Jordanian National Security and the Future of Middle East Stability

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JORDANIAN NATIONAL SECURITYAND THE FUTURE OF MIDDLE EAST STABILITY

W. Andrew Terrill

January 2008

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as denedin Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in thepublic domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United StatesCode, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

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The views expressed in this report are those of the authorand do not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of theDepartment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government. This report is cleared for public release; distributionis unlimited.

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I would like to thank Mary J. Elias, Dr. Norman Cigar, SarahE. Womer, Dr. Dallas Owens of the U.S. Army War College, andMajor David M. Burke of the U.S. Air Force, for useful and insightfulcomments on earlier drafts of this work. I owe Mary a particulardebt for carefully reviewing several drafts and generating anumber of useful suggestions and ideas throughout the lifeof this project. I would also like to thank Colonel MohammadSalim Jaradat of the Royal Jordanian Army for sharing his wisecouncil with me throughout the year he spent at the U.S. ArmyWar College, as well as during earlier discussions in Jordan andMalta. During multiple trips to Jordan, I was treated with greatkindness and openness by General Mohammad Fahed al Allaf, thecommandant of the Royal Jordanian National Defense College. Ialso appreciate the discussions that I have held with membersof the Royal Jordanian National Defense Colleges Center forStrategic Studies under the leadership of Retired Major GeneralMahmoud Ohed Irdaisat. Other Jordanian friends from whomI have learned a great deal include Brigadier General OttallahButosh, Major General (Ret.) Adnan Obeidat, Brigadier GeneralSalah I. Qudah, and Colonel Yaya Ahmad al Qudah. Despite thesignicance of this help, all mistakes in this work of fact, omission,interpretation, and speculation are entirely my own.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should beforwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army WarCollege, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.


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ISBN 1-58487-335-3


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FOREWORD

The United States and Jordan have maintained avaluable mutually-supportive relationship for decadesas a result of shared interests in a moderate, prosperous,and stable Middle East. In this monograph, Dr. W.Andrew Terrill highlights Jordans ongoing value as aU.S. ally and considers ways the U.S.-Jordanian alliancemight be used to contain and minimize problemsof concern to both countries. Although Jordan isnot a large country, it is an important geographicalcrossroads within the Middle East and has been deeplyinvolved in many of the most important events in theregions recent history. Now, the importance of thisrelationship has increased, and Jordan has emerged asa vital U.S. ally in the efforts to stabilize Iraq and also

resist violent extremism and terrorism throughout theregion.

Dr. Terrill notes the importance of Jordanian politi-cal reform, but also recommends patience, opposingthe idea of coercing Jordan on democratization issueswhile Amman is currently struggling to cope withsevere refugee and terrorism problems resulting fromthe war in Iraq. He devotes considerable attention tothreats against Jordan emanating from the ongoingterrorist activity and sectarian warfare in Iraq. Dr.Terrill takes an especially close look at the Jordanianprogram to train 50,000 Iraqi police ofcers andalso considers the ongoing role of Jordan in trainingSpecial Operations forces of a variety of friendly Arabcountries. This monograph also considers the broader

implications for the United States and the region if theJordan government is crippled in its ability to functionby spillover problems from Iraq.


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Jordanian differences with Iran, which go backto the 1979 Islamic Revolution, are also considered.

While such differences are serious and have worsenedsince 2003, Jordan remains interested in improvingits relations with Tehran and has sought out areas ofagreement with the Iranian regime. On the Israeli-Palestinian front, Amman is seeking ways to calm theWest Bank and Gaza Strip and serve as advocate ofPalestinian rights while maintaining normal relationswith Israel. A special Jordanian fear is that a possiblePalestinian civil war between the Hamas and Fatahorganizations will create a wave of refugees from thewest just as the crisis in Iraq has led to at least 750,000Iraqi refugees eeing from problems in their country.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offerthis monograph as a contribution to the nationalsecurity debate on this important subject as our nation

continues to grapple with a variety of challengesassociated with the U.S. presence in the Iraq and thelarger Middle East. This analysis should be especiallyuseful to U.S. strategic leaders as they seek to addressthe complicated interplay of factors related to MiddleEastern security issues and the support of local allies.This work may also benet those seeking a greaterunderstanding of the strategic importance of Jordan.We hope this monograph will benet ofcers of allservices, as well as other U.S. government ofcialsvisiting Jordan or the larger Middle East region,and that it will contribute to strengthening the U.S.-Jordanian strategic relationship.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

W. ANDREW TERRILL joined the Strategic StudiesInstitute (SSI) in October 2001, and is the GeneralDouglas MacArthur Professor of National SecurityAffairs. Prior to his appointment, he served as a MiddleEast nonproliferation analyst for the InternationalAssessments Division of the Lawrence LivermoreNational Laboratory (LLNL). In 1998-99, Dr. Terrillalso served as a Visiting Professor at the U.S. Air WarCollege on assignment from LLNL. He is a formerfaculty member at Old Dominion University inNorfolk, Virginia, and has taught adjunct at a varietyof other colleges and universities. He is a retiredU.S. Army Reserve lieutenant colonel and ForeignArea Ofcer (Middle East). Dr. Terrill has published

in numerous academic journals on topics includingnuclear proliferation, the Iran-Iraq War, OperationDESERT STORM, Middle Eastern chemical weapons,ballistic missile proliferation, terrorism, and commandooperations. Since 1994, at U.S. State Departmentinvitation, Dr. Terrill has participated in the MiddleEastern Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS)Track 2 talks, which are part of the Middle East PeaceProcess. He has also served as a member of the militaryand security working group of the Baker/HamiltonIraq Study Group throughout its existence in 2006. Dr.Terrill holds a B.A. from California State PolytechnicUniversity and an M.A. from the University ofCalifornia, Riverside, both in Political Science. He alsoholds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Claremont

Graduate University, Claremont, California.


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SUMMARY

One of the most important and longstandingstrategic relationships for the United States within theArab World has been with Jordan. The value of thisrelationship has increased signicantly since 2003 asthe result of ongoing U.S. difculties in Iraq and thewider Middle East. Jordans longstanding ties with theWest, ongoing counterterrorism efforts, and moderatepolicies toward Iraq and Israel suggest that it maybecome a central target of violent extremism in comingyears. Moreover, Jordans strategic location within theMiddle East (bordering Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia,Iraq, and the Palestinian West Bank territory) makeit an especially attractive target for any revolutionarygroup with region-wide aspirations.

Jordan strongly advised the United States againstits 2003 invasion of Iraq but has, nevertheless, soughtto nd ways to help stabilize Iraqi society after SaddamHusseins ouster from power. Amman has made theseefforts (including a program to train Iraqi police) inpartnership with the United States. Jordans fortuneshave often been linked to events in Iraq, its larger andmore populous neighbor, and the current instability inthat country is of special concern to Amman. The bestpossible Iraqi outcome for Jordan would be the eventualemergence of a stable, pro-Western, pro-Jordanianstate, which effectively integrates Iraqs Sunni Arabsinto the emerging political system. The realization ofthis goal does not appear likely for the foreseeablefuture, but the Jordanians can be expected to support

any reasonable efforts to contain and minimize Iraqiinternal warfare which impacts on them through suchissues as refugee ow from Iraq and increases in cross


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border terrorism and crime. Currently, there are atleast 750,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan.

Ongoing setbacks in Iraqs political reconciliationprocess suggest that stability there may remainproblematic for some time, and that professionalterrorists tempered in the crucible of Iraqi ghtingmay prove a region-wide menace. The Jordaniansare concerned about this process and have denedterrorism as the greatest threat that their country isfacing. They have also intensied efforts at ghtingterrorists including Iraq-based radicals such as the nowdeceased Jordanian criminal turned al Qaeda leader,Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who was hunted down andkilled by U.S. military forces with the aid of Jordanianintelligence. Jordan is also seeking to battle terrorismoutside of its own borders and can be an importantU.S. ally in containing and resisting radicalism

throughout large parts of the region. In this regard,the Jordanian monarchy has often depended upon itshighly professional military and intelligence servicesto help protect the government from both internaland external adversaries. The Jordanian governmenthas for decades encouraged friendly Arab countriesto send ofcers and soldiers to take advantage oftraining opportunities in Jordan. The new U.S.-fundedKing Abdullah II Special Operations Training Centerbuilds on this tradition, and is an important tool in thestruggle against terrorist extremism.

The Jordanians remain deeply suspicious of Iranand view the post-2003 expansion of Iranian politicalinuence with great concern. Iranian inuence in Iraqis a particularly troublesome concern. The Jordanians

are also opposed to the development of an Iraniannuclear weapons option, but publicly oppose an Israelior U.S. military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.


