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July 13, 2006. 3am As gotten from India, for indexing by Prof. Rasmusen, exceptput in one large tex file, with indexing commands added in the preamble, and with minorchagnes made so it will run through latex without stopping.
This is just the bibliography file. The other files are in a gamesinfoxxx.tex file.
1
23 November 2005Eric Rasmusen, [email protected]. http://www.rasmusen.org.References and Name IndexForthcoming and unpublished articles and books have been assigned the years “(forthcom-ing)” and “(unpublished)”. The page numbers where a reference is mentioned in the textare listed after the reference. The date of first publication, which may differ from the dateof the printing cited, follows the author’s name. Some publications (e.g., The Wall StreetJournal) cited in footnotes in the main text but are not the in the bibliography. In thecase of newspapers, I provide page numbers, but the exact page may differ among regionaland time-of-day editions.
Aumann, Robert (1981) “Survey of Repeated Games,” in Essays in Game Theory andMathematical Economics in Honor of Oscar Morgenstern, edited by Robert Aumann,Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut (1981). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161.
Aumann, Robert (1987) “Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rational-ity,” Econometrica, 55(1): 1-18 (January 1987). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85.
Aumann, Robert (1997) “On the State of the Art in Game Theory,” in Understand-ing Strategic Interaction, edited by Wulf Albers, Werner Guth, Peter Hammerstein,Benny Moldovanu, and Eric van Damme, Berlin: Springer Verlag (1997).See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.
Aumann, Robert & Sergiu Hart (1992) Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Appli-cations, New York: North-Holland (1992). See pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .viii,ix,xi.
Axelrod, Robert & William Hamilton (1981) “The Evolution of Cooperation,” Science,211(4489):96 (March 1981). Reprinted in Rasmusen(2001a). See page . . . . . . . . . 163.
Ayres, Ian (1991) “Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotia-tions,” Harvard Law Review, 104(4): 817-872 (February 1991). See page . . . . . . . 387.
523
Ayres, Ian & Peter Cramton (1996) “Deficit Reduction through Diversity: How Affirma-tive Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition,” Stanford Law Review, 48:761-814 (April 1996). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452.
Bagehot, Walter (1971) “The Only Game in Town” Financial Analysts Journal, 27(2):12-22 (March/April 1971). Reprinted in Rasmusen(2001a). See page . . . . . . . . . . 280.
Baird, Douglas, Gertner, Robert & Randal Picker (1994) Strategic Behavior and the Law:The Role of Game Theory and Information Economics in Legal Analysis, Cambridge,Mass: Harvard University Press (1994). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix.
Bajari, Patrick & Ali Hortacsu (2004) “Economic Insights from Internet Auctions,” TheJournal of Economic Literature, 42(2): 457-486 (2004). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452.
Bajari, Patrick, Han Hong & Stephen Ryan (2004) “Identification and Estimation ofDiscrete Games of Complete Information,” NBER Working Paper No. T0301,http://ssrn.com/abstract=601103, (October 2004). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108.
Bajari, Patrick & Stephen Tadelis (2001) “Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A The-ory of Procurement Contracts,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 32(3): 387-407(Autumn 2001). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342.
Baldwin, B. & G. Meese (1979) “Social Behavior in Pigs Studied by Means of OperantConditioning,” Animal Behavior, 27: 947-957 (August 1979). See pages . . . . . 24, 34.
Baye, Michael R. & Heidrun H. Hoppe (2003) “The Strategic Equivalence of Rent-Seeking,Innovation, and Patent-Race Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 44(2): 217-226. See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422.
Baye, Michael. See Kovenock, Baye & de Vries (1996).
Becker, Gary (1968) “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” The Journal ofPolitical Economy, 76(2): 169-217 (March/April 1968). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212.
Becker, Gary & George Stigler (1974) “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensationof Enforcers,” The Journal of Legal Studies, 3(1): 1-18 (January 1974). See page 228.
Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Vijay Krishna (2000) “The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: ASynthesis,” Pennsylvania State University working paper,http://econ.la.psu.edu/ ∼vkrishna/papers/synth34.pdf (March 10, 2000). See page141.
