Brunei Joint Doctrine Publication JOINT INTELLIGENCE BJDP-2.00 (Edition 1.0)
Welcome message from author
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Brunei Joint Doctrine Publication
JOINT INTELLIGENCE
BJDP-2.00
(Edition 1.0)
BJDP-2.00
i
JOINT INTELLIGENCE
Brunei Joint Doctrine Publication BJDP-2.00 dated 1 March 2017
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF
HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT OF BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
1. This document is to be kept within the Ministry of Defence or Royal Brunei Armed Forces establishment. 2. It is issued for the information of such persons only as need to know its content in the course of their official duties.
3. Any person finding this document should hand it in with the particulars of how and where found to a Royal Brunei Armed Forces Military Establishment, or to a Police Station for its safe return to:
JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS ROYAL BRUNEI ARMED FORCES
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE BOLKIAH GARISON BB3510
NEGARA BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
THE UNAUTHORISED RETENTION OR DESTRUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS AN OFFENCE
BJDP-2.00
ii
FOREWORD
‘Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false,
and most are uncertain. What one can reasonably ask of an Officer is that
he should possess a standard of judgement, which he can gain only from
knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense’.
Carl Von Clausewitz: “On War”, 1832
Although Clausewitz’s observation is now over 180 years old, it continues
to have equal relevance today in relation to Intelligence processes applied
to the conduct of contemporary Joint Operations regardless of nature,
scale and level of intensity. The application of the Joint Intelligence Cycle
is a ‘whole Force’ responsibility, from Commanders and Staff to
Intelligence specialists and those who are tasked to collect information at
source. For this reason, all those involved in the Joint Intelligence Cycle
must develop a deep understanding of the approach described within this
publication so that all requirements and product may be seamlessly and
continuously fused with all other areas of Joint Operational delivery.
Recognising that the interpretation of information is a subjective process
we must fully acknowledge that at the heart of this Joint Intelligence Cycle
it is our Intelligence Officers, Staff and Analysts who give us our
competitive edge. While understanding how the intelligence process
works, I also look to Commanders to grow our intelligence capability by
nurturing and investing in our specialists. Finally, this publication
compliments the publication of the Intelligence Officers Handbook – the
two must be understood equally and used in conjunction with each other.
PEHIN DATU PEKERMA JAYA DATO PADUKA SERI MOHD TAWIH BIN ABDULLAH Major General Commander Royal Brunei Armed Forces
Date – 2 Jamadilakhir 1438 Date – 1 March 2017
BJDP-2.00
iii
PREFACE
1. BJDP-2.00, Joint Intelligence, sets out Joint Intelligence Doctrine for
the Royal Brunei Armed Forces. It is specifically intended to be a guide
for all those who are involved in the intelligence process. More generally,
it will assist those whose work brings them into contact with Intelligence or
those undergoing Staff and other training to help them to come to an
understanding of the derivation of Intelligence and its application to
operations.
2. BJDP-2.00 is set out in 3 Chapters: the first deals with Intelligence
Doctrine; the second the application of the Intelligence Cycle; and the third
a brief synopsis of the Intelligence Estimate. This publication must be
used in conjunction with the Intelligence Operators Handbook (published
by the Intelligence Training Wing – ITW) as the latter provides the
practical methodology of delivery which is described within this
publication.
BJDP-2.00
iv
JOINT INTELLIGENCE
CONTENTS
Foreword ii Preface iii Contents iv Amendment Proposals v Distribution vi
Chapter 1 – Intelligence Doctrine
Introduction 1-2 Terminology 1-3 Levels and Types of Intelligence 1-7 Sources of Information and Intelligence Agencies 1-9 The Principles of Intelligence 1-14
Chapter 2 – The Intelligence Cycle
Direction 2-3 Collection 2-9 Processing 2-13 Dissemination 2-23
Chapter 3 – The Intelligence Estimate and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace/Environment
The Intelligence Estimate 3-2 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace/Environment 3-2 The IPB Process 3-4
Lexicon
Acronyms and Abbreviations Lexicon-1 Terms and Definitions Lexicon-4
BJDP-2.00
v
AMENDMENT PROPOSALS The Joint Doctrine and Warfare Centre is responsible for publishing
Brunei Joint Doctrine Publications (BJDPs) within a hierarchy of similar
publications. Comments on factual accuracy or proposals for amendment
are welcomed by the Doctrine Editor at:
Joint Doctrine and Warfare Centre
Ministry of Defence
BOLKIAH GARISON BB3510
NEGARA BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
BJDP-2.00
vi
DISTRIBUTION
Unit Copy No. (of 100)
DMOD Secretariat Office 001 to 002 Comd RBAF Secretariat Office 003 to 004 Inspectorate Unit, Comd RBAF Secretariat Office 005 to 006 HQ ROYAL BRUNEI LAND FORCE 007 to 011 1Bn Royal Brunei Land Force 012 to 014 2Bn Royal Brunei Land Force 015 to 017 3Bn Royal Brunei Land Force 018 to 020 Sp Bn Royal Brunei Land Force 021 to 023 HQ ROYAL BRUNEI NAVY 024 to 028 Base 029 to 031 Fleet 032 to 034 HQ ROYAL BRUNEI AIR FORCE 035 to 039 Operations Wing, Royal Brunei Air Force 040 to 042 Air Regiment, Royal Brunei Air Force 043 to 045 JOINT FORCE HQ 045 to 049 HQ SPECIAL FORCE REGIMENT 050 to 052 HQ GURKHA RESERVE UNIT 053 to 055 HQ ROYAL BRUNEI MALAY RESERVE REGIMENT 056 to 057 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE 058 to 059 Intelligence Training Wing, Dte Int 060 to 065 DEFENCE ACADEMY, ROYAL BRUNEI ARMED FORCES
066 to 075
Spare (kept in JDWC) 075 to 080
BJDP-2.00
vii
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
BJDP-2.00
1-1
CHAPTER 1: INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE
BJDP-2.00
1-2
INTRODUCTION
‘Know the enemy and know yourself: in a hundred battles you will never
be in peril.’
Sun Tsu
1.01 Intelligence is a battle-winning factor. It is a pre-requisite of good
planning and an indispensable weapon in a commander’s armoury. A
commander ought to attempt to discover the intention of his enemy before
embarking on an operation rather than setting out for the field of battle
blindfolded.
1.02 Advances in technology have enabled a commander to have
access to vast amounts of information about the strength, equipment and
location of the enemy as well as what the enemy is doing at any time.
Information that is properly collated, evaluated, analysed and interpreted
can be processed into intelligence where an assessment can be made of
what the enemy intends to do next. It is the predictive nature of
Intelligence that makes critical information stand out from the general
mass of information for use by a commander.
1.03 In order to provide intelligence, information has to be collected to
a pattern, prompted by questions raised by the commander. This
information is subjected to an analytical process in which human
judgment, based on the collective knowledge and experience of the
intelligence staff plays a major part. Finally, for it to be of use in the
planning or conduct of operations, the product of this process, the
intelligence, must be disseminated in a timely manner, in an easily
understandable format to those who need it. It is the description of this
whole process, on and under the sea, on the land and in the air, which this
publication addresses.
BJDP-2.00
1-3
TERMINOLOGY
1.04 Many of the terms used in connection with intelligence are
abstract in nature and may, therefore, be interpreted in a number of
different ways, giving rise to the possibility of misunderstanding. This
problem is often worse when working in combined or coalition operations,
which the Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) could well be, where terms
may have to be translated into other languages, including Bahasa Melayu.
Intelligence terms must, therefore, be defined in simple language unless
they are adequately explained. As a starting point, it is essential to
understand the difference between information and intelligence.
Information
1.05 Information may consist of an objective single fact or a series or
group of objective facts upon which no evaluation has been carried out. It
is a factual description of a state of affairs, which currently exists or has
existed at some point. It is neutral in nature and can relate to events in the
past or present.
1.06 During the build-up to and the engagement on operations the
commander will potentially have access to very large amounts of
information relating to every aspect of the operational environment. The
commander’s intelligence Staff cover a wide range of matters relating to
friendly, enemy and neutral forces. This includes details of their strength,
identity, equipment type and capability, location, character and capability
of command, state of re-supply, numbers of casualties, state of
reinforcement, fuel states, ammunition states and many other facts.
There will also be an equally large amount of information relating to the
battlefield environment, the weather, climate, terrain, sea state and depth,
tide and current, flying conditions, socio-political influences and other
aspects of the battle space.
1.07 In making his preparations for an operation the commander will
identify what information, relating to all operating forces, he requires in
order to assist him to make his plan.
BJDP-2.00
1-4
Intelligence
1.08 Information is of infinitely greater value when a conclusion of
some sort is drawn from the fact or series of facts that make up the
information. This may come about as a result of the association of a fact
or series of facts with some other information already held, or when it is
considered in the light of experience.
1.09 By itself a fact is merely information, but when it is related to other
information already known and is considered in the light of experience, it
gives rise to intelligence. Intelligence differs from information by being the
result of a process of judgment based on knowledge and experience; it is
not neutral and is open to challenge. Relating one set of information to
another, or judging information against a database of knowledge already
held, is the analytical process which is the root of the production of
intelligence from information; this relationship is shown in Figure 1.1
below.
Figure 1.1 – Information and Intelligence Relationship.
1.10 Intelligence is able to provide the commander with an assessment
of an enemy’s capabilities, intentions and a prediction of his likely tactics.
