Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment (JCLE) Baseline ... · Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment Baseline Assessment Report ... and the success of the endeavor will depend on

Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment Baseline Assessment Report

Approved for Public Release 1

Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment (JCLE)

Baseline Assessment Report

30 June 2011

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release

Administrative/Operational Use, 30 June 2011

Requests for this document shall be referred to:

United States Joint Forces Command

Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate

Capabilities Solutions Group

115 Lakeview Parkway

Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

Attention: CDR Robert C. Soares, USN; Phone: 757-203-3582



Table of Contents

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 3

1.0 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................... 6

1.1 Background.......................................................................................................................................................... 8

1.2 JCLE Main Idea and Hypothesis ......................................................................................................................... 12

1.3 BAR Objectives ................................................................................................................................................... 13

1.4 Research Questions ........................................................................................................................................... 15

2.0 Enterprises and Social Networks .................................................................................................................... 17

2.1 The Enterprise in Context .................................................................................................................................. 17

2.2 Constraints in Enterprise Perspectives Relative to the JLEnt ............................................................................. 27

2.3 Elements of a Social Network ............................................................................................................................ 29

2.4 Enterprise Theory to Logistics Practice .............................................................................................................. 41

3.0 Survey of Logistics Concepts and Operations ................................................................................................. 42

3.1 Current Joint Logistics Doctrine and Directives ................................................................................................. 42

3.2 Future Logistics Strategy and Concepts ............................................................................................................. 51

3.3 International and NGO Approaches .................................................................................................................. 56

3.4 Selected Handbooks and Guides Related to the JLEnt ....................................................................................... 62

4.0 Principles of a Logistics Enterprise ................................................................................................................. 67

4.1 Leverage Existing Networks ............................................................................................................................... 68

4.2 Common Awareness of JLEnt Membership and Connections ............................................................................ 69

4.3 Account for Differing Backgrounds, Perspectives, and Cultures ........................................................................ 70

4.4 Awareness of Information Sharing Barriers ...................................................................................................... 72

4.5 Trust Relationships Across the JLEnt ................................................................................................................. 74

4.6 Build Consensus on Common Goals and Objectives ......................................................................................... 76

4.7 Embrace Emergent Networks ........................................................................................................................... 78

4.8 Appropriate Linking Strategies ......................................................................................................................... 79

4.9 Develop Appropriate Network Participation .................................................................................................... 81

4.10 Develop Logistics Planners with Social Networking Competency ................................................................... 82

5.0 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................... 84

Appendix A: BAR Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 85

Appendix B: Acronyms ......................................................................................................................................... 94



Executive Summary

Military force is only one element of national power and in the complex environment of the

future, it rarely will succeed alone. Instead, joint forces typically will operate in conjunction

with other agencies of the U.S. and partner governments, and the success of the endeavor will

depend on the success of that partnership. Depending on circumstances, the joint force may

lead the national or multinational effort or may support other agencies, usually by creating the

security conditions that allow nonmilitary agencies to operate.1

This whole of government approach to security is increasingly relevant to military logistics as

well. This is a challenging statement for the joint force, as the practice of logistics is central to

the U.S. way of war. As the 2010 edition of the Joint Operating Environment notes, “the

logistics prowess of the U.S. armed forces was central to fielding the global force necessary to

project forces across vast distances from the United States into Eurasia.” In some ways the U.S.

focus on logistics is perhaps the defining feature that enables the U.S. to successfully wage war.

However, the 2010 Joint Concept for Logistics (JCL) notes that joint theater logistics initiatives

are fragmented largely due to a lack of specific goals, strategies, accountability for achieving

results, and performance measures.2 For these reasons, logistics delivery in complex crisis is

perhaps not as rapid or precise as required in an environment that, as the Capstone Concept for

Joint Operations (CCJO) notes, must be responsive to complex challenges on short notice and

indeterminate location, challenges which require joint forces to project and sustain military

power over global distances and for significant duration.3 The JCL has developed a solution to

current logistics problems through the articulation of a Joint Logistics Enterprise, or JLEnt,

which is defined as a “multi-tiered matrix of key global logistics providers, cooperatively

structured to achieve a common purpose.”

This report, the Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment Baseline Assessment Report (JCLE BAR) is

intended to provide a broad understanding of the intellectual underpinnings of the JLEnt

1 Admiral M.A. Mullen, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, U.S. Department of Defense (15 January 2009), p. 1.

2 Joint Concept for Logistics (6 August 2010), p. 8.

3 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, p. 12.

We need to spur and harness a new diversity of instruments, alliances, and institutions in which a

division of labor emerges on the basis of effectiveness, competency, and long-term reliability.

This requires enhanced coordination among the United Nations, regional organizations,

international financial institutions, specialized agencies, and other actors that are better placed

or equipped to manage certain threats and challenges.

National Security Strategy, May 2010



solution. It describes the role of the baseline assessment within the larger context of Joint

Concept Development and Experimentation across the Department of Defense. It then

discusses the JLEnt’s identity as a social network, describing the notion that the structure of

social relations among logistics providers and consumers can materially improve or hinder the

rapid and precise delivery of logistics during military or humanitarian operations at home and

abroad.

The report then catalogs current logistics-related documents across the prospective JLEnt,

including a survey of current joint logistics doctrine and directives, future logistics strategy and

concepts, international and NGO approaches to cooperative logistics, and selected handbooks

and guides related to the JLEnt. Section 4 of the BAR describes the key principles in

operationalizing the JCL derived from theory and from the review of key logistics documents

across the logistics community. These principles are the foundation for future work in

operationalizing the JLEnt for experimentation purposes and for providing logistics planners

across the JLEnt a framework from which to move forward. These principles are summarized as

follows:

Leverage existing networks.

Work towards a common awareness of key JLEnt participants and their goals and

objectives.

Account for different backgrounds, perspectives, and cultures of JLEnt participants.

Be aware of barriers that hinder access to information across a social network.

Focus on building trust relationships across the JLEnt.

Attempt to build consensus on common objectives and goals, while recognizing where

objectives and goals may diverge.

Embrace emergent logistics networks.

Develop appropriate network node linking strategies

Develop appropriate network participation strategies.

Develop logistics planning expertise with competency in social networking.

The BAR provides the intellectual linkage between the JLEnt as established within the Joint

Concept for Logistics and the notion that improved social network principles and best practices

can result in more rapid and precise delivery of logistics in an array of crisis situations. In the

process, it describes the tools and perspectives required to operationalize the JLEnt in terms of

social networks.

What remains to be discovered – and is the central issue under investigation in the JCLE

experimentation campaign – is how to optimize the JLEnt’s social network to best improve the

ability of the JLEnt as a whole to provide faster and more precise delivery of logistics on the



battlefield. The BAR is the foundation for this effort, but significant work across the JCLE project

remains, including JLEnt visualization and modeling efforts, JLEnt validation events, simulation

runs, and community of interest writing events. These events will further refine network

principles and best practices into usable recommendations for the ongoing operationalization

of the JLEnt across the community.



1.0 Introduction

Unlike many other experimentation projects at United States Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM), the Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment (JCLE) begins with a conceptual solution

in hand. This solution – the Joint Concept for Logistics (JCL) – was approved by the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff Director for Logistics, J4, in August 2010. The

central idea found within the JCL is the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt), which is described as

an “enterprise solution” to the complex logistics problem set facing the U.S. Department of

Defense (DOD) and its partners around the world.

The purpose of the BAR is to provide traceability between the JLEnt and the JCLE project, and to

provide a comprehensive body of knowledge related to the structure and function of logistics

providers across the embryonic JLEnt.4 To do this, the BAR describes an “enterprise solution”

within the context of the logistics domain while providing the detail necessary to operationalize

a JLEnt for experimentation purposes. The BAR articulates the theoretical underpinnings of an

enterprise solution; it links this theoretical discussion with logistics practices across the whole

of the U.S. Government (USG), including the DOD and humanitarian communities. Finally, the

BAR concludes with a discussion of important JLEnt principles and best practices that set the

proper conditions for the development of an operational model of the JLEnt. Together, these

BAR elements will provide a common foundational understanding of key aspects of the

project’s approach to operationalizing the JLEnt. Furthermore, it will serve as a narrative for

the development of an experimental model of the JLEnt as it is constructed, explored, and

optimized during the JCLE project.

The structure of this BAR has been modified from the USJFCOM template because the

conceptual solution to the logistics problem has been developed to a significantly greater

degree than is typical for an experimentation project. Figure 1.1 below depicts these

differences.

4 Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment: Experiment Concept Paper (21 March, 2011)

“In bitter, bloody fights in both Afghanistan and Iraq, it became clear to me and to many

others that to defeat a networked enemy we had to become a network ourselves. We

had to figure out a way to retain our traditional capabilities of professionalism,

technology, and, when needed, overwhelming force, while achieving levels of knowledge,

speed, precision, and unity of effort that only a network could provide.”

General Stanley McChrystal, “It Takes a Network,”

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/it_takes_a_network



Figure 1.1: Unique JCLE BAR Approach.

As noted in USJFOM’s Guidelines for Conducting a Baseline Assessment: “Ideally, the baseline

assessment provides recommended solutions that can then be examined in an experiment.”5

Recommended solutions are derived from a rigorous, phased approach that begins by framing

and focusing topics within the area of study. It uses a structured process to link the military

problem statement to Warfighter Challenges and Joint Capability Areas (JCAs). This contextual

effort generally leads to an extensive problem decomposition and gap identification and

assessment elements (called Phases 2 and 3, respectively). The purpose of these BAR efforts is

to scope the military problem and identify priority issues suitable for experimentation. A

typical BAR concludes with the identification of potential solutions based on capability gaps and

synthesizes this information for use as the starting point for experiment design, engagement,

and transition efforts across the project.

5 USJFCOM, “Baseline Assessment Template/Assessment Criteria,” p. 1.



For the purposes of the JCLE project, the conceptual solution to logistics problems has been

identified, articulated through the JCL, vetted through the Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP)

process, and approved at the highest levels of the DOD. For this reason, the framing, focusing,

and decomposition of the military problem statement was completed during JCL concept

development efforts. Thus, the availability of an approved framework solution to a set of

logistics-related gaps in military capabilities means that extensive efforts to articulate and

prioritize gaps is not necessary for the overall experiment design. Furthermore, close

interaction among USJFCOM, experiment sponsors, and the stakeholder community during a

series of executive steering group (ESG) meetings and engagements in late 2010 provided a

detailed level of direction and focus for experimentation efforts.

In developing the JCL, the logistics community has already invested significant intellectual

capital in developing a military problem statement, logistics-related capability gaps, and a

notional solution framework. Thus, the JCLE and BAR should not focus on the sufficiency or

validity of the concept or on describing or elaborating the gaps in the current Joint Force

capability set. The JLEnt solution, as laid out in the JCL is the starting point of the experiment.

As such, the BAR is designed to support the assessment of the JCL by operationalizing key

elements of the concept. “Operationalization” in this case is the process of defining an abstract

concept in such a way that it can be accessible to specific observation and practically measured.

Furthermore, operationalization means maturing our understanding about which methods in

enterprise development tend to succeed and which tend to fail.

This report is the first step to operationalize the JLEnt. It begins with a conceptual study of an

enterprise as a mode of social organization. It then explores the current body of work related

to the practice of logistics in crisis situations across interagency (IA), multinational (MN),

nongovernmental organization (NGO), and commercial worlds. Finally, it concludes with a set

of principles and best practices for logistics enterprises that will be used to further guide

operationalization of the JCL across the experimentation effort.

1.1 Background

The JCL was signed on August 6 2010 by the CJCS, Admiral Michael G. Mullen and by the Joint

Staff Director for Logistics, J4, Lieutenant General Kathleen Gainey. The JCL establishes a

common framework for thinking about future joint logistics operations in the 2016-2028

timeframe. It identifies the logistics capabilities required to support the four military activities

(combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction) described in the Capstone

Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The JCL is the approved conceptual solution to logistics



problems facing the joint force. As such, it is the central point of reference for guidance about

the development of future logistics capabilities, doctrine, and force structure.6

Concepts are written in response to challenges facing the current joint force. The first element

of joint concept development is to define a set of military problems into a clear and precise

military problem statement. This problem statement articulates the issues and concerns that

prompt the DOD to engage in the process of developing a conceptual vision for more capable

future joint forces. An understanding of the military problem statement is critical for the JCLE

project as it provides context for the operationalization of the concept for experimental

purposes. The military problem is posed by the JCL as follows:

The problem statement was derived from top-level guidance from leadership, bottom-up

lessons learned in actual combat, foreign humanitarian assistance, and domestic disaster

response operations. For example, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report

describes a number of DOD-level priorities concerning logistics. One priority in particular

discusses the dependence of U.S. national strategy on the ability to rapidly project forces and

resupply globally, thus giving the nation the ability to provide operational commanders with

force and logistic superiority when and where needed. However, this capacity is not only

resident within the department of defense. As the QDR further notes, “the Department must

work to better support unity of effort both within the joint force and externally among

multinational, interagency, and nongovernmental elements.”7

The 2010 edition of the Joint Operating Environment (JOE) continues this QDR theme that the

tyranny of distance is prominent in the conduct of war, and the Joint Force will always

encounter difficult problems associated with moving forces over great distances and supplying

them with fuel, munitions, repair parts, and sustenance. In such an environment, joint logistics

6 Joint Concept For Logistics (6 August 2010), p. iii.

7 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2010), p. 76.

The Joint Concept for Logistics Military Problem

How can joint force commanders and DOD integrate or synchronize and optimize joint,

interagency, multinational, nongovernmental, and contracted logistics to simultaneously

establish and maintain multiple Joint Force Commanders’ operational adaptability and

freedom of action in design, execution, and assessment of concurrent combat, security,

engagement, and relief and reconstruction missions in an environment characterized by

increasing complexity, uncertainty, rapid change, and persistent conflict?

The Joint Concept for Logistics Military Problem

How can Joint Force Commanders and DOD integrate or synchronize and optimize joint,

interagency, multinational, nongovernmental, and contracted logistics to simultaneously

establish and maintain multiple Joint Force Commanders’ operational adaptability and

freedom of action in the design, execution, and assessment of concurrent combat,

security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction missions in an environment

characterized by increasing complexity, uncertainty, rapid change, and persistent

conflict?



capabilities must support the presence, reach, and capability of U.S. military forces as well as

the ability to work with like-minded partners around the world.8 As the Joint Force addresses

American security challenges abroad, it will be continuously engaged in dynamic combinations

of combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction in the face of opponents who

attempt to disrupt the global networks that bind the United States and its allies and partners

along with the catastrophic natural or humanitarian disasters that stretch these networks to

the point of disruption. Thus, transportation, trade, and communications networks must be

resilient in the face of inevitable disruption by willful opponents and unanticipated natural

disaster.

The problem set, however, is in many ways much larger than the logistics domain alone. Over

15 years ago, Martin Libicki, in a seminal work on the implications of proliferated and

networked computer devices on the battlefield described a military environment as

characterized by the rapid increase in the distribution of intelligent, coordinated agents,

allowing military systems to maintain contact with one another while becoming widely

dispersed. Furthermore, these dispersed systems might be more responsive because their

“mesh” of sensors could communicate with one another and orient military forces with much

greater violence of action. The conditions would massively increase a commander’s

appreciation or understanding of developments within the battlespace, and reduce the time

needed to react.9

Although Libicki described these developments in terms of sensors and robotics applied against

opposing military forces, the principles he described are also relevant to integrated logistics

problems across the spectrum of military operations. A large number of NGOs, IO’s, and

multinational partners are spread across the crisis area, however, they are able to interact

through finely “meshed” social network in very close proximity to the precise problems and

needs within a crisis area – and are increasingly linked by powerful communications and

information technologies – potentially increasing their collective ability to understand an

respond to humanitarian catastrophe.

Currently organizational changes to leverage information technology on a large scale have

lagged behind the proliferation of devices to link individuals to worldwide networks. Twenty

years ago, the relative lack of information technology resulted in what are now traditional

organizational structures with a focus on bureaucratic procedures, hierarchical social customs,

with clearly defined – usually vertical – lines of authority for all levels of management. As

8 Joint Operating Environment, p. 4.

9 Martin Libicki, “The Mesh and the Net, Speculation on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon,” McNair Paper 28,

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (March, 1994) p. 13



information technology has rapidly matured at the institutional and personal levels, social

networks have become prevalent and successful enough to overwhelm traditional

organizational approaches to exchanging information and operating effectively as a cohesive

whole.

In general, the DOD’s understanding of the structure and function of technology-enabled social

networks has not kept pace with their reality as more traditional forms, customs, procedures,

and authorities have become one set of pathways within a much wider and “authority-

ignoring” social networked architecture10 General Stanley McChrystal described this dynamic in

the context of irregular conflict in Afghanistan:

“It became apparent that an effective network involves much more than relaying data. A

true network starts with robust communications connectivity, but also leverages physical

and cultural proximity, shared purpose, established decision-making processes, personal

relationships, and trust. Ultimately, a network is defined by how well it allows its

members to see, decide, and effectively act. But transforming a traditional military

structure into a truly flexible, empowered network is a difficult process.” 11

Logistics, with its highly diverse set of actors across the military, government, international,

NGO, and private suppliers, each with their own objectives, principles, and procedures may in

fact be conducive to the rigorous application of enterprise principles. Although “the task of

organizing the participants in an international operation into a single, coordinated campaign is

likely to be challenging in the extreme,” perhaps a single coordinated approach is not the

answer to the challenge of “integrated or “synchronized” logistics solutions.12 As the JCL itself

notes, “integrating or synchronizing processes and capabilities is not an end in itself. Nothing is

gained if the JLEnt accomplishes integration or synchronization and it does not lead to

optimizing outcomes.”13 The most important facet of the concept’s central idea is the

optimization of the totality of JLEnt processes and capabilities.

This idea – that changes to the density, persistence, and quality of relationships among diverse

logistics actors has a material effect on the ability to deliver logistics in a timely manner – is the

starting point for the JCLE project. The remainder of the BAR further elaborates on this idea

10

Kotalarsky and Oshri, “Social ties, knowledge sharing and successful collaboration in globally distributed system development projects.” European Journal of Information Systems (8 February 2005). p. 37. 11

General Stanley McChrystal, “It Takes a Network,” Foreign Policy (March/April 2011). 12

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, “Finding the Right Mix: Disaster, Diplomacy, National Security, and International Cooperation” (January 2009), p. 81. 13

Joint Concept for Logistics (6 August 2010), p. 14.


http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/TheRightMix.pdf

http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/TheRightMix.pdf



while providing a framework to understand how social networks might be altered to improve

logistics delivery across the whole of the JLEnt during complex crises.

1.2 JCLE Main Idea and Hypothesis

“In the aftermath of catastrophic events, when plans for organized and timely response

break down, impromptu groups often emerge to provide disaster relief. Much remains to

be learned about the internal dynamics of these emergent response groups…”14

A cohesive enterprise for logistics, the JLEnt, is the solution the concept proposes to address

key indicators of the logistics problem set. The JCL describes the JLEnt as “a multi-tiered matrix

of key global logistics providers cooperatively structured to achieve a common purpose.”15 In

this definition, “tiers” denote the different types of organization that are part of the JLEnt.

Within the JCL experiment design, these tiers are differentiated according to the organizational

structures within which they are embedded or the priorities/objectives that they pursue. For

the JLEnt these layers include:

The Department of Defense

The Interagency Community

Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Organizations

The Multinational Community

Industry

The main goal of the JCLE approach is to explore the nature of the relationships among the

organizations that make up the JLEnt in order to understand how changes or modifications to

these relationships influence logistics provision in crisis situations. This social network analysis

approach is not focused on formal organizational structures, but rather “the study of social

relationships among actors *and+…the disciplined inquiry into the patterning of relations among

social actors.”16 This is particularly important for the JLEnt due to its multiple layers of highly

diverse and differently-motivated actors. Indeed, the JCL reinforces the idea that the JLEnt is

very much a social network, noting that “the JLEnt *does not+ imply a particular structure or

command relationship.”17 Thus, experimentation efforts are focused on understanding the

dynamics of the social network that comprises the JLEnt and discovering ways to optimize that

network. For these purposes, the working hypothesis for the JCLE project is as follows:

14

Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, and Hollingshead, “Coordinating Expertise among Emergent Groups Responding to Disasters,” Organization Science, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January-February 2007) pp. 147-161. 15

Joint Concept For Logistics (6 August 2010), p. 10. 16

Ronald Brieger, “The Analysis of Social Networks” in Handbook of Data Analysis (London: Sage Publications, 2004), p. 505-526. 17

Joint Concept for Logistics (6 August 2010), p. 10.



Within the JCL, the role of the JLEnt is to provide a mechanism with which Joint Force

Commanders (JFCs) can work to optimize logistics processes and capabilities and to allocate

logistics resources according to national security needs in an environment featuring an array of

actors. Within the context of this project, experimentation efforts will work to understand how

the JLEnt can be operationalized by understanding its role in networking, integrating, and/or

synchronizing capabilities and processes across the logistics community. Furthermore, the

experiment approach will allow the community to better understand and articulate the

relationship between optimized JLEnt processes and their contribution to rapid and precise

logistics responses.

1.3 BAR Objectives

The purpose of the background research is to develop a broad understanding of the current

body of work related to the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt) as the solution to the integration of

DOD capabilities with those from the interagency, multinational, nongovernmental, and

commercial worlds and to provide a foundation for the operationalization of enterprise best

practices in the context of logistics operations in a wide variety of complex crises. This BAR will

address three foundational issues within the context of the JCLE project.