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Amman assumes that the Tehran leadership is rationaland deterrable, and the Jordanians are willing to

make that judgment despite the fact that an Israeli-Iranian nuclear exchange could have catastrophicconsequences for Jordan. The Jordanian leadershipalso continues to stress that its primary regionalconcern is nding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinianconfrontation through ongoing interaction with bothparties. Jordan has worked closely with PalestinianAuthority President Mohammad Abbas, but remainsdeeply suspicious and watchful regarding the activitiesof the Hamas organization which it views as inclinedto unproductive meddling in Jordanian politics.

The value of the U.S.-Jordanian relationship canalso be expected to grow in importance as the UnitedStates moves to withdraw eventually from Iraq. Underthese circumstances, Jordan will continue to seek ways

to address any cross border problems resulting fromthe ongoing conict in Iraq. Likewise, Jordan willcontinue to use its excellent intelligence and militaryservices to wage an unrelenting war on al Qaeda andhelp train friendly Arab forces to do the same. TheUnited States must, therefore, continuously seek to aidJordan in coping with terrorism and other dangers aspart of a Middle East policy that aids moderation andhopes to provide the region with a viable future.


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JORDANIAN NATIONAL SECURITY

AND THE FUTURE OF MIDDLE EAST STABILITY

Many obituaries of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordanhave been prepared for instant use. . . . But it still livesand the obituaries gather dust on the les.

Peter Manseld1

Ill be quite honest with you. Were in a state of war. . . .I hate to say it, but were picking up terrorist groups [ata rate of] one every two weeks.

King Abdullah IIDecember 20042

We see there is great benet of having the King AbdullahII Special Operations Training Center in Jordan and allfriendly counter-terrorism forces from all over the worldcoming to train.

Colonel Maher HalasehProject Director for the developmentof a now-operational, state of the artspecial operations and counterterrorismcenter in Jordan3

Introduction.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is central to thegeopolitics of the Middle East region and borders onSyria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the PalestinianWest Bank. This geography also places the Jordaniansadjacent to two major centers of actual and potentialconict: (1) the Israel-Palestine theater and (2) the

Iraq/Gulf theater. Although it has an importantgeographical position, Jordan is also a relatively small


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country (about the size of Indiana) with only around6 million citizens. It has limited natural resources and

no oil, leaving the Jordanians with uncertain leverageto inuence regional events. To the extent possible,Amman has sought to remain engaged with all of itsneighbors and head off any potential problems beforethey can develop into a crisis. Hostile neighbors can beparticularly problematic for a small country like Jordan,and when considering policy options, the Jordaniansoften draw from their unpleasant experience of severeregional isolation at some key times in the regionshistory. Additionally, throughout its existence, Jordanhas depended heavily on foreign aid to support itsoften fragile economy. In recent years, such aid hasbeen provided by a diversity of donors including Arabstates, the European Union, and especially the UnitedStates.4

The United States and Jordan have maintaineda mutually-supportive and positive relationship fordecades as a result of shared interests in a moderate,prosperous, and stable Middle East. This bilateralrelationship has often been of considerable value toboth nations despite obvious disparities betweenthe two in size and power. The relationship has alsobeen able to survive and overcome various periods ofdisagreement and division such as occurred in 1990-91when Amman was unwilling to join the U.S.-sponsoredUnited Nations coalition to eject Saddam Hussein fromKuwait. In the turbulent post-Saddam era, the future ofJordan can be expected to relate directly to the futurestability of that region, as well as to the possibilities formeaningful U.S.-Arab collaboration. A prosperous and

stable Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan clearly remainsstrongly in U.S. national interests.

Jordans fortunes have often been linked to eventsin its larger and more populous neighbor, Iraq, and the


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current instability in that country is correspondinglyof special concern to Amman. The best possible Iraqi

outcome for Jordan would be the eventual emergenceof a stable, pro-Western, pro-Jordanian state, whicheffectively integrates Iraqs Sunni Arabs into theemerging political system. Reaching such a goal doesnot appear likely for the foreseeable future, but theJordanians can be expected to support any reasonableefforts to contain and minimize Iraqi internal warfarewhich affects them through such issues as refugee owout of Iraq and increases in cross border terrorism andcrime. Conversely, a full-scale Lebanese-style civilwar in Iraq would be a nightmare for Jordan, and theJordanians will need tremendous help in coping withthe consequences should such a catastrophe occur.Under these circumstances, Jordan can either be ahelpless conduit for radical inuence coming out of

Iraq or it can be a wall of resistance halting and perhapshelping to roll back radical advances depending, atleast to some extent, on the support it receives fromthe United States and other allies.

Other challenges that Amman must addressinclude problems with terrorism, the dangers posed byan empowered Iran, and ongoing Israeli-Palestinianand intra-Palestinian difculties. Terrorism is not anew concern for the Jordanians, but new and morevirulent strains will provide a different kind of threat.Additionally, relations between Jordan and Iran havebeen marked by suspicion since the 1979 revolutionand may become even more problematic as the Iraniansextend their inuence into Iraq. Moreover, problemsin the Israeli-Palestinian peace process always have

a ripple effort for Jordan. Correspondingly, theJordanian monarchy will have to be especially adeptat addressing a number of challenges that will require


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wise statesmanship to be combined with reasonableefforts at political modernization and reform.

As the United States copes with ongoing challengesin Iraq and throughout the region, it cannot afford toneglect the interests of its allies along Iraqs bordersincluding Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan.Of these states, Kuwait and Jordan have often beenmost directly inuenced by Iraqi events in previoushistorical eras.5 Jordanian leaders usually display akeen understanding of Iraqi political dynamics becauseof a history of economic and other ties between thetwo states and because Jordans survival has oftendepended heavily on the efciency of its intelligenceservice in assessing and countering threats to regimesurvival. Jordanian views on Iraq are often informedby a solid understanding of Iraqi issues based ona longstanding interest in Baghdads political and

economic actions and are therefore always worthy ofserious consideration. The continuing overlap betweena number of U.S. and Jordanian goals for Iraq and theregion often present a useful backdrop for U.S. foreignpolicy in the Middle East.

Nature of the Jordanian Monarchy.

Jordan was established as a British-supported ad-ministrative entity in 1921 and as a British League of Na-tions Mandate in 1923 in the aftermath of World WarI. It originated as Transjordan, an articial state withlong straight borders and few natural frontiers exceptthe Jordan River, which was used as the boundary withthe Palestinian mandate.6 Transjordan was created out

of the unallocated parts of the Palestinian mandateeast of Jordan River in former territory of the OttomanEmpire on the initiative of key British leaders including


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Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill.7 The UnitedKingdom placed Transjordan under the administration

of Abdullah bin Hussein who was given the title ofemir (usually translated as prince). Emir (later King)Abdullah had been a British ally during World War Iand was viewed by London as a useful partner to helpmaintain its inuence in the region.8 As the rst leaderof Transjordan, Abdullah received a British subsidy foradministration and seeking the loyalties of local tribes.British army ofcers were also sent to Transjordan toprovide the nucleus of a more modern military to becreated from the tribal forces loyal to the new emir.9

Transjordan became formally independent inMay 1946, at which time Abdullah assumed the titleof king. King Abdullah led Transjordan (re-namedthe Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1949) until hisassassination in 1951 in Jerusalem by a Palestinian

gunman.10

Transjordan under Abdullah fought inthe 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war, with its military doingfar better in the ghting than the other Arab forcescommitted to the conict. An Arab-Israeli armisticesigned in April 1949 left the Transjordanians in controlof the eastern part of the city of Jerusalem and the WestBank of the Jordan River. King Abdullah announced theplanned annexation of these regions into his kingdomon October 20, 1949. He also changed the countrysname, and granted full Jordanian citizenship to WestBank Palestinians. No other Arab state recognized thisJordanian annexation as legal, and there were seriousbut unsuccessful efforts to expel Jordan from the ArabLeague for seizing what the other Arab states widelyviewed as Palestinian territory.11 King Abdullah

responded that the area was in danger of being seized bythe Israelis unless it was protected through unicationwith Jordan (which had security ties with the United


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Kingdom). The West Bank, nevertheless, was capturedby the Israelis in the June 1967 Six Day War and, after a

series of diplomatic setbacks, the Jordanians renouncedall legal and administrative ties to this territory infavor of the Palestinians on July 31, 1988. Despite losingthe West Bank and East Jerusalem, more than half ofJordans current population is composed of Jordaniansof Palestinian origin, who dominate the private sectorof the economy.12

Following King Abdullahs assassination, hisson, Prince Talal, became king but proved unable togovern effectively due to deepening schizophrenia.In 1952, Prince Hussein acceded to the throne at age18, replacing his father who sought medical treatmentabroad.13 King Hussein thus began what was to become46 years in power in which the political identity ofmodern Jordan was formed. Throughout his life, King

