Cojuangcos equity position in
FUB, later UCPB, the PCA agreed under paragraph 6 (b) of the second
agreement to cede over to the former a number of fully paid FUB
shares out of the shares it (PCA) undertakes to eventually
subscribe. It was further stipulated that Cojuangco would act as
bank president for an extendible period of 5 years.Apart from the
aforementioned 72.2%, PCA purchased from other FUB shareholders
6,534 shares of which Cojuangco, as may be gathered from the
records, got 10%..As of June 30, 1975, the list of FUB stockholders
included Cojuangco with 14,440 shares and PCA with 129,955
shares.14It would appear later that, pursuant to the stipulation on
maintaining Cojuangcos equity position in the bank, PCA would cede
to him 10% of its subscriptions to (a) the authorized but unissued
shares of FUB and (b) the increase in FUBs capital stock (the
equivalent of 158,840 and 649,800 shares, respectively). In all,
from the "mother" PCA shares, Cojuangco would receive a total of
95,304 FUB (UCPB) shares broken down as follows: 14,440 shares +
10% (158,840 shares) + 10% (649,800 shares) = 95,304.Shortly after
the execution of the PCA Cojuangco Agreement, President Marcos
issued, on July 29, 1975, P.D. No. 755 directing x x x as narrated,
PCA to use the CCSF and CIDF to acquire a commercial bank to
provide coco farmers with "readily available credit facilities at
preferential rate" x x x.Then came the 1986 EDSA event. One of the
priorities of then President Corazon C. Aquinos revolutionary
government was the recovery of ill-gotten wealth reportedly amassed
by the Marcos family and close relatives, their nominees and
associates. Apropos thereto, she issued Executive Order Nos. (EO)
1, 2 and 14, as amended by E.O. 14-A, all series of 1986. E.O. 1
created the PCGG and provided it with the tools and processes it
may avail of in the recovery efforts;17E.O. No. 2 asserted that the
ill-gotten assets and properties come in the form of shares of
stocks, etc., while E.O. No. 14 conferred on the Sandiganbayan
exclusive and original jurisdiction over ill-gotten wealth cases,
with the proviso that "technical rules of procedure and evidence
shall not be applied strictly" to the civil cases filed under the
EO. Pursuant to these issuances, the PCGG issued numerous orders of
sequestration, among which were those handed out x x x against
shares of stock in UCPB purportedly owned by or registered in the
names of (a) the more than a million coconut farmers, (b) the CIIF
companies and (c) Cojuangco, Jr., including the SMC shares held by
the CIIF companies. On July 31, 1987, the PCGG instituted before
the Sandiganbayan a recovery suit docketed thereat as CC No.
0033.The Republic interposed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Re: Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., praying that a summary judgment be
rendered:a. Declaring that Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is
unconstitutional insofar as it validates the provisions in the
"PCA-Cojuangco Agreement x x x" dated May 25, 1975 providing
payment of ten percent (10%) commission to defendant Cojuangco with
respect to the FUB, now UCPB shares subject matter thereof;b.
Declaring that x x x Cojuangco, Jr. and his fronts, nominees and
dummies, including x x x and Danilo S. Ursua, have not legally and
validly obtained title over the subject UCPB shares; andc.
Declaring that the government is the lawful and true owner of the
subject UCPB shares registered in the names of Cojuangco, Jr. and
the entities and persons above-enumerated, for the benefit of all
coconut farmers. x x xFollowing an exchange of pleadings, the
Republic filed its sur-rejoinder praying that it be conclusively
declared the true and absolute owner of the coconut levy funds and
the UCPB shares acquired therefrom.Defendants Lobregat, et al. and
COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the x x x (PCA) was
the "other buyers" represented by defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr. in the May 1975 Agreement entered into between Pedro Cojuangco
(on his own behalf and in behalf of other sellers listed in Annex
"A"of the agreement) and defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. (on
his own behalf and in behalf of the other buyers). Defendant
Cojuangco insists he was the "only buyer" under the aforesaid
Agreement.Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. did not own any share
in the x x x (FUB) prior to the execution of the two
AgreementsDefendants Lobregat, et al., and COCOFED, et al., and
Ballares, et al. admit that in addition to the 137,866 FUB shares
of Pedro Cojuangco, et al. covered by the Agreement, other FUB
stockholders sold their shares to PCA such that the total number of
FUB shares purchased by PCA increased from 137,866 shares to
144,400 shares, the OPTION SHARES referred to in the Agreement of
May 25, 1975. Defendant Cojuangco did not make said admission as to
the said 6,534 shares in excess of the 137,866 shares covered by
the Agreement with Pedro Cojuangco.Defendants Lobregat, et al. and
COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the Agreement,
described in Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 755 dated
July 29, 1975 as the "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial
Bank for the Benefit of Coconut Farmers" executed by the Philippine
Coconut Authority" and incorporated in Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 by
reference, refers to the "AGREEMENT FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A
COMMERCIAL BANK FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE COCONUT FARMERS OF THE
PHILIPPINES" dated May 25, 1975 between defendant Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. and the PCA (Annex "B" for defendant Cojuangcos
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE:
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. dated September 18, 2002).Sandiganbayan