It provides the theoretical justification for the structure and function of the JLEnt – the

core solution proposed within the Joint Concept for Logistics. This part of the report

explores the nature of “enterprises” as a solution for the logistics problem set. This

understanding provides the intellectual linkage between the JLEnt as described in the

concept and the experiment’s analytic approach by providing justification for ongoing

experimentation activities relating to the central idea of the JCL Concept.

It establishes a common understanding of key ideas and themes across the current

logistics community, including a broad understanding of logistics concepts and

operations across the Services, COCOMs, Agencies, Multinational organizations, and

Nongovernmental Organizations as they relate to the JLEnt. This information is

collected during experiment engagement and research activities, and works to feed the

development of the JLEnt social network representation.

“If the JLEnt has the ability to network and integrate or synchronize processes and

capabilities, then the result will be the ability to deliver, position, and sustain the

Joint Force in a more rapid and precise manner at the best value.”



It provides a set of enterprise and logistics-related principles and best practices for use

in simulation runs, limited objective experiment (LOE) events, handbook development,

and as a basis for the development of the DOTMLPF-P18 solutions.

The JCLE BAR is one element in a much larger JCLE project. Figure 1.2 below illustrates how the

BAR is related to some of the other major elements of the project. Because the JCL BAR is

structured in a different manner than is typical for a BAR, it also relates to other project

elements in a slightly different manner as well. Instead of a BAR leading to an analytic

framework and experiment design, based on extensive gap analysis, the analytic framework

and BAR for the JCLE project are developing in parallel. Significant engagement and interaction

between USJFCOM and the Logistics community of interest in 2010, uncovered a clear desire by

the experiment sponsors to focus the operationalization of the JCL. The analytic framework

reviewed the extensive body of discussions among the COI, and developed a plan to model and

examine the JLEnt in terms of the density, persistence, and quality of relationships among

diverse logistics actors and the a material effect of these changes on the ability to deliver

logistics in a timely manner.

Figure 1.2 BAR Relationships to other JCLE Project Elements.

18

Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy



The baseline assessment has been developed in parallel with the analytic framework and

experiment design. As the analytic framework developed a method to understand and

articulate the JLEnt enterprise terms, the BAR focuses on the academic literature related to

enterprise theory as well as surveying logistics concepts, handbooks, and other “practitioner”

literature. This survey directly influences the experiment’s analytic approach by providing the

foundational data necessary to build the JLEnt. Issues surrounding the nature of enterprises

and logistics principles and best practices provide the foundation for LOE activities and for later

modifications to the JLEnt model to assist in optimizing the network cohesion that contributes

to the overall effectiveness of the JLEnt during a crisis. Together, this body of work directly

supports experiment efforts and the development of a possible “JLEnt Handbook” to capture

practical lessons for use by logisticians throughout the enterprise.

Thus, the outputs of the JCLE BAR are not gaps and other issue areas subject to extensive

subsidiary concept development, experimentation, and capability development efforts. In fact,

the JCL itself is intended to fill this role. Rather, it is focused on the understanding,

characterization, and modeling of the JLEnt as described in the JCL and how modifications to

the JLEnt network might influence the rapid and precise delivery of materials across a set of

representative scenarios.

Section 2.0 of the BAR explores each hypothesis term in more detail with an eye toward the

practical operationalization of these ideas in the JLEnt construct. This section of the BAR begins

by examining the notion of “business enterprise” within the context of the logistics enterprise

set out in the JCL. The BAR examines how processes and capabilities are integrated or

synchronized in the presence or absence of formal relationships and control mechanisms. This

section sets out the essential theory of logistics enterprises to link the JCL to the experiment

framework, and examines the relationship of the hypothesis term “network” with the JLEnt.

This section closes with a description of how social networks can be constructed and developed

in such a way as to effectively contribute to rapidity and precision in logistic delivery.

1.4 Research Questions

Focused and clear research questions help to guide the process of research and writing. For the

purposes of operationalizing the JLEnt, the BAR writing team developed a set of research

questions to assist in developing each key JCLE topic area. Together, these research questions

provide a rudder for the research and engagement teams to guide the gathering of information

“A prudent question is one half of wisdom.”

Sir Francis Bacon



in the form of academic literature, logistics concepts and doctrine, and manuals and policy

documents across the IA, NGO, and Multinational layers of the JLEnt. For the JCLE BAR, these

questions include:

What is an enterprise as an organizational construct?

What qualities make an enterprise more or less effective?

How is the JLEnt a social network?

What are the attributes of a social network?

How does the idea of a social network relate to the conduct of logistics?

How is the current logistics social network structured?

With these guiding questions in mind, the next major section of the BAR, Enterprises and Social

Networks unpacks the notion of enterprise as an organizational structure with a view towards

developing a better understanding of the intellectual foundations for the structure and function

of the JLEnt.



2.0 Enterprises and Social Networks

This section of the BAR examines current opinions concerning the meaning of the term

“enterprise” and its connection to the practice of logistics as envisioned in the JCL. As

previously described, the JLEnt is the central idea within the JCL. This section will interpret how

“enterprise” is used within the academic literature and why it has been selected as the

functional solution to the logistics problem set. Next, this section will discuss enterprise theory

and current practices of logistics. Although the JCL provides broad guidance about the proper

structure of a logistics enterprise, the level of detail is insufficient to fully operationalize the

concept. This section of the BAR will provide the foundation for practical principles to guide the

operationalization of the JLEnt over the course of the JCLE project.

What follows is a brief survey of the academic literature related to the theory of business

enterprises, including its origin and the state of current thought in the area, as well as key ideas

relevant to the operationalization of the JLEnt. It will then outline how the enterprise method

might be used to develop cooperative structures and reinforce the perception of common

purpose across the diverse logistics stakeholder community. Through these insights, the JCLE

project will develop the capacity of the JLEnt to provide a more efficient and effective logistics

response across the joint logistics community.

2.1 The Enterprise in Context

The term “enterprise” is frequently mentioned as a key objective within the Joint Staff J4’s Joint

Logistics Strategic Plan and as the central solution to the logistics problem set within the JCL. It

is important for the experimenters to understand the term, connotations, and implications of

an enterprise in order operationalize the concept in a meaningful way for the logistics providers

that constitute the JLEnt. The word “enterprise” is derived from the French word for

“undertaking.” In common usage, “enterprise” denotes a project, activity or great collective or

individual effort. More specifically, “enterprise” is often used in the language and discourse of

business and industry to describe a purposeful social, technical, and economic undertaking

designed to create value for its stakeholders. The JLEnt retains much of the meaning of these

definitions as an organization designed, built, and optimized to pursue a specific, often

entrepreneurial, activity.

“The JLEnt is a multi-tiered matrix of key global logistics providers cooperatively

structured to achieve a common purpose. It may be bound by an assortment of

collaborative agreements, contracts, doctrine, policy, legislation, or treaties…”

JLEnt Definition, Joint Concept for Logistics



According to the JCL, the definition of JLEnt has three core elements which set it apart from the

current community of interest (COI)-based logistics paradigm. Each element of the JLEnt

concept has a theoretical presence within the enterprise literature with important implications

for the operationalization of the concept. The three JLEnt definitional elements have been

extracted from the concept definition (see text box above) and consist of:

A diverse group of logistics-providing organizations,

Cooperatively structured, and

Focused on a common logistics problem.

The Joint Logistics Strategic Plan places the transition of the current-day logistics COI into an

enterprise model at the very beginning of its list of strategic-level objectives. The difference

between these two concepts is the difference between exchanging ideas and perspectives

among interested partners and acting on those ideas in a mutually beneficial way.

Communications between organizations with vastly different backgrounds, mandates, and

cultures is difficult enough. Between talking and doing – especially in a complex international

crisis – lie a complex patchwork of agreements, formal and informal relationships, ad hoc

arrangements, and field expedients that constitute the sum of the world’s logistics response

capabilities. The JLEnt is the DOD’s approach to moving from unstructured and general

“communication” to cooperative “action” to provide optimized logistics to JFCs in crisis

situations.

An enterprise-like approach to logistics has emerged and undergone significant evolution

independent of the DOD’s JLEnt approach. Since 2005, the United Nations system has

approached functional, cross-organization cooperation through its cluster approach, while the

FEMA has undergone similar change in the development of the National Response Framework

and subsidiary set of Emergency Support Functions.

The humanitarian reform initiative noted that sectoral or thematic groups cutting across

current organizational boundaries would significantly improve the performance of global

humanitarian response. These sectoral and thematic groups are organized around seven

“clusters” focused on issues such as water distribution, camp management, and logistics. Each

global cluster is led by a specific UN entity or NGO organization which coordinates common

responses and provides rudimentary information management capacities. These cluster leads

are charged with three key responsibilities, including the development of standards and policy,

building response capacity, and providing operational support. During logistics operations, the

World Food Program (WFP) acts as the cluster lead. The enterprise perspective has influenced

both the DOD’s JLEnt conceptual approach as well as the UN cluster system. Synchronizing DOD

logistics processes with the cluster system is the critical first step in operationalizing a JLEnt



across military, interagency, intergovernmental organization (IO) and nongovernment

organizations (NGO), multinational, and industry layers.

What is it about the notion of an enterprise that has led concept writers across three very

distinct cultural and organizational contexts to select this approach as an organization principle

and what does an enterprise perspective mean for the practice of logistics going forward? The

context for an enterprise solution is a multi-agent organization created for a particular

undertaking that has elements among people, processes, and technology which interact with

one other and their environment as a system-of-systems to achieve goals.19 This section will

closely examine each of the JLEnt’s definitional elements to understand them in terms of what

the academic community has to say about each element.

Diversity of Organizations

As conceived in the JCL, the JLEnt is dependent on a large array of cooperative partners,

including nations, NGOs, international organizations (IOs), and commercial entities. The

concept focuses on ensuring that support decisions are based on the most effective and lowest-

cost delivery mechanism as opposed to focusing on the specific identity of the logistics process

owner. It does this by providing a framework to understanding the diversity of JLEnt partners,

especially in regards to their specific capabilities and the capacity of each member. The logistics

cluster also echoes this perspective, noting that:

“Partnerships are critical for effective emergency response as no single individual or

group is capable of sufficiently responding to any crisis. Collaboration, consultation,

building local knowledge and capacity strengthens preparedness and response to

disasters of any type. Ignoring local capacity and local knowledge creates a risk of

responding in ways that are inefficient and ineffective and which contribute to future

dependencies and vulnerabilities.”20

Enterprise literature typically describes how diverse business units within a company –

including finance, management, production, distribution, and marketing - all provide different

perspectives to a specific business problem or task. None can optimally complete a cross-

functional task alone, but inputs from all are essential to the optimal completion of a business

objective or goal. Furthermore, the literature often references the idea that large groups with

relatively diverse perspectives and views can be remarkably knowledgeable when their

averaged judgments are compared with the judgments of individuals. In the early 1900s, Sir 19

Kenneth C. Hoffman Ph.D., Leonard A. Wojcik Ph.D., et. al. “Descriptive Enterprise Dynamics – A Multi-Disciplinary Unifying Framework,” Conference on Systems Engineering Research, CSER Paper #44 (March 14-16 2007), p. 2. 20

Logistics Cluster, “Logistics Cluster Operational Guide,” http://log.logcluster.org/operational-environment/partnership/index.html



Francis Galton hinted at the ability of large groups of people to estimate with an accuracy that,

in aggregate, may exceed that of individual experts. This idea of the “wisdom of crowds” was

taken up in 2004 in a book of the same title which described the ability of crowds to think, act,

and cooperate effectively on large scales, independent of central control.21 Unfortunately,

academia is still in the process of understanding “the internal dynamics of emergent

organizations” and, especially in crisis management situations, how responders and resources

are integrated in an adaptive manner.22

Within such an environment, disaster researchers have recognized the importance of

emergent response groups – i.e. groups with no preexisting structures such as group

membership, tasks, roles or expertise that can be developed and coordinated before a disaster

event occurs. 23 In the absence of single, authoritative structure to control the orientation and

operations of multi-organization-spanning enterprises, enterprise theorists have developed

theories to understand different modes by which groups can communicate and work together.

Figure 2.1 below illustrates a typical approach within the literature used to describe enterprise

relationships. In it, different organizations are categorized in three different nested levels

depending on the degree of control and interaction among the groups.24

A unifying framework for enterprises takes into account the complexity of different

organizational relationships and does not

attempt to force the entirety of the

enterprise into the control and predict ring.

Political engineering takes precedence over

defined command relationships at the “messy

frontier” between standing command and

control. In this frontier, questions of power,

resources, and social relationships take on

special importance due to changing roles and

missions.25

21

James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations, (2004) 22


Drabek and McEntire, “Emergent Phenomena and the sociology of disaster: Lessons, trends and opportunities from the research literature” Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2003), pp 97-112. 24

Leonard Wojcik and Kenneth Hoffman, “System of Systems Engineering in the Enterprise Context: A unifying Framework for Dynamics, p 2. 25

B.E. White, “A Complementary Approach to Systems Engineering,” Presentation to the NDAA Systems Engineering Conference, (24-27 October 2005).

Figure 2.1 Enterprise Relationships



Figure 2.2 Attributes of Enterprise Relationships

The idea that the characterization of different interaction modes among the organizations may

provide logistics in a complex crisis situation is highly relevant to the “layers” within the JCLE.

Integrated military commands from the tactical level, through a joint task force (JTF), to a

combatant command, and ultimately to the President are prototypical examples of

organizational interactions within the “control and predict” ring. Although formal and even

legal relationships exist between the DOD and other agencies in the USG, IA relationships

within the USG often fall within the “influence and guess” ring. The third ring, intervene and

observe, describes the more fluid and dynamic relationship between DOD and non-

governmental and international organizations (IO).

Understanding the different modes in detail is central to the operationalization of the JLEnt.

Organizational design based on treating the DOD’s relationship with NGOs as fully within either

of the two central rings is highly counterproductive. From the perspective of IOs, the logistics

cluster and its processes and functions are the central coordinating mechanism – however, this

is done in a manner substantially different from the strict planning and control relationships

within DOD. Approaching these organizations with the intent to establish the “harmonization,”



“coordination” and “optimization” of all activities in support of JFCs is a sterile approach at best

and actively counterproductive at worst:

“It is not uncommon to hear…NGOs say that they should not coordinate with or be

coordinated by the military. In fact, the UN and NGOs define the term as meeting or

talking and sharing information, whereas the military uses it to mean command and

control of a given situation.”26

Understanding how to manage these relationships between layers governed by a command and

control set of relationships and an “influence and observe” layer will be critical. Luckily,

enterprise literature strongly indicates that these very different types of interaction can be

classified and thus modeled. Furthermore, it suggests that enterprise modeling is possible

across boundaries where organizational command is fluid and dynamic. It also suggests that

JLEnt development must focus on understanding the routes through which enterprise nodes

connect and how cooperative relations can be optimally built across the different rings. What

then, is the best organizational design approach in an environment featuring (as the JCL terms

it) “continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships…constantly appearing and

disappearing”? The collective body of work known as enterprise architecture (EA) provides

explanations as to how groups of differently-configured organizations might work together in

less structured environments.

Cooperative Structures

Over the past two decades the term EA

has evolved to address the impact of the

information revolution on organizational

design and collective action among

geographically dispersed groups. More

specifically, it has developed to address

the increasing complexity of computer

and information technology (IT) systems

as well as the increasing cost and

misalignment of those systems in

business. In 1987, J.A. Zackman noted that

the decentralization of organizations

without some organizing structure,

principles, or architecture would likely

26

Lynn Lawrey, Ed. Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military, (2009), pages 196-197.

Enterprise Architecture

Noun

1. A business function that collects and manages business

information for the purpose of improving the way that a

business responds to current or future challenges and

opportunities.

2. A rigorous model of the motivations, structures,

information, processes, and systems of an enterprise

created for the purpose of decision support.

Adjective (used with object)

3. A team of influencers and thought leaders within an

enterprise chartered with understanding, optimizing, and

improving the way the business operates.

“Inside Architecture, Microsoft Developers Network”

http://blogs.msdn.com/b/nickmalik/archive/2010/08/08/a-reasonable-canonical-definition-of-enterprise-architecture.aspx



lead to chaos. EA assist organizations in maintaining unity of effort and purpose within these

information-enabled and increasingly connected environments.27

The notion of EA—using information technologies to bring together dispersed organizations

and increase their common level of shared awareness and common purpose—was developed

as a means to deploy information technology across widely dispersed business organizations.

The study of EA provides several important advantages to organizations that apply it to their

own operations. The literature notes several benefits to an organization from a successfully

implemented EA in the context of marrying IT to a particular business model, including:

Increased adaptability to changing external conditions.

Improved focus on organizational goals and objectives.

Reduction in the misapplication of information technologies.

Reduced complexity in information technology systems.

Improved agility of new information technology systems.

Improved morale, as more individuals see a direct correlation between their work and

the organization's success.28

The Zachman paper noted over two decades ago that “it is not hard to speculate about, if not

realize very large, very complex systems implementations, extending in scope and complexity

to encompass an entire enterprise.” 29 In fact, the emergence and near-universal extension of

the internet and cellular phone technology have placed de facto systems architectures far

beyond what was envisioned within Zachman’s paper. Access to universal connectivity is the

norm in 2011. Importantly, these networks have emerged spontaneously and are generally not

controlled centrally or managed. Any operationalization of the JLEnt must take this into account

and build from the assumption that standards, rather than systems, will be the framework for

common communications and collaboration across layers.

Today, in the context of the deployment and management of information systems, business

process reengineering is a massive undertaking in the private sector. Within the USG, EA best

practices are developed and promulgated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). For

the OMB, EA is a management practice for aligning resources to improve business performance

and help agencies to better execute their core missions.30 The federal government recognizes

27

J.A. Zachman, “A Framework For Information Systems Architecture,” IBM Systems Journal (Vol 26. No. 2) p. 276-291. 28

Roger Sessions, “A Comparison of the Top Four Enterprise Architecture Methodologies,” The Microsoft Developers Network, (May 2007). 29

J.A. Zachman, “A Framework for Information Systems Architecture,” IBM Systems Journal” (Vol 26. No. 2) p. 276-291. 30

Office of Management and Budget, Federal Enterprise Architecture Practice Guidance (November 2007).



that cooperative structures developed by means of an enterprise approach offer tangible

benefits to organizations. Although the primary purpose of an EA is to inform, guide, and

constrain the decisions for the enterprise, the enterprise approach to organizations allows:

Increased ability to capture facts about the mission, functions, and business foundation

in an understandable manner to promote better planning and decision making.

Improved communication among the business organizations and IT organizations within

the enterprise through a standardized vocabulary.

The development of architectural views that help to communicate the complexity of

large systems and facilitate management of extensive, complex environments.

A focus on the strategic use of emerging technologies to better manage the enterprise

information and consistently insert those technologies into relevant parts of the

enterprise.

The discovery of opportunities for building greater quality and flexibility into

applications.

The achievement of economies of scale by providing mechanisms for sharing services

across the enterprise.31

The Microsoft Developer’s Network’s third definition of EA, found in the text box earlier in this

section, illustrates developing multi-organization cooperative practices and is, at its base, a

sociotechnical problem. To succeed, the JLEnt must develop a common perspective on each

JLEnt organizations’ “relationships to each other and to the environment in order to understand

complexity and manage change.”32 This lack of overarching EA for the entirety of the logistics

domain was described in some detail within the JCL, which noted that the practice of joint

logistics lacks a “coordinated and comprehensive management approach to guide and

oversee…joint theater logistics.” Furthermore, “efforts to develop and implement joint theater

logistics initiatives have been fragmented…due largely to a lack of specific goals and strategies,

accountability for achieving results, and outcome-oriented performance measures…”33

The lack of an enterprise approach to joint logistics suggests that operationalization of the JLEnt

should first focus on developing a shared understanding of the full scope and extent of the

enterprise, including the possible set of partners (which will change based on the specific crisis

situation) and the complexity of their relationships across the JLEnt layers. Next, cooperative

structures constructed to operationalize the JLEnt must guide and inform action in spite of

31

Chief Information Officer Council, “A Practical Guide to Enterprise Architecture” (February 2001), p. 6. 32

Enterprise Architecture Research Forum. http://earf.meraka.org.za/earfhome/our-projects-1/completed-projects 33

Joint Concept For Logistics (6 August 2010), p. 8.



differing perspectives, goals, or principles – and even different sets of partners that will

participate depending on the conditions of the particular crisis.

Before technology-based collaborative solutions are applied to operationalize the JLEnt, the

human complexity of the organization must be described and understood by all enterprise

members on at least a basic level. For example, the international humanitarian community will

likely be in an area long before (and long after) military forces are deployed to a crisis, and in

certain situations, will likely be reaching out to collaborate and coordinate together through the

UN logistics cluster. The deployment of military forces into a region without knowledge of these

already existing collaborative structures has the potential to hinder or disrupt fragile aid

delivery mechanisms. On the other hand, NGOs may not fully understand the special

capabilities that military forces can bring to bear, such as rotary wing assets or port and airfield

opening and management packages.