The possession of reliable intelligence provides a commander with a
critical advantage over the enemy, in that he is able to get inside his
opponents mind and form an insight into what the enemy commander’s
actions or reactions are likely to be. Therefore, the commander can plan
INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION
PR
OC
ES
SIN
GC
OL
LE
CT
ION
FA
CT
S
DA
TA
FA
CT
S
BJDP-2.00
1-5
his own actions based on this knowledge, decreasing the risks inherent in
combat and increasing the likelihood of success.
1.11 Intelligence will never be complete and there will always be
unanswered questions in the mind of the person or people trying to build
up a picture of the enemy. Intelligence can never be guaranteed to be
totally accurate; however, an estimate of its likely accuracy can be made,
thus enabling a commander to decide what weight to place on the relevant
intelligence when making a decision.
Areas of Intelligence Responsibility and Intelligence
Interest
1.12 In order to enable the commander and his intelligence staff to
focus their intelligence effort, an Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AIR)
and an Area of Intelligence Interest (AII) must be established in relation to
the area of operations and stakeholders. These are set out by the highest
formation to the next level, and so on down the chain of command. An
explanation of each of these terms is given below.
1.13 Area of Intelligence Responsibility. The AIR is defined as: ‘The
area assigned to a commander for which he is responsible for the
provision of Intelligence, within the means at his disposal.’ In practice, the
size of this area will be limited by the capabilities of the collection systems
at the commander’s immediate disposal, so range is a principle element in
determining the AIR. The commander will direct the main effort of his
intelligence staff in this area.
1.14 Area of Intelligence Interest. If it could influence the plan for or
conduct of his current operations, or might affect future operations, the
commander will also require intelligence about the area immediately
outside his AIR. This area is the commander’s AII and is defined as: ‘the
area about which a commander requires intelligence on those factors and
developments likely to affect the outcome of his current or future
operations.’ Figure 1.2 below shows this relationship. As he is unlikely to
be able to acquire this intelligence through his own collection systems,
BJDP-2.00
1-6
intelligence staff will have to request it from higher or flanking formations.
As a general rule, the AII of one level of command is the AIR of the next
level of command above it.
AREA OF
INTELLIGENCE
RESPONSIBILITY
AREA OF
INTELLIGENCE INTEREST
AREA OF
INTELLIGENCE INTEREST
AR
EA
OF
INT
EL
LIG
EN
CE
IN
TE
RE
ST
AR
EA
OF
INT
EL
LIG
EN
CE
INT
ER
ES
T
Figure 1.2 – Relationship between the AII and AIR.
BJDP-2.00
1-7
LEVELS AND TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE
1.15 The 3 levels of Intelligence are derived on a geographical basis
and are represented in Figure 1.3:
Strategic Intelligence is all about understanding the political intent of a national
government (foreign government), especially during conflict resolution. It is
about knowing how a decision maker at the strategic level makes decisions. The
joint assessment by the Directorate of Intelligence and Directorate of Defence
Policy must be able to determine how national government intent uses its
diplomatic, economic and military levers of power to steer the solution that best
meets their own national interest.
Operational Intelligence is the intelligence that allows Joint Force Commander
to plan an operation within a Theatre of Operation. It is produced by J2 staff at
the JOC and is confined to the production of intelligence covering Commander
RBAF’s Area of Intelligence Interest. In producing this intelligence, the JOC J2
Staff will use all relevant sources of information, as well as intelligence derived
from assets both outside and inside the JOC command structure.
Tactical Intelligence is required by tactical (formation and unit) commanders
for the planning of operations at their level of command. This intelligence will be
produced by G2/N2/A2 at formation (HQ Land Force, HQ Navy, HQ Air Force)
and Unit level as appropriate, and will be confined to their commander’s Area of
Intelligence Interest, although, the information used to produce that intelligence
may be derived from assets both outside and inside the tactical commander’s
command structure.
Figure 1.3 – Levels of Intelligence.
Types of Intelligence
1.16 Each of the levels of intelligence described in Figure 1.3 may be
divided into 3 types of intelligence:
a. Basic Intelligence. Basic Intelligence is the background
intelligence about a subject. It is maintained in databases and is
continually updated in peacetime and during operations. The main
use of Basic Intelligence is to set the scene at the outset of
operations to meet intelligence requirements dealing with facts
BJDP-2.00
1-8
that are less likely to change, such as: terrain analysis; weather
patterns over a period of time; topography; and the main
equipment and weapon capabilities of potential enemies.
b. Current Intelligence. Current Intelligence is that which is
produced in response to Intelligence Requirements (IRs) linked to
a current or imminent operation, and which refers to events at the
time of the operation such as changes to the enemy’s order of
battle, combat efficiency and tactics.
c. Applied Intelligence. Applied Intelligence is intelligence
which is tailored to provide direct support to the decision-making
process; this is the core business of Combat Intelligence
practitioners. Applied intelligence is generated by exploiting
relevant basic and current intelligence to meet specific IRs.
BJDP-2.00
1-9
SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES
1.17 Information that is processed into intelligence is collected from a
variety of ‘sources’ and ‘agencies’. It is important to understand the
differences between these 2 terms:
a. A Source. A source gathers or collects information either
randomly (for example a human source that reports overheard
conversations), or to meet a specific requirement (for example an
Observation Post put in place to report enemy activity at a pre-
determined location, or a camera recording images along the
programmed flight path of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)).
The source does nothing more than collect and record information
and pass it on, it has no capacity to process information. Sources
are further categorised as ‘Uncontrolled’ or ‘Controlled’. As the
terms imply, an uncontrolled source gathers information without
direction, whereas a controlled source responds to a specific
Request for Information (RFI) or tasking. As a general rule, higher
or parallel formations and non-RBAF controlled sources will be
given RFIs, and subordinate formations or units a tasking.
b. An Agency. An Agency differs from a source in that it has
the ability to provide some or all of the processing that turns
information into intelligence. At one end of the scale, an agency
could be a naval vessel gathering information, with personnel on
board who have been specifically trained to analyse information
on behalf of the ship’s Commanding Officer. At the other end of
the scale, a government department whose main purpose it is to
gather information from a wide variety of sources, and which
employs a large number of specialised people who apply large
amounts of sophisticated processing power to the information in
order to produce high grade intelligence, is also an Agency.
BJDP-2.00
1-10
SOURCERFI
TASKING
RFI TASKING
PIR
IR
AGENCY
INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION
Figure 1.4 – The difference between a Source and an Agency.
1.18 Sources and agencies can be grouped under 3 headings:
a. Controlled. Sources and agencies that can be ordered or
tasked by the intelligence staff to provide information or produce
intelligence, rather than requested to do so, are controlled; for
instance, subordinate Army, Navy or Air Force units are
controlled. It follows that the higher up the chain of command, the
greater the number of sources and agencies that are under
control. High-grade sources and agencies that can provide
information or produce intelligence over a wide area are placed
under command and control of the highest appropriate formation.
Examples of controlled sources and agencies are: observation
posts; foot patrols; armoured reconnaissance patrols; aircraft; and
battlespace surveillance devices and sensors, both ground based
and airborne.
b. Uncontrolled. Uncontrolled sources and agencies are those
that provide information or produce intelligence, but which are not
under control of the intelligence staff because they cannot be
tasked directly. Some examples are: newspapers and periodicals;
television and radio broadcasts; scientific and technical journals;
navigational instructions; reference books and maps; town plans;
guidebooks; directories; and tide tables or charts produced by
BJDP-2.00
1-11
hostile or neutral governments. Strategic surveillance systems,
such as satellites operated by friendly nations, also fall within this
category; whilst the output from these may be made available,
their programming would be under the control of the owning
nation.
c. Casual. A casual source produces information from an
unexpected quarter. Examples include: prisoners of war;
defectors or refugees; non-combatant enemy personnel;
escapees; the local civilian population in an area of operations;
captured enemy documents and equipment; and intercepted
enemy electronic emissions. Information from casual sources
must always be treated with extra caution as the ability to ‘plant’
information through a casual source may form part of a deception
plan.
Types of Intelligence Sources
1.19 Sources are categorised under a number of headings that are
explained below. They are listed in alphabetical order rather than ranked
in importance, and it should be noted that the RBAF does not necessarily
possess any sources within certain categories. However, it is important
for Intelligence Staffs to be aware of them, because when working in a
coalition environment it is most likely that these sources will be available
from other nations within the coalition.
a. Human Intelligence. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is
derived from any information collected by people through the
medium of the five human senses, although sight and hearing are
usually the main ones involved. The ability of the senses to
collect information may be enhanced by, for example, the use of
binoculars or telescopes to improve sight, or microphones and
other technical devices to clarify speech. The range of possible
human sources is difficult to quantify, but every serviceman or
woman in contact with the enemy either by sight, sound, smell or
touch is a potential HUMINT source. Some service personnel,
such as those in reconnaissance or Special Forces units will be
BJDP-2.00
1-12
operationally tasked in a HUMINT collection role. Other examples
of HUMINT sources are prisoners of war, refugees, civilians living
in or around an operational area, experts in the geography and
climate of a particular area, as well as agents trained in the
collection of HUMINT. In certain circumstances it is necessary to
use specialist agencies in order to maximise the potential of
HUMINT sources such as: linguists; personnel trained in the art of
tactical questioning; or interrogators.
b. Imagery Intelligence. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) is
intelligence gained from all types of pictures, or more properly,
images. The information conveyed by an image is clear, concise
and usually unequivocal (although analysts must always be wary
of deception). The bulk of IMINT is derived from sources such as
satellites, aircraft and UAVs fitted with sensors designed for taking
either still or moving aerial pictures. However, hand held cameras
as used on patrols can provide valuable imagery for analysis.
