Journal of Race Development - 1910 - 16.pdf

7/27/2019 Journal of Race Development - 1910 - 16.pdf

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The Indian Problem and Imperial Politics

Author(s): Alfred L. P. DennisSource: The Journal of Race Development, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Oct., 1910), pp. 187-208Published by:Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/29737857 .

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THE INDIAN PROBLEMAND IMPERIALPOLITICS.By Alfred L. P. Dennis, Ph.D., Professor of History in the Uni?

versity of Wisconsin.

An address delivered at Clark University during the Conference uponthe Far East.

The demand of natives of India for a greater degree ofself-government, possibly for complete freedom from foreigncontrol, has within recent years defined and enlivened thepresent problem of India. This problem is infinitely com?plex. Its roots lie deep in Indian history; and its solutionis "on the knees of the gods." Here are questions peculiarto India and here also is a situation revealing forceswhich areat work throughout Asia. Furthermore it involves muchmore than the adjustment of relations between Europeanand Asiatic, for the conditions which affect party politicsinEngland and which influence international policies throughout the world are also entangled. Indeed, as in so manylarge questions of governments, racial, religious, economic,and educational ideals are fused in the passionate life of aproblem of fundamental importance. Here then is

a verydifficult matter, not likely to be quickly settled. It will bepossible therefore only to ask for some of the causes of thisdifficulty, to analyze the question rather than to attempt toanswer it.

We must, however, recognize at the outset that recentinvestigations and new conditions force us to deny or to dis?regard certain generalizations and deductions as to Indianhistory. Thus the noJon of an absent-minded, unintentionalacquisition of India by the English, which Sir John Seeleyset forth, is not based on the facts. So the assumption ismistaken that, because English rule in India has in the lastanalysis depended on force, it must and should depend onforce, and force alone, for all time to come. Of similar stuff

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188 ALFRED L. P. DENNIS

is the occasional catholic self-congratulation on the undoubt?ed but ill-defined benefits of British administration. The em?phasis which many wiser writers have with justice laid onthe military aspect of the revolt of I?57 has also tended toobscure the fundamental fact that British administrativepolicy, political as well as military, was in large degree re?sponsible for a rising that was much more than a mutiny.

Again the lack of national feeling and of efficient nationalorganization in India, at least since theEnglish have knownIndia, threatens to give too long a lease of life to the state?ment that there can be no Indian nation. Indeed one is inthe making to-day.

But by way of contrast note the equally mistaken pre?judice that a brilliant and prolific antiquity, the imperialas well as the local tradition of India, should entitle the de?scendants of earlier rulers to a larger degree of self-govern?

ment to-day, perhaps to entire freedom from foreign rule.As well argue that the Greek to-day is fit to inspiremoderncivilization, that the silvern memories of the Incas shouldsecure to Peruvians the larger claim in South America or,on the other hand, that a record of centuries sunk in subju?gation and disunion should to-day operate to deprive theItalian of his independence and his national pride. Fre?quently also we find the preposterous statement that fam?ines were unknown in India before British administration.

Too often the intended conclusion is that the British areresponsible for recent famines. The slightest examinationof native documents of earlier Hindu, of Muhammadan orofMaratha origin is sufficient to show the falsity of thisstatement. The deforestation of ancient India is a funda?

mental cause of drought and famine. Indeed in the RigVeda (Book III, Hymn 8) some remote conception of thissort may be recognized, for the prayer to the "Sovran of theForest" beseeches freedom from "poverty, and famine."The prayer to Indra (the rain-god) inBook VIII, Hymn 55,reads: "From this our misery and famine set us free;" andagain in Book X, Hymn 42, is the prayer, "May we subdueall famine and evil want with store of grain and cattle."The prayers for rain are of course numerous; and so clearly



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THE INDIAN PROBLEM AND IMPEEIAL POLITICS 189

was the evil recognized that the word for plague becamesynonymous with famine. But it ispossible that some of thehymns of the Rig Veda were written before the Hindu con?querors of India are supposed to have entered India. Evenif this were so the continued use of these hymns throughoutthe history ofHindu India would indicate their appreciationby priest and people aswell. So also we have the equivalentto our English phrase, "let well enough alone." The Indianproverb runs :

(Through too great cold thewood is burned,through too much rain famine comes; too much is ever

bad." Here of course the cause of famine is assumed to bean excessively wet season. Then we have the old law thatin famine-time a man could take his wife's property to sup?port life without obligation of refunding. Famine, there?fore, seems to have been a familiar experience in ancienttimes. For the year 1396 A.D., we have the record in aMaratha manuscript of the "dreadful famine" distinguishedfrom all others by a special name, the "Durga Diwi." TheHindu tradition declared that it lasted for twelve years andthat its disastrous influence was seen in the continueddepopulation nearly thirty years later of the vast regionbetween the Godavari and the Kistna. The Muhammadanhistorians, not of one but widely scattered parts of Indiamake frequent allusions to frightful famines; and Bernierthe French traveler, wrote in the seventeenth century toColbert of a famine in which "no adequate idea" could begiven "of the sufferings of the people."*

But this is only a part of the story. After all, the causesand character of the present problem can be revealed onlyby a correct appreciation of the facts of Indian history. Itis indeed unnecessary on this occasion to detail many of them.