Bernanke, Benjamin (1983) “Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propa-gation of the Great Depression,” The American Economic Review, 73(3): 257-276(June 1983). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286.
Bernheim, B. Douglas (1984b) “Strategic Deterrence of Sequential Entry into an Industry,”The RAND Journal of Economics, 15(1): 1-11 (Spring 1984). See page . . . . . . . . 246.
Border, Kim (1985) Fixed Point Theorems with Applications to Economics and GameTheory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1985). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . 502.
Chiappori, P. A., Steven Levitt & T. Groseclose, (2002) “Testing Mixed Strategy Equi-libria when Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer,” TheAmerican Economic Review, 92(4): 1138-1151 (September 2002). See page . . . . 107.
Chiappori, P.A. & B. Salanie (2003) “Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Re-cent Work,” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics - Theory and Applications,Eighth World Congress, pp. 115-149, M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen and P. Turnovsky,eds., Econometric Society Monographs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press(2003). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216.
Cho, In-Koo & David Kreps (1987) “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,” The Quar-terly Journal of Economics, 102(2): 179-221 (May 1987). See pages . . . . . . . . . . . 344,187.
Chung, Tai-Yeong (1996) “Rent-Seeking Contest when the Prize Increases with AggregateEfforts,” Public Choice, 87(1-2): 55-65 (1996). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423.
528
Clapp, R. See Capen et al. (1971).
Coase, Ronald (1960) “The Problem of Social Cost,” The Journal of Law and Economics3: 1-44 (October 1960). See pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205, 233.
Coase, Ronald (1972) “Durability and Monopoly,” The Journal of Law and Economics,15(1): 143-149 (April 1972). See pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493, 501.
Cooper, Russell (1999) Coordination Games: Complementarities and Macroeconomics,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1999). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.
Copeland, Thomas & J. Fred Weston (1988) Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, 3rdedn., Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley (1st edn., 1983). See pages . . . . . . . . 360, 516.
Cosmides, Leda & John Tooby (1993) “Cognitive Adaptions for Social Change,” pp. 162-228 of The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture,ed. J.H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, Oxford: Oxford University Press(1993). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76.
Cournot, Augustin (1838) Recherches sur les Principes Mathematiques de la Theorie desRichesses, Paris: M. Riviere & C. (1838). Translated in Researches into the Mathe-matical Principles of Wealth, New York: A.M. Kelly (1960). See page . . . . . . . . . . 94.
D’Aspremont, Claude & L. Gerard-Varet (1979) “Incentives and Incomplete Information,”The Journal of Public Economics, 11(1): 25-45 (February 1979). See page . . . . . 470.
David, Paul (1985) “CLIO and the Economics of QWERTY,” AEA Papers and Proceed-ings, 75(2): 332-337 (May 1985). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29.
Debreu, Gerard (1959) Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium,New Haven: Yale University Press (1959). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 502.
Debreu, Gerard. See Arrow & Debreu (1954).
Debreu, Gerard & Herbert Scarf (1963) “A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy,”The International Economic Review, 4(3): 235-246 (September 1963). See page . . 1.
Demsetz, Harold. See Alchian & Demsetz (1972).
Deneckere, Raymond J. & R. Preston McAfee (1996) “Damaged Goods, ”The Journal ofEconomics and Management Strategy, 5(2): 149-174 (Summer 1996). See page 486.
de Vries, Casper G. See Kovenock, Baye & de Vries (1996).
Diamond, Peter (1982), “Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium,” TheJournal of Political Economy, 90(5): 881-894 (October 1982). See page: . . . . . . . 111.
Diamond, Peter & Michael Rothschild, eds. (1978) Uncertainty in Economics: Readingsand Exercises, New York: Academic Press (1978). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.
Dimand, Mary Ann & Robert Dimand (1996) A History of Game Theory, London: Rout-lege (1996). See pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,34.
Dimand, Mary Ann & Robert Dimand (1997) The Foundations of Game Theory, 3 vol.,Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing (1997). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.
Dixit, Avinash & Barry Nalebuff (1991) Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge inBusiness, Politics, and Everyday Life, New York: Norton (1991). See pages viii, 124.