Thus, there is a significant social component to cooperative structures that must be understood

among JLEnt members before formal collaborative agreements, contracts, doctrine, policy,

legislation, or treaties are established. It is critical that the social basis for the enterprise is

described before barriers harden into (perhaps) sub-optimal mechanisms for cross-organization

collaboration. Common activities across formal organizational boundaries are more effective if

they include a shared goal, a clear reward structure, known group membership, expertise and

skills to accomplish a task and time to share relative levels of knowledge.34

Common Purpose

The U.S. military has come to understand the importance of developing shared and common

purposes across the warfighting enterprise. As the DOD has engaged networked opponents in

Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as globally, the act of orienting military forces on common goals is

a critical predictor of success. As General McChrystal noted in his article “It Takes a Network,”

“…Lacking sufficient shared purpose or situational awareness, each component contributed far

less to the outcome than it could or should have.” 35 The JCL takes up this theme, describing

unity of effort as central to operationalizing the JLEnt. It notes that optimized logistics delivery

must be founded on an understanding of shared and common objectives in spite of distinctive

doctrine, policies, processes, cultures, and capabilities across the many organizations that make

up the JLEnt.36

34


General Stanley McChrystal, “It Takes a Network,” Foreign Policy (March/April 2011). 36

Joint Concept For Logistics (6 August 2010), p. 17.




The complexity of developing common purpose is highlighted in figure 2.3 below, which

illustrates how a seemingly simple phrase “devastating earthquake” can have a very different

meaning depending on one’s background, training, and role in the situation.37 People common

to an organization often have similar experiences and have planned together prior to a crisis

situation, leading to a common conceptual frame of reference and encouraging the swift

development of common approaches to the situation. There are often hundreds of discrete

organizations or entities working within the same crisis area, each with different—and often

competing—agendas. Thus, any operationalization of JLEnt must provide a means through

which groups can understand the true nature of the crisis, one another’s conceptual framework

for dealing with the crisis, the environment in which the crisis is taking place, and develop a

shared approach to addressing the crisis.

Figure 2.3 Individual Perspectives on a Crisis Situation

This approach mirrors the joint force’s Vision for a Joint Approach to Operational Design, which

advocates the development of operational design prior to highly-structured planning efforts.

The Vision notes that the inclusion of partners in the planning process is critical for

commanders to address complex future challenges. This perspective is further reinforced by 37

Mr. Tony Icayan, “Information and Knowledge Management: A Content-Based Solution” NATO CIMIC Fusion Center, (February 2011), p. 6.



enterprise literature, which notes that building a common purpose cannot be resolved through

procedural or technical means alone. Rather, the key issue is to build trust.

“The biggest problem is a people problem: if people from different sites don’t have the

respect and trust for each other, they don’t work well together…”38

Common operational design is about visualizing how the world might look when operations are

complete.39 The JLEnt must encourage the construction of trust relationships among its

prospective members such that each can openly talk about boundaries, red-lines, capabilities,

and realistic approaches to common solutions that the enterprise might be able to collectively

seek. Effective enterprise activities depend on open communications, which in turn depend on

trust among the many members of the enterprise. As enterprise theorist Julia Kotlarkski noted,

this element of EA is at once the foundation of an effective enterprise, but “is also the very

quality that is most difficult to build at a distance.”40 This tension is at the heart of the proper

operationalization of the JLEnt. Disaster response or rapidly changing combat operations will

stress the JLEnt’s cooperative enterprise structures in ways that perhaps are far more difficult

to address than a less anarchic, hostile, and deadly business environment.

Developing an enterprise perspective across an organization such as the DOD is challenging

enough, yet an operationalized JLEnt still cannot function properly if prospective partners are

not aware of a common desire to work within a general framework for logistics delivery. As we

have seen, EA is fundamentally concerned with identifying common or shared assets – including

strategies, business processes, investments, data, systems, and technologies. With the addition

of disparate perspective of other JLEnt partners, building trust across informal networks is

perhaps the most important thing to get right in an operationalized JLEnt.

2.2 Constraints in Enterprise Perspectives Relative to the JLEnt

The theory of enterprises and EA overlaps to a significant degree with the development of a

multi-tiered JLEnt as envisioned in the JCL. However there are several key differences between

the types of enterprises that are generally examined in the literature and with the prospective

operationalized JLEnt. These differences must be kept in mind during the development of the

principles and best practices that will operationalize the concept for experimental purposes.

The enterprise literature examined for this report tended to focus on three major themes which

do not readily inform the operationalization of the JLEnt: a focus on private industry, work in an 38

A chief software architect quoted in Kotalarsky and Oshri, “Social ties, knowledge sharing and successful collaboration in globally distributed system development projects.” European Journal of Information Systems (8 February 2005). p. 37. 39

Vision for Joint Operational Design, (6 October 2009) p 3-4. 40

Kotlarsky and Oshri, p. 39.



infrastructure-rich business environment, and bias towards IT solutions to problems that are

human and relational in nature.

Examples of enterprises used in the studies are generally sampled from private industry, and

usually focus on bridging divisions, groups, or units within a single company. Thus, the most

fundamental difference between the JLEnt (as envisioned within the JCL) and enterprises

(generally represented within the literature) is that enterprise studies are based on case studies

within a private sector business organization. Incentives to participate within the enterprise are

clearer, directly relating to job performance or the businesses bottom line. The major exception

to this is the work of Dr. Thomas Drabak who, in his paper “Theories Relevant to Emergency

Management Verses a Theory of Emergency Management,” relates broad theoretical principles

in the humanities and organizational science to the practice of crisis management.41

The second major gap in the literature is that enterprise studies generally focus on teams

working in business settings within IT-enabled building infrastructure. Enterprise literature

often neglects specific enterprise attributes of organizations working in widely distributed,

outdoor, and/or austere locations. In contrast to a more steady-state business or government

administrative context, an international crisis, disaster response, or combat situation will

present a number of challenges that do not generally appear in the literature, including

situations in which:

Formal plans and agreements quickly break down in unexpected ways.

Authority structures break and may react in unforeseen ways.

Planned communications links break down.

Information about a disaster arrives at a pace, level of detail, and level of credibility that

slow down organizational responses.

The major exception to this is found in the article titled “Coordinating Expertise among

Emergent Groups” which focuses on the uses of enterprise approaches in groups responding to

crises.42

The third element that makes the JLEnt distinct from academic approaches to enterprise theory

is that EA is generally focused on information architecture and technical aspects of developing

IT-based computer networks, thus generally neglecting social aspects of enterprise

41

Thomas Drabck, “Theories Relevant to Emergency Management Verses a Theory of Emergency Management,” Manuscript presented at the Emergency Management Higher Education Conference, National Emergency Training Center, Emmitsburg, Maryland, June, 2004. 42

Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, and Hollingshead, “Coordinating Expertise among Emergent Groups Responding to Disasters,” Organization Science, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January-February 2007) pp. 147-161.



development. Within the context of the JLEnt, the breadth of the “multi-tiered matrix” creates

added conceptual problems far beyond those considered in a typical EA project. As

demonstrated in the literature, enterprise theory and EA tends to be applied in the context of a

single business, and focuses on the deployment of IT to weld together disparate parts of an

organization. This technical focus on EA is beginning to shift (see section 2.3 below), and the

article titled “Process of Social Integration: The Key to Making Enterprise Systems-Enabled

Change” is a noted exception to this general trend.43

For these reasons, the JLCE project must extend enterprise theory in a significant way to make

it more applicable to the problems specific to the provision of logistics across many different

organizational layers. The academic literature also provides an important set of tools that allow

us to extend enterprise theory for our specific purposes. Currently, there is a significant trend

within the academic literature to “bring the human back in” and better understand the social

context of human relationships within the organization. A better understanding of the type and

character of effective information exchange can occur through an understanding of the human

relationships. This distinct domain of study – social network theory – is concerned with the

character of human relationships.

2.3 Elements of a Social Network

“A significant yet often overlooked component of people’s information environments is

composed of the relationships that they use to acquire information and knowledge.”44

The JLEnt is built on the notion that improving the structure or quality of social relations among

logistics providers and consumers can materially improve the rapid and precise delivery of

logistics during combat operations or humanitarian relief efforts at home and abroad. It is not

enough, however, to give each organization an internet connection, telephone, and directory

and assume that logistics delivery will suddenly become more effective.

“Most previous enterprise systems studies focus on implementation issues or critical

success factors without taking into consideration that complex relationship of

reciprocal causality between technology and human factors would cause the failure of

43

Teoh, S., & Pan, S. (2006). Process of Social Integration: The Key to Making Enterprise Systems-Enabled Change. Goteborg: European Conference on Information Systems Proceedings 2006. 44

Rob Cross, Andrew Parker and Stephen Borgatti, “A bird’s-eye view: Using social network analysis to improve knowledge creation and sharing,” IBM Institute for Business Value, p. 1.



enterprise systems to meet organizational expectations or deliverance of values

promised.”45

Social network theory provides a number of tools to assist in better observing, classifying, and

perhaps modifying the human relations that underpin the experimental JLEnt. Understanding

the characteristics of the JLEnt in terms of its identity as a social network can assist in better

understanding the key attributes of an effective social network within the context of the global

logistics community. Social networks are organizational structures comprised of individuals

connected by one or more relationships and principally consist of “nodes” and “links” which

together provide a high-level picture of the social network as a whole. 46 Nodes are the actual

organizations or individuals within the structure under observation. Links are the connections

which tie individual nodes together. Nodes communicate with other nodes through links and

each node can be connected to as few as one other node, or to every other node in the

network.

Figure 2.4 Formal Organization Chart versus Social Network View

Social networks differ from organization charts in that they describe how information flows

through an organization both formally and informally, rather than lines of authority that

describe a typical corporate, government, or military organization chart. These two distinctly

different views often paint a very different portrait of how information is exchanged. Figure 2.4

above visually depicts the difference between a formal organizational view (left) and social

network view (right) of a single division of a private corporation.47 The diagram on the left

depicts a typical organization chart, dividing people along business administrative lines, and

45

Teoh, S., & Pan, S. 46

S. Wasserman and K. Faust. Social Network Analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994. 47

Cross, Parker and Borgatti, p. 4.



providing a guide to command authorities across the division. The figure on the right provides

an illustrative view of the same organization from a social network perspective. Note that from

a network view, “Cole” is the most highly connected node in the organization, even though he

is relatively low within the formal organizational structure. In contrast, “Jones” is at the head of

the organization, but with only two strong network linkages, is among the least connected

people within the network.

As these two views illustrate, simply overlaying an information system or concept of operations

over an existing organization or collection of organization may not capture the true essence of

an organization’s method of operation. Information flows through networks in ways that may

perhaps bear only a passing resemblance to the formal agreements, authorities, treaties, or

doctrine that are supposed to govern them. Thus, a depiction of the social network that

underpins an organization is unlikely to be found in organizational documentation or in other

governing materials. It must be gathered through extensive personal interviews.48 Finding the

boundaries of a social network – who is within the network in question and who is not – is a

critical question that greatly affects the functioning JLEnt. An individual is more likely to build

the necessary connections to link with others across the network, if they perceive themselves

to be an integral part of an organization working toward a common purpose.49

Although the evolution of an operational social network may be influenced or guided by more

formal arrangements, they are only a small part of the larger social network picture. Once a

general picture of a social network has been established through detailed interviews across the

network there are several ways that the analyst can examine it, including:

Number of links. The effectiveness of networks is strongly dependent on how nodes are

linked to one another. A node may be insufficiently or excessively linked to other

organizations depending on the situation and information required to carry out

particular common activities. Network analysis can describe the average number of links

per node, as well as the relative distribution of nodal connections across a network.

Connectors or Bottlenecks? Some central nodes may provide the only connections

between different parts of the network. In a high-trust environment, highly linked

central nodes may create bottlenecks that can significantly slow the flow of information

across a network. However, in a multi-organization enterprise with a lower level of trust

across a network, what appear to be bottlenecks may in fact be key bridging nodes that

48

Extensive interviews across organizations is a common methodology in the social network literature. See for example Wu, L., Lin, C.-Y., Aral, S., and Brynjolfsson, E., " Value of Social Network -- A Large-Scale Analysis on Network Structure Impact to Financial Revenues of Information Technology Consultants ", Winter Information Systems Conference, Salt Lake City, UT, Feb. 2009. 49

In theoretical terms, this is called “fostering internal collective bonding.” See Teoh, S., & Pan, S. (2006), p 7.



allow a relatively fragmented network to orient on a problem quickly. (see “scale-free

networks” below).

Average Distance. How effectively information is transmitted across a social network

depends on the degree of network separation between all pairs of nodes within a group.

Short distances (i.e. few intermediaries between the nodes) generally transmit

information more accurately and in a timelier manner, while long distances transmit

information more slowly and with more distortion.

Isolation. Groups or people may not be well integrated with the larger network and thus

may have untapped skills or capabilities. If left unchecked, enterprise subgroups or

cliques may develop distinct subcultures, different objectives or goals, or even negative

opinions towards other enterprise elements resulting in a degradation of overall unity of

effort. On the other hand, parts of the social network may require isolation to prevent

fragmentation of larger parts of the network. For example, DOD combat logistics may

need to be isolated from humanitarian logistics if military capabilities are to contribute

to UN or NGO responses to a humanitarian incident.50

Although social networks are central to the sharing of information within organizations or

multi-organization enterprises, leaders across the enterprises often do not understand the scale

and scope of the social network, and thus have little leverage to change them. This is in spite of

the fact that the academic literature points to a number of ways in which networks can be

analyzed in terms of network connectivity and related business or activity outcomes. Social

network analysis can assist in operationalizing the JLEnt’s ability to network and integrate or

synchronize processes and capabilities by focusing on critical social network related issues. This

includes improving information flow and knowledge reuse; developing an ability to sense and

respond to key problems or opportunities; driving planned or emergent crisis responses; and

encouraging interaction in areas of common purpose.51

Scale-free Networks

The preceding section focused on the attributes of nodes and links. The unit-level approach to

networks can provide knowledge on how a particular network might function. However, a

larger, more systemic view of social networks is acceptable in order to account for the “shape”

or “topology” of the overall social network. A sudden emergence of large and reliable network

maps of very complex systems, such as the internet, protein relationship pathways, or the

spread of epidemics has driven the development of network theory during the past decade.

One of the key findings in network theory is that some past systems were too complicated to

50

Derived from Cross, Parker and Borgatti, p. 4. 51

Rob Cross, “Making Invisible Work Visible: Using Social Network Analysis to support Strategic Collaboration” Network Roundtable at the University of Virginia,



understand and bound by a

relatively simple idea – the

scale-free network. As one

researcher noted “probably

the most surprising discovery

of modern network theory is

the universality of the [scale-

free] network topology”52

What exactly is a scale-free

network? A scale-free network

is one that obeys a power law

distribution in the number of

connections between each

node within the network. Few

nodes exhibit extremely high

connectivity while the majority

of nodes in the network are

poorly connected to the larger

network. Scale-free networks tend to emerge as new nodes link preferentially to older nodes.

Thus, the longer a node has been established the greater the number of links to it. This

preferential linkage profile is self-reinforcing, and tends to result in highly connected “hubs”

(“Cole” in the example found in figure 2.4 above).53

The scientific literature of scale-free networks reinforces the notion that very few (if any)

networks seen in nature – including human social networks – are completely random. Principles

and mechanisms beyond randomness drive their evolution, thus allowing individuals to

(perhaps) shape or influence their development.54 The assumption can be made that the social

network that underpins the JLEnt will very likely be based on the principles of a scale-free

network, thus providing some understanding on its behavior when operationalized. Scale free-

networks tend to be:

Extremely tolerant of random failures. In a random network, a small number of random

failures can collapse the network. A scale-free network can absorb random failures up to

80% of its nodes before it collapses.

52

Albert-László Barabási “Scale Free Networks: A Decade and Beyond,” Science (24 July 2009), p. 412. 53

Albert-László Barabási and Eric Bonebau, “Scale Free Networks” Scientific American (May 2003), p. 50. 54

Barabási, p. 413.

Figure 2.5 Scale-Free Networks



Extremely vulnerable to intentional attacks on their hubs. Attacks that simultaneously

eliminate as few as 5-15% of a scale-free network's hubs can collapse the network.

Simultaneity of an attack on hubs is important. Scale-free networks can heal themselves

rapidly if an insufficient number of hubs necessary for a systemic collapse are removed.

Extremely vulnerable to epidemics. In random networks, epidemics need to surpass a

critical threshold (a number of nodes infected) before it propagates system-wide. Below

the threshold, the epidemic dies out. Above the threshold, the epidemic spreads

exponentially. Recent evidence indicates that the threshold for epidemics on scale-free

networks is very low.55

There are several implications for the proper operationalization of the JLEnt that can be

assumed if the social network that underpins it is operationalized as a scale-free network. The

first implication is that logistics providers should identify and link to highly connected “hubs”

within the social network. These large hubs link widely across the network, and can ensure that

large providers that are less well linked can access other local, less connected clusters very

close to the logistics problem. This is a difficult problem in a crisis situation, and significant

advantages can be gained in an operationalized JLEnt by doing some of this identification and

network development and awareness work before a crisis. During a crisis, the situation will

change quickly, and organizations will likely not focus on this foundational aspect of network

awareness. Using NGOs as an example:

NGOs, NGO personnel, and NGO operations do not in fact “look” like anything in

particular. Sometimes identifiable by their trucks, logos, staff, or flags, NGOs are civilian

organizations and do not require any form of specific uniform or standard presence.

Some may argue this point, though, and suggest that NGOs are extremely sensitive to

identifying themselves as major actors within an emergency... In recent years, NGOs

have gone from visible, easily identified cars, trucks, and offices to nondescript ones.

Because NGOs have become targets for violence, this is now the norm.56

A second implication is that “hub nodes” in the JLEnt should be reinforced so that they do not

fail, due to intentional attacks or lack of capacity that overwhelms their ability to serve as

information conduits throughout the system. This might include increasing the capacity of

secondary hubs as backups if primary hubs are overwhelmed. Steps to accomplish this might

include augmenting the communications capacities of an existing hub and limiting or decreasing

the maximum number of connections to any one hub. This is a key issue in crisis response

55

John Robb, “Scale Free Networks,” at Global Guerillas (7 May 2004). 56

Lynn Lawrey, Ed. Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military, (2009), p. 95.

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/scalefree_terro.html



operations, and has repeatedly appeared in the literature. As one article on crisis response

operations and social network operations noted:

“Sustaining reliability across large systems of organizations will require extraordinary

effort, both by operators of technical systems and the regulatory and political authorities

that oversee them. Yet economic pressure to improve efficiency by utilizing complex and

interdependent systems is difficult to resist, despite evidence that such a strategy also

entails increasing vulnerability to disruption…”57

Finally, because epidemics can be transmitted quickly through a scale-free network, reputation

and trust are vital. A rumor, story, or negative piece of information are analogous to an

epidemic and can quickly reverberate through a scale-free network. Logistics operators should

be aware of this, and be prepared to protect and build a reputation of trust and confidence –

which will also be swiftly transmitted through the network. Once again, this attribute of scale

free networks is prevalent in current military operations. As General McChrystal noted in “It

takes a Network”:

“Although we got our message out differently than did our enemies, both organizations

shared basic attributes that define an effective network. Decisions were decentralized

and cut laterally across the organization. Traditional institutional boundaries fell away

and diverse cultures meshed. The network expanded to include more groups, including

unconventional actors. It valued competency above all else – including rank. It sought a

clear and evolving definition of the problem and constantly self-analyzed, revisiting its

structure, aims, and processes, as well as those of the enemy. Most importantly, the

network continually grew the capacity to inform itself.”58

Thus, the JCLE should first ensure that the JLEnt is indeed developing as a scale-free network –

which is a very reasonable assumption based on their prevalence in nature. If so, proper

operationalization of the JLEnt should then consider the identification and reinforcement of

pre-existing hubs, or the construction of new highly connected hubs to bridge different network

communities (or “layers” in our terminology) as a start point. Further investigations into scale-

free networks will also likely provide significant insights about how to proceed.

57 Todd LaPorte, “Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response: How Private Action Can Reduce Public Vulnerability,”

Organizational Strategies for Complex System Resilience, Reliability, and Adaptation Pg 145. 58

General Stanley McChrystal, “It Takes a Network,” Foreign Policy (March/April 2011).




Transactive Memory

One of the most important elements of a social network that defines its usefulness in a

business or government setting is its ability to provide “off board memory” for individuals and

small groups.59 No one person or group has all knowledge relevant to a large task, and social

networks provide a means to access knowledge that may not be immediately available. The

study of transactive memory systems (TMS) describes how people in a group learn, store, use,

and coordinate knowledge to accomplish goals. The theory describes “how different

organizations learn about who knows what, using that knowledge to decide who will do what,

resulting in more efficient and effective individual and collective performance.”60 In order to

build effective TMS across a group, three major elements should be considered.

Trust in memory (or expertise) specialization. Each member of the JLEnt must be

confident that required information will be accessible when it is needed. Effective TMS

tend to feature groups able to delegate responsibility and to specialize in different

aspects of a task. This is very difficult in a civil/military context as information entering

military processes often has a very difficult time getting out.

Credibility of expertise. Members of the JLEnt must believe that each participating

element knows its specific business area and can trust that opinions or

recommendations are based on beliefs about the reliability of members’ expertise. This

can also be difficult in a civil military context (or even within the military in a joint

context) as one party may view the other as an “amateur” or insufficiently professional

to render credible information about a situation.

Ability to coordinate tasks or expertise. Enterprise members must be able to

coordinate their work efficiently based on their knowledge of who knows what in the

group.61

The text box of the following page below provides some questions which help to judge how

well the JLEnt has operationalized a common TMS.