IMINT is defined as: ‘Intelligence derived from imagery acquired
by photographic, radar, electro-optical, infra-red and thermal (heat
based) sensors, which can be ground based, sea borne or carried
by overhead platforms.’
c. Open Source Information. Open Source Information
(OSINF) is information derived from open sources (sources
available to anyone) such as: radio; television; newspapers;
books; state propaganda; academic and scientific journals;
manuals and published papers; and the Internet. OSINF contains
no classified information and is most likely to be used as a source
of Basic Intelligence. It can also be used as confirmation or
clarification of other intelligence or information which may be
classified and thus allow intelligence to be more widely shared.
d. Signals Intelligence. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is the
generic term used to describe all intelligence derived from the
Electro-Magnetic Spectrum (EMS). It is in fact divided into two
quite distinct parts:
BJDP-2.00
1-13
(1) Communications Intelligence. Communications
Intelligence (COMINT) is intelligence obtained from
information gained through the interception of
communications and data links. Such information may be
collected in either verbal form, for example by the
reception of broadcast radio messages, or by the
interception of point-to-point communications such as
telephone or facsmile.
(2) Electronic Intelligence. Electronic Intelligence
(ELINT) is intelligence derived from the technical
assessment of emissions from such equipment as Radar
and Missile Guidance Systems. It also covers lasers and
infrared devices and any other equipment which produces
emissions in the EMS. By comparing information about
the emissions with data already held in a database (each
type of equipment has a unique ‘signature’) it is possible
to derive intelligence about the equipment and its
controlling authority.
BJDP-2.00
1-14
THE PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE
Figure 1.5 – The Principles of Intelligence.
1.20 The 8 basic principles that govern the production of intelligence
and the organisation and activities of those who produce it are listed
above in Figure 1.5. If these principles are not adhered to, the quality and
effectiveness of the intelligence product will be seriously diminished. They
are to be applied by all Intelligence Staffs within the RBAF. The principles,
which are usually listed using the pneumonic CROSSCAT, are:
a. Centralised Control. Intelligence must be centrally
controlled in order to: avoid unnecessary duplication of effort;
provide mutual support; and ensure efficient and economical use
of resources. Normally, centralisation will be focused at the
highest practical level to ensure the widest possible coverage for
the resources available.
PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE
C - CENTRALISED CONTROL
R - RESPONSIVENESS
O - OBJECTIVITY
S - SYSTEMATIC EXPLOITATION
S - SOURCE PROTECTION
C - CONTINUOUS REVIEW
A - ACCESSIBILITY
T - TIMELINESS
BJDP-2.00
1-15
b. Responsiveness. Intelligence staffs must be responsive to
the IRs of the commander at all times.
c. Objectivity. Information, or the interpretation of it, must not
be distorted to fit pre-conceived ideas.
d. Systematic Exploitation. Sources and Agencies must be
systematically exploited by methodical tasking based on a
thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations.
e. Source Protection. All sources of information must be
adequately protected from threats at all times. The protection
afforded to a source must be balanced against the operational
need to make any intelligence derived from their information
accessible to the user.
f. Continuous Review. Intelligence must be continuously
reviewed and where necessary revised, taking into account all
new information and comparing it with what is already known. It
must be remembered that the process is cyclical in nature and is
never complete until the battle is won.
g. Accessibility. All relevant information must be readily
available to both users and the intelligence staffs. Information and
intelligence is of no value if it is not accessible to those who need
to have all relevant facts available to them in order to make valid
assessments.
h. Timeliness. Intelligence must be disseminated to those who
need it in time for it to be of use. The most accurate information or
intelligence is useless if it arrives at its destination too late for
appropriate action to be taken.
BJDP-2.00
1-16
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
BJDP-2.00
2-1
CHAPTER 2: THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE
BJDP-2.00
2-2
2.01 A structured and systematic approach is required to deal with: all
the information that is available; to identify what is relevant or to seek for
that which is not present; and to process the right information into
intelligence before disseminating it to those who need it, in time for it to be
of use. The Intelligence Cycle is the framework within which four
operations are conducted to achieve this, culminating in the distribution of
the finished intelligence product. The sequence is cyclic in nature since
intelligence requires constant reappraisal and updating, if it is to remain
current and relevant to the Commander’s needs. These ‘stages’ are
explained below and shown diagrammatically in Figure 2.1:
a. Direction. The direction stage is where the commander sets
out his Intelligence Requirements (IRs) and the collection effort is
planned by the Intelligence Staffs.
b. Collection. Information is gathered in the collection stage
according to a planned, systematic exploitation of sources and
agencies as directed by the Intelligence Staff.
c. Processing. During the processing stage, information is
converted into intelligence by collation, evaluation, analysis,
interpretation and integration.
d. Dissemination. The dissemination stage sees intelligence
being distributed to those who need it, in an appropriate form, by
any suitable means, in time for it to be of use.
DIRECTION
COLLECTIONDISSEMINATION
PROCESSING
Figure 2.1 – The Intelligence Cycle.
BJDP-2.00
2-3
DIRECTION
2.02 Direction is the first stage of the Intelligence Cycle and consists of
the elements shown in Figure 2.2:
IDENTIFICATION OF
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT
CONTINUOUS CHECKS ON THE
PRODUCTIVITY OF SUCH AGENCIES
PLANNING OF
COLLECTION EFFORT
ISSUE OF ORDERS & REQUEST TO
COLLECTION AGENCIES
Figure 2.2 – Stage 1 of the Intelligence Cycle: Direction.
2.03 There are two aspects to Direction:
a. Commander’s Direction to Intelligence Staff. The
Commander must direct his Intelligence Staff. He must give clear
instructions concerning the intelligence that he needs and, where
necessary, set a time limit on its provision. His directions should
always be as specific as possible and, wherever possible, he
should place his IRs in an order of priority.
b. Intelligence Staff Direction to Sources and Agencies. The
direction given by Intelligence Staff to their sources and agencies
forms the basis of the ‘Collection Plan’. One of the principles of
intelligence (Systematic Exploitation) must be applied. Compiling
the collection plan involves:
BJDP-2.00
2-4
(1) Deciding how the commander’s questions are going
to be answered and what information and intelligence is
required to do so satisfactorily.
(2) Tasking appropriate sources and agencies to collect
the necessary information or to provide the intelligence.
(3) Maintaining a continuous check that the right
information is being collected in the right time frame.
2.04 Intelligence Requirements (IRs). IRs are a series of questions
which may come from the Commander or fall out of the Intelligence
Estimate or Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)/Environment
(IPE) process. They are formulated to obtain the intelligence necessary to
support a commander in the development of a successful plan to achieve
his mission. Where the Commander has an anticipated and stated priority
for IRs to support his planning and decision-making, these are termed
Commander’s Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs). Typically,
Commander’s PIRs focus on intelligence concerning the enemy and the
environment critical to the planning and successful execution of friendly
Courses of Action (CoAs).
Indicators
2.05 In conventional operations before the process of making the
Collection Plan can take place, the intelligence staff has to identify key
indicators of enemy activity which are appropriate to the particular
operation. The nature of the indicators that are selected will drive the
choice of sources and agencies that will be tasked to collect the
information and provide intelligence. Figure 2.3 below shows how
Indicators are grouped under 3 headings: Alert or Warning Indicators;
Tactical or Combat Indicators; and Identification Indicators.
BJDP-2.00
2-5
TACTICAL/COMBAT INDICATORS
Tactical or Combat Indicators reveal the type of
operation that the enemy is preparing to conduct.
Each type of operation across the spectrum of
operations requires specific and characteristic
preparations.
The indicators linked to these preparations can be
defined well in advance and linked to specific types of
operation.
An example might be the loading of armoured
vehicles on ships or railway wagons indicating an
armoured operation.
ALERT/WARNING
INDICATORS
Alert or Warning Indicators
relate to preparations for
aggressive action carried out
by a potential enemy or
belligerent, which give early
warning of the fact that
hostilities are imminent.
An example might be the out-
loading of War Maintenance
Reserve Stocks or the call up
of reservist personnel.
IDENTIFICATION INDICATORS
Identification Indicators and signature equipment are those which enable the identity and
role of a formation, unit or installation to be determined from the recognition of its
organisation, equipment or tactics.
An example might be the sighting of a specific number of M109 SP Guns with associated
support vehicles indicating a Heavy Artillery Battery, Troop or Regiment.
Figure 2.3 – Types of Indicators.
2.06 In non-conventional operations, e.g. counter terrorism or counter
insurgency, definitive factors of activity are unlikely to be available or may
be of a generic nature. The lack of indicators should not prevent
preparation of the Collection Plan. As a campaign or operation evolves
and an enemy becomes better known indicators will become more readily
available.
The Collection Coordination and Intelligence
Requirement Management Concept
2.07 The Collection Coordination and Intelligence Requirement
Management (CCIRM) concept shown in Figure 2.4 has been developed
to ensure an effective Collection Plan which is managed in accordance
with the Principles of Intelligence to answer the Commanders PIRs and
IRs. CCIRM encompasses those activities that result in the most effective
BJDP-2.00
2-6
and efficient employment of intelligence collection, processing,
exploitation and reporting to satisfy tactical, operational and strategic IRs.
Although the word collection is used as part of CCIRM, it must be
understood that because of its nature CCIRM falls within the Direction
stage of the Intelligence Cycle, rather than in the Collection stage.
SOURCE
AGENCY
TASKING
OWN CCIRM
COLLECTION
PLAN
SOURCE
AGENCY
TASKINGCOLLECTION
PLAN
PIR
IR
RFI
Figure 2.4 – CCIRM Concept Flow Chart.