DecisionOn July 11, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed
PSJ-A, ruling in favor of the Republic, disposing insofar as
pertinent as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule
as follows:C. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: EDUARDO
M. COJUANGCO, JR.) dated September 18, 2002 filed by plaintiff.1.
Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 755 did not validate the Agreement between PCA
and defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. dated May 25, 1975 nor did
it give the Agreement the binding force of a law because of the
non-publication of the said Agreement.2. Regarding the questioned
transfer of the shares of stock of FUB (later UCPB) by PCA to
defendant Cojuangco or the so-called "Cojuangco UCPB shares" which
cost the PCA more than Ten Million Pesos in CCSF in 1975, we
declare, that the transfer of the following FUB/UCPB shares to
defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. was not supported by valuable
consideration, and therefore null and void:a. The 14,400 shares
from the "Option Shares";b. Additional Bank Shares Subscribed and
Paid by PCA, consisting of:1. Fifteen Thousand Eight Hundred
Eighty-Four (15,884) shares out of the authorized but unissued
shares of the bank, subscribed and paid by PCA;2. Sixty Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty (64,980) shares of the increased
capital stock subscribed and paid by PCA; and3. Stock dividends
declared pursuant to paragraph 5 and paragraph 11 (iv) (d) of the
Agreement.3. The above-mentioned shares of stock of the FUB/UCPB
transferred to defendant Cojuangco are hereby declared conclusively
owned by the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines.4. The UCPB
shares of stock of the alleged fronts, nominees and dummies of
defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. which form part of the 72.2%
shares of the FUB/UCPB paid for by thePCA with public funds later
charged to the coconut levy funds, particularly the CCSF, belong to
the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines as their true and
beneficial owner.As earlier explained, the core issue in this
instant petition is Part C of the dispositive portion in PSJ-A
declaring the 7.22% FUB (now UCPB) shares transferred to Cojuangco,
plus the other shares paid by the PCA as "conclusively" owned by
the Republic. Parts A and B of the same dispositive portion have
already been finally resolved and adjudicated by this Court in
COCOFED v. Republic on January 24, 2012.From PSJ-A, Cojuangco moved
for partial reconsideration but the Sandiganbayan, by Resolution of
December 28, 2004, denied the motion.Hence, the instant
petition.Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction, in Civil
Case No. 0033-A, an "ill-gotten wealth" case brought under EO Nos.
1 and 2, to declare the Cojuangco UCPB shares acquired by virtue of
the Pedro Cojuangco, et al. Agreement and/or the PCA Agreement null
and void because "not supported by valuable
consideration"?Ruling:THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE SUBDIVIDED AMENDED COMPLAINTS, INCLUDING THE
SHARES ALLEGEDLY ACQUIRED BY COJUANGCO BY VIRTUE OF THE PCA
AGREEMENTS.The issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
subdivided amended complaints has peremptorily been put to rest by
the Court in its January 24, 2012 Decision in COCOFED v. Republic.
There, the Court, citing Regalado27and settled jurisprudence,
stressed the following interlocking precepts: Subject matter
jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by the consent or
acquiescence of any or all of the parties. In turn, the issue on
whether a suit comes within the penumbra of a statutory conferment
is determined by the allegations in the complaint, regardless of
whether or not the suitor will be entitled to recover upon all or
part of the claims asserted.The Republics material averments in its
complaint subdivided in CC No. 0033-A included the following:CC No.
0033-A12. Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. served as a public
officer during the Marcos administration. During the period of his
incumbency as a public officer, he acquired assets, funds and other
property grossly and manifestly disproportionate to his salaries,
lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property.13.
Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., taking undue advantage of his
association, influence, connection, and acting in unlawful concert
with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, AND THE
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, embarked upon devices, schemes and
stratagems, to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of
Plaintiff and the Filipino people, such as when he a) manipulated,
beginning the year 1975 with the active collaboration of Defendants
x x x Maria Clara Lobregat, Danilo Ursua etc., the purchase by . .
. (PCA) of 72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of the x x x
(FUB) which was subsequently converted into a universal bank named
x x x (UCPB) through the use of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization
Fund (CCSF) being initially in the amount of P85,773,100.00 in a
manner contrary to law and to the specific purposes for which said
coconut levy funds were imposed and collected under P.D. 276, and
with sinister designs and under anomalous circumstances, to wit:(i)
Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. coveted the coconut levy funds as
a cheap, lucrative and risk-free source of funds with which to
exercise his private option to buy the controlling interest in FUB;
thus, claiming that the 72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of
FUB could only be purchased and transferred through the exercise of
his "personal and exclusive action option to acquire the 144,000
shares" of the bank, Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and PCA, x
x x executed on May 26, 1975 a purchase agreement which provides,
among others, for the payment to him in fully paid shares as
compensation thereof 95,384 shares worth P1,444,000.00 with the
further condition that he shall manage and control the bank as
Director and President for a term of five (5) years renewable for
another five (5) years and to designate three (3) persons of his
choice who shall be elected as members of the Board of Directors of
the Bank;(ii) to legitimize a posteriori his highly anomalous and
irregular use and diversion of government funds to advance his own
private and commercial interests, Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.
caused the issuance by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos of PD 755 (a)
declaring that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered
special and fiduciary and trust funds and do not form part of the
general funds of the National Government, conveniently repealing
for that purpose a series of previous decrees, PDs 276 and 414,
establishing the character of the coconut levy funds as special,
fiduciary, trust and governmental funds; (b) confirming the
agreement between Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and PCA on the
purchase of FUB by incorporating by reference said private
commercial agreement in PD 755;(iii)To further consolidate his hold
on UCPB, Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. imposed as consideration
and conditions for the purchase that (a) he gets one out of every
nine shares given to PCA, and (b) he gets to manage and control
UCPB as president for a term of five (5) years renewable for
another five (5) years;(iv) To perpetuate his opportunity to deal
with and make use of the coconut levy funds x x x Cojuangco, Jr.
caused the issuance by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos of an
unconstitutional de