59

Daniel Weigner, “Transactive Memory: A Contemporary Analysis of the Group Mind,” in B. Mullen and GR Goethals, Editors, Theories of group behavior, Springer-Verlag, New York (1987), pp. 185–205 60


Checklist below derived from Kyle Lewis “Measuring transactive memory systems in the field: Scale development and validation.” Journal of Applied Psychology (2003), p. 587-604 and Moreland and Argote, “Transactive memory in dynamic organizations in Peterson and Mannix, eds. Leading and Managing People in the Dynamic Organization, (2003).



Trusted TMS are an essential part of effective collaboration across geographically or culturally

separated groups. Higher scores

across each of these “checklist”

elements has been correlated with

more efficient and effective

coordination among enterprise

members. An operational JLEnt

should use theoretical principles of

TMS to assist in developing the

specific capacity to gather and

share “who knows what” across the

logistics AND crisis response domains.

A JLEnt’s TMS should have two levels, a Figure 2.6 Transactive Memory and Social Ties

Checking the JLEnt’s Transactive Memory System

Specialization

1. Does each JLEnt member have specialized knowledge of some aspect of the crisis?

2. Does my organization have knowledge about an aspect of the crisis that no other team

member has?

3. Are different JLEnt members responsible for expertise in different areas?

4. Are the specialized knowledge of different JLEnt members needed to deliver rapid and precise

logistics?

5. Do I personally know which JLEnt members have expertise in specific areas, or know how to

quickly get this information?

Credibility

1. Is my organization comfortable accepting procedural suggestions from other JLEnt members?

2. Does my organization trust that other members’ knowledge about logistics delivery in this

crisis is credible?

3. Am I confident relying on the information that other team members brought to the

discussion?

4. When other members gave information, does my organization double-check it to ensure its

validity?

5. Is my organization able to rely on other members’ level of expertise?

Coordination

1. Does the JLEnt work together in a well-coordinated or synchronized fashion?

2.Do JLEnt members have few misunderstandings about what to do?

3. Is there much confusion about how the JLEnt would accomplish the task?



high level which shares knowledge of large scale organizational capabilities and perspectives on

logistics concepts for emerging crisis situations. A second, more detailed layer may go to the

individual level and provide perspective on immediate crisis knowledge, knowledge on key

personnel with access to larger logistics organizations, and information about who has

important area information about the local area, such as customs-related issues, or road

capacity in a remote but important location.

Network Governance

Previous social network research has focused on the behavior and relationships of nodes and

links, but not the behavior of the network as a whole, or as a system. This section will define

the types of links that may connect actors across space as well as the character of those

connections. This section focuses on classes of governance networks which include three or

more legally autonomous organizations that work together to achieve not only their own goals

but also a collective goal. 62

It is often assumed that governance as a concept is not appropriate to the study of social

networks; it implies hierarchy and control behaviors which are perhaps antithetical to social

network principles and practices. However, collaborative agreements and reflexes among

organizations have their own forms of governance that, although different from typical

organizational approaches, are useful categories with which to operationalize the JLEnt. This

subsection will discuss ties that connect actors across the JLEnt and shed some light on the

nature of collective action within a socially networked group of organizations.

There are three basic modes of governance across these types of social networks, and include:

Participant-Governed Networks. Networks governed among the organizations that

constitute it, with no overarching governing authority. Decisions are made by collective

decisions of each network partner, and power among them is relatively symmetrical,

even if capabilities among the participating organizations vastly differ. This type of

governance can be seen in, for example, a group of banks and venture capitalists

attempting to assemble financing packages for a business startup. The advantage of

participant-governed networks is that it tends to channel groups with common purposes

on a common objective quickly allowing the collective to attack the problem

simultaneously and from many different angles. Furthermore, it is effectively allows the

network to better create “community capacity” because each organization participates

willfully and is fully committed to common goals.

62

Keith Provan and Patrick Kenis, “Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (2 August 2007), p. 231.



Lead Organization-Governed Networks. This type of network governance structure is

one in which a single organization coordinates all network level activities. This

organization may exercise authority over network decisions, and is generally

asymmetrical in that some organizations have a greater “vote” than others across the

network. Furthermore, communications among the different organization is usually

brokered by the lead organization, with little interaction among the other network

components. “Supplier networks”, for example the auto industry, where large parts

suppliers have asymmetric pricing power over sub-component providers is an example

of this type of network. Often, this type of network evolves where collective self

government is not efficient enough to solve a problem. Often, a lead organization will

build networking capabilities and invite others to participate in the network on the

terms of the lead organization. This model is also frequently used by the U.S. military in

civil-military relations (CIMIC) activities, building network capacities and inviting other

nations, NGOs, or IOs to use them.

Network Administration Organization. This type of network governance structure is

characterized by the establishment of an administrative entity focused on governing the

network and guiding its activities. The network broker provides coordination capacity

and may develop toolsets, processes, procedures, or information management

capacities to facilitate information flows across the common network. Sub-components

of the network still interact, but on terms established by the network broker. The UN’s

logistics cluster is a prototypical example of a network broker, in that it provides

network capacities across the humanitarian response community. This type of

governance structures is useful in enhancing the legitimacy of the network in politically

difficult or organizationally complex situations. 63

The layout of the social network should be carefully considered when deciding on the type of

governance necessary to operationalize the JLEnt. Each type of network governance has

advantages and disadvantages depending on the specific situation. The literature identified

four key factors which indicate the relevance of a particular form of network governance to the

situation; level of trust among members, number of organizations within the network,

consensus on goals, and need for network administrative capabilities across network actors.

Figure 2.7 below illustrates these relationships and provides a guide to the type of network

organization best suited to different configurations of these variables.

63

Provan and Kenis, p. 234-236.



Figure 2.7 Environment and Effective Network Governance.

The forms of network governance used across the JLEnt will likely change dramatically

depending on the specific situation and levels of network participation. In combat situations,

the joint force will likely insist on a “lead organization” mode with the JFC and his staff acting as

the lead organization. During a defense support to civilian authorities (DSCA) operation at

home, the joint force may become part of a network where the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) acts as the lead agency. In foreign humanitarian disaster relief,

the joint force may attempt to plug into the logistics cluster, acting as the network

administrative organization through a Department of State (DOS) liaison. One added layer of

complexity noted by the CCJO notes that combat, security, engagement, and relief and

reconstruction may be simultaneous. If differing crises are simultaneously occurring, then the

result may be a “hybrid” JLEnt network governance mode, with parts of the JLEnt operating in

different governance modes. Unfortunately, the literature has little to say about how to merge

different network governance approaches.

The important point is to understand that different configurations of the many nodes in the

JLEnt may suggest different modes of governance if the JLEnt as a whole is to be effective.

Furthermore, is suggests several key variables – trust, number of network members, level of

consensus among members, and need for network-level assets – for logistics planners to

address to make existing network governance approaches more effective.



2.4 Enterprise Theory to Logistics Practice

Networking the JLEnt, as the JCL notes, is a key part of the solution to logistics problems within

the joint operating environment. As we have seen, networking the JLEnt includes far more than

wiring together disparate organizations with the technical capacity to share information widely

and at great distances. In an environment with so many different actors with such a great

diversity of perspectives, goals, objectives, approaches, and capabilities, “networking the JLEnt”

must first come to terms with the human relationships that drive the logistics processes. The

assumption in the JCLE is that modifying social networks will have a positive impact on the rapid

and precise delivery of materials to users. To explore this, we must understand the key

elements of a social network, how they are relevant to the logistics community, and how they

might be changed to optimize an actual JLEnt. A discussion of key documents across the current

logistics COI is necessary to help identify the relevance of these theories to logistics.



3.0 Survey of Logistics Concepts and Operations

This section of the BAR will provide a survey of current handbooks, doctrine, and other logistics-

related documentation across each of the JLEnt Layers. At the intersection of logistics and cross

organization social networks lays a set of documents that describe aspects of the emerging

JLEnt. The following literature review provides background information on the perspectives of

organizations that are important to operationalizing the JLEnt. The following section extracts

information from key potential members of the JLEnt, and their views about common

approaches to the practice of logistics. Each paragraph is followed by a summary of key issues

for consideration in operationalizing the JLEnt for experimentation purposes. Although many

more were reviewed during the research process, those listed are considered the most relevant

to the BAR.

3.1 Current Joint Logistics Directives and Doctrine

National Security Presidential Directive-44, signed December 7, 2005, assigns the DOS as lead

organization for the planning and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction efforts abroad. It

calls for strong coordination between the DOS and DOD and establishes the Policy Coordination

Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations. The directive clearly states that in

the event of an overseas humanitarian relief effort, DOS will be the supported organization and

DOD will be a supporting organization. It directs the Secretary of State to coordinate with the

Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to ensure HA/DR activities do not interfere with ongoing U.S.

military operations. This document can be found online at:

http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html

Presidential Directive 44 Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Ensures a mechanism is in place to allow DOS to coordinate relief efforts.

“The Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction

contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate. The

Secretaries of State and Defense will develop a general framework for fully coordinating

stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where

appropriate.”

Humanitarian assistance in areas of ongoing military operations requires significant

cooperation between the DOS and DOD.

DOD Directive (DODD) Number 3000.05, Stability Operations (September 2009), provides

guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission

sets, and lessons learned develop. This document establishes DOD policy and assigns

responsibilities within the department for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and

support stability operations. The directive emphasizes the importance of supporting other U.S.

http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html



agencies, foreign authorities, and NGOs in SSTR operations. This document can be found online

at: http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf

DODD 3000.05 Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Develop the capability to work closely with relevant U.S. departments and agencies,

foreign governments and security forces, global and regional international

organizations, U.S. and foreign NGOs, and private sector individuals and for-profit

companies.

Develop skilled military/civilian teams to ensure security, develop local governance

structures, promote bottom-up economic activity, rebuild infrastructure, and build

indigenous capacity for such tasks.

Develop greater means to help build other countries’ security capacity quickly to ensure

security in their own lands or to contribute forces to stability operations elsewhere.

Exercise, game, and, when appropriate, red-team logistics operations with other U.S.

departments and agencies.

Ensure oversight of contracts in stability operations and ensure U.S. commanders

deployed in foreign countries are able to secure contract support rapidly.

DOD must be prepared to conduct and support stability missions. They are given priority

comparable to combat operations that must be explicitly addressed and integrated

across all DOD activities.

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian

professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary

to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.

The International Assistance System: Concept of Operations (October 2010) was produced in

order to provide a reference guide for seeking and accepting international assistance in the

wake of an overwhelming disaster on U.S. soil. The concept of operations (CONOPS) describes

the role of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DOD, and DOS in requesting,

coordinating, and employing foreign disaster relief and recovery assistance. It describes policy-

based relationships among the organizations and their sub-agencies. The CONOPS also

recommends actions to any federal agencies with independent authority over a non-Stafford

Act incident response, but acknowledges that they will lack the legal capacity to assign missions

to DOD and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This document can be

found online at:

https://www.llis.dhs.gov/displayContent?contentID=47760&milliseconds=1305657537833

https://www.llis.dhs.gov/displayContent?contentID=47760&milliseconds=1305657537833



International Assistance System Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

The International Assistance System should be part of domestic response JLEnt as it

serves as a mechanism to govern relations between the DHS, DOD, DOS, and MN

and foreign NGO nodes.

During disaster response operations, any inflow of commodities or services

(domestic or international) into the affected area that has not been specifically

requested and/or coordinated by a responding agency represents some degree of

obstruction to relief operations, and may also present transportation, logistical,

and/or homeland security and defense challenges.

Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, Joint Logistics (July 2008), sets forth doctrine for the activities and

performance of the DOD in joint operations and provides the basis to conduct joint logistics. It

provides military guidance for combatant commanders and other JFCs to exercise authority

along with the doctrinal framework within which logistics can be optimized for operations,

education, and training. The document acknowledges the existence of sub-enterprises within

the joint logistics community in terms which could be applied to the JLEnt at large. For example,

it describes the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise as “the complex of equipment,

procedures, doctrine, leaders, technical connectivity, information, shared knowledge,

organizations, facilities, training, and materiel necessary to conduct joint distribution

operations.” JP 4-0 does not describe logistics provision in terms of a JLEnt nor does it describe

social network or techniques to improve logistics provision through relationships with partners

outside of the DOD. However, the publication provides the doctrinal basis for “control and

predict” behaviors within the DOD layer of the JLEnt. This document can be found online at:

http://www.i-mef.usmc.mil/mlg/lmtw/_downloads/signedJP4_0.pdf

Joint Publication 4-0 Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Create unity of effort by developing a clear understanding of how joint and

multinational logistic processes work, knowing the roles and responsibilities of the

providers executing tasks in those processes, building agreements around common

measures of performance (process outcomes), and ensuring appropriate members of

the JLE have visibility into the processes.

Maintain JLE-wide visibility by assuring access to logistic processes, resources and

requirements in order to gain the knowledge necessary to make effective decisions. JLE-

wide visibility provides the means to optimize logistic processes to maximize outcomes,

increase readiness, and build confidence in joint logistics.

Ensure rapid and precise responses in order to meet the constantly changing needs of

the joint force. Key performance indicators of this are speed, reliability, and efficiency.

http://www.i-mef.usmc.mil/mlg/lmtw/_downloads/signedJP4_0.pdf



Measure sustained logistic readiness – the principal outcome of joint logistics – at the

tactical level.

Express the relationship challenges of establishing control and unity of the joint logistics

command between commanders and joint logisticians. Operations are often distributed

and conducted rapidly and simultaneously across multiple joint operations areas within

a single theater or across boundaries of more than one geographic combatant

commander (GCC) and can involve a large variety of military forces and multinational

and other government organizations.

Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental

Organization Coordination during Joint Operations (March 2006), is a two-volume publication

that describes the IA, NGO, and MN environment. It provides fundamental principles and

guidance to facilitate coordination between the DOD, and other USG agencies, NGOs, and

regional organizations. Volume I of this Joint Publication addresses the necessity of

organizational interdependence in joint operations: “Functional interdependence means that

one organization relies upon another to attain the objective. This interdependence is the

strongest and the most lasting potential bond between agencies, departments, and

organizations.” Volume II contains a list of organizations, USG agencies; foreign government

organizations; and U.S., foreign, and international NGOs, many of which play some role in the

JLEnt. The amount of detail on each organization varies widely and may be affected by changes

the logistics cluster structure has experienced since the publication of this document. The

practice of logistics with the NGO and UN communities is dated. Neither volume explicitly

states the existence of a logistics enterprise; however, they describe the benefits of

cooperation across IA, MN, and NGO boundaries. Both volumes of this document can be found

online at:

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_08v1.pdf and at

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_08v2.pdf


Understand missions, core competencies, and legal requirements/limitations of each

organization before the commander engages with them.

Establish roles and responsibilities for all organizations in order to strengthen the bonds

of interdependence. Exchange liaisons with supported/supporting organizations to

strengthen bonds and facilitate inter-organizational communication. This will reduce the

likelihood of duplication of efforts and enhance calculations of required logistics.

Ensure the needs and concerns of all participating organizations are understood and

promptly addressed, especially pertaining to interests, policies, core values, and legal

limitations.





Initial concepts of military operations may require revision based on feasibility analysis

and consideration of related activities by voluntary and private organizations,

particularly with regard to logistics.

JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations (September 2002)

describes the unique logistical aspects associated with multinational operations, including

planning, coordination, execution, command and control, and deconfliction of logistic

requirements. It provides guidance and principles for the U.S military in conducting logistic

activities when operating as part of a MN force. It describes the nature of logistic support

elements such as supply systems, movement control, maintenance, engineering, contracting,

logistic information systems, host-nation support, real estate management, security, and health

support during the appropriate phases of MN operations. It outlines organization, structure,

methodology, coordinating responsibilities, and processes. Furthermore, it establishes priorities

and institutionalizes the logistic planning function for multinational operations, ranging from

major theater war to military operations other than war. This document can be found online at

http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp4_08(02).pdf

Although JP 4-08 was published before the introduction of the concept of the JLEnt, it helps

inform the MN layer of the enterprise. The publication lays out current guidance for conducting

MN logistics operations, including policy and legal restrictions. It also suggests changes to

improve future operations, including:

A framework for U.S. involvement in MN operations that removes barriers to

cooperative actions

Expanded bilateral agreements to provide flexible responsive support throughout the

spectrum of coalition operations

Improved logistics capabilities in MN organizations by leveraging the strengths of

coalition partners

Increased interoperability through focused logistics core tasks


Develop flexible multinational MN logistic support concepts that can be tailored to

effectively respond to a broad range of contingencies.

Ensure all MN forces have visibility of logistic activity during the operation to promote

cooperation and coordination.

Obtain early knowledge of the organic logistic support capabilities of forces provided by

participating nations and identify the means to support their needs

Because the participants in MN operations are sovereign states with their own military

establishments, equipment, doctrine, procedures, national cultures, and military

http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp4_08(02).pdf



capabilities, the logistic support for these operations presents difficult challenges to U.S.

GCCs, subordinate joint force commanders, the services, and defense agencies.

JP 4-09 Distribution Operations provides a doctrinal framework for the planning, execution,

and assessment of joint distribution operations during joint military operations. It sets forth

doctrine governing joint activities to facilitate unity of effort during joint distribution

operations, describes authorities and responsibilities for joint distribution operations, discusses

distribution capabilities and processes, and details methods and procedures designed to

enhance efficiency and effectiveness of distribution operations. The publication provides the

doctrinal basis for the conduct of distribution operations within the DOD layer of the JLEnt.

JP 4-09 recognizes that the “effective and efficient fulfillment of joint operational requirements

is dependent on the deliberate coordination and synchronization of multiple logistic

processes.” It supports the JCLE’s test of “rapid and precise” as a measure of the success of a

logistics network, while suggesting unity of effort and visibility across the joint logistics

environment as two additional tests. Although the publication does not mention the JLEnt, it

does describe the JDDE introduced in JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. Additionally, the publication’s

definition of a supply chain easily applies to an operationalized JLEnt: “Its fundamental goal is

to maximize force readiness while optimizing the allocation of limited resources.” This

document can be found online at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_09.pdf


Rapidity requires elements of the JLEnt to forecast, anticipate, and plan distribution execution.

Precision requires the JLEnt to minimize deviation from acceptable standards as it responds to dynamically changing conditions and requirements.

Applying creativity, insight, and boldness in the application of logistic principles is essential to successful JDDE operations—balancing these principles with the application of sound judgment and decision-making skills is the basis of the art of logistics.

Field Manual 4-0, Sustainment (April 2009), provides authoritative U.S. Army (USA) doctrine for

the sustainment of forces in full spectrum operations. Its intent is to describe how sustainment

builds and maintains combat power, supports strategic and operational reach, and enables

endurance. The field manual (FM) establishes how sustainment operations are integrated and

synchronized into the overall operations process – plan, prepare, execute, and assess. While

the army does not discuss its role in the larger JLEnt, it details the Army’s participation in a

number of constituent logistics enterprises, and helps to inform the USA aspect of the service

layer of the logistics enterprise. This document can be found online at:

https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/6718-1/fm/4-0/fm4_0.pdf

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_09.pdf

https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/6718-1/fm/4-0/fm4_0.pdf



FM 4-0 Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

The successful operationalization of the JLEnt will require a common language among all

the services, as well as among MN, IA, and NGO partners.

Logistics challenges include providing support in varied physical environments (terrain,

climate, and urban areas), working among multicultural populations and operating in

areas where it may be difficult to discern the enemy from non combatants.

USA views its greatest challenge as providing responsive sustainment to a rapidly

deployable force to meet threats worldwide.

Consider and plan for interoperability with allies and coalition forces.

Maximize benefits afforded by working with NGOs, OGAs, and IGOs.

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 4-0, Combat Support (September 2010) is the U.S. Air

Force’s (USAF’s) keystone document addressing the full spectrum of combat support functions

that operate in peace and in war. It stresses the need for tailored combat support packages

with the personnel, facilities, equipment, and supplies required for supporting USAF forces. It

establishes doctrinal guidance for combat support to air and space forces across the full range

of military operations. The document covers USAF combat support, including an overview of its

constituent organizations and their roles and responsibilities, as well as guidance on

assessment, development, and posturing for the employment of forces in an operational area.

It also includes guidance for readying, positioning, employing, sustaining, and recovering the

force prior to, during, and following deployment. While AFDD 4-0 does not discuss the concept

of a logistics enterprise, it does briefly speak to the necessity of incorporating partners from the

inter-service, MN, and private sectors. This document can be found at: http://www.e-

publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFDD4-0.pdf

AFDD 4-0 Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Involve contracting personnel in the operational planning process at every level to

ensure that contracting support, when used, will be responsive to the needs of the

commander.

When possible, consolidate contracting units between services and agencies at a given

deployed location to take advantage of economies of scale on procurements, reduce

internal competition within a local vendor base, and prevent duplication of effort.

Plan and coordinate intratheater movement in advance of deployment, and be ready to

implement as soon as practical.

Logistics operations require “closing the loop”, that is, accounting for perishable items,

bringing equipment back, and reintegrating personnel back into home life. This is made

substantially more difficult as the number of logistics players increases.

http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFDD4-0.pdf

http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFDD4-0.pdf



Evolving missions, employment, and support concepts, as well as constant changes in

technology, weapons systems, and equipment require continuous reassessment and

adjustment of logistics operations.

Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 4, Naval Logistics (January 1995) describes how the U.S. Navy

(USN) applies fundamental logistic principles, functions, and elements, and how it uses the

resources of formal planning and logistic information support to attain the basic goal of

operational force readiness. It emphasizes the non-materiel aspects of naval logistics, stressing

that naval logistics is a complex system of systems, which encompasses planning, acquisition,

maintenance, engineering support, training, transportation, facilities operations, and personnel

support. NDP 4 offers an introduction to naval logistics, but is best used in conjunction with the

remainder of the NDP 4 series, especially NDPs 4-01, 4-02, 4-08. This document can be found

at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/ndp4.pdf

NDP 4 Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Consider the USN’s logistic corollaries to the principles of war when planning and

conducting logistics support: responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy,

attainability, sustainability, and survivability.

In war, the magnitude of personnel-support functions and the quantity of materiel and

supplies needed, as well as corresponding airlift and sealift requirements, will increase,

and systems become subject to disruption by enemy action and the fog (friction and

uncertainty) of war resulting in erroneous assumptions and planning shortfalls.

Every logistics operation is different; no single precise planning formula will work in

every scenario.

Logistics operations will need to support the high tempo of combat operations while still

supporting peace time missions, such as training and humanitarian assistance / disaster

response (HA/DR) operations.

The Joint Supply Joint Integrating Concept (JS JIC), (March 2010) describes how a Joint Supply

Enterprise (JSE) will conduct future (2016-2028) joint supply operations that result in “Perfect

Order Fulfillment” and sustained joint supply readiness for the JFC. The JIC describes the

framework used to identify, describe, and apply joint supply capabilities and the methods used

to develop that framework, which include: defining the desired joint supply process outcomes;

identifying key stakeholders and focal point responsibility for achieving those outcomes; and

defining the future joint supply processes, shared information, and decision support

architectures. The central idea of the JS JIC is if the JSE will: integrate or synchronize JSE

processes and capabilities in order to optimize them to best support the JFC; plan, capture, and

predict joint supply requirements; network joint supply operations; and seamlessly link to the

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/ndp4.pdf



Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise, then the JFC will benefit from perfect order

fulfillment and sustained joint supply readiness that enables operational adaptability and

freedom of action.

The JS JIC describes the JSE in the larger context of the JLEnt in order to better organize IA, MN,

NGO, and commercial industry partners. The JSE integrates or synchronizes joint supply

operations capabilities with other logistics capabilities at all levels within the JLEnt. It can be

viewed as the specific subset of the JLEnt which is responsible for ensuring supplies are

provided to the point of employment at the right time and location, and in the right condition

and quantity. As described in the concept, the JSE will be made possible by the “alignment of

information, financial, and communication networks and the development of seamless

interfaces with distribution, maintenance, and other joint capabilities”, which will be enabled

by the operationalization of the JLEnt.

Joint Supply Joint Integrating Concept Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Establish a JSE piece of the JLEnt that will enable JFCs and their components to rapidly

supply and sustain joint forces engaged in full spectrum military operations.

Integrate or synchronize JSE processes and capabilities in order to optimize them to best

support the JFC.

“Fuse authoritative logistics data, develop shared knowledge and common metrics,

strive for standardized use/commonality of materiel, and develop logistics modeling and

simulation tools.”

Use information technology to network the logistics chain from end to end.

Future joint operations will require an elevated level of joint supply support, must

integrate the capabilities of many new partners, and satisfy the unique requirements of

multiple missions simultaneously.

Supply activities must be prepared to respond to diverse and unique requirements

anywhere on the globe.

Processes established for supporting routine deployment and sustainment may not be

sufficient for rapid and irregular surge requirements.

Conditions often render those traditional supply planning and business processes in use

across the DOD and the extended enterprise obsolete.

The various enterprises envisioned by branches of the DOD must be integrated into a

cohesive JLEnt.

The Joint Logistics Distribution Joint Integrating Concept (February 2006) focuses on two

challenges-joint deployment/rapid distribution and agile sustainment- that future JFCs will face,

specifically in the 2015-2025 timeframe. Throughout the document, problems with joint



distribution operations are mentioned. Per the JL(D) JIC, joint distribution operations are the

collective activities necessary to plan, synchronize, and execute movement and sustainment

tasks in support of military operations. According to the paper, a solution to serving these

operations is the JDDE.

This concept paper describes the JDDE as an end-to-end enterprise consisting of equipment,

procedures, doctrine, leaders, technical connectivity, information, shared knowledge,

organizations, facilities, training, and materiel necessary to conduct joint distribution

operations. This concept directly supports the three over-arching distribution imperatives cited

in the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept: build the right capacity into the joint

distribution pipeline; exercise sufficient control over the pipeline; and provide a high degree of

assurance that right forces, equipment, sustainment, and support will arrive when and where

needed.

The central idea of the JDDE is that it must be capable of providing future JFCs with the ability

to rapidly and effectively move and sustain selected joint forces in support of major combat

operations or other joint operations. The JDDE must be capable of operating across the

strategic, operational, and tactical continuum with a set of integrated, robust, and responsive

physical, information, communication, and financial networks. This concept can be found

online at: https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/411268/file/54689/jld_jic.pdf

Joint Logistics Distribution Joint Integrating Concept Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the

JLEnt

Build a single unified enterprise capable of rapidly delivering and positioning joint forces

and sustainment from any origin or supply source to any JFC designated point of need

and back again

Augment any JFC with additional, ready, scalable, and agile distribution capabilities

Network the entire system in near real-time with common operational views and shared

knowledge, intuitive decision-support and modeling tools, and asset visibility

A wider range of adversaries, complex and diverse battlespace and technology diffusion

and access will have significant implications for joint distributed operations.

Simultaneous operations in multiple theaters may significantly impact the effectiveness

of the logistics enterprise.

3.2 Future Logistics Strategy and Concepts

Published in 2010 by the JS J4, the Joint Logistics Strategic Plan describes a way forward for a

complex military environment. Future logistics depends on a JLEnt architecture that takes

advantage of sustained relationships with MN and IA partners based on the assumption that

https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/411268/file/54689/jld_jic.pdf



military logistics operations will exist within an extremely diverse, complex, and globally

distributed environment. This facet of future military activity drives joint logisticians to

integrate and synchronize a wide range of logistics capabilities. The document highlights the

notion that no one organization will be successful meeting the logistics challenges associated

with the four types of CCJO military activities (combat, security, engagement, and relief and

reconstruction). The document also underscores that success in the future joint logistics

environment will come from aligning the efforts of DOD, the industrial base, NGOs, IA, and MN

partners into a singularly focused JLEnt. Figure 3.1 portrays and describes this federation of

entities who must work together to provide the logistics support required to successfully

execute global CCJO military activities. This document can be found online at:

http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2010-02/021810133805_J4_StrategicPlan_vFINAL.pdf

Figure 3.1 J4 Strategic Plan Visualizes the Joint Logistics Enterprise

Joint Logistics Strategic Plan Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

The JLEnt promoted in this J4 strategic plan drives the concept of a foundational JLEnt

inclusive of DOD and non-DOD logistics partners and stakeholders who are aligned,

interoperable, able to leverage all available support.

Describes the goal of the JLEnt to optimize logistics support such that no operation is

ever constrained by logistics.

http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2010-02/021810133805_J4_StrategicPlan_vFINAL.pdf



The Joint Concept for Logistics (August 2010) presents a common framework for providing

logistics support to joint forces operating as described in the CCJO. It introduces the JLEnt to

provide logistic partners an effective means to achieving common ends. The concept describes

the framework for the JLEnt as a “multi-tiered matrix of key global logistics providers

cooperatively structured to achieve a common purpose.” It acknowledges that the enterprise is

neither a rigid nor well-defined structure as it is governed by “an assortment of collaborative

agreements, contracts, doctrine, policy, legislation, or treaties designed to make it function in

the best interest of the JFC or other supported organization.” The optimized JLEnt will be more

capable than the sum of its parts, and the JCL describes the process of optimization as “the

most important facet in the Central Idea.” This document can be found online at:

http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/jcl.pdf

Joint Concept for Logistics Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Integrate and synchronize JLEnt processes and capabilities in order to optimize them to

best support the JFC.

Provide unity of effort across end-to-end logistics processes in support of the JFC.

Deliver, position, and sustain (including retrograde, redeployment, and return of

materials) joint forces from any point of origin to any point of employment.

Network the JLEnt in a real-time global information system with accurate data, total

requirement and resource visibility, common operational views, and shared perspective

with intuitive decision support tools.

The JLEnt must be underpinned by common procedures and language, joint training and

doctrine, interoperable equipment, authoritative and reliable information, and adaptive

leadership.

“The fundamental challenge in creating a JLEnt is determining how to integrate,

synchronize, and optimize organizations, processes, capabilities, and resources that are

outside the DOD.”

The JLEnt will operate in a radically different fashion in a HA/DR, DSCA, or major combat

operations (MCO) scenario.

Success requires a collective agreement on which organization is supported and which

organizations are supporting.

On September 27, 2010, LTG Gainey presented a brief called Global Logistics Challenges, which

addressed recent advances in logistics as they emerged spontaneously in global military

operations, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as various disaster response

operations throughout the world. LTG Gainey argued that the joint force has already begun to

leverage JLEnt principles, but much work remains to be done before MN, IA, NGO, and IO

partners are fully incorporated into this framework (see Figure 3.2 below). The brief echoes the

http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/jcl.pdf



findings of the JS J4’s Joint Logistics Strategic Plan, which sets forth the joint force’s logistic

mission, vision, and goals through 2014. This document can be found online at:

http://ndtahq.com/documents/GaineyCOMPRESSED.pdf

Global Logistics Challenges Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Gaining and maintaining operational access will be a significant challenge for many JLEnt

configurations.

The joint force must remain prepared to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster

relief operations even while postured to conduct major combat operations.

HA/DR operations may need to begin prior to formal DOS and DOD concurrence due to

requirements for immediate life-saving assistance and proximity of available forces.

United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) estimates that on average 72-hours pass

from the time that an ambassador declares a disaster to the time that SECDEF foreign

disaster response authorities are granted.

Figure 3.2 Logistics Challenge: Many Organizations in the JLEnt Not Visible

Objective 4.5 of the Multinational Experiment 6, Adaptive Logistic Network, (2011) was a 16

month, two-phased project which examined logistics information sharing in a complex

environment. The project examined potential solutions to improve planning and coordination

of international logistic responses in a range of scenarios, including HADR during steady state

operations. It resulted in a collaboration tool, called the All Partners Access Network (APAN), an

open-source, web-based collaborative tool suite and network architecture. The experiment also

http://ndtahq.com/documents/GaineyCOMPRESSED.pdf



produced a coordination framework and improved guidelines to execute responses while

reducing redundancies and inefficiencies. When fully implemented, ALN/NE 6 Obj. 4.5 is

expected to improve coordination, expand information sharing capabilities, synchronize

logistics, and generally enhance the conduct of logistics. Objective 4.5 of MNE 6 was specifically

developed to explore joint logistics in complex environments, including during HA/DR

operations. Tools such as APAN will help to strengthen the JLEnt and improve the efficiency of

joint logistics. The project explores and enhances many of the connections between nodes that

make up the JLEnt, but it does not explore the structure of the network itself. This document is

not available online.

Adaptive Logistics Network Challenges Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Make use of existing tools for logistics execution and information sharing such as APAN

in developing logistics guidance and recommendations.

Incorporate ALN/MNE 6 Obj. 4.5’s findings in regards to the roles and responsibilities of

logistics partners in a joint operation.

Identify current processes and procedures for logistics execution and information

sharing.

Incorporate research on where impediments/barriers exist in synchronization of

logistical efforts.

Identify science and technology capability solutions for information sharing and

collaboration.

Even when partners are willing to share information, a lack of proper policy or tools can

impede synchronization.

The Navy Supports L.I.F.E: A Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Concept (March 2011) is

a report which provides background on, justifies, and describes the USN’s “The Navy Supports

L.I.F.E” concept. L.I.F.E. stands for logistic, information, force protection and expertise: the four

key domains where navies can make a difference in supporting their humanitarian partners. In

response to a massive increase of reported disaster around the world over the last half-century,

the USN developed this concept to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of world navies in

HA/DR operations. The USN stresses that the L.I.F.E concept is not a new mission, but a new

strategy for an old task. Although specific to a HA/DR scenario, this concept supports the basic

premise of JCLE that the integration of the USG, host nation governments, other national

governments, IOs, NGOs, and foreign military forces is vital to conducting efficient and effective

operations. This document can be found online at:

https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/COE/Individual/CJOS/LIFECONCEP/LIFEConcep/file/_WFS/Th

e%20Navy%20Supports%20LIFE_pressWeb.pdf

https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/COE/Individual/CJOS/LIFECONCEP/LIFEConcep/file/_WFS/The%20Navy%20Supports%20LIFE_pressWeb.pdf

https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/COE/Individual/CJOS/LIFECONCEP/LIFEConcep/file/_WFS/The%20Navy%20Supports%20LIFE_pressWeb.pdf



L.I.F.E. Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Improve coordination by promoting complementary roles between USG, MN, and NGO

participants in disaster relief operations.

Improve the efficiency of maritime commanders with a mission-dedicated toolbox,

including a basic approach to plan and conduct their mission.

In between crises, promote and extend their capabilities to support humanitarian

missions and train within the humanitarian community.

Overcome the challenges of interoperability by providing humanitarian partners with a

basic interface to match needs with supplies.

Unless trained and equipped for the specific disaster mission, emergency responses are

limited in their ability to deliver the desired effects. Whilst highly capable in combat

operations, most in the military are poorly trained and organized to deliver

humanitarian aid.

The risk of humanitarian tragedies increases as the booming population growth compels

an urban extension into more exposed areas, especially along the coasts, where the

potential risk of natural disasters (tsunamis, hurricanes, and flood) is highest.

In a time of tight fiscal resources, the struggle for recognition is vital for many

organizations in order to generate funding. This incentive works to make integration

significantly more difficult.

Being part of the coordination process presents a risk to a smaller organization’s

independence due to the perception that larger organizations may overpower, threaten

or influence their actions and outcomes. Depending on their nationalities and

ideologies, some organizations will refuse to be committed alongside others, making the

coordination process even more complicated.

3.3 International and NGO Approaches

The Logistics Cluster and Humanitarian Reform (July 2010) is part of a larger Humanitarian

Response Review published by the UN Emergency Response Coordinator to address the ad hoc

and unpredictable nature of many international responses to emergencies. The report

introduced UN-led global logistics cluster as one of three pillars of this reform. The logistics

cluster should be considered by the DOD as the IO and NGO community response to the same

set of issues that led to the development of the JLEnt. Integrating DOD JLEnt approaches to

logistics with the cluster approach is critical if this vision for cooperative logistics is to be

realized. The cluster grouping mechanisms are intended to strengthen system-wide

preparedness and technical capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies by ensuring

there is predictable leadership and accountability for all the main areas of humanitarian

response. Clusters are primarily responsible for standards and policy setting, building response

capacity, and operational support. The WFP is the designated lead of the logistics cluster at the



global level, and will generally be the lead at the country level as well. However, it may have to

appoint another organization to act as country level lead. This document can be found online

at: http://www.logcluster.org/about/logistics-cluster/background-information/general_overview

Figure 3.3 The UN Cluster Approach

Logistics Cluster and Humanitarian Reform Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Conduct information management operations in order to ensure that all actors are

operating with similar facts and assumptions.

http://www.logcluster.org/about/logistics-cluster/background-information/general_overview



Challenges include such issues as ensuring humanitarians have the access they require,

but at the same time do not become a target. Other challenges include minimizing the

competition for scarce resources such as ports, supply routes, airfields and other

logistics infrastructure.

Military actors have a tendency to establish relationships with the civilian population

and in many cases attempt to provide them assistance, which can interfere with the

neutrality of NGO and other organizations also providing assistance.

The Logistics Cluster Operational Guide (undated) is part of the logistics cluster web site

operated by the WFP in its role as logistics cluster lead agency. This site serves to propagate a

better understanding of the UN logistics cluster approach to logistics. The logistics cluster page

provides an introduction to the UN logistics cluster, as well as an overview of activities and

responsibilities, activation processes, reporting lines and accountability, and links to additional

resources and tools. logistics cluster operations vary in scale from information sharing,

coordination (such as infrastructure assessment, port and corridor coordination, transporters

and rates, customs, equipment supplier information) to those involving common air, ocean and

overland transport and storage.

Via the logistics cluster, the WFP sets standards and policies, helps build response capacity, and

supports logistics operations through activities such as deployment of personnel, assessment of

logistics gaps and challenges, compilation of joint response plans, and liaison with civil and

military actors. The site serves as an accessible source for understanding the processes by

which the logistics cluster is activated and used. It describes how the various members of the

JLEnt conduct logistics operations during disaster relief and recovery operations. The guide sets

out the core functions of the IO/NGO logistics response in the JCLE, particularly within the

HA/DR scenario. This site can be found at: http://log.logcluster.org/

Logistics Cluster and Humanitarian Reform Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Use the logistics cluster as a model of one method to exploit shared assets, aptitudes

and competencies of various organizations within the JLEnt.

To whatever extent it is possible, develop common standards, policies and tools across

the JLEnt.

Establish or enhance the capacity of both the USG and partners and allies to respond to

humanitarian disasters internally, and to facilitate the reception of foreign aid.

The success of joint logistics operations depends on the level of participation from other

humanitarian organizations as well as trust and interest amongst participants.

http://log.logcluster.org/



Figure 3.4 The Logistics Cluster Activation Process

The Sphere Project’s Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response

(2010) provides a vital insight into the perspective of humanitarian NGOs on the DOD. The

standards are aligned with the Sphere Project’s two core beliefs as expressed in the included

Humanitarian Charter: those affected by disaster have right to life and dignity and, therefore, to



assistance; and that all possible steps must be taken to alleviate human suffering resulting from

disaster or conflict. The handbook’s guideline that “humanitarian agencies must remain clearly

distinct from the military to avoid any real or perceived association with a political or military

agenda that could compromise the agencies’ independence, credibility, security and access to

affected populations” describes a significant challenge JCLE faces in attempting to establish

unity of effort or even common purpose as developed within the JLEnt.

The Sphere Handbook is designed for planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation

during humanitarian response. It is intended to be an advocacy tool when negotiating for

humanitarian space and for the provision of resources with authorities. Because it is not owned

by any one organization, the Handbook enjoys broad acceptance by the humanitarian sector as

a whole. It has become one of the most widely known and internationally recognized sets of

standards for humanitarian response and is used as an IA communication and coordination tool

The handbook, while focused on practitioners involved in planning, managing or implementing

a humanitarian response (including staff and volunteers of local, national and international

humanitarian agencies), is also intended to be used by other organizations, including the

military, to understand the standards used by the humanitarian agencies with which they

interact. It specifically addresses the early recovery stage of HA/DR, and provides an excellent

source for challenges, areas of concern, and vulnerabilities which are likely to arise in the

aftermath of a disaster.

Furthermore, the handbook is useful for gaining perspective on the military role in disaster

response from an NGO perspective. Specifically, the framework defines the military as “a set of

actors not primarily driven by the humanitarian imperative, requiring the development of

specific guidelines and coordination strategies for humanitarian civil–military dialogue” and

warns that “any association with the military should be in the service of, and led by,

humanitarian agencies according to endorsed guidelines. Some agencies will maintain a

minimum dialogue to ensure operational efficiency (e.g. basic program information sharing)

while others may establish stronger links (e.g. use of military assets). In all cases, humanitarian

agencies must remain clearly distinct from the military to avoid any real or perceived

association with a political or military agenda that could compromise the agencies’

independence, credibility, security and access to affected populations” This handbook can be

found at:

http://www.sphereproject.org/component/option,com_docman/task,cat_view/gid,70/Itemid,2

6/

http://www.sphereproject.org/component/option,com_docman/task,cat_view/gid,70/Itemid,26/

http://www.sphereproject.org/component/option,com_docman/task,cat_view/gid,70/Itemid,26/



Sphere Project Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Develop specific guidelines and coordination strategies for humanitarian civil–military

dialogue.

Use local labor and markets to benefit the local economy and promote recovery

whenever feasible.

The handbook’s recommendation that NGOs maintain a separation from the political

and military objective could increase the difficulty of establishing unity of effort in the

JLEnt.

During a HA/DR or DSCA scenario, Sphere Project standards require the consultation of

local authorities, and the response capabilities and national agencies and institutions

must be reinforced.

Disaster response requires unique equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures for

dealing with vulnerable groups, including children, the elderly, those exposed to

HIV/AIDS, and persons with disabilities.

A March 8, 2005 meeting between the heads of major U.S. humanitarian organizations and U.S.

Civil and military leaders at the United States Institute of Peace produced a pamphlet entitled

Guidelines for Relations between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian

Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments. This pamphlet provides

recommended guidelines to govern the interaction between the U.S. military and NGOs during

both MCO and disaster relief scenarios. It strongly emphasizes the need to maintain a strong

degree of separation between the DOD and any NGOs with which it might interact, while

encouraging the development of robust pipelines for communication. This document can be

found online at: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/guidelines_pamphlet.pdf

NGO Relations Guidelines Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Define clear roles and responsibilities for each party in the DOD-NGO relationship.

Develop and enhance lines of communication with NGOs, the incorporation of NGO

liaisons into the DOD communication structure during all phases of combat (including

Phase 0) and disaster assistance.

The pamphlet’s recommendation that the U.S. military not refer to NGOs as “partners”

suggests underlying difficulties in promoting cooperation between the DOD and NGOs.