But some of these facts and conditions must be briefly re?called. Here, then, is the British Empire in India and Bur?

ma, a region lacking in geographic unity, as large as thatportion of the United States east of a line drawn from Bis?marck in the north to El Paso in the South. Here is a pop?ulation numbering nearly four times that of the United

* Cf. Hopkins : India, Old and New.



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States in 1901, of great diversity in race, religion, language,civilization and history. These people are not ruled inaccordance with a uniform system, for there are more govern?

ments in India than there are religions. And even withinsome of the larger groups of the population separations ofbelief, occupation and interest secure an even greater diver?sity of ideals. To these differences of every description,religion and social custom naturally give special sanctionand sanctity among people to whom religion is still a power?ful matter of every day life. Here, too, the subtlest in?tellectual ability is to be found side by side with the deepestveneration for mere tradition and with unexpected credulityas to the new and the unknown.

For the first time in their history these lands and popula?tions are under one supreme authority. Indeed rarelyinmodern times and for any long period has any of the largerportions of this empire had real political unity. The tra?dition is that of separation, of the disintegration of succes?sive political fabrics, which the military ardor and adminis?trative ability of various individuals and families may haveset up for longer or shorter periods of time. Rebellion andsecession have been habits of Indian politics. In like fash?ion large portions of the present Indian Empire have been the

prize of successive foreign conquerors. Until recently warsand raids have for nearly 1200 years been the almost yearlyoccupation of many of its rulers. Apparently never beforein historic times has so large a portion of India been at peaceas within the last fifty years. For the second Afghan war,the third Burmese war, and the frontier expeditions haveleft the great centers of the empire undisturbed. Yet to-daythe traditions of Indian history are still strong; the forcesof unrest, of rebellion, of disintegration are threatening the

political system as they have so regularly done in times past.From this point of view, therefore, the fact that there is anIndian problem to-day is in line with the history of India.But this does not lessen the difficulty of that problem.So far we have considered Indian history in the singular.In reality it is made up of the histories of many ancientgovernments and peoples. A number of these are part of



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THE INDIAN PROBLEM AND IMPERIAL POLITICS 191

the British Empire, enjoying a large degree of autonomy,proud of their relative freedom from administrative controlby the foreigner and hostile to the pretensions of outsideforces whether Asiatic or European. Nowhere in the litera?ture on this general subject can be seen any solution of thisquestion which would be at all likely to satisfy the aims andaspirations of the native states now included in the IndianEmpire. Of course complete independence, the divisionof India into amultitude of petty sovereignties and a fewlarger states would be the answer to this query by certainsections of public opinion. Such a result, however, even ifthe peaceable withdrawal of theBritish were conceded, wouldinaugurate a long period of wars between these states, theconquest of the smaller and weaker states by the larger andstronger. Such a condition would invite foreign interven?tion in the interests of peace if not of selfish aggrandizement.

Here, then, is another difficulty closely related to the ancientyet continuing political tendencies of India.In the third place is religion. The two militant religioussystems of India, Hinduism and Islam, have a long recordboth of hostility and of mutual toleration. Their relationsare of the greatest importance; indeed the cycles of religioushistory are everywhere important in politics. The practi?cal expulsion of Buddhism from India proper, the greatHindu revival which compelled it, and the establishment of

Muhammadanism as the religion of a fighting and conquer?ing class, together with the subsequent quieter extensionof Islam among the lower ranks of Hindu society are allfactors in Indian political and social development. Theseventeenth century, however, marked high tide of Muham

madam influence in India as in other parts of Africa and inEurope. Indeed there is an interesting parallel in the fash?ions in which by the end of the seventeenth century Protes?tantism and Muhammadanism had each reached itsmaximumof territorial extension in Europe and in Asia respectively.Since that time the expansion of Protestantism has chieflybeen in North America, Australia and South Africa, that ofRoman Catholicism in South America and that of Islamin Western and Central Africa. Subsequently in India,



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on the other hand, Hinduism, of one sort or another, tookon new fervor and political force in the rise of theMarathasand the Sikhs. But this attempt to recover political lead?ership in India by Hindu confederacies and states wasstopped by the rise of British rule and by force of Britisharms. Thus, although the first charters of British adminis?tration were gained from decadent Muhammadan officials,the real acquisition of India was largely at the expense of

nascent Hindu princes. Under these circumstances, be?cause there were far more Hindus than Muhammadans andbecause, certainly since the Mutiny, the Muhammadanshave until recently to a great extent withdrawn themselvesin proud disappointment from political activity in India theBritish have recognized Hindu rather than Muhammadanassistance in the administration of India. The result wasthat even in Eastern Bengal, where the Muhammadans werein a decided majority, the civil staff, in so far as itwas openedto natives at all, has until recently been largely recruitedfrom the minority?from Hindu society. The Hindu of

