JUNE 4-5, 1942. EARLY 1942 EVENTS THE DOOLITTLE RAID: WHEN? APRIL 18-19, 1942 WHERE? WESTERN PACIFIC, JAPAN ISLANDS WHO? U.S. ARMY AIR CORPS / FORCE BOMBERS.
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JUNE 4-5, 1942
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EARLY 1942 EVENTS THE DOOLITTLE RAID: WHEN? APRIL 18-19, 1942
WHERE? WESTERN PACIFIC, JAPAN ISLANDS WHO? U.S. ARMY AIR CORPS /
FORCE BOMBERS U.S. NAVY Lt. COL. JAMES DOOLITTLE, U.S.A.A.F. IS C/O
16 B-25 BOMBERS (80 OFFICERS & AIRMEN) WHY? RETALIATION FOR
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK TO BOOST U.S. MILITARY & PUBLIC MORALE
PROBLEM? HOW TO GET AIR GROUP CLOSE ENOUGH TO JAPAN W/OUT DETECTION
HOW TO GET CREWS / PLANES TO SAFETY RESULTS? TOKYO BOMBED W/LITTLE
DAMAGE CASUALTIES: U.S. 3 KIA, 8 POW (4 DIE IN CAPTIVITY 3
EXECUTED, 1 OF DISEASE), 15 B-25 BOMBERS JAPAN 50 DEAD, 400 WOUNDED
STRATEGIC RESULTS: JAPAN WITHDRAWS CARRIER GROUP FROM INDIAN OCEAN
TO DEFEND JAPAN JAPAN DECIDES TO ATTACK MIDWAY ISLAND
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LT. COL. JAMES H. DOOLITTLE, USAAF
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THE REAL DOOLITTLE
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U.S. ARMY B-25 BOMBER
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DOOLITTLES B-25 LAUNCHES FROM U.S.S. HORNET, APRIL 18,
1942
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DOOLITTLES B-25s OVER TOKYO HARBOR, APRIL, 1942
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DOOLITTLE RAIDER IN JAPANESE CAPTIVITY, APRIL, 1942
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THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA WHEN? MAY 4-8, 1942 WHERE? CORAL
SEA, S.PACIFIC (near Australia) WHO? IJN COMBINED FLEET (carriers
& battleships) USN 2 CARRIER TASK FORCES (define) AUSTRALIA
DESTROYER FORCES WHY? JAPAN ATTEMPTING TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION
IN S. PACIFIC OCCUPY PORT MORESBY (New Guinea) EXTEND CONTROL IN
SOLOMON ISLANDS SO WHAT? DIRECT THREAT TO AUSTRALIA RESULTS? FIRST
BATTLE TO EMPLOY LARGE-SCALE CARRIER-BASED ATTACKS HEAVY FIGHTING /
LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES CASUALTIES: JAPAN 1 CARRIER SUNK, 1 DAMAGED,
966 KIA U.S. 1 CARRIER SCUTTLED, 1 HEAVILY DAMAGED, 656 KIA
STRATEGIC EFFECT? JAPAN CANNOT OCCUPY PORT MORESBY 2 JAPANESE
CARRIERS UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE AT MIDWAY U.S. & ALLIES NOW HAVE
TIME TO PREPARE NEW GUINEA INVASION
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MIDWAY ISLAND, CENTRAL PACIFIC
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AERIAL RECONAISSANCE PHOTO, MIDWAY ISLAND, 1942
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FLEET ADMIRAL CHESTER NIMITZ, COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC
FLEET
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REAR ADMIRAL RAYMOND SPRUANCE, COMMANDING OFFICER, TASK FORCE
16, BATTLE OF MIDWAY
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VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM HALSEY, U.S. NAVY, ORIGINAL C/O, TASK
FORCE 16
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REAR ADMIRAL FRANK JACK FLETCHER, COMMANDING OFFICER, TASK
FORCE 17, BATTLE OF MIDWAY
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LCDR JOSEPH ROCHEFORT, U.S. NAVY, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE &
CRYPTOLOGY DIVISION
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ADMIRAL ISORUKU YAMAMOTO, COMMANDING OFFICER, IMPERIAL JAPANESE
NAVY
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ADMIRAL CHUICHI NAGUMO COMMANDING OFFICER, IMPERIAL JAPANESE
CARRIER FLEET, BATTLE OF MIDWAY
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MIDWAY: PREPARING FOR BATTLE JAPANESE GOALS: ELIMINATE U.S.
