[John R. Ballard] Fighting for Fallujah a New Daw(BookFi.org)

GGBK002-FM Ballard-xml March 10, 2006 15:46

Fighting for Fallujah


PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD

Board Cochairs

Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School ofPublic and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.)

Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the AdvisoryBoard, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St.Andrews (U.K.)

Members

The late Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN (Ret.), former Director of ForceTransformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense (U.S.A.)

Eliot A. Cohen, Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies and Director,Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Paul H. Nitze School of AdvancedInternational Studies, The Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.)

Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategicand International Studies (U.S.A.)

Therese Delpech, Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Atomic Energy Commission),Paris (France)

Sir Michael Howard, former Professor of History of War, Oxford University, andProfessor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.)

Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, (U.S.A.) (Ret.), former Deputy Chief ofStaff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army (U.S.A.)

Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director,International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.)

Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All SoulsCollege, Oxford University (Australia)

Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department ofGovernment and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.)

Jusuf Wanandi, cofounder and member, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategicand International Studies (Indonesia)

Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)


Fighting for Fallujah

A New Dawn for Iraq

✯✯✯

JOHN R. BALLARD

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONALWestport, Connecticut • London


Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data

Ballard, John R., 1957–Fighting for Fallujah : a new dawn for Iraq / John R. Ballard.

p. cm.Includes index.ISBN 0-275-99055-9 (alk. paper)1. Iraq War, 2003—Campaigns–Iraq–Fallujah. I. Title.

DS79.76.B355 2006956.7044′342–dc22 2006001235

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.

Copyright c© 2006 by John R. Ballard

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may bereproduced, by any process or technique, without theexpress written consent of the publisher.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2006001235ISBN: 0-275-99055-9

First published in 2006

Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.www.praeger.com

Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with thePermanent Paper Standard issued by the NationalInformation Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984).

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1


In honor of the Marines, Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmenwho fought and died in Iraq.

Military service is the ultimate form of patriotism.



Contents

✯✯✯

List of Maps ix

Preface xi

Acknowledgments xiii

1. The Old Bridge 1

2. Showing Resolve 11

3. The Lion of Najaf 25

4. Shaping Operations Prior to the Assault 39

5. Assault Operations 53

6. Clearing and Searching 71

7. Civil–Military Operations: The Bridge to a New Fallujah 85

8. A New Dawn: Lessons in Modern Warfare 99

Postscript 113

Notes 117

Glossary 139

Selected Bibliography 145

Index 149

A photo essay follows page 52.



List of Maps

✯✯✯

1. Iraq and the Sunni Triangle xiv

2. The Fallujah Operations Area 3

3. April 2004 Operations in Fallujah 14

4. Najaf and the Old City 31

5. Initial Assault Operations into Fallujah, November 2004 56

6. Area Clearing Status in Fallujah, December 2004 68

7. The Initial Resettlement Plan for Fallujah 78



Preface

✯✯✯

On March 31, 2004, four American civilians drove into the Iraqi city of Fallujahand unknowingly opened a new chapter in America’s decade-long involvementwith Iraq. They had only just departed from their base camp and had traveled lessthan 5 miles when their small convoy was halted at a traffic intersection in thecenter of the city in Iraq’s Sunni triangle. Without warning, two gunmen attackedand killed all four of them. Then, as the gunmen withdrew, everyday workers andpassersby pulled the bodies from the vehicles and began hacking them apart withpicks and shovels in full view of dozens of other residents of the city of mosques.The murders occurred less than 100 meters from the main city police station. Later,the bodies were burned, hauled around for several city blocks, and eventually hungto rot from the green steel girders of the old bridge leading to the west across theEuphrates River.

These civilian contract employees of the security firm called Blackwater, USAwere well experienced in the security business, but they had clearly underestimatedthe danger present in Fallujah that day. Similarly, the newly arrived Marines of the1st Marine Expeditionary Force, also based in nearby Camp Fallujah, did not yetunderstand the key elements of the insurgency they were to encounter in Iraq orthe unique character of their neighboring city. Fallujah had stymied no less harsha man than Saddam Hussein and for centuries had been well known as a fiercelyindependent and largely ungovernable town.

Less than a year later, many of these Marines, reinforced by other U.S. Armyand Marine units and units of the new Iraqi army, would assault into Fallujah anddestroy what had over the intervening months become a key node of the insurgencythat had nourished the anti-Iraqi movement in the country. The destruction ofthe terrorist sanctuary that was Fallujah changed the future of the war in Iraq as


xii ✯ ✯ ✯ Preface

much as the defeat of Saddam Hussein and his army in 2003. It did not destroythe insurgency, but it fundamentally altered the way insurgent forces would attackthe coalition from that point forward. It ended any thought that insurgent forcescould beat coalition units in conventional combat.

Most importantly, the fight for Fallujah showed the resolve of the new Iraqigovernment to defeat the insurgency in cooperation with its multinational part-ners. Largely because of the insurgent defeat in Fallujah and the suppression ofthe insurgency in several other cities, Iraqis willingly turned out in huge numbersto vote in their first free national election on January 31, 2004. The insurgency inIraq would not be the same after that winter.

This book tells the story of the fight for Fallujah so that future combat opera-tions can benefit from the important lessons learned there. It also illustrates theinnovations that characterized combat in Iraq and the heroism demonstrated bycountless Marines, Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen in the face of a determined andskilled enemy. The lessons from combat in Fallujah are germane not only for otheroperations in the war on terror, but also for future combat in general, as urbanwarfare and similar technology will certainly dominate most battlefields in thefuture.

Finally, this story also shows the American people another side of the war inIraq. It reveals the civic improvements made from coalition initiatives and the greatefforts of the coalition to shield and assist the Iraqi people from the consequencesof the war. It makes the important relationships between the U.S. and Iraqi leadersmore clear, and it tells much about the everyday lives of people in the Sunnitriangle. It should make everyone involved more proud of the work done in Iraq.


Acknowledgments

✯✯✯

My service in Iraq, from August of 2004 to March of 2005, provided bothfirst-hand experience with the operations in and around Fallujah and a workingrelationship with most of the key personnel who directed operations during thattime. I also benefited from access to many of the first-hand accounts and theofficial military records of the period immediately prior to my tour of duty – fromMarch to July 2004. Many members of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and 1stMarine Division also contributed to my understanding of operations in Al Anbarprovince. My thanks and deep appreciation go to each member of these proudprofessional organizations.

I thought it was important to record the names of many of the servicemen andwomen who lost their lives in Iraq as this story is being told. I do this to honorthose who died, although I understand well that the circumstances surroundingthe deaths of each of these men and women are unique. I have not listed all thosewho died in support of the war on terror, and I sincerely regret any omissionsor inaccuracies among these names listed. We Americans should honor everyonewho has sacrificed for our freedom.

Beyond anyone else, this book has been supported by the diligent and kind en-couragement of my beloved wife, Rosaline. She has been friend, advisor, researcher,critic, and sounding board; her uniquely valuable insight and her genuine love anddevotion have made every part of this book and everything in my life better. Shesupported me during my time in Iraq and during every day that this book has beenin our minds. It is also for our girls.

Although it has benefited from a great deal of government information, thisbook does not reflect the views or opinions of the U.S. government or the U.S.Marine Corps; nor does it reflect their policies or those of any of the Marineorganizations listed above. The views expressed in this book are mine alone, as areany errors or omissions.

John R. BallardWashington, D.C.


Map 1. Iraq and the Sunni Triangle

GGBK002-01 Ballard-xml March 10, 2006 15:7

Chapter One

✯✯✯

The Old Bridge

For the four contract employees of Blackwater, USA, awakening with the risingdesert sun made the last day of March 2004 like so many days that had passedbefore in Iraq.1 Although it was already quite hot when they packed their gear, theywanted to get an early start driving through the nearby Iraqi city of Fallujah. Iraqisdo not do much early in the day, so the traffic was not expected to be heavy. AsAmerican defense contractors, they did not work for the U.S. military and did notfeel it necessary to coordinate all of their activities with the newly arrived Marinecommand at Camp Fallujah, where they lived. Plus, three were former membersof the elite Army Green Berets2 and the fourth, Scott Helvenston, was a formerNavy SEAL (Sea-Air-Land),3 so they knew many people in the camp well and feltconfident of their own abilities in country.

They also understood very well that their security rested in part on theiranonymity, so they sought simply to blend in as they drove west in two Mit-subishi Pajeros, four-wheel-drive sport utility vehicles, off the camp and down thedivided highway, mixing with the ever more numerous cars on the road. Every-thing seemed normal as they drove under the overpass and straight down Highway10 through the very center of the city in the two SUVs. Ignoring the longer, butless congested, route on the interstate highway that skirted the northern edge ofFallujah, they passed the beautiful new blue mosque and minaret next to the firestation and continued west toward the Euphrates River only to find more trafficcongestion than usual near the city center.4

They eventually crossed the main intersection of the city (just past the mayor’scomplex and police headquarters) and then veered left on the main street, headingfor the “new bridge” crossing the river. Only two blocks further, however, as theyslowed at another major intersection, a lone attacker armed with a rocket-propelledgrenade launcher walked confidently up to the lead SUV and fired at point-blankrange into its chassis. Other Iraqis sprayed the vehicles with bullets from their


2 ✯ ✯ ✯ Fighting for Fallujah

AK-47 assault rifles. “When an American with bullet wounds in his chest staggeredout and fell to the ground, he was kicked, stomped, stabbed, and butchered.”5

As the first vehicle was engulfed in flames, the driver of the second SUV quicklyattempted to drive over the highway median and escape back out of the city. Butbefore it could even leave the intersection, that vehicle was also hit by numerousAK-47 bullets and both of its passengers were killed.

In 2004, such a vicious attack on foreigners was not new to Fallujah or to Iraq;what followed, however, gave evidence of the extreme emotions that were buildinginside the city. As word of the attack spread, crowds of local residents, whipped intoa frenzy of anger, assaulted the destroyed vehicles and pulled the bloody bodiesof the Americans from them. They were celebrating the horrible deaths of fourmen whom they did not even know but who they felt represented the influence ofAmerica in Iraq. Armed only with work tools, the huge crowd of jubilant locals,including many children, beat and dragged the bodies block by block through thestreets of their city. Two of the four bodies were eventually paraded through fiveor six city blocks and hung “like slaughtered sheep”6 with wire from the greenpainted ironwork of the old Euphrates River bridge. All the while, local Iraqisopenly chanted and cheered before cameras.

The old green bridge over the Euphrates was a cultural icon in Iraq, but oncethose charred bodies were hung there, it became a new sort of symbol and broughta completely different type of attention to the city of Fallujah. Perhaps the peopleof Fallujah did not understand the implications of this attack, but on that datedecision makers in the United States and the international media took notice ofthe city in a way they never had before. Less than 1 year later, the fortunes ofFallujah would turn full circle as multinational forces and units of the Iraqi Armyassaulted and significantly damaged the city, at least in part because of the violenceand enmity shown on March 31, 2004.

FALLUJAH: THE CITY OF MOSQUES

The city of Fallujah sits on the east bank of the Euphrates River only 35 miles westof Baghdad. Although population figures for Iraqi cities are imprecise at best, mostanalysts accept that over 200,000 Fallujahns lived in the city prior to the start ofthe war in Iraq in March 2003. The city has no real natural resources but doeslie across the traditionally important lines of communication that link the Iraqicapital with Syria to the west and Jordan to the north. One of the first roads leadingwest from Baghdad to Jordan was built through Fallujah in 1914. It is located inthe province of Al Anbar midway between Baghdad and the provincial capital, thesimilarly restive Sunni city of Ramadi. Even under the British occupation of Iraqafter the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the city was a trouble spot. In the springof 1920, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Leachman, a renowned explorer and a seniorcolonial officer, was sent to quell a rebellion in the city, but he was killed just southof Fallujah in a fight with local leader Shaykh Dhari. In response, the British sent an


The Old Bridge ✯ ✯ ✯ 3

CampCampFallujahFallujah

N

Fallujah GeneralHospital

Mayor’sComplex

TCP-1

Euphrates River

ToBaghdad

ToRamadi

Old “Green” Bridge

New Bridge

BlackwaterAttack Site

The Fallujah

OperationsArea

Saklawyiah

Highway 10

Railroad Line

Map 2. The Fallujah Operations Area

army to crush the uprising, an action that took the lives of more than 10,000 Iraqisand 1,000 British soldiers.7 By most accounts even Saddam Hussein had troubledealing with Fallujah and bought the city’s loyalty with passive acceptance of thesmuggling trade, which included automobiles and other western luxury items andbrought it much of its prosperity.

War has touched Fallujah several times throughout history. The Romans battlednear the city in the third century. Xenophon had also fought there 600 yearsearlier. Its location astride the Euphrates and at the western doorway to Baghdadhas always made it valuable territory. Today, however, its value rests more on high-value smuggling than any other commodity outside of providing material supportfor terrorism. It has been said that “Fallujah is where the deals go down in westernIraq. It’s where the sheiks and imams take their cut from international smugglersand issue their threats, promises, and praise.”8 Stolen cars are reworked for sale inIraq, and other illicit materials are often transferred to Baghdad markets. Thus, ithas traditionally been and remains a city beyond the law.

Fallujah has a very ugly history with coalition forces, and much of this historyis linked to its now-famous bridges. During the first Gulf War, one errant laser-guided bomb from a British jet intended to destroy the bridges over the Euphratesfailed to guide and landed in the city market area, killing approximately 100 localresidents. This was only the first of several bad incidents that only heightened



the natural distrust between the residents of Fallujah and the coalition forcesin Iraq.

In 2003, after many portions of the Al Anbar province were taken under the con-trol of special operations forces during the early weeks of operation Iraqi Freedom,elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, centered on the 325th Airborne InfantryRegiment, arrived in the city briefly starting on Saddam’s birthday, April 28. Yeteven this first visit was marred by error, as several residents of Fallujah were killedafter U.S. soldiers fired on residents during a demonstration the initial night theAmericans were in the city. According to press reports, the local Fallujahns claimedto be unarmed, although the American soldiers did confiscate several weapons.9

The locals were certainly chanting anti-American slogans and massing in a waythat threatened the soldiers. What is certain is that several Iraqis were killed in theconfrontation and that it spawned a second demonstration the following night,which also received fire from the American forces. One soldier was quoted as say-ing, “a couple of hundred people gathered out in the streets; they threw rocks, sowe shot back, and they all ran down that way.”10

The Iraqi version of these events included between 6 and 12 dead and over 50wounded, but there were conflicting reports given to members of the press.11 One ofthe people interviewed by Cable News Network reporter Karl Penhaul was a doctorat Fallujah General Hospital. The staff at that hospital would later become infamousthrough their regular support of the insurgency using exaggerated media claims.Later in the same week, a third incident occurred in Fallujah that resulted in injuriesto seven soldiers. The U.S. Army V Corps chief of staff, Brigadier General DanielHahn, stated, “We have information that former Ba’ath Party members remain inFallujah and are organizing small groups to demonstrate against coalition forces.These outside agitators then use the demonstrating crowds as cover as they fire oncoalition forces.”12

Still, regardless of the truth of these incidents, the injuries suffered by the localsinflamed the preexisting perception that the American forces were anti-Iraqi.And the actions of the 82nd Airborne clearly set an extremely negative precedentfor multinational forces operating in the city, as they eventually withdrew fromthe company-size fighting position they had established downtown.13 The localdemonstrators played into the hands of those in the city who wanted to confrontthe American military and the 82nd Airborne were not fully prepared to deal witha hostile population, given the assumption during planning that liberated Iraqiswould welcome the American army following the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

By early June 2003, senior coalition commanders realized they had a real problemin Fallujah. In response, they dispatched a brigade from the 3rd Infantry Division(3rdID), which became the first American force to really control the area aroundthe city.14 The 3rdID was directed to reinforce the coalition presence in the regionand support the efforts of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3rdACR) operatingin northwestern Iraq.15 At the time it moved on Fallujah it was a tired unit, spentafter the long historic run on Baghdad from Kuwait in the opening attack of thewar. Fallujah, meanwhile, had profited from the gap in military coverage during



April and May to attack numerous anticoalition elements and begin to developitself into a zone of defiance. The 3rdID had planned a full-scale attack to shutFallujah down but ended up executing a quasi-peacekeeping mission in the cityinstead. The city quickly took advantage of the lenient approach and began tofight back. The first improvised explosive device (IED) employed against coalitionforces was used in the western outskirts of Fallujah on July 18, 2003.

One of the key lessons learned by all units that served in Fallujah is that the cityunderstood power better than it understood negotiations. The criminal-backedleadership of the city was used to dealing forcefully with one of the most repres-sive governments in the world and after Saddam’s fall any occupier who usedless forceful approaches became easy prey for manipulation. The involvement ofthe 3rdID in Fallujah ended quickly and rather unsuccessfully in the late sum-mer of 2003. Unfortunately, its less than forceful actions continued a trend ofmultiple transitions executed by U.S. military units who permitted the city lead-ers to slowly gain a powerful position in opposition to the coalition. After theirshort time in Fallujah, the soldiers of the 3rdID were shifted back to Baghdadand the area around Fallujah became the responsibility of the overextended3rdACR.

The 2nd Battalion of the 3rdACR from Fort Carson, Colorado, assumed themission in Fallujah in early August and became the first American unit to workeffectively, albeit temporarily, with the residents of the city.16 The 3rdACR madesome inroads with the local residents by giving up their mechanized vehicles torun patrols in Humvees, thus reducing damage to the city infrastructure, but evenafter such a positive start the 3rdACR failed to establish real control in the city. Itsforces were just far too spread out to be effective in such a challenging city.

The 3rdACR was replaced again, in mid-September, by the 505th Parachute In-fantry Regiment (the 3rd Brigade) of the 82nd Airborne Division, commanded byColonel Jeffrey Smith, which was encamped just outside the city.17 The 82nd tooka much more aggressive approach with the insurgency than had its predecessor,with some initial negative consequences. During the handover of responsibilitybetween the two units, members of the 82nd fired on and killed eight local Fallujahpolicemen and a guard for the nearby Jordanian hospital on September 12, 2003.Five days later the paratroopers from same unit opened fire at a wedding, killing a14-year-old boy and wounding six other people after mistaking celebratory gunfirefor an attack.18 Such actions did not endear the residents to the 82nd, but the AllAmerican Division did not relent in its aggressive approach.

In October and November, in response to numerous incidents in Fallujah, thatDivision began a series of cordon-and-search raids throughout the city targetingknown insurgents and Former Regime Element (FRE) supporters of the insurgency.On October 13 the local Iraqi police fired on soldiers inside Fallujah, and onOctober 31 another big firefight occurred near the fire station downtown. OnNovember 2, insurgents based in Fallujah shot down a U.S. CH-47 helicopter,killing 16 soldiers.19 As the insurgency increased its opposition, the paratroopersof the 82nd matched it with ever-greater aggressiveness and firepower. Later the



same month, a bomb destroyed the office of Mayor Taha Bedawi, who had beenappointed in April 2003 by tribal sheiks. Bedawi, who was subsequently forced toleave his post, was known to cooperate with U.S. forces.20

From December 2003 to March 2004, the 82nd continued to conduct operationsin Fallujah, all the while working to build the confidence and capability of the IraqiCivil Defense Corps (ICDC) and police forces in the city. The leaders of the82nd knew that saturating the streets with soldiers was the only way to controlthe environment and establish real security. Every mission was accompanied bypsychological and information operations to help the people understand the roleof the coalition forces and the options they had for future progress in the newIraq. Lieutenant Colonel Brian Drinkwine, the commander of the 1st Battalion,505th Infantry, explained, “with the increased street operations and interactionamong the local populace, more Fallujahns may view us not as just Americans, butas people with a sense of purpose – to rebuild Iraq into a free, democratic nation.”21

The American and Iraqi soldiers were even conducting limited joint patrols inJanuary 2004 to include a hugely successful mission to confiscate weapons fromthe city conducted on January 6. The 82nd Airborne integrated a strong civil affairsprogram with their operations to improve schools and other facilities in the area,but they could never shake the opposition of the “behind the scenes” city leaders.

These early forces had very few troops with which to control a huge, yet sparselypopulated, area along the strategically valuable Euphrates River. Some of the res-idents of Fallujah had been circumventing the rules of even Saddam Hussein’soppressive regime for years and were well adept at finding ways around any re-strictions on their activities. With a large amount of space to cover, no recognized“enemy” formations in the field to focus on, and no way of distinguishing neutralIraqis from potential insurgents, the military units of the coalition had a verydifficult task to accomplish. As late as May 2005, after 2 years of living in the area,coalition forces discovered a very sophisticated underground bunker complex filledwith a huge amount of weapons and ammunition in a location within 5 miles ofthe main Multinational Force (MNF) base camp outside of the city of Fallujah.22

This complex had most likely been in use since the very first days of U.S. activityin the area, yet it was not discovered for 3 years. The enemy threat posed to theMNF in the area was well organized and well employed, presenting a significantchallenge for counterinsurgency operations.

THE NATURE OF THE INSURGENCY IN IRAQ

The insurgency facing the coalition forces in Iraq was multifaceted and complexin motivation. Most simply, it was a conglomeration of three separate but looselycooperating groups with different but complimentary agendas. The most distinctof these groups was the FRE,23 who had previously been members of SaddamHussein’s Ba’ath Party. These people were fairly well known from their previousgovernment positions and were clearly opposed to the coalition and the new Iraq



because, as Sunni members of Saddam’s government and army, they had beendisenfranchised by the de-Ba’athification policy of the Coalition Provisional Au-thority (CPA). In some cases these Iraqis had previously been powerful governmentofficials who had committed acts of injustice. Some members of the FRE had sim-ply been lower-level functionaries working to put food on their tables, but all ofthe Iraqis who were actively employed by the former regime lost their jobs andhonest livelihoods when Ambassador Paul Bremer decided on de-Ba’athification,so among members of all these Ba’athist groups, there was no love for the new Iraq.FRE insurgents were more practical than idealistic, they were all Iraqis, and theywere well networked in Al Anbar province. They were not necessarily well trained,unless they had been members of the Iraqi armed forces or security services underSaddam, but in 2003 there were very few alternatives open to them and they wereextremely committed to their cause.

The second category of insurgents consisted of the hardened terrorists, membersof a terrorist group, or employees of a terrorist group. The most famous of thesegroups was the Al Qaeda-linked terrorist organization led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, known as Al Qaeda in Iraq. Zarqawi deserves special mention becausehe came to be the major terrorist actor and primary terrorist coordinator inIraq during this period. He is Jordanian by birth and met Osama bin Laden inAfghanistan as have so many of the Al Qaeda converts of his generation. Unlikemany of his fellow terrorists, however, Zarqawi’s motivation was much less religiousand much more criminal in nature. He was a thug and personally participated insome of the most vile acts committed by his group of terrorist-insurgents.

Terrorists came to Iraq from a host of nations to join in the war as idealisticsupporters of any group who attacked the United States, Israel, or even “westerninstitutions” more generally. Terrorists were ideological in their motivation andnormally well trained and well financed. Their training gave them flexibility andtheir financial support gave them mobility, so they rarely stood to fight in Iraq,preferring to strike quickly and run from major engagements.

An important aspect of the terrorist motivation in Iraq was inspiration fromjihadist Muslim ideologues. Although rarely was a direct connection obvious, manyof the terrorists who came to fight in Iraq did so because they were motivated bythe writings and media issued by bin Laden or conservative Muslim religiousleaders. This brought a sense of holy war to the fighting on the part of the terroristsand certainly created a climate where acts like suicide bombings, which wouldotherwise be extremely rare, came to be commonly employed. The jihadists didnot limit their attacks to Americans, but felt perfectly justified in killing otherMuslims anytime they came in proximity to American or Iraqi national targets.

The third opposition group in Iraq was much more ill defined and was largelycomposed of criminals and malcontents who saw the war as a way to profit frominstability and lack of governmental control. Saddam had opened the Iraqi prisonsprior to his fall, and western Iraq was full of people who would prey on anysoft target or take advantage of opportunities for theft and profiteering. Most ofthese people were Iraqi and very few were well trained or financed, but they were



extremely difficult to identify and had a completely opportunistic approach tothe war.

The FRE and their cause were a magnet to the terrorists, and although they bothsought to attack both the coalition and the new Iraqi government, they frequentlyhad different longer-term goals, so any linkage between members of the FRE andthe true terrorists was normally short term. Criminals might join either group andfrequently operated on the fringes of both groups, seeking simply to fan the flamesof instability and get paid for their actions. Any alliance of these three groups wasweak and normally temporary, but from the coalition perspective, because theyoften acted similarly, it was very difficult to sort out with any certainty individualmembers or attribute responsibility for an act to any specific group. In 2004,Fallujah came to be inhabited by numerous members of all three groups. Unlesssomeone was captured or killed, or a group claimed responsibility for a givenattack, it was frequently impossible to tell who made an attack or for what reason,so wargaming, or outthinking these groups, as was traditional with an enemy inconventional conflict, was always a very difficult challenge fraught with risk.

This inability to categorize and analyze the enemy in Iraq made the fightingthere much more difficult for professional Soldiers and Marines. Convoys werefrequently attacked by different groups on the same day, and those enemy actionsmay or may not have been coordinated. The process of identifying and targetingkey leaders, normally an important tool for western military forces, was extremelycomplex in Iraq. Even if an enemy leader or cell could be identified, the loosenature of the opposition made understanding where it might fit into the overallenemy organization very problematic. This was one of the most frustrating aspectsof the conflict in Iraq.

THE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TAKES CONTROL

One of the key lessons of any insurgency is the absolute requirement to remainengaged with the local population – to prevent the insurgents from freely swimmingin the ocean of local support. Without regular access (and, to be frank, the 82ndAirborne was far too overextended to be present in all of the tense areas of theprovince), the influence of the coalition slowly but precipitously dropped in theearly months of 2004. When the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)24 assumedcontrol of the region from the 82nd Division in late March 2004, relations withFallujah were limited and constrained at best. Still, the MEF arrived with greatnew energy and a much more deliberate and aggressive approach to operations.25

Typified by the catchphrase of the 1st Marine Division, “No Better Friend, NoWorse Enemy,” the Marines had specifically designed a new training plan and evenchanged their uniform policy to signal that “a new sheriff was in town.”26

The MEF and all of its major subordinate commands had participated in theinitial assault in Iraq during the first phase of operation Iraqi Freedom. Moving onthe right flank of the coalition’s two-pronged attack up the Euphrates River valley,



it had taken Basra and Nasiriyah and then crossed the river to enter Baghdad onApril 8. Following the effort to secure the Iraqi capital, one of the MEF’s subor-dinate units, Task Force Tarawa, pressed on northward to take Saddam Hussein’shometown of Tikrit before major combat operations became less vigorous and thecoalition command repostured its forces to assert control over the entire country.27

In the late spring of 2003, the MEF was finally assigned to control the majority ofsouthern Iraq, between the British sector, Multinational Division-South (MND-South), and Baghdad, including the cities of Hillah, Kut, Diwaniyah, Karbala, andNajaf. This period allowed the MEF to focus on stability operations in a relativelyquiet sector of Iraq dominated by Shia interests prior to its redeployment to theUnited States in October 2003. Very quickly following their return home, however,the Marines of the MEF learned that they would be returning to Iraq for phase twoof the war – the stabilization of Iraq and operation Iraqi Freedom II.

Understanding well that stability operations require different approaches andindeed different skills than do conventional combat operations, the subordinatecommands of the MEF began a very aggressive training program to reorient ondifferent tasks and a different mind-set in December 2003. The 1st Marine Divisiontraining program was based on long-standing Marine doctrine and lessons learnedfrom previous low-intensity combat operations, reaching as far back as the BananaWars of the 1920s. The Marines had pioneered a Small Wars Manual28 and had alarge stock of reading material designed to frame a different attitude among thetroops to better deal with the complexities of counterinsurgency operations.29 TheDivision also had a different strategy for stability and support operations, whichrequired each individual Marine to understand Iraqi culture and traditions andinteract openly with the Iraqi people. These programs would go a long way towardpreparing the forces for the very different type of war they would encounter in Iraqduring 2004.

Still, changing from a conventional more “kinetic” mind-set to a more engagedstabilization approach required aggressive leadership and daily example from thesenior leaders of the MEF. The drive, commitment, and style of the MEF leadershipwould be a critical factor in the ability of the force to transition to counter theevolving threat in Iraq while gaining and developing the trust of the Iraqi people.The key leaders of the MEF included its veteran commander, Lieutenant GeneralJim Conway,30 who had led the MEF in the assault into Iraq the previous year,and his aggressive, no-nonsense chief of staff, Colonel John Coleman. Other keyplayers included the gruff commander of the 1st Marine Division, Major GeneralJim Mattis,31 who had commanded the Marines in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq,and his savvy assistant division commander, Colonel Joe Dunford.32 These menrounded out a long roster of leaders who had already served in Iraq but who wouldhave to meet very different challenges during their second tour in country.