Calcutta, of Madras and of Bombay has furthermore shownremarkable activity in availing himself of the opportunitiesfor education, such as it is; he has been aided in tiiis by aremarkable memory, by great intellectual dexterity, espec?ially in the field of the humanities. For science he appar?ently has less appreciation or capacity.But side by side with this eager desire to acquire one sortof European education there has also been a revival of an?cient Hindu feeling and a renascence of political as well asreligious ambition. Under the stimulus of this provocativesituation and also because of other enlivening forces, outsideof India, Muhammadan society in India has also beenstirred. Indeed throughout the East and in Africa Panislamism has become a political factor. In India, however,other and more local ambitions, have been affected by thisgeneral situation. The Muhammadans of India, therefore,are asking for greater recognition by the British, while pro?testing their loyalty to British rule. The alignment of

Hindu and Muhammadan, while in the ear of each a quickerstep is beating, is not a sign of peace nor a promise of mutual



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toleration. Politics and religion are the two sides of thesingle coin which passes current throughout India and in?deed throughout Asia. And, while such primal social forcesare stirring with renewed vitality, the readjustment of rela?tions between Hindu and Muhammadan and between bothand the English is pregnant with the gravest difficulties.So the stimulating memories of social antagonisms, the zestof religious propaganda, and the smoldering jealousies offanaticism are the complicating possibilities of revived po?litical ambitions on the part of both Hindu and Muhamma?dan in India.

But there is a fourth aspect of thismatter. The develop?ment of India has been largely influenced in earlier periodsby the history of other parts of Asia; and many of the dom?inant political forces in India have been of foreign origin;nevertheless the history of the past century has, on thewhole,set India apart, in comparative isolation from the rest of

Asia. The course of events in the Far East or in the NearEast has not until recently directly stimulated the inner lifeof India. This condition, however, has passed, perhapsforever. Certainly now and in the immediate future theproblem of India belongs to the larger problem of Asia. InTurkey, Persia, China, Korea and the Philippines, as wellas in India, are similar energetic political and social forcesworking toward the solution of local problems, yet at thesame time as part of a larger movement. The student

must, therefore, appreciate the connection of the presentproblem of India with the Asiatic question as a whole and

mark at least the influence of contemporary Asia on India.Two things, however, are important. We in Americahave a breathless benevolence for the future and often find

it hard to realize the hold of deep rootages in ancient cus?tom and local habit. The undoubted awakening of Asia

has led some to assume that in various Asiatic countrieswhole peoples could wheel in orderly fashion from the an?cient highway to a new avenue, where the country wasrough and the road makers were not skillful. The heir?looms, moreover, are in the baggage; and a revolution, a con?stitution, and all the glib patter of the professional agita



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tor and the hasty patriot are of small account comparedwith the ancient history which even a new nation may notforget.

But, on the other hand, open to all the tempests standsthe new age?

"half built against the sky.""Scaffolding veils the wall,And dim dust floats and falls,

As, moving to and fro, their tasks the masons ply."

And the masons are, for a wonder, hurrying in Asia. Bustsof Rousseau on sale in China; Thos. Cook & Sons planningan excursion ticket via railway and steamboat for the pil?grimage toMecca; the American school-teacher in the Phil?ippines; and the dash of the Japanese torpedo boats in theharbor at Port Arthur. This world is a " catholic kind of

place," but such facts Asia has never seen "save out of onechimerical generation.'7 So must the soothsayers give way

?the prophets of it never can be because it never was.And now the isolation of India has passed. The spectac?

ular successes of Japan, for example, attracted the mostsympathetic and jubilant notice in the native press of India.

How far these successes were a cause of the present revivalof native feeling in India is open to debate; but, even if thecausal connection is not as strong and direct as has beenassumed by some observers, the fact still remains that animmense interest in Japanese policies has been aroused incertain influential sections of Indian society.On the one hand, the awakening of an increased sense ofAsiatic unity among the peoples of the Far East andMalayaand Burma by the Buddhist revival has on the whole hadonly an academic interest for India. And this is probablyan advantage, for it has prevented any entanglement ofreligious jealousy, from interfering with the development ofan appreciation of other currents of Asiatic feeling in Chinaand Japan. The military, economic and political achieve?ments of Japan, however, and agitating educational andsocial reforms in China, have been of special significance toIndian thought on these matters. Thus the ancient policy



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of the Chinese boycott and its recent application have had atleast a counterpart in Bengal in the "Swadeshi" movement."Swadeshi" has recently been applied in rough and unfor?tunate fashion to economic conditions, in an attempt toboycott goods of European origin; but true "Swadeshi" isessentially amuch broader movement, hiding the continuingspirit and some of the characteristics of Indian thought andlife, "the patient, deep disdain" of Asia forEurope.Of course the other side of this movement is the notion ofa general strike, the adoption of some of the conceptions and

methods of European anarchists by some of the extremistsin India. But still another sign of the relation of the Indiansituation to Asiatic affairs is the feeling in certain quartersin Calcutta that the Anglo-Japanese alliance is really a be?trayal of Asiatic interests by Japan. There are not a fewIndians who look eagerly for the ending of that compactas the signal for the reduction of British power in India.Yet Indian students are now going to Japan as Chinesestudents did a few years ago; and at the other end of Asiait was an Indian who last winter largely assisted in theorganization of the student revolt in the Syrian ProtestantCollege at Beirut.