2.08 The CCIRM concept gives rise to an effective intelligence
structure that allows for rapid and efficient tasking of sources and
agencies. CCIRM comprises two major components:
a. Coordination of the Collection Effort. Collection
coordination is the development and control of a collection plan
that sets out how and from whom the information and intelligence
needed to meet the PIRs and IRs is to be collected:
(1) PIRs and IRs are converted into a Request for
Information (RFI) or tasking in the form of orders,
BJDP-2.00
2-7
dependent on the relationship with the source or agency.
These are the specific questions that are put to sources
and agencies.
(2) Coordination involves the tasking of subordinate
sources that provide raw information and subordinate
agencies that produce processed intelligence. Sources
and agencies outside the control of the relevant CCIRM
Staffs may also be requested to provide the answers to
RFIs.
(3) If a number of RFIs or tasking orders are directed at
the same source or agency, CCIRM Staffs are required to
put them in order of priority.
(4) CCIRM Staffs must fully understand the capabilities
and limitations of the sources and agencies with which
they operate. They must break PIRs into constituent IRs
and translate these into RFIs or tasking orders capable of
being answered by the selected source or agency with the
minimum of time and effort.
b. IR Management. In overseeing the overall management of
the processing, exploitation and reporting of intelligence to satisfy
tactical, operational and strategic PIRs and IRs, individual CCIRM
Staffs must closely monitor the product from sources and
agencies to ensure that it is timely, accurate and relevant:
(1) Responses to RFIs or tasking orders by sources and
agencies must be passed directly to the originator of the
IR, with CCIRM Staff as an information addressee only,
thereby saving valuable response time.
(2) To manage the IR process, CCIRM Staff must
maintain a database of RFIs and tasking orders and the
subsequent responses, in order to ensure that time is not
wasted in duplicating similar questions at a later time. It is
BJDP-2.00
2-8
good practice to have this database widely available, to
allow the originators of IRs to do their own research;
however, this requires a robust IT system and a standard
user format. To allow for changes in PIRs and IRs, the
collection plan will require constant review/revision and
updating.
2.09 In summary, CCIRM develops logically from the Direction,
Collection and Processing stages of the Intelligence Cycle. It is a
management function that enables the timely flow of intelligence by
coordinating the information collection effort and facilitating the provision
of intelligence. It is a skilled task, which must be practiced frequently in
peacetime to ensure maximum efficiency on operations.
BJDP-2.00
2-9
COLLECTION
2.10 Collection is the second stage of the Intelligence Cycle. It is the
process by which information or intelligence is collected in order to meet
the PIRs and IRs that were identified in the Direction stage. There are 2
parts to the collection process:
a. The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and of
sources and agencies by the Intelligence Staff.
b. The timely delivery of the information collected by sources
and agencies to the next stage of the Intelligence Cycle where it
will be processed into intelligence.
The Exploitation of Sources and Agencies
2.11 Chapter 1 of this publication described the differences between
sources and agencies. Intelligence Staff must know the detailed
capabilities and limitations of all the controlled and uncontrolled sources
and agencies that are available to them. This enables them to select the
appropriate source or agency for a particular task and allows them to
conduct a vital check on source or agency reliability and productivity.
2.12 In selecting a source or agency for a particular task, there are a
number of factors that must be taken into consideration:
a. Security. Sources and agencies must be adequately
protected and not put into unnecessary danger. Failure to protect
them will result in either the loss of the source or agency, or its
compromise by the enemy, who may then be able to use it to feed
deceptive information into the system. The inconsiderate use of
sources and agencies could also result in the compromise of the
operation that they are supporting.
b. Capability. A source or agency tasked to collect information
or produce intelligence must be capable of carrying out the task.
BJDP-2.00
2-10
The intelligence system will soon be discredited if operational
units are tasked beyond their capabilities.
c. Suitability. There will be occasions when more than one
source or agency is capable of carrying out a collection task. In
deciding which source or agency to choose, careful consideration
must be given to the attributes of each to ensure that the most
appropriate for the task is chosen.
d. Risk. Occasions may arise where the information or
intelligence required is so vital that the need for its collection
outweighs the risks involved. Such occasions place difficult
decisions on the shoulders of the senior intelligence officer who
may feel it necessary to consult the Commander if time allows.
e. Battle Space Environment. Various components of the
battle space environment such as weather, terrain or political
constraint may limit the ability of a source or agency to collect
information. Such considerations must be taken into account
when planning the tasking of sources and agencies. Dependent
upon how critical a particular item of information may be,
alternative sources may be tasked on a contingency basis to cater
for changes in the environment.
f. Multiplicity and Balance. Multiplicity is the tasking of more
than one source to collect the same information. Doing so gives
greater assurance that the information will be collected and is a
valuable aid towards verification of the information, helping to
guard against deception. Balance is achieved by ensuring an
even distribution of the collection workload across the whole
range of sources and agencies that are available. Corroboration
is required in targeting operations.
BJDP-2.00
2-11
Delivery of Information
2.13 The value of information and intelligence decreases with the
passage of time. In order to reduce the rate of decay, timings within the
Intelligence Cycle must be as short as possible. It is, therefore, an
essential requirement that sources deliver their information within the time
specified by the tasking organisation:
a. Response Time. Response time of a collection system will
depend to a large extent on the type of source or agency that is
deployed. If a system such as a manned aircraft is used to meet
the tasking, the deployment time of the system may add
considerably to the response time. If however the source is
already deployed, as in the case of a satellite system or a SIGINT
collection system, the overall response time may be shorter.
Efficient management of sources can further reduce response
time. In the case of the manned aircraft, if an air force unit knows
it is being used in the information gathering role, times and
numbers of sorties flown can be managed to ensure aircraft are
deployed and ready to respond as soon as tasking is received.
b. Reporting Time. The value of the majority of information
collected to be used at the tactical level during operations
decreases rapidly with the passage of time. The most desirable
condition is that information should reach the analyst in near real
time. With modern communications and collection systems this
can quite often be achieved. However, many sources still take
some time to deliver their information. These times can vary
widely and must be taken into consideration when choosing which
source or agency to task. Some of the factors that affect the
reporting time of sources and agencies are:
(1) The requirement to make contact with or recover the
source.
BJDP-2.00
2-12
(2) The requirement for the information to undergo some
form of processing before it can be interpreted, such as
developing film from a camera.
(3) The availability and capability of communications
systems.
2.14 The Nature of the Collection Plan. The Collection Plan must be
seen as a dynamic process requiring energy and zeal in its management;
sources and agencies must be tasked on a continual basis. Planners
must react to changes in information and IRs that develop as the
operation progresses, which themselves may be the result of previous
tasking of the sources and agencies.
2.15 Management of Collection Assets. The management of
collection assets should be dedicated to an Intelligence, Surveillance,
Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) Officer above Battalion
level. The ISTAR Officer has a number of tools available to manage these
assets. The ISTAR Synchronisation Matrix draws together the Collection
Plan and Decision Support Overlay (DSO). The ISTAR Synchronisation
Matrix is in effect an order that allocates secondary tasks to assets.
Because of this, it must be staffed to and authorised by the Commander.
2.16 Collection Plan. The Collection Plan is the primary tool for
allocating ISTAR assets to IRs. However, while it tells collectors what
question to answer, it does not tell them where or when to look. Rather,
the DSO from the IPB/IPE and Planning process show where to look and
the ISTAR Synchronisation Matrix shows when.
BJDP-2.00
2-13
PROCESSING
2.17 Processing is that part of the Intelligence Cycle in which
information is converted into intelligence. Processing is a structured
series of actions which, although set out sequentially, can also take place
concurrently. The 5 elements of processing are shown in Figure 2.5
below:
Figure 2.5 – Processing Stage Elements.
2.18 Processing is carried out at a number of points in the information
and intelligence chain of command. Each new processing sequence
relates the intelligence to facts that are not available at other levels. For
instance in conventional operations, there may be greater knowledge of
an enemy’s strategic, operational and flanking operations, but in non-
conventional operations a lower level may have a greater knowledge of an
adversary’s capabilities and level of support from the local population.
Thus it is important for information to be shared as quickly as possible
with other layers of command even if it appears at one level that is
yielding no intelligence.
PROCESSING STAGE
COLLATION
ANALYSIS EVALUATION
INTERPRETATION
INTEGRATION
COLLECTION
STAGE
DISSEMINATION
STAGE
BJDP-2.00
2-14
Collation
2.19 Collation is made up of the procedures for receiving, grouping and
recording all reports arriving in an Intelligence Office, at any level. It
involves:
a. The basic task of allocating an identifying number to and
registering the receipt of each incoming item of information and
intelligence.
b. The placing of each piece of information or intelligence into an
appropriate category or group through recording on a log sheet,
marking on a map or chart, filing, indexing or entering into an
electronic database.
c. The maintenance of a system for collation, which allows any
member of the Intelligence Staff to rapidly and efficiently collate
information and intelligence.
2.20 There are no fixed formats for collation and the method applied
will vary in each situation. As a basic principle, graphical displays of
information and intelligence should be used wherever possible, as this is
the method by which the Intelligence Staff can acquire and assimilate the
maximum amount of information in the shortest possible time. Further
examples are provided in the RBAF Intelligence Operators Handbook
(See Chapter 4 – Processing).
2.21 The categories or groups into which information and intelligence
are placed through the collation system should be related to the
formation’s AII and to the type of operations that are to be conducted.
They must also be based on:
a. The Commander’s PIRs and IR.
b. The volume of information that is expected to be held by, and
to pass through, the system.