Eaton, C. & Richard Lipsey (1975) “The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsid-ered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition,” The Reviewof Economic Studies, 42(1): 27-49 (January 1975). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476.
Eatwell, John, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman (1989) The New Palgrave: Game Theory,New York: W.W. Norton & Co. (1989). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii.
Edgeworth, Francis (1897) “La Teoria Pura del Monopolio,” Giornale Degli Economisti,40: 13-31 (1925). Translated in pp. 111-142 of Edgeworth, Francis, Papers Relatingto Political Economy, Vol. I. London: Macmillan (1925). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . 465.
Gjesdal, Froystein (1982) “Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Prob-lem,” The Review of Economic Studies, 49(3): 373-390 (July 1982). See page . . 217.
Glazer, Jacob & Albert Ma (1989) “Efficient Allocation of a ”Prize”: King Solomon’sDilemma,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1(3): 222-233 (1989). See page . . . . 302.
Glosten, Lawrence & Paul Milgrom (1985) “Bid, Ask, and Transaction Prices in a Spe-cialist Model with Heterogeneously Informed Traders,” The Journal of FinancialEconomics, 14(1): 71-100 (March 1985). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280.
Guasch, J. Luis & Andrew Weiss (1980) “Wages as Sorting Mechanisms in CompetitiveMarkets with Asymmetric Information: A Theory of Testing,” The Review of Eco-nomic Studies, 47(4): 653-664 (July 1980). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294.
Harris, Milton & Arthur Raviv (1995) “The Role of Games in Security Design,” TheReview of Financial Studies, 8(2): 327-367 (Summer 1995). See page . . . . . . . . . . 284.
Harsanyi, John (1973) “Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale forMixed Strategy Equilibrium Points,” The International Journal of Game Theory,2(1): 1-23 (1973). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78.
Harsanyi, John (1977) Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and SocialSituations, New York: Cambridge University Press (1977). See page . . . . . . . . . . . 400.
Harsanyi, John & Reinhard Selten (1988) A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection inGames, Cambridge: MIT Press (1988). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29.
Hart, Oliver & Bengt Holmstrom (1987) “The Theory of Contracts,” in T. F. Bewley (ed.),pp. 71-155 of Advances in Economic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press(1987). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196.
Hart, Oliver & John Moore (1990), “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” TheJournal of Political Economy, 98(6): 1119-1158 (December 1990). See pages 234, 234.
Hart, Oliver. See Grossman & Hart (1980, 1983).
Hart, Sergiu (2005) “An Interview with Robert Aumann,” http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/∼hart/abs/aumann.html (January 2005; updated April 2005). See page . . . . . . . . 34.
Haywood, O. (1954) “Military Decisions and Game Theory,” Journal of the OperationsResearch Society of America, 2(4): 365-385 (November 1954). See page . . . . . . . . . 20.
Henderson, Dale. See Canzoneri & Henderson (1991).
Hendricks, Ken & Robert Porter (1988) “An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asym-metric Information,” The American Economic Review, 78(5): 865-883 (December1988). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452.
Hendricks, Ken & Robert. Porter (forthcoming), “Lectures on Auctions: An Empiri-cal Perspective,” in M. Armstrong and R. Porter, eds, The Handbook of IndustrialOrganization, vol III, Elsevier, forthcoming. See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452.
Hirshleifer, Jack (1987) “On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises,” InThe Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality, edited by John Dupre.Cambridge: MIT Press (1987). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162.
Hirshleifer, Jack (1989) “ Conflict and Rent-Seeking Success Functions: Ratio and Differ-ence Models of Relative Success,” Public Choice, 63(2): 101-112. See page . . . . . 423.
Hirshleifer, Jack & Juan Martinez-Coll (1988) “What Strategies can Support the Evo-lutionary Emergence of Cooperation? ”The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32(2):367-398 (June 1988). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161.
Hirshleifer, Jack & John Riley (1979) “The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information: AnExpository Survey,” The Journal of Economic Literature, 17(4): 1375-1421 (Decem-ber 1979).
Hirshleifer, Jack & John Riley (1992) The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1992). See pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii, 52.