Husseins foreign policy remained consistently friendlyto the West, involving a special relationship with theUnited Kingdom which after 1956 was overshadowedby ties to the United States.14 Jordan also sought goodrelations with the Arab states but faced consistentproblems with more leftist Arab regimes such asEgypt under President Gamal Abdul Nasser.15 DespiteAmmans participation in the 1967 War, Jordanianrelations with Israel were generally much better thanthose of any other Arab state with the brief exceptionof Egypt, which entered into a 1979 peace treaty withIsrael.16 Jordan, which has a history of strong informalrelations with Israel, established its own peace treatywith the Israelis in October 1994.17 The Jordanianpeace with Israel was often warmer than the Israeli-

Egyptian relationship, involving more economic andpolitical cooperation. When King Hussein attendedthe 1996 funeral of assassinated Israeli Prime Minister


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Yitzhak Rabin, he referred to the Israeli leader as abrother and incurred considerable criticism for doing

so.18

King Hussein died on February 7, 1999, after a long

struggle with cancer, leaving Jordan without the leaderwho had come to epitomize the state. Moreover, in astartling January 1999 revision to the line of succession,Prince Abdullah, the kings oldest son was selectedby King Hussein to become monarch rather than thekings younger brother Hassan ibn Talal who hadbeen crown prince since 1965. This change was madeonly 2 weeks before King Husseins death in apparentresponse to his fear that Hassan would permanentlymove the line of succession to his own branch of thefamily.19 King Abdullah II (hereafter King Abdullah),therefore, unexpectedly assumed the Jordanian throneat the age of 37 after a career as an army ofcer in

which he had risen to the rank of Brigadier General andcommanded the Jordanian Special Forces Brigade.20His formal coronation as king took place on June 9,1999, despite holding actual power since February ofthat year. Although Abdullahs knowledge of militaryand security issues is impressive, his lack of politicalexperience in 1999 and rise to the throne at a relativelyyoung age caused some concerns in Jordan andinternationally. Prince Hassan was widely considereda deputy king who had been groomed to be head ofstate for over 30 years.21 The sudden change of planscould have caused serious problems in a number ofother Arab countries, but the Hashemites would notallow a dynastic issue to become violent or even tobe aggressively disputed in public. Since the startling

events of 1999, Prince Hassan has continued to livein Jordan and has made a special effort to displayhis continuing loyalty and subordination to King


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Abdullah. He has publicly stated that he believes thatprimogeniture is the right of the head of state in the

Hashemite context and that Abdullahs successionwas in a sense a return to normalcy.22

In an assessment that would be difcult fora knowledgeable person to dispute, author AlanGeorge maintains that, King Abdullah presents notso much as a monarch but as an approachable, plainspeaking, down to earth and even slightly self-effacingprofessional army ofcer.23 Some of his critics like tosuggest that Abdullah spoke English better than Arabicin his initial public addresses as king.24If so, his problemswith formal spoken Arabic were rapidly overcome,although King Abdullah has clearly experienced a closerelationship with the West in a region where such tiesare sometimes looked upon with suspicion. In additionto having a British mother, the king received much

of his early education in the United Kingdom (at theSaint Edmonds School in Hindhead) and the UnitedStates (at two schools in Deereld, Massachusetts). Asa young man, Abdullah was admitted to the UnitedKingdoms Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst andupon graduation commissioned as a second lieutenantin the Jordanian Army.25 He was then seconded to aBritish Army unit for a tour of duty as a Reconnais-sance Troop Leader serving in both England andwhat was then West Germany. 26

King Abdullah came to power while Jordan wasmourning a leader known to be a giant of Arab politicsand diplomacy. Unable to move directly into his fathersrole as a major regional and international politicalgure, King Abdullah focused on more prosaic but

nevertheless vital economic goals. This was probablyan unavoidable choice since in 1999 around a third ofthe national budget was taken up by repayments on a


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$6.8 billion foreign debt, and approximately one-thirdof the population was living below the poverty line.27

Independent sources estimated that unemploymentran as high as 27 percent in the same time frame.28 Inaddressing these concerns, King Abdullah has been anadvocate of what he calls Jordan First policies whichinclude a special emphasis on improving the economicwelfare of Jordanian citizens.29 The king has stated thatthroughout his career in the Army, he encounteredJordanian soldiers who sought out military service as away to escape from oppressing and often rural poverty.30He maintains that he wishes to make a difference onthis issue for reasons of personal compassion as wellas regime stability.

The Jordan First approach appears to denepriorities in a way that allows the king to more easily justify Jordans cooperation with the West and its

willingness to continue normal relations with Israel (tothe extent domestic and regional conditions permit).It has also been viewed by critics as a way for Jordanto distance itself from regional problems involving thePalestinians and Iraqis. President Bashar Assad of Syriain a March 12, 2006, statement suggested that sucha slogan is a separation from the Arab [identity] andpan-Arab nationalism.31 He also stated that rstslogans effectively mean that the United States, Israel,or any other non-Arab country comes second.32 The Jordanian leadership hotly denies this interpretationof its policies, and Syrian-Jordanian relations werestrained for some time after Assad made his comments,although they had improved signicantly by 2007.33

King Abdullahs westernized outlook appears to

have been reinforced by the values he developed as amodern military leader including a focus on discipline,efciency, and organization. Consequently, King


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Abdullahs approach to leadership has sometimescaused problems in his interaction with Jordanian tribal

leaders. Some such leaders have reportedly complainedthat he is abrupt and has lost touch with tribal customsand traditional values.34 King Abdullah starts andends meetings on time, which is not always viewed asappropriately respectful by more traditional Jordanianleaders. The kings patience for time-consumingsocial events which help bind the tribal leaders tothe monarchy is also much more limited than that ofhis father. Some tribal leaders have reportedly beenhopeful that Abdullah might eventually be replacedby his younger brother, Prince Hamza. Hamza becamecrown prince in 1999 when Abdullah became king, butwas removed from this position in late 2004.35 Hamzabears a much stronger physical resemblance to KingHussein than does Abdullah, and he seems to have a

similar personality and manner. Rather opaquely, KingAbdullah explained his decision to remove Hamzafrom the role of crown prince by suggesting that theposition of crown prince was an encumbrance in hisperformance of other duties.

The overwhelming signicance of the monarchyin Jordanian political life, and especially the longtimereign of King Hussein, is a vital component of the Jordanian national identity, even among Jordaniansof Palestinian origin. Moreover, Jordan has often hadmuch better and less repressive government than manyof the other states in the region. The security services,while efcient and tough, are not a notable presencein the everyday life of ordinary citizens. Despite thissuccess, the Jordanian leadership is aware that the

current political system cannot continue indenitelywithout greater political reform and more democraticinput. Consequently, the challenge of opening the


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political system, while avoiding the dangers of doingthis in a hurried, poorly-planned, or sloppy manner, is

one of Jordans greatest contemporary challenges.

The Modern Jordanian State and the Issuesof Governance and Opposition.

The Jordanian monarchy dominates the state butalso considers itself to be modernizing and reformist.Some foreign observers view Jordanian political reformas little more than an exercise in image managementby the ruling elite, but this interpretation is a seriousoversimplication.36 Although the Jordanian leadershipis concerned about how the regime is viewed bythe West and other sources of foreign aid, carefullymanaged and halting political reform in Jordan is partof an overall strategy of meeting public expectations to

ensure regime survival. Such reform tends to expandduring times of economic discontent but contractwhen the government is seeking to implement whatit views as essential but unpopular policies such asthe 1994 Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty and variousforms of Israeli-Jordanian cooperative behavior basedupon that treaty. Additionally, Jordanian leadersare currently interested in underscoring an image asdemocratic reformers in order to avoid running afoulof the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), U.S. demandsfor increased democracy in the Middle East. UnlikeSaudi Arabia and Egypt, the Jordanians have managedto deect most U.S. media and other U.S. criticism bystressing their interest in reform and by serving as anespecially important partner in efforts to stabilize the

Middle East during its current era of turbulence.37Jordans most democratic institution is the

Parliament which was created in its modern form by


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the 1952 Constitution, although there have been earlierparliaments (which have sometimes been dissolved

for signicant periods of time) as far back as 1929.The current Parliaments lower house is elected andincludes 110 (formerly 80, then 105) members who holdofce for a 4-year term. The Upper House is appointedby the king and has 55 members. The Parliament waseventually suspended and temporarily replaced with aNational Consultative Council in the aftermath of theJune 1967 Arab-Israeli War when Israel seized controlof the West Bank.38 The Jordanian leadership resortedto this expediency because it was not prepared to holdelections with the West Bank under Israeli occupation.It was also unwilling to conduct East Bank-onlyelections, which might have appeared too acceptingof the Israeli occupation of what Amman then viewedas Jordanian land. This reason for reluctance about

elections disappeared when King Hussein severedlegal and administrative ties with the West Bankin 1983. After a hiatus of over 22 years, Jordan heldparliamentary elections in 1989 achieving a 70 percentturnout.39