Unfortunately, very soon after taking over responsibility from the 82nd AirborneDivision, the newly arrived Marines were confronted with the charred bodies oftheir countrymen hanging from the old green bridge less than 5 miles away inFallujah.33 The incident not only horrified the world, but it also directly affected



the pace and style of counterinsurgency operations conducted by the coalitionforces in Iraq. At first, there was little the Marines could do, but they were soondirected to execute an operation named Vigilant Resolve,34 the destruction of theinsurgency in Fallujah in response to the Blackwater attack.35 After March 31, 2003,Fallujah took on a worldwide significance far greater than its physical size. For thenext year, the name Fallujah resonated in media outlets across the globe on a dailybasis. During that year, the city would rise to even greater prominence before beingpummeled and then rebuilt by the Marines and their coalition partners. For thatyear the old bridge leading west pointed to a very different future dominated byjihadist-inspired sharia courts.


Chapter Two

✯✯✯

Showing Resolve

The coalition response to the killings of the Blackwater contractors in Fallujahwas sadly ironic. Without a directed military response, generated by the horrificnature of the incident, a new relationship between the coalition forces and theresidents of Fallujah might have been forged. Because the Marines of MEF hadarrived with a very different, more Iraqi-centric, and more integrated approachto the stability operations mission than had been used previously by the U.S.Army forces in the area, the Fallujahns could have been weaned away from theinsurgency. A crucial part of the Marine approach called for engagement with theIraqi people in a way reminiscent of the Civic Action Program (CAP) pioneeredby the Marine Corps during the Vietnam conflict.1 The Marines expected thatby demonstrating they could be good friends with the Iraqi people they couldsoften Sunni perceptions of an occupation and develop better communicationsand unity of effort against the insurgents. Eventually, of course, the Marine goalwas to minimize support for the insurgency among the local Iraqis and reduce theneed for combat operations.

But, by the time the Marines arrived, the 82nd Airborne had effectively ceasedactive patrolling inside Fallujah, after repeated acts of violence indicated securitywas better left to the local police and ICDC soldiers within the city.2 Notwith-standing the lack of coalition activity in the city, before the Blackwater incident,the Marines still wanted to engage with the people of Fallujah to show the benefitsof their unique approach, and they quickly resumed active engagement with thepopulation. Yet, almost immediately after their arrival the Marines began to sensethat the situation in Fallujah was not as calm as they had been led to believe.3 First,a rocket was fired from the city into the coalition force base at Camp Fallujah,4

killing a doctor assigned to the 82nd Airborne on March 20. Later, on March 26,an attack on a logistics convoy nearby resulted in the death of a Marine, PrivateFirst Class Leroy Sandoval, Jr., and about 18 Iraqis.5



Thinking these attacks were isolated incidents in a dangerous country, ColonelJohn Toolan, the commander of the 1st Marine Regiment, charged with security inthe area, and other Marine leaders entered Fallujah the next day to discuss the newMarine way of interacting with local residents in the mayor’s complex of the city.During that meeting, seven Marines were wounded by mortar fire.6 The next dayyet another Marine was wounded near the highway intersection on the east side ofthe city, and a Special Forces soldier was killed by a command-detonated IED whileleaving Fallujah.7 It was then clear to the Marines that something unanticipatedwas going on in the city. On the same day of the Blackwater murders, five U.S.Army soldiers died in an IED attack in nearby Habbaniyah, Iraq.8

So it was a rising level of violence that was already in evidence, combined withthe deaths of the five soldiers outside Fallujah on March 31, not just the chillingBlackwater murders that drove the MEF toward a traditional assault on the enemyin Fallujah in late March. In fact, the initial forays of this assault actually beganas early as March 29, even as Colonel Toolan and his 1st Marines were acceptingtactical responsibility for the city from the 82nd Airborne. On that date the 2ndBattalion, 1st Marines had begun a limited objective raid into the northeasterncorner of the city to discover the source of the recent attacks on March 27.

Although the main assault did not begin in earnest until Monday, April 5, theMarines had immediately begun conducting tactical operations to identify anddeal with the threats in Fallujah because it was obvious to them that insurgentactivity was a significant threat.9 Of course, there was no doubt that an evengreater response was needed after the incidents of March 31, but it appears inretrospect that the insurgents in the city were actually taking advantage of theturnover between the 82nd Airborne and the Marines to attack the coalitionduring a period of weakness. This ability to identify and exploit a potential gap incoverage caused by the turnover between the two units shows that the insurgency inFallujah was being directed by a commander or commanders capable of observingand analyzing coalition activities for opportunities and then taking action to gaintactical advantage. It was a much more sophisticated and capable enemy than manypeople in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere in America realized.

VIGILANT RESOLVE, NO WORSE ENEMY . . .

The April attack by the coalition forces into Fallujah changed the insurgencyin Iraq in several ways. Most critical among these changes was the fact that formonths afterward, the insurgents believed they could both defeat coalition forces inurban combat and manipulate influential Sunnis in Baghdad to negotiate on theirbehalf against coalition forces. The April fighting in Fallujah also established someimportant precedents for operations to follow, in both Najaf and in other areas ofAl Anbar province, including the second attack in the city, which would follow inNovember. For these reasons an overview of the April operation is important to afull understanding of what followed.


Showing Resolve ✯ ✯ ✯ 13

Although the U.S. military can respond very quickly to a host of situations incrisis, attacking into a city the size of Fallujah remains an extremely complex task.Such complexity requires time for detailed planning and positioning forces. A fewadditional days of breathing room before the assault would have elicited a differentMarine response in Fallujah, but war all too frequently forces commanders to reactunder less than optimal circumstances. Within hours of the March 31 incidents,the MEF began to shift additional units toward Fallujah and to posture suppliesfor offensive operations. In less than a week, the MEF, in coordination with itssubordinate tactical commands, the 1st Marine Division, and Colonel Toolan’s1st Marine Regiment (assigned to provide security in the area), had produced anassault plan focused around employing two Marine battalions and parts of twoIraqi battalions inside Fallujah to root out the insurgents in the city. The operationwas named Vigilant Resolve.

The plan called for Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1),10 under the commandof Colonel Toolan, to surround the city and then penetrate it from two anglesimmediately before launching a series of raids to capture the key individuals linkedto the most extreme violence in the city. The main physical objectives identifiedin the plan were to establish control over the mayor’s complex at the city’s centerand the Iraqi military compound to its west.11 Through the first 3 days of April,units were moved from nearby areas of the province and the key access points intoFallujah were occupied by coalition forces, with Golf Company 2nd Battalion, 1stMarines taking control of the western approaches into the city, including the oldgreen bridge where the contractor bodies had been hung.

The 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Greg Olsen)in the northwest and 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (commanded by LieutenantColonel Brennan Byrne) in the southeast were the key maneuver forces work-ing for Toolan.12 The two local ICDC battalions deemed combat capable by theMEF were intended to support the Marine penetrations in the city. All of theseunits were to be supported by AC-130 Specter gunships at night and F-15 Eaglefighters and AH-1 Cobra helicopters during the daylight hours.

This plan appeared to be an effective approach to the problem, fully integratingthe Iraqi forces and employing a focused effort to isolate the insurgents whileconducting operations with an eye to protecting the local residents. Unfortunately,the Iraqi units involved in the operation got off to a very bad start, with onebattalion encountering an IED as it began movement from Baghdad. That was allit took to convince the unit’s soldiers that they did not want to fight in Fallujah.The second battalion arrived in time to provide a company to each of the twoMarine assault battalions, but even it lost a great deal of its effectiveness aftersuffering three fatalities in the first few days of the fighting. In the early spring of2004, the ICDC units simply did not have sufficient unit cohesion and training tosuccessfully fight the insurgents.

After access to the city had been controlled by coalition units occupying themajor entry routes, the initial combat patrols entered Fallujah early on Mondaymorning April 5, broadcasting warnings for the residents to stay indoors for their



1/5

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HaydraMosque

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Mayor’sComplex

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NewBridge

Old “Green” Bridge

BlackwaterAttack Site

April 2004

Operations

in Fallujah

QueensArea

IndustrialArea

3/4

Highway 10

Railroad Line

Jolan

2/1

Area

2/23/4 joined the fight on April 82/2 entered operations on April 24

Map 3. April 2004 Operations in Fallujah

own safety.13 Many of the financiers, recruiters, and weapons suppliers for theinsurgent movement were rounded up in early raids.14 “Iraqi police dropped offU.S. leaflets at city mosques, announcing a daily 7 P.M. to 6 A.M. curfew andordering residents not to carry weapons.”15 The prohibitions on weapons and freemovement were to help differentiate between the insurgents and the locals. TheMarines even developed and broadcasted techniques for residents to stay shelteredin their homes and ways to safely approach coalition forces.

Unfortunately, the Marines’ reception in the city was anything but safe. Troopscame under fire almost immediately from insurgents, who used rifles, automaticweapons, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and mortars, firing from homes,vehicles, and even mosques. Insurgent snipers fired from rooftops and the windowsof homes and businesses. The Marines returned fire and quickly brought helicoptergunships to bear against the enemy positions, but four Marines were killed on thefirst day of combat operations in the city.16 It was very clear that many of the localresidents were aiding the enemy fighters, who wore black clothing and scarveswrapped around their faces.17

Lieutenant Colonel Brennan Byrne’s 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (commonlyknown by the abbreviation 1/5) attacked from the east into the heavy industrialarea of the city and bore the brunt of the initial casualties. One Marine commented,“As soon as we pulled up, they started shooting at us. There were mortars, rocketsand bullets flying everywhere. . . . It seemed like everyone in the city who had a



gun was out there.”18 Still, the Marines tried to avoid civilian casualties by limitingthe use of indirect fires in the city. At this early stage in the second year of the war,the employment of artillery and close air support inside cities was still consideredrisky. Even with the intensity of the Iraqi response, Byrne commented that theaction was “about making the city livable so people don’t have to live in fear of thethugs who have taken over the city.”19

Still, by Tuesday, April 6, 1/5 had consolidated among several strong positionsin the industrial area of the city’s east side.20 In 2004, that part of the city wasprimarily filled with small factories, auto shops, and warehouses, and coveredwith junk machinery and car parts. So it was particularly rough urban terrain forcombat operations, but, at least it then had many fewer residents than the othersections of the city – certainly many fewer people lived there than lived in thedensely packed northwestern sector of Fallujah known as the Jolan. Using cannonfrom AC-130 gunships and aircraft-delivered rockets, Byrne’s battalion was ableto carve out control of a fairly large section of the city and reinforce its positionsaround an old soda factory, used as a strong point.

Elsewhere in Fallujah, things were not going smoothly at all. Small, scatteredgroups of insurgent fighters were waging hit-and-run attacks and running streetbattles against the Marines in both the northwestern and the northeastern sectorsof the city. “For hours into the night, the sides traded fire, while teams of Marinesmoved in and out of the neighborhood, seizing buildings to use as posts and battlinggunmen. Helicopters weaved overhead, firing at guerilla hide-outs.”21 Four homeswere destroyed in the initial fighting and between 20 and 50 Iraqis were killedor wounded. Perhaps just as troubling, after suffering their initial casualties, thesupporting Iraqi units began to fail and never again performed as expected in theoperation. For the fight in Fallujah, it was really only the newly arrived Marinebattalions that counted – and they were set against a much better situated andstronger enemy force than was anticipated.

The residents remaining in the city figured out quickly that the ongoing attack inFallujah was something very different than anything they had experienced before.Consequently, on the third day of the operation, the city erupted with a flow ofresidents fleeing from the combat. The Marines had thought to provide food andwater for a needy population but were amazed to observe over 80,000 Iraqis flowthrough the exit points in a matter of only 20 hours.22 Everyone understood thatthis operation indicated a big change in the way the coalition was waging thesecond year of war in Iraq.

NOT JUST FALLUJAH

Unfortunately for the Marines, Fallujah was not the only challenge the coalition wasfacing in early April. At the same time they began operations in the city of mosques,the 1st Marine Division also began increased operations elsewhere in the provinceso as to put additional pressure on the insurgents and limit any reinforcements



to those enemy fighters already in Fallujah. Unexpectedly, the enemy in Ramadiand other Sunni cities mounted surprisingly strong counterattacks in response tothe Division’s efforts and, to make things worse, a Shia holy man named Muqtadaal-Sadr began a parallel campaign focused against the coalition in general and theCPA in particular in the southern Iraqi city of Najaf.

In Ramadi, the fighting was particularly intense, requiring augmentation ofthe front line fighting troops by the support sections and division headquartersunits to deal with the severe insurgent response. Fox News reported, “Dozensof Iraqis attacked a Marine position near the governor’s palace” in Ramadi andquoted military sources saying, “This is unlike any other firefight we’ve seen sofar.”23 The insurgent response was so strong that all American officials in Iraqwere directed to remain inside their compounds for security reasons. Fighting alsobroke out in Nasiriyah, Kut, and Karbala and in the Sadr City section of Baghdad.Ominously, eight fuel trucks intended for Camp Fallujah were attacked and burnedby insurgents between Baghdad and Fallujah, leaving a huge plume of black smokein the sky over the epicenter of the conflict.

In a moment of terrible timing, the U.S. Administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer,had chosen April 5 to declare al-Sadr an “outlaw.”24 This declaration inflamedmany among the Shia majority in Iraq and started a Shia confrontation in centralIraq at the same time that the coalition was dealing with the Sunnis in Fallujahand throughout the rest of Al Anbar province. Soon, the world, and particularlythe White House, was concerned about the stability of Iraq, with two of its majorreligious groups in open conflict with the U.S. civil administration, only weeksbefore the transfer to full Iraqi sovereignty was scheduled to occur. Al-Sadr calledfor open revolt against the coalition forces and Ambassador Bremer cancelled areturn to Washington to brief congressional leaders on the situation in Iraq.

Fortunately, these various outbreaks were only loosely related. It is certain thatal-Sadr’s decision to overtly attack the coalition had been brewing for months, andthe attacks in Ramadi were a response to coalition posturing. But the overall effectwas to make it appear that both Sunni and Shia insurgents were working togetheragainst the coalition – which had never been expected. Early April was a periodof great tension. One year had passed since the fall of Saddam and few of theAmerican promises for prosperity had materialized. Additionally, Zarqawi and hisAl Qaeda-linked movement began a much more aggressive campaign of terror inthe country as well. All of these factors cast an ominous cloud over the activities ofthe coalition in Iraq during early April and made maintaining the political supportneeded for any tactical success in Fallujah much more difficult to achieve.

In Baghdad and other Sunni areas of Iraq, residents were shocked at the intensityof the fighting and dismayed at reports that many Fallujahn civilians were beingkilled and injured in the city. Few people understood the facts behind the attackor the real conditions inside Fallujah, but most suspected the worst about thecoalition because the news coverage, by both western and Arab journalists, wasvery critical. In response to this concern, nearly 5,000 Iraqis drove toward Fallujahon April 6 to deliver food and other forms of aid to their neighbors.



MAINTAINING VIGILANCE

On Wednesday, April 7, the Marines continued their push toward the center ofFallujah, “darting across roads and crouching on corners as the echo of mortars andrifles mingled with the wail of prayers and warnings from minarets.”25 Althoughthe MEF claimed that a quarter of the city was under coalition control, the level offighting was clearly still escalating, as were casualties.26 As they drove deeper intothe city, the Marines were forced to use more weapons systems against a broaderrange of targets.

In one case, in response to rifle and grenade fire from inside the building, 1/5employed fixed-wing and helicopter fires against the Abdelaziz Samarri Mosque,reportedly injuring a group of Iraqi residents and seriously damaging the building.General Mattis, the hard-bitten commanding general of the 1st Marine Division,who was on site at the time, along with the Commandant of the Marine Corps,General Michael Hagee, concurred with the attack on the mosque, noting that theinsurgents had “profaned” the site by first using it to attack the Marines.27 Thiswould become the first of many examples of insurgents ignoring the commonlyheld laws of armed conflict in Fallujah.

The issue of employing weapons in and around mosques was an extremelydifficult challenge at the time. The Marines were well aware of the Iraqi sensitivitiesconcerning their holy sites and used due caution; however, they found that theirMuslim enemy had no compunction against employing mosques as bases andfiring positions. This put the Marines in a no-win situation, forcing them to attackthe holy sites with as much precision as possible, yet still accepting that someinevitable damage – both physical and cultural – would occur. Robert Kaplan,who accompanied Bravo Company 1/5 into the city, noted, “By the standards ofmost wars, some mosques in Fallujah deserved to be leveled. But only after repeatedaggressions was any mosque targeted, and then sometimes for hits so small in scopethat they often had little effect. The news photos of the holes in mosque domes didnot indicate the callousness of the American military; rather the reverse.”28

Through the afternoon and early evening the fighting raged block by block andhouse to house. Chants from minarets called on God to protect Fallujah and, somethought, urged holy war against the American invaders. After dark, enemy mortarrounds fell all around 1/5’s headquarters, killing an 11-year-old girl and woundingher sister. Some Marines were already saying that the urban combat in Fallujah wasmore dangerous and unpredictable than what they had experienced in Baghdadthe year before. Navy Corpsman Percy Davila said, “It is urban and scary. Thereare windows everywhere, bullets and grenades whizzing over your head. Whenyou cross the street, you just put your head down and pray.”29 Colonel Toolan wasalready maneuvering two additional Marine battalions into Fallujah because of theintensity of the fight.30

More intense fighting continued in the city on April 8.31 An F/A-18 Hornetfighter, from the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN73) in the Arabian Gulf, conducted a 20-millimeter strafing run against an enemy



position, and the Marines were able to push deeper into the city and shore up theirdefensive positions throughout the area.32 The same day, General Sanchez provideda briefing to reporters in Baghdad, noting that the ICDC forces continued to workwith the Marines in the city, making “tremendous progress in restoring legitimateauthority to Fallujah.”33 He also promised that once the security situation isstabilized, the quality of life of the residents of Fallujah would be improved throughthe substantial resources available to the MEF.

In fact, the MEF had made plans to assist Fallujahns, but the fighting duringthe night and into the next day largely prohibited much assistance from beingdelivered into the city. Another F/A-18 dropped two 500-pound, GBU-12 laser-guided bombs on another enemy position in Fallujah the following morning,April 9. But, at noon that same day, the Marines unilaterally suspended combatin Fallujah on the direction of Ambassador Bremer, to hold meetings betweenmembers of the local governing council and the leadership of the anti-coalitionforces in the city and to permit the delivery of supplies provided by the relevantdepartments of the Iraqi government.34 Unfortunately, the insurgents wanted nopart of a ceasefire and combat operations resumed in less than 2 hours.35

Muslim views on the fighting grew exceedingly critical as the days of combatpassed, and by April 9 anti-coalition sentiment was very strong all around theMiddle East. An Al-Jazeera correspondent in Fallujah, quoted by the PalestineChronicle, noted, “People are scared. They are angry,” and then he describedcorpse-littered streets and hundreds of dead and wounded civilians.36 In nearbyBaghdad, Sunnis were openly rallying support for the insurgents in Fallujah,donating blood, money, and medical supplies.37 Those on the scene knew better;Kaplan wrote, “The overwhelming percentage of the small arms fire – not tomention mortars, rockets, and RPGs – represented indiscriminate automatic burstsby the insurgents. Marines responded with far fewer, more precise shots.”38

As with any combat operation in urban terrain, the toll on the civilian populationwas nearly unavoidable and its effects had a profoundly negative impact on theinternational media and the CPA – the national authority in Iraq at the time. AfterApril 8, with the bombs being dropped so visibly in the city and a great deal ofsympathetic reporting by the Arab press, senior officials were questioning some ofthe tactics used in the fight.39 Very quickly, the Iraqis near the seat of governmentin Baghdad not only urged restraint, but also began negations with the insurgents.

The “temporary halt to offensive operations” was intended to support realnegotiations and to reduce civilian suffering. But because the insurgent leadershiphad little faith in negotiations and little concern for civilian welfare, such politicallymotivated halts in the combat did little except give the insurgents time to rearmand augment their forces. Every day saw continued fighting. Hundreds of theenemy fighters were combining to conduct well-coordinated attacks on Marinesby midmonth.40

In one such action, some 300 insurgents launched multiple RPGs against aplatoon of Marine amphibious assault vehicles, resulting in the complete destruc-tion of one vehicle, the death of one Marine, and multiple Marine injuries in the



platoon. The firefight continued in adjacent houses in the city, with insurgentsrepeatedly attacking the wounded Marines with rifle and RPG fire and hurlinggrenades. After 6 hours of heavy combat, the dead and injured Marines were evac-uated, leaving dozens of insurgent bodies in and around the site of the originalambush.41

By April 13, high-level negotiations had started to gain some traction and thecombat operation to destroy the insurgents in Fallujah was effectively on hold.42

Unfortunately, although the Marines consistently pursued a number of basic de-mands with the insurgents (represented by token city leaders in the negotiationprocess), the enemy failed to make good on any of their promises, even after theMarines began withdrawing tanks and forces from the city as they had agreed.43

Some older, largely unserviceable, weapons were turned in, but the insurgentsnever made a significant commitment to fulfilling the agreements made duringthe negotiations. Bringing about an end to the contest through negotiations wasat an impasse.

The idea of a “Fallujah Brigade” to clean up the city under the command of anIraqi general was first discussed on April 16 during negotiations at Camp Fallujahbetween the locals and the MEF.44 An Iraqi army general from Fallujah, JasimMohamed Saleh, was named to help solve the security situation in the city. Asthe former commander of the Iraqi 39th Division, he was respected by the Sunnisand seemed agreeable to a new relationship where he would serve under MEFcommand. But even as these new more innovative negotiations continued, roundsand rockets were still being exchanged every day in the winding streets of the city.In fact, April 17 saw some of the toughest fighting of the operation. With no realprogress in the one-sided “dialog” with the insurgents, the Fallujah Brigade seemedto offer the only viable option.

On April 19, in discussions with the Iraqis, another former general, MohammedLatif, offered that a Fallujah Brigade could restore order inside the city, and GeneralConway agreed to give the idea 2 weeks to prove itself. The Fallujah Brigade wasto operate under MEF command and control, and General Saleh seemed, at leastat the time, to be the right leader to put the idea into action. By April 22, a moregeneral cease-fire was proposed yet again in the city, but fierce fighting continuedin smaller pockets throughout Fallujah. The insurgents simply had no desire tostop fighting after midmonth, for they believed they had turned the tide of publicopinion against the coalition and that every additional day of combat in Fallujahwas to their strategic benefit. In part, they were exactly right.

By that time, a post-combat concept of operations had been developed (April 21)to provide immediate humanitarian aid to the city in the wake of the fighting. Thisincluded a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) to work with Nongovern-mental Organizations (NGOs) to provide relief supplies. Over the course of thebattle, many among the civilian population had been caught inside their homesand as many as 150,000 people were trapped in the isolated city, without regularsupplies of food and fuel. The humanitarian plan was envisioned to be put intoaction preceding any renewed combat operations in the city. It addressed aid, as



well as construction and cleanup projects, for the residents of Fallujah and someroad and building repair.

Also of note, by the end of April, the MEF’s lack of robust Public Affairs (PA)and Information Operations (IO) activities had become obvious in relation tothe effective efforts of the insurgents. So the MEF placed new emphasis on thosetechniques, and they began to figure much more prominently in the scheme ofmaneuver than they had in the initial operations order. This showed the MEF tobe a learning organization, even in combat. PA and IO were areas that the MEFconsistently worked hard to improve, under difficult constraints imposed by higherheadquarters, and that would contribute much to the future success in Fallujah,once the improved techniques were brought to bear.

Still, after April 22, the situation in Fallujah was very uncertain. The enemyfighters inside the city were reinforcing their positions and growing in power.They were using mosques and hospitals as defensive positions and some analystsbelieved they would use the local residents as human shields when combat resumed.The insurgents clearly understood that civilian casualties and coalition attacks onmosques and other normally restricted targets played very well in their favor in theinternational media. Combat continued intermittently in the city as the Marineunits shifted positions to avoid being targeted by the insurgents while trying tomaintain a climate conducive to negotiations.

Then on Monday April 26, 3 weeks after the offensive started, several new majorengagements between groups of insurgents and Marines rang throughout the city.The insurgents counterattacked on that date because they believed the Marineswere readying for a renewed assault. Indicative of the valor and sacrifice of thosedays, in a small corner of the tightly packed city, Lance Corporal Aaron C. Austingave his life to protect his fellow Marines during a vicious massing attack by some300 insurgents against his platoon from Echo Company, 2/1. The insurgents hadmoved in from three directions, all along the alleyways amid the houses wherethe Marines were positioned; both sides fired rifles and hurled grenades. Onegrenade blast started a fire, igniting several other explosives and wounding sev-eral Marines. As the enemy prepared yet another assault, Austin exposed himselfto enemy fire to throw a grenade and halt their attack. For his heroic actions,Lance Corporal Austin was later awarded the Silver Star.45 During the same ac-tion, Master Sergeant Donald Hollenbaugh, U.S. Army, won the DistinguishedService Medal for his bravery while helping the Marines to hold off the insur-gent assault during evacuation of casualties from the house the Marine unit wasoccupying.

From actions like these and the continued stress on the city’s population, greatpolitical pressure began to be applied to cease any further combat and seek anegotiated settlement. As a result of this pressure, and the continued lack of progresson the ground and in the negotiating room, a Fallujah Brigade, constructed fromformer Iraqi army soldiers with the sole purpose of restoring order to the city inthe Marine’s stead, seemed to be the best option. Because the idea was presentedby a group of former Iraqi military officers, it also seemed to have the advantage



of obtaining some level of Sunni reintegration under the CPA – it appeared to bethe only practical Iraqi solution to an Iraqi problem.46

THE FALLUJAH BRIGADE

The Fallujah Brigade was a unique and always tenuous construct. Its conceptualleader, Major General Salah, arrived in the city in his Iraqi army uniform to greatcheers from the residents. But no sooner was he acknowledged by the locals than hispast human rights violations against Iraqi Kurds made him politically untenableas a coalition partner. So the Fallujah Brigade was eventually commanded in thefield by Brigadier General Latif (and still later by a General Abdullah, who claimedto be Latif’s successor but did little or nothing in the city). Initially formed duringthe last week of April, it began operations with an initial compliment of nearly600 members after May 1.

The concept behind the Fallujah Brigade was for it to act as a buffer between theinsurgents and the coalition, to isolate the foreign fighter element of the insurgencyin Fallujah, and to destroy that group while protecting the local population andrestoring order in the city. It was supposed to collect weapons from the insurgentsand initiate investigations into the murders of the Blackwater contractors. Unfor-tunately, the leadership of the Fallujah Brigade – both Saleh (who was an insurgentsympathizer) and Latif (who was reluctant to act against Iraqis) – was heavilyinfluenced by the city’s insurgent-supporting tribal leaders. Both Iraqi generalsplayed to both sides of the confrontation, telling the Marines what they wantedto hear and acting as expediently as possible with the insurgents inside the city ofFallujah. Not only was the leadership of the Fallujah Brigade ineffective, the unititself was also severely infiltrated by insurgents, so it was never fully capable ofaccomplishing what it was intended to do.

The test of the Fallujah Brigade began on May 4, when, after another Marinewithdrawal, General Latif agreed to take over the remaining Marine positionsaround the city and to reassert control over the city center the following day. By thefollowing week, the Marines had begun providing limited humanitarian assistanceto the residents of Fallujah and had even developed a claims process for battledamage in the city. The cease-fire was holding and the coalition was planning toconduct a major convoy into the heart of the city on May 10, but the city had yetto give up any crew-served weapons systems – one of the essential preconditionsof any continued cease-fire from the coalition perspective. Although the convoywas conducted as scheduled (bringing General Mattis and 10 Marine vehicles tothe mayor’s compound for a meeting with city leaders), clear signs were alreadyevident that the Fallujah Brigade leadership was not going to make good on itsclaims to rid Fallujah of foreign fighters and provide security in the city.

The interposition of the Fallujah Brigade, which effectively ended operationVigilant Resolve, proved in the end to disappoint everyone. Although well equippedby the coalition to do its job, the Fallujah Brigade quickly showed itself unable to



oppose the Sunni anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) in the town, and over the summer itslowly dissolved as an effective military force. At the very least the Fallujah Brigadewas a first attempt at an Iraqi solution to Fallujah’s troubles, and when it failedto maintain the peace, the blame could no longer be pinned on coalition forcesexclusively.47 Iraqis began to see that they too were at least partially responsible forthe problems confronting the city.