The influence on India of recent events in Persia and moreparticularly inTurkey and Arabia is hard tomeasure. It istoo early to know whether the Wahabbi unrest in Arabia,which has been reaching perilously close to the holy cities,will have any serious effect on Muhammadan opinion inIndia. In time past, however, similar movements havehad a decided r?le in promoting disturbance. The moreimportant question iswhether the attempts to establish rep?resentative institutions in both Shiah and Sunni countries,in Persia and in Turkey, may not be responsible for an evengreater awakening of political hopes in India. The fashionin which until very recently Indian Muhammadans of bothbranches have held aloof from political agitation is no evi?dence that this self-denial will continue. Indeed the signsof change can already be seen. As the Turkish revolutionhas complicated theEnglish position inEgypt, so itmay wellhave an increasing influence in India on Hindu as well as on



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Muhammadan, though not necessarily to bring these twointo greater agreement and cooperation.From another point of view also the isolation of Indiahas passed. For as the German railway to Baghdad comesto completion, as Russian influence in northern Persia in?creases, themonopoly of English influence in India threatensto decrease. It may then be possible for the native of Indiato find over his shoulder a European interest which mightgive secret if not open support to his policy of baiting theBritish. An increase in the solidarity of Asiatic feeling,therefore, is now a probability of the future; and the exten?sion of European rivalries to almost every part of Asia makesthe agitation in India amatter of general Asiatic significance.Itmay at the opportune time give special occasion for foreigninfluence on the Indian problem. Thus this problem be?comes amatter of world politics. Its difficulty is therebyonly increased.But as yet we have not touched the question which manywould consider foremost. The difficulties arising from thedirect relations ofEngland and India constitute in themselvesa field for endless discussion and speculation. These rela?tions are naturally within the special range of native agita?tion in India and provide the stormiest subjects for questionand debate in Parliament. It is the unfortunate experienceof politics that complicated questions are rarely studied tillthey become urgent of solution. When calm honesty is

most needed partisan vociferation deafens the jury. In thisrespect the Indian problem shares the common lot of livequestions.There is on the one hand a grieved and now insulted pub?lic opinion in England and among Anglo-Indians in India.This opinion is reluctantly realizing that a considerableportion of the population of India hates English rule.Hitherto many of these honest men have, for the most part,lived content, possibly in the hope that an arduous and un?selfish lifemust in the end be appreciated even by the silentif not "sullen peoples." They have unconsciously followed

Oliver Cromwell and thought as he spoke of government"for the good of the people and for their interest, and with



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out respect had to any other interest," thinking, as he did,"that's the question; what's for their good, not what pleasesthem." Indeed there is scarcely a worthy book written inthe period 1850-1880 which does not voice this conviction.Since 1880 the chorus of a natural self-satisfaction has scarcely lessened. The British public at home, serene in the ben?evolence of its intentions and apparent success, has tillrecently rested secure as Archbishop Laud did. The inten?tions of Charles I were good; his policies must therefore be

wise. And a wonderful achievement along certain and im?portant lines in India has been won, at what cost the worldmay never know; certainly the glib orator of the IndianNational Congress hardly appreciates. It is not necessaryto copy any of the almost grandiloquent descriptions ofBritish administrative success in India, as you may findthem with slight variation in book after book. Indeed wecannot contemplate ihe possibilities of Indian history duringthe last century if English rule in India had been lacking.This may be due to prejudice, yet I hope it is not. At allevents we must recognize that all is now not for the best inthis best of possible worlds. Candide and the professionaloptimist have had their day.

Soon the other hand rises a chorus crescendo accelerando.A section of Indian society, now articulate, thanks in largedegree to English education, voices both present wrongsand ancient disappointments. Even in America, we havealready heard inmost eloquent language the views of thiselement. I use the word advisedly, although it will wellarouse discontent in theminds of those who may believe thatthey have heard the voice of India and of no mere element.

They have not. But if they have heard what at the outsideestimate some ten per cent of the population of India reallyknows it thinks of British government they have also heardwhat nearly thirty million people think. Consider that dayand night with increasing ardor such statements as someheard from Swami Abhedananda and his friends are beingdinned into the ears of a still vaster population, and believethat the possibilities of future and further discontent withBritish rule are almost beyond calculation.