Jordanian democratic and economic reform madesignicant strides from 1989 until 1994. Reform sloweddown in 1994 as a result of King Husseins decisionto implement several unpopular policies which he feltwere necessary for the countrys well-being. Thesenew courses of action could be reasonably expected togarner intense opposition in any sort of strengthenedParliament elected under more democratic election lawsthan those in place at that time. The most controversialof these policies was the establishment of the Israeli-

Jordanian Peace Treaty signed in the presence ofU.S. President Bill Clinton in October 1994. Anotherunpopular policy change was the progressive hardening


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of Jordanian policies toward Saddam Husseins Iraqafter the 1991 Gulf War.40 In the short-term aftermath of

the 1991 ghting, the Jordanians limited their criticismof Saddam due to widespread public sympathy forthe defeated Iraqis and because Amman was not yetcertain of the long-term consequences of antagonizingits larger neighbor. This situation had changed by 1996when the Jordanian government granted asylum toSaddams defecting sons-in-law, Lieutenant GeneralHussein Kamil and Lieutenant Colonel Saddam Kamil,and their families. The Hussein Kamil defection wasespecially serious since he was the former Minister ofIndustry and Military Industrialization (MIMI) andbegan providing some of Iraqs most sensitive militarysecrets to United Nations (UN) ofcials investigatingSaddams weapons of mass destruction (WMD)program.41

In assessing the viability of Jordans parliament,it is also important to consider the issue of politicalparties. Jordan has over 30 political parties, most ofwhich are small and inconsequential. These partiescame into existence following the passage of the 1992Political Parties Act.42 Some Jordanians appear reluctantto become involved with political parties out of aconcern that the government views political activityand activism unfavorably.43 The concern is often mostpronounced among the many Jordanians who workin public sector jobs. The most notable exception tothis trend involves members of the Islamic ActionFront (IAF), which is Jordans only important politicalparty at the present time. The IAF is the political armof the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood

and serves as the major opposition party to manygovernment policies including support for U.S. effortsin Iraq and the continuation of normal relations with


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Israel. It takes pride in identifying itself as a loyalopposition.44 It also has the potential to strengthen,

while some of the smaller parties may be forced todissolve under a new more stringent law that requiresa political party to achieve some minimal indicators ofviability in order to enter the electoral process. Theserequirements include a minimum number of 500founding members, with members drawn from at least5 of the countrys 12 governorates.45 The smaller partiesare calling upon the king to seek the revocation of thisnew, tougher version of the political parties law.46

The Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhoodwas established in Amman in 1945.47 Throughout itshistory, the Brotherhood in Jordan has been willingto tolerate or even support the Hashemite monarchyand was often opposed to groups that constituted amuch more serious threat to the throne. In the 1950s

and 1960s, the Islamists were a useful counterweight toleftist Arab nationalists opposed to the monarchy andPalestinian nationalists who wanted to overthrow theHashemite government in order to wage war againstIsrael without the constraints imposed by the Jordanianleadership.48 The government was therefore often moreinterested in co-opting rather than suppressing thoseIslamists who did not show an interest in overthrowingthe monarchy. The Muslim Brotherhood had relativelygood relations with King Hussein at various points intime such as the 1960s when traditional forces seemedto be under assault by republican leaders such as thoseof Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Egyptian President Nassersanti-Jordanian rhetoric also coincided nicely with hisunyielding campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood

in Egypt, helping to push both sides towards each other.On at least one occasion in the 1960s, the Jordaniangovernment and the Islamists cooperated to organize


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an Amman demonstration protesting the Nassergovernments repression of the Egyptian Muslim

Brotherhood as well as the execution of several of itsmembers.49

Following a decision to outlaw political parties in a1957 crackdown on anti- government activity, JordansMuslim Brotherhood was seldom seriously repressedbecause it was not generally viewed as subversive.Thus, the organizational foundation for the IAFssuccess was set during the time frame when the MuslimBrotherhood grew and developed, while competingopposition movements faced serious harassment by thesecurity forces. When parties were legalized once againin September 1992, the Brotherhood was consequentlywell-prepared to use the IAF to ll the former politicalvoid and establish itself as the leading Jordanianparty.50 The IAF was also one of the primary vehicles

for expressing public discontent over the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty and the subsequent normalizationeffort. Unfortunately, for the Islamists, the IAF lost 6seats out of 22 in the 1993 elections due to new electorallaws and vigorous government restrictions of politicalactivity imposed in the aftermath of the Madrid peacetalks with Israel, which the IAF opposed.51 It boycottedthe 1997 elections because of constricting electoralrules, but in 2003 it ran 30 candidates and won 17 seatsin the expanded 110-seat lower house.52

The IAFs emergence as Jordans dominantopposition party has often been viewed with alarmwithin Western circles due to its opposition to theWest and Israel as well as various extreme statementsand actions by some of its members (such as when two

IAF members of Parliament paid their respects at afuneral service for Abu Musab Zarqawi as discussedlater in this monograph). While such concerns are


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reasonable, the regime sees a strong positive side topolitical participation by the Muslim Brotherhood and

the IAF. In particular, these groups have provideda credible, nonviolent political opposition that hastraditionally defended and been loyal to Hashemiterule.53 The viability of the Muslim Brotherhood hasoccasionally undercut the rise of much more radicalIslamic opposition groups such as the LiberationParty which was outlawed in 1956 and severelyrepressed thereafter.54 Additionally, the IAF appearsto be handicapped by factionalism. Thus, ironically,the Jordanian political system may work best for theregime when the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF arelegal but never quite strong enough to gain real power.These groups naturally have no interest in playing thisgovernment-scripted role indenitely. Instead, forthe last decade, the IAF has used legislative action,

boycotts of some elections, charges of rigged votingprocedures, and appeals to international organizationsand the world media as ways to pressure the Jordaniangovernment to open up the system and give them aserious opportunity to share power indenitely. 55

The Jordanian opposition has frequently com-plained about the press and election laws being de-signed to ensure the dominance of pro-governmentforces in Parliament. The ways in which the governmentdraws Parliamentary districts has often been a particularsource of opposition concerns since traditional pro-monarchy rural districts are over-represented at theexpense of urban areas that are often the strongholdsof Islamist power. 56 Tribal candidates can also workaround bans on electioneering before the appointed

time by owery media descriptions of how and whya particular tribal candidate was chosen to run forpublic ofce. In 1997 this disagreement reached an


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impasse, and the IAF chose to boycott parliamentaryelections. They have periodically threatened to repeat

this tactic but have only occasionally done so. In July2007 the IAF announced that it was boycotting localelections, but the government said it was too late forsuch a decision and the names of IAF candidates whohad led remained on the ballot.57

There are also occasional delays in elections dueto regional and domestic problems. In recent years,King Abdullah dissolved the Parliament in June 2001and announced plans for new elections in November2001.58 Partially because of the crisis in Middle Eastpolitics that began on 9/11, these elections did not takeplace as scheduled. A new election was held in June2003. About two-thirds of the delegates elected to thelower house were pro-establishment supporters of theKing. Of the 30 seats it contested in the elections, 17

went to the IAF.59

In addition to the IAF members, alimited number of independent Islamists were alsoelected in 2003. Most Jordanian parliaments tend tobe dominated by tribal candidates and other strongsupporters of the kings policies who invariably dowell. While charges that the electoral rules have beendesigned to favor such candidates are correct, theirstrength also has a great deal to do with the enduringimportance of tribal and family ties in locking invotes. Ofcials of the IAF have told the Jordanianmedia that they are very aware that they cannotdisplace the power of the tribes.60 Most recently,the king dissolved the Parliament in August 2007 inpreparation for new elections.61 Problems between themonarchy and the IAF were already at a high point

when this announcement was made, and the IAFdangled the possibility that they would again boycottthese elections. In late September the Islamists backed


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away from this threat despite [what they called] aplethora of good reasons to boycott the election.62

The Jordanians and Saddams Iraq.