At the same time the Fallujah Brigade was failing, the police in Fallujah, whichwere never very supportive of the coalition, began to side more with the insurgentand AIF that gathered in the city. One of the conditions of the Fallujah Brigade’sexistence was that the city of Fallujah became solely the Brigade’s responsibility,meaning that Marine forces were not to enter Fallujah with out prior coordination.This understanding established a slow deterioration of security in Fallujah withvarious insurgent groups vying for control in the city.

By June it was clear that the city was no longer open to the coalition and itspatrols. Insurgents increasing controlled the daily life of the residents of Fallujah.The city police were intimidated into turning a blind eye to insurgent activity.Finally, regular military communications between the Fallujah Brigade and thecoalition became strained and then increasingly infrequent. Although ColonelToolan met daily with representatives of the Fallujah Brigade, General Latif andthe other leaders of the Brigade were clearly coming under insurgent control andonly rarely acting to accomplish their stated mission. The Fallujah Liaison Team(FLT) site was opened outside Traffic Control Point 1 (TCP-1) to facilitate dialogbetween the city and the MEF leadership, but in doing so TCP-1 itself becameone of the most dangerous locations in the world, taking daily indirect fire andsmall arms attacks. Life in Fallujah became more dominated by the insurgents andTaliban-like, conservative religious practices.

STRATEGIC CHANGES

On June 28, the CPA turned over full sovereignty to the Interim Iraqi Government(IIG) in a surprise move 2 days prior to the announced date of turnover ofsovereignty. In part this shift was enabled by the cooperation in evidence duringthe negotiations and termination of the April fight in Fallujah. Unfortunately,although the new Iraqi government was an effective compromise politically andculturally, no one knew if it would become a true, effective government.

Through July and August, insurgent forces had an increasingly free run of thecity, and over time Fallujah became an area restricted from coalition ground andair movement, effectively blocking military transportation from using Highway 10from Baghdad to the provincial capital of Ramadi. Over time the insurgency in thecity expanded its influence to surrounding areas and troop movement anywherenear Fallujah became risky. In August, anti-Mahdi Militia48 fighting in nearbyNajaf took the attention of the world off of Fallujah for a few weeks, but theinfluence of the insurgency that “turned back the Marine assault” only grew.



The transition from the CPA to the IIG and the shifting of the military commandand control organization in Iraq at the same time permitted a general atrophy ofthe national focus on Fallujah at the very time the Fallujah Brigade was slowlybut clearly decomposing. At the same time, the insurgents were only increasingtheir powerbase in the city of Fallujah. The summer months saw a steady rise ininsurgent control and a similar decrease in coalition force freedom of maneuveraround Fallujah. For the residents of the city, the summer also brought an evermore restrictive, fundamentalist regimen to activities in Fallujah.

LESSONS FROM FIRST CONTACT

For the coalition in general and the Marines in particular, operation Vigilant Re-solve was very instructive. The enemy proved to be extremely smart and adaptableand demonstrated the capacity to fight under extreme conditions. Combat againstthe insurgents in Iraq would be vicious, close, and unbounded by traditionallaws of armed conflict. Marines proved to be extremely effective in small unitactions with close air support. Snipers, tanks, grenades, and the Advanced CombatOptical Gunsite (ACOG) proved invaluable. Marine urban tactics and fire controlmeasures also proved themselves in counterinsurgency combat where the civilianpopulation remained close to combat actions.

Unfortunately, the Marine’s Iraqi counterparts did not serve well overall andremained suspect as coalition partners. In part this was because of inadequatetraining, but it was also a symptom of the fact that the new Iraq had no professionalmilitary after de-Ba’athification. Some individual Iraqi soldiers performed well,but as units above the company level they were too weak to be employed in combatwithout very close control.

Worse for the coalition, in the face of such an enemy, the Iraqi leaders of theIraqi Governing Council were uncertain in their commitment to fight insurgentsin Iraqi cities. The CPA had too limited support from the people, and the prospectof civil war was too likely in the early months of 2004 for many Iraqis, particularlySunnis, to back coalition combat of any duration beyond a few days.

The MEF saw quickly that such a tenacious enemy would fight hard in urbanterrain and had to be separated from its base of support in the local populationif it was to be decisively engaged and defeated. Unfortunately, Fallujah was onecity where the residents at least tacitly supported the insurgency, a place wheretraditional counterinsurgency operations might not work. The temperament ofthe locals was clearly anti-coalition and new approaches were needed to effectivelycombat the threat.

In 2004, the Marine leadership learned quickly that some aspects of combatoperations were going to be very different from the way they were the year before.Operations were much more politically constrained and tactics were much lessfluid in the urban terrain. Even more importantly, the coalition realized that thepublic affairs fight was just as important as the tactical battle. The objectives



and benefits of any future operation had to be clear to all concerned, and allcivil–military activities had to be planned and integrated from the outset with anaggressive information plan. As Robert Kaplan wrote, “none of the above mattersif it is not completely explained to the American public – for the home front ismore critical in a counterinsurgency than in any other kind of war.”49

Finally, a fully integrated command structure and capable Iraqi forces wererequired for any future operation. The ICDC forces in the area were worthless,many members of the initial Iraqi forces sent from Baghdad to participate in thebattle were timid, and the Fallujah Brigade was ineffective against fellow Sunnis.Better strategic coordination with the new Iraqi government was needed, and muchbetter trained and integrated Iraqi forces had to be developed for any long-termsolution to be viable in Al Anbar province in general and Fallujah in particular.Even with such improvements, however, Fallujah would remain a very tough nutto crack.


Chapter Three

✯✯✯

The Lion of Najaf

Because the ICDC was completely ineffective against terrorists, during thesummer months of June, July, and August 2004 insurgent forces had an increasinglyfree run of the city of Fallujah. Over the same period, insurgent capability grewand grew as the city became known as an enemy sanctuary. Because of the factthat the city was supposedly under the control of the ICDC and was not theresponsibility of the coalition, as the enemy grew in strength, Fallujah increasinglybecame restricted from American ground and air movement for force protectionreasons. It was simply too dangerous to enter the city, given the limited role theMEF was allowed to play there.

Political constraints aimed at reaching out to Sunnis and strategic force pro-tection considerations even effectively blocked military transportation from usingHighway 10, the main road from Baghdad to the provincial capital of Ramadi tothe west that passed right by Fallujah. In time, to most soldiers in the coalition,the city became just a dark spot on the map in west-central Iraq. Meanwhile, allthrough the summer, the insurgents in the city slowly expanded their influenceinto the surrounding suburban areas, increased the level of intimidation to thosewho did not support their cause, and grew roots in adjacent towns until troopmovement anywhere near Fallujah was observed and tracked by the enemy and itssympathizers. Inside Fallujah the municipal functions became increasingly dom-inated by the needs of the insurgents, who began taking over more and moresafe houses as their numbers grew and building defensive works to improve theirexpanding stronghold. The city that had resisted the coalition assault in April wasby August a new symbol of the strength of the insurgency.

Still, the growing influence of the anti-Iraqi elements in Al Anbar province wasnot unique to that part of Iraq. Baghdad witnessed ever more numerous acts ofopposition to the post-Saddam government during the summer, as did severalother cities. And, more ominously, these acts were not always Sunni inspired;



other groups were starting to take a more active role in the insurgency. Some ofthese groups were Shia supported, and the influence of Iran was suspected. Thisexpansion of the opposition resulted in ever-increasing numbers of incidents ofIraqi-on-Iraqi violence. In other words, the insurgents were taking the fight to theIraqi people, not just the coalition forces.

Then, during the first days of August, antigovernment Mahdi Militia1 workingin nearby Najaf took the attention of the world off of the infamous Sunni triangleand Fallujah. For a few weeks the attention of the world changed to focus onShia opposition; this important change signaled yet another significant step inthe ever-increasing development of the insurgency.2 While the symbolism of theApril battle that “turned back the Marine assault” continued to grow, the fightingin Najaf illustrated a more dangerous form of revolt and gave the coalition anopportunity to learn some important tactical lessons that would be important toplanning the second fight in Fallujah.

THE INSURGENT VIOLENCE EXPANDS

These summer insurgent attacks need to be viewed in a greater context, however.As indicated, Fallujah and Najaf were not alone among Iraqi cities where unrestand violence was significant in the spring and early summer of 2004. At least 68people had been killed in Basra on April 21, 13 died in Baghdad on June 14,and insurgents launched coordinated attacks across Iraq on June 24, killing andinjuring over 300 people. Later in the summer, on July 28, nearly 70 Iraqis werekilled in Baquba.

The specific types of violent acts were also expanding. Murdering hostagesbecame a favored insurgent tactic during this period, beginning on April 14 withthe death of an Italian security guard. Nick Berg, a young U.S. hostage, had beenshown being beheaded in a video released on May 11.3 During the same time framecoalition forces continued to fight insurgent groups and to bomb their supportinginfrastructure of safe houses, training bases, and weapons caches, whenever andwherever they could locate them, particularly in the Sunni triangle north and westof the Iraqi capital.4

This expansion of the insurgency and its actions had complex causation. Ter-rorists were most certainly behind the most grisly acts, the beheadings and thelarge impact bombings. But, FRE members and Iraqi criminals were also at work,adding to the confusion by taking advantage of any weakness in the governmentof coalition. To many outside of Iraq, it appeared that the insurgency was growingsignificantly in size under their very eyes.5 Certainly, as the months passed and thecoalition military units did not leave the country, more and more Iraqis joinedthe fight with patriotic motivations. Still, the largest source of conflict inside Iraqremained internecine vendettas left over from years of abuse of power. Religiousstrife was prevalent. With a tremendous rise in prices and goods being brought


The Lion of Najaf ✯ ✯ ✯ 27

into the country, incidents of crime rose as well. All of these facts made the summerof 2004 a very difficult period for the new Iraqi government.6

These circumstances would have been difficult for any established government,but they were even more challenging to a brand new management team withlimited recent experience in Iraq. The United Nations, under the leadership ofveteran diplomat, special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, had only appointed the keymembers of the new IIG on June 1.7 When it took office in late June, the focusof effort of this first new Iraqi government was designed to be directing the day-to-day affairs of the 26 national ministries, preparing the country for nationalelections in January 2005, and helping the coalition create Iraqi security services toeventually take full responsibility in the country, but the IIG was quickly dominatedby battling the insurgency instead.

PRELUDE: IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY

One of the most significant events of the Iraq war occurred on June 27, 2004,when the American-led CPA gave up responsibility for governing Iraq to the newlyselected Iraqi sovereign government managed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi.8 Theformation of this IIG had been the subject of much negotiation during the latespring but had finally been formed through compromise among the three majorreligious groups in the country. Although the president, Sheik Ghazi al-Yawar,was a Sunni, the real power in the structure rested in the office of Prime MinisterAllawi.

The transfer of sovereignty occurred at 10:26 A.M., 2 days earlier than hadbeen announced, in part to throw off insurgents (who may have been plottingan attack on the announced day) and in part because the new government didnot want to waste even a single day.9 The establishment of a democratic ad-ministration in Iraq was certain to be a difficult task in the face of so muchturmoil. Initially, even the functioning of the ministries remained inefficient atbest; provincial governments were just being formed and the new national gov-ernment, the IIG, needed to establish even the most basic of procedures, includingthe working relationships among the president, two vice presidents, and the primeminister.

Early on, it became clear that the prime minister was the pivotal position andIyad Allawi was the key to success for the IIG effort. Allawi was a long-time leaderof one of Iraqi’s many anti-Saddam opposition groups. He had also been one ofthe most prominent members of the original Iraqi governing council after the fallof the Iraqi dictator. He was from a Shia family, and although trained as a doctor,his aggressive opposition of Saddam had made him a firm and forceful leaderwith a very strong understanding of security issues.10 Allawi had a host of solidsupporters from his many years as an opposition leader, but his new task as primeminister would require him to develop a government even as he had to determine



policy for the fledgling state, fighting for its life while working to establish itself asan independent entity, with the coalition still a dominant force in the country.

Another key player in this demonstration of Iraqi sovereignty was the newlyarrived U.S. Ambassador, John D. Negroponte. It was important to show that L.Paul Bremer, the former U.S. Administrator, was leaving Iraq and being replacedby a diplomat whose responsibility did not include the administration of thecountry. Negroponte11 was a diplomat of great experience, having served as theU.S. ambassador to war-torn Honduras in the early 1980s and later representingthe United States in the Philippines and Mexico and at the United Nations. Hisstature demonstrated a commitment to supporting the IIG and his skill wouldbring much to the table in the difficult year ahead.

The final leg of the new management team confronting the insurgency in Iraqwas the newly appointed commander of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I),U.S. Army General George W. Casey, who assumed command on July 1.12 LikeAllawi and Negroponte, Casey brought great talent and stature to the task in Iraq.He had most recently served as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army after havingcommanded the 1st Armored Division in Germany and serving as the Director,Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, on the Joint Staff in Washington, D.C., beforebecoming its director in 2003. Casey’s appointment as a four-star commander inIraq, under the command of General John Abizaid, the commander of the U.S.Central Command, demonstrated a renewed commitment to strategic directionof the war effort and better coordination with the political element at the newU.S. embassy.

Allawi, Negroponte, and Casey formed a very effective team. Each knew well tostay in their own lane to fully empower the others, yet they worked well enoughtogether to ensure that the three most critical elements of the counterinsurgency,the host nation government, international diplomacy, and military power, wereall well synchronized. Such synchronization would prove critical as the ongoingturbulence in Fallujah grew more and more influential and problems elsewhere inIraq continued to plague the new Iraqi government.

SHIA OPPOSITION IN IRAQ

The confrontation in Fallujah was strongly influenced by Sunni religious andtribal opposition to the MNF13 and the new Allawi government. The Sunnishad been largely displaced as the power brokers in Iraq. In particular, Ambas-sador Bremer’s de-Ba’athification policy and the dissolution of the Iraqi Army –both Sunni flagstones – had angered the Sunnis and turned them away fromany significant involvement in the government. President Yawar remained a to-ken without real power in the eyes of most Sunnis, and in 2004, the insurgencyseemed to them the only real way of combating what they viewed as increasingefforts to exclude them and diminish their role in the country they so recently hadruled.14



Sunni opposition to the new government, and certainly to the MNF, was antic-ipated and well understood by most people working on the development of thenew Iraq. What was potentially much more dangerous and concerned them most,however, was the slow but clear growth in Shia opposition to the IIG. That oppo-sition was made clear in Baghdad through the continuing strife in the slums of theShia areas known as Sadr City. It became even more dangerous with the growingdemands of the Shia “holy man,” Muqtada al-Sadr, and his demonstrations in theholy city of Najaf.

The Shia holy city of Najaf is located just over 150 kilometers southwest ofBaghdad. Imam Ali bin Ali Talib, Muhammad’s son-in-law, is buried there, in theworld-famous Imam Ali Mosque. Because of its historical significance, Najaf hasbecome one of the holiest and most important cities in Islam, and the spiritualcenter of Shiite Islam, because Imam Ali was not just the son-in-law of the ProphetMohammad, he is also seen as the first leader of the Shias. The city holds such arevered place in Islam that even Iran’s Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini choseto live in exile there from 1964 to 1978.

Under normal circumstances, Najaf is a pretty city situated on a plateau “withboulevards lined by trees, arched brick buildings, and streets filled with beardedclerics wearing white or black turbans.”15 Its huge cemetery and the Shia shrinesat its center mark the city physically and psychologically. Thousands of the faithfulvisit the city to pray at the breathtaking mausoleum of Hazrat Ali. In 2004, it wasa city of over 550,000 people and, because of its religious importance, it becamea significant flashpoint for non-Sunni insurgent actions against the new IIG and,even more unfortunately, the site of some of the most intense fighting of thesummer.

Muqtada al-Sadr chose to fight in Najaf for a reason. His father had lived andtaught there, becoming one of the most revered Shia leaders in Iraq before he wasassassinated, along with two of his sons, by Saddam Hussein’s henchmen. The elderal-Sadr’s influence had always radiated from the city of Najaf, but his survivingson first came to prominence as the leader of the Mahdi Militia in the Sadr Cityarea of Baghdad. Sadr City was an extremely poor Shia enclave in the capital city,where his words found fertile soil and his appeal grew to national significance.

Yet, on April 10, 2003, it was in much more prosperous Najaf that Muqtadaal-Sadr’s actions first became linked to the nascent insurgency.16 On that datesome of his followers allegedly assassinated the chief cleric of the Imam Ali Shrinein a dispute over the keys to the mosque. By September 2003, after coalitionforces moved into the area of Najaf,17 Sadr began calling for the overthrow ofthe CPA and had set up his own shadow Iraqi government in the Sadr City areaof Baghdad. Coalition forces had their hands full in the huge, densely populatedcity of Baghdad, and in Najaf, a lack of reconstruction project funding and MahdiMilitia efforts combined to discourage pilgrims. The resulting downturn in tourismproduced an economic slump and disappointment with the coalition.18 Sadr tookfull advantage of these difficulties to press his agenda with the dissatisfied inboth cities. By the following spring, in March 2004, his rhetoric had become so



extreme that the CPA shut down his newspaper, which only served to worsen thesituation.

As a result of Muqtada al-Sadr’s continuing vocal opposition and the worseningeconomic conditions, open fighting broke out between Mahdi Militia elementsand government forces in early April in Najaf, Sadr City, and even in Basra.Ambassador Bremer declared Sadr an outlaw the next day, based largely on hisalleged participation in the murders of two prominent Najafis, Imam Abdul Majidal-Khoei and rival Shia leader Ayatollah Sayed Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim. Theconflict in Najaf soon proved too great for the local Iraqi Security Forces to handleand the Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) commander, General Metz, assignedthe 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2ndACR) to the region for over 2 months.Najaf province is too large for even an armored cavalry regiment to maintainorder, so 2ndACR concentrated its operations on security of the main supplyroutes outside the old city of Najaf and countering the Mahdi Militia.

Luckily for the coalition, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani19 stepped in to effectivelymediate the violence caused by al-Sadr’s militiamen, and a truce was developedon June 4. The truce permitted the Mahdi Militia to remain in the city and calledfor restrictions on the employment of coalition forces in the area.20 Similar to thetruce that had ended operation Vigilant Resolve; these conditions satisfied few andpermitted antigovernment forces to retain the initiative.

Under the guidance of the most respected of Shia leaders, and with certain rightsprovided by the truce agreement, al-Sadr went to ground for nearly 2 months,resurfacing only in early August, after stating yet again his opposition to thegovernment. Sadr publicly boycotted an important Sunni conference, signaling hisrenewed effort to gain attention, and the Mahdi Militia stepped up their activitiesagainst local security forces around Iraqi. Sadr’s spokesman called for revolutionand claimed his supporters controlled four provinces in the country.21 They evenattacked a newly arrived element of the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (11thMEU) on Monday, August 2.22 The situation peaked again when Iraqi policemenand MNF forces were forced to surround al-Sadr’s home and counterattack enemyforces on August 5 in response to a significant attack by Mahdi Militiamen on themain Najaf police station the night before.23

When attacked by members of the Mahdi Militia, the Najafi police called for IraqiArmy support, and by the early hours of Thursday morning, U.S. Marines fromthe 11th MEU were called in by the provincial governor as well.24 Officially, theMahdi Militia claimed the altercation was instigated by the police, but regardlessof the real cause (the Mahdi Militia had been operating outside the exclusionzone, kidnapping members of the Iraqi security forces and conducting harassingattacks in violation of the truce,25 acts they claimed to be defense of the city againstcoalition encroachment), the confrontation resulted in heavy gunfire, mortar, andgrenade blasts – significantly more resistance than the local police could handle.

In response to the militia attack on the police station, the Marines had firstdeployed an antiarmor team and then a mechanized quick reaction force, including



To Kufa

Imam Ali Mosque

Old City of Najaf

Cemetery

Ring Road

Najafand the

Old City

Najaf

Map 4. Najaf and the Old City

armored vehicles and tanks. When the fighting continued to escalate, a section ofAH-1 Cobra and UH-1 Huey helicopters was assigned to provide close air support.A UH-1 helicopter was soon shot down by the militia and a reinforced infantrycompany was then quickly deployed to reinforce the Marines in the fight.26 A lessonwell learned previously by the Marines was the need to act rapidly and decisively incombat, charging “to the sound of the guns.” Finally, provincial Governor Adnanal-Ziruffi ordered the local Iraqi National Guard and police forces to seal off Kufaand Najaf in response to reports that busloads of Mahdi Militia were travelingfrom Baghdad to fight in Najaf.

Some thought the use of such force would intimidate al-Sadr and deter hiscontinued antigovernmental rhetoric, but in fact his followers grew ever moremilitant as additional force was applied. Al-Sadr himself urged a cease-fire ashad occurred in Fallujah in April, but Governor Ziruffi rejected al-Sadr’s call.Ziruffi, along with many others, had been soured by the failure to resolve the issueearlier and remained convinced that Sadr would respond only to force. “Oncehe was convinced the Interim Iraqi Government and the coalition forces weredecisively engaged, he wanted the job finished.”27 Instead of folding, however,the Mahdi Militia mounted stronger-than-expected opposition and the level offighting continued to increase.



COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE SHIA SOUTH: THE LION OF NAJAF

Back at Camp Fallujah, the MEF had not anticipated such hard fighting in Najafprovince. Outside of al-Sadr’s actions, that part of Iraq had been relatively quiet,and the Spanish contingent of the coalition based there had encountered littletrouble with the local Najafis after the fall of the Saddam regime. Yet, in reaction tothe significant threat posed by the antigovernment Mahdi Militia, the 11th MEUwas soon called on by General Metz to conduct full-scale offensive operationsto defeat al-Sadr’s forces in Najaf and restore normal civil authority in the city.Normally, the MEF would have had only a fatherly interest in the MEU’s taskings,as 11th MEU worked directly for General Metz, but with the potential of significantcombat operations, General Conway recommended that the MEU and indeed theentire province of Najaf be “chopped”28 to MEF control.29

Over the following weeks, in the first sustained urban combat since the previousApril operations in Fallujah, MEF and coalition forces under the tactical controlof 11th MEU eventually destroyed or expelled the well-entrenched elements ofthe Mahdi Militia from Najaf and did so without damaging the holy Imam AliShrine and Mosque complex. Perhaps most importantly, the fighting in Najafshowed a new Iraqi military capability for the first time and witnessed severalother improvements that would prove critical to all future operations in Iraq,including those to come in Fallujah.

The 11th MEU had only just begun getting established in the province whenthe confrontation with al-Sadr exploded into large-scale fighting.30 At the time,it included only one battalion of infantry, the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines (knownas BLT 1/4 once the normal compliment of Marine reconnaissance, tanks, and ar-mored vehicle units were integrated with the infantry) commanded by LieutenantColonel John L. Mayer. The MEU commander, Colonel Tony Haslem, soon under-stood that he needed more “boots on the ground” to deal with the ever-worseningsituation in such a large city.

Combat continued through Thursday, August 5 and into August 6, resulting ina company-size attack by Alpha Company, BLT 1/4, in the Najaf cemetery.31 Thecombat in the difficult terrain of the cemetery was intense and unforgiving. Thesite was huge, the Mahdi Militia were fanatical defenders, and the hundreds ofmonuments (many of which were busted and broken) made fighting there hell,foot by dirty, terrible foot. Understanding the importance of the fighting in Najaf,General Metz approved the reinforcement of the MEU by forces from the 1stCavalry Division in Baghdad.

On August 7, Task Force 1-5 Cavalry (TF 1-5) arrived from the Iraqi capital toreinforce the 11th MEU and its single infantry battalion. Meanwhile, the local IraqiNational Guard forces led a second Iraqi operation to raid a Sadr safe house inNajaf. This engagement resulted in four enemy killed and the capture of two othermembers of the Mahdi Militia. Downtown, BLT 1/4 reached its limit of advance,and John Meyer was able to pull Alpha Company out to rest and refit after thehorror of the initial cemetery contest.



Through its immediate and aggressive fighting, the BLT seemed initially to havebroken the back of the most organized resistance by the Militia. The next day,TF 1-5 cleared the remainder of the Najaf cemetery and encountered little to noresistance moving into the central area of the city. On Monday, August 9, the MEFofficially assumed control of 11th MEU and the other coalition forces with thearrival of the MEF forward command element, commanded by the MEF deputycommanding general, Brigadier General Dennis J. Hejlik. Upon his arrival, andfor the duration of operations in and around Najaf, General Hejlik and ColonelHaslem conducted rounds of sustained peace negotiations with representatives ofthe IIG and Mahdi Militia officials while still planning and supervising smaller-scale combat operations. The goal was to minimize the effects of the confrontationon the people of the region. An initial cessation of hostilities was planned for thefollowing Wednesday, August 11.

As further reinforcement, TF 2-7 Cavalry arrived at Forward Operating BaseDuke outside of Najaf on August 10. On August 11, the MNF units were againengaged by AIF in the southwest, northwest, and northeast portions of the city.32

It was clear that the Mahdi Militia would not adhere to any peace. General Hejlikput TF 2-7 into the fight resulting in a three-battalion advance on the Imam AliShrine complex at the heart of the symbolic city beginning at 6:45 in the morning.On Thursday, August 12, after 1 full week of combat, units from BLT 1/4 andmembers of the 405th Iraqi National Guard Battalion conducted another raid nearal-Sadr’s house to destroy known AIF in the area and gather intelligence infor-mation. They attacked and cleared four buildings against a platoon-size enemyarmed with small arms, sniper rifles, and mortars, resulting in 3 enemy killed and18 militia wounded.33 Later analysis of the information found in al-Sadr’s house(numerous documents, computer hard drives, and other material) produced muchvaluable intelligence implicating him and his key leaders in the worst acts of theMilitia.

Also on Thursday, the 11th MEU, in support of the Iraqi 36th CommandoBattalion and the new Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force (ICTF), conducted a di-rect action mission in the Sahlah Mosque in nearby Kufa. Marines from BLT1/4 provided an exterior cordon around the site, while members of the 36thCommando and ICTF established an inner cordon around the mosque and con-ducted the actual assault into the building, killing three and capturing eight MahdiMilitia.

A second cessation of hostilities was directed by General Metz on Friday,August 13 and some reports indicated that al-Sadr had been wounded in thefighting the day before, so most thought the uprising would wind down by theweekend. But that was not to be. Clearly, religion and anticoalition fervor servedas an effective motivator for the Mahdi Militia, and the conflict in Najaf demon-strated true commitment on the part of Allawi’s IIG. On the first meeting dayof the new Iraqi National Assembly, the government ordered the reinforcementof the coalition in Najaf province with a battalion of the new Iraqi InterventionForce (IIF).



On Sunday, August 15, both TF 1-5 and TF 2-7 were engaged numerous times bydirect and indirect militia weapon systems.34 Both U.S. units returned fire, killingor wounding a host of the enemy. Later that day, Governor Ziruffi announced thatthe Provincial Council had voted to oust the Mahdi Militia and had demandedthat al-Sadr’s forces leave Najaf. Sporadic fighting continued with members of theMahdi Militia intentionally using mosques and the Imam Ali Shrine area as safehavens from which to attack coalition forces. In response to the increasing combatand the need for maximizing the effects of firepower in the city, a Restricted FireArea (RFA) was created by the MEF to ensure the protection of the holy sites in thecenter of Najaf. By creating such a fire control measure, aviation and artillery firescould be employed with greater precision, yet enemy fighters could still be freelyengaged elsewhere.

On Tuesday, August 17, Alpha Company of BLT 1/4, back in the fight andattached to TF 2-7, conducted a destruction raid on a suspected enemy weaponscache site in Najaf, while Charlie Company, TF 2-7, conducted a second destructionraid on another suspected enemy stronghold nearby. These raids resulted in thecapture of one militiaman and discovery of another significant weapons cache. Thesame day, at the request of Army Lieutenant Colonel Jim Rainey, the commanderof TF 2-7, Marine fixed-wing aviation assets engaged an enemy mortar positionnear the hotel district within the Old City of Najaf.

The combat intensity increased again on August 18, which saw sustained en-gagements involving every battalion attached to the 11th MEU. TF 1-5 was engagedwith enemy RPGs in the cemetery. Alpha Company, TF 2-7, received heavy ma-chine gun, small arms, and RPG fire from a building just inside the ring road. AfterBravo Company of BLT 1/4 was engaged by mortar fire, aviation assets surgicallydestroyed the mortar system, which been located within the RFA.35 Reinforced byIraqi National Guard, the local Iraqi police established a TCP for all traffic ap-proaching the ring road and finally succeeded in containing the Mahdi Militiameninside the center sector of the city. On Friday, August 20, in response to enemymortar fire directed at TF 1-5 in the cemetery, an AC-130 Specter gunship wasemployed with telling effect to accurately destroy the enemy position. The AC-130soon became the fire support system of choice inside the tightest zones of the city.

