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* The joint visit was planned but not conducted as JOTC had already briefed actors in the department in July 2011.
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2011 CYCLONIC SEASON
JOINT REGIONAL NATURAL DISASTER SEMINARS
MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
� Briefing participants welcomed the explanation of coordination mechanisms and emergency operation centers to be activated at central level (Port-au-Prince) in
case of emergencies (COUN - Cellule Technique - EJOINT/EJOC). In most
departments some humanitarian actors (UN agencies and NGOs), government
representatives and MINUSTAH personnel were not aware of the new systems put
in place to face the 2011 cyclonic season.
� At local level the activation of the regional emergency operation centers (RJOC,
COUD, COUC) was reported to be functioning well in most of the departments
visited. In Artibonite, in relation to the activation of MINUSTAH's Regional Joint
Operations Center (RJOC), it was highlighted that the Chief of the Regional Office
(CRO) has the autonomy to activate the RJOC, especially if this is done in
coordination with the activation of the DPC's Centre d’Operation d’Urgence
Departmental (COUD). This is in line with the principle that any crisis should be
dealt with first at department level with resources available locally. If the crisis is of
such magnitude that it cannot be handled at department level (or more departments
are affected), then the emergency operation centers at central level (i.e. EJOC, COUN
and EJOINT) might also be activated. The CRO in Gonaives highlighted that, for
example, for Tropical Storm “Emily” the RJOC was activated before the Expanded
Joint Operation Center (EJOC) in Port-au-Prince.
� During the visits, many actors felt that there should be a stronger decentralization
of decision making processes. Actors felt they need to be empowered to take
action/decision without formal approval from the central level. This observation
was raised by humanitarian actors as well as by Government representatives at
communal and department level.
� Overall, there was a very good representation of departmental authorities (DPC
and Government representatives) at the briefings. However, it would have been a
great opportunity to have more local actors (maires/casecs) around the table to
focus on local issues during disasters. In particular, the lack of local authorities at
the briefing in the Centre Department is indicative of the fact that relations with
them in this department might need to be improved. This was confirmed during the
visit by MINUSTAH CRO, who indicated that often authorities at communal level
(maire) prefer to contact the DPC in Port-au-Prince directly regarding activities or
specific needs, rather than inform partners at department level.
� The JOTC process to request MINUSTAH assistance in support of humanitarian
activities was clarified in detail in different departments (Grand Anse, Sud Est,
Artibonite). It was explained that humanitarian partners need to submit requests
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through the Humanitarian Focal Point in the department for validation and
prioritization. Then the request is passed on to MINUSTAH (through the CRO) for
approval of the request and the delivery of the support. If MINUSTAH's resources at
local level are not enough to complete the request, then this is submitted to the JOTC
in Port-au-Prince for further evaluation and processing. The importance of using
MINUSTAH assets on the basis of the “last resort” criteria was also reiterated. The
need to always keep MINUSTAH CRO informed about requests, especially if these
involve the use of key and expensive resources, like special flights, was also
highlighted. There have been occasions where the lack of information sharing
between central and department level has led to duplication of efforts and
conflicting information.
� During the visits, much interest was shown in relation to MINUSTAH’s Military
Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO 002/004/005), related to the detachment of units
and the additional authorisation vested in the AOR Commander. It was explained
that FRAGO 004 refers to operations in the vicinity of Port-au-Prince whereas
FRAGO 005 refers to operations outside Port-au-Prince, organized around the CROs
and RJOCs. Both of these FRAGOs include two important concepts, namely “OPCON”
and the relationship between the CRO and the Battalion Commander during a
natural disaster. Under the OPCON concept, the Battalion Commander has the
authority to task military components with what to achieve. The military
component commanders then decide how they will achieve it. While the military
chain of command remains unchanged and direct tasking from the Force
Commander always takes precedence, Battalion Commanders have the authority to act on CRO requests without the need for a direct Tasking Order from the Force Commander.
� Information Management/flow during a crisis was perceived in some
departments as an aspect to be improved. In Gonaives for example, it was noted that
during an emergency the frequency of the reporting requested by the central level is
sometimes too tight to allow the regional office to collect all the necessary
information from the field. It was also noted that all RJOCs need email accounts that
all participants can access as information can get lost during the shift system if
emails are not being received by everyone in the RJOC. Information flow between
the RJOC and the COUD was reported to be working well in the majority of
departments. In the South Department, the joint mission suggested to strengthen
dialogue among all the actors present in the department with more regular
coordination meetings and discussion forums.
� In some departments radio communication represents a challenge (North and
Centre). Sometimes this is due to difficulties in radio communication between the
DPC, Humanitarian Community and MINUSTAH (in the North department there is
no COMCEN to relay the information among the two different systems). Overall,
there is a lack of satellite phones for the DPC in all the departments.
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� More clarity in terms of shelter management (opening/managing and closing the
shelters) was felt to be needed in some departments (North and Artibonite).
� The need for engineering repair works was highlighted in some departments
(North, South, Grand Anse). MINUSTAH military representatives of the joint
delegation explained that since there are currently only limited engineering assets
available, and that Ready Deployment Engineering Units (RDEUs) have to be
coordinated in centralised areas throughout the country, it is not possible to have an
RDEU deployed in all departments.
� The need and importance of conducting joint natural disaster exercises where all
participants can work through problems in a simulated environment to test
procedures and lines of communications was expressed in all departments. The
recommendation of the delegation is to have two national simulation exercises
(April and July) to be conducted in the Departments which have not been yet the
subject of these exercises (Grand Anse, North, South). Regional/local joint natural
disaster exercises should also be conducted in coordination with the Regional
Natural Disaster Seminars.
� Overall, the visits represented the opportunity to network and exchange contact details with key actors at local level. These visits are instrumental in strengthening
information flow between the central and department levels and address
concerns/questions on Emergency Preparedness and Response.
TECHNICAL ISSSUES:
� The format of the presentation delivered during the Joint Regional Natural Disaster
Seminars should include a Question and Answer (Q&A) session at the end of each
section so as to allow participants to have a discussion on a specific topic when the
information provided is still fresh in their minds.
� Non-MINUSTAH members of the delegation should be given a higher priority on
MINUSTAH flights to ensure that they make the manifest and are not left behind on
the day of a seminar.
� It is recommended to include a representative from the DPC (national level) in the
joint visits to illustrate the Government of Haiti’s contingency plan and SNGRD.
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2011 CYCLONIC SEASON JOINT REGIONAL NATURAL DISASTER SEMINARS