UN Ref. 2010.02 Civil Military Coordination in UN-Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-

CIMIC) (September 2002) provides guidance to and sets policy for military staff and contingents

in the operational and tactical coordination between UN military and civilian partners. UN-

CIMIC refers to facilitating the interface between military and civilian components of an

integrated mission, as well as with the humanitarian and development actors in the mission

http://www.usip.org/files/resources/guidelines_pamphlet.pdf



area. It defines the core tasks of UN-CIMIC as civil-military liaison, information sharing, and civil

assistance. This document can be found at:

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/451ba7624.html

UN Ref. 2010.02 Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Implement a means to share intelligence and analysis across the entire spectrum of

operations throughout IA, NGO, and MN communities.

Identify the requirements of military forces to support civilian personnel as early as

possible in the planning process.

Appoint a single focal point to process all incoming information from other agencies,

NGOs, and local partners.

Include national staff officers and translators from the host country, in particular

female, to serve as a link between the military component and local communities.

By destroying infrastructure, natural disasters may drive NGOs and civilian personnel to

an increased reliance on support from the military.

3.4 Selected Handbooks and Guides Related to the JLEnt

Handbook 24-2, Understanding the Defense Transportation System (January 2009) provides a

broad look into United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and covers everything

from structure and operations to the heraldry of the USTRANSCOM emblem. The handbook

details the Defense Travel System (DTS) node within the JLEnt. It explicitly records

USTRANSCOM’s support for an IA, MN, and public-private enterprise, vetted by modeling and

simulation, in order to facilitate the logistics process, and argues that such a network would

both mitigate many of the challenges presented by the 21st century and allow the functional

COCOM to better serve its customers. This handbook can be found at:

www.transcom.mil/J6/j6o/j6_oi/pubs/24.pdf

Understanding the Defense Transportation System Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Provide the capability to synchronize the movement of forces and sustainment from a

designated location, or source of supply, to a desired point of employment with a high

degree of reliability.

Leverage information systems and best business practices to achieve continuous

process improvement.

US military forces must plan and prepare to prevail in a broad range of operations that

may occur in multiple theaters in overlapping time frames.

United States Northern Command’s (USNORTHCOM’s) DSCA Handbook (expires January 2012)

contains both a tactical level commander and staff toolkit and a liaison officer toolkit. It is

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/451ba7624.html

http://www.transcom.mil/J6/j6o/j6_oi/pubs/24.pdf



intended for both planning purposes and to be used as an on-the-ground how-to guide for

forces supporting a HA/DR scenario on U.S. soil. Although it does not directly reference the

JLEnt, it indicates that any DSCA environment will be characterized by a wide array or

organizations, including other government agencies and NGOs, each working cooperatively to

accomplish the mission. It also emphasizes the important role that logistics play during a DSCA

scenario. This handbook is a major resource for researching and constructing the DSCA scenario

as part of the JCLE project. This handbook can be found online at:

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/FM3-28/CommanderStaffDCSAHandbook.pdf

NORTHCOM DSCA Handbook Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Effectively manage and communicate FEMA’s expectations of DOD during DSCA

response to allow for efficient execution of relief operations and successful

synchronization of military and civil capabilities after a disaster when local and state

infrastructure may be overwhelmed.

Institutionalize the use of civilian liaison officers (LNOs) as representatives and points of

contact (POCs) for other government agencies, NGOs, and private-sector entities.

Institutionalize the use of military LNOs as representatives and POCs for the military

commander.

The Joint Force will need to be constantly prepared to conduct DSCA operations. In the

period between 2000 and 2008, disasters resulted in 426 Presidential Disaster

Declarations, averaging four per month.

Legislation places restrictions on what government agencies, including the DOD, can and

cannot do during disaster response.

USPACOM’s “How to” Handbook on Multilateral Information Preparation of the Operational

Environment (MIPOE) for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) (undated)

provides detailed instructions for completing the MIPOE process. While the handbook does

very little to inform the JLEnt itself, it provides detailed instructions for conducting disaster

relief and recovery operations in USPACOM’s area of responsibility (AOR), including a four-step

process for planning, including:

Step 1: Define the Operational Environment

Step 2: Describe the Operational Environment / Analysis of the Disaster Area

Step 3: Evaluate Risk

Step 4: Determine Courses of Action

The first two steps apply to all HA/DR scenarios, while steps 3 and 4 are only applied as needed.

This document provides extensive information about the actual planning of operations within

USPACOM and assists in understanding interaction across nodes within the AOR. This handbook

can be found at: https://community.apan.org/ha/dr/m/j2/54846/download.aspx

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/FM3-28/CommanderStaffDCSAHandbook.pdf

https://community.apan.org/hadr/m/j2/54846/download.aspx



USPACOM’s “How-To” Handbook Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Use information held and gathered by members of the JLEnt in order to construct a clearer intelligence picture.

HA/DR operations will almost universally be multilateral. They will involve a wide variety of U.S., international, and regional participants, including governments, humanitarian organizations, and private commercial and industrial partners.

The U.S. Coast Guard Logistics Handbook (March 2001) describes and documents existing U.S.

Coast Guard (USCG) logistics systems and is intended to act as a baseline for future

improvements. The handbook provides a broad overview of logistics throughout the USCG in

support of aircraft; boats; cutters; command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligence; and facilities platforms. It is non-directive in nature and not intended to change

processes currently in place. It contains a listing of Coast Guard logistics relationships – both

within the USCG and other parts of the DHS as well as with the DOD, other government

agencies, commercial sources of supply, and other organizations with which the Coast Guard

operates. This handbook can be found online at: http://www.uscg.mil/directives/cim/4000-

4999/cim_4000_2.pdf

U.S. Coast Guard Logistics Handbook Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Put into place interoperability-related standards, guidance, and policy.

The United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook is a 2008 guide

produced by the United Nations in order to aid UN civil-military coordination officers in advising

the leadership of the humanitarian community on civil-military issues and facilitating the

establishment, maintenance and review of appropriate relations between civilian and military

actors present during a HA/DR or MCO scenario. It offers key insights on the difficulties in

conducting joint civil-military logistics operations from the perspective of NGOs. It stresses the

need for constant communications between agencies and organizations cooperating in disaster

relief and recovery. Chapter 4, “Transportation and Logistics” was expanded in the most recent

version. It describes the military and humanitarian perspective on transport and logistics and

lists keys military actors, minimum necessary information which must be shared, possible

activities, considerations, lessons learned, and best practices. This section is primarily

concerned with instructing UN-CIMIC Coordination officers how to deal with the military, but it

may be useful as a source for a humanitarian organization perspective and to gain an

understanding of difficulties NGOs experience in trying to coordinate with the military. This

handbook can be found online at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47da7da52.html

http://www.uscg.mil/directives/cim/4000-4999/cim_4000_2.pdf

http://www.uscg.mil/directives/cim/4000-4999/cim_4000_2.pdf

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47da7da52.html



UN Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the

JLEnt

The Joint Force requires policies and processes for communicating operational logistics

needs with NGOs. This communication process may require the DOD to repackage

information into a format which NGOs can use.

“Experience has shown that in almost all emergencies some level of civil-military

coordination is required and that failure to establish effective and appropriate civil-

military relations can have severe consequences both in current operations and in the

later stages of the emergency.”

Communication about the location, activity, and makeup of civilian transportation

convoys is especially important during security operations or MCO, so that they are not

mistaken for adversary forces.

The military, public, and private sector each have different ways of formatting data. This

can become an obstruction when attempting to share information.

In 2001, the WFP published a report arguing the need for a comprehensive approach to build

partnership with NGOs titled WFP Working with NGOs: A Framework for Partnership, which

outlines the key elements derived from historical successes and failures which have produced

useful relationships with associate organizations and contains specific recommendations for

improving field-level partnerships. It emphasizes that a partnership must be mutually beneficial

with clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities. Furthermore it recommends

explicit contractual agreements as the preferred form of relationship to facilitate a quick and

efficient disaster response.

A partnership is defined by the WFP as a mutually beneficial alliance between organizations

where roles, responsibilities, and accountability are clearly defined. These relationships are

based on a shared vision regarding objectives and purpose of work. They involve joint resource

contributions, shared risks and joint control of information. The paper proposes capacity-

building, advocacy, and other measures related to establishing effective partnerships with a

particular focus on strengthening relationships with local NGOs. This document can be found

at:

http://www.wfp.org/sites/default/files/Working%20with%20NGOs%20A%20Framework%20for

%20Partnership.pdf

WFP Working with NGO Issues Relevant to Operationalizing the JLEnt

Build partner capacity to operate effectively with military forces by sharing information,

synchronizing organizational support structures, and developing means of financial

interoperability.

http://www.wfp.org/sites/default/files/Working%20with%20NGOs%20A%20Framework%20for%20Partnership.pdf

http://www.wfp.org/sites/default/files/Working%20with%20NGOs%20A%20Framework%20for%20Partnership.pdf



Nurture contractual and long-term partnership agreements among NGOs in order to

reduce response time and increase operational efficiency.

The JFC must understand an organization’s point of view, motivations, and agenda in

order to work with any organization effectively.

The wide array of organizations represented in the NGO layer has a diverse set of goals,

capabilities, and values which can complicate the task of constructing a cohesive

network.

The Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military (Summer 2009) provides an

extensive overview of DOD-NGO relationships from the military’s perspective. While stressing

the wide variety of different NGOs, the guide bins them into four rough groups based on

organizational goals: humanitarian aid (both emergency and developmental), advocacy groups,

faith-based groups (which are founded on religious principles, but do not use religion as part of

the aid given), and missionary groups. The guide cautions that NGOs are massively diverse and

no two have exactly the same objectives, missions, operating procedures, or capacities, and

argues that generalizations and abstractions must be developed in order to provide a cohesive

body of information, even if this results in the sacrifice of some level of detail.

Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military Issues Relevant to Operationalizing

the JLEnt

Develop methods to nurture standardization in logistics methodology amongst NGOs,

which will result in an increase in efficiency and accountability.

Every NGO is unique; no two have exactly the same objectives, missions, operating

procedures, or capacities. To provide a cohesive body of information, generalizations

must be made and some level of detail must be sacrificed.



4.0 Principles of a Logistics Enterprise

An initial set of principles or best practices that will likely underpin a successfully-

operationalized JLEnt can be established based on the survey of academic literature as well as a

number of documents within the logistics and civil-military coordination communities of

practice. These principles are based on an understanding of enterprise and network theory, and

can be used to assist in operationalizing the JLEnt for experimental purposes. They can also

serve as a foundation for JLEnt-related activities of logistics planners as the Joint Force and its

partners move from “community of interest” to “community of practice.” Strikingly, many of

the themes – including encouraging social and cultural trust, shared purpose, establishment of

common decision-making processes, and the development of personal relationships – were

deductively recognized during ground operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but are also core

themes established in the enterprise and social network literature.

The following list is a set of principles and practices that will serve to link the theory of

enterprises of social networks found in section 2.0 of the BAR with the actual logistics concepts

and operations described in section 3.0 above. Each must be explored in greater detail during

the experimentation campaign. However, these principles and best practices should serve as a

guide to how the theory of enterprises and social networks can be effectively applied to the

rapid and precise delivery of logistics in a fully operationalized JLEnt.

JLEnt Principles and Best Practices

These principles should be considered as the community of practice works to operationalize the JLEnt.

Leverage existing networks.

Work towards a common awareness of key JLEnt participants and their goals and objectives.

Account for different backgrounds, perspectives, and cultures of JLEnt participants.

Be aware of barriers that hinder access to information exchange across a social network.

Focus on building trust relationships across the JLEnt.

Attempt to build consensus on common objectives and goals, while recognizing where

objectives and goals may diverge.

Embrace emergent logistics networks.

Develop appropriate network node linking strategies.

Develop appropriate network participation strategies.

Develop logistics planners with competency in social networking.



4.1 Leverage Existing Networks

Perhaps the first “best practice” to understand is that fragments of a working JLEnt are already,

in a narrow sense, operationalized through the work of the UN logistics cluster and in FEMA’s

National Response Framework. As noted earlier, the cluster approach was established to

enhance partnership among a diverse set of organizations, to develop cooperative structures

based on common standards and policies, and to encourage common focus through the

development of a collective crisis response capacity. For example, the Joint Force should

understand the logistics clusters’ “network administrative” mode of governance and how this

governing structure might affect DOD’s approach to augmenting or contributing to the logistics

cluster. Logistics officers and planners could potentially strengthen the JLEnt’s social network

by building a sustained relationship with those organizations, such as USAID, which have

already plugged into the logistics cluster, and using this connection to pass military information

to the wider JLEnt.

Whatever the scale of the operation, logistics cluster activities will typically include periodic

logistics cluster meetings involving all organizations (UN, IOs, and NGOs). It is strongly

recommended that field logisticians leverage USAID representation, and participate in meetings

if participation does not conflict with other USG priorities or principles. Key points of discussion

addressed in these meetings typically include agreement on basic crisis approaches, daily or

weekly critical issues, (e.g. endorse the CONOPS; agree on specific action points for the group,

etc). Field logisticians representing their organizations in these meetings are closely linked with

headquarters organizations and ensure that their head of mission, emergency coordinators,

and others at the strategic level are kept informed of local crisis developments.64

This connection to the logistics cluster may be critical because it serves as the hub for logistics

related information across many multinational partners, the international and

nongovernmental communities. The cluster incorporates the UN, its subsidiary organizations

(such as the WFP or the Office for the High Commission for Refugees) and private charity or

development organizations such as the Red Cross or Doctors without Borders. JP 4-0 includes

information on integrating international partners, military services and associated command

structures within a combatant command or its CIMIC apparatus. The perspective is one of

placing the joint force commander at the center of the effort. However, from the perspective of

64


“Look at what coordination mechanisms exist before you make your own…”

~Mr. Tony Icayan, Chief Knowledge Manager, NATO CIMIC Fusion Center




the UN’s logistics cluster for example, the DOD is the periphery and the logistics cluster is the

central point of contact. Joint logistics doctrine must be adjusted to reflect this perspective and

provide logisticians with adequate tools to operate with the logistics cluster based on this

perspective.

Furthermore, a similar enterprise-like organizational structure exists for domestic emergency

management efforts. The core of the JLEnt is managed in homeland disaster scenarios by FEMA,

along with other agencies of the DHS. The National Response Framework’s Emergency Support

Function 7 (ESF7): Logistics Management and Resource Support Annex describes how this

existing JLEnt layer is structured and how the DOD may connect. As with the logistics cluster, an

organization outside of the DOD serves as the lead agency for the JLEnt (in this case, FEMA).

DOD elements of the JLEnt should understand the principles that govern FEMA’s whole of

government architecture and participate in and develop the relationships with other

government entities to encourage further rapidity and precision in logistic response.

At the headquarters level, ESF7 establishes, maintains, and executes national logistics plans,

policies, procedures, and doctrines. It also develops and maintains visibility of resources and

national logistics support requirements and capabilities. The military provides functional

command, coordination, and oversight of all national logistics activities, including resource

management at joint field offices, and distribution centers. The military’s role in the JLEnt is to

provide support to the regional/field/joint field office-level logistics management structure,

which is responsible for developing, maintaining, and executing the supplemental regional

logistics plans that implement headquarters plans, policies, and procedures.

4.2 Common Awareness of JLEnt Membership and Connections.

The visualization of the existence and function of social networks may qualitatively change how

communications flow through an operational JLEnt. Rob Cross notes that a key opportunity for

the construction of future social networks is in the visualization of these networks:

“Whereas today we rely on two-dimensional, static, and notoriously outdated

organization charts to depict what an organization is or does, soon we will be able to

represent companies, even industries the way they really are: active, in motion,

growing, shrinking, flowing in the direction of opportunities…the new organization chart

is likely to be a network movie, a dynamic visual representation that will provide

powerful new insights into how an organization is working, and critical warning signals

about the places and ways in which it isn’t.”65

65

Cross and Thomas, p. 180.



Across the multi-tiered matrix that makes up the JLEnt, members will have widely varying levels

of participation and capacity to deliver logistics. The context for each “network movie,”

including the nature and character of connections among nodes will dramatically differ; each

different situation will likely have very different JLEnt configurations based on the nature and

scale of operations. For instance, connections that can exist in a humanitarian disaster relief

scenario OCONUS will not be feasible for a combat operations scenario.

JP 4-0 notes that JFCs must maintain logistics-enterprise wide visibility by assuring “access to

logistic processes, resources and requirements in order to gain the knowledge necessary to

make effective decisions.” The publication goes on to note that “this kind of visibility is the key

to continuously monitoring progress and is enabled by operational inputs which serve to inform

joint logisticians about the current situation.” Service reports, operational summaries, and

logistical situation reports all serve to expand the joint logistician’s awareness of the JOA.

However, as noted earlier in this paper, the formal connections between organizational

structures may not always reflect the reality of the JLEnt’s evolving structure. In order to put

the JLEnt into operation, its constituent organizations must develop ways to “see” the network

and to share that perspective across the JLEnt.

Seeing into the JLEnt structure must also nurture a keen understanding of competences and

expertise among JLEnt members. JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and

Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations speaks to working with

IOs and NGOs, but does not provide detailed understanding of their motivations, nor how they

may fit within common logistics efforts as described in the JCL. Furthermore, the joint

publication does not speak specifically about the connections that link IOs, NGOs, and other

government agencies in the United States and across multinational partners, nor does it

provide a guide to the UN’s cluster approach, either in general, or the specific logistics cluster.

4.3 Account for Differing Perspectives

JP 3-08 describes the need to ensure the needs and concerns of all participating organizations

are understood and promptly addressed, especially pertaining to interests, policies, core values,

and legal limitations. The document describes the large capacity or very specialized skills across

the wider IA/IO/NGO communities. The document also notes that any activity that strips an

NGO’s appearance of impartiality, such as close collaboration with one particular military force,

may well eliminate that organization’s primary source of security. However, there are other

perspectives that joint commanders will have to understand and account for when accessing or

engaging with the JLEnt. Some other sources of friction between military, IA communities,

NGOs, and others include:



Long vs. Short Term View. Conflict can even exists between actors with similar cultural

perspectives (humanitarian and development actors) due to their differences between

short and long term goals. For example, humanitarian relief workers may desire to

deliver free food aid to a needy village. This is a short term goal which may hinder

longer-term development work focused on increasing local capacity to provide for itself.

Requirements for Media Coverage. Humanitarian and Development organizations

survive primarily on “donor” funds. Media coverage of both the crisis and their

participation in that crisis will assist them in getting more funds. Therefore they want

more media coverage. In contrast, diplomats and the military often seek to get the crisis

off of the front pages of newspapers since that often means they have accomplished

their mission and can go home. In most cases (the Pakistan floods and earthquake, or

Indian Ocean tsunami), the United States will want its efforts to be positively viewed by

the local population as well to support larger strategic messages.

Competition. Finally, competition can also be a source of friction between actors. NGO

representatives have claimed during engagements that they are more comfortable

sharing information with the military than with other humanitarians they are competing

with for “donor” funds. The military and private security forces also have a conflicting

relationship even though they share a common culture and background, partly because

the military prefers to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. 66

The degree to which NGOs might have a strong working relationship between them is defined

by their adherence to three fundamental humanitarian principles: humanity, impartiality, and

neutrality.67 These three basic principles assist in understanding how NGOs may relate to or

participate in a JLEnt based on the particular situation. For example, NGOs can be very sensitive

of associating themselves with the military of any foreign nation for fear that such association

may negatively impact its impartiality and neutrality. This will especially be the case in a major-

combat operation. At the same time, NGO involvement with the military is evolving as both

NGOs and foreign militaries inevitably work within the same operational space. The Sphere

Handbook, a well respected book which reviews the humanitarian charter and offers minimum

standards for humanitarian response, notes the “increased involvement of the military in

humanitarian response, a set of actors not primarily driven by the humanitarian imperative.”68

66

Civil Military Overview Guide Notes 67

These are drawn from the U.N. Charter, International Law, and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. 68

The Sphere Project, p. 11.



The Sphere Handbook very effectively summarizes the tension between the perspectives of

different actors and should serve as a foundation for how the JLEnt’s members understand this

set of social relations.

“The military bring particular expertise and resources, including security, logistics,

transport and communication. However, their activities can blur the important

distinction between humanitarian objectives and military or political agendas and create

future security risks. Any association with the military should be in the service of, and led

by, humanitarian agencies according to endorsed guidelines. Some agencies will

maintain a minimum dialogue to ensure operational efficiency (e.g. basic program

information-sharing) while others may establish stronger links (e.g. use of military

assets). In all cases, humanitarian agencies must remain clearly distinct from the military

to avoid any real or perceived association with a political or military agenda that could

compromise the agencies’ independence, credibility, security and access to affected

populations.”69

These ideas, coupled with similar mental exercises for different industry groups could perhaps

be further developed in JP 3-08. Also, the joint force may wish to develop a set of principles

and motivations to offer the NGO a similar understanding of U.S. military engagement and

logistics practices. A common cultural assumption baseline may allow the joint force and its

nonmilitary partners to understand better areas of common interest, focus more on common

logistics endeavors needed to solve or address the crisis, and to spend less time and focus on

issues that may divide them or on issues not readily addressable based on more enduring

principles.

4.4 Awareness of Information Barriers

There are many barriers to information sharing between military and civil actors that must be

brought down if the JLEnt is to be operationalized. The “free revealing” of information in a

chaotic crisis environment is more effective than tightly defined organizational structures for

moving information about logistics requirements and capabilities. However, information

barriers often define how governments, militaries, and businesses typically function, and thus

have been difficult to transcend.