The following day, Alpha Company of BLT 1/4 conducted a raid in Kufa to clear aformer Iraqi police station that had been taken over by insurgents. In support of thisraid, Bravo Company attacked by fire into a nearby Mahdi Militia checkpoint. The2nd Platoon of Alpha Company and BLT 1/4’s reconnaissance platoon establisheda screening line to prevent any enemy egress from Kufa to the south. Again, anAC-130 gunship, in coordination with attack helicopters, put extremely effectivefire on the target during the attack. Both objectives were secured with an estimated45 enemy killed and another 30 captured.

Why the Mahdi Militia continued to fight against such continued coalitionsuccess is difficult to determine. They may have been emboldened by the earliersuccess in Fallujah, or they may have benefited from a higher level of organizationalcohesion inspired by their religious fervor. In any case, al-Sadr did not try to limit



the combat and the members of his militia continued to fight day after day, takingserious losses without a major victory. Slowed encircled and then cut off fromoutside support, al-Sadr’s forces had no fighting chance against the combinedefforts of the Marine and Army units and those of the Iraqi military and police.Even worse, the local Najafis, who had never been very supportive of the militia’sactivities, grew increasingly opposed to their actions. Changing popular support isof course the key to success in any insurgency, and after the weekend of August 21and 22, al-Sadr’s hopes in Najaf were pointless without popular support.

Sunday, August 22 saw TF 1-5, reinforced by elements of BLT 1/4, conductinga probing attack on the western portion of a prominent parking garage near theshrine that had been used continuously as a base by the Mahdi insurgents. Theprobing element encountered heavy resistance, centered mainly on the buildingsto the southwest of the parking garage. The trusty AC-130 aircraft, which had beenprosecuting targets of opportunity on the western end of the parking garage andsurrounding buildings, was used to engage a mortar position. After TF 2-7 receivedsniper fire from four buildings to the east of the RFA, aviation assets destroyedthose targets also, killing several more members of the Militia.

Despite rumors of Iraqi peace talks, the fighting continued on Monday, Au-gust 23, with TF 2-7 receiving both RPG and heavy machine-gun fire from thenorthern end of the Old City. The AC-130 Specter was again employed to destroythe enemy fire. Following an RPG and small arms fire attack on TF 1-5 fromwest of the Imam Ali Shrine, artillery fire destroyed a second target close by. Thefollowing day TF 2-7, TF 1-5, and BLT 1/4 all conducted limited-objective attacksin their respective zones inside the city. They were supported by 155-millimeter ar-tillery, AC-130 gunships, AV-8B Harrier aircraft, F-18 fighters, and AH-1W Cobrahelicopters. TF 2-7 came in contact immediately and executed numerous closeair support (CAS) missions. Hellfire missiles and several rockets helped the TFtake buildings in the eastern portion of the Old City of Najaf. TF 1-5 engagedthe enemy with tank main gun, 25-millimeter chain gun, and heavy machine-gunfire. Following those attacks, TF 1-5 moved south into the Old City to conducta reconnaissance by force. TF 1-5 encountered a deliberate obstacle with imbed-ded IEDs and sporadic RPG and small arms fire. Again, an AC-130 aircraft wasbrought in to engage the obstacles, which resulted in a large secondary explosionand the partial reduction of the enemy obstacle. The AC-130 gunship also engageda bus near the garage complex. BLT 1/4 successfully cleared their zone with littlecontact, forcing a Mahdi Militia retreat south and east, where the 36th Commandoconducted preplanned ambush, resulting in numerous enemy casualties.

On August 24, a UH-1N Huey helicopter employed a Bright Star laser designatorin Najaf for the first time in combat. The aircraft designated a building that housed5 to 15 Mahdi Militia and a possible antiaircraft gun. The building and enemywere destroyed by Hellfire missiles, from an AH-1W Cobra helicopter, whichwere employed in conjunction with the Bright Star laser. On August 24, TF 2-7established attack by fire positions around the eastern side of the ring road tosupport the pending BLT 1/4 attack south through the cemetery and into the



northwest corner of the Old City. Two key buildings were seized, followed bysystematic clearing of Mahdi Militia forces throughout the night. In support ofthis attack and the final assault planned for August 26, 2004, several key targets wereengaged by fixed-wing aviation assets. To help shape the conditions for the finalassault on the shrine and mosque, GBU-12s (500-pound bombs) and GBU-31s(2,000-pound bombs) were delivered on key buildings that housed Mahdi Militiawith superb results. During this final decisive assault over 50 enemy fighters werekilled, and the coalition forces suffered 13 wounded in action (WIA).36

Sporadic fighting continued throughout the morning and into the early after-noon of Thursday, August 26, 3 weeks into the fighting. BLT 1/4 again attackedthe Mahdi Militia through the northwest corner of the Old City. Alpha Companyattacked toward the east and tied in with TF 1-5 near the intersection of the ringroad and Route Nova. TF 2-7 attacked from east to west in its sector of the city.By 3 P.M., the Imam Ali Shrine and Mosque were surrounded and final planningcontinued on decisive actions to storm the site.37 However, General Metz, the newcommanding general of MNC-I, released an order directing MEF to cease offensiveoperations in Najaf to allow Iraqi political and religious officials the opportunityto peaceably resolve the removal of Mahdi Militia from the Imam Ali Shrine andMosque complex. On August 27, the Grand Ayatollah Sistani received the keys tothe Imam Ali Shrine and Mosque complex, finally signaling the end of hostilitiesin Najaf.

THE SCHOOLHOUSE OF NAJAF

The combat operations in Najaf were characterized by intense and close com-bat. Infantry fought at close range through a huge cemetery, honeycombed withtunnels, crypts, and other concealed positions. Even so, close air support and maintank direct fire enabled ground units to dislodge Mahdi Militia from improvedfighting positions in the cemetery and buildings around the mosques. During theentire 24 days of combat in Najaf, MEF forces suffered relatively light casualtiesbut killed an estimated 1,500 of the enemy.

The defeat of the enemy in Najaf represented the beginning of the end forthe organized Mahdi Militia insurgency and the marginalization of a dangerousmilitant Shia insurgent movement, a strategic outcome that later helped shapefuture combat operations in Fallujah and encouraged Shia support for a nationalelection to follow later in the year. It was particularly significant that the Iraqisecurity forces played such a prominent role in the action. The combat operationsin Najaf demonstrated conclusively that some Iraqi military units could hold theirown in high-intensity combat alongside their American counterparts. In fact, theycould be entrusted to conduct limited independent operations – to secure mosquesand other sensitive targets. The 36th Commando Battalion and the ICTF provedthemselves in combat.

Integration of U.S. Marine and Army units also proved easy and powerful. Thetwo Army Task Forces integrated very well into the MEU operations and were



highly interoperable with BLT 1/4. MEF command and control, using the forwardcommand post over the full distance from Camp Fallujah, also worked very well.Finally, although the urban combat in Fallujah had proven the effectiveness of theU.S. weapons systems, it was really in the tight quarters of the cemetery and OldCity of Najaf that coalition, combined arms tactics, and techniques really provedtheir viability.

Muqtada al-Sadr had attempted to spark Shia opposition to the newly formedIIG and set fire to Iraq. He did so at a very weak period for the IIG in the war, buthis movement failed to gain decisive support among the people because he choseto employ tactics that only brought more death and destruction to the country.He wanted to become a religious lion in a very holy city and remake the future.But he was firmly and decisively confronted by the coalition, and his methodswere sufficiently exposed by Prime Minister Allawi so that his fellow Shia rejectedthe vision he proposed for the future of Iraq. Al-Sadr never became the “lion” ofNajaf, and his failure helped prepare the government’s path and reinforced Allawi’sconviction for decisive action in Fallujah.

SUMMER HEAT IN FALLUJAH

The situation in and around Fallujah had only grown worse during the summermonths.38 In fact, a major shift in the coalition’s approach to the city occurred whenLieutenant Colonel Suleiman of the 506th Iraqi National Guard was kidnappedand killed by insurgents in downtown Fallujah. Suleiman was one of the twolocal National Guard battalion commanders and was the first truly aggressive Iraqiofficer to make a mark through his efforts to return order to Fallujah. Whenhe confronted Omar Hadid in early August over the abduction of one of hisofficers, Suleiman was kidnapped and tortured to death. It was clear at the timethat Abdullah Janabi and Hadid were collaborating with Zarqawi to establish ajihadist state in Fallujah.39 The murder caused the MNF leadership and a few keymembers of the IIG to determine that no local success was likely by Iraqis in thecity. From that point forward the MNF focus of effort was to restore the peacethrough military means. The concurrent operation in Najaf had demonstrated forthe first time that some Iraqi forces would fight against insurgents, but only if theywere recruited from other areas of Iraq and only if they were closely integratedwith MNF units. This was an important lesson that would play significantly in thesuccess of operations in Fallujah in the fall.



Chapter Four

✯✯✯

Shaping Operations Priorto the Assault

With the clear lessons of operation Vigilant Resolve and the combat in Najafin mind, the MEF realized that the continuing threat from Fallujah might never besolved through negotiations and that plans for a second, more decisive, militaryassault needed to be refined. From the MEF’s operational perspective, two keyimprovements desired in any future operation would be an effort to split the AIFfrom their popular support base and a parallel, reinforcing effort designed to drawthe civilian population out of the city in advance of any fighting to save innocentlives and minimize negative reactions from the international media. Over the fallmonths, splitting out the enemy and protecting the civilian population becamejust as important in preparing for combat as more traditional actions, such asbuilding logistics stockpiles and developing actionable intelligence.

If the population of Fallujah voluntarily left their homes, it would benefit theMNF in three critical ways. First, the incidence of civilian casualties would belowered significantly, and that would in turn reduce the chances that politicalleaders in both the United States and Iraq would be pressured to stop the assaultprior to accomplishing all of the objectives of the operation. Second, the AIFforces would be increasingly less well hidden and less well sheltered by innocentcivilians. Thus, precision targeting could have a greater effect during operationsin the city. Finally, the “shaping actions” (unit feints around the city, probingoperations, loudspeaker activities, and even public statements by key officials) hada tendency to draw out enemy fighters so that they could be positively identifiedand attacked. On many occasions ground forces would make feints along the southand eastern sides of the city to draw out the enemy defensive forces and allow theMEF to identify their key leaders, defensive structures, and command and controlnodes.

Finally, the shaping actions of the MNF would help deceive the enemy as tothe actual point of the attack. The key members of the insurgent leadership could



have no doubt that the attack would come, but the constant probing effort of unitsnight after night during the shaping phase helped convince them that the mainattack would come again from the south and east, as had been the case in operationVigilant Resolve the previous April.

STRATEGIC TIMING

By mid-September, the level of insurgent opposition in Fallujah was so visible andso defiant that something had to be done if the IIG of Prime Minister Allawi wasto have any credibility as a partner in the war on terror and any claim of returningsecurity in Iraq. The irony was that the Fallujah terrorist enclave was so prominentthat it called attention to itself as a symbol of terrorist opposition to the UnitedStates and its coalition partners. Its success spelled its own defeat. If Allawi wasto direct the action against Fallujah, and it appeared he had the guts and politicalpower to do so, then the coalition military leadership needed to give him adviceconcerning the timing and scope of the action required to purge the city of theenemy.

It was clear to most military planners that the operation to free Fallujah had totake place during one of three different periods of time, each driven by different butequally dominant strategic reasons. The U.S. elections in early November, the Iraqielections in late January, and the Ramadan Islamic holy period were unrealistictimes for combat operations to start. Political leaders were just not likely to orderan attack during those sensitive periods of time. This fact made the last week ofSeptember, the second week of November, and the last week of December the onlytimes that an assault of over 2 weeks in duration could be conducted withouthaving a direct and negative effect on one of the elections. With a possibility thatthe attack could be directed as early as the first period in late September, the MEFstepped up its targeting campaign at midmonth to increase the pressure on theinsurgent leadership and begin to shape the tactical fight.

One of the most significant problems facing the MEF planners was a lack ofuseful, recent intelligence concerning insurgent actions in Fallujah. Because theywere not patrolling in the city and could not fly over or insert human intelligenceagents into the city, their understanding of the exact locations and activities ofthe enemy were severely restricted. In fact, members of the MNF had far lessinformation about what was going on inside Fallujah than they had concerningthe actions of the Republican Guard under Saddam in the first phase of the fighting.Over time, the MEF G2, under the leadership of Colonel Ron Makuta, developedsome Iraqi sources of intelligence inside the city, but the most valuable source ofinformation about insurgent actions over the fall turned out to be the insurgent’sresponses to the MEF’s shaping campaign.

One of the most difficult challenges of the battle was the effort to separatethe residents of the city from the insurgents who were living there by night andattacking the multinational forces by day. It is certainly true that many Fallujahns


Shaping Operations Prior to the Assault ✯ ✯ ✯ 41

supported the insurgency, at least passively. The city had always been a hotbed ofunruly conservatism; many of the residents were unhappy with the displacementof Saddam Hussein, and many more were opposed to any presence of foreignersin there city. So there were many who would be inclined to support the insurgencyat least with giving information, shelter, or material to individual insurgents.Certainly, too, several well-known leaders of the insurgency, among them OmarHadid, Abdullah al-Janabi, and Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi, were known to live inand have free run of the city. Their supporters brought money and business tothe city. The leaders of Fallujah appeared to side with the insurgents. They hadfrequently negotiated for the insurgents during the spring and provided otherforms of low-level support for the anti-MNF operations.

Still, many residents of Fallujah were not active in the insurgency and even thosethat did provide passive support frequently did so simply as a means of livelihood.Iraq by the summer of 2004 was a sovereign country, and although some discountits freedom of action, the IIG was making the majority of the key decisions in theday-to-day management of the country. The MNF and the U.S. embassy wantedvery much to keep public support for the IIG strong and to demonstrate the defacto Iraqi control of the nation’s affairs. The law of war clearly requires thesafeguarding of innocent noncombatants from the destruction of war. One of thelessons learned most painfully during the April fighting in the city was the powerof the international lobby and the negative impact of images of civilian injuriesduring modern urban warfare. Finally, the support of the local residents wouldcertainly be crucial for any posthostilities reconstruction effort and the eventualreturn of the region to normalcy. Therefore, there were many practical reasons tospare local residents of the city from the risks of fighting.

Although the rationale for sparing the residents was evident to most seniorcoalition leaders, the actual process of protecting them from lethal firepowerwas much more difficult to develop. The devil was always in the details. No onereally knew how many Iraqis lived in Fallujah; estimates ranged from 240,000 tonearly 400,000. No census records existed and the normal baseline for estimatingpopulation in Iraq (the family food card system resulting from the Oil for Foodprogram) was wildly inaccurate. The Iraqi Ministry of Trade (MOT) had issuedsome 24,000 food cards to families who claimed Fallujah as their home city.Notionally, these cards were designed to allocate food to all the members of anIraqi family living in one “household,” but even very senior ministry representativesused different numbers when they were asked how many people lived in an averagehousehold. In the west most families range in number from 4 to 6 members, butin Iraq the planning figure varied from 10 to 16 members per household. Eventhis large variation did not accurately account for the “residents” of Fallujah whoactually lived in other cities and were driven into the anti-MNF enclave by theinsurgency itself.

Using a midrange planning figure of 300,000 residents, it quickly became obviousthat caring for so many civilians would tax the resources of the whole nation.Although many believed that Iraq would return to being a prosperous nation soon



after the fall of Saddam because the country was rich in oil natural resources,the facts were that in Iraq in 2004 the infrastructure was too old and poorlymaintained to support event the most basic needs of the Iraqi people. Electricservice was intermittent, fuel was in short supply, and even food and medicineswere often lacking in parts of the country. So it would have been a huge burdenon the government if it had to care for the residents of Fallujah for long. Thedramatic increase in the availability of luxury items such as cars and cell phonesonly increased the burden on the archaic systems that provided basic, essentialservices.

The fractious Iraqi cultural and religious climate only added complexity tothe situation. Sunnis were still out of favor and resented by the majority Shiapopulation. Fallujah was a symbol of Sunni influence and the near Taliban-likeapproaches of the religious leadership of the city (under the influence of Janabi)only increased the reluctance of the national government in Baghdad to work withthe Fallujahns. Prime Minister Allawi did maintain a dialog and even negotiateddirectly with key members of the city “leadership,” but even he was frustrated withthe lack of progress toward a reduction in the opposition rhetoric. The “leaders” ofthe city were in reality just frontmen for insurgents who had no desire to produceanything other than death and destruction.

Once the requirement to spare the population became an accepted planningfactor, the MEF had to consider practical ways of shielding the population fromthe effects of battle. The easiest way to do that would be to force the residentsfrom their homes and leave only the insurgents in the city. This concept was legallydubious and impractical. Any effort to force the population from the city wouldnot only result in a very negative international reaction but would also place theonus for sheltering and feeding those “displaced” by MNF direction back on thecoalition. Although widely assumed to have excess capacity for personnel support,in fact, the MNF barely had enough resources to support even 10,000 displacedcivilians, and that support would be provided largely by contracted agencies atexorbitant prices. Thus, it was not feasible for the military to simply direct anevacuation of the city because the MNF did not have the resources to care forthe population that would be forced from its homes. Additionally, any forcedevacuation would undoubtedly give the insurgents a huge target and easy escapefrom the city, not to mention painting the MNF as a brutal occupier.

MINIMIZING DAMAGE

Any modern military action requires the judicious application of combat power,but combat in an urban area demands a great deal of effort if damage to civilians andnonmilitary infrastructure is to be prevented. This is most complex when airpowerand indirect (artillery and mortar) fire are concerned. The fight in Fallujah involvedsome of the most extensive firepower in recent history, so the development of thetargeting process deserves to be explained.



The MEF targeting process was designed to integrate both lethal (kinetic) firesand nonlethal fires. Lethal firepower most normally included aircraft deliveredbombs, artillery1 and rockets, artillery and mortar fire, and less commonly usedtank and machine-gun fires delivered from the immediate outskirts of the city.Nonlethal fires included all those things the military could use to influence theactions of the enemy, but most commonly involved media statement and commu-nications.

The MNF had been firing on targets in Fallujah for months, and even with ashortfall in quality intelligence by September, had built a fair database of bothpotential targets and places that needed to be protected. Unfortunately, the earlierfighting in April had resulted in some very extensive restrictions on the employmentof indirect fires into the city. Partially because operation Vigilant Resolve ended in acease-fire and partially because of the huge degree of international scrutiny Fallujahhad generated, most artillery- and aircraft-delivered fires into the city had to bepersonally approved by the senior U.S. military commander in Iraq – GeneralGeorge Casey. Even then each proposed fire mission had to be gauged againstcriteria for collateral damage. If the damage from a chosen weapons system on agiven target was too high, regardless of the importance of the target, approval wasrequired from the U.S. Secretary of Defense.2 Given current planning technologies,these restrictions would not have been too onerous on static preplanned targets;however, many of the emerging targets revealed in Fallujah occurred on very shortnotice. With no visibility at the street level and little reliable overhead observation,when an enemy weapons system or cell leader was discovered, the permission toattack that target was required very quickly.

The G3 operations section of the MEF staff, lead by Colonel Mike Regner, wasthe center of the MEF targeting coordination and approval process. By September,his staff was highly skilled, as much had been learned during the fighting in Apriland later in Najaf that helped make the fires section of that staff particularlyresponsive. Due to his recent experience in Najaf, with its complex urban firesissues, it made great sense to have Brigadier General Hejlik lead the command’scoordination of fires efforts and chair the nightly 8 P.M. MEF targeting board,where all subordinate commands of the MEF contributed to develop the mosteffective plan for the employment of both kinetic and non-kinetic fires. Late everynight, once all the targeting coordination was done, the MEF commander, GeneralSattler, formally approved the targets scheduled for the next day. Although hewas frequently wakened during the night for required modifications, or to seekhigher command approval of unanticipated or emerging targets, overall this systemworked very well for the entire MEF.

A classic example of this system in action was the berm attacks on suspectedIEDs buried in earthen embankments in Fallujah. Although initially the MEFcommander had to seek higher approval for fires inside Fallujah, over time theMEF demonstrated such expertise with the targeting that greater and greaterfreedom was earned. The earthen berms that were being constructed in the citywere clearly efforts by the insurgents to fortify their positions, and they would have



become great obstacles if, early in the October shaping period, General Sattlerand his targeteers had not chosen to attack the berms as threats. As time passedthe MEF gained valuable intelligence from the secondary explosions that resultedfrom taking the berms out all around the city of Fallujah. After these strikes theinsurgents had many fewer defenses and the attacking battalions knew very well toexpect IEDs inside insurgent defensive networks.

Of course, these strikes, particularly the ones on emerging terrorist targets inthe city, were bound to have negative information value for the enemy, who haddemonstrated a facile ability to use every bit of negative publicity to limit the MEF’sfreedom of action. With each strike, there was always a chance of Iraqi casualties andthe terrorist-supportive staff at the Fallujah General Hospital was always willing topublicize any injuries, no matter how loosely related to the MNF fires.3 In one casean ambulance from the hospital was used to ferry weapons inside the city duringa feint. As the ambulance, when used uniquely to transport weapons, was a lawfultarget, the MEF commander approved a strike on the vehicle. The insurgents latershowed photos of a bullet-ridden ambulance with many wounded Iraqis, when,in actuality, the weapon system used to strike the ambulance was a laser-guidedbomb.

There were instances when innocent Iraqis were injured or killed as a resultof MNF fires in the city. Although all targets and weapons systems were carefullyweighed, warfare is so unpredictable that no process designed to minimize collateraldamage can anticipate everything. On at least one occasion the MEF was able toidentify a known terrorist and some bodyguards staying nightly in a local house.The insurgents were monitored for several days and permission was obtained touse a laser-guided bomb to destroy the house in the early hours of the morningafter the insurgents returned there one night. Although the resulting attack didnot damage any of the homes flanking the dwelling where the insurgents weresheltered, the target planners had no way of knowing that a few other Iraqis werebeing kept in the house by the insurgents.

SHAPING THE BATTLESPACE – THE PLANNING PHASE

Formal planning for an assault on Fallujah began on September 10. The MNC-Istaff at Camp Victory in Baghdad conducted a video teleconference (VTC) withkey MEF and 4th Civil Affairs Group (CAG) planners. The stated objective ofthe VTC was to pass down Fallujah mission analysis products from MNC-I anddiscuss the commander’s planning guidance provided by Lieutenant General TomMetz (III Corps and MNC-I commander and Lieutenant General Sattler’s imme-diate operational boss). That conference was immediately followed by a detailedcollaborative planning session between MNC-I and MEF staff members, includingrepresentatives from the MEF subordinate commands.

By September 13, the critical tasks for both combat and posthostility stabiliza-tion operations had been roughed out. Given the experience of the April attack



in Fallujah, the planners identified requirement for a “branch plan” to addressthe high potential for civilians in the battlespace. Information operations was ac-knowledged as a weak capability and the knotty problem of isolating the insurgentswhile keeping MEF supplies flowing was also identified as a concern.

From the very beginning, the planners put their cultural perspectives and lessonslearned during previous combat operations into effect. Every critical task identifiedhad to pass a four-question test: (1) How do the Iraqis view this action? (2) Is itculturally acceptable? (3) Can the Iraqis sustain this effort? And, finally, (4) does ithelp in a transition to full Iraqi control of their country? With such questions as aguide, all the work that went into developing the military situation in Fallujah wasaimed at an eventual return of the city to an Iraqi municipal government free ofterrorist influence. The MEF leadership had clearly modified its focus of effort toensure all MNF military actions in the area were developed with Iraqi solutions inmind.

In the third week of September, key military planners from around the MEFhad conducted mission analysis for operations in Fallujah and had developeda draft-protected target list to ensure key infrastructure was shielded from bothintentional and unintended fires throughout the duration of the planned operation.The CAG had developed 10 conditions to turn over Fallujah to local control. OnSeptember 25, MNF-I released its order 306, entitled “Integrated Operations Priorto Ramadan.” It stipulated that the MEF, in coordination with the Iraqi SecurityForces, should conduct full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations to counterand neutralize FRE and foreign terrorist networks and eliminate their sanctuaries.That direction clearly made Fallujah an objective and pushed for decisive actionprior to the end of November. General Sattler immediately flew to Baghdad to briefGeneral Metz on phases two and three of the operation, then named Phantom Fury.

For 4 days after that briefing, the MEF staff took the follow-on guidance pro-vided by Generals Metz and Sattler to develop an even more detailed concept forposthostilities in Fallujah. The 4th CAG civil affairs planners had a leading rolein envisioning what the requirements for the interim government and securityconditions needed to be to set conditions for the eventual transition of the cityback to local Iraqi government control.

By the end of September, the MEF and its subordinate commands were clearlyfocused above all else on preparations for the fight for Fallujah. Although manyother smaller operations were being conducted throughout western Iraq, theprimary focus of effort was shaping the major fight around Fallujah and link-ing all other operations to support that goal. Because fighting an insurgency ismuch, much less precise than fighting a conventional campaign, significant ef-fort was expended making sense out of the ever-changing mosaic of insurgentactions in the Al Anbar province and the adjoining areas of southwest Baghdadand Najaf that made up Area of Operations (AO) Atlanta – the MEF’s area ofresponsibility.

Each morning at 7:30, the MEF commander, General Sattler, and his staff wouldmeet in the combat operations center at Camp Fallujah for an overview briefing of



the events of the previous 24 hours and any planned events for the day and in thenear future. This brief not only informed the commander and helped focus the staffon the key issues from among the hundreds of details that had to be coordinatedeveryday but, most importantly, it also provided perspective from which to assessthe effectiveness of the MEF counterinsurgency campaign. Sattler would enter theoperations center and sit with his trusted deputy Brigadier General Hejlik on oneside and his chief of staff Colonel John Coleman on the other. Filling out the firstrow were his intelligence chief, Colonel Makuta, and his director of operations,Colonel Regner. The brief began with quick summaries of the weather and thelatest intelligence, and then rapidly covered the actions and readiness of the majorsubordinate units within AO Atlanta.

Thus, every day the MEF commander would review the actions of the enemy andthose of his own units to analyze patterns and opportunities, risks, and concerns.Activities in and around Fallujah were only a portion of the brief, but as the weekspassed, the city received increasing attention. Of note, General Sattler maintaineda particular focus on four less traditional military efforts that helped frame thecampaign. These were (1) the progress of Iraqi security force development, (2) in-formation operations, (3) media and important visitors to the area of operations,and (4) civil–military operations.

The enemy had been far from passive during the early days of September andmaintained an unrelenting series of attacks on Marine positions throughout themonth. Mortar rounds and rockets fell on Camp Fallujah, Camp Blue Diamond,and other Marine bases on a regular basis. Four Marines had been killed in westernIraq on September 3, and seven others died just north of Fallujah on September 6.4

A solider assigned to the MEF, Army Private First Class Jason L. Sparks, was killedin Fallujah by insurgent fire on September 85 and two other Marines, includingFirst Lieutenant Alexander Wetherbee, died in combat on September 12.6 Twomore Marines died as a result of hostile fire the following day, putting Septemberwell on its way to becoming one of the deadliest months of the war.7 Even majorbases were not immune from enemy attacks; as an example, one of the key groundcommanders in the region, Colonel Larry Nicholson, was severely injured and hiscommunications officer, Lieutenant Colonel Kevin M. Shea, was killed, by a rocketthat penetrated their headquarters on Camp Fallujah on September 14 – the veryday Colonel Nicholson had assumed command of the regiment from Colonel JohnToolan.8 Seventeen more Marines would die as the month wore on.9

General Sattler received a detailed brief on the operational planning from hiskey staff on October 1, during which he made some key decisions concerningcommand and control and the phasing of the operation. Among other issues,he agreed to assign the 4th CAG under the tactical control of the 1st MarineDivision to ensure that the transition from active combat to posthostilities couldbe directly managed by the ground commander, in concert with the “three-blockwar” construct. He also concurred with the employment of the 31st MEU in theoperation. Although some were disappointed that September had passed withoutan order to start the assault on the city, most members of the higher-level staffs



knew well that much more work remained and that any available time was neededbefore any cohesive attack would be completely prepared.

One of the innovations of the Fallujah battle plan was the incorporation ofthe 31st MEU (which was still not in country) as the headquarters in charge ofwestern Al Anbar and the border region, freeing up the 7th Marines headquarters,under Colonel Craig Tucker, and one of his battalions (1st Battalion, 8th Marines)to join in the tactical assault on the city. The infantry battalion assigned to the31st MEU would also be brought to Fallujah for the attack and the aviation andcombat service support elements of the MEU were integrated into the operationsof the Marine Air Wing (MAW) and the Force Service Support Group (FSSG).Although such flexibility was not new, it brilliantly demonstrated the Marine AirGround Task Force flexibility touted by the Marines.