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We can then realize that there is a great difference ofopinion as to British rule in India between the AngloIndian official and the British public on the one hand and aconstantly increasing section of Indian society on the other.On the whole the blindness of one party and the inaccurateassumptions of the other seem to me to belong to the usualorder of partizan characteristics. It is probably inevitablethat injustice should be done to each party by the other.There are undoubted errors in British rule to-day as there isalso a firm belief that, in spite of all itsmistakes, British ruleis better for India than the sort of native rule which the na?tives could set up for themselves. There is the natural con?fidence of men untrained to politics that native rule of anysort must be better for India than the best rule that the for?eigner can give. So you have as the fifth real difficulty inthe problem of India this dead-lock of opinion. That it is ofthe gravest sort you can appreciate as you read of assassina?tion inEngland and bomb throwing in India. But what aresome of the questions involved in this dead-lock and how fardo these questions themselves present difficulties?First of all is the educational system which English direc?tion and native development have set up in India. Here thismatter must be touched only with a view to the special

problems treated in this paper. The extraordinary con?trasts of Indian history are, however, perhaps nowherebetter illustrated than in its recent educational history.There is certainly grim irony in the situation. Here we havea tribe of busy sportsmen, the "goddams" as the FrenchCanadians used to call them, settling the educational poli?cies of a race, whose complete systems of philosophy arealmost contemporary with the early Celtic invasions ofBritain. To the many castes of India another was added,the caste of the foreign ruler, who ate beef and scorned whathe could not understand. Blind himself to the signs of thetimes his rationalistic liberalism led him, at first grudginglyand slowly, to assist in spreading a thin veneer of so-calledWestern culture on a surface already deeply scarred by thelessons of the ages. To-day in England we may hope forsome serious consideration of educational methods and of



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the value of purely literary and philosophical studies ascompared with the more practical tests of the physicaland social sciences. But when Macaulay laid his unfortunateburden on the Indian student the Englishman in all sinceritybelieved a solemn duty had been successfully assumed.Superficial and almost useless learning by rote, mere testsof memory, a false yet exalted worship of the examinationsystem have been in large part the result. The carefulrating on the basis of marks in examinations and the use ofthe examination as the only real passage to the haven ofgovernment service have degraded lofty literary and philo?sophical subjects, and even the little science that has creptin, to the basis of crude commercialism. Little is valuedexcept for the sake of the examination mark. So a boy'sstanding in the schools gained by foolish cramming with theaid of parrot-like memory and digested syllabi may fix theamount of dowry which his father may demand with the fu?ture bride for this precocious product of mistaken pedagogy.Intellectually and morally the Indian peoples, and in particu?lar the Hindu of Bengal, have as a whole profited little byEnglish education. Of course the great mass of the popu?lation have remained in their illiteracy undisturbed by thisprocess. But the result is that the natural leaders of an em?bryo nation have been badly trained for their future work,have on the one hand lost touch with their own people andalso failed to get the best and most useful of what Europecould have given them. Of course I speak in most generalterms. The relatively few individual cases where betterresults have been obtained cannot, however, be taken astypical. Indeed one of the most significant and discourag?ing signs of the times is the hostility and frantic oppositionof Hindu educational leaders to the attempts of Lord Curzon tomake the system more effective and to secure better

methods of education. The effect of this situation on pre?sent politics is great. If Englishmen are chagrined at thefailure of the natives of India to rise to new responsibilities,if they are alarmed at the garrulous misrepresentation ofvengeful office-seekers they have themselves to blame to aconsiderable degree.



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A second live difficulty is the dead-lock over the economicquestion. The unfriendly critics of British rule usuallymake a great deal of the exploitation of India, and especiallyof Bengal, in the consulships of Clive and Warren Hastings.They often involve both of these remarkable men in thegeneral corruption of the period. Then with long reach andcumulative arithmetic they calculate the present poverty ofIndia back to the days of an unreformed House of Commonsand a rapacious East India Company. Even if all were trueI cannot see that the economic drain of India by Englishcommercial freebooters at the close of the eighteenth cen?tury has very much to dowith the present situation. Farther

more, we have here in any event a bad case of political indi?gestion caused in large parts by that brilliant work, of" near-fiction," Macaulay's essay on Warren Hastings. Itis, however, a deep reproach to modern, and particularlyto English, scholarship that more thorough work has notbeen done on the financial relations of England and India.It has been left very largely toMr. Romesh Dutt, to dealwith the modern economic history of India. His worksare a veritable storehouse of statements and deductions laidforth in scholastic form. From his pages nearly every Indianpatriot cites liberally with more or less accuracy. A lessscholarly work by the lateMr. Digby bears the ironical title"Prosperous British India." It is on the whole less convinc?ing ifmore stimulating thanMr. Dutt's books. The deathof Mr. Justice Ranad? was a misfortune to real studentsof the economic question, for the first word has really onlybeen mumbled. On the whole, the impartial investigatormust continue to feel that, however serious the charges ofeconomic exploitation and maladministration by the English

may appear to be in the pages of Dutt and Digby, the datafor the earlier period, particularly from 1815 to 1858, aredubious and that in some cases a wonderful trust has beenshown in the work of early discredited compilers, such as

Montgomery Martin who wrote about 1840. I do not knowwhat the truth is regarding the history of Anglo-Indian eco?nomics. But the whole subject is now in that uncertaincondition most inviting to present day political debate.The result of that debate is heat, not light.