Iraq was created by the British from formerOttoman territory after World War I under a League ofNations mandate in a process similar to the creationof Jordan. Iraq, however, contained a much morediverse population by ethnicity and Islamic sect thandid Jordan.63 Emir Abdullahs brother Feisal, who hadinitially been placed on the throne of Syria, was drivenfrom that country by the French and subsequentlyaccepted a British invitation to become the king ofIraq (subject to a well-managed referendum of theIraqi public).64 Relations between Iraq and Jordanremained cordial so long as both countries were

ruled by Hashemite monarchies through the mandateperiod and after formal independence. The situationchanged with the overthrow of Iraqs Hashemitemonarchy in a bloody 1958 coup during which KingHusseins friend and cousin, 23-year-old King Feisal IIwas murdered.65 This turn of events quickly poisonedthe Iraqi-Jordanian relationship, and Brigadier AbdulKarim Qassim, the Iraqi coup leader, was referred toby Jordanian leaders as the new Hulagu after theMongol leader who sacked Baghdad in 1258, and thusbecame a central villain in Arab history.66 Despite theseproblems, Jordanian political isolation was so seriousin this time frame that diplomatic relations with Iraqwere reestablished in October 1960.67

Restored Iraqi-Jordanian ties did not lead to

normal relations between the two countries, but thepropaganda war between Amman and Baghdadended as both nations struggled to cope with more


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serious subversive threats from Egypt. Iraqi-Jordanianrelations also did not improve substantially under a

series of Iraqi governments that took power sequen-tially following Qassims February 1963 assassination.When a Baathist coup (the second since 1963) tookplace on July 17, 1968, there seemed little reason toexpect an improvement in Jordanian-Iraqi relationsover that of previous post-Qassim regimes. It was alsounclear if the new regime would remain in powerlong enough to establish a stable foreign policy beforethe Iraqi political system generated a new coup.Nevertheless, this regime was eventually to displayan unusual degree of durability. Unlike the 1963 IraqiBaath regime, which survived less than a year, thisnew government was to display considerably morelongevity due mostly to the efciency, pragmatism,and brutal ruthlessness of one of its rising leaders, the

hard-working and security-minded Saddam Hussein.Jordanian relations with Iraqs second Iraqi Baath

regime did not start out well, but improved dramaticallyin the late 1970s as Iraq attempted to assert a leadershiprole in the Arab World following Egypts ostracism overits 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Saddam Hussein, whowas by then the de facto strongman of Iraq and about tobecome president, made his rst visit to Jordan in 1979,and Iraq provided some limited aid to Jordan followingthat visit.68 This aid, along with other Arab support,was designed to enable Jordan to resist U.S. pressureto involve itself in the Camp David process on termsmost of the Arab World did not consider acceptable.The real turning point for Jordanian-Iraqi relations,nevertheless, occurred in the early stages of the 1980-

88 Iran-Iraq War. Jordan, like the United States, wasdeeply concerned that Tehran would defeat the Iraqisand emerge from the victory more empowered to


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export its radical ideology throughout the Middle East.Iraq, for its part, was interested in rapidly improving

its relations with Jordan for a variety of reasons relatedto the war effort against Iran.

During the course of the war, Iraqs few ports cameunder repeated air attack from Iran, and the Jordanianport of Aqaba became an indispensable point ofentry for military supplies that were then transportedoverland by truck to Iraq.69 King Hussein also made astrong effort to convince Saudi Arabia and the otherArab Gulf countries to support Baghdad as the onlyavailable bulwark against Khomeinism. Jordan senta handful of volunteers to participate in noncombatmilitary missions, and Jordanian generals may haveconsulted with Iraqi senior ofcers about war strategy.70When the Iran-Iraq war ended in summer 1988, Jordanwas one of Baghdads closest allies. Two years later, this

comfortable arrangement became a serious problem asAmman faced a major foreign policy crisis resultingfrom Saddam Husseins unexpected and recklessinvasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

Jordan condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,but it also opted to remain outside of the U.S.-ledmultinational coalition against Saddam Hussein,instead urging a peaceful solution to the crisis. ManyJordanians, particularly Palestinian-Jordanians, viewedSaddam as an Arab champion willing to stand up to theWest and to Israel. Additionally, Jordanian economicties to Iraq were important for keeping Ammanseconomy aoat. In a particularly useful observation,Marc Lynch has noted that, with the exception ofKuwait and Iraq, no state was more deeply affected

or directly threatened by the 1990-91 Gulf crisis thanJordan.71 Prior to the invasion, Jordan had enjoyedexcellent relations with Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and


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the United States. Now Jordan tried without success tond a formula to avoid war and continue acceptable

relations with Iraq and at least some of its adversaries.The mutually exclusive demands of Baghdad and theU.S.-led coalition nevertheless made such compromiseimpossible. After war broke out on January 16, 1991, theking continued efforts to work with all parties to endthe conict, and on February 6, he made a particularlytough speech denouncing U.S. policy toward Iraq.This speech followed the U.S. destruction of Jordanianfuel trucks mistaken for military targets enteringIraq through the Amman-Baghdad highway.72 In hisremarks, King Hussein condemned the war and calledfor a renewed effort to seek a diplomatic solution. Thekings harsh tone was widely viewed as excessivelypro-Saddam in the West and Saudi Arabia.

Jordan maintained acceptable economic relations

with Iraq following the 1991 war, although Saddamspost-1991 status as an international outlaw preventedthe restoration of friendly pre-war political relations.73 Jordan continued to receive some free and the restsubsidized oil from the Baghdad regime in return forongoing trade relations in other commodities duringBaghdads period of regional and global isolation. Justprior to the U.S.-led 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iraqis werepurchasing around $500 million in Jordanian goodsannually.74 The Jordanian trucking industry dependedgreatly on Jordanian-Iraqi trade which involved food,medicine, and other humanitarian goods allowedunder the UN embargo of Iraq.75 The United Statesdid not oppose such Jordanian-Iraqi economic tiesand instead chose to understand Ammans continuing

economic problems and especially the need to obtainoil wherever it could be found. The Jordanian-Iraqioil and trade agreements were also never challenged


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by the UN sanctions committee which ofcially tooknote of the transactions, with language that was

widely regarded as tacit approval.76

Not surprisingly,the Jordanian government asserted that they met therequirements of all pertinent UN resolutions, and theirtrade agreements with Iraq were therefore legal.77

As noted earlier in this monograph, theimplementation of a new and harder line Jordanianpolitical policy towards Iraq is most usefully dated toAugust 1995, when King Hussein granted asylum toHussein Kamal and Saddam Kamil, the defecting sons-in-law of Saddam Hussein.78 This policy of movingaway from Iraq was not popular with the Jordanianpublic, but King Hussein viewed such actions asessential to restore good relations with the UnitedStates and Saudi Arabia. The suffering of Iraqi citizensunder UN sanctions was well-known to the Jordanian

public, and many blamed the United States ratherthan Saddam for the continuation of such sanctionsfor years after the war. Moreover, many Jordaniansdid not view Saddam as totally lacking in redeemingqualities. In particular, Saddams continuing pro-Palestinian rhetoric was often well-received by largeportions of the Jordanian public and especially thoseof Palestinian origin. Moreover, Iraqi payments to thefamilies of Palestinian suicide bombers killed in attacksagainst Israel were viewed as a humanitarian gestureby signicant elements within the Jordanian public.By contrast, most Israelis and Americans viewed suchpayments as an incitement to murder.79

In the lead up to the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion ofIraq, King Abdullah strongly urged the United States

not to go to war, warning of a potential post-invasioncivil war that could spread to involve Iraqs neighbors,including Jordan.80 U.S. political leaders were not


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dissuaded and instead sought Jordanian support fortough anti-Saddam policies that would culminate in

the 2003 invasion. In noting the importance of the U.S.pressure Jordan was experiencing, former ForeignMinister Jawad Anani stated that Jordan has learnedthe hard way from the previous war, and this timehis Majesty believes Jordan should not be exposed toanother bitter experience.81 The Jordanian leadershipalso saw the pre-war time frame as a particularly badpoint to antagonize the United States. In addition tothe concerns noted above, the Jordanians seemed tofear that the United States intended to install AhmadChalabi as the new leader in Iraq or that he wouldat least play a highly prominent role in Iraqs future.This type of development would have been a seriousproblem for the Jordanians since their relations withChalabi were abysmal following the failure of the

Chalabi-controlled Jordanian-based Petra bank.82

Thisinstitution collapsed in a scandal costing Jordanianstockholders and investors around $1 billion. Chalabiwas convicted in absentia of embezzlement by aJordanian Court and sentenced to 20 years in prison.83While the Jordanians would almost certainly havemade efforts to improve their relations with Chalabihad he taken power in Iraq, such an effort would havebeen long and painful, with no guarantee of success.