The next day MNC-I released its Warning Order 15 for operation PhantomFury, officially tasking the 31st MEU [which had been the U.S. Central Command(CENTCOM) theater strategic reserve] to support the operation. On October 3,MNF-I released its order outlining the required “Preconditions for Operationsin Fallujah.” Thus, the basic forces were assigned and the stage was set for moredetailed planning in the first days of October.

The focus of the planning effort remained on the crucial transition from combatto posthostilities. MEF, CAG, MAW, FSSG, and Division planners met at CampBlue Diamond to refine the combat tasks and build in requirements addressing thesafeguarding of the civilian population. The planners recognized early the needfor much more coordination with higher headquarters and the IIG, so a series ofcoordination meetings were scheduled to ensure all the supporting efforts neededin Fallujah were synchronized with the assault plan. While this planning effortcontinued at higher levels, everyday combat continued to take its horrible toll.10

On October 7, Colonel John Ballard and Lieutenant Colonels Mike Paulk andKevin Hansen flew to Baghdad to brief the MNC-I and MNF-I civil–militaryoperations staffs concerning the phase four requirements that had been developedby the planning effort at Camp Blue Diamond. Presenting key elements of theirplan in advance to members of the MNC-I (III Corps) and MNF-I staffs permittedthose staffs to accurately synchronize and leverage national resources and to beginan informed dialog at the staff level with certain key members of the embassy andIraqi governments in Baghdad. These efforts in turn permitted the CAG and 1stMarine Division staffs to hone their expectations of civil–military action duringthe Fallujah operation.

With this additional level of detail established, MEF subordinate commandsfurther expanded their plans. The Division refined the sequence of major oper-ations and the key objectives to be secured along with the actions required ofsupporting forces around Fallujah. A key shortfall in military police and securityunits along with major road network outside of Fallujah was referred through theMEF to MNC-I for sourcing. A critical infrastructure review meeting was heldat the CAG headquarters to finalize a protected target list with the input of theother MEF subordinate commands to include the MEF Engineer Group (MEG),



the critically important Navy Seabees, and the Army Construction Engineers. Atthis point, because of sparse intelligence and civil information, the MEF still didnot understand fully how the critical infrastructure inside Fallujah worked. Thiswas important to make critical decisions concerning what could be targeted andwhat might need to be immediately reconstructed as the battle was ongoing. Forexample, the MEF submitted a request for additional information concerning the10 water lift stations in the city because planners did not understand how theyworked together to keep the city free of the waters of the Euphrates River, the levelof which was higher than sections of southern Fallujah.

BATTLE PREPARATIONS

By October 18, the key elements of the plan had been completed and the 1st MarineDivision commander, Major General Natonski, was able to conduct a rock-drillsynchronization meeting of every action to be conducted by each of his subordinatecommanders. After Natonski outlined his intent for the operation, his primarytactical commanders, Colonels Shupp and Tucker, walked through their regimentalsequence of actions and supporting assault objectives. These descriptions of assaultobjectives were followed by Colonel Ballard’s overview of the civil affairs effort andhow it would be integrated to support the assault commander’s objectives. Then theoperations officer of the U.S. Army’s Blackjack Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division,which had recently been tasked with a supporting mission by MNC-I in responseto the MEF’s need for additional security forces around Fallujah, discussed how hisbrigade would assist in sealing off the objective area. This meeting, orchestrated byLieutenant Colonel Joe L’etoile, the very capable Division G3, was the first time allthe tactical commanders had met face to face to pull together the individual partsof the plan.

The result of this synchronization effort was 1st Marine Division fragmentaryorder number 363-04, released on October 21. It specified that at H-hour onD-day, the Division, reinforced by the CAG and the Blackjack Brigade, wouldattack “to destroy insurgent forces in Fallujah in support of the ISF in order toestablish legitimate local control.” The main attack was planned for November 8,and initial operations to set conditions for the main attack were scheduled to begin24 hours prior to that on D-day, November 7.11

MNC-I fragmentary order 891 followed 2 days later, confirming the missionand adding emphasis on the role of the IIG.12 It also included reference to theneed to safeguard the Iraqi people, which became the next major planning issueto be addressed. The next day, October 24, the 4th CAG released its operationsorder, focusing on conducting CMO in support of the 1st Marine Division tominimize civilian interference in military operations, minimize human suffering,restore essential services, and establish the foundation for local Iraqi governance.Over the next few days, key planners met at Camp Fallujah to develop a conceptof operations for handling dislocated civilians (DC) from Fallujah. This effort



resulted in MNC-I accepting responsibility to build and run a displaced civiliancamp near Fallujah, should large numbers of the population need food and shelterduring the battle.13

During the final few days of October, the pace of events picked up even more.The MEF issued its final operations order for operation Phantom Fury stating theobjective of “clearing enemy forces in order to allow legitimate governance, security,and reconstruction of the city.” The 7th Marines headquarters and one infantrybattalion had moved to nearby Camp Baharia, and the Blackjack Brigade hadestablished its units at Camp Fallujah. That same day, the 4th CAG transferred to thetactical control of the 1st Marine Division, which shifted its forward command postto Camp Fallujah. General Natonski had another coordination meeting with hiscommanders inside the old base auditorium, where he was to remain throughoutthe major combat phases of the fight.

With a great deal of furious activity, it was obvious to the enemy that somethingwas imminent in Fallujah. As a consequence, insurgent activity in general andprobes, mortar attacks, and vehicle-borne IED strikes all increased significantlynear the end of the month. During this build-up, in one of the most horrific attacksof the year, a suicide bomber in a luxury car detonated his vehicle inside a convoyof the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, while that battalion was moving into the Fallujahoperations area. The resulting fireball killed eight Marines, wounded many others,and saddened everyone in the coalition camp.14

Camp Fallujah was the scene of a classic wartime event on November 1. TheMEF conducted a final Phantom Fury confirmation brief in the base theater,during which all the MEF subordinate commanders walked through their planwith Generals Sattler and Metz. There were still some notable shortfalls, amongthem a complete lack of Iraqi military staff members to coordinate activities andno Iraqi police to establish law and order inside Fallujah, but the exchange ofinformation was extremely valuable and General Metz left with a true sense ofconfidence in the MEF’s plan.

With the confirmation that the plan was sound and approval delegated tohit targets inside the city, the MEF really began operation Phantom Fury onNovember 2, conducting nightly targeting boards and monitoring unit movementswith a huge critical events log in the MEF combat operations center. One majorissued remained: the integration of Iraqi forces.

IRAQI FORCES FOR THE FIGHT

If the fighting in Fallujah was to meet the critical four tests set by the MEF foroperations, then Iraqi forces had to be fully integrated into the MEF. To assistin that effort, and in response to the shortfalls addressed in the November 1confirmation brief, Iraqi Major General Abdul-Qader and his deputy, BrigadierGeneral Kassim, arrived at Camp Fallujah on November 3. They were sent notonly to form the Iraqi component of the multinational force set for Fallujah, but



also General Abdul-Qader had been empowered by the Prime Minister of Iraq toserve as the military governor of Al Anbar province. This gave him the authorityto establish law and order in the city during combat operations.

Even with the fortuitous arrival of General Abdul-Qader, Iraqi forces still hadto be moved to the Fallujah operations area, supported with basing and essentialsupplies, and fully integrated into the Division structure. This huge effort (whichwas conducted simultaneously with the reception and basing of 10,000 additionalU.S. forces around Fallujah) was monumental in scope and importance, but it wasunderstood from the beginning to be of greatest importance, for the assault onFallujah had to be made by an integrated U.S. and Iraqi force.

General Sattler made the reception and integration of the Iraqi forces one of hishighest priorities. To facilitate their integration, the MEF constructed what cameto be known as the East Fallujah Iraqi Camp (EFIC). From broken buildings withno power and water, the MEF engineers (Army, Navy, and Marine), with the helpof every available “free hand” in the camp, built sufficient basing to accommodateand train all eight of the Iraqi battalions sent to the fight. By the time these Iraqiunits arrived in camp, they had shelter, food, and water and training equipmentfor the fight staged in unit sets and were met by representatives of their “parent”MEF units so that they would be immediate melded into the force. Once in camp,each Iraqi unit was paired with an American counterpart, liaison officers wereexchanged, and integrated training began in earnest.

ISOLATION

Overnight on November 6, most units of the 1st Marine Division and their Iraqicounterpart units shifted out of their home bases and began movement to theassault positions that were chosen around the city. By that time, the BlackjackBrigade had already begun active patrolling of the highways around the city. Thenext day, on November 7, coalition forces began the fight for Fallujah by seizingthe Fallujah General Hospital at the western end of the old bridge – effectivelysealing off the city from insurgent reinforcement in a bold opening move on thesite where Fallujah became infamous 7 months before.

The attack on the hospital was launched because MEF intelligence officers knewthat site was home to one of the insurgents’ most important command and controlnodes, and the hospital itself was key terrain controlling access to the old bridge.By taking the upper peninsula the MNF could control egress from both of the city’swestern bridges. The insurgents believed that the MNF would not attack hospitals,not fully understanding that by using one as a military command facility they hadsacrificed its protected status. Still, rather than attacking the insurgent commandand control node with fires, which would destroy much of the hospital, the MEF haddetermined to accomplish the objective using the Iraqi 36th Commando Battalionand elements of its own Task Force LAR, built around the 3rd Light ArmoredReconnaissance Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Dinauer. To



prevent reduction of its ability to provide essential health care services, an attachedcivil affairs team led by Captain (Doctor) John Williams, MC, USN, delivered aNew Emergency Health Kit – a 30-day package of medical supplies procured fromSweden. This small tactical action received much attention in the press as the firstact of the battle. Eventually, it was seen as a strategic information operations win,protecting an important Fallujahn civic capability.

The same night as the attack on the Fallujah General Hospital, November 7,reconstruction teams from the CAG and MEG moved in immediately behind thelead assault battalions. The CAG coordinated with the Iraqi Ministry of Electricitythrough Lieutenant Colonel Steve “Wildman” Walsh to shut off the power toFallujah. Walsh and a very small team removed critical parts to the main generators,so the power could not be reenergized by the insurgents.

In the immediate hours prior to the start of the assault on Fallujah, the MEFconcentrated its efforts on isolating the city from the insurgency. This isolationwas critical to prevent to escape of the insurgents in the city and to ensure that AIFwould not be able to reinforce their people in the city. Using the Blackjack Brigade,the 1st Marine Division controlled all the roads leading to Fallujah from the southand east, assembled the main attack force of two regiments along the highwaybounding the northern side of Fallujah, and then moved the light armored taskforce, including the Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion, up the peninsula west ofthe city to effectively seal it off. Once the city was surrounded15 the main combatforces of the 1st Marine Division moved into place all along the northern edge ofFallujah. The combined force was set.


GGBK003-CP Ballard-xml March 10, 2006 16:14

Lieutenant General James T. Conway, commander of MEF during Iraqi FreedomI and the first 6 months of Iraqi Freedom II.

Lieutenant General John F. Sattler, commander of MEF dur-ing operation Al Fajr.


General Mattis during negotiations after Vigilant Resolve.

Marines fighting inside a building during Vigilant Resolve.


A company commander in Fallujah during Vigilant Resolve.

Soldiers fighting in the cemetery in Najaf.


Lieutenant General Abdul-Qader (center), with Brigadier General Hejlik (far left),Brigadier General Kassin (left), and Colonel Ballard (far right).


Major General Richard Natonski in the Fallujah CMOC.

Colonel Mike Shupp, commander of RCT-1.


Destruction in the city of Fallujah. The old green bridge across the Euphrates is inthe background.

Marines during the assault into Fallujah.


A Marine walking the old green bridge after it was captured during Al Fajr.

The tank, bulldozer, and attack aircraft were all used as necessary and with greateffect.


Iraqi soldiers of the 36th Commando Battalion erecting an Iraqiflag in Fallujah.


Residents of Fallujah waiting to reenter the city in November.

The Iraqi Minister of Municipalities discussing the rebuilding of Fallujah during avisit to the city in February.


Iraqi women waiting in line in Fallujah for $200 payments from the MEF.

The Monday Fallujah Reconstruction Meeting in the CMOC. At the head ofthe table are Deputy Minister Muhammad Abdullah and Director General BasilMahmoud of the Ministry of Industry.


Residents of Fallujah standing in line to vote on January 30, 2005.

Iraqi election workers being transported to polling sites.


Iraqi soldiers trained and ready in Najaf.


Chapter Five

✯✯✯

Assault Operations

By the evening of November 7, 2004, the 1st Marine Division was arrayedin its attack positions around Fallujah and the city was effectively cut off frominsurgent support from the outside world.1 The Division’s order of battle includedtwo Marine Regiments and the 1st Cavalry Division’s Blackjack Brigade, but eachof those formations were fully joint and combined, with Marine and Army unitscross-attached and Iraqi forces integrated into all the U.S. formations for theduration of the fighting in Fallujah.

On the northwestern side of the city, Colonel Mike Shupp’s 1st Marines (RCT-1)included the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel WillyBuhl); the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel PatrickMalay) and Mechanized Task Force 2-7 Infantry from the U.S. Army (commandedby Lieutenant Colonel Jim Rainey); as well as two battalions of the Iraqi Interven-tion Force (1/1 and 4/1 IIF) and a small battalion of the Iraqi Specialized SpecialForces (SSF). On the northeast side of Fallujah, Colonel Craig Tucker had the 1stBattalion, 8th Marines (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gareth Brandl); the 1stBattalion, 3rd Marines (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Ramos); andthe U.S. Army’s Armored Task Force 2-2 (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel PeteNewall); a battalion of the IIF; and even a battalion of the new IAF, plus anotherbattalion of SSF, all rolled up within Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT-7). Cov-ering the southeast side of the battle space was the 2nd Brigade of the 1st CavalryDivision, the Blackjack Brigade, which for operations in Fallujah included the Ma-rine 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion and the 6th Battalion of the 3rd Brigade of theIAF.

In advance of the fight, the Division staff had divided the city into grids andretitled almost all the crucial streets with first names (such as Elizabeth, Cathy,Dave, and Donna in the north) for ease of understanding. Some of the other



names, such as Michigan (the label for the main highway bisecting the city fromeast to west), had been retained from the period of operation Vigilant Resolve. Asall the key leaders had rehearsed the execution of the plan numerous times, thestreet names and grid locations had become almost a current slang, unintelligibleto anyone other than the warriors of the MEF. The plan called for the assaultforces to infiltrate into their battle positions under cover of darkness late onNovember 6 and wait there all of D-day (November 7) without movement, as ifthe positioning was just another in the series of feints that the Marines had beenconducting since October. Then, the actual attack would begin before first lighton the following day – a time when they knew that insurgents would be unlikelyto respond effectively from their beds and when most of the residents who hadnot left would be safe in their homes. The assault concept was for both Marineregiments to attack from the north on parallel axes of advance slicing through thenorthern half of the city, smashing the insurgents against the Army brigade in thesouth.

OPERATION AL-FAJR COMBINED OPERATIONS

Although the MEF had been calling the operation Phantom Fury for weeks, justbefore it began, the Iraqi Minister of Defense renamed the operation Al Fajr (“newdawn” in Arabic) to highlight the Iraqi nature of the operation. This change show-cased a uniquely important element of the assault on the city: the formation ofa functional command and control mechanism for the Iraqi forces operating inFallujah. It was a working-level, coalition command and control (C2) process thatfacilitated unity of effort at both the tactical and operational levels of war. Themost influential part of this structure provided the MEF some coordinating au-thority over Iraqi units and institutions, while still maintaining Iraqi direction ofthe operation. It was formed when Iraqi Major General Abdul-Qader MohammedJassim was appointed military governor of Al Anbar province by Prime Min-ister Allawi immediately prior to the commencement of combat operations onNovember 5.2

When General Abdul-Qader arrived at Camp Fallujah to assume his duties asthe provincial military governor, he was assumed to have authority over all MNFforces in the province, and, more importantly, everything in the city of Fallujah, toinclude law and order. This was a huge assumption given the fact that he arrivedwithout any written charter from the prime minister3 and with only a few officers toform a staff. Luckily, General Sattler and the members of his MEF staff understoodthe critical importance of Abdul-Qader’s role and he was immediately hosted by(and his meager staff was supported by) the MEF headquarters in an impressiveconference facility rehabilitated literally overnight by Colonel John Coleman anda bunch of his command group Marines. The newly “combined headquarters”arrangement on Camp Fallujah made complete integration of the Iraqi SecurityForces within the MNF structure possible.


Assault Operations ✯ ✯ ✯ 55

By that time, the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I)had been formed to assist in the development and training of all the Iraqi securityforces. It provided two liaison officers to General Abdul-Qader but had no realstaff resources to provide him and neither did his own government. In particular,General Abdul-Qader needed a broad range of administrators and representativesfrom the various national ministries to function effectively as a military governor.For example, he needed immediate support from the Ministry of Interior (MOI)so that he could manage police and local security issues. Because he did not get anyreal support from the MOI for several months, he had to formulate many basicsecurity policies, such as weapons handling, curfew, and vehicle-use rules, withoutIraqi legal advice.

General Abdul-Qader proved to be a brave and cooperative commander whosoon was a strong advocate for the operation with his government; he even be-came a spokesman for the operation’s success with the international media. Heworked closely and well with the MNF chain of command, yet always retained anindependent decision-making role. Because he was not completely dominated bythe MNF4 and had the respect of his subordinate Iraqi brigade commanders, heaccomplished many difficult tasks that would have been impossible for the MNFcommanders to do on their own.5 He also worked well with the MEF staff todevelop a host of important policies to include rules of engagement during thebattle and eventually the civic rules that the Fallujah residents were required tofollow on their return.6

With General Abdul-Qader’s concurrence, before any forces moved on the city,thousands of leaflets were dropped to urge the remaining residents to leave. Otherleaflets would also outline the new rules for the residents of the city to observeover the coming weeks, mostly in a continuing effort to separate insurgents fromresidents and protect the residents from accidental injury. One last appeal was alsomade for any members of the Fallujah police or Iraqi Security Forces still workingin the city to come over to the coalition – where they would be allowed to retaintheir jobs. No one volunteered.

FIRST TO FIGHT

Colonel Shupp’s 1st Marines had the most difficult approach on D-day becausethey could not get direct access to the critical Jolan area of Fallujah without showingtheir hand. But they could and did establish an attack position in the dominatingterrain of the Saklawyiah Apartment complex, several eight-story buildings just200 meters across the train tracks for their initial objective. They did so by actuallygoing door to door, paying the residents who were still in the apartments $200 toleave and “rent” their homes for the period of the battle. But that did not makethe Marines of the regiment safe from enemy fire. The apartment complex waskey terrain because it allowed the Marines to look down into the city; once theytook the apartments the Marines moved up to the rooftops and began engaging



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Initial Assault Operations

into Fallujah,November 2004

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Map 5. Initial Assault Operations into Fallujah, November 2004

insurgents who were trying to move toward their fighting positions. No one wantedthe enemy to see the extent of the MNF attack force.

The view on the apartment rooftop was choice, but it also attracted a lot ofenemy fire. Machine-gun teams were carrying guns and boxes of ammunition upeight flights of stairs in full Kevlar body armor, while Marine snipers engaged theenemy to keep them inside the city proper. The whole time insurgents were alsofiring mortars and rockets at the apartments.7 It was a dangerous move, but everystudy of the attack had indicated the apartments had to be taken and held beforethe assault could begin.

Craig Tucker’s 7th Regiment was able to move almost into the city from thenortheastern road on the night of D-day. The northeastern corner of Fallujah wasoutside of enemy observation and had a far less congested approach, but Tucker’smen were still very exposed through the long first day because their attack positionwas largely open desert with very few buildings. It was separated from the city onlyby a major rail line and the Fallujah city train station. With the forces in position,the commanders and troops had to wait out a very long and nerve-wracking daywithin easy rocket and mortar range of the enemy.

The tactical attack plan called for the two Army mechanized battalions to pen-etrate as quickly and deeply into the city as they could from north to south. TheMarine infantry battalions (having more actual infantrymen per battalion than theArmy mechanized units) and their Iraqi counterparts would follow in immediate



trace of the armor, clearing pockets of resistance and searching for remnants ofinsurgent groups blown wide open by the plunging mailed fist of the Abramstanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. All the feints and the historical precedent ofthe April attack had convinced the enemy that the primary attack would comeat Fallujah from the south. The MNF senior planners were hoping that the tworegiments could push south to the main east–west highway, known forever to themas Route Michigan, within 48 to 72 hours, quickly pushing the insurgents into theless well developed and less inhabited southern half of the city where they couldbe decimated by fire.

Along the way there were a series of tactical objectives that had been chosen be-cause they were either known insurgent command and control nodes or suspectedweapons stockpiling locations. Several of these were located in mosques or othernormally restricted locations, again because the insurgents believed that the MNFwould not attack them in such places. For example, the famous Hydra Mosque,along the main north–south route, nicknamed Ethan, was a well-known insurgentheadquarters. These sensitive objectives were assigned to the Iraqi Security Forces,so that non-Muslims would not have to enter such holy sites.

Although many outside Iraq had a very poor opinion of the Iraqi troops, theirpast experience fighting alongside Iraqis in Najaf had given the Marines a moreopen mind as to their abilities in combat, and their esteem grew as the Marine andArmy leaders worked with them in the immediate days preceding the battle. So byD-day, commanders felt confident in assigning the Iraqis important objectives likethe Hydra Mosque. Colonel Shupp had such confidence in one of his assigned Iraqibattalions that he gave it its own axis of advance up front with his lead battalions.Clearly, the Iraqi forces had not only proven themselves in Najaf but also improvedtheir tactics and unit cohesion at the battalion level by November.

One of the locations assigned to the Iraqi forces was the single operationalobjective that had to be secured immediately before the main assault on the citycould begin: the Fallujah General Hospital. For weeks prior to the attack, theMarines had observed insurgents using the hospital on a peninsula formed bya bend in the Euphrates, across the old green bridge, as a communications andcommand and control node. Because the location had good observation of theentire western side of the city, and restricted access in and out of Fallujah bydominating both bridges leading to the west, it had to be controlled by the MNF inthe very early stages of the attack. But, as a hospital, and a hospital well known forgiving anti-coalition comments to the press, “controlling” it posed a very delicateproblem.8

After much debate (during which time some MEF planners wanted to simplyblow the building up), it was agreed that the Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion wouldbe given the mission of securing the hospital at a time during the night when mostof the staff would be off duty. The Iraqis were accompanied by elements of 3rdLight Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (Task Force Wolfpack) and a U.S. Navymedical team from the CAG composed of Captain John Williams, M.D., and ChiefChester Painter, who were assigned to assess any patients in the hospital needing



care and to drop off a container of medical supplies that would keep the facilityin operation for several weeks. Without firing a shot, the Iraqi Commandos burstthrough the doors of the facility and rounded up nearly 40 military-age malesin the hospital who were neither staff nor patients. In fact, very few of the hos-pital beds were occupied and only one patient was in serious condition.9 Oncethe hospital was secured, the Iraqi soldiers raised the Iraqi flag in the compoundas a symbol of things to come. The 36th Commando and Task Force Wolfpackalso secured the two bridges that connected the peninsula with the city and es-tablished blocking positions on each, completing the isolation of the city prior toD-day.10

Based on input from General Abdul-Qader and the MEF staff, Prime MinisterAllawi had placed the entire country of Iraq in a state of emergency and put around-the-clock curfew in effect in Fallujah, where he also banned the carrying ofweapons and the use of private vehicles. Once the Fallujah General Hospital andits nearby bridges were under coalition control, Colonel Mike Formica’s BlackjackBrigade took positions on the southern and eastern approaches to the city torestrict any insurgents from escaping and to prevent any insurgent reinforcementsfrom entering Fallujah. Units from RCT-1 and RCT-7 completed movement intotheir attack positions just north of the city, with RCT-1 poised against the westernportion of the city and RCT-7 assigned to the east. With MNF leaflets coveringthe city streets, and Iraqi radio and television announcing the national curfew, allcivilian vehicle traffic was stopped and the area turned eerily quiet. The battlespacewas set for commencing the main attack just after nightfall.

Still, after the units had waited the long day in their attack positions, manyuncertainties remained in the leader’s minds. How many civilians were left in thecity? Would the insurgents use civilians as human shields? Would they use gas orbiological agents in the fighting? Would the lead battalions get bogged down inthe densely packed urban blocks of the city? How many insurgents were waitingfor them? The insurgents inside Fallujah certainly knew that the battle they hadanticipated for weeks was primed to start. They had no idea what kind of brawnwas about to hit them.

A-DAY, NOVEMBER 8

Phase III (Decisive Operations) in Fallujah began at 7 P.M. on Sunday, November 7(which was actually A-5 hours, as A-day was November 8), with the lead companiespushing into the northern edges of the city under the cover of darkness. Everyonein the MEF knew that the Army battalions’ mechanized punch was key to thetempo of the main assault. Lieutenant Colonel Dave Bellon said of the attack by7th Marines, “2/7 became our wedge. In short, they worked with 3rd Battalion, 1stMarines. We were limited in the amount of prep fires that we were allowed to fireon the city prior to the invasion. This was a point of some consternation to theforces actually taking the city. Our compensation was to turn to 2/7 and ask them



to slash into the city and create as much turbulence as possible for 3/1 to follow.Because of the political reality, the Marine Corps was also under pressure to ‘get itdone quickly.’ For this reason, 2/7 and 3/1 became the penetration force into thecity.”11

In the northwest, RCT-1 used a similar approach. Bellon recounted, “Immedi-ately following 3/5’s attack on the apartment buildings, 3/1 took the train stationon the north end of the city. While the engineers blew a breach through the traintrestle, the Cavalry soldiers poured through with their tanks and Bradley’s andchewed an opening in the enemy defense. 3/1 followed them through until theyreached a phase line deep into the northern half of the city. The Marine infantryalong with a few tanks then turned to the right and attacked the heart of the enemydefense. The fighting was tough, as the enemy had the area dialed in with mortars.3/5 then attacked into the northwest corner of the city. This fight continued asboth Marine rifle battalions clawed their way into the city on different axis.”12

The attack started a bit more slowly than many had hoped because access intoFallujah had been significantly constrained by insurgent defenses, but very soonafter the lead infantry companies breached the defensive belt the armor took anyvestige of control away from the defending insurgents by plunging down the citystreets and destroying anything that posed a threat. Abrams tanks and Bradleyschewed through every vehicle, wall, berm, and defensive barrier they encountered,streaming south and leaving enemy dead and small fractured enemy units in theirwake. The infantrymen rushed in right behind them to kill every enemy remainingin the fight.

Initial press coverage of the operation was uneven, with early confusion on thepart of the media about the real focus of the fighting understandable, given theneed for operations security. Still, Jackie Spinner of The Washington Post, PatrickMcDonnell of The Los Angeles Times, and several other embedded reporters soonbegan to reveal the battle in great detail. They were purposely allowed full access,and commanders at all levels took care to provide them regular updates oncethe battle unfolded so that the truth about the operation could be told. Spinnerquoted Prime Minister Allawi’s revealing comments authorizing the attack, “I havereached the belief that I have no other choice but to resort to extreme measures toprotect the Iraqi people from these killers and to liberate the residents of Fallujahso they can return to their homes. . . . I gave my full authority to the multinationalforces, Iraqi forces. We are determined to clean Fallujah from the terrorists.”13 Fortheir part, the insurgents in the city let it be known that they too would supportreporters and provide them transportation and housing; they fully intended to telltheir story as well.14

Once started, the MNF penetration went even faster than the Marines hadhoped. Afterward, from studies of the battle and debriefs of those insurgentscaptured, it became clear that the shaping strategy had worked exceptionally wellto manipulate the battle. First, the enemy forces arrayed along the northern sideof the town were almost exclusively less well-trained, local fighters, paid well bythe city leaders only to man barricades and defend the outskirts of the city.15 They



fought, but were no match for the coalition, and they broke and ran quickly inthe first hours of the fight; they were killed or wounded in significant numbersduring the slicing penetrations of the MNF assault battalions, but many continuedto fight in ever smaller and more determined numbers as they were pummeled bythe determined MEF infantry squads.

The majority of the “hard core” foreign fighters were posted in the southernsection of the city, where the earlier Marine feints had made it appear that theattack would originate. The enemy had placed well-trained insurgents in well-prepared interlocking fighting positions there, with huge ammunition stockpilesnearby. Many of the insurgents in the southern part of the city were holding foreignpassports and most were dedicated ideologues. They were prepared to fight to thedeath – and most did just that.16

Even more significantly, the good news was that the coalition forces found the citynearly deserted of civilians. Of the over 200,000 estimated inhabitants of Fallujah,initial assessments revealed fewer than 20,000 people had remained in the city asthe assault began. This near absence of civilians not only made the battlefield mucheasier for the MNF to work in, but it also ensured that meeting the needs of the fewpeople remaining would be much more manageable. It was evident also, early inthe fight, that there were very, very few casualties among the civilian population,who had heeded the MNF call to stay at home and remain out of sight.