“Relinquishing control over content is perceived by many to endanger U.S. interests and

personnel, undermine orders from superiors and the wisdom of experts, diminish the

69

The Sphere Project 2011, p. 60.



power that comes from holding on to knowledge, and open institutions to criticism as

the limits of their knowledge are revealed.”70

Specific obstacles to information sharing that may impede the development of an operational

JLEnt include, for example, cultural differences between the military and others. These

differences cause friction as many military members view members of IO/NGOs as

undisciplined, and perhaps not very effective or particularly trustworthy. In contrast, many

IO/NGO members view members of the military as aggressive and inflexible. Therefore, the

military often views working with IO/NGOs as too troublesome, while the IO/NGOs resent the

military’s propensity to take charge of the situation when they arrive, overwhelming ongoing

work and assuming that others are not capable of decisive action.

In addition, the military's “need to know” mentality and strict classification and information

release policies complicate information flows required for a JLEnt. The military has always had

an “information protection” mentality and therefore if a person or organization was not

deemed to have the “need to know” a piece of information this was not shared with them. This

mentality greatly hinders civil-military cooperation, especially in the information age where

even military intelligence personnel may gather significant data from open sources. Civilian

organizations frequently have little problem sharing information with the military, but the

perception is that military does not reciprocate. Current information security regulations and

classification policies have the potential to severely limit the quality of information shared with

needed JLEnt entities. This lack of reciprocity in levels of information is likely a significant

potential source of distrust among JLEnt members, hindering the rapidity and precision of

logistics delivery across the network as a whole.

As a CSIS report goes on to note “because traditional ways of managing information flows are

becoming counter-productive, free revealing must find a way to work within the context of

institutional realities.”71 Decades of field practice and lab experimentation have not yet solved

the problem of multi-level security information sharing. Therefore, it is critical that all members

of the JLEnt identify in advance those information-sharing barriers that exist. Rather than

attempting to breach a wall that heretofore has been impervious to attempts to defeat it, the

JLEnt should seek to make all participants aware of these barriers and seek to build trusting

relationships in an environment where full exchange of all information remains beyond the

realm of the possible.

70

Rebecca Linder, Wikis, Webs, and Networks: Creating Connections for Conflict-Prone Settings, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2006), p. 17 71

Linder, p. 17.



Moreover, the underlying purpose for these institutional barriers ought to be readdressed.

Information must never be shared if it threatens national security, yet all information is not

always useful. Too much information can drown out good information. The onslaught of

information needs no help from institutions who adopt a “water hose” approach—social media

and other outlets are already overloading development and response efforts; Rather, a

thoughtful awareness of circumstances on the ground with particular emphasis on who may

need what information when.

4.5 Focus on Building Trust Relations across the JLEnt

Reciprocal trust is perhaps the most important variable in a functioning social network. Based

on both a review of academic literature and interviews with representatives from across the

JLEnt, trust is generally built through sustained interaction and ongoing reciprocity between

elements in the network. At the tactical and field level, CIMIC personnel are already focused on

establishing credibility and confidence with relevant civil actors, and joint logisticians should

work to do the same within a working JLEnt. Civilian groups may fear they will lose their ability

to autonomously direct events, and become overwhelmed by the massive capacity of military

forces, while military planners may struggle with their inability to control the many variables

and uncertainties that organizations outside their command may bring to the crisis.

NGOs and humanitarian relief organizations are often capable of trading goods and information

with a greater degree of efficiency than formal government and corporate institutions due to a

relative lack of legal and bureaucratic regulation and the absence of a profit incentive. Because

they are not motivated by shareholder profit and provide services and support missions that

serve public interests across borders, the legitimacy of their actions may be above the reproach

directed at firms and at individual national governments. Because of this, these groups may

serve within the JLEnt as trusted bridges of otherwise disparate entities drawn from both

private and public sectors. They are not without their own problem set, however, and the JLEnt

must also account for tensions specific to nonmilitary organizations working in a crisis. These

include:

Competition. In the Aid and Private Sector community, many organizations are in

competition for donor funds. The sharing of information with the military (or others in

their community) can be stifled to keep information from competitors and have better

access to the donor community.

Security. In the humanitarian community, perceptions of neutrality and impartiality

have traditionally shielded them from harm. Concerns of being associated with military

in the field can be dangerous not only to the NGO’s staff and property, but also to the

communities they are trying to assist.



Principles. The definition of humanitarian assistance is different for civilians and the

military and this can impede working together on such projects. Interaction with military

may even go against organization mandate.

Resources. Compared to the military, most civilian agencies/organizations are much

smaller and have many fewer resources (personnel and financial). Therefore, they must

be flexible and much of their staffs, especially international staffs, have competing

demands – many persons within NGOs and IOs carry multiple responsibilities (i.e.

Program Manager, Liaison, Reporting and at the end of the day they can only focus on

what is most important or live saving in their opinion). Most civilian organizations also

have a high turnover rate of NGO and IO personnel especially in areas of conflict/natural

disaster. 72

The joint force must also be open and insistent with the NGO/IO communities about their own

rationale and authority to take part in crisis response situations.

“Although the wider humanitarian community may still have reservations about military

involvement in humanitarian work, the reality is that national or foreign militaries–in

some cases both– are increasingly likely to be asked by their governments to respond to

emergencies. In the interest of making the humanitarian emergency response more

effective and predictable, the involvement of military forces needs to be taken into

account and appropriately planned for by all parties in such situations. One of the most

obvious conclusions that can be drawn from the operation in Haiti...is the need to

engage with the military before disaster strikes, so that humanitarian agencies have the

opportunity to shape military planning, rather than simply react to it.”73

Kotlarsky and Oshri have found several best practices relating to building trust across social

networks in distributed teams. These should be brought to bear in operationalizing the JLEnt,

and include:

Promote mutual introductions among all members of the social network, including

mutual visits across locations.

Reduce communications barriers and develop mutually acceptable communications

channels.

Routinize communications through regular sessions, project meetings, and visits to

outlying, but critical JLEnt node sites.

72

CIMIC Fusion Center Briefing notes. 73

Humanitarian Exchange Newsletter, Humanitarian Practice Network, Humanitarian Response Group, (October 2010) p. 14



Open direct communications channels and promote a centralized “bulletin board”

where all can share information.

Ensure message quality through precision e-mails and writing (including standard

message sets), graphical representations of ideas if possible.

Use of groupware tools, knowledge repositories, teleconference and video conferencing

facilities, and online chat.74

These best practices should be coupled with a focus on detailed sharing of specific skills and

knowledge sets and a commonly accessible, updateable repository or register of logistics

competencies across the JLEnt. As is illustrated in section 2.3, the development of detailed

knowledge about “who knows what" across a social network is key to building TMS systems.

The joint force could begin such an effort by providing detailed information about logistics

capabilities that the military may be able to provide to civilian actors in a crisis, as well as a

snapshot of specialized skills, such as aerial mapping or port and airfield-opening packages that

may be brought to bear on behalf of the JLEnt.

4.6. Build Consensus on Common Goals and Objectives

Enterprise literature also notes that the establishment of shared beliefs and values between

employees is catalyzed by the sharing of common languages, codes, values, and practices. The

JLEnt is a very different type of cooperative endeavor than typical formalized coordination

procedures. A diverse array of individuals, ad hoc groups, repurposed organizations (such as

private companies), and formal organizations will all converge on the crisis area. The

motivations of these groups are as diverse as the number of organizations involved,

complicating the ability to understand the mechanics of the social network itself.

Across the multi-tiered matrix that makes up the JLEnt, members will also have widely varying

levels of participation and capacity. Each different situation will likely have very different JLEnt

configurations based on the nature and scale of operations. For instance, in a combat

operations scenario, partners may be different from those in a humanitarian disaster relief

scenario. A key element of a JLEnt for the United States will be an embassy country team, each

with very unique and specialized access to the host nation. Understanding the country team

capacities will be central to U.S. whole of government response capacities. Likewise, as

74

Kotlarsky and Oshri, p. 44.

“Bereft of outside agency input, the military will generally fill the void as it sees fit.”

~USAID, “Working with the Military in the Field.” Field Operations Guide



implementing partners on the ground, NGOs are intimately aware of humanitarian needs

during a natural disaster and have “an immediate capacity and knowledge of what needs to be

done to respond to humanitarian needs.”75

For information to flow across barriers within a social network, members must identify with a

mission larger than their organization’s own goals. In places where trust is a rare commodity,

personal relationships are essential for making progress. Actors must also recognize that while

there may be different, often competing tactical objectives, all can derive mutual benefit from

cooperation. Ideological arguments can be overcome when people work together on a concrete

problem, form personal relationships, and develop trust.

In order to build trust among a diverse JLEnt, contribution should be based on knowledge, not

status or rank. The participatory structure of networks is necessary to succeed in conflict-prone

settings. The complex nature of post-conflict settings guarantees that information is not limited

to a finite number of people. Instead, individuals and organizations (both local and

international) have different types of expertise. Participatory systems and structures would

make the best use of each person’s knowledge and ensure maximum situational awareness for

all actors.

“Encouraging users to generate, structure, and evaluate content makes the most of their

insights. There are numerous experts with content to share—as well as many

practitioners who may have smaller, but still insightful, success stories from their

experience on the ground. Furthermore, practitioners are very willing to share their

experiences; they do not lack the will to help, only the means to do so. Even if only a

small fraction of the millions of people who have experience with international

interventions are able to share their ideas, then a huge increase in knowledge and

understanding is possible.”76

The logistics community, (as well as the wider DOD) should understand how the cluster

approach works, and transmit detailed knowledge about the workings of DOD logistics entities.

For the logistics cluster, response capacity is based on an understanding of several key goals

and objectives:

First, the approach aims to ensure sufficient global capacity is built up and maintained

in all the main sectors/AORs, with a view to ensuring timely and effective responses in

new crises.

75

Lawry and Frandsen 2009, p. 21. 76

Rebecca Linder, p. 18.



Second, the approach aims to ensure predictable leadership in all the main

sectors/AORs. Cluster leads are responsible for ensuring response capacity is in place

and that assessment, planning and response activities are carried out in collaboration

with partners and in accordance with agreed standards and guidelines. Cluster leads

also act as the “provider of last resort.”

Third, the approach is designed around the concept of partnerships (i.e. clusters)

between UN agencies, IOs, NGOs, and national governments. Partners work together

towards agreed common humanitarian objectives both at the global level

(preparedness, standards, tools, stockpiles and capacity-building) and at the field level

(assessment, planning, delivery and monitoring). By designating cluster leads, the aim is

to make the international humanitarian community a better partner for host

governments, local authorities and local civil society, and to avoid situations were

governments have to deal with hundreds of uncoordinated international actors.

Fourth, the approach strengthens accountability. Cluster leads are accountable, at the

global level, to the Emergency Relief Coordinator for building up a more predictable and

effective response capacity in line with Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)

agreements. At the field level, in addition to their normal institutional responsibilities,

cluster leads are accountable to humanitarian coordinators for fulfilling agreed roles and

responsibilities for cluster leadership, such as those listed in the IASC Generic Terms of

Reference for Sector/Cluster Leads at the Country Level. The approach also strengthens

accountability to beneficiaries through commitments to participatory and community-

based approaches, improved common needs assessments and prioritization, and better

monitoring and evaluation.77

4.7 Embrace Emergent Networks

The JLEnt will never be able to account for all players prior to a crisis, no matter how well one

plans. Rather than acting as a nuisance or aberration, emergent activity fills a void that cannot

be filled by more traditional, centralized command and control approaches.78 FEMA’s ESF 7

notes that planning and coordinating with other supply chain partners in the private sector is

critical, and in a domestic response situation, private industry can bring to bear materials in

quantities that often dwarf what is available in U.S. General Services Administration, FEMA, or

Red Cross prepositioned stocks. Joint forces should understand this aspect of the JLEnt and

prepare to augment emergent networks, particularly in the private sector, wherever possible

with engineering and movement assets. In a particularly devastating humanitarian disaster, the

capacity to move information from planning and headquarters to the field and back can be

77

CIMIC Fusion Center Briefing notes 78

Tierney, Lindell, Perry, “Facing the unexpected: Disaster preparedness and response in the United States.” Joseph Henry Press.



muddled and inconsistent. Joint force logisticians should also be ready to identify specialized

communications capabilities to link emergent networks to the JLEnt as a whole to take

advantage of their detailed knowledge and information about a crisis situation.

The social networks under consideration here will have very fluid relationships, fleeting

membership, dispersed leadership, and transient mission objectives as environmental

conditions continually change.79 Emergent social networks will often not be organized around

formal planning processes and JLEnt nodes should have sustained, everyday contact with

possible partners so that partnership becomes reflexive and “normal” when a crisis begins. As

one United States Africa Command logistics expert noted “the importance of building

relationships beforehand cannot be overstated.”80

4.8 Develop Appropriate Social Network Strategies

Figure 4.1 below illustrates several flawed social network configurations that may be identified

and remediated in a functioning JLEnt social network.81 Although each nodal flaw is described in

terms of an individual in the source document, each can be applied to the function of a specific

organization within the JLEnt as well.

It is clear from the social network theory that inappropriate network governance strategies can

severely degrade the ability of the collective to act in a cohesive manner. “Coordinating

response in the absence of a [structure] is likely to create epistemic differences [different

objectives], reputation stakes [distrust in expertise], and blame apportionment [lack of trust],

potentially making the process quite difficult.”82 For example, one article on social networks

suggests that the development of close-knit partnerships focused on developing strong

command type ties found in military or government organizations may be difficult, and in fact,

may act to insulate the logistics enterprise from outside information or factors against which it

must respond. Therefore, developing a network or awareness level across the JLEnt may serve

as a crucial bridge between two dense layers.83 The reverse aspect of this perspective is that

JLEnt social networks lacking in weak ties will be fragmented and incoherent – leading to less

rapid and precise logistics delivery within this context. Information about logistics needs may

spread slowly while organizations within the different layers of the JLEnt may have difficulty

developing a sense of common purpose during a logistics operation.

79


Interview with USAFRICOM Logistics Expert by JCLE Engagement Team. 81

From Cross and Thomas, p. 141. 82

Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, and Hollingshead, p. 156. 83

The Strength of Weak Ties, p. 1363.



Furthermore, a number of

ideas that can assist in

shaping a more responsive

JLEnt social network have

been derived from the

theory surveyed for this

report. After the JLEnt has

been characterized and

examined, relations

between nodes can

perhaps be adjusted and

modified in terms of:

“Between-ness” is

negatively

correlated with a

node's

performance.

Being a bridge

between many

people is not

helpful for the

node's

performance.

Network reach is

highly correlated

with overall

network

performance. The

number of people

reachable in three

steps is positively

correlated with

higher

performance.

Having too many

strong links —

communication Figure 4.1 Sample Social Network Design Flaws



among the same set of people is typically observed with a negative correlation with

performance. Perhaps frequent communication to the same person may imply

redundant information exchange.

Structurally diverse networks with abundance of structural holes are associated with

higher performance. Social network theory is explicit that more connections do not

necessarily result in better performance. Some distance is sometimes necessary to

avoid information overload and increase the diversity of information available to the

network. When friends of your friends are not friends of each other or belong to the

same social group.

Having just a few information keepers who have high betweenness centrality is

positively associated with performance. While an individual node may lose efficiency by

acting as a bridge, a small number of bridges can drastically increase the performance of

the entire network.84

4.9 Develop Appropriate Network Participation

JP 4-0 recognizes the fact that NGOs and IOs are important, but cannot be commanded:

“In the absence of a formal command structure, the joint logistician will need to

collaborate and elicit cooperation to accomplish the mission…the benefit of leveraging

the unique skills and capabilities that NGOs and IGOs possess can serve as a force

multiplier in providing the joint warfighter more robust logistics.”85

The JFC must understand how to leverage the unique capabilities of NGOs and IOs or other

government agencies to provide substantive, legitimate logistics materials during a crisis.

However, the commander must also understand key tradeoffs as he designs and accesses the

JLEnt’s social network capacities. In developing a JLEnt with appropriate membership to the

task, JLEnt governance will be required to balance a number of important areas that are in

tension. Rapidity and precision are the JLEnt’s major goal, but to achieve rapid and precise

delivery of supplies, the JLEnt will need to balance:

The effectiveness of the network as a whole to address immediate crisis needs vs.

longer term efficiency of more enduring solutions. Efficient solutions may require a

smaller number of tightly-controlled JLEnt units, while effective solutions may require

inclusiveness of a wider array of partners.

Internal vs. external legitimacy. The JLEnt must be seen as responsive to common goals

across participating organizations, as well as to the needs of logistics recipients that the

84

Lynn Wu, Ching-Yung Lin, Sinan Aral, Erik Brynjolfsson, Value of Social Network (4 September 2009). Briefing. 85

Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics, p. V-13.



JLEnt is intended to serve. Overemphasis on external legitimacy means that network

members are highly disconnected and the JLEnt is a network only nominally – i.e., it

does not provide a common, coordinated response. However, focusing too much on

coordination within the network may mean that key constituencies on the outside may

view the JLEnt as illegitimate. For example, when humanitarian and combat related

principles come into conflict, the JFC will be hard-pressed to balance the two.

Flexibility vs. Stability. Flexibility may make the JLEnt more responsive by rapidly

reconfiguring to the crisis at hand; however, stability means that long term relationships

among the participants can be built, enhancing overall trust within the system. 86

Diversity of opinion versus aggregation. As discussed in Section 2.1, networks must be

large and diverse enough to generate the "wisdom of crowds" effect. 87 Each

organization should maintain their own private sources of information – even if it is

seen across the network as an eccentric interpretation of the “known” facts.

Furthermore, opinions should not be commanded by the opinions of those around

them. However, diverse opinions must not prevent unified or complementary action if

the JLEnt is to be effective, so social networks must attempt to balance the ability of

turning private judgments into a collective decision without undermining the wisdom of

crowd effect.88

These tensions have significant practical implications for the governance profile of the JLEnt as

a whole. From a doctrinal perspective JP 4-0 should consider the proper balance of these

criteria when selecting or advocating a particular form of network governance form. Each can

have critical implications for overall network effectiveness. The effective management of

network participation requires the need to recognize and respond to both internal and external

network demands; both when selecting a governance form and when managing tensions that

arise as a result of using that form.

4.10 Develop Logisticians Competent in Social Networking

Most military members (except perhaps CIMIC/Civil Affairs personnel) are not well versed in

the need or benefits of interacting with civil actors, and have few procedures for doing so. Out

of 123 pages of text, JP 4-0 dedicates a single page to working with MN communities and NGOs.

It provides little guidance about how to synchronize logistics activities across the JLEnt other

than to direct the reader to JP 3-08. Likewise, this publication provides little guidance on

practical logistics coordination. Logisticians typically have little training in civil-military

86

Provan and Kenis, p. 244. 87

James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations, (2004) 88

Jan Lorenz, Heiko Rauhut, Frank Schweitzer, and Dirk Helbing, "How Social Influence can Undermine the Wisdom of Crowds Effect," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 108 No. 20 (May 17, 2011).



cooperation, and are focused on developing logistics functional expertise. Training on why and

how to work with civil actors and MN partners should become an essential part of any military

logistics training program.

As part of this training, logisticians (as well as other operations and planning specialists) should

become familiar with social network ideas, principles and approaches. The JLEnt cannot be

effective if logisticians do not understand how social networks operate, and what issues may

encourage their effective operation. Network analysis may be a useful tool for logisticians by

making invisible elements of the JLEnt more apparent and helping them to better understand

how information such as logistics requirements or capabilities might best flow through the

JLEnt. Understanding bottlenecks or other inefficient network configurations can yield insights

across the JLEnt as a whole (see section 4.9 above).

Thus, logisticians who are competent in social network perspectives and strategies will enable

the joint force to encourage better enterprise-wide collaboration and assist in reducing

complexity, increasing understanding, reducing response time, and amplifying the ability of the

JFC to access and leverage important knowledge across the enterprise. When establishing a

logistics enterprise, logisticians and CIMIC personnel should be prepared to discuss the

configuration of the JLEnt with members by asking questions and engaging in social-network-

related discussions such as those described by Cross and Thomas in figure 4.2 below.

Figure 4.2 Social-Network Related Questions for Planners.89

89

From Rob Cross and Robert Thomas, p. 125.



5.0 Conclusion

Constructing a common enterprise across wildly differing organizations, cultures, and

approaches is a difficult and complex challenge. Social network theory can provide some

guideposts to improve collaboration and coordination within such an environment. One theme

repeated throughout social network literature is the importance of trust in collaborative

relations. The emerging theory of TMS also points to the notion that trust is built on a mutual

belief in the expertise and competence among individuals and groups. For this reason, a

logistics enterprise may be easier to build than any other functional enterprise that the joint

force may participate in. Across the joint logistics community, within domestic agencies,

international partner nations, IOs, NGOs, and private industry and shipping are experts in

understanding demand requirements, supply, warehousing, movement, packaging and delivery.

The common language shared by these experts will be crucial in forming the foundation of trust

relationships upon which an operationalized JLEnt will be truly effective.

Experimentation efforts can then serve to further develop the full set of military implications

(hinted at in section 4 above) that exist at the intersection of logistics practice, social network

and enterprise theory, and military planning and operations. This work will identify key points

throughout the logistics process at which social network connections can be leveraged to

influence (or be influenced by) other key providers of logistics across the JLEnt. This effort will

begin by identifying the linkages for FEMA and the UN logistics cluster.