STRATEGIC POWER IN PACIFIC ALLOW JAPAN TO STRENGTHEN / TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF RECENT CONQUESTS WOULD ENSURE NO REPEAT OF DOOLITTLE
RAID HOW? / WHAT WAS THE STRATEGY? LURE U.S.NAVY CARRIERS INTO TRAP
& ELIMINATE THEM A THREAT TO HAWAII WOULD FORCE U.S. TO RESPOND
W/ CARRIER FORCES ATTACK & OCCUPY MIDWAY ISLAND
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MIDWAY: ORDER OF BATTLE JAPANESE FORCES*: 4 CARRIERS 2
BATTLESHIPS 15 SUPPORT SHIPS 248 AIRCRAFT U.S. FORCES: 3 CARRIERS
25 SUPPORT SHIPS 233 CARRIER-BASED PLANES 127 LAND-BASED (Midway
Island) PLANES *THESE FIGURES ONLY INCLUDE FORCES DIRECTLY INVOLVED
IN COMBAT AT MIDWAY
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COMPARING FORCES JAPAN: ADVANTAGES LARGER NAVAL FORCE MOST
IMPORTANTLY MORE CARRIERS MORE EXPERIENCED NAVAL CREWS MORE
EXPERIENCED PILOTS CONFIDENCE MOMENTUM JAPAN: DISADVANTAGES FEW, IF
ANY NAVAL CODEBREAKING / CRYPTOLOGY WAS INFERIOR TO U.S. BATTLE
PLAN IS COMPLICATED: JAPANESE FORCES CANNOT SUPPORT EACH OTHER WHY?
THEY ARE DISPERSED OVER LARGE AREA OVERCONFIDENCE UNDERESTIMATION
OF U.S. CAPABILITIES (at that time)
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COMPARING FORCES(contd.) U.S.: ADVANTAGES CODEBREAKING /
CRYPTOLOGY U.S.: DISADVANTAGES LESS EXPERIENCED CREWS FEWER SHIPS,
esp. CARRIERS INFERIOR TORPEDO PLANES INFERIOR FIGHTER PLANES U.S.
CANNOT AFFORD TO LOSE CARRIERS WHAT ROLE DO U.S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
CODEBREAKERS PLAY IN THE BATTLE? IJN NAVAL CODE (IJN-25) WAS BROKEN
BY THE U.S. CODES PROVED MIDWAY WAS JAPANs PRIMARY TARGET
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U.S. NAVY TASK FORCE 16 CARRIERS, BATTLE OF MIDWAY U.S.S.
HORNET (above) U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (right)
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U.S.S. YORKTOWN, TASK FORCE 17
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U.S. NAVY SBD DAUNTLESS DIVE BOMBER
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U.S.NAVY TBD DEVASTATOR TORPEDO PLANE
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U.S. NAVY GRUMMAN F-4-F WILDCAT FIGHTER
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U.S. NAVY BREWSTER F2A-3 BUFFALO FIGHTER
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JAPANESE CARRIER SORYU JAPANESE CARRIER HIRYU
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JAPANESE CARRIER KAGA
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JAPANESE CARRIER AKAGI
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NAKAJIMA BN5 KATE TORPEDO PLANE (ABOVE) ; AICHI D3-A VAL DIVE
BOMBER (BELOW)
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MITSUBISHI A6M ZERO FIGHTER
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COURSE OF BATTLE JUNE 4: 0620 hrs: JAPANESE ATTACK MIDWAY HEAVY
AIR LOSSES FOR U.S. MIDWAY DAMAGED, BUT AIRFIELDS REMAIN INTACT SO
WHAT? U.S. CAN STILL LAUNCH ATTACKS FROM ISLAND IJN WILL HAVE TO
PREP. FOR 2 nd ATTACK ON MIDWAY 0500 hrs.: U.S. ATTACK JAPANESE
CARRIERS w/MIDWAY- BASED PLANES 0715 hrs.: NAGUMO ORDERS CARRIER
TORPEDO PLANES REARMED W/ CONTACT BOMBS (why?) 0800 hrs.: IJN SCOUT
PLANES SIGHT U.S FLEET NAGUMO ORDERS HALT TO ARMING OF PLANES
ORDERS BOMBS REMOVED & REPLACED BY TORPEDOS PROBLEM: NAGUMO
MUST WAIT FOR MIDWAY STRIKE FORCE PLANES TO LAND THEN HE WILL
LAUNCH PLANES AGAINST U.S. CARRIERS SO WHAT? U.S. FLEET HAS ALREADY
LAUNCHED THEIR ATTACK PLANES
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COURSE OF BATTLE PROBLEMS? FOR IJN? YES THEY HAVENT LAUNCHED
PLANES AGAINST U.S. FLEET FLIGHT DECKS / HANGAR DECKS ARE COVERED
w/BOMBS, TORPEDOES, & FUEL LINES FOR U.S.? YES THEIR PLANES
WERE LAUNCHED w/OUT COORDINATION PLANES GET SEPARATED ON FLIGHT TO
IJN SO TORPEDO PLANES HAVE NO FIGHTER COVER 0920 1000 hrs.: U.S.