On November 9, 2/7 was pushing to the west toward the Euphrates with 3/1clearing through the Jolan district in the northwestern quarter of Fallujah. Embed-ded reporter Kevin Sites caught the somber mood as elements of India Company,3/1, continued the attack against the fleeing enemy down one of the main thor-oughfares of the city, studded with ambush sites in building after building:

The Marines turn the corner onto a main street they’ve tactically dubbed, “Elizabeth.”. . . A squad from India Company passes by an alleyway with a spray painted rocketpropelled grenade launcher – a real RPG round explodes against it. One Marine’sface is burned by the powder and the gas – another has caught shrapnel in the leg, athird has been shot in the finger by the small arms fire that followed. . . . The Marinesturn their M16s on the building to the west where they believe the shooter is hiding.But that is just an appetizer. A gunner in the armored turret of a Humvee fires 40-millimeter grenades non-stop into the building. . . . Staff Sergeant Terry Mcelwain ofBurden Texas is pissed. He grabs the bazooka-like AT-4 rocket launcher from the backof another Humvee. Its fire zips into the now smoking building. Macelwain wantsWeapons Company to fire a TOW missile into it as well, but low hanging electricalwires make it impossible – so he calls up the tanks instead. Two Abrams lumbertowards the target. They stop and fire main guns in unison. The explosion shakes thestreet.17

Even with all their firepower, the insurgent defenders continued to shoot at theMarines with rifles and RPGs. Then other insurgents opened fire from the Marine’sfront, boxing them in. Later, the same platoon would call in the AC-130 gunshipto use its mini-guns against the well-dug-in enemy. Sites continued, “The Marines



know they are being hunted. Boxed from the east and the west in a treacherous killzone by an enemy they can feel – but can’t see.”18 Everywhere in the north half ofFallujah it was the same. A treacherous and unpredictable enemy used the naturaldefenses of the city and hard-bitten zeal to snipe and claw at the coalition forceseven as they were decimated every time they were caught in the open.19

On the east side of the city, Pete Newall’s 2/2 was already poised on RouteMichigan and looking to press into the south of Fallujah. 1/8 had taken the HydraMosque with Iraqi Security Forces and was driving on toward the mayor’s complexin the city center. Even as the assault battalions were still in close combat a few blocksaway, civil affairs teams from the CAG began delivering humanitarian assistancesupplies to the few Iraqi civilians assembling in the vicinity of the SaqlawyiahApartments. No dislocated civilians or resulting humanitarian problems wereimmediately observed inside Fallujah proper, but the MEF had humanitariansupplies staged well forward to assist should they be required. The attack by RCT-7continued into the night, with the assault battalions pressing into the western andsouthern sectors of the northeast quadrant. The Army’s 2/2 mechanized task forceheld up and began to reinforce its battle positions along Michigan – the main routebisecting the city from east to west. In the northwest, where the buildings weremore densely packed, the going was a bit slower but still well ahead of expectations.

By November 10, the Marine Corps’ birthday, 1/8, working for Craig Tucker,had fully occupied the mayor’s complex, a main objective in the heart of town. Thiswas a key event signaling real progress in the fight. Although the enemy was stillraining down fire on the Marines inside the buildings of the complex from higherstructures all around the central square, the area was the political and symbolicheart of the city and it was firmly under Marine control. Occupying the squaredemonstrated that the insurgents no longer dominated the city; it was from thatsquare, too, that the new Fallujah would begin to be rebuilt. Understanding thesignificance of the action, the Iraqi forces in the square again raised the Iraqi flag –a symbol of the new dawn for the city.

Even while the battle to secure the centerpiece of Fallujah continued, the1st Marine Division began to prepare for the eventual return of the city to its people.Major Tim Hansen, the civil affairs team leader assigned to 1/8, remembered,

As I sat using a piece of broken cinder block for a chair, I saw what I thought wasanother rifle squad double timing around the corner toward me. The squads usuallywent out a hole in the wall near me because the wall gave them protective coveruntil the last minute. The protection was needed because the 100 yards of open fieldbetween the wall and the next building had become known as “Snipers Alley,” a placewhere a sniper had a good 10 seconds to get a bead on you if you dashed acrossthe field and 30 seconds or more to pull the trigger if you walked. I looked at thesquad again and my eyes fixed on the flak jackets of the two lead Marines. One hadtwo silver stars! Holy smokes, it was a Marine Corps major general and a bunchof colonels; I then recognized two of them as Major General Natonski and ColonelBallard, the CO of 4th CAG. They were on a leader’s recon mission for a CMOCheadquarters. After a brief cordial greeting, the “fire team” stacked up along the wall



and waited to make the dash across “Snipers Alley.” As the junior Marines present,Lieutenant Shuford and I thought it prudent to offer to provide cover fire to the 0-6fire team. He and I looked at each other, popped up over the wall and searched forpossible enemy snipers as the general and colonels zigged and zagged across the field,which at the end of the run turned into a pile of soft dirt and a muddy swamp. Oncethey were across the field and next to the four story high rise, the sniper fire resumedin the direction of the government complex. It all turned out well as the CMOC waseventually established at the Youth and Sports Center, the fire team’s final destinationthat day.

The following day, Bravo Company of the 445th Civil Affairs Battalion (attachedto 4th CAG) established the CMOC on that site, the former city recreation centerin the mayor’s complex in the center of Fallujah.

SENDING A MESSAGE

On the evening of November 10, Generals Sattler and Abdul-Qader provided thefirst joint press briefing of the operation to the assembled media in Camp Fallujahand the pool of reporters of the global press corps via VTC. General Sattler knewthat the world needed to understand why the attack was taking place and should alsoknow that it was exceeding all expectations. So he began the briefing by confirmingthe mission was “to liberate the city” so that the rule of law and conditions forreconstruction could be established. Although Sattler was his usual ebullient self,it was General Abdul-Qader who made the biggest impression on the listeners.Instead of merely nodding to confirm General Sattler’s statements, he made hisown heartfelt commitment evident, saying, “we wanted the Iraqi armed forces tosay what the Iraqi dream is all about. We wish the people of Iraq to live in peacelike any other nation.”20 He continued as follows:

Our armed forces are just at the beginning of their formation. For that we need thefriend, the multinational friends, to help us in this respective. And we work shoulderto shoulder with our friends to minimize casualties on both sides. . . . With all that weare also giving guidance for the civilians how to be safe, secure during the operation.And our Iraqi armed forces and the friends, we are trying to minimize collateraldamage as minimum as we can. We are using weapons according to the enemysituation.

The press conference was an important part of the information campaign con-ducted by the MEF to ensure the world understood the reasons for the operation,but General Abdul-Qader’s forceful and personal role in the briefing set a newstandard. He had been in the thick of the fighting earlier that day with GeneralSattler and he saw then for the first time that the future of Iraq could start inFallujah. From that day forward, General Abdul-Qader remained a proud andpublic spokesman for the operation, and with every passing day he grew in stature



as a commander of the first Iraqi-directed operation to take the country back fromthe insurgency.21

The first horror stories of the insurgent occupation of Fallujah also began to becirculated during that initial press conference. Marines had discovered one Iraqichained hand and foot to a wall in northern Fallujah earlier that day. They had alsofound several homes that appeared to have been used as human slaughterhouses forinsurgent kidnapping victims.22 It was well understood that Zarqawi had operatedout of Fallujah, and most intelligence officers expected that such sites would bediscovered; however, no one anticipated the extent of the organized killing in thecity. Computer information on multiple murders, passports for illegally enteredforeign nationals, chemicals that could have been used to make dirty bombs,many IED factories, and weapons cache sites too numerous to count filled thecity. Although the gruesome appearance of the killing rooms got most of themedia attention, it was the sophistication and the size of the insurgent war-makingmachine in Fallujah that concerned most of the commanders.

As the days passed, more and more evidence of insurgent terror tactics wasrevealed in the city. Underground prison cells with dead Iraqis were discoveredin one house, and in another, five bodies with bullets in the back of their headswere found. Then, a few days later, Marines discovered the headless corpse of amutilated Caucasian female, with her hands and feet cut off.23 Along with thebooby-trapping of dead bodies, the misuse of “protected” sites and equipment(e.g., mosques, white flags, and ambulances), and the “killing rooms” and otherterrorist material, these discoveries made it very clear that the insurgents had beenvictimizing the local population, as well as using techniques that violated the usualconvention of armed conflict in the city. To confirm the worst suspicions of someplanners, a chemical agent was even found in the city that could have been used asa small weapon of mass effects, killing thousands.

In Baghdad on November 10, it was revealed that the key leaders of the in-surgency, including Zarqawi, probably fled the city prior to the assault. Even so,everyone knew that the fighting would still significantly reduce the power of theinsurgent movement, and with the mounting evidence of their unlawful acts, noone involved doubted the need to finish the operation thoroughly. As a sign ofthe desperation of the enemy, that same day, three of Prime Minister Allawi’s rela-tives were kidnapped and threatened with beheading – the insurgency’s symbolicmethod of death – if the assault on the city was not stopped.24 Unlike the situationin April, Allawi was not deterred; he was determined to go the distance all along;in fact, the kidnapping most likely only cemented his conviction to fight until thecity was cleared of the terrorist enemy.

GOING THE DISTANCE

On Thursday, November 11, Veteran’s Day in the United States, the assault battal-ions stepped off on the next phase of the liberation of the city. Leaving some units



to begin the all-important detailed searching to clear pockets of resistance fromthe north, Lieutenant Colonel Joe L’etoile, the division operations officer, recom-mended to General Natonski that the two assault regiments reconfigure forcesand continue the attack even more aggressively than originally planned. Instead ofsweeping west to the Euphrates, both RCT-1 and RCT-7 were directed to continuethe attack to the south, all the way to the bottom of the city. This continuationof the attack would pin any remaining insurgents against the Blackjack Brigade,which was positioned in the south of the city.

As before, the Army mechanized task forces led the attack south, with 2/2 blastingthrough the industrial area occupied by the Marines of 1/5 back in April and with2/7 attacking in parallel between 2/2 and the river. 1/8 pushed out of the mayor’scomplex to clear behind 2/2, and 3/1 did the same for its sister Army battalion inthe western zone. As the assault units penetrated into the bottom third of the city,they began to find even more sophisticated defensive positions and a much moredetermined enemy.25

The “Queens” area was where the enemy had built up its best forces and fightingpositions in anticipation of the Marine attack, and it was there in the bottomthird of the city, trapped by the Blackjack Brigade further south outside the citylimits, that the most devastation would result from a cornered enemy fighting tothe death. Luckily, because the insurgents had anticipated that attack would comefrom the south, when 2/2 blasted its way down from the north, it encountered therear of most of the insurgent positions and surprised most of the enemy defenders.They had not benefited from a unified command system inside Fallujah, and theinsurgents in the south were largely caught unaware by the attack, without beinginformed of the advancing MNF forces by their fellow fighters in the northern halfof the city.

After 4 days of fighting, Shupp’s RCT-1 was able to turn the security for the Jolanneighborhood over to the Iraqi Security Forces on November 11. Although Jolanhad been the first area attacked and was not as well defended as initial estimateshad concluded, it was still significant that Iraqi forces could take on the securitymission in an area of the city that had traditionally been a center of the insurgentmovement. It was also near the location where the regeneration of the city wouldbegin, so giving the Iraqi Security Forces the first role in that effort was particularlyfitting.

It was also on Thursday that the rumors of a humanitarian disaster began tobe circulated in Baghdad and through the Arab media. With the MNF claimingcontrol of more than two-thirds of Fallujah, and the insurgents also saying theywere still in control of the city, people began to imagine the worst for the residents. Aspokesman for the National Islamic Resistance in Fallujah, Abu Shams al-Fallujy,told Al Jazeera that, “the situation in the town is very critical. The U.S. forcesbegan a retreat under intense resistance fire. They are conducting a ferocious aerialbombing and artillery barrage. They have not accomplished any advance towardsthe edges of the town.”26 According to Al Jazeera, the Red Cross and Iraqi RedCrescent Society were extremely concerned that “tens of thousands who fled were



ill and living in cramped conditions” and implied that because “up to half of thepopulation of 300,000 may have stayed behind” there must be many wounded anddead residents in the city under MNF bombardment.

Al Jazeera had started discussing a humanitarian disaster the night before in anarticle entitled, “Mosques Bombed in Falluja Fighting,” and continued the sameline of reasoning in another article 2 hours later, “Falluja Facing HumanitarianCrisis.”27 With claims from people inside the city that “hundreds of familiesneeded help” and “from a humanitarian point of view, it’s a disaster, there’s noother way to describe it,” Iraqis in general and Sunnis in particular began to putgreat pressure on the Allawi government to stop the fighting as had been donein April. In November, the difference was that Allawi was firm in his control andhis convictions. He had previously negotiated with the leaders of the city and bythis time had lost all respect for them. In addition, he had his own commanderon the ground, and General Abdul-Qader was just as firm in his support of thecontinuing fight.

Still, reasonable assertions of a humanitarian problem in such an urban fightwere legitimate, and the MEF had to continue a full court effort to address claimafter claim over the following weeks that the postulation was being supported andthat no crisis existed. The MNF flew helicopters over all the outlying cities to lookfor displaced residents and stepped up an aggressive plan to provide all manner ofsupplies to the Iraqis who were found in shelters and camps in the southern halfof Al Anbar province.

Most of this humanitarian coordination work was accomplished by the MEF staffand the CAG, so even as the battle raged in the city, things continued apace back atCamp Fallujah. On November 12, the MNF-I medical staff and the CAG surgeon,Commander Lou Tripoli, established an ambulance exchange point aboard thecamp to evacuate any injured Iraqi noncombatants to hospitals in Baghdad andto the MNF military hospital at Abu Ghraib. Also, on November 12, civil affairsteams began to deliver humanitarian assistance (HA) supplies and provide medicalcare to local Iraqi residents at one of the many mosques in Fallujah. Although over400 Iraqis were evacuated for their own safety, only about 20 individuals neededmedical care.

On Friday, the assault regiments in Fallujah pressed the attack to the far cornersof the city.28 The concept was to first break up all large concentrations of enemyforces remaining in the city and then establish local control by searching out anddestroying enemy pockets of resistance seeking refuge in individual buildings andhomes in the various neighborhoods. The Marine and Army commanders hadexpected some decentralized fighting because they understood that the enemy wasa loose coalition of groups from within and outside of Iraq, but they had notexpected the insurgents to shift to a determined resistance movement in Fallujahonce the city was dominated by the MNF forces.

The MEF staff estimated that by that point some 150 insurgents had beendetained, over 300 had surrendered, and over 600 had been killed in the city.General Sattler estimated that the MNF controlled about 80 percent of Fallujah,



but he made it very clear that the process of clearing the city, searching “each andevery house,” would take time and would certainly result in more combat.

The attack forces continued to employ the AC-130 with telling effect, as well asfixed-wing aviation, as they closed on the southern limits of Fallujah. Some threeto four dozen insurgents tried to break out of the city to the south but were pushedback by the Soldiers and Marines assigned to Blackjack. Even in the northern halfof the city, the fighting remained intense. General Natonski noted, “Today ourforces are conducting deliberate clearing operations within the city. . . . In almostevery single mosque in Fallujah, we have found an arms cache. We have foundIED-making factories. . . . We’ve been shot at by snipers in minarets.”29

One of the most significant contributions to the fight in the city was made bya unit that never deployed from Camp Fallujah – the U.S. Navy’s Bravo SurgicalCompany, the “cheaters of death.” Bravo Surgical was one of many medical supportorganizations in the province and was but a way station along the medevac route forseriously wounded personnel requiring extensive hospital treatment; but duringthe most intense combat in Fallujah it was where the vast majority of Soldiers andMarines were treated and returned to the fight! At a higher rate than ever before inhistory, many individuals were able to complete treatment and return to the fightwithin days.

For a Soldier or Marine who was seriously injured, after immediate treatmentby on-scene unit medical personnel, they were normally medevaced back to BravoSurgical, triaged, and then retransported to the main Army Hospital in Baghdad orBalad, Iraq. For some, their wounds would take them on to the Army Hospital inLandstuhl, Germany; for those with the most severe injuries, treatment would takeplace at Brooke Army Medical Center in Texas or at Walter Reed Army MedicalCenter or Bethesda Naval Hospital, both in Washington, D.C.

Still, it was while in the care of the “cheaters of death” that the vast majority ofinjured Soldiers and Marines received their most important treatment. Under mostcircumstances in previous conflicts, many more military personnel would have diedin Fallujah. But with the advances in individual protective equipment (armoredvests, neck and groin pads, helmets, and ballistic glasses) and the capability toget the injured to treatment within the first “golden” hour after the wound wasreceived, the doctors and nurses assigned to Bravo Surgical were able to workwonders and prevent a host of normally catastrophic injuries from taking theMarine or Soldier out of the fight.

CLOSING IN

Unfortunately, the superb relationship that the MNF had cultivated with themedia for the operation in Fallujah turned sour on Saturday, November 13, whenan embedded reporter with 3/1 observed what appeared to be the purposefulshooting of a wounded Iraqi by a Marine corporal in that battalion. As with mostunits in the southern section of the city, 3/1 was pushing insurgents south, while



also clearing important facilities and other known enemy locations within its areaof operations. In this case, the Marine’s unit had been assigned to clear a mosquethat had been searched previously, yet where anti-coalition fighters had been seenreinfiltrating the area.

The corporal entered the building and shot three anti-coalition fighters, oneof whom was recorded on videotape by embedded reporter Kevin Sites. Becauseso many of the enemy fighters in Fallujah had been using ruses and other illicittactics, the shooting by the Marine was later found to be consistent with the rulesof engagement in effect at the time because the enemy fighter appeared to befeigning death with his arm concealed behind his back.30 The incident inflamedmany Iraqis, who already held poor opinions of the MNF in the wake of the AbuGhraib prison incident the previous spring. It also illustrated well the complexityof the combat environment and the stress placed on many individual Marines andSoldiers during irregular warfare, particularly in urban areas.31

Claiming “there is not going to be a stone unturned in the city,” by Sunday,November 14, Colonel Shupp was able to state that the major clearing operationwould only last another 4 or 5 days.32 At the time, there was a band of 50 to 80enemy fighters holding out in the southern area of the city, but no other firefightswith large groups of insurgents were expected, although it was evident that theenemy had built a sophisticated system of tunnels linking many of the buildingsin Fallujah. General Natonski noted, “We are sweeping back and forth, they aretrying to get behind us. . . .”33

It was truly a “three-block war” in the city, where Marines and Soldiers couldbe required to walk police-like security patrols down one block, encounter ahigh-intensity firefight on the second block, and then be asked to provide hu-manitarian assistance to Iraqi residents in the third block they passed through.This had long been a Marine training construct, but was never more pertinent orchallenging than in the rubble- and water-filled streets of Fallujah at the end of thefirst week of fighting.34 It was a crucial validation of the training philosophy thathad been bred into Marines since the tough days of their service in Somalia andHaiti in the early 1990s.

The MEF estimate of the number of enemy killed in the fighting had risen to1,200 by that time, necessitating the construction of a makeshift morgue.35 Oneof the civil affairs teams later determined that a potato factory just east of theentrance to the city was a suitable place to process insurgent corpses. The MEFcommander then reformed his own mortuary affairs detachment within the ForceService Support Group (FSSG) to carry out this function for the enemy. This wasimportant both to gather any available intelligence from the remains of the enemyand to show due concern for the religious practices of a Muslim enemy.

James Hider captured the tone in Fallujah during the weekend saying, “at mid-night Fallujah looked like a scene from Stalingrad, with thick rubble on the roadsand hundreds of severed power cables dangling between shattered buildings. Fogenveloped the smashed city in a silence frequently pierced by explosions and gun-fire. . . . In the winding streets black-clad gunmen poured burning oil on roads



Railroad Line

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011

13 14 15 16 17 1819 20 21

22 23 24 25 2728 29 30 31

33 34 35 36 3839 40 41 42

44 45 4651

52 5354

56

57 5859

6061

64 6566

67

74

70 7172

76 77 78

26

32

37

43

47

4849

50

55

62 63

73

68

75

79

80 81 82 83 84 85 86

12

Not Cleared

Semi Permissive

Cleared

Area Clearing Status in Fallujah,

December 2004

Highway 10

69

Map 6. Area Clearing Status in Fallujah, December 2004

to attract armoured columns into rocket ambushes, unaware that their actionswere being filmed by unmanned American aircraft. . . . Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, theterrorist leader, issued an audiotape yesterday that confidently predicted victoryfor Fallujah’s rebels. But after five days of fighting, U.S. forces are closing in onthe men who have run the city as their own Islamist state for six months.”36 Theinsurgents in the south employed antitank rockets against U.S. tanks and Bradleyfighting vehicles, and the enemy lured Marines and Soldiers into well-constructedambushes inside houses and businesses all over the city, specifically focused topenetrate their protective equipment.

That Saturday, the city began to change. From the nearly continuous soundsof gunfire that had been the norm all week, Fallujah became much quieter andeerily still, except when increasingly isolated individual insurgents made violentcontact with Marines and Soldiers and died. Fallujah smelled of death. Nearlyall the structures in the city were damaged. Dogs and cats began to roam thestreets in packs, feeding on the dead. The Marines and their Iraqi counterpartsbegan to construct firm bases in the city from which to conduct normal securitypatrols. Task Force Rushmore (the CAG commander’s jump command post) con-ducted the first of many visits through Fallujah to begin coordinating the processof restoring essential services. For the first time, the Marine and Army CA teamsused Iraqi soldiers to distribute humanitarian assistance supplies to local residents.



And, on November 15, the Fallujah CMOC site survey was completed and the com-bined CAG/MEF Engineer Group (MEG) reconstruction team began its movementinto the city center to begin the critical reconstruction effort in Fallujah.

Even more symbolic was the reopening on November 15 of the old green bridgeacross the Euphrates by the Marines of 3/5. After a solid week of the most intenseurban combat that the Marine Corps had seen since Hue City in Vietnam over25 years earlier, the reopening of the green bridge completed the action started sosignificantly way back the previous April.37 As Major Todd Des Grosseilliers, thebattalion executive officer, said, “For the Marines, this was a major victory.”38 Thereal issue remained: Could the MEF build on the great tactical victory to achieve astrategic success in Iraq by returning a free and functioning city to its residents?



Chapter Six

✯✯✯

Clearing and Searching

Although fighting would continue sporadically for weeks, and despite the factthat there were still insurgents operating in the city, the MEF began to shift itsfocus at the end of the first week of combat in Fallujah to the resettlement andreconstruction of the city. With directions from the MEF on November 16 torelocate the CMOC from the Fallujah Liaison Team (FLT) site east of the city tothe mayor’s complex in the heart of downtown Fallujah, and the movement of theCAG operations cell downtown on the same day, the transition to a new phase ofoperations began in earnest.

Let there be no mistake, even as the MEF staff and the CAG began the reconstruc-tion process, heavy fighting still occurred on a regular basis and its managementstill occupied most of Colonel Shupp’s time – and would continue to do so formany weeks. News reports indicated that at least 38 Americans and 6 Iraqis haddied to free the city, while the operation had taken the lives of nearly 1,200 in-surgents and captured over 400 more.1 There were some 20,000 buildings to clearin the city and the insurgents still fought in small pockets whenever they couldmarshal sufficient fighters.

On November 15, during one clearing mission in a house in Fallujah con-ducted by 3/1, Sergeant Rafael Peralta threw open a closed door to reveal threeterrorists with AK-47s. He was hit in the head and chest with multiple bul-lets at close range and went down. As the fight continued, a “yellow, foreign-made, oval-shaped grenade” rolled into the room. Sergeant Peralta reached out,grabbed the grenade, and tucked it into his abdomen, where it exploded, takinghis life.2 In giving his own life, Sergeant Peralta saved the lives of the Marinesin his squad. Dangerous, dirty, and terrifying combat continued every day in thecity.



MEF COMMAND AND CONTROL CHANGES

During a December 15 coordination meeting between Brigadier General Hejlik,Rear Admiral Alexander, Colonel Shupp, and Colonel Ballard, the MEF developeda new cooperative arrangement for the reconstruction efforts in Fallujah. TheMEF had never been responsible for reconstruction on a scale like that needed inFallujah, and the normal combat command arrangements did not give the MEFcommander the flexibility that he wanted in the reconstruction effort, so he directedthat General Hejlik would ensure close coordination among Colonel John Ballard,the commander of the CAG, who was the MEF lead for phase four operations inFallujah and the principle coordinator with Iraqi government officials; AdmiralAlexander, the commander of the MEG; and the regimental commander who“owned” the tactical battlefield, Colonel Mike Shupp.

This structure was designed to balance force protection and combat require-ments with the public works and civic action tasks needed to resettle the city underan overall timeline that was acceptable to the Iraqis. Every detail of the activitiesin Fallujah required coordination because the tactical situation remained fluidand the Iraqi government was very slow to respond to requests for support. Thecoordinating group structure also made establishing a priority of effort (for every-thing from supplies that were needed by both the military forces and the Fallujahresidents to funding for major projects that could be accomplished by both govern-ments) relatively easy. In practice, many other agencies, including both the MNC-Iand MNF-I staffs and the various ministries of the IIG, hampered or frustrateddecision making, but at least the key leaders of the MEF could easily pulse togetherand develop a quick response to an emerging problem. This structure did alterthe normal reporting chain within the MEF as it brought the 1st Marine regimentinto a closer direct support relationship with the MEF, but, like the shift of theCAG to the tactical control (TACON) of the Division earlier, these alterationswere well accepted because all the key leaders worked well together. Flexibility andresponsiveness were increased without much added confusion.

SETTING CORNERSTONES FOR RECONSTRUCTION

As valuable as he was as a military commander, General Abdul-Qader did not feelcomfortable making civil decisions. He was not a Fallujahn and had no experi-ence in civil administration. He was particularly reluctant to accept responsibilityfor financial and police functions because he had no experience in these areas ofcivil society. In the initial planning for the operation, the MEF staff had clearlystated the need for a new mayor and a new (local if possible) police force inthe city – at the conclusion of offensive operations. Preparations for such ca-pabilities in Fallujah should have started prior to or during the initial assault.Unfortunately, no mayor or police forces ever materialized and the structures putin place by the MNF to manage the combat operation and reconstruction of the


Clearing and Searching ✯ ✯ ✯ 73

city also had to be used for local administration. These included several criticaltools, prominently among which were the Municipal Support Team (MST) andthe CMOC.

Luckily, the CAG had previously created and trained its MST to assist in theinitial civic reconstruction. The MST included a public administrator, a publicworks engineer, a security officer, a judicial officer, and a very clever veteran ofthe first phase of the war who really understood Iraqi culture, Marine CaptainBrian Reynaldo. Although designed for work in the city, on November 13, themembers of the CAG MST met with General Abdul-Qader to discuss the detailsof the reconstruction effort. The MST then began working as an adjunct to Gen-eral Abdul-Qader’s tiny staff, helping him formulate answers to civil problemsthat occurred during the fighting and to develop policies for the reconstructionperiod. These included the distribution of humanitarian assistance supplies, cur-few regulations, access control, and the use of Iraqi Security Forces to preventlooting.

The CMOC was simply a coordination site for the military to interface with thelocal people and Iraqi and international aid organizations. But the Fallujah CMOChad been the only location where any meaningful dialog had occurred betweenthe Marines and the leadership of the city, and it was also the only place thatIraqis felt comfortable to talk with the MNF about a host of issues, ranging fromdisappearing persons to employment opportunities to medical needs. Shifting thesite downtown sent a clear signal that relations with the city were to be reestablishedin a traditional manner, with the principal municipal functions taking place at thesame site that the Fallujahns had always used to interact with their government.Of course, the city was in extreme distress by November 16, and the team ofMarines that moved downtown that day took on the responsibility of managing allthe major functions of a moderate-size city with every single process and serviceseverely broken.

The director of the Fallujah CMOC, Lieutenant Colonel Dave Dysart, was aveteran civil affairs officer who understood well what was needed in the city. Heand his key leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Scott Ballard and Lieutenant Colonel GaryMontgomery, established initial workspaces and security, powered up telephoneconnectivity, and put the towering presence of Master Sergeant Albert Blankenshipin control of the physical site. The CMOC was fully operational on November 17.Dysart and his team stayed in the city without a break for most of the following4 months.

Colonel Mike Shupp’s 1st Marines regimental headquarters had also been es-tablished in the mayor’s complex, located in the former education building lessthan 200 meters from the CMOC (which had been placed in the former city sportscenter). Therefore, the municipal “managers” had easy (if still very dangerous) ac-cess to the force commander responsible for coordinating the security of the city,and Colonel Shupp ensured that both processes – security and essential servicesrestoration – were as well coordinated as two often diametrically opposed effortscould possibly become.