BJDP-2.00
2-15
FACTORS AFFECTING COLLATION
1. STANDARDISATION
2. COMMON SUBJECT HEADINGS
3. CROSS REFERENCING
4. VISUAL PRESENTATION
5. URGENCY AND SPEED OF REACTION
6. RESTRICTIONS ON VOLUME OF RECORDS
7. PRAGMATISM
8. PRIORITY
Figure 2.6 – Factors affecting Collation. 2.22 Factors Affecting Collation. Figure 2.6 lists the factors that
should be taken into account when establishing and operating a collation
system:
a. Standardisation. Whenever possible, the subject headings
and sub-headings of the groupings into which information and
intelligence is placed should conform to a framework set out by
the Intelligence Staff at the next higher formation headquarters
(HQ). Therefore, logically, the standard flows down from the
highest level HQ involved in an operation, with each subordinate
HQ adding more headings according to the level of detail
required. Standardised subject headings and database structures
facilitate the exchange of information and intelligence across, and
up and down the chain of command. Furthermore, the use of
standardised systems is likely to speed up processing times; for
example, the standardised spelling of an organisation, piece of
equipment or person prevents confusion.
b. Common Subject Headings. The selection of headings and
sub-headings by the Intelligence Staff should be based upon the
PIR and IR associated with the particular type of operation being
undertaken, and the battle-space environment within which it is to
BJDP-2.00
2-16
be conducted. The sensible selection of headings and
sub-headings will make the categorisation of information and
intelligence relatively straightforward.
c. Cross Referencing. All entries in the system should be
cross-referenced to the original reports and to entries in the filing
system, the log and indexes. Where electronic databases are
used, their relational nature will carry out much of this work
automatically. When using electronic databases it is important to
ensure that back-up copies of at least the key elements of the
database are kept, ideally independent of the power source for the
original database.
d. Visual Presentation. The visual impact of maps, diagrams
and graphical based presentations should be exploited as an aid
to the rapid assimilation of large amounts of information and
intelligence.
e. Urgency and Speed of Reaction. The system must have
the capacity to react swiftly to short notice requests for the
information and intelligence required to meet the Commander’s
PIRs and urgent IRs.
f. Restrictions on the Volume of Records. The capacity of
the system to deal with a particular volume of records for both
throughput and storage will be dictated by:
(1) The numbers of intelligence personnel available to
operate the system.
(2) The nature and tempo of operations.
(3) The capacity of recording equipment.
(4) The capacity of the storage and retrieval system.
(5) The physical space available in the Intelligence Office
or Cell.
BJDP-2.00
2-17
(6) The size and scope of the intelligence task.
g. Pragmatism. There will always be a temptation to try to
process every piece of information and intelligence coming into
the Intelligence Cell. This will almost inevitably lead to systems
and procedures becoming overloaded and slowing down. To
avoid this, a compromise must be struck between what is
desirable and what is practicable. This can only be achieved by
adopting a pragmatic approach to the collation process.
h. Priority. The collators must always be aware of the priorities
placed on various IRs, so that incoming information related to
them is given the correct priority and treated with the appropriate
degree of urgency.
Evaluation 2.23 Evaluation is the step in the processing stage which determines
the reliability of the source and credibility of the information provided. The
evaluation step allocates a rating to each piece of information or
intelligence, indicating the degree of confidence that may be placed upon
it. This rating is based partly on the subjective judgment of the evaluator,
partly on experience of other information produced by the same source
and, in the case of information produced by a sensor, the knowledge of
the accuracy of the particular sensor system.
2.24 In order to avoid any bias between rating the reliability of sources
and the credibility of the information provided, both factors have to be
considered separately and independently. The internationally accepted
NATO standardised values for allocating ratings for the reliability of
sources and credibility of information are shown in Figure 2.7 below:
BJDP-2.00
2-18
Completely ReliableA
Usually ReliableB
Fairly ReliableC
Not Usually ReliableD
UnreliableE
Reliability Cannot Be JudgedF Truth Cannot be Judged6
Improbable5
Doubtful4
Confirmed by other sources1
Probably True2
Possibly True3
RELIABILITY OF SOURCE CREDIBILITY OF INFORMATION
Figure 2.7 – The Reliability and Credibility of Sources and Information. 2.25 Ratings allocated to a piece of information are derived by
combining the values of reliability and credibility; thus, a piece of
information judged to be ‘probably true’ from a source known to be
‘usually reliable’ would be rated B2. The advantages of using this method
of evaluation are that:
a. It provides standardised, internationally accepted and
understood, shorthand to evaluate the quality of information.
b. Over a period of time, it gives an indication of the capabilities
of various sources and agencies, and aids the selection of those
that are best suited to particular tasks.
2.26 In keeping with the Continuous Review principle of intelligence,
Intelligence Staffs should routinely review sources and re-grade them
according to their current reliability and relative worth.
BJDP-2.00
2-19
Analysis and Integration
2.27 Analysis and integration are defined separately, although in
practice integration follows on from analysis without a break. Therefore, in
reality, the two processes are treated as one. During analysis, the
collated and evaluated information is scanned for significant facts. These
are then related to other facts that are already known and deductions
made from the comparison. Integration is the drawing together of these
deductions to identify a pattern of intelligence (a sequence of events or a
pen picture of an individual). This aspect of processing is almost totally
mental and is the critical point in the Intelligence Cycle.
2.28 Training in analytical techniques, e.g. dialetics, critical thinking, all
underpin this task. In common with many other routines involving the use
of personal judgement, the Analysts’ skills will improve with practice. It is
the responsibility of all those in authority in the intelligence area to ensure
that Analysts receive regular and consistent practice in peacetime, with
constructive feedback on their performance. This regular practice and
honing of the Analyst’s skill will ensure that the right level of ability exists
at the outset of operations. It is also necessary to ensure that the right
calibre of people are identified to join the Intelligence Staff, as not
everyone has the flair, imagination or mental faculty to be successful in
this area.
Link Analysis 2.29 Link Analysis identifies relationships between subjects by relating
individuals to locations, vehicles and incidents. The process of building a
link analysis chart is systematic:
a. The first step is to identify the basic entities the link analysis
will focus upon, the people, organisations, places, vehicles,
weapons and incidents/events.
b. Once entities have been identified, then the matrix can be
completed showing confirmed and suspected/assessed links. IT
can simplify this process.
BJDP-2.00
2-20
c. For the purpose of brevity, accuracy and source protection,
each entity should be given a unique identifier.
Interpretation
2.30 Interpretation is the final stage in Processing, where information,
which has been collated, evaluated, analysed and integrated, is finally
interpreted to complete the process of converting information into
intelligence.
2.31 The Mental Process. Interpretation is an objective mental
process of comparison and deduction based on common sense, life
experience, military knowledge (covering both friendly and enemy forces)
and existing information and intelligence. During interpretation new
information is compared with, or added to, that which is already known,
giving rise to fresh intelligence. This mental process can be broken down
into a sequence of principal questions that must be asked about the item
of information that is being considered:
a. Identification. Who is it? What is it? This is not merely
matching an identity to a unit or a name to a piece of equipment;
rather, it is the consideration of all the implications of the presence
of that unit or piece of equipment at that particular point in time
and space.
b. Activity. What is it doing? Details of current activity must
always be compared with information about previous activity, to
discover whether there is any change in activity patterns. This
can simply be described as the absence of the normal (inactivity)
or the presence of the abnormal; activity that fulfills either criterion
must have some significance.
c. Significance. What do the answers to the first two questions
mean? What is their significance? Do they have any relevance to
the IRs and the bigger intelligence picture?
BJDP-2.00
2-21
d. Completion. In answering the last question the analyst must
be sure that a piece of information has been fully exploited to
make all possible deductions. One way of achieving this is to ask
‘so what?’ whenever a deduction has been reached, and when
that question has been answered, to ask ‘so what?’ again. Only
when no further answers can be found have all deductions been
made.
e. Beware Deception. Intelligence Staff are a prime target for
deception. Therefore, analysts must be suspicious by nature,
must not jump to conclusions and must seek confirmation of even
the most credible information from the most reliable of sources.
History has shown that deception pays dividends to the deceiver
and is a powerful and effective component of Command and
Control Warfare (C2W).
f. Confirmation. At the end of this mental process, the
deductions and conclusions flowing from it are fitted into the
intelligence picture. However, in almost every case, the resultant
intelligence will not be conclusive and there will be a requirement
to acquire further information to either confirm or refute these
deductions or conclusions. The need to meet these new
requirements drives the Intelligence Cycle and the repetitious
nature of the Collection Plan.
Summary 2.32 The systematic treatment of information and intelligence carried
out during the Processing Stage is a combination of bringing order to the
receipt and recording of information (collation), and the applying of logic
and method to the mental process of converting information into
intelligence. The mental process itself relies upon: a broad knowledge of
the enemy’s tactics, equipment and organisation; a depth of tactical
experience on the part of the Analyst; and the possession and the
application of common sense, coupled with the ability to make reasoned
deductions.
BJDP-2.00
2-22
2.33 It is the reasoning skill of a human being which is critical to the
successful operation of the analytical process at the heart of the
Processing Stage. This skill is acquired rather than taught, and is the
product of practice and experience over a period of time. Developing and
maintaining this analytical skill is core to the predictive nature of
intelligence.
BJDP-2.00
2-23
DISSEMINATION 2.34 Dissemination is defined as: ‘the timely conveyance of
intelligence, in an appropriate form and by any suitable means, to those
who need it.’ The key components of this definition are:
a. Timeliness. The majority of intelligence, certainly at the
operational and tactical levels, is time sensitive; that is to say that
it loses its value with the passage of time. This drives the
requirement to get intelligence to its intended user as quickly as
possible. When the processing stage has had to be truncated in
order to meet deadlines, the resultant intelligence must be clearly
marked as such, so that the user may treat it with a fitting degree
of caution and discretion. Intelligence which reaches its intended
destination too late for the purpose for which it was intended is
worthless.
b. Appropriateness. Intelligence must be in a format relevant
to the needs of the recipient. It must meet his requirements, it
must be in the correct language, and it must be disseminated by a
system common to both sender and recipient. If it fails to meet
any of these requirements, it will, in common with belated
intelligence, be worthless. Therefore, in peace time, it is
incumbent upon Intelligence Staff at the highest command and
control levels to ensure that the systems to be used on operations
are appropriate for the intelligence task and available to controlled
sources, agencies, recipients and Intelligence Staff at all levels.