TORPEDO PLANES ATTACK SEVERE LOSSES (ex. TORPEDO SQUADRON 8)
CRITICAL MOMENT: JAPANESE COMBAT FIGHTER PATROL COVERING CARRIERS
IS DRAWN DOWN TO SURFACE CHASING TORPEDO PLANES 1020 hrs.: U.S.
DIVE BOMBERS ARRIVE OVER IJN CARRIERS IJN FIGHTER PLANES CANNOT
STOP THEM (why?) 3 DIVE BOMBER SQUADRONS ATTACK 3 IJN CARRIERS HIT
SIMULTANEOUSLY THE FATAL FIVE MINUTES: KAGA, AKAGI, SORYU ALL HIT
& SUNK HIRYU LAUNCHES AIRSTRIKE IMMEDIATELY U.S.S. YORKTOWN IS
ATTACKED BY IJN DIVE BOMBERS & TORPEDO PLANES HEAVILY DAMAGED;
SINKS ON JUNE 7 HIRYU IS SUNK AFTER U.S. ATTACK IN AFTERNOON
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AERIAL RECONAISSANCE PHOTO, MIDWAY ISLAND, 1942
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MIDWAY ISLAND AIRFIELD LOCATIONS
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LT. COMMANDER (LCDR) JOHN THACH, U.S. NAVY
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THE THACH WEAVE
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BATTLE OF MIDWAY, BATTLE SEQUENCE, JUNE 4, 1942
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LCDR JOHN C. WALDRON, SQUADRON C/O, TORPEDO SQUADRON 8, U.S.S.
HORNET
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VT-8, TORPEDO SQUADRON 8, U.S.S. HORNET
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JUST A WORD TO LET YOU KNOW THAT I THINK WE ARE READY. WE HAVE
HAD A VERY SHORT TIME TO TRAIN AND WE HAVE WORKED UNDER THE MOST
SEVERE DIFFICULTIES. BUT WE HAVE TRULY DONE THE BEST HUMANLY
POSSIBLE. I ACTUALLY BELIEVE THAT UNDER THESE CONDITIONS WE ARE THE
BEST IN THE WORLD. MY GREATEST HOPE IS THAT WE ENCOUNTER A
FAVORABLE TACTICAL SITUATION, BUT IF WE DONT, AND THE WORST COMES
TO WORST, I WANT EACH OF US TO DO HIS UTMOST TO DESTROY OUR
ENEMIES. IF THERE IS ONLY ONE PLANE LEFT TO MAKE A FINAL RUN IN, I
WANT THAT MAN TO GO IN AND GET A HIT. MAY GOD BE WITH ALL OF US.
GOOD LUCK, HAPPY LANDINGS, AND GIVE EM HELL. LCDR JOHN C. WALDRON,
C/O TORPEDO 8, JUNE 4, 1942
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LCDR JOHN C. WALDRON TAKING OFF DECK OF U.S.S. HORNET
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U.S.NAVY DAUNTLESS DIVE BOMBERS BEGIN THEIR ATTACK, JUNE 4,
1942
IJN KATE TORPEDO PLANE AFTER WEAPON RELEASE ON U.S.S.
YORKTOWN
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U.S.S. YORKTOWN SINKING
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U.S.S. YORKTOWN AT 17,000 FEET BELOW PACIFIC OCEAN SURFACE
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EFFECTS ALLIES 1 st MAJOR VICTORY AGAINST JAPAN ELIMINATES
JAPANs OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY WHY? HIGH CASUALTIES FOR VETERAN PILOTS
HIGH CASUALITES FOR CARRIER CREWS EXPERIENCED PEOPLE CANT BE
QUICKLY REPLACED LOSS OF 4 CARRIERS CANT BE QUICKLY REPLACED SETS
THE STAGE FOR U.S. INVASIONS OF SOLOMON ISLANDS & NEW GUINEA
THE TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC THEATRE OF WORLD WAR II