Although the MEF priority of work was shifting to reconstruction, the 1stMarine Division had to remain primarily concerned about stamping out insurgentfighting in the city. Less than one-third of Fallujah was deemed to be fully clearedof insurgent activity, and even those cleared areas proved to be easily “reinfected”by enemy fighters who moved house to house and through the sewer system atnight to obtain weapons, food, and ammunition from previously emplaced caches.

Amazingly, with all these problems, the real fight in mid-November was forpublic and governmental perceptions about the plight of the Fallujahn peoplebecause the misconceptions concerning a humanitarian crisis simply would notend. Based solely on historical experience in other conflicts and no real under-standing of the situation in the city, many outside Fallujah were convinced that thecity was experiencing a humanitarian crisis of significant proportions. The UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees hosted a meeting in Amman, Jordan,on November 19 with several major relief organization to plan how to help thethousands they believed were in need. The image in many minds was of tens ofthousands of people wandering the streets during active combat operations. Thereality was that the city was nearly vacant. At most, a couple of hundred peoplewere still living in Fallujah, mostly in their own homes, and by midmonth, theMEF had their locations well identified.

But so many concerns about a humanitarian crisis, unfounded or not, spurredofficials in Baghdad to press for numerous updates concerning the plight ofFallujah’s residents. In response, the MEF and MNC-I actually embarked on amajor effort to find the local residents reputedly sheltering in numerous sites allaround the eastern portion of Al Anbar province. This effort included helicopteroverflights and even reconnaissance missions to a host of small towns in southernAl Anbar province.

Partially in response to the questions about internally displaced persons onNovember 16, the CAG had coordinated the delivery of HA supplies from theIraqi government and Red Crescent Society to residents of nearby Saqlawyiahand Habbiniyah. Two days later, MEF representatives attended the first in a seriesof senior meetings in Baghdad designed to address the Fallujah situation. In theIraqi capital, the lack of real coordination among the national ministries becamepainfully evident despite all the answers that had been requested before the combatoperations had stared. General Sattler regularly stressed with General Abdul-Qaderthe necessity to get Iraqi Ministries involved, and the Iraqi general wholeheartedlyagreed, but his requests for support seemed to fall on deaf ears inside the variousIraqi government ministries.

The military structure in Baghdad had been adapted by General Casey to supportthe reconstruction effort as well. Casey had tasked his deputy, British LieutenantGeneral Sir John Kiszely, with chairing the coordination effort. General Kiszely wasa hard-driving force among the Baghdad crowd and never hesitated to call Iraqirepresentatives to task against specific objectives identified by the coordinationgroup. He visited Fallujah on several occasions and became a true advocate for thecity’s restoration. He was often difficult to deal with and did not always support



the MEF’s plans, but he always had the big picture in mind and effectively brokethrough several logjams to get decisions made.

Of interest, the MNSTC-I staff also had a British deputy commander at thetime, Major General Andrew Farquhar, later Major General Mark Mans, whowith Canadian Major General Walter Natynczyk also played an important role insupporting requests for resources in the fighting for Fallujah. Although the majoractions in the city were accomplished with U.S. and Iraqi forces, the multinationalpartners in Iraq did support the effort and reinforced it with their actions in othersections of the country. In particular the Black Watch Regiment was assigned tothe 1st Marine Division during the winter of 2004, and it played an importantrole in closing one of the avenues through which insurgents could have escapedFallujah for Baghdad.

Still, the transition from active combat to reconstruction continued, and onNovember 19, the CAG and the 1st Marine Division conducted a reconstructionplanning meeting to correlate time and resources for the eventual return of citizensto the city. The return of residents was then to be based on a prerequisite ofestablishing a safe and secure environment with minimal basic services restored.As an innovative technique, the Division planners developed a sector map of thecity, color coding the 17 principal resettlement areas. This diagram gave specificityto the process and helped immensely in coordination of effort. At that time, fewmilitary planners expected a significant political push to return residents early tothe city, but such a push soon began to drive the priority of work in Fallujah.

In a groundbreaking event on November 20, the working-level members of theIraqi “Fallujah Reconstruction Committee” from Baghdad agreed to meet at CampFallujah, and on the next day, under the leadership of General Abdul-Qader, thead hoc group met at the camp and agreed to form several standing work groupsto prioritize and coordinate Iraqi government reconstruction activities within thecity. This was a critical first step toward real coordination for the future of Fallujahand Al Anbar province overall.

Improvements in the city infrastructure also began on November 20, whenseveral electricity crews from the Ministry of Electricity finally entered the cityand began working to repair the maze of tangled and fractured electrical wiringin Fallujah. The electrical network in Fallujah had suffered from years of abusebefore the fighting and was a jury-rigged combination of several older and a fewmore modern electrical arrangements. Electricity was a key element of life in thecity, as it would be in any other modern urban area, but the damage the networkhad received during combat broke the back of an already insufficient system. Itwas readily apparent that the electrical services would require rapid and extensiveimprovement to return full functionality to the city.

Also on that day the MEF began to conduct regular contractor coordinationmanagement meetings. Civilian contractors were linked up with security escortsat vehicle checkpoints on the outskirts of the city and brought into Fallujah towork. This process sounded simple but proved very difficult to execute in practice.Contractors often failed to link up with security at the coordinated time or place.



Eventually, the still well-known FLT site proved functional as a contractor stagingand link-up area, but even this required a team of on-site managers and coordi-nators to work through a host of daily issues, such as security, fuel, movementcontrol, and storage of material.

The previous day one of the infantry companies in the city has discovereda terrorist command center and VBIED workshop believed to have been usedby Zarqawi. The command center included computers, letters from the terroristleader, and a large sign titled, “Al Qaeda Organization.”3 Eleven Marines, oneAmerican, and one Iraqi soldier had been killed in continued fighting in Fallujahsince November 15.4 It was still a very dangerous place.

In a critically important step toward the city’s recovery, the IIG sent some moresenior ministry representatives to Camp Fallujah to attend the very first Fallujahreconstruction meeting on November 21 with General Abdul-Qader. Initially, theIraqi attendees were extremely reluctant to even visit Camp Fallujah, preferringinstead to meet in the cement plant operated by the MOI located a few kilometersnortheast of city. (The Iraqis were reluctant to enter Camp Fallujah because theyfeared for their lives if the insurgents identified them as working with the MNF.)But, over time, it became evident that the meetings could only function as desiredif they occurred inside Camp Fallujah and a regular series of meetings was designedfor each Monday.

To support these meetings and entice the Baghdad representatives to workfrom Camp Fallujah, the MEF created additional sleeping quarters outside theconference building used by General Abdul-Qader for his command center. TheIraqi ministry representatives were flown by military helicopter from Baghdad tothe meeting site on the camp to ensure their safety. The first group of Iraqis toarrive at Camp Fallujah for the meeting were a scared and ragged bunch who hadnot been told by their ministry officials that they would be staying overnight in thecamp. No one knew for certain who the key members of the Iraqi contingent wereor how much authority they had been given by their individual ministers. In fact,the MEF staff had to trust that all the men who arrived were indeed opponents ofthe insurgency.5

General Sattler began the first meeting with an appeal for unity of effort anddedication to the task of restoring Fallujah to its residents. Colonel Ballard provideda briefing on the MEF’s posthostilities planning and proposed some initial prioritiesof work. Then General Abdul-Qader spoke for the first time before his fellow Iraqicivil leaders to push for an aggressive and diligent approach to restoring security andservices such as electricity and water. As with many initial interagency meetings,the November 21 get-together lacked any form of decision-making process andno one knew who the real influential personalities were. Still, the first meeting diddevelop a high level of concurrence on the need to prioritize MNF-I efforts andthankfully set a good precedent for dialog and cooperation.

The MEF was not the only organization working to assist the Fallujahns. Thehost of NGOs that many expected to arrive with humanitarian supplies nevermaterialized, but the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS) did establish an office in



Fallujah on November 24. Although the IRCS was soon proven to harbor insurgentsupporters, the establishment of its office in the city did help allay some concernsof a widespread humanitarian disaster and opened a useful “window” into the cityfor nonmilitary members of the Iraqi government to gain an appreciation of whatwas really happening there.

The MEF and 1st Marine Division planners had by that time developed aninnovative plan to manage the flow of returning citizens. They understood thatthe proper management of the flow of people and the information they neededto return to their homes safely would be keys to success. So the Marine plannershad identified information required to inform the residents of conditions insideFallujah, printed pamphlets for distribution all over the province, and developeda scheme of entry control points, an identification badge policy, and even newcitywide rules of conduct required for a municipality that still had no police ortraffic officers. Security inside the city was still the driving factor, and the Marinesdid not want thousands of people to reenter the city all at once because shops andbusinesses were still filled with goods that presented the temptation for looting, asdid the household items that were remaining after the owners left the city. Almostevery door in the city was open as a result of the clearing operations that wererequired to ensure the insurgents had been evicted from Fallujah.

Additional evidence of the dangers of entering the city before it could be madesecure was illustrated by the discovery of a massive weapons cache, the largest upto that point in the city, inside the Saad Bin Abi Waqas mosque. This mosquewas the location where Janabi had been known to preach. It contained artilleryshells, heavy machine guns, antitank mines, and even some surface-to-air missilecomponents. On the same day in the southwestern part of the city, a suspectedchemical laboratory was also discovered by forces searching for buried weapons.That lab contained some vials of cyanide and manuals for producing anthrax.6

There was no doubt remaining that the city had hosted all of the worst elementsof the insurgency.

Debris removal contracts were let starting on November 26, although gettingcontractors into the city still proved to be a painfully slow and difficult process.Unexpectedly, a host of coordination issues concerning security requirements ofthe MNF, residual insurgent intimidation efforts, and fear of the unknown keptcontractors and laborers away from many very lucrative opportunities. By the endof the month, standing water in the city posed a real threat, so water removal con-tracts were let to assist the MEG engineers with the monumental effort to dry up thenumerous areas of the city that were under water. Water tank installation contractswere also let as the MEG determined that what remained of the water treatmentsystem was insufficient for the needs of the city. Food and construction materialcontracts were also formed to build stockpiles in advance of the return of residents.

The military labor provided by the MEG finally began to reduce flooding inFallujah on November 27; 3 weeks after major combat began in the city. The NavySeabees started generators and operated three lift stations, producing the firstnoticeable drop in flood water levels in the city. Pumps had to be operated daily



I d aH

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Hadra Mosque !

JolanArea

Mayor sComplex

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NewBridge

Old Green

Bridge

Railroad Line

QueensArea

Highway 10

3 Jan 05 2 Jan 05

1 Jan 05

28 Dec 04

21 Dec 04

26 Dec 04

20 Dec 04 19 Dec 04

18 Dec 04

17 Dec 04

15 Dec 04

30 Dec 04 29 Dec 04

24 Dec 04

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22 Dec 04

31Dec04

The Initial Resettlement

Plan forFallujah

45

6 16 17 18

121110

1413

15

2

9

8

7

ECP-1

DistrictECP-1: Military traffic onlyECP-4: Not an entry point, for pedestrian traffic to and from hospitalECP-3: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10ECP-5: 7, 8, 9, 13, 15ECP-2: 11, 12, 14, 17, 18

ECP-5

ECP-3

27 Dec 04

ECP-4

3

ECP-2

1

Map 7. The Initial Resettlement Plan for Fallujah

to keep ahead of the water table; even so, the dewatering effort would remainan ongoing challenge for many more weeks. Many feared at the time that hadthe Navy Seabees not been able to rid the city of standing water, Fallujah and itsresidents might have been prone to an insect-borne disease outbreak. Later, onDecember 1, a U.S. Navy Forward Deployable Environmental/Preventive MedicineUnit (FDPMU) arrived in Fallujah to conduct a survey addressing the potentialpublic health threats in the city. Although its members did not detect any significantinsect-borne disease vectors, they did recommend ridding the city of the largenumber of feral dogs and cats that were living amid the rubble.

That same day, Ambassador John Negroponte and Ambassador Bill Taylor, thehead of the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), both visited Fallujahalong with the Iraqi Minister of Industry and Minerals, Hajim Al-Hasani, who hadbeen assigned by Prime Minister Allawi as the chief Iraqi coordinator for the city’sreconstruction. Ambassador Negroponte felt strongly that the Iraqis needed tosupport the reconstruction effort in Fallujah more strongly, so he toured the citywith Minister Hasani to understand the extent of the destruction and to impelHasani to greater activity. Both men spoke to reporters in the Fallujah CMOC anddiscussed reconstruction plans with the CMOC team.

During the second weekly Iraqi reconstruction meeting held on Camp Fallujahon November 28, the Iraqis chose December 15 as the resettlement date for Fallujahresidents. In part, this was a signal of their urgency and although the date would



slip slowly to the third week of December, it was still an important target for all thekey players to focus their efforts. Even more importantly, during the same meeting,Engineer Basil Mahmoud of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals was appointedas the Iraqi civil manager of the reconstruction effort for Fallujah. General Abdul-Qader quickly began to defer all civil decisions to Basil and focus his efforts solelyon security issues once the civil coordinator had been acknowledged by the otherministry representatives.

Ambassador Negroponte’s push for greater Iraqi energy bore real fruit onNovember 30, when Prime Minister Allawi arrived in the city and visited theCMOC. Allawi traveled with just a few subordinates, including Minister Hasaniand Allawi’s close advisor Adel Hillawi, but made a quick and decisive study ofthe situation. He spoke in very specific terms in the CMOC with Basil Mahmoudand the Iraqi officials working downtown in Fallujah to press for a town counciland fuller involvement by the residents of the city in the reconstruction process.Prime Minister Allawi lent his full support to the reconstruction effort, and hisvisit stimulated a stronger effort on the part of his government and resulted innewfound sincere interest on the part of several ministries that had not been suf-ficiently engaged prior to his visit. The one outlier among the ministries in activecoordination remained the MOI, which had still made no effort to develop a newpolice force for the city.

It is important to remember that in November the IIG was still a governmentin development and that even in a mature, functioning democracy coordinatinga national effort for something as extensive and complex as the reconstruction ofFallujah was a monumental task. Similar to American efforts to coordinate thenational response following a natural disaster, the various parts of Allawi’s govern-ment were loathe to expend resources outside their specific areas of responsibilityand no “contingency” funds were available in Iraq for such an expensive propo-sition. Therefore, particularly in the early weeks, reconstruction coordination forthe effort in Fallujah required a great deal of personal commitment from leadersat all levels and, indeed, forceful persuasion by the prime minister and his staffdirector, Adel Hillawi.

CHANGES IN MEF FORCES

Colonel Craig Tucker’s RCT-7 had only been shifted to the Fallujah operations areafor the assault portion of operation Al Fajr. He and his battalions were needed backin the northwestern part of the province to relive the 31st MEU and tighten controlson the border entry points into Iraq. Tucker’s battalions had begun turning overtheir sections of Fallujah to their sister units in Mike Shupp’s RCT-1 soon afterthe first week of combat operations.7 By the first week of December, RCT-7 hadturned over all of its responsibilities in the city and RCT-1 provided the commandand control of all forces assigned for security operations in the city – both UnitedStates and Iraqi.



Under normal circumstances such a rapid turnover and reduction in forcesin the city would have produced a gap into which the enemy could attack theMNF. But the interoperability among the MEF forces (from commands all overthe Marine Corps) was so well honed that no noticeable reduction in coverage wasevident. Added to this efficient turnover, the Iraqis provided a newly organizedPublic Order Brigade to replace the Marines and soldiers of RCT-7.

The Public Order Brigade, commanded by Major General Mehdi, was so newthat the individual units did not even have basic items of equipment such as coldweather boots and gloves (it was December and even Iraq gets quite cold in theevenings). They did have new weapons but did not have the level of trainingnecessary to carry out even small unit maneuvers unassisted by U.S. forces. Thismeant that the MEF was required to provide both basic equipment and small unittraining to the Public Order units prior to employing the Brigade inside Fallujah.

Most of the equipment was issued and the training accomplished in the EastFallujah Iraqi Camp (EFIC), a training site built from nothing east of the mainMEF camp specifically to support the Iraqi forces in the operation. In the camp,each Marine unit in Fallujah was linked to an Iraqi unit of similar size, with whichit would be paired in the city. Both units lived and trained together and workedas a team inside Fallujah. This innovative mentorship technique significantly ac-celerated the improvement in the readiness of the Public Order Brigade and gaveColonel Shupp the additional forces he needed to replace the departing RCT-7battalions.

Colonel Shupp and General Mehdi also had to work hand in hand. Although theybegan the relationship as skeptical partners, over time, they both began to valuethe other’s contributions. In particular, General Mehdi soon saw how dedicatedColonel Shupp was to the Iraqi people and their welfare and he then began to stepup his own role as the senior Iraqi security officer in the city. As with GeneralsAbdul-Qader and Sattler, the mentorship program succeeded again through thepersonal dedication and professionalism of the people involved.

SLOW START TO IRAQI RECONSTRUCTION

Even in early December 2004, military labor still shouldered the full burden ofreconstruction and cleanup in Fallujah. The municipal workers of the city wereslowly coming back to work, but the civilian contractors that were the only sourceof the manual labor required were still not showing up to assist. Intimidation,fear, and access coordination were all to blame. Water removal and rubble clearingremained the top two priorities – both preconditions to the return of the residents.(Rubble clearing was not just a beautification issue; the Marines feared many IEDsand items of unexploded ordnance lay beneath the mounds of rubble.)8

On December 3, 3 weeks after the initial bids were announced, the first threecontractors arrived in Fallujah to begin water and rubble removal. Of greaterimport on December 5, the Seabees were finally able to turn over 3 of the 10 water



lift stations to returned municipal employees.9 The water contractor also beganinstalling large gray water cisterns in the city to compensate for the damaged pipesand provided washing water to residents after their return.

During the December 9 Fallujah reconstruction meeting in Baghdad, the U.S.representatives stressed the risk involved with an earlier-than-acceptable returndate for the population. It was clear to those who were working in the city everyday that a rapid increase in the city population would easily overwhelm fragile civilsupport structures then in place. Given the possibility of an early reopening of thecity, on December 9, the CAG staff prepared a plan to backstop Iraqi reconstructionefforts for an early return date. This plan identified MNF resources required andalso illustrated the cost of an early reopening without essential Iraqi support toassist in informing the Iraqi decision makers.

The same day, in a press conference, General Sattler outlined the generic planfor returning residents to Fallujah. The plan was based on the Division’s desireto limit access only to heads of households, at least initially, and to control theresettlement by opening only certain districts of the city on a gradual basis. The planalso included using a limited number of entry control points and iris scanning toproduce identification cards for certain residents (mostly military-age males) andno privately owned vehicles. General Sattler indicated that 90 percent of the city’sbuildings had been cleared, but some unexploded ordnance might still remain soreturning residents needed to be very cautious. The information needed to get outto the residents of Fallujah so that they could understand what to expect and howlong it might take to get the city resettled. The MEF depended on the IIG to getthe information out to the Iraqi population, but General Sattler also wanted toensure that the media was well informed about the plan and the need to manageexpectations – it would not be a headlong dash to return.10

By December 11, the first four entry control points and associated humanitarianassistance sites had been constructed by the Marine battalions in the city and theSeabees. The Marines needed to have the sites in advance of the actual return –still expected for December 15 – so that they could train and rehearse a variety ofscenarios prior to the arrival of the first waves of returning residents. The entrycontrol points were designed to shield residents from an attack while they werebeing checked through security, in case of the number one threat – the vehicle-borne IED (VBIED).

The Director of the United States Agency for International Development(USAID) and Ambassador Taylor, the American director of the Iraqi Recon-struction Management Organization (IRMO) both visited Camp Fallujah on De-cember 12 to get an update on the reconstruction efforts in Fallujah. GeneralSattler sat in on the meeting to signal the importance of the construction effort,while Colonel Ballard briefed the Fallujah resettlement plan to USAID DirectorNatsios, Ambassador Taylor of IRMO, and a host of Iraqi ministry representatives.USAID had provided funding for two large electrical generators in Fallujah andhad promised much more support but was not at the time very forthcoming withpersonnel and materials.



As a painful reminder of the severity of the fighting that still occurred in Fallujah,five Marines lost their lives in a single day as a result of combat that broke outon December 12. Every day, Marines and their Iraqi counterparts continued torisk their lives patrolling the streets of the city. Although the enemy had by mid-December been decisively defeated, there was evidence that some insurgents werereturning to the city to continue the fighting. Slowly the Iraqi security forces weretaking on the role of the municipal police, but the process was a difficult one. Itwas only the establishment of such local “beat cop” security that could effectivelyensure the safety of the people inside Fallujah, allowing the Marines to focussingularly on the insurgent threat.

During the Fallujah reconstruction meeting held on December 13, each Iraqiministry representative was asked to brief their plan for the support of returningFallujah residents. Unfortunately, the members from the important Trade and Oilministries did not have executable plans to support the returning populace. Becausethe Trade Ministry was responsible for providing the monthly Iraqi food allocationand the Ministry of Oil was to distribute fuel oils, their planning and resourceshortcomings could have posed a real threat to an otherwise successful returneffort. In such cases, only the MNF remained to compensate for any shortfalls,but even the MNF did not have the food or fuel to support 100,000 residentssimultaneously with ongoing operations in Iraq.

During the 2-day period from December 13 to 14, significant combat actionin the city of Fallujah slowed reconstruction efforts and closed the main supplyroutes to contractor traffic. It was the last gasp of the main body of the insurgentsthat had started in the city a month before and the pooled resources of those whohad reinfiltrated, but it was a futile attempt to lessen the MNF control in Fallujah.By mid-December, the local residents were strongly behind the MNF’s efforts andthey were reporting on violations of the rules and on any weapons caches theyfound. There was no longer any real indigenous support for the insurgency in thecity.

Also, on December 14, the MEF released its operations order 001-04, entitled“Phase IV, Operation AL FAJR.” That order delineated the functional responsi-bilities among the MEF major subordinate commanders during the next phase ofthe operation and designated the 4th CAG as the main effort. The Deputy Com-manding General, Brigadier General Hejlik, was designed as the MEF’s ExecutiveAgent to oversee the security, stability, reconstruction, and resettlement effortsin Fallujah. The 1st Marine Division was tasked to provide security within thecity, as well as manning entry control points and using the Biometric AutomatedToolset System (BATS) to identify every military-age male who returned to thecity. Both the FSSG and the MEG were directed to provide engineering support tothe reconstruction effort, and the FSSG was required to oversee the functioning ofthe HA sites.

Even with all the military planned completed, on December 15, the Fallujahresettlement date was eventually postponed on the very day planned for thereentry of its residents. The security situation and lack of ministry preparations



forced the IIG to postpone the date. This gave the MEF additional breathingroom to fully prepare and rehearse the entry control process it was so feverishlydeveloping.

Overall, the city was improving, if very slowly. By December 16, water and rubbleremoval efforts continued to make good progress. A significant decrease in floodwater levels was noticeable for the first time as a result of the MEG’s removal effortsthroughout city. Based on the original return date, on December 17, bus routeswere established in the city to move Fallujahns about without permitting privatelyowned vehicles free access within the city. And, the following day (December 18),electrical restoration efforts brought the Fallujah General Hospital back on citypower and local Iraqi municipal leaders begin meeting with one another at theCMOC without prompting to do so from the CAG.

That same day, the 1st Marine Division released its FRAGO 453-04 (Operation AlFajr Phase IV) to give guidance to its major subordinate commanders for the returnof residents to Fallujah. That order formally set the parameters for Phase IV ofoperation Phantom Fury (now called Al Fajr) to begin from the MNF perspective.Unfortunately, it was the Iraqi ministries that still had much to do to make thereturn successful.

By December 20, a noticeable change in Iraqi support in Fallujah was illus-trated by the Ministry of Oil’s effort to restock the fuel station outside the cityof Fallujah and the Ministry of Minerals efforts to stockpile food and householdnecessities in the cement plant. The next day, IRAQNA cellular phone servicewas restored after IRAQNA workers were brought into the city to make neces-sary repairs. Late in the day, the IIG announced from Baghdad that December 23would be the resettlement date – the date for the residents to return. The next day,contractors were finally given unescorted access to work in the city to make finalrepairs.

During the period of major combat operations in Fallujah, the Marines dis-covered a vast amount about the enemy they were fighting. They also found over450 weapons cache sites, 24 IED factories, 13 command and control (headquar-ters) locations, 2 VBIED construction sites, and numerous execution sites. The 1stMarine Division also located 4 known hostage locations. Along the way, Marinesand Soldiers identified numerous violations of the law of armed conflict, includinginstances where an IED was placed in a human corpse, insurgents faked surrenderwith a white flag, and multiple occasions when the enemy used schools, hospitals,and ambulances to stage attacks.11

Given the news about December 23, the MEF issued a modification to itsprevious operations order 001-04 (Fallujah Resettlement). The modification set thenew date and specified that MEF forces would support the IIG in the resettlement ofthe city of Fallujah and the reestablishment of governmental control and essentialservices. It also required the MEF subordinate commanders to provide emergencysupplies and services as required and provide security in coordination with theIIG to hasten the city’s return to local control. From the military perspective allthe controls were in place to begin resettlement.



THE RETURN TO FALLUJAH

On December 23, the real objective of the operations began to be realized whennearly 1,000 residents returned to a Fallujah free of organized insurgent influence.They lined up in cars, from the entrances to the city to the visual horizon, notknowing what they would find once inside but anxious to restart their lives. Onceinside the shattered city they traveled by their own cars (the requested prohibitionon private automobiles was disapproved as too harsh) toward the Andalus sectionof the city very near the old green bridge. From that small part of the city, Fallujahwould slowly be reborn over the coming weeks and months.

A few days later, Osama bin Laden had a speech published on the Internet thatpaid homage to the fighters in Fallujah who were “standing firm and refusing tosubmit” in the face of the MNF attack.12 He certainly knew the truth. Overall, thespeech was a clear acknowledgment that the battle had been lost, yet bin Ladenstill praised the insurgent fighters who fought bravely “bareheaded and with chestsuncovered” against the Americans.13 As in many other elements of the Al Qaedamedia campaign, bin Laden attempted to turn the tactical defeat into a rallyingcry for more support for his overall campaign of jihad.

He used the speech to declare Zarqawi the Emir of Al Qaeda in Iraq and Baghdadthe capital of the Islamic Caliphate he desired. In another section of the speech,he also demonstrated that Prime Minister Allawi, along with President Karzai ofAfghanistan, were apostate supporters of the infidel. The leader of Al Qaeda usedthe fight for Fallujah to urge even greater steadfastness against the besieging andbombarding American invader. Even as the defeat of the insurgents in the city wassealed by the peaceful return of the city’s residents, the strategic importance ofFallujah was not lost on bin Laden.


Chapter Seven

✯✯✯

Civil–Military Operations:The Bridge to a New Fallujah

Once the decision was made to reopen the city to all its residents, the fo-cus of effort by military forces in Fallujah had to change as well. The transi-tion from combat operations against the enemy to a focus on the restorationof essential services and humanitarian assistance in Fallujah was envisioned tobe spatial, not time based. In other words, although fighting was continuing insome areas of the city, where possible, MNF and Iraqi forces would be rebuildingpump houses and electrical substations in an area not far away, and, in otherlocations within the city, military forces would also be providing humanitarianrelief supplies to the remaining Fallujah residents. Under this construct, con-flict in the city would be terminated and livability would be restored sector bysector.

In practice, this conditions-based conflict termination and resettlement processworked rather well on the ground, but it did suffer from some significant challenges.First, the agreed-on prerequisites for restoring normalcy to the city were nevercompletely met. The IIG did appoint a military governor, but General Abdul-Qader’s authority in the city was never made clear. Perhaps more importantly, theMinister of the Interior flatly failed in his commitment to bring in police forcesfrom outside the city to restore civil order. Iraqi and coalition soldiers, to includetwo battalions of newly formed public order troops, were used instead to providethe necessary police functions in the city for several months. Finally, both the MNFand the IIG did commit funds for the city’s restoration, but initially there was nocoordinating mechanism to determine who should accomplish which essentialproject and in what order civic and public works projects were to be completed.It will surprise no one to know that the MNF and Iraqi priorities for restorationwere different.