The Principles of Dissemination 2.35 Dissemination is governed by the following set of principles:
a. Accuracy. Disseminated material must be accurate. It must
report the situation exactly as it has been factually proved,
complimented by interpretation, agreed by the formation senior
Intelligence Officer, or with any interpretation handed down from
BJDP-2.00
2-24
higher formation. Any disagreement over interpretation must be
resolved between intelligence staffs prior to further dissemination.
b. Brevity. Reports must be as brief as possible and yet must
include everything that the recipient(s) need to know. It takes time
to shorten both written and oral briefs and Intelligence Staff must
allow themselves time to do so. The effectiveness of visual
presentations in imparting information quickly should always be
borne in mind.
c. Interpretation. A clear differentiation must always be made
between facts and the interpretation of them. In all written
material, any interpretation should be preceded by the word
‘Comment’ to show deductions and the results of analysis or
‘Assessment’ to show how intelligence has been interpreted
during the Processing Stage. In oral briefings, the difference
between fact and interpretation should be emphasised by the use
of phrases such as ‘the conclusion to be drawn from this is….’ or
‘it is probable/possible that this means…’.
d. Standardisation. Reports will be understood more quickly
and easily if they are written in a logical sequence, following a
standard format with which everyone is familiar. Details of the
formats of these reports must be included in Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs). When disseminating intelligence outside the
formation whose SOPs are being followed, care must be taken
that an explanation of any unusual or non-standard formatting is
included with the report.
e. Evaluation. An evaluation of each item of information
included in an intelligence report should be made, rather than an
evaluation of the whole report. The evaluation should be in the
alphanumeric format set out in Figure 2.7.
f. Timeliness. Whenever possible, information should be
processed into intelligence before dissemination, rather than
being disseminated as information. The interpretation of the facts
BJDP-2.00
2-25
is usually more valuable than the facts themselves. However,
when time is at a premium, processing of urgent information may
not be possible. In these circumstances, information should be
disseminated as quickly as possible with the caveat that it has not
been processed. This is particularly true for current information,
although the occasions when this is necessary should be rare; the
processing stage is primarily a mental activity, so a quick
evaluation and interpretation should usually be possible. In this
instance, the report should state that the processing has been
swift and perhaps not fully considered.
g. Distribution. Intelligence Staff are responsible for ensuring
that all information and intelligence is passed to those who need
it. Senior Officers in each processing agency are to ensure their
SOPs clearly allocate responsibility for ensuring correct
distribution. Whilst it is inevitable that a great deal of reliance will
be placed on standard distribution lists, it is imperative that a
frequent periodic check is made to ensure that no one has been
omitted from the distribution of what could be vital intelligence to
them.
h. Regularity. The Commander and his Intelligence Staff will
require a summary of intelligence that affects their AIR on a
regular basis. The timings of these reports must be laid down in
SOPs, and they must follow the principles set out under the
heading of ‘standardisation’ above. In addition to these regular
reports, ad hoc responses to urgent IRs and PIRs will also be
required.
i. Security. Care must be taken not to over classify
intelligence. Over classification frequently imposes delay in
handling and transmission. As a general rule, information
concerning the enemy need not be encrypted if the enemy would
not have sufficient time to act upon it even if he became aware it
had been compromised. However, the greatest care must be
taken not to reveal the source of information, and there will be
occasions where the risk of compromising the source will have to
BJDP-2.00
2-26
be weighed against the value of using the information. On such
occasions, Intelligence Staff will have to make recommendations
in the form of an impact statement, setting out the consequences
of possible compromise in order to assist the Commander in
making a decision.
Dissemination Formats 2.36 There are four formats in which information and intelligence can
be disseminated, shown in Figure 2.8 below:
ELECTRONIC DATAWRITING
GRAPHICALLYVERBALLY
DISSEMINATION
Figure 2.8 – Types of Dissemination.
Verbal Dissemination
2.37 Verbal briefing is the original method of passing on information
and intelligence. It must be governed by the following principles:
a. Clarity. The briefer must ensure that he has rationalised his
thoughts before he starts his briefing or presentation. A briefing
should follow a standard format set out in SOPs and if necessary,
the briefer should follow written notes. The use of visual aids,
maps, drawings, diagrams and other images enhances the
BJDP-2.00
2-27
briefing and helps to clarify the information or intelligence that is
being briefed.
b. Relevance. The briefer must ensure that the information and
intelligence he is passing on is relevant to the level of operations
in which his audience is involved. Furthermore, it must be current
(that is to say not out of date) and must not already have been
briefed to the same audience.
c. Brevity. Brevity and succinctness are the keys to successful
verbal dissemination of information and intelligence. The good
briefer is one who imparts the most information in the fewest
words.
2.38 Types of verbal briefing. Verbal briefings may be given in one
of two styles:
a. Impromptu.1 An impromptu briefing is given when the
Commander or other personnel require to be brought up to date
as quickly as possible by the Intelligence Staff. Impromptu
briefings usually take place on a one to one basis or to a very
small group of people of the same specialisation (for example the
Commander and Chief of Staff together, but not a mix of
operational and logistics staff). They are informal in nature and do
not necessarily require a structured format. They contain only
those intelligence highlights needed to bring the audience up to
date from the time of the last formal briefing.
b. Formal. Formal briefings are given to a more formally
constituted group such as the Commander and his principal Staff
Officers or a group of Formation and/or Unit Commanders.
Formal briefing requires an element of time for its proper
preparation and should be given using a standard format with
which everyone is familiar. If they are not familiar with the format,
1 Without preparation, off-hand.
BJDP-2.00
2-28
the briefer must take time to explain the format beforehand.
Examples of formal briefs are:
(1) IPB Brief. An IPB Brief is used to deliver the results
of the IPB process in support of a wider operational
planning process. It includes the effects of terrain and
weather, the current enemy situation and capabilities and
enemy COAs.
(2) Formal Intelligence Brief. A Formal Intelligence
Brief is used for planned Update Briefs.
2.39 The pros and cons of verbal briefing. The advantages of
verbal briefing are that they are generally quick; facts are put across
succinctly and the briefer can be questioned easily, either during or after
the presentation. The disadvantage is that the effectiveness of the brief is
dependent, to a large extent, on the personality and skill of the briefer.
Written Dissemination
2.40 The principles of verbal dissemination are equally applicable to
written dissemination. Written Intelligence is usually disseminated through
the medium of either an Intelligence Summary (INTSUM), or an
Intelligence Report (INTREP):
a. INTSUM. The INTSUM is a concise, periodic summary of
intelligence on the current enemy situation within a Commander’s
AIR. It is designed to update the current intelligence situation and
to highlight important developments during the reporting period. It
contains information that may be relevant to the PIR and IR of any
commander and includes an appraisal based on evaluation and
interpretation of that information. An INTSUM is sent to those
who need it and the distribution must include all those whose
responsibilities and interests may be affected by its contents.
INTSUM formats will differ depending on the type of operations
being conducted, the environment and the adversary(s) faced.
BJDP-2.00
2-29
Higher Formations should dictate the format, frequency and timing
of INTSUMs from its subordinate Units.
b. INTREP. An INTREP is used for the immediate dissemination
of information or intelligence which is judged to be too urgent to
wait for the next INTSUM. An INTREP should contain any
deductions that can be made from the information and intelligence
in the time available. If time is pressing raw information may be
passed as an INTREP where a threat is identified as imminent or
there is an opportunity for rapid exploitation. The minimum
distribution of INTREPs should be laid down in SOPs at each level
of command. However, this should not inhibit the originator from
widening the distribution if he believes this necessary because the
INTREP contains information relevant to non-SOP addresses.
c. Other types of Intelligence Reports. There are many other
types of intelligence report, such as those produced by specialist
agencies covering technical intelligence and imagery analysis
reports. These are beyond the scope of this document.
Graphical Dissemination 2.41 Information or intelligence can be distributed as a Pictorial
Intelligence Summary (PICINTSUM):
a. Description. A PICINTSUM is a pictorial representation of
the enemy situation and may be produced in addition to or instead
of an INTSUM. It should include all the peripheral information
found on an INTSUM including classification, Date Time Group
(DTG) of its validity, originator and distribution list.
b. Format. A PICINTSUM can be produced as a trace,
schematic or overlay to a map, in which case it should clearly
show the map series, map sheets and scale of the map it relates
to, as well as grid reference points. The PICINTSUM should show
known current dispositions a well as assessed dispositions and
BJDP-2.00
2-30
intentions. It should be accompanied by notes explaining the
graphic symbols.
Electronic Data Dissemination
2.42 Increasingly, information and intelligence is disseminated
electronically. This approach removes the time consuming requirement
for the production of written messages and is more secure than radio
transmission. Furthermore, intelligence disseminated in this way reaches
its intended recipients faster. There are two main applications for the
electronic dissemination of intelligence:
a. System to System. A common or universal database format
or structure that electronically disseminated intelligence can be
placed into is a useful tool. If used properly, data does not have
to be altered between being extracted from one database and
being transmitted to and stored in a receiving database using the
same format or structure. If the common database structure is
replicated at each level of command, the dissemination of
intelligence up and down the chain of command is simplified and
very quick. However, care has to be taken to ensure that the
intelligence delivered to each level of command is relevant to that
level. There is always a danger of ‘dumping’ information on a
recipient which he doesn’t need, and is physically not capable of
processing due to a lack of resources.
b. Unstructured Data. Unstructured data that would otherwise
have been passed in written format, such as patrol reports,
INTREP or INTSUM can be stored in a database as text. Using
the search and retrieval tools common to most software,
intelligence can be ‘pulled’ quickly from one database and
‘pushed’ to another.