The U.S.-led war against Iraq began in March2003. Three days after the U.S. launched its attack, Jordan expelled ve Iraqi diplomats, accusing themof espionage. One of the Iraqis was further accusedof being involved in a foiled terrorist attack withinJordan.84 Jordan also allowed a limited and temporary

U.S. and possibly British military deployment onits soil in 2003 for participation in the war. The U.S.presence has been conrmed by Ambassador L. Paul


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Bremer in his memoirs,My Year in Iraq.85 In describingthis relationship, Bremer stated that Jordan, had

helped us considerably during the invasion, allowingCoalition Special Operations forces to operate from itsterritory, although he does not mention numbers.86Former Central Command Commander GeneralTommy Franks has stated, We ooded Western Iraqwith hundreds of special operators [from Jordan] tosecure the Scud elds.87 In Cobra II, Michael Gordonand retired U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant GeneralBernard Trainor stated that the United States and Jordan engaged in lengthy negotiations over thenumbers and types of U.S. forces to be stationed inJordan to support the hostilities. Gordon and Trainorsuggest the eventual agreed upon troop strength was5,000 U.S. soldiers, down from a U.S. request to put14,000 troops in the kingdom.88 This number would

have included Patriot air defense missile crews as wellas the troops General Franks describes above. Priorto the war, both Amman and Washington publiclyacknowledged that Patriot systems had been sent to Jordan to safeguard that country against attacks byIraqs suspected surface-to-surface missiles, includingScuds. 89 A missile defense network set up in such away could also be used to protect Israel, a much morelikely target had Saddam been able to retain some sortof residual Scud missile capability (which proved notto be the case).

Shortly after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there werelarge anti-American demonstrations in Amman andother Jordanian cities. Tens of thousands of Jordaniansdemonstrated peacefully in these events.90 On some

occasions, there were also short-lived riots and clasheswith the police. Angry antiwar reporting by the Jordanian media was permitted and, in combination


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with other Arab news outlets, threatened to increasedomestic anger over Jordans ties to the West. Under

these circumstances, it appeared possible that theregime might have felt the eventual need for a harshcrackdown to control the potential for increasedviolence on the street.91 The rapid defeat of Iraqiconventional forces and the fall of Baghdad wereconsequently viewed with relief in Amman. Despitetheir previous warnings of possible Iraqi civil war, atleast some Jordanians now viewed the worst dangersassociated with the war to be over. Nevertheless,early decisions by coalition authorities worried theJordanians, including the dissolution of the Iraqi armyand the sweeping process of de-Baathication.92

After the 2003 ouster of Saddam Hussein, KingAbdullah gave Saddams daughters, Raghdad andRana, and their nine children refuge in Jordan, despite

the womens continued public defense of their fathersactions.93 Since neither daughter was complicit inSaddam Husseins crimes, this decision on asylumwas presented to the world as a reasonable act of Arabchivalry, despite some Iraqi anger over the decision.94Saddam oldest daughter, Raghdad, nevertheless,became more controversial in 2007 when the Iraqigovernment requested her extradition for allegedlyproviding funds to the insurgency in Iraq.95 TheJordanians showed no interest in such an extraditionand tended to view the Iraqi justice system as hopelesslybiased against Sunni Arabs. 96 This evaluation is notunreasonable, and allowing the Iraqi justice system toarrest Raghdad would have been deeply unpopularamong Jordanians.97 In an interpretation that often

disturbs Westerners, some ordinary Jordanian citizens(and various other Sunni Muslims) viewed theexecution of Saddam Hussein as an act of pro-Iranian


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Shiite revenge against an Arab nationalist leader ratherthan the long overdue punishment of a murderous

tyrant.98

The Future of Jordanian-Iraqi Relations.

As Iraqs post-Saddam era unfolds, Jordanianleaders cannot avoid being haunted by the possibleemergence of either a hostile Iraq or an Iraq in chaos. Ineither of these cases, a dramatic increase in terrorismand cross border crime would almost certainly becomemajor problems. Moreover, Jordanian-Iraqi trade couldbe expected to collapse in both of these cases. TheJordanians are also concerned that a chaotic Iraq wouldcontinue to produce waves of refugees in addition to theapproximately 750,000 Iraqis who have already ed toJordan at the time of this writing. Jordan probably has

a stronger stake in a stable, united, and prosperous Iraqthan any other Arab state except Kuwait. To the extentpossible, Amman has therefore consistently supportedU.S., international, and Iraqi efforts to achievethese goals. Both before and after Operation IRAQIFREEDOM, Iraq was Jordans most important exportmarket.99 Currently, U.S. and international contractorswith business in Iraq often stay at Jordanian hotels,and the Jordanian port of Aqaba is extremely busywith imports to be sent to Iraq.100 In keeping with thiscontinuing involvement with Iraq, Jordan was the rstArab country to appoint a fully accredited ambassadorto Iraq, doing so in August 2006.101

Although Jordan is deeply interested in a stabilizedIraq, it has remained unwilling to send combat forces

there in the absence of a larger Arab effort. Such a movehas remained too sensitive regionally and domesticallyfor Jordan to implement while other Arab nations are


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refusing to do so. The Jordanians did, nevertheless,transfer military equipment, including armored

vehicles, to the new Iraqi army that was formed inthe aftermath of Saddams removal from power.102While most of this equipment was comprised of oldersystems being phased out of the Jordanian inventory,it was still useful to the Iraqis since they were criticallyshort of armored vehicles for use by the new army.After Saddams ouster, some Iraqi military ofcers alsoreceived training in Jordan, including those forming thenucleus of Iraqs new air force. 103 The Jordanian Armyalso established an Army eld hospital in Fallujah inthe immediate aftermath of Saddams ouster.104 Sadly,the Jordanians serving in this unit faced insurgentattacks early in the post-Saddam era despite their statusas Arabs, Sunni Muslims, and humanitarian medicalpersonnel.105

More signicantly, King Abdullah made aSeptember 29, 2003, offer to train 30,000 Iraqi police,with this number subsequently adjusted upwardto 35,000.106 These police candidates were given an8-week course in police skills and procedures inclasses of 1,500 at the Jordanian International PoliceTraining Center near the village of Mawaqqar, 20miles east of Amman.107 The chief U.S. Administratorin Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, called this effort the worldslargest police training program, and the UnitedStates quickly agreed to provide funding for theprogram.108 About 50,000 police cadets were trained atthis facility from 2004 until 2007, thus exceeding theinitial projections for the numbers to be trained underthe program.109 The nal class of Iraqi police cadets

graduated in summer 2007, although limited numbersof Iraqi police candidates may still receive specializedtraining in Jordan. Otherwise, Iraqi police training has


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transitioned to facilities inside Iraq.110 Jordanian policetrainers continue to be involved in the training program

despite the change in location.111

Additionally, theMawaqqar facility remained in use for some monthsafter the departure of the police classes, although itsmission changed to the training of Iraqi prison guards,as will be discussed later in this monograph.

While the police training program was valuable inproviding police skills and instilling professionalism,this effort was not enough to reform and rebuild anefcient and professional Iraqi police force in the shortterm.112 The January 2005 election of highly sectarianleaders in Iraq complicated police professionalization,since various internal security gures sought to bringtheir favored militiamen into the interior ministry.Militiamen associated with the most importantShiite political parties were consequently favored for

admission into the Interior Ministry police forces in anumber of instances, despite a lack of police training.113Once Jordanian-trained recruits returned fromMawaqqar, they were often caught up in problemsassociated with the militia power struggle for controlof the police. The recruits were often resocializedinto patterns of choosing sectarian loyalties overprofessionalism if they were hired and then retained forpolice service at all (which some were not).114 Efforts atreform may eventually roll back this practice to someextent, although the ultimate value of the Jordaniantraining program remains uncertain. If the Iraqi policesystem remains problematic, it will apparently do sobecause of the divisive nature of Iraqi politics ratherthan for any shortcomings attributable to the Jordanian

training program.In addition to its concerns about Iraqi instability,

the Jordanian government has shown a consistentapprehension over the fate of Iraqs Sunni Arabs.115


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Any Jordanian efforts to support Iraqs Sunnis andpresent their concerns to the international community

are especially well-received by the Jordanian public.To these ends, Amman has attempted to advise theUnited States on ways to reduce tensions with IraqsSunni Arabs. These measures have included urgingthe United States to reach out to Sunni leaders andlongstanding efforts to convince the United Statesto ease the de-Baathication process, which many Jordanians view as vindictive and anti-Sunni.116 The Jordanian leadership also meets with some of IraqsSunni Arab leaders including tribal leaders who haveties to Jordanian tribes.117 Under some circumstances, Jordan might also be expected to approach IraqsShiite dominated government to express concerns itholds about the treatment of Iraqi Sunni Arabs.