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The contemporary economic situation is scarcely lessproductive of differences in opinion. The army of figures,yearly marshaled in the official records, would at first thoughtencourage the hope that the truth might be here secured.One of the characteristic features of the whole matter, how?ever, is the hopeless inaccuracy of partisan pamphleteers.The native Indian press is doing incalculable harm to thecherished cause of Indian nationalism by methods whichthreaten to discredit even statements which may very wellbe true. On the other hand the general indifference of theEnglish public to the situation is extraordinary. Onlyrecently has there been much effective appreciation of realmistakes of English economic policy. I am not so muchconcerned with the question of the economic drain from Indiato England, whether it be annually ?18,000,000 or ?25,000,000 or at the most ?30,000,000. Even if these figures arenot susceptible to certain modification this drain may beregarded by some as at least in part a sort of insurance,paid unwillingly to be sure, but guaranteeing to India cer?tain benefits. The difficult question of land tax, the lack ofsufficient irrigation projects, the extravagance of govern?

ment celebrations such as the recent Durbar, the state ofIndian industries, the bureaucratic rust eating into adminis?tration?these are only a few of the fields inwhich it seemstome galling charges can be brought against British econo?mic policy in India. At all events the net result both inreal life and in political propaganda is alarming, if not dis?heartening.Still a third feature in this dead-lock of opinion is the in?creasing friction caused by racial contact, and the changedconditions of intercourse between England and India whichhave affected the character and methods of British rule inIndia. For one thing, more Englishmen go to India thanever before; and more Indians go to England. There is anadvantage in this, but there may be serious and unwelcomeresults as well. The Indian goes to England to study theanatomy of English life and power; he sometimes mistakesthe skeleton in the closet for the proper subject of study.

On the other hand the purely commercial Englishman, even



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when not of the "beach-comber" type often lacks a senseof responsibility; and insular ignorance may lead to imperti?nence and insult to the respectable native. In both casessympathetic racial relations suffer.The telegraph, daily news and orders from the other sideof the world, and the attempt to satisfy a double standardof public opinion have also affected the position and respon?sibilities of rulers in India who are no longer lonely. Thiscondition has made Lord Morley, the Liberal Secretary ofState for India, one of the most influential and autocraticrulers that India has known in recent years. The relativelyfew Indians who really know much about what is going onin England have also learned the possibility of appeal to

Caesar. They have their spokesmen, however few and in?effective, in Parliament; and they have learned that Csesarhas many heads. The administration of the expert, there?fore, the judgment of the man on the spot, is now entangledby remote and foreign forces. Government by "wireless"is a new thing; not necessarily a wise thing.The general tendencies of racial feeling in other parts ofthe world have also had an influence in India. For obscureand varied reasons the contact of races is producing greaterfriction to-day. On both sides there may be more vigorousself-assertion; there certainly is greater jealousy and im?patience on the part of the white man. His task of keepinghimself clear from the spiritual penalties of power is toodifficult. Ruling other people is hard on the character ofthe ruler. So there has been bred in India an increasinghabit of hostility on the part of some leaders; and at anytime this may be translated into dire action as the lowerranks on both sides imitate with less comprehension theoften unconscious yet arrogant attitude of their superior.So, on the whole, opinion is enflamed.

By selection three energetic causes of debate as to AngloIndian relations have been briefly suggested to you. Icome now to a sixth major difficulty of the Indian problem,?the influence of this problem on the affairs of the British

Empire and the effect of recent British imperial policies andproblems on Indian politics. And here again I must rigor?ously confine myself to a few aspects of a large matter.



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Europe was surprised when in 1801 a British force wassuccessfully sent from India to expel the French fromEgypt.Here was the first exhibition of the resiliency of the AngloIndian Empire. The order to send 7000 Indian troops toMalta in 1878 and the cooperation of Indian troops invariousrecent British expeditionary forces in China as well as inEgypt has further illustrated this factor. But the efficiency,ifnot the loyalty, of the native troops under British commandand also of the armies of the Indian native states have seriouslimitations. While we had no hesitancy in using negrotroops against the Spanish and in the Philippines, it isdoubt?ful whether British public opinion would encourage the useof native Indian regiments, though officered by white men,in any war outside of Asia against a European or Amer?ican enemy. Certainly during the South African war, whenthe temptation must have been severe, the notion that it