Within the Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment, the JLEnt is currently in the process of being

examined with a view towards understanding its set of nodes and connections and sharing that

understanding across the community. Over the course of the next several months, the body of

thought developed in this report will be applied to this visualization, with a view to optimizing

the JLEnt’s social network. Several experimentation activities, including LOEs, are underway to

validate the JLEnt’s social network and simulation runs to understand the relationship between

the social network and logistics delivery in three different operational scenarios. What remains

to be discovered – the central issue under investigation in the JCLE experimentation

campaign – is how to optimize the JLEnt’s social network to best improve the ability of the

JLEnt as a whole to provide faster and more precise delivery of logistics on the battlefield.

“The practice of logistics is a bridge, a common language that we can use to speak across

cultural boundaries…”

~ JCLE Interview with USAFRICOM Logistics Expert



Appendix A: BAR Bibliography

Altay, N., Sameed, P., & Sounderpandian, J. (2006, March 31). Strategic Planning for International

Disaster Relief Logistics: Implications for Research and Practice.

Anderson, S. (2010, October 5). Conference of Logistics Directors Expeditionary Housing and Airfields:

Enabling the Warfighter. USA.

ATEC. (2010, December 3). Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Quick Reaction Test Info

Brief. Joint Test and Evaluation.

Barabasi, A.-L. (2003). Scale Free Networks. Scientific American , 48-52.

Barabasi, A.-L. (2009). Scale Free Networks: A Decade and Beyond. Science , 412-418.

Bracht, MAJ G. A. (1991). Disaster Relief Logistics Doctrine for U.S. Army Units: Fact or Fiction?

Brieger, R. (2004). The Analysis of Social Networks. In R. Brieger, Handbook of Data Analysis (pp. 505-

526). London: Sage Publications.

Brown, P. C. (2010, October 5). Joint Concept for Logistics. USA.

Chief Information Officer Council. (2001). A Practical Guide to Enterprise Archtecture. CIO Council.

Christianson LTG CV. (2006). Joint Logistics - Shaping Our Future: A Personal Perspective.

Cooper, A. K. (2008, May 5-9). Some Thoughts on Humanitarian Logistics and Qualitative Methods. CSIR.

Cropsey, S. (2011, January/February). Anchors Away: American Seapower in Drydock. World Affairs .

Cross, R., & Thomas, R. (2009). Driving Results Through Social Networks: How Top Organizations

Leverage Networks for Performance and Growth. San Francisco: John Wiley and Sons.

Cross, R., Borgatti, S., & Parker, A. (2001). Making Invisible Work Visible: Using Social Network Analysis

to Support Strategic Collaboration. Chalottesville, VA: Network Roundtable at the University of Virginia.

Cross, R., Parker, A., & Borgatti, S. (2009). A Bird's Eye View: Using Social Network Analysis to Improve

Knowledge Creation and Sharing. IBM Institute for Business Value.

Defense Contract Management Agency. (2009). Strategic Plan FY 2009 - 2013. Alexandria , VA, USA.

DOD. (Nov 28, 2005). DOD Directive 3000.05.

DOD. (Expires January 2012). DSCA Handbook Tactical Level Commanderand Staff Toolkit.



Drabeck, T., & McEntire, D. (2003). Emergent Phenomena and the Sociology of Disaster: Lessons, Trends

and Opportunities. Disaster Prevention and Management , 97-112.

Drabek, T. (2004). Theories Relevant to Emergency Management Versus a Theory of Emergency

Management. Emmitsburg, MD: Emergency Management Higher Education Conference.

Eckstein, MAJ Jeff. (1999, November). Operation Fuerte Apoyo: Disaster Relief in Nicaragua. Engineer ,

pp. 15-18, 21.

Faulkenberry, B. B. (2010, October 4-7). United States Africa Command: JLEnt in a Small/Dispersed Unit

World...Today and the Future. District of Columbia, USA.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2010). International Assistance System: Concept of

Operations.

FEMA, DoS, USAID. (Oct 1, 2010). International Assistance System Concept of Operations.

Fenton, G. (2008, May 8). Partnering for Relief - Optimizing Logistics: An Inter-Agency Approach: Why

and How?!

Gainey, L. G. (2010). Joint Logistics Strategic Plan. Washington: J4 Directorate for Logistics.

Gainey, LTG Kathy; Thomson, Col Rick; Stine, Col Bob; Summers, Col Bill; Baker, COL Tommy; Sheppard,

CAPT Brian. (2010, September 27). Global Logistics Challenges: National Defense Transportation

Association Forum and Expo.

Gates, R. (2010). Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense.

General Accounting Office. (2010). Preliminary Observations on DoD's Progress and Challenges in

Distributing Supplies and Equipment to Afghanistan. Washington: General Accounting Office.

Global Logistics Cluster Support Cell. (Jul 2010). Logistics Cluster and Humanitarian Reform. Rome.

Granovetter, M. (1983). The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited. Sociological Theory ,

201-233.

(2005). Guidelines for Relations between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian

Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments. U.S. Institute For Peace.

Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. (2011). Disaster Relief 2.0: The Future of Information Sharing in

Humanitarian Emergencies. Washington D.C.

Hester, J. (2009). A Technique for Determining Viable Military Logistics Support Alternatives. Georgia

Institute of Technology.

Hoffman, K., & Wojcik, L. (2007). Descriptive Enterprise Dynamics - A Multi-Disciplinary Unifying

Framework. Conference on Systems Engineering Research. CSER Paper #44.



Icayan, T. (2011). Information and Knowledge Management: A Content Based Solution. NATO CIMIC

Fusion Center.

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. (2009). Finding the Right Mix: Disaster, Diplomacy, National

Security, and International Cooperation.

International Organization for Migration. (2010). IOM General Procurement Principles and Processes for

Procurement of Goods, Works, & Services.

Joint Center for Operational Analysis. (2007, January 23). International Humanitarian Assistance and

Disaster Relief Operations .

Joint Logistics Compass. (2010). Joint Staff J4.

Joint Logistics Strategic Plan 2010-2014. (2010). Joint Staff J4.

Joint Logistics White Paper. (2010, June 4). Department of Defense.

Joint Staff. (2008, July 8). Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-57 . Joint Staff.

Joint Staff. (2010, February 5). Distribution Operations. Joint Publication 4-09 .

Joint Staff. (1995, April 26). Doctrine for Health Services Support in Joint Operations. Joint Publication 4-

02 .

Joint Staff. (2009, March 17). Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Joint Publication 3-29 .

Joint Staff J4. (2010, April 13). Logistics and the Interagency Whole of Government Initiative.

Joint Staff. (2010, December 9). Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine. Joint Publication 4-03 .

Joint Staff. (2010, August 6). Joint Concept For Logistics.

Joint Staff. (2001, September 27). Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support. Joint Publication 4-04 .

Joint Staff. (2007). Joint Doctrine for Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovermental

Organization Coordination during Joint Operations. Joint Publication 3-08 .

Joint Staff. (2002, September 25). Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations. Joint

Publication 4-08 .

Joint Staff. (1995, June 16). Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. Joint Publication 3-07

Joint Staff. (1997, June 17). Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System. Joint Publication 4-01

Joint Staff. (2006, February 7). Joint Logistics (Distribution). Joint Integrating Concept .

Joint Staff. (2006, February 7). Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept v1.0.



Joint Staff. (2008, July 18). Joint Logistics. Joint Publication 4-0 .

Joint Staff. (2005, August 5). Joint Logistics over-the-Shore (JLOTS). Joint Publication 4-01.6 .

Joint Staff. (2010, March 22). Joint Mobilization Planning. Joint Publication 4-05 .

Joint Staff. (2010, March 22). Joint Operations (Change 2). Joint Publication 3-0 .

Joint Staff. (2010, March 31). Joint Supply. Joint Integrating Concept .

Joint Staff. (2001, June 11). Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common-User Logistics during

Joint Operations. Joint Publication 4-07 .

Joint Staff. (2001, August 15). Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian

Assistance.

Joint Staff. (2010, April 13). Logistics and the Interagency: Whole-of-Government Initiative.

Kotlarsky, J., & Oshri, I. (2005). Social Ties, Knowledge Sharing and Successful Collaboration in Globally

Distributed System Development Projects. European Journa of Information Systems , 37-48.

Kotze, P. (2011, February 12). Completed Projects. Retrieved from Enterprise Architecture Research

Forum: http://earf.meraka.org.za/earfhome/our-projects-1/completed-projects

Kovacs, G. (2009). Humanitarian Supply Chain Management. HUMLOG Institute.

Lalonde, C. (2007). Crisis Management and Organizational Development: Toward a . Proceedings of OLKC

2007 -- "Learning Fusion" (pp. 507-515). London, Ontario: Organizational Communications and

Information Systems Proceedings.

Lamneck, P. (2010, October 5). SOF Logistics Enterprise. USA.

LaPorte, T. (2006). Organizational Strategies for Complex System Resilience, Reliability, and Adaptation.

In P. Auerswald, L. Branscomb, T. Laporte, & E. Michael-Kerjan, Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response:

How Private Action can Reduce Public Vulnerability (pp. 135-156). New York: Cambridge University

Press.

Lawrey, L. (2009). Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military.

LeFever, RADM M. A. (2007, January 24). Operation Lifeline - Combined Disaster Assistance Center -

Pakistan: After Action Report. CDAC-PAK After Action / Lessons Learned Team.

Lewis, K. (2003). Measuring Transactive Memory Systems in the Field: Scale Development and

Validation. Journal of Applied Psychology , 587-604.

Libicki, M. (1994). The Mesh and the Net: Speculatino on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon.

Washington D.C. : National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies.



Linder, R. (2006). Wikis, Webs, and Networks: Creating Connections for Conflict-Prone Settings.

Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Liu, S., Palen, L., Sutton, J., Hughes, A., & Vieweg, S. (2008). In Search of the Bigger Picture: The

Emergent Role of Online Photo Sharing. Proceedings of the 5th International ISCRAM Conference.

Washington: International Community on Information Systems for Crisis Management Response.

(2011). Logistics Cluster Operational Guide. UN World Food Program.

Majchrzak, A., Jarvenpaa, S., & Hollingshead, A. (2007). Coordinating Expertise Among Emergent Groups

Responding to Disasters. Organization Science , 147-161.

Mathaisal, D., Cathart, T., & Agripino, M. (2005). Sustaining the Military Enterprise: Architecture for a

Lean Transformation. Defense Procurement Analysis .

McChrystal, S. (2011, March/April). It Takes A Network. Foreign Policy .

Military Sealift Command Civil Service Mariner Handbook. (2010, May). USA.

Moreland, R., & Argot, L. (2003). Transactive Memory in Dynamic Organizations. In R. Peterson, & E.

Mannix, Leading and Manaaging People in the Dynamic Organization (pp. 135-162). Mahwa, NJ:

Lawrence Earlbaum Associates.

Mullen, A. M. (2009). Capstone Concept for Joint Operations.

Multinational Operations. (2007, March 7). Joint Publication 3-16 . Joint Staff.

National Level Exercise 2011 Concepts and Objectives Meeting Briefing. (2011, April 8-9). Illinois: Illinois

Emergency Management Agency.

National Security Presidential Directive 44. (2005, December 7).

Net Hope. (2006). Disaster Relief.

Ngang, B. J., & Kuo, B. C. (2010, August). The Use of Information and Communication Technology in

Disaster Management (The Case of Cameroon). Jonkoping International Business School, Jonkoping

University.

Obama, B. (2010). National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington: White House.

Office of Management and Budget. (2007). Federal Enterprise Architecture Practice Guidance.

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Management and Budget.

Operational Contract Support. (2008, October 17). Joint Publication 4-10 . Joint Staff.

Operations, I. C. (1996, October 9). Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations. Joint Publication

3-08 , I . Joint Staff.



Panter, F. L. (2010, October 5). Marine Corps Logistics Capabilities Enabling the JCL.

PASOLS Mutual Logistics Support Handbook Part 3: Humanitarian Assistancec and Disaster Relief

Operations. (n.d.).

Patterson, W. (2010, May 19). Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP).

Personnel Recovery. (2007, January 5). Joint Publication 3-50 . Joint Staff.

Provan, K., & Kenis, P. (2007). Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and

Effectiveness. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory , 231-237.

Relief Supply Chain Management. (n.d.). HUMLOG Group.

Robb, J. (2004, May 7). Scale Free Networks. Retrieved from Global Guerillas:

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/scalefree_terro.html

Roux, C. Y. (2010). Navy Supports Life: A Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster relief Concept. Combined

Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence.

Sessions, R. (2007). A Comparison of the Top Four Enterprise Architecture Methodologies. The Microsoft

Developers Network.

Sheppard, C. B. (2011, April 26). U.S. Africa Command J4. (M. J. Becker, Interviewer)

Sheu, J.-B., Chen, Y.-H., & Lan, L. W. (2005). A Novel Model for Quick Response to Disaster Relief

Distributions. Proceedings of the Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies , 5, pp. 2454-2462.

Sphere Project. (2010). Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Statndards in Humanitarian Response.

Geneva.

Stability Operations. (2009). DODD 3000.05 . Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Stevenson, M. H. (2010, October). Army Logistics Capabilities: COLD Conference. Richmond.

Surowiecki, J. (2004). The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many are Smarter than the Few and How

Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies, and Nations. New York: Little, Brown and Co. .

Sustainment. (2009, April). Field Manual 4-0 . Department of the Army.

Teoh, S., & Pan, S. (2006). Process of Social Integration: The Key to Making Enterprise Systems-Enabled

Change. Goteborg: European Conference on Information Systems Proceedings 2006.

(2010). The Logistics Cluster and Humanitarian Reform. UN World Food Program.

Thomas, A. (2003). Humanitarian Logistics: Enabling Disaster Response. Fritz Institute.

Thomas, R. C. (2009). Driving Results Through Social Networks. San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons.



Tierney, K., Lindell, M., & Perry, R. (2001). Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response

in the United States. Washington: Joseph Henry Press.

U.S. Agency for International Development. (July 2008). Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy.

Washington, DC.

U.S. Agency For International Development, Office of Military Affairs. (2010). Civilian-Military Operations

Guide (1 ed.).

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (n.d.). Emergency Operations: Emergency Power Mission.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (n.d.). Emergency Operations: Packaged Ice and Bottled Water Missions.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (2010). Emergency Operations: Temporary Roofing Mission.

U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. Coast Guard. (2001, March 20). Commandant Instruction

M4000.2: US Coast Guard Logistics Handbook.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2008). Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for

Complex Emergencies.

UN World Food Program Logistics Cluster. (n.d.). Logistics Cluster Operational Guide. Retrieved from

Logistics Cluster: http://log.logcluster.org/operational-environment/partnership/index.html

United Nations. (2002). Civil Military Coordination in UN-Integrated Peacekeeping Missions. UN

Reference 2010.02 .

United Nations. (2008). Civil Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook.

United States Agency for International Development. (2010, Decemeber 3). The Foreign Humanitarian

Assistance and Disaster Relief Handbook.

United States Air Force. (2000, October 25). War Reserve Material Program Guidance and Procedures.

Air Force Instruction 25-101: . USA.

United States Air Force. (2007, April 3). Air Force Doctrine Document 2: Operations and Organizations.

United States Air Force. (2010, October 13). Air Force Guidance Memorandum, Air Force Supply Chain

Management.

United States Air Force. (2000, December 1). Air Force Instruction 21-201 Management and

Maintenance of Non-Nuclear Munitions.

United States Air Force. (2010, June 14). Air Force Instruction 32-102: Civil Engineering Planning and

Programming Military Construction (MILCON) Projects.

United States Air Force. (2010). Combat Support. Air Force Doctrine Document 4-0 .



United States Air Force. (2010, September 17). Combat Support. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-

4 . USA.

United States Army. (2010, December). Disaster Response Staff Officer's Handbook: Observations,

Insights, and Lessons. USA.

United States Army. (2009, April). Sustainment. Field Manual 4-0 .

United States Marine Corps. (1997, February 21). Logistics. MCDP 4 .

United States Marine Corps. (2002, October 21). Aviation Logistics. MCWP 3-21.2 .

United States Marine Corps. (1999, April 15). Logistics Operations. MCWP 4-1.

United States Marine Corps. (2005, June 19). Petroleum and Water Logistics Operations. MCWP 4-11.6 .

United States Marine Corps. (2000, June 13). Tactical-Level Logistics. MCWP 4-11 .

United States Marine Corps Title X Wargame: Expeditionary Warrior 2010 Scenario. (2010). United

States Marine Corps.

United States Navy. (2007, May). Navy Advanced Base Logistics Operations. Navy Tactics Techniques and

Procedures 4-01.1 .

United States Navy. (2002, August). Navy Supply Operations. Navy Warfare Publication 4-08 .

United States Navy. (2007, May). Navy Transportation. Naval Warfare Publication 4-01 .

United States Navy. (2007, March). Medical Logistics. Navy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 4-02.1 .

United States Navy. (1995). Naval Logistics. Naval Docrrine Publication 4 .

US Coast Guard. (2010). Mississippi River and Tributaries Waterways Action Plans Upper and Lower

Mississippi River Annex 2010.

US Marine Corps. (2002, January 30). MCWP 4-12: Operational-Level Logistics.

USAFRICOM Public Affairs. (2010, September 2). U.S. Africa Command. Retrieved February 22, 2011,

from www.africom.mil: http://www.africom.mil/

USAID. (2003). Acquisition and Assistance, ADS Series 300, Chapter 306--Interagency Agreements.

Retrieved March 20, 2011, from USAID : http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/306.pdf

USAID. (n.d.). Programming Policy, ADS Series 200, ADS 251--International Disaster Assistance. Retrieved

March 20, 2011, from USAID: http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/251.pdf

USAID/DCHA/OFDA. (2005). Field Operations Guide For Disaster Assessment and Response (Version 4

ed.).



USAID/DCHA/OFDA. (Jun 2010). Logistics and Relief Commodities Sector Update.

USJFCOM. (2011). Baseline Assessment Template/Assessment Criteria. USJFCOM.

USJFCOM J9. (2011). Adaptive Logistics Network / Multinational Experiment 6 Objective 4.5 (ALN/MNE 6

Obj. 4.5). Unpublished.

USJFCOM. (2011). Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment: Experiment Concept Paper. USJFCOM.

USJFCOM. (2010). Joint Operating Environment. USJFCOM.

USJFCOM. (2009). Vision for Joint Operational Design. USJFCOM.

USNORTHCOM. (Expires 2012). DSCA Handbook.

USNORTHCOM J4. (2011, February). Concept of Support In the Domestic Theater.

USPACOM. (Undated). "How To" Handbook on Multilateral Information Preparation of the Operational

Environment for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.

USPACOM. (2010, Novemeber 22). Foreign Humanitarian Assistance /Disaster Relief.

USTRANSCOM. (2009). Understanding the Defense Transportation System. Handbook 24-2 .

Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994). Social Network Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weigner, D. (1987). Transactive Memory: A Contemprary Analysis of the Group Mind. In B. Mullen, & G.

Goethals, Theories of Group Behavior (pp. 185-205). New York: Springer-Verlag.

WFP/UNHRD. (n.d.). Standard Operating Procedures for UN Humanitarian Response Depot Network.

Retrieved March 20, 2011, from UNHRD: www.unhrd.org/new/docs/SOPs%20UNHRD%20Network.pdf

Wojcik, L., & Hoffman, K. (2006). Systems of Systems Engineering in the Enterprise Context: A Unifying

Framework for Dynamics. Mitre Corporation.

World Food Program. (2008). Consolidated Framework of WFP Policies.

World Food Program. (2001). Working With NGOs: A Framework for Partnership.

Wu, L. L.-Y. (2009). Value of Social Network -- A Large-Scale Analysis on Network Structure Impact to

Financial Revenues of Information Technology Consultants . Winter Information Systems Conference.

Salt Lake City.

Zachman, J. (1987). A Framework for Information Systems Architecture. IBM Systems Journal , 276-291.



Appendix B: Acronyms

AFDD Air Force doctrine document

AOR area of responsibility

BAR baseline assessment report

CCJO Capstone Concept for Joint Operations

CIMIC civil-military coordination

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

COCOM combatant command

COI community of interest

CONOPS concept of operations

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense directive

DOTMLPF-P doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and

education, personnel, facilities, and policy

DOS Department of State

DTS Defense Transportation System

DSCA defense support to civil authorities

EA enterprise architecture

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FM field manual

GCC geographic combatant commander

IA interagency

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

IO international organization

IT information technology

JCL Joint Concept for Logistics

JCLE Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment

JFC joint force commander

JLEnt Joint Logistics Enterprise

JOE joint operating environment

JP joint publication

JS Joint Staff

JTF joint task force

L.I.F.E logistic, information, force protection, expertise

LNO liaison officer

LOE limited objective experiment

MCO major combat operations



MIPOE multilateral information preparation of the operational

environment

MN multinational

NDP naval doctrine publication

NGO nongovernmental organization

OMB Office of Management and Budget

POC point of contact

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

SECDEF Secretary of Defense

SSTR stability, security, transition, and reconstruction

TMS transactive memory system

UN United Nations

USA United States Army

USAF United States Air Force

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USCG United States Coast Guard

USG United States Government

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

USN United States Navy

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command

USPACOM United States Pacific Command

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

WFP World Food Programme

Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment (JCLE) Baseline ... · Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment Baseline Assessment Report ... and the success of the endeavor will depend on

Documents