Giuseppe Grossi & Anna Thomasson - Jointly owned companies as instruments of local government: comparative evidence from the Swedish and Italian water sectors A critical analysis of a case study Dario Di Nucci University of Salerno
Giuseppe Grossi & Anna Thomasson -
Jointly owned companies as instruments of
local government: comparative evidence
from the Swedish and Italian water sectors
A criticalanalysisof a case study
Dario Di Nucci
University of Salerno
• Cost price principle
• None of the companies is listed on any stock exchange
• CEO can’t be a member of the board
• Shareholders cannot directly interfere in the management
• Shareholders can appoint or remove the board of directors
• Special shareholder’s meeting
• City council members can be board membersFocus
Focus
• Companies expect to break even
• Cross-transfers from local goverments as «social costs»
• Big municipalities are often traded on the stock exchange
• Board has executive and supervisory functions
• Board members are appointed by the shareholders
• Rappresentation in the board can be proportional or not
• City council members cannot be board members
The SwedishCompany
A limited company in the Stockholm region
Founded in 1989 by 1 municipality, but by 2008 participated by 6
Increasing regulation
Increasing demand for more advanced techniques
Increasing improvement request for the delivered service
The ItalianCompany
A limited company in the Tuscany region
Founded in 1938 by 16 municipalities, but now is a joint-stock company
ExternalControl
Swedish Company Act
General law for local government
Laws for delivery of public services
56 municipalities in the areas of Grosseto and Siena
1994 Water Act
Optimal Territorial Area (OTA) governedby Area Water Authority (AWA)
Convenzione per la gestione del servizio idrico integrato
Piano d’Ambito
Ownershipand InternalControl
Annual General Shareholder meeting
Director lasts 4 years
Managing directors, chairman and financial
board develop directives and agreements
Owners ensure control the management
With less owners, CEO become more
independent
Patti parasociali between public and private owners
The industrial partner has a strong knowledge and experience in the service provisioning
One or two tier organization
Top Management
A parent company and 4 subsidiaries
Parent company board consist of politicians from the 4 largest owners
4 directors, 4 substitutes, 1 chairman
2 board members could be water and sewage services’ experts
Owners make decisions based on management proposals
9 members:
1 president
1 vice-president
1 CEO
6 directors
Members last 5 years
5 members appointed by public
4 members appointed by private (including CEO)
Financing Mostly by customer fees
Fees are based upon the actual cost of services in each specific municipality
Budgets are separated in every subsidiary
No cross-subsidisation
Fees are calculated within an OTA
Public owners seek continuous improvement of the services without tariff levels increasing too suddenly
Private partners are interested in profits and in raising tariffs
Conclusions
Tensions can arise when companies have fragmented ownership.
In the Italian case the conflict of interests emerges between the CEO and the chairman.
In the Swedish case the conflict of interests emerges between the company and the owners.
Issues in external control and internal management.
The best governance mechanisms is foundation (secure inner accountability).
External control doesn’t solve the potential conflicts of interests of hybrid organization with fragmented ownership.
Supplementary case-specific mechanisms are needed.
ReferencesGiuseppe Grossi & Anna Thomasson (2011) Jointly owned companies as instruments of local government: comparative evidence from the Swedish and Italian water sectors, Policy Studies, 32:3, 277-289, DOI: 10.1080/01442872.2011.561695