was a "Sahib's war," a fight of white man against white man,in which no Asiatic need apply, proved sufficient to pre?vent the use of Indian troops. It is 'an interesting specu?lation whether any such self-denying ordinance would hold,if unfortunately in years to come hostilities should breakout between England and Japan, or between England andthe United States, when our negro troops might be used inthe Philippines. At all events one phase of racial feelingas well is hereby indicated.But if the existence of the Indian armies has been of somelimited use to the British Empire at large, the increasing

necessity of maintaining a large British force in India sug?gests still another aspect of the matter. For the time wecan disregard the agitating question of the financial cost ofthis army. It is there "to sit on the lid." The events ofthe last few months are not likely to decrease its size andthose events may tend increasingly to justify to the Britishtax-payer his content that the costs are charged to the Indianbudget. The fact is, however, that the Indian situation to-dayactually decreases and will continue to decrease the militaryefficiency of the British Empire. I say this with due appre?ciation that India affords an excellent training ground forthe British army and that heroic efforts have been made by



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Lord Kitchener to squeeze out of the government of Indiathe necessary funds and power to promote the cause of mili?tary reform. Whether Lord Kitchener's ideas and whetherthe larger issue ofmilitarism, which his attitude has provokedare for the best interests even of the British Empire, is another

matter. At all events the fact remains that at the other endof the Suez canal an army is detained whose hasty intrench

ment on the east coast of Britain might turn the scale in someArmageddon of the future.

Turning, however, from purely military matters, Englishcolonial policies and crises have special significance in viewof the Indian situation. The retired Anglo-Indian officialhas had no doubt that the burdens of British South Africanpolicy in 1879-1880 andmore particularly in 1898-1901 havetold heavily on British interests in India. In the earlierperiod the policy finally adopted with regard to Afghanistanwas probably influenced by the situation in South Africa.And in the recent struggle the drain on the empire was un?doubtedly immense. Furthermore, the revelation of mis?management was a delightful surprise told not even inwhis?pers in Calcutta bazaar and later rumored across the border.The resulting prolonged public discussion inEngland of thedeficiencies of British colonial and military policies hasnaturally furnished food for discussion to the gentlemen atat Puna and even at Lahore. A recent English visitor tothe maneuvers near Peshawar of the crack corps of the AngloIndian army reports the bland inquiry and comment of anative: "Your army in England is no good now?" Whatjubilation the recent naval panic has produced in themindsof native schemes at Bombay I do no tknow. Again the greatlonging of many agitators in India, even of the more moderatetype, is to be able to "answer back" effectively to any un?

welcome policy dictated from Whitehall. The successfulassertion by Natal in 1906 of local colonial opinion as to thetrial of natives connected in the uprising there lighted a

vista to the advocates of Indian autonomy. The furtherproblem of the protection of native Indian subjects in otherportions of the British Empire has illustrated another aspectof the indirect relations of Canada and South Africa to India.



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But amore important phase would at once be exposed byany real attempt to deal with the economic question. Itis almost impossible to see how the trade interests of Indiaand of other portions of the British Empire can be success?fully covered by the same roof, however striped and gabled.

Any plan of an imperial customs union must be consideredin the light of the Indian situation. However, I congratu?late myself that this subject cannot be taken up in thispaper. The connection of the Indian problem with Britishimperialism is therefore close, yet perplexing. The coloniesset an example to Indian ambition; and British colonialpolicy creates situations which hamper the development ofa policy clearly wise for India.

Lastly is the difficulty arising from the present state ofEnglish politics and public opinion. The situation at homeis particularly complicated by the almost universal rangeof British interests. Thus foreign as well as domestic factorsmust be kept as arriere-pensees. The history of the lastthirty years inEngland, when finally the proper and possibletime arrives in which to write of it intelligently and withreal knowledge, will, I think, be notable for at least twothings. On the one hand there is treatment by successiveBritish ministries of three foreign problems of the first order;and in the second place, there is the rise of two relativelynew factors inEnglish domestic politics and public opinion.

Among other matters Lord Beaconsfield bequeathed tothe Liberal ministry of 1880 three major problems, unsolvedand bristling with difficulties, viz.: the assertion of a domi?nant British interest in the neighborhood of the Suez Canalwhere imperial connections were involved; secondly, thenatural hostility ofRussia, balked in her plans by the Britishpolicy which had led to the Congress of Berlin; and thirdly,and more clearly of special importance in Indian matters,the Afghan war and the whole potential situation in the

Middle East, a region where Russian hostility might wellwork special damage to British interests.

Now at the end of thirty years we can see after vacilla?tions and a welter of blood the establishment and mainten?ance of British administrative control in Egypt and the pro



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tection of the Suez canal, while the battle of Omdurman haschecked the probability of Franco-Russian intrigue in theupper Sudan and Abyssinia respectively. Anglo-Russianrivalry has undergone at least an eclipse. A wiser apprecia?tion both of the need of Russian influence in Europeanpolitics and of the value of accomodation in fields ofmutualinterest inAsia has, for the time being, relieved England.And this at a time when she apparently needed both handsfree to deal with a possible Anglo-German crisis. All thishas in the third place, reacted on the situation in CentralAsia. The wisdom of British withdrawal from Afghanistanis clearer to-day than in the eighties. But the politicassertions of the continuance of British interests in thatregion and the Tibetan expedition place England to-day ina much stronger position in this region than ever before.