2.43 Management of Electronic Distribution. Large amounts of data
can easily be distributed across the chain of command without: it being
given the necessary consideration and context that give it meaning; nor
BJDP-2.00
2-31
the processing that will turn it into intelligence. Management of the flow of
information must be given careful consideration and must be practiced.
2.44 Communications. In preparing communication systems to
support the collation and dissemination of information and intelligence, the
following factors should be taken into consideration:
a. Speed. For the dissemination of intelligence speed is of the
essence. Therefore, wherever possible, an electronic
communication system should be used to pass intelligence in near
real time.
b. Encryption. Electronic encryption is instantaneous and has
no effect on the time taken to disseminate intelligence. Manual
encryption is time consuming and consideration must also be
given to the time taken to the process of decoding at the
recipients’ end. Where intelligence is urgent and of high priority,
the risk of compromise must be weighed against the time required
to complete manual encryption; in deciding whether to encrypt or
not, consideration should be given as to whether the enemy would
have time to respond to any intelligence compromised through a
lack of encryption.
c. Bandwidth. Bandwidth determines the rate at which
intelligence can be transmitted over the communications system;
the narrower the bandwidth, the slower the transmission rate.
This consideration particularly affects the exchange of large
quantities of data between databases, rather than the
dissemination of relatively small amounts of intelligence.
However, if the dissemination of even relatively small amounts of
intelligence is likely to involve graphics such as maps,
photographs or diagrams, then bandwidth again become a
significant factor.
d. Language. If intelligence is to be transmitted in a language
other than that understood by the recipient, a situation that could
occur in combined or coalition operations, consideration may have
BJDP-2.00
2-32
to be given to basing a Liaison Officer, fluent in the recipient’s
language, at the recipient’s location. Although resource intensive,
this method of dissemination prevents the possibility of
intelligence being misunderstood and then acted upon with
potentially disastrous consequences. Amongst the developed
nations that frequently provide forces to multinational coalitions, it
is accepted that English is the common language of the
intelligence community. It is essential that Intelligence Staffs
perfect their English during peacetime as it is too late once
operations have begun.
e. Point-to-point or all informed communications. The
decision to use point-to-point systems such as telephones or
facsimiles or to use an all informed system such as broadcast
radio, must be dictated by the nature of the intelligence that is to
be disseminated.
BJDP-2.00
2-33
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
BJDP-2.00
3-1
CHAPTER 3 – THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE AND INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE
BATTLESPACE/ENVIRONMENT
BJDP-2.00
3-2
THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
3.01 The intelligence process often produces large amounts of
information and intelligence that must be focused to best meet the
commander’s needs. At the same time, particularly in the earlier stages of
operational planning, the commander may not be in a position to give
precise direction. The Intelligence Estimate and Intelligence Preparation
of the Battlespace (IPB)/Environment (IPE), are 2 tools that can be used
to facilitate the focusing of the intelligence effort, including Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).
3.02 The Intelligence Estimate. The Estimate process is fundamental
to planning an operation. The aim of the Estimate is to reduce a complex
mass of information into a number of Courses of Action (CoAs) from which
the Commander can select his preferred CoA. It is by this means that the
Commander, supported by his Staff, formulates an Operational Plan. The
Estimate Process describes the operational environment and the
adversary situation in detail and helps the Commander to identify the
adversary Centre of Gravity (CoG). While this Chapter provides an
overview of the Intelligence Estimate, further depth and detail can be
found in the RBAF Intelligence Operators Handbook and therefore must
be used in conjunction with this publication during planning.
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE
BATTLESPACE/ENVIRONMENT
3.03 The purpose of IPB or IPE is to support the Commander’s
planning and decision-making process by providing him with the basis for
achieving situational awareness. It integrates the enemy picture with the
friendly forces, allowing the Commander to visualise the entire
battlespace, with different overlays covering almost every aspect
important to him. It also helps the Staff answer his Intelligence
Requirements (IRs) and assists in focusing collection assets on critical
activities.
3.04 IPB/IPE differs from written estimates as it is designed to present
information and intelligence graphically. The basic elements used in IPB
are similar to the Intelligence Estimate; however, the means by which
BJDP-2.00
3-3
these elements are developed and displayed is different. The main
advantages of IPB over the Intelligence Estimate include:
a. Ease and speed in updating and presenting a large
quantity of information and intelligence.
b. Ease of assimilating information and making amendments
to the intelligence picture due to changes in variable factors as
they occur, by making simple changes to overlays or computer
graphics.
c. Ease of co-ordinating large quantities of non-prioritised
information contained in intelligence databases.
d. Ease of identifying essential areas of intelligence interest
and decision points.
3.05 IPB procedures can be applied to any operational environment
and to operational specialities such as fire support, air defence, electronic
warfare and logistics to name a few. The IPB process has application in
Operations other than War, including for example Peace Support
Operations (PSO). Furthermore, the techniques used in the IPB process
can be applied equally well to the analysis of operations by friendly forces
including mobility factors, battlespace environment and Force Protection.
The extent to which it can be used will vary according to local
circumstances. Precise procedures can be adapted to meet the factors
relevant to a given situation, to the component concerned, local staff
resources and to the level of technological support available.
3.06 The IPB Concept. The IPB is a systematic, cyclical and dynamic
process, which is closely connected to the individual stages of the
Commander’s decision-making process. The results of the IPB process
are represented graphically on a series of overlays and supported by
written analysis. The overlays include basic data on terrain, weather and
the adversary’s tactical doctrine, all of which can be prepared during the
planning stage of an operation. Just prior to, and during operations,
current data will be added which, when integrated, will graphically show:
BJDP-2.00
3-4
a. Possible adversary options.
b. Locations where collection planning should be focused,
via the Collection Coordination and Information Requirements
Management (CCIRM) process, to monitor or detect both current
and future adversary activities.
c. Locations where own forces can influence the course of
events by using manoeuvre and, via the targeting process, strike
assets.
d. Decision points at which the Commander must act to
influence adversary operations.
THE IPB PROCESS
3.07 The IPB Process. The IPB process consists of the 4 steps
shown in Figure 3.1 and explained below:
Figure 3.1 – IPB Process.
THREAT INTEGRATION
STEP
3
STEP
2
STEP
1
STEP
4
DEFINE THE BATTLESPACE
THREAT EVALUATION
BATTLESPACE AREA EVALUATION
BJDP-2.00
3-5
a. Step 1 – Define the Battlespace. This step of the IPB
outlines the broad situation in terms of environment, stakeholders
and own forces. It also identifies, for further analysis, significant
characteristics of the battlespace. The outcome of this step is to
determine the Area of Intelligence Interest (AII) and also to
provide the Commander and Staff with sufficient background
knowledge of the environment’s characteristics that may affect
both the enemy and friendly Courses of Action (COAs). These
characteristics may include terrain, force capability, cultural
stakeholders, political, religious, infrastructure, economic, Laws of
Armed Conflict (LOAC), Laws of the Sea and human factors.
b. Step 2 – Battlespace Area Evaluation. This step
assesses the effects of particular characteristics of the
battlespace on operations conducted by both friendly and
adversary forces. Its primary purpose is to identify adversary and
friendly forces’ Mobility Corridors (MC) and Avenues of Approach
(AA), as well as Key Terrain (KT) and Vital Ground (VG). Some of
the principal factors affecting the battlespace are:
(1) Battlespace Environment. Features such as
maritime minefields, forests, mountainous terrain, urban
areas and threat Air Defence (AD) will, to varying
degrees, restrict the ability of all protagonists to move in
the battlespace. An analysis of the battlespace
environment will determine likely Severely Restricted,
Restricted and Unrestricted manoeuvre areas, the
characteristics of which are described in the table 3.1
below:
BJDP-2.00
3-6
Severely Restricted
Movement Restricted Movement
Unrestricted Movement
Joint Operations Area
Area over which manoeuvre by the force is impracticable due to terrain, weather or political considerations.
Area over which manoeuvre is only possible at reduced speed or with caution, is likely to be canalised or will only be possible with the deployment of additional assets.
Area, which is open to all components.
Maritime (separate overlays for surface and sub-surface elements may be necessary)
Water space in which ships or submarines will not operate due to depth of water, obstacles, threat levels or political considerations.
Water space in which manoeuvre is only possible with caution is likely to be canalised or will only be possible with the deployment of additional assets (e.g. minesweepers).
Water space open to all shipping without restrictions.
Land Ground over which manoeuvre by the type of force being considered is impracticable.
Ground over which manoeuvre is only possible, at reduced speed, is likely to be canalised or will only be possible with the deployments of additional assets.
Ground, which is open.
Table 3.1 – Movement in the Battlespace Environment.
(2) Infrastructure. The communications network,
including such elements as roads, ports and harbours,
maritime choke points, airfields, bridges, rail links and
terrain funnelling are important to mobility and support to
operations. Furthermore, in certain types of operations, it
may be necessary to limit damage to parts of the physical
infrastructure such as housing, key public utilities,
industrial facilities and the transportation network. This
will link with effects-based targeting and much of the
information may already be available within the DIS
integrated targets/Info Ops organisation.