Hoffman, Elizabeth & Matthew Spitzer (1985) “Entitlements, Rights and Fairness: AnExperimental Examination of Subjects’ Concepts of Distributive Justice,” The Jour-nal of Legal Studies, 14(2): 269-297 (June 1985). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .378.
Hughes, Patricia (1986) “Signalling by Direct Disclosure Under Asymmetric Information,”The Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8(2): 119-142 (June 1986). See page 360.
Kennan, John & Robert Wilson (1993) “Bargaining with Private Information,” The Jour-nal of Economic Literature, 31(1): 45-104 (March 1993). See page . . . . . . . . 125, 400,502.
Kennedy, Peter (1979) A Guide to Econometrics , 1st edn., Cambridge: MIT Press (1979,5th edn. 2003).
Klemperer, Paul (1987) “The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs,” TheRAND Journal of Economics, 18(1): 138-150 (Spring 1987). See page . . . . . . . . . 152.
Kovenock, Dan, Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries (1996) “The All- Pay Auctionwith Complete Information,” Economic Theory, 8(2): 291- 305. See page . . . . . . 420.
Kreps, David, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, & Robert Wilson (1982) “Rational Coopera-tion in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,” The Journal of Economic Theory,27: 245-252 (August 1982). Reprinted in Rasmusen(2001a). See pages . . . . . . 2, 181.
Kreps, David & A. Michael Spence (1985) “Modelling the Role of History in IndustrialOrganization and Competition,” in Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Wel-fare, edited by George Feiwel. London: Macmillan (1985). See pages . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,3.
Kuhn, Harold & Albert Tucker, eds. (1953) Contributions to the Theory of Games, VolumeII, Annals of Mathematics Studies, No. 28, Princeton: Princeton University Press(1953).
Laffont,Jean-Jacques & David Martimort (2001) The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton: Princeton University Press (2001). See page . . . . . . . . . . . ix.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Jean Tirole (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement andRegulation, Cambridge: MIT Press (1993). See pages . . . . . . 130, 329, 330, 339, 340.
Lakatos, Imre (1976) Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery, Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press (1976). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.
Lane, W. (1980) “Product Differentiation in a Market with Endogenous Sequential En-try,”The Bell Journal of Economics, 11(1): 237-260 (Spring 1980). See page . . .501.
Layard, Richard & George Psacharopoulos (1974) “The Screening Hypothesis and theReturns to Education,” The Journal of Political Economy, 82(5): 985-998 (Septem-ber/October 1974). See pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350,370.
Leonard, Robert J. (1995) “From Parlor Games to Social Science: Von Neumann, Mor-genstern, and the Creation of Game Theory 1928-1944,” The Journal of EconomicLiterature, 33(2): 730-761 (June 1995). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.
Levitan, Richard & Martin Shubik (1972) “Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints,”The International Economic Review, 13(1): 111-122 (February 1972). See page 465.
Levitt, Steven. See Chiappori, Levitt & Groseclose (2002) and Duggan & Levitt (2002).
McDonald, John & John Tukey (1949) “Colonel Blotto: A Problem of Military Strategy,”Fortune, p. 102 (June 1949). Reprinted in Rasmusen(2001a). See page . . . . . . . . 110.
McGee, John (1958) “Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case,” TheJournal of Law and Economics, 1: 137-169 (October 1958). See page . . . . . . . . . . 120.
Milgrom, Paul & John Roberts (1986) “Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality,”The Journal of Political Economy, 94(4): 796-821 (August 1986). See page . . . . 370.
Milgrom, Paul & John Roberts (1992) Economics, Organizations, and Management, En-glewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall (1992). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii,216.
Milgrom, Paul & Robert Weber (1982) “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,”Econometrica, 50(5): 1089-1122 (September 1982). See pages . . . . . . . . 429, 441, 449.
Milgrom, Paul. See Kreps et al. (1982), Glosten & Milgrom (1985), and Holmstrom &Milgrom (1987, 1991).
Milinski, M. (1987) “TIT FOR TAT in Sticklebacks and the Evolution of Cooperation,”Nature, 325: 433-435 (January 29, 1987). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161.