However, the reaction of these three results on the Indianproblem may perhaps be better realized ifwe imagine for amoment what would be the possibilities if, instead of theactual situation, we saw, in the Levant, the route to Indiaunguarded and the forces both of European hostility and

Muhammadan unrest threatening that route. As far asRussia is concerned the continuing crisis in Persia, comingfast on the heels of Turkish revolutions and disturbancesin India, would be the occasion of far greater alarm andinternational friction. A similar condition of uncertaintyand a wider range of obligation and possibility in Central

Asia would only intensify the critical character of presentpolitics.We have been considering what might have been. Thatthe situation is different is no real guarantee that the pros?pects of the future may be fair. These fields of foreignpolitics each contain the possibilities, ifnot the probabilities,of future discord. Thus it is a matter of doubt to me howlong the British public will remain reasonably quiescent asto Russian advance in Persia. A more rapid increase in

Russian influence, a quicker step toward the Persian Gulf,and the politics of the future would at once be pregnant withwar. And it is just these possibilities on which the radicalIndian nationalists most depend for the weakening of British



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policies in India, and finally for the realization of dreams ofindependence. It is hard to think of India as a whole; itis harder still to measure the relation of Indian politics tointernational policies of world-wide range. Yet we will misssomething ifwe do not think on these things.

The changes and problems of more clearly domestic char?acter have, however, another sort of significance for Indianaffairs. Two relatively new tendencies inEnglish domesticpolitics and public opinion must

now be mentioned. On theone hand is the increasing influence of the economic problemat home, the entry of the Labor party into more or lesseffective participation in national politics, and the conse?quent tendency of the government to consider imperialquestions with reference to the discontent of a hithertosubmerged democracy at home. On the other hand is anincreased hardness of the ruling classes. The older passionsof liberalism, the glow of sympathy with struggling nationali?ties are chilled. The men who cheered Kossuth and ralliedto Garibaldi are dead. The experience of decreased economicprosperity, the stress of foreign competition, the bitter andsurprising realization that after all, Englishmen are misunder?stood, if not actually unpopular, almost the world over,each factor has had its influence on national character. Apeople in a panic is not likely to be either wise ormerciful;the national nerves have undergone a great strain; and obsti?nacy is not lacking in the British constitution. The new ele?ment in political life at home is, therefore, untrained to dealwith Indian affairs; and the older element is bewildered andnaturally incensed by the disappearance of many of theflattering monuments to British prestige. So the domesticsituation, from whichever aspect we may view it, is per?

plexing. And after all, sovereignty in India is domestic inEngland.

As you may now imagine, the Indian problem as a wholedoes not admit to my mind of any satisfactory answer atpresent. The conciliatory policy of Lord Morley and theassociation of an increased but limited number of nativesin the Indian councils does not seem likely to appease theextremists in India or in England. It may allay agitation



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temporarily, but, though probably a wise step, itmay bemisunderstood by self-constituted political leaders in Indiaas a sign of weakening on the part of the British government.

Nothing could be more unfortunate. For on the whole whilethe government of India by the British may be reformed, it isnot going to disappear in our day or for a very long time tocome. The sooner Indians realize this the better. And yetdo not mistake me. I regard the attitude and hopes of the

moderate section of Indian patriots as most natural. Someof these men may be unwise; they may not appreciate all thedifficulties and dangers which their desires involve; but it isno discredit to them personally that they have taken theair of a new age and lookwith longing to the hills, where menstand erect, secure, with muscles hardened by the patientascent towards freedom. The cnief present danger to Indiannationalism is the discrediting, if not the utter ruin of itscause by political demagogues, reckless in thought, vengefulin action, preaching liberty but eager for power, largely tosatisfy personal ambition as long ago, the prophet Jeremiahspoke: Ye have not hearkened unto me, in proclaimingliberty, every one to his mother, and every man to his neigh?bor : behold I proclaim a liberty for you, with the Lord, tothe sword and to the pestilence. On the shoulders of realnative leaders therefore, rests a tremendous responsibility.They must see to it that they do not lead the people of Indiaastray, hurrying them towards a false dawn.

Resolutely, however, I have declined in this paper to advo?cate solutions of problems, which have been merely labeled.The connections and combinations of various facts and poli?cies, the attempt to analyze a complicated situation are surelyenough; and, if bewildering, at least we have for our comfortthe knowledge that much more has been left out than hasbeen included.

We can still follow the wonderful, if bloodstained, pageantof Indian history. The racking realities of poverty andfamine, the perpledng tangle of old hopes and new fears,the interests of the desert and of the thronging bazaar, the"tawdry rule of kings," and the ancient service of the

Golden Rule are all parts of this great matter.

Journal of Race Development - 1910 - 16.pdf

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