(3) Protected Areas. The Laws of Armed Conflict
provide specific protection to certain types of building and
objects such as cultural property, places of worship and
medical facilities. These cannot normally be used for
BJDP-2.00
3-7
military purposes or targeted. The requirement to avoid
collateral damage and civilian casualties will place
constraints on operations in major population centres as
well. Also, certain installations such as nuclear power
plants and chemical production facilities could, if
damaged, pose a threat to the safety of friendly forces or
the civilian population.
(4) Weather Conditions. Weather conditions may
hinder or improve mobility. Bad weather can affect
maritime, air and aviation and, to a lesser effect, land
operations, communications and the use of ISR assets. In
a broader context, climate determines the types of
equipment, the logistical support and the training needed
for operations in a specific area.
(5) Human Factors. The demographic composition
of the area of operations, the attitudes of the ethnic or
political parties in a particular conflict, the presence of
Non-governmental Organisations and refugees are
important factors, particularly in non-conventional
operations.
c. Step 3 – Threat Evaluation. The aim of this step is to
identify the exact nature of the adversary and to provide an
assessment of the adversary’s capacity to conduct operations.
The adversary’s forces and dispositions are identified and from
consideration of the adversary’s doctrine, an assessment is made
of the tactics that are likely to be used in operations against
friendly forces.
d. Step 4 – Threat Integration. The fourth step of the IPB
process combines the results of the Battlespace Area Evaluation
with the doctrinal understanding developed in the Threat
Evaluation. The impact of the constraints imposed by the
battlespace environment on the likely operational and/or tactical
approach of the adversary is considered to determine his likely
CoAs. His most likely CoA can be assessed, potential critical
points in his plan identified and his CoG determined. The threat
BJDP-2.00
3-8
integration process consists of the production of a sequence of
overlays:
(1) The Situation Overlay. The adversary’s
doctrinal model is moulded to fit restrictions imposed by
the factors shaping the battlespace environment such as
terrain, infrastructure, protected areas, weather and other
relevant factors. Based on an assessment of his aim,
strengths and weaknesses and his possible deployment
and tactics, a Situation Overlay is produced for each CoA
showing his deployment adapted to the terrain along
identified AAs. The overlay should also include time lines
showing rates of advance or withdrawal, and phase lines
indicating points in time and space of critical importance
to the adversary in maintaining his momentum.
(2) The Event Overlay. The Event Overlay is
derived from the Situation Overlay and identifies
graphically when and where key tactical events might take
place. Locations where events of importance to the
conduct of the operation may occur are designated as
Named Areas of Interest (NAI). These may include Point,
Line or Area NAIs or a combination. Detection and
recognition of events or activities at these points and/or
areas will confirm or deny the adversary’s intention to
pursue a specific CoA. Furthermore, the identification of
NAIs prompts the tasking of collection assets in order to
establish and maintain surveillance over these areas. It
should be noted that while several Situation Overlays may
be produced, only one Event Overlay is produced. This is
because the NAIs shown in the Event Overlay are
intended to identify which CoA the enemy is following.
e. The Decision Support Overlay. The Decision Support
Overlay is the end product of the integration process. It is
essentially a combined intelligence and operational estimate in
graphical form. Thus it is not a solely intelligence product and
requires from across the Planning Staff. The NAIs identified on
the Event Overlay are refined by the Intelligence and Operations
BJDP-2.00
3-9
Staff in the course of Wargaming to develop Target Areas of
Interest (TAI). TAIs, which can also be points or areas, are where
the Commander can influence the operation by destroying,
delaying or disrupting the threat using his strike assets. The
identification of TAIs is the initial step in the targeting process. A
Decision Point (DP) or a Decision Line (DL) must be identified for
each TAI. DPs and DLs are points and lines offset in time and
space from their respective TAIs, where the Commander must
make a decision to use his assets if he is to influence the
operation at a particular TAI. As with the NAIs, it is necessary to
maintain surveillance over TAIs and DPs. This requirement to
maintain surveillance, as well as the need to acquire further
targeting data will provide additional input to the Collection Plan
and ISR.
3.08 Application. Besides enabling a Commander to determine his
IRs through clarity of presentation and logic, IPB also provides the basis
for wargaming, which is used to develop the detailed plan, by comparing
the CoA determined by the commander or his operations staff with the
most likely adversary CoA identified through the IPB process. The
Decision Support Overlay refined through wargaming can assist the
Commander and his Staff in managing the plan. The products of the IPB
process can support and enhance the development of overlays showing,
for example, the assessed adversary Fires capability, possible
dispositions of an adversary’s sea and air defences, an estimate of
adversary collection capabilities and an assessment of adversary CBRN
capability.
BJDP-2.00
3-10
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
BJDP-2.00
Lexicon-1
LEXICON
This Lexicon contains acronyms/abbreviations and terms/definitions used
in this publication.
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AA Avenue of Approach (IPB or IPE term)
AD Air Defence
AII Area of Intelligence Interest
AIR Area of Intelligence Responsibility
ARS Armoured Reconnaissance Squadron
C2W Command, Control Warfare
C3 Command, Control, Communications
CCIRM Collection Co-ordination and Information Requirements
Management
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CI Counter-intelligence
CNR Combat Net Radio
CoA Course of Action
CoG Centre of Gravity
COMINT Communication Intelligence
DTG Date Time Group
DL Decision Line
DP Decision Point in IPB or IPE
DTG Date, Time, Group
DSO Decision Support Overlay
ELINT Electronic Intelligence
EMS Electronic Magnetic Signature
EN Enemy
FF Friendly Forces
Gd Ground
HUMINT Human Intelligence
BJDP-2.00
Lexicon-2
HQ Headquarters
HPT High Priority Target
HVT High Value Target
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
INTREP Intelligence Report
INTSUM Intelligence Summary
IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
IPE Intelligence Preparation of the Environment
IR Intelligence Requirement
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and
Reconnaissance
KT Key Terrain
MC Mobility Corridor
NAI Named Area of Interest (IPB or IPE term)
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
OOTW Operations other than War
OP Observation Post
ORBAT Order of Battle
OSINF Open Source Information
PICINTSUM Pictorial Intelligence Summary
PIR Priority Intelligence Requirement
PSO Peace Support Operations
RBAF Royal Brunei Armed Forces
RFI Request for Information
SANDA Sources and Agencies
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SoM Scheme of Manoeuvre
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
STAP Surveillance and Targeting Acquisition Plan
BJDP-2.00
Lexicon-3
TAI Target Area of Interest (IPB or IPE Term)
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
VG Vital Ground
BJDP-2.00
Lexicon-4
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Agency
An organization or individual engaged in collecting and/or processing
Information.
Analysis
A step in the Processing stage of the Intelligence Cycle in which
information is subjected to review in order to identify significant facts for
subsequent interpretation.
Area of Intelligence Interest (AII)
The area about which a commander requires Intelligence on those factors
and developments likely to affect the outcome of his current or future
operations.
Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AIR)
The area assigned to a commander for which he is responsible for the
provision of Intelligence, within the means at his disposal.
Basic Intelligence
Intelligence, on any subject, which may be used as reference material for
planning and evaluating subsequent information.
Collection (Stage 2 of the Intelligence Cycle)
The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of
information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the
production of intelligence.
Combat Indicators
See Indicators
Commander
The authority for who Intelligence is produced.
BJDP-2.00
Lexicon-5
Current Intelligence
Intelligence that reflects the current situation at strategic, operational or
tactical level.
Direction (Stage 1 of the Intelligence Cycle)
The identification of Intelligence Requirements. Planning the collection
effort. Issue orders and requests to collection agencies. Maintenance of a
continuous check on the productivity of such agencies.
Dissemination (Stage 4 of the Intelligence Cycle)
The timely conveyance of intelligence, in an appropriate form and by any
suitable means, to those who need it.
Evaluation
A step in the processing stage of the Intelligence Cycle constituting
appraisal of an item of information in respect of the reliability of the source
and the credibility of the information.
Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
Intelligence derived from information collected by and provided by human
sources.
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
Intelligence derived from imagery acquired by photographic, radar,
electro-optical, infra-red and thermal (heat based) sensors, which can be
ground based, sea borne or carried by overhead platforms.
Indicators
Items of information, which reflect the intention or capability of a potential
enemy to adopt or reject a course of action.
Information
Unprocessed data of every description that may be used in the production
of Intelligence.
BJDP-2.00
Lexicon-6
Integration
A step in the Processing stage of the Intelligence Cycle whereby analysed
Information or Intelligence is selected and combined into a pattern in the
course of production of further Intelligence.
Intelligence
The product resulting from the processing of information concerning
foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas
of factual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity
that results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such
activity.
Intelligence Requirements (IR)
Those items of Intelligence required by a commander in order to conduct
current operations and plan future missions.
Intelligence Staff
Those who are involved in the production of Intelligence through the
application of the Intelligence Cycle and its associated processes.
Interpretation
The final step in the processing stage of the Intelligence Cycle in which
the significance of information or intelligence is judged in relation to the
current body of knowledge.
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
Intelligence derived from information contained in open sources.
Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)
An Intelligence requirement, for which the Commander has an anticipated
and stated priority in his task of mission planning and decision making.
Processing (Stage 3 of the Intelligence Cycle)
The production of intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis,
integration and interpretation of information and/or other intelligence..
BJDP-2.00
Lexicon-7
Reporting Time
The lapsed time between a sensor detecting an item of information and its
receipt by an Intelligence Analyst.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
Intelligence derived from the electro-magnetic spectrum. SIGINT consists
of COMINT and ELINT.
Source
A person from whom, or a thing from which, information can be obtained.
BJDP-2.00
Lexicon-8
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
Related Documents