As noted earlier, mainstream Islamists who do not

engage in terrorism are an important force in Jordan,and organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhoodand the IAF have serious followings. In the event ofan Iraqi civil war, these groups will undoubtedlysympathize with Sunni Iraqis and will pressure theJordanian government to at least passively support theactions of these types of individuals. The prestige ofJordans Islamic organizations would also rise due totheir vociferous opposition to U.S. policy, which theywould blame for any Iraqi civil war and possibly forcreating the conditions that led to any atrocities byShiite organizations attacking Iraqi Sunnis. Main-stream Islamists could become a much more seriousdomestic center of political power and could perhapsconstrain the ability of the monarchy to conduct the

pro-Western foreign policy with which it is mostcomfortable. King Abdullahs continuing efforts toappear optimistic about Iraqs future may be related tothis dynamic.


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Quite apart from security issues, Jordan hopesto receive a reliable supply of discounted Iraqi oil

once again, and has received encouraging signsfrom the Iraqi government on this issue.118 Jordanianhopes for consistent near-term shipments of oil fromIraq nevertheless appear problematic despite suchencouragement. On September 4, 2007, somewhatgratuitously, the Iraqi Ambassador to Jordan statedthat ongoing violence in his country could delay someplanned shipments of oil for an unspecied amountof time.119 Yet, this reality has not clearly ended thepossibility of a steady oil supply from Iraq. On anespecially encouraging note, the rst shipment of Iraqioil sent to Jordan in 4 years arrived on September 30,2007. The shipment consisted of eight oil trucks whichwere loaded in Kirkuk and delivered their cargo toJordans Zarqa oil renery.120

The Iraqi Refugee Issue.

One of the most important issues dominatingcontemporary Iraqi-Jordanian relations concerns Iraqirefugees who have sought asylum in Jordan to escapefrom the ongoing warfare in their own country. Asof late 2007, there were at least 2.4 million refugeeswho had ed Iraq for various sanctuaries abroad, aswell as around 2 million internally displaced Iraqis.121 Jordan traditionally has been welcoming to Iraqis,and around 400,000 Iraqis were living there just priorto the invasion.122 This gure had swelled to between700,000 and one million by mid-2007.123 In May 2007,King Abdullah stated that the number was around

750,000, but this was basically an informed guess thatis now dated.124 The only country hosting more Iraqirefugees than Jordan is Syria, with over one million


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Iraqi expatriates within its borders.125 In autumn 2007,Damascus dramatically toughened the regulations that

limit Iraqis from entering Syria.126

Following Saddams fall, a signicant number of

the earliest refugees with some skills or resources wereable to enter Jordan. In particular, large elements of theIraqi middle class and many wealthy Iraqis chose to livein Jordan rather than remain in their homeland underthe exceptionally dangerous post-2003 conditions.127These people had the economic means to ee, andchose to do so. Additionally, many prosperous Iraqiprofessionals also ed because they and their familieshad become kidnapping targets for lawless elementsseeking high ransoms.128 Some of the Iraqis in Jordanwould like to immigrate to Europe, Canada, orelsewhere, but the overwhelming majority of thosethat are interested in migrating to a third country have

been unable to do so.129

Around 30,000 Iraqi refugeeshave been given UN asylum seekers documents, butmost have been unable to nd another country toaccept them. To complicate matters further, Iraqis whoreceive such documentation are no longer eligible fora Jordanian work permit that allows them to engagein lawful employment in Jordan.130 Thus, they waitand sometimes work without permits and the legalprotection that accompanies such documentation.131

The inux of Iraqi refugees is often viewed asresponsible for major distortions in the Jordanianeconomy. Housing has become a particularly seriousproblem, and the cost of rent has risen dramatically inmany instances.132 This change has occurred becauseof increased demand for housing and also because of

widespread real estate speculation spurred by the inuxof Iraqis.133 The problems with housing costs come atan unfortunate time for less prosperous Jordanianssince the price of gasoline and petroleum products


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has also continued to rise due to the loss of some freeoil from the Saddam regime with the rest of the oil

imported from Iraq at subsidized rates.134

The effectsof the refugee inux are not all negative, however,since spending by wealthier and middle class Iraqishave tended to prop up the hotel, restaurant, and otherservice industries. Some economists further suggestthat the impact of Iraqi refugees on the economy hasbeen exaggerated, and that the dramatic escalations inprices are more attributable to other factors and mostespecially the dramatic escalation in the price of oilimports for Jordan since 2003.135

Iraqi refugees have also placed a strain on the abilityof the Jordanian government to provide public servicesand most notably education. Until August 2007, onlyIraqis holding residency permits were allowed toenroll in public schools. This policy was then changed

in response to humanitarian concerns, and all Iraqichildren became eligible for free public education inJordan.136 Jordanian Ministry of Education ofcialsinitially projected that the reforms would allow around50,000 Iraqi students to enter the educational systemat all grades, in addition to the 14,000 Iraqis that hadalready been incorporated into Jordanian schools.137These numbers did not immediately materialize.Preliminary estimates suggest that only 8,000-10,000additional Iraqi children were registered for school,although more are expected to be forthcoming.138Iraqi children will receive all of the same privileges asJordanian children, including meals provided under theSchool Nutrition Program.139 In August 2007, the UnitedStates announced that it would contribute $30 million

to assist Jordan, Syria, and several other states in theirefforts to provide educational facilities to Iraqi refugeechildren following a UN appeal for approximately


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$130 million to defray these educational expenses.140The European Union (EU) is also in discussions with

Amman about increasing aid to help Jordan cope withrefugee problems.141 Such aid would complement the265 million euros in overall aid to Jordan which the EUhas already budgeted for the 2007-2010 time frame.142

Jordanian policies for granting visas became morestringent following the November 2005 bombings inAmman (discussed below).143 Young Iraqi men are oftenparticularly suspect and likely to be turned away atthe Jordanian border or at Jordanian airports and portsof entry. Jordan now fears an even greater number ofrefugees in the event of chaos in Iraq. A 2007 Jordanianlaw requires Iraqi refugees entering Jordan to carry aG-Series passport.144 This is a new type of passport thatIraqis must obtain in Baghdad and cannot be issued onthe border. It replaces the old S-Series passport which

the United States and United Kingdom have stoppedrecognizing because it is easily forged.145 In October2007, the Jordanian Health Ministry also requiredtravelers from Iraq to have a stamp on their entry cardattesting that they are free from cholera, which hasbecome an increasing problem in Iraq.146 All of theserestrictions have helped to limit the number of Iraqisable to enter Jordan under current circumstances.

To protect itself from being further swamped withrefugees, Jordan appears to be considering puttingtroops inside Iraqs western desert along their mutualborder should various extreme scenarios play out.147Jordanians worry that new waves of refugees with fewskills or resources will be difcult to manage and maysupport themselves through crime if no other options

are available.148 In conversations with journalists, Jordanian ofcials have suggested that in a full-scaleIraqi civil war Jordanian troops might be deployed


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across the Iraqi border as far west as Rutbah, around40 miles inside Iraq. This would be done to ensure that

refugee needs are met in Iraq itself, and that additionalwaves of refugees do not overwhelm Jordanian bordersecurity.149 Such a contingency would undoubtedly becoordinated with the United States if it occurred whilesignicant numbers of U.S. troops are still in Iraq.

Is Terrorism Moving to Jordan from Iraq and Can ItBe Stopped?

Jordan has a long history of being victimized byattacks from both state-sponsored terrorist groupsand by terrorist organizations operating without suchstate support.150 In the 1960s a major ideological divideamong Palestinian guerrilla groups involved whetheror not it would be necessary to overthrow conservative

Arab governments (viewed as insufciently committedto the Palestinian Revolution) as a preliminary stepto defeating Israel by striking from the territory of itsArab neighbors. Jordan, which has the longest borderwith Israel of any neighboring state, became a specialtarget of groups accepting the latter school of thought.Radical Palestinian leader George Habashs PopularFront for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) maintaineda formal political platform calling for the overthrowof the Hashemite government. The PFLP platformincluded language that the road to Jerusalem wasthrough Amman, and that Amman needed to becomean Arab Hanoi to confront and defeat the Israelis.151While such organizations were extremely dangerousin the 1960s and helped to inspire the Jordanian civil

war in 1970-71, they have now been replaced by newthreats.