Mirrlees, James (1974) “Notes on Welfare Economics, Information and Uncertainty,” InEssays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty, edited by M. Balch, Daniel Mc-Fadden, and S. Wu. Amsterdam: North Holland (1974). See pages . . . . . . . 218, 294.
Mookherjee, Dilip & Ivan Png (1989) “Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution,”The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(2): 399-415 (May 1989). See page . . .109.
Morrow, James (1994) Game Theory for Political Scientists, Princeton: Princeton Uni-versity Press (1994). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix.
Moseidjord, Asbjorn. See Mead et al. (1984).
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Nalebuff, Barry. See Ghemawat & Nalebuff (1985), Dixit & Nalebuff (1991).
Nalebuff, Barry & John Riley (1985) “Asymmetric Equilibria in the War of Attrition,”The Journal of Theoretical Biology, 113(3): 517-527 (April 1985). See page . . . . . 82.
Pearce, David (1984) “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection,”Econometrica, 52(4): 1029-1050 (July 1984). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.
Pearce, David. See Abreu et al. (1986, 1990).
Peleg, Bezalel. See Bernheim et al. (1987).
Peltzman, Sam (1991) “The Handbook of Industrial Organization: A Review Article,”The Journal of Political Economy, 99(1): 201-217 (February 1991). See page . . 107.
549
Peltzman, Sam. See Jarrell & Peltzman (1985).
Perez-Castillo. See Macho-Stadler & Perez-Castillo (1997).
Perri, Timothy (2001). See Rasmusen & Perri (2001).
Petrakis, Emmanuel. See Rasmusen & Petrakis (1992).
Picker, Randal. See Baird, Gertner & Picker(1994).
Pigou, A. (1920), The Economics of Welfare, 4th edn. (1932), 1st edn. (1920), London:Macmillan and Company (1952, 1st edn. 1920). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216.
Pitchik, Carolyn. See Osborne & Pitchik (1986, 1987).
Png, Ivan (1983) “Strategic Behaviour in Suit, Settlement, and Trial,” The Bell Journalof Economics, 14(2): 539-550 (Autumn 1983). See pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67, 122.
Png, Ivan. See Mookherjee & Png (1989).
Png, Ivan & David Hirshleifer (1987) “Price Discrimination through Offers to MatchPrice,” The Journal of Business, 60(3): 365-383 (July 1987). See page . . . . . . . . 501.
Polemarchakis, Heraklis. See Geanakoplos & Polemarchakis (1982).
Popkin, Samuel (1979) The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society inVietnam, Berkeley: University of California Press (1979). See page . . . . . . . . . . . . 233.
Radner, Roy (1980) “Collusive Behavior in Oligopolies with Long but Finite Lives,” TheJournal of Economic Theory, 22(2): 136-156 (April 1980). See page . . . . . . . . . . . 160.
Rapoport, Anatol & Albert Chammah (1965) Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Study in Conflictand Cooperation, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1965). See page . . 184.
Rapoport, Anatol, Melvin Guyer & David Gordon (1976) The 2x2 Game, Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press (1976). See pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 33.
Rasmusen, Eric (1988b) “Mutual Banks and Stock Banks,” The Journal of Law andEconomics, 31(2): 395-422 (October 1988). See pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231, 253.
Rasmusen, Eric (1989a) Games and Information, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. Secondedition, 1994. Third Edition, 2001. Japanese translation by Moriki Hosoe, Shozo Mu-rata, and Yoshinobu Arisada, Kyushu University Press, vol. I (1990), vol. 2 (1991).Italian translation by Alberto Bernardo, Milan: Ulrico Hoepli Editore (1993). Span-ish translation (Juegos e Informacion) by Roberto Mazzoni, Mexico City: Fondode Cultura Economica (1997). Chinese Complex Characters translation, Wu-NanBook Company, Taipei (2003). (www.wunan.com.tw/) Chinese Simplified Characterstranslation, Yang Yao (CCER, Beijing University http://ccer.pku.edu.cn/en/eyyao.htm),Liangjing Publishing. French translation, Jeux et information Introduction la th.oriedes jeux, Brussels: Editions de Boeck & Larcier (2004). See pages . . . vii, ix, xi, xi.
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