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Most recently Jordan has faced challenges fromradical Islamist terrorists including members of al-

Qaeda.152

Until his 2006 death, the key terrorist gurethat dominated the shadow war between Jordan andal-Qaeda was Abu Musab al Zarqawi (actual name:Ahmad Fadel Khalayla). While Zarqawi is known toWesterners primarily for his actions in Iraq, he was Jordanian by birth and also had a long history ofterrorist activities in Jordan. Zarqawi began his careerin Jordan as a small-time criminal who, lacking options,ed to Afghanistan to become part of the anti-Sovietjihad. While he arrived there too late to ght against theSoviet military, he did participate in operations againstthe pro-Soviet Afghan government that had been leftbehind after the Soviet withdrawal. In Afghanistan,Zarqawi became involved with al-Qaeda and wasmentored and supported by terrorist mastermind Abu

Zubaydah.The rst Jordanian veterans of the Afghanistan

war began to return to Jordan in September 1991, withZarqawi arriving in the kingdom in early 1993.153 Bythis time, he was a skilled and ardent terrorist andwas therefore placed under close surveillance by the Jordanian security forces. Unsurprisingly, Zarqawiwas arrested and convicted by a Jordanian court in 1994for possessing bombs and mines without a permit andfor using a false passport.154 In the course of his trial,Zarqawi quickly admitted possessing the weapons,but his co-defendant, Abu Mohammad al Maqdisi, alsocredibly claimed the bombs and mines were for useagainst the Israeli enemy and not to strike againstgovernment or other institutions in Jordan.155 The

court did not view this argument as an extenuatingcircumstance and found Zarqawi and Maqdisi guilty.Zarqawi was then imprisoned for 5 years (of a 15-year


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sentence), but was pardoned in March 1999 as part of afar-ranging amnesty following King Husseins death.

King Abdullah announced the amnesty whichincluded Zarqawi shortly after coming to power, afterbeing lobbied by the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood toinclude Islamist prisoners in any show of mercy.156 Suchamnesties are sometimes viewed as an Arab traditionwhen a new king comes to power, provided theprisoners have a reasonable hope of being redeemed.Under King Hussein, amnesties and pardons were acontinuing feature of Jordanian governance whenapplied to those who were not viewed as a threatto the public or to national security. King Husseinoften presented himself as personally stricken for thefamilies of wayward Jordanians and stressed that hehoped for their relatives release as soon as this couldresponsibly be done. While the king did not manage to

enjoy 47 years in power without some skill at politicaldrama and public relations, this imagery still presentsa somewhat reassuring contrast to other regional statesthat are known for long and brutal imprisonment forpolitical dissenters.

The idea of welcoming opponents back to the Jordanian family after they are punished is also animportant aspect of Jordanian political culture anda strategy for regime maintenance. King Husseinprovided numerous examples of this approach,including pardoning those who attempted to over-throw him. One such individual, General Ali AbuNuwar, ed Jordan in 1957 after being implicated in anapparent coup attempt. He was later pardoned in themid-1960s and appointed Jordanian ambassador to

France in February 1971.157 On another memorable oc-casion in late 1996, the king personally drove dissidentLeith Shubeilat to his mothers house from prison fol-


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lowing a royal pardon.158 Shubeilat had served 11months of a 3-year prison sentence for slandering the

king and royal family in a series of lectures criticizingJordanian-Israeli contacts since 1948. The idea behindKing Husseins approach appears to have been to showgenerosity to those who have tasted punishment andthereby allow them other options besides being lifelongenemies. Secondarily, such an approach might at leastcause them to consider moderating their commitmentto future legal or illegal opposition. Some nonviolentregime opponents like Shubeilat were pardonedmultiple times. King Abdullah, although following inhis fathers footsteps with the March 1999 pardon, waslater to regret deeply his generosity toward Zarqawi.He may also have blamed some of those who advisedhim to grant pardons to men that in retrospect werecommitted terrorists who could never have reconciled

with the Jordanian government or lived a peaceful lifeas a Jordanian citizen.

Shortly after Zarqawi was released from prison,he became involved with his former al-Qaeda mentorAbu Zubayda who was the chief planner for what laterwere to become known as the millennium plots.159They involved strikes against sites in Jordan and LosAngeles International Airport. Striking at Jordaniantourist sites would have met the twin terrorist goalsof killing Western nationals and undermining futuretourism which serves as one of the economic mainstaysof the Jordanian economy and therefore the regime. Inhis memoirs, former CIA Director George Tenet (1997-2004) notes his strong concerns about the anticipatedmillennium attacks by al-Qaeda as intelligence started

to become available in the lead up to the plannedstrikes.160 Tenet also stated that he was exceptionallypleased by U.S.-Jordanian intelligence cooperation,


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and he complements the head of the GeneralIntelligence Directorate (GID) by name in his book.161

Tenet suggests that the millennium attacks might nothave been so effectively thwarted if such cooperationhad not been forthcoming. This was also a relationshipthat beneted the Jordanians since they were a centraltarget of the attacks.

Zarqawis organization was also involved inthe October 2002 murder of Laurence Foley, a U.S.diplomat in Amman, although Zarqawi himself wasnot in Jordan at the time.162 Earlier, in summer 2002,Zarqawi entered Iraq to coordinate with anti-SaddamKurdish extremists from the Ansar al Islam party innorthern Iraq. He was, therefore, well-positioned tobegin working with other anti-American terroristsand insurgents once the anti-U.S. insurgency began in2003. Unsurprisingly, Zarqawi was quickly identied

as the mastermind behind the August 7, 2003, truckbomb attack against the Jordanian Embassy in Iraqthat left 18 dead and 57 wounded.163 The car bombitself was rigged by Abu Umar al Kurdi, a memberof the Zarqawi organization who was later capturedand confessed.164 At the time, this strike was the worstattack on a nonmilitary target in Iraq since the fall ofSaddams regime. It also clearly illustrates the trendin which al-Qaeda of Iraq was continuing to planacts against Jordanian targets despite its overarchingfocus on ghting in Iraq. By April 2004, the Jordanianleadership was making its own view of al-Qaeda clearby sentencing eight terrorists to death for the murderof Foley. Six of the militants, including Zarqawi, weresentenced to death in absentia.165 Two others were in

Jordanian custody and later hanged.166A number of Jordanian radicals left their own

country (and especially the towns of Salt and Zarqa)


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to ght U.S. troops in Iraq or Afghanistan followingthe U.S. interventions in these countries. In addition

to their commitment to the struggle against the West,Jordanian extremists also sought to leave their homesand travel to Iraq for a variety of reasons, includingproblems with surveillance by local authorities, a lackof acceptance by their home communities (usually dueto their time in prison for violent offenses), and a lackof economic opportunities in Jordan. Problems within Jordan, nevertheless, did not constitute their onlychallenges. Since 2004 the ow of terrorist recruits fromSalt and Zarqa into Iraq has faced serious interdictionefforts by the Jordanian authorities.167 Some Jordanianradicals still managed to get through to Iraq, and atleast one was reported to have conducted a high prolesuicide bombing that killed 125 people in Hillah, almostall of whom were Shiite police and army recruits.168

It might also be noted that the Jordanian govern-ment has made recent, serious efforts to relieve pov-erty in the region around Zarqa and Salt (which areabout 25 miles apart), perhaps in partial response to theproblem of terrorism. A centerpiece of this effort is theconstruction of modern and affordable housing nearZarqa with funding from Saudi Arabia. Current planscall for the King Abdullah bin Abdul Azziz al SaudResidential City, which is designed to house around370,000 Jordanian citizens, and will include parks,banks, mosques, and cultural and recreation centers.The total project is expected to cost almost $2 billion.169Jordanian banks will provide loans to purchase thesehomes at subsidized rates of interest. Additionally, theproject is expected to create numerous local jobs and

attract investments.In addition to attempts to overcome poverty that

may breed terrorism, Amman has made a continuing


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effort to help destroy the Zarqawi group and otheranti-Jordanian terrorist organizations. In an August

2004 announcement, Jordanian and Iraqi authoritiesstated that they had concluded an agreement to shareintelligence on cross border crime including terrorism,kidnapping, smuggling, drug trafcking, and moneylaundering.170 According to some journalistic sources,Jordan has an effective intelligence gathering operationinside of Iraq.171 Moreover, Jordanian intelligenceis sometimes reported as having especially usefulconnections to some of Iraqs large Sunni tribes.172 TheJordanians, as noted earlier, reported foiling an averageof two terrorist plots a week during this time frame.173According to a September 1, 2006, speech by GeneralIntelligence Director al Dhahabi, The al-Qaedaorganization is the biggest threat to our Jordaniansecurity. We foiled many of the schemes that targeted

Jordan. But we do not announce these schemes.174

Jordan has consistently sought close ties with the

Iraqi government as a way of combating the threatof anti-Jordanian terrorism. Senior Jordanian ofcialsmaintain that enhanced intelligence exchange is akey goal in their relations with Iraq.175 Obtainingterrorism-related intelligence from Iraqi sources isprobably a key Jordanian goal, but it is doubtfulthat

Jordanian National Security and the Future of Middle East Stability

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