THE INTER-MINISTERIAL FALLUJAH WORKING GROUP

The second key mechanism for the coordination of effort in Al Fajr was an inter-agency working group that operated at the operational level and linked issues inFallujah with intergovernmental support through the MNF military headquartersand the U.S. and UK embassies. This Inter-ministerial Fallujah Working Groupoperated through twice weekly meetings. The first was always held in Fallujah, ini-tially on Camp Fallujah while combat operations continued, and then later withinthe old Fallujah mayor’s complex at the MEF CMOC. The second was always heldin Baghdad, normally at the Ministry of Industry and Minerals, whose minister wasappointed as the lead agent for Fallujah reconstruction. Although many individualsattended both these meetings, their focus and authorities were quite different. Thelocal Fallujah meeting was designed to provide the administration and technicalexpertise to manage the city’s affairs. It was led by Engineer Basil Mahmoud ofthe Ministry of Industry and Minerals, who for several months was in effect thecity manager of Fallujah. He had the authority to establish priorities and directlocal reconstruction activities by the various Iraqi government institutions. He wasassisted every day by members of the MST. During November, MEF Civil Affairsofficers effectively directed the affairs of the city while combat operations were thefocus of effort, but by January, as the residents were beginning to return, EngineerMahmoud had grown to be the key Iraqi figure in the city and the manager of dailyactivities.

The Baghdad meeting was normally chaired by the Deputy Minister of Indus-try and Minerals, Mr. Mohammed Abdullah Mohammed. Minister MohammedAbdullah was a career bureaucrat of real skill, who had survived under SaddamHussein and into the IIG. He ensured that the policymakers within the council ofministers were executing the work and following the priorities required in Fallujah.Using personal authority alone, he managed to gain resources from many of theresource-poor ministries in Iraq to help the reconstruction in Fallujah. Militaryrepresentatives attended both meetings and acted as a sort of connecting file at thelocal and national levels. The one gap in coverage of this two meeting process wasat the provincial level.

Like most nations, Iraq has a strong provincial government function, wherenational policies are adapted to more local needs. For the operation in Fallujah,the provincial government was in Ramadi, only 30 miles away, yet unfortunately,the appointed governor there was never very well integrated into the coordina-tion process. Initially, the civilian governor was so repressed and intimidatedby insurgent threats that he played no visible role; afterward, Prime MinsterAllawi appointed a new governor, Sheik Fassel al-Goud, but he attended onlyone meeting in Fallujah and did nothing to assist in the reconstruction effort.His provincial Directors-General could have added much to the recovery pro-cess but was effectively isolated from the most pressing issues because the gov-ernor was not interested and the national government in Baghdad was absorbedby it.


Civil–Military Operations: The Bridge to a New Fallujah ✯ ✯ ✯ 87

Another important shortfall in this structure was the lack of any functioningIraqi civil–military coordination. It took the prime minister’s personal involvementto get the Ministry of Interior or Ministry of Industry to work directly with theMinistry of Defense for any of its subordinate command elements. In practice,this meant that the MNF pulled together any inter-ministerial coordination thatdid not occur in either the local Fallujah meetings or the Baghdad ReconstructionWorking Group. With no forcing function behind the scenes, it was extremelydifficult to develop in any real consensus in the early months. Only after somereconstruction headway was developed and significant funding was made availabledid any proactive ministry coordination begin on the part of the Iraqi leaders.Publicity certainly helping this as Fallujah was on every media outlet in the country,but it was progress and money that really made the difference.

THE NEWLY REOPENED CITY

On December 24, long lines at the city’s four primary Entry Control Points (ECPs)begin the start of what would seem to the Marines as an endless series of complaintsabout access to Fallujah. Government officials, contractors, and workers all wantedspecial high-speed access to the city, but with every improvement in access someimprovement in security had to be made and the risk in not maintaining securitywas unacceptable to the MEF, so speed of access became a sort of a governor onentry to the city.

Finally showing some interest, Governor Fassal al-Goud attended the Fallujahreconstruction meeting at the CMOC on December 27. By his own statements,the governor was clearly out of touch with current reconstruction efforts andprogress. He would continue to remain disengaged with Fallujah governance.Intimidation was still rampant in Al Anbar province overall, however, and themurder of the Al Anbar vice governor at the end of the month effectively haltedkey leader engagement at the provincial level. This barbaric act had no tangibleeffect on Fallujah reconstruction though, as government involvement in Iraq hadtraditionally bypassed the provincial level and only occurred significantly at thenational level.

The good news was that the national government of Iraq was improving itssupport significantly day by day, and the city was mostly clear of the major pocketsof debris. By December 28, food and fuel deliveries from the Baghdad ministrieswere occurring regularly in Fallujah. The Ministry of Trade (MOT) was truckingfood and welfare supplies such as heaters and cooking fuel into the city once ortwice a week. Initially, they were off-loading the trucks at mosques around the city,but the government quickly decided to distance itself from the traditional supportthrough mosques and began to shift their deliveries to the humanitarian assistancesites created by the Marines. (The IIG expressed concern over the practice ofdistributing food from mosques because it did not want to associate governmentaction with religious sites.)



The first of these humanitarian assistance sites to be constructed was in Jolan onthe location of a children’s amusement park; it was named Jolan Park. The secondsite was in the southern half of the city in an open area near a flour factory – it laterbecame known as Brahma Ranch. The final site was Dave’s Field in the easternsector of the city, located behind a small strip mall, near some soccer fields.

All three of these locations were ringed with protective wire and well guarded bythe individual infantry battalions that had responsibility for the sector of the cityin which they were located. Although the civil affairs Marines assisted with overallcoordination, they were normally run day to day by Marines from the 1st FSSG, andIraqi soldiers always played a part in the distribution of aid. These humanitarianassistance sites were eventually turned over to the MOT in the second week ofJanuary, when the MOT began to take full responsibility for the distributionof food from Jolan Park. The MEF continued to operate two other HA sites atBrahma Ranch and Dave’s Field for several more weeks, but they soon outlivedtheir usefulness as the market system in the city began to take new root.

Fuel deliveries were more challenging because of the special handling requiredand the value of fuel on the black market. Luckily, the Ministry of Oil controlledtwo storage sites in Fallujah and was able to make special provisions to keep threefuel stations fairly well stocked with automobile fuel (which in Iraq is benzene).Cooking and heating fuels were also distributed in the city, although initiallythe Marines provided much of it by contracting tanker trucks to roam the citypermitting residents to fill containers street side.

These distribution efforts were possible only because the MEG and groups ofcontracted workers had put a priority on clearing the city of debris immediatelyafter the heaviest fighting was reduced in late November. Using military labor(dump trucks and drivers) initially, over December more and more contractedworkers and ministry assistance contributed to the effort until all the streets wereclear of obstructions; downed power lines were removed, and the barriers andobstacles constructed by the insurgents (which many feared still contained IEDs)were removed to a dump site north of Fallujah.

The new year closed out a chapter in Fallujah with the cost of one more Marine’slife in the continuing clearing effort by RCT-1. Lance Corporal Jason E. Smith ofPhoenix, Arizona, died on December 31 during a patrol in support of opera-tions in the city. He was assigned to 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion,1st Marine Division. Smith’s death showed that the city remained a dangerousplace even after nearly 2 months of security operations.

A NEW YEAR BACK IN FALLUJAH

During the first week of January, drinking water was restored to the northwestquadrant of the city. Although without electricity, the water pumps used by Fallujahresidents to lift the liquid from the pipes at street level could not be operated topump the water to cisterns on the rooftops of residential homes. The first evidence



of markets and shop owners opening up also began to appear in that first weekof the year. The Marines first witnessed a vegetable market doing brisk businessin western Fallujah, just east of the new bridge and near the Green Mosque. Thisarea, the Andalus, was the first to be repopulated and was the origin of most of theeconomic growth in the first weeks.

At the end of the week, several local Iraqi officials met with former presidentialcandidate and serving U.S. Senator John Kerry, at his request, during an official visitto Camp Fallujah. The conversation focused on the upcoming elections, stability,and compensation but was not tainted with bitterness on the Iraqis’ part, as manymight have expected. Overall, the officials understood about the challenges ofreturning life to the city and were thankful for the U.S. assistance. The generalpopulation, however, still had a wait and see attitude.1

During January, the management arrangements inside Fallujah began to shift.First General Abdul-Qader was appointed the new commander of all Iraqi landforces in early January. He moved to his new headquarters in Baghdad with GeneralKassim and neither officer was replaced. Although Basil Mahmoud was servingadmirably and was in fact growing more and more influential as the city’s recon-struction coordinator, he did not want to make decisions about resident’s legalissues. As had always been anticipated by the Marines, there was a growing needfor a municipal council or mayor in the city.

Consequently, on January 11, the CMOC staff met with former Fallujah mayorRa’ad Hussein, who appeared supportive of coalition efforts. He had been mayorin late 2004, before the last insurgent-supporting mayor (a man named Al Joorusi)had occupied the post. Al Joorusi had tried to lobby for his old job and title backduring the initial days of the operation, even presenting himself at Camp Fallujahas an IIG coordinator, but he was so tainted by his association with the insurgentsthat he was completely rebuffed by the IIG.

Ra’ad Hussein was not completely above suspicion either, and the Marinesstarted to work with him as an authority figure very much with a wait and seeattitude. Colonel Shupp knew that he had some dangerous ties with the sheiks ofthe city, and members of his staff were implicated with anti-coalition activities (onewas later arrested for plotting to kidnap a Marine officer). But Mayor Ra’ad seemedto have the best interests of the people at heart and was a hardworking man whoremained closely involved with every issue of reconstruction and resettlement, sohe performed a very useful service and became gradually accepted as the municipalchief.

By midmonth it was apparent to General Sattler that the city needed an infusionof funds to jump start the individual family reconstruction needs in the city. Hepushed hard for the Iraqi government to contribute $100 to each family that hadreturned, but the Iraqi bureaucracy, even using the national food card systemas a template, proved too unwieldy to produce payments in short notice. Afterpushing formally several times, General Sattler decided to use his own authorityand obtained MNF-I permission to pay the families using coalition funds. Thistactic definitely inspired the IIG to match his offer of a payment, but the Iraqi



government still suffered under such mismanagement that this first significantcash payment shipment was intercepted and stolen within hours of its arrival inthe provincial capital of Ramadi.2

On January 13, the MEF through RCT-1 began paying a $200 humanitarian as-sistance payment to all Fallujah heads of households. That same day, the Ministryof Trade doubled its food shipments into Fallujah, and on the following day allneighborhoods in Fallujah were finally opened to residents. The gradual resettle-ment plan was complete on schedule on January 14, although it seemed to theMarines on the ground as though it was a rush to fill the city much faster thanseemed prudent. Again, it was the sense of urgency in Baghdad, not Fallujah, thatdrove events, from a fear that delays could reflect badly on the IIG.

The MST’s role in bringing the sheiks, imams, and other Fallujahn leaders ofvarious groups together to develop some sort of a city council was crucial. Theprime minister had pressed for a city council rather than a single mayor so thatbroad-based support could develop in the city. Over time the MST became themotive force within the city for this effort and, through its town hall meetings,it reached out to touch a host of additional issues that were of local concern.Although the effort started slowly, after midmonth it began to engender ever-greater local involvement once it became clear that the reconstruction committeewas responsive to requests by residents.

The MST mentored Iraqi technocrats and municipal leaders and assisted BasilMahmoud, the appointed Iraqi reconstruction director, in his many varied tasks.With the addition of U.S. Navy Seabees and their construction engineering ex-pertise on several working groups, the MST played the critical tactical role ofdeveloping governance, consensus, and progress in the city.

TRANSITION TO A NEW FALLUJAH: NATIONAL ELECTIONSAND COMPENSATION

By the second week of January 2005, Fallujah had become a very different city.Reconstruction was still modest, but the MNF and the IIG had compensated for thebasic city essential services and more and more residents were staying overnightin the city. Although the entire city was open for resettlement and incidents ofcombat had been nearly extinguished, Iraqis were still very hesitant to go to thescene of so much heavy fighting. Still, everyone in the government knew that theburden of so many displaced people would be hard for Iraq to bear and the nationalelection scheduled for the end of January would be difficult to conduct as long asthe Sunnis viewed Fallujah as a battlefield.

Food, fuel, and water were being provided in the basic ways throughout the city.Food was still distributed to locals in two humanitarian assistance sites (one atBrahma Park in the south and the other at Dave’s Field in the northeast quadrantof the city). Electricity was still problematic, with the only source of power beingprovided by generators spread around the various city districts. Because household



water was lifted from ground level by electrical pumps, drinking water was notflowing in individual homes but was still furnished by tanker trucks moving dailyalong the major streets. Large gray cisterns with ground-level outlet valves suppliednonpotable cleaning water to the residents that had returned. Still, long lines ofcars still built up along the five major roads leading into the city; nearly 1,000 carstransported an average of over 7,000 people into the city each day. Governmentfood distribution – normally supplied by ration cards through the Oil for Foodprogram3 – had yet to be reestablished, and markets remained barren except fora few fresh vegetable stands at the base of the western bridge. Normal life had notyet returned, but it was clear that the foundation for the new, safer city had beenlaid.

The number one priority of the MNF for Fallujah was pushing through an Iraqicompensation package for housing reconstruction in the city. General Sattler andhis key staff knew that normal life in the city could only return once the residentswere able to rebuild their homes and markets were reopened in the city. For thatto occur, Fallujah needed an influx of capital. The MEF was so concerned aboutthe state of the city’s houses that it started planning a process to pay each head ofhousehold $200.

No one thought it would be possible to pay each Iraqi family inside the city.Yet, in characteristic fashion, the Marines never considered that the effort wouldfail. They obtained the funds and used the same humanitarian assistance site inBrahma Ranch that had been used to dispense food early in the operation as asecure location. Information was broadcast throughout the province to ensure allthe families on the Oil for Food ration card rolls for the city were able to requestthe money. Each head of household was eligible to get the $100 by showing proofof residency. (Each also received an ink stamp on the hand to prevent applyingmultiple times.)

In a matter of a few days, over 32,000 residents of Fallujah were paid the“humanitarian payment.” They stood in long lines, they were orderly, and theyunderstood what the money was intended to do. Their own government hadpromised to match the payment, but it took weeks for that effort to reach thehands of the needy (although for the IIG payment, eligible residents were able toget the money at several national banks in Al Anbar and in Baghdad).

Still combat casualties punctuated the daily efforts of the MEF as it conducteda series of clearing operations in Ramadi and the northern half of the province.4

These operations were designed to keep the insurgents who had been cleaned outof Fallujah on the run and prevent the supporting elements of the terrorist networkfrom picking up from the cell that had been destroyed by Al Fajr.

ZARQAWI’S CALL FOR PERSEVERANCE

In an effort that was clearly linked to Osama bin Laden’s Internet speech onDecember 27, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had a similar announcement released on



January 20 that provided a great deal of insight into the results of the fight forFallujah from the perspective of the insurgent leadership.5 Zarqawi made eightmajor points in his announcement, which was clearly aimed at inspiring his sub-ordinates and other Muslims to continue the fight against the MNF and the IIG,but his major theme throughout was perseverance. The loss of Fallujah had beena heavy blow to his movement, but he sought in this announcement to rally thoseremaining loyal to his cause and inspire them with the sacrifice of those who hadbeen martyred in the city.

Zarqawi claimed that the fighting in Fallujah had produced a “significant militaryand strategic victory” by forcing the United States to fight in close combat in thestreets of the city and suffer increased casualties. He believed that such losses wouldproduce in turn a “major psychological defeat” by causing President Bush and theentire U.S. leadership to suffer from “moral confusion.” Zarqawi’s text indicatedthat the martyrs in Fallujah had taught new lessons in perseverance and wouldinspire others to take up jihad.

Among his major points, Zarqawi also testified to the importance of PrimeMinister Allawi’s involvement in the effort in Fallujah, although he claimed thatAllawi’s actions had merely striped him of his “cloak of deceit” supporting theUnited States and Israel in Iraq. Among the most outlandish diatribes in the tapedversion of the statement was Zarqawi’s claim that 800 Israelis had participated inthe battle, along with numerous Jordanians.6

Of note, Zarqawi also chose this January message to insult the Grand Ayatollahal-Sisatani by calling him “the imam of infidelity” on the tape. Zarqawi claimedthat 80 percent of the Iraqi security forces in the city were Shia and the remaining10 percent were Kurds, in an effort to show that the other Iraqi sects were alliedwith the United States against the Sunni minority there. Zarqawi obviously was aproponent of increased violence between Sunnis and Shia in Iraq.

Although much in the tape was incorrect, the text did demonstrate that Zarqawi’sinformation was uneven at best. His assessment of the role and composition of theIraqi forces was not far off target, but his own confirmation of the death of OmarHadid in the tape showed he did not have all the facts concerning his own forces.The tape also showed that the strategy of the insurgent leadership would continueto be based on long-term attrition of the MNF forces and would remain dependenton keeping up the perseverance and religious righteousness of the effort in the eyesof Sunni Muslims.

Zarqawi made his allegiance to Osama bin Laden clear and expressed his com-mitment to the overall terrorist campaign. He called for all Muslims to join withhim even if many more would be martyred for the cause. The tape also demon-strated that even Zarqawi understood the importance of the impending Iraqinational elections on the success of the insurgency. In the tape he called stronglyfor Iraqis not to participate in the voting, for he knew that a strong turnoutwould significantly reduce the support for the insurgency among non-Sunnis andwould further isolate and minimize the influence of the Sunni minority in thecountry.



NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN AL ANBAR PROVINCE

The IIG had announced plans to hold national elections during the previous sum-mer of 2004, and an Independent Electoral Commission for Iraq (IECI) had beencreated to plan and conduct the electoral process. The IECI was an independentbody, set up and run using funds allocated in the Iraqi budget “to prepare for andconduct elections in Iraq in accordance with the highest international electoralstandards.”7 From its inception, supporters of the IECI knew that it had to becompletely impartial and thoroughly professional to help ensure the credibility ofany election.

The IECI began its work by recruiting a national staff, which was later aug-mented by a host of regional staff members. There were to be three separateelections on January 30: one to select an Interim National Assembly, one for aKurdistan National Assembly, and another in each province to select the eighteengovernorate councils. Operating independently of the Iraqi government, the IECIwas empowered to develop all the regulations and polling procedures necessaryfor the conduct of the elections.

The MEF staff understood that these elections were perhaps the most significantevent that would occur in Iraq in 2005, so key members of the staff began electionplanning even before the assault on Fallujah began. It was a real credit to thestrategic vision of the MNF as a whole that such a “nonmilitary” task as electionsupport received any focus at all in violence-prone Al Anbar province in 2004. Yet,the commitment of the MEF and its commander General Sattler were even morenoteworthy given the huge task of resettling Fallujah and fighting the insurgencyin the rest of Al Anbar province simultaneously.

Over time, the MEF staff developed a very detailed security and logistic sup-port effort to support the IECI and its international contractors prior to andduring the elections. A very small group of planners had started developing anelections concept of support as early as September 2004. Lead by a few officersin the MEF operations and plans sections and the CAG, these planners tackledthe difficult challenge of supporting an election completely indirectly. In otherwords, they could not influence the policies and procedures of the IECI eventhough they understood very well that the voting in predominately Sunni AlAnbar province would have to be conducted very differently than elsewhere inIraq. For example, if they announced the location of any polling center in ad-vance of the election, the insurgents in that area would most certainly eitherdestroy the site or set explosives to kill voters on polling day. Having identified thenumber and locations of centers, the MEF staff began obtaining essential protec-tive concrete barriers and radio communications sets to equip the polling centersites.

Naively, the IECI had envisioned that elections in Al Anbar would follow the samemodel as elsewhere in Iraq, but most Iraqis and Americans in Al Anbar provinceunderstood that would not be true. The first indication the IECI leadership hadthat the Sunni heartland would present unique problems to their efforts was when



the provincial representative they hired in December refused to occupy his office inRamadi. Without a provincial representative, no voter education program wouldbe developed for the province and no polling center locations would be chosen. TheMEF obtained permission from the IECI to offer suggestions for the polling centerlocations, but the IECI was very reluctant to allow the MEF any involvementin voting education or media. The commissioners of the IECI and its director,Carlos Valenzuela, were very suspicious of the MEF’s motives and, as they did notunderstand the dynamics of the Sunni triangle, they delayed approving any MEFinvolvement in the process to the eleventh hour.

Although the MEF representatives put as much pressure on the IECI as theycould to incorporate a more aggressive approach to polling, nothing improved overthe months preceding the election until the IECI finally revealed in late January thatit might not be able to hire sufficient polling center workers for Al Anbar provinceby Election Day. In most of Iraq, local residents were hired to operate pollingcenters in their own neighborhoods; in Al Anbar, residents did not understandthe election process well and were actively being discouraged from voting – atthe threat of their lives if they visit a polling site – by the insurgents still in theprovince.

The real problem was that Sunni leaders in the province were either intimidatedby the insurgents or were unconvinced of the value of the election. Many whodid understand that the election gave them a chance to determine the future ofIraq were so fearful that they would be punished for voting that they plannedto stay away. It was extremely hard to choose risking one’s life for democracywhen most Iraqis in the province had no real experience of voting. Sunni leadersfelt that any election that would reflect majority rule would necessarily workagainst the objectives of Sunnis and favor the preferences of the majority Shiaelectorate.

As it had with locations for polling centers, the MEF again offered supportwith the needed polling station workers. Within days, the MEF’s subordinatecommands, through coordination with community and government leaders, as-sembled hundreds of Iraqi citizens from Al Anbar to work for the IECI in pollingcenters. On January 25, for example, Marines from the CAG and Kael Weston ofthe State Department hired a large number of election poll workers in Fallujah.This group included over 100 Iraqis from the city who would end up working inpolling centers all across Al Anbar province.

Two days later in Fallujah, the CMOC staff held a series of elections-orienteddiscussions with local sheikhs. One of these events was even covered in detail byABC’s Nightline news program. Such discussions were critical to an understandingof the process and the value of elections. As few residents of the city had ever votedin a meaningful election, there was understandable mystery associated with theprocess. It was also quite unclear from the IECI-produced literature what effect theelection could potentially have on the area, so the CMOC staff put special effortinto a local education program to inform and empower the residents of the citythat they had by that time come to care very much about.



In a huge logistical feat, the FSSG and the MEG provided thousands of con-crete barriers and other polling station materials to the general locations of theproposed polling sites. Great resourcefulness and initiative was exercised to findproducts (walk-thru metal detectors, wands, barriers, and commercial phones,among other things) that could be delivered on very short notice to Al Anbarsites to support Election Day activities. Many of these items were purchased fromcivilian sources all over the world by the MEF to ensure the security of the pollingprocess.

The CAG developed a reception and training program that picked up the IECIpolling center workers at Baghdad International Airport and transported them toa hasty training facility at the Taqqadum Air Base west of Fallujah. There near therunway, the CAG staff, lead by Colonel Miles Diamond, provided 3 days of basicpolling center training prior to the workers’ departure for the actual sites wherethey were to assist with the voting.

To support Iraqi polling center workers, the 1st Marine Division and the CAGprovided Election Support Teams (ESTs) for each polling center. These ESTs con-sisted of a senior NCO or officer and a translator from the unit that was providingthe security for the polling center assigned – most frequently, they were membersof the CAG (supporting the unit) who interacted directly with the IECI work-ers. The ESTs had the responsibility to provide liaison with the IECI workers attheir respective polling centers and to help coordinate security, daily support, andtraining for the elections.

The ESTs met their polling center workers at Taqqadum Air Base at the com-pletion of training and arranged for their air transport from Taqqadum to varioussites throughout Al Anbar province. Upon arrival at the MEF delivery sites, eachEST and the IECI workers were transported to the designated polling centers andimmediately began setting up the spaces to be ready by first light on January 30for the arrival of the voters. For many Marine ESTs, this resulted in a 24-hour dayand then another full day of working security issues for voters. On the morning ofElection Day, these ESTs moved out of the polling centers along with the Marinesand Soldiers who were providing outer cordon security. No Marines were presentin the polling centers on Election Day.

As a collateral mission, the MEF sought to ensure that all polling center workers,both locally recruited and IECI provided, had a very positive experience. TheMEF succeeded in sending all the workers home enthusiastic about their positiveexperiences with MNF and the democratic process. This extra effort was believedessential to support successful polling center recruiting for future elections inOctober and December 2005.

Another challenge the MEF faced was the lack of IECI-provided voter ed-ucation on the election and the election process. The MEF information oper-ations cell worked closely with IECI, producing and distributing hundreds ofproducts released in concert with a deliberate education campaign in the weeksprior to the election. This campaign was designed to inform voters of the exis-tence of the election, the date of the election, the importance of the election to



Iraq’s future, and then in the last few days the exact locations of polling centers.Polling center locations were not released until January 28 for force protectionreasons.

In conjunction with the information operations effort, the MEF leadership,supported by civil affairs Marines and Soldiers, and the Department of State’sKael Weston, engaged almost daily with local and provincial government leaders,sheiks, religious leaders, former military leaders, and business leaders to solicittheir support for the elections. Battalion Commanders, Regimental/Brigade Com-manders, as well as the Assistant Division Commander and Commanding General,promoted the elections message over and over again to the Iraqi people they dealtwith every day. This multifaceted method of delivering the message proved highlysuccessful, particularly in Fallujah.

All the MEF subordinate commands played important roles in supporting theelections. The Division continued to conduct a series of violent spoiling opera-tions to keep the insurgents off guard and reduce their ability to intimidate thepopulation.8 The 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (3rd MAW) safely flew over 500 sor-ties in support of the actual election movement, flying over 4,080 passengers and83,570 pounds of polling materials in a 4-day period, spanning the entire MEFarea of responsibility from An Najaf in the south to Al Qaim in northwesternAl Anbar province. During operation Citadel II, the 3rd MAW transported over4,002 passengers and 80,880 pounds of cargo. This effort was conducted by over455 carefully planned sorties. Finally, once the election was completed, the MAWand U.S. Air Force C-130s safely returned over 1,100 IECI election volunteers totheir home cities in southcentral Iraq.

This helicopter movement in Iraq was no small feat. Flying around Al Anbarprovince was always a very dangerous and unpredictable action. This was broughthome to every member of the MEF in the worst way possible, when on Jan-uary 26, in the midst of repositioning the forces to support the election process,a CH-53 helicopter of the 3rd MAW crashed outside of Ar Rutbah in north-western Iraq. Twenty-seven Marines and one Sailor were killed in the tragicaccident.9

During the same period, the FSSG of the MEF built “Iron Mountains” of sup-plies and put infrastructure in place to receive, billet, and provide basic dailysupport to the over 1,000 IECI personnel in the province. Then, the FSSG iden-tified and built life support requirements for 1,000 IECI personnel, and segre-gated, guarded, and secured the IECI polling materials and personnel at CampTaqaddum. The materials were sorted, distributed, and staged at the forward stag-ing locations; then the FSSG distributed the necessary materials to the pollingcenters.

The MEG placed over 200 concrete barriers at polling sites for the January30 elections, reducing significantly the threat at high-density polling sites. Itprovided engineering support at designated polling centers for habitability andsurvivability of IECI workers and it provided several hundred Seabees as mem-bers of a provisional infantry battalion (the Spartacus Battalion) that was used



to augment sparse Division resources spread throughout the province for theelection.

On January 30, all Division polling centers opened on time and Iraqi citizenswere able to vote at all centers in the province. Luckily, thanks to the huge forceprotection effort and the operations security emplaced by the MEF, the insurgentswere caught unprepared; no injuries were suffered by Iraqis or Marines at anypolling center in Al Anbar. Intelligence reports through Election Day indicatedthat the MEF’s disruption actions [which included vehicle control points (VCPs),cordon and search operations, targeted raids, and presence operations] made itdifficult for the insurgents to conduct deliberate operations or plan actions againstthe voting centers. The absence of attacks against polling centers on Election Daydemonstrated the success of the MEF’s offensive strategy and the quality of itsexecution. The MEF suffered only one Marine and one Soldier killed in action onElection Day.10

Of particular note, on January 30, Marines in Fallujah observed a very largevoter turnout in the city. Over 7,000 Fallujah residents participated in the event,demonstrating conclusively the value of engaging with the local Iraqi populationand the optimism that could be generated in even the most devastated of Iraqilocations. Voter turnout in the Shia environs of Abu Ghraib prison was the onlyother area where the election was actively supported by the people of Al Anbarprovince. In some areas, including the city of Ramadi, intimidation was so powerfulthat no voters visited the polls. The paucity of involvement elsewhere in theprovince gave even more significance to the turnout in Fallujah, where no onedoubted that the high level of safety added greatly to the willingness of Iraqis toturn out to vote.

Following the polling on January 30, all ballots were tallied by the IECI, boxed,and returned to Camp Taqqadum without incident. The MEF’s locally hired work-ers were paid on site, using IECI funds, and released in good spirits. Most of themwere extremely encouraged by their participation in the election process . . . animportant seed for Iraqi elections to come. Within 48 hours, as planned, all pollingcenters had been cleared of personnel, equipment, and barriers and returned totheir original state.

These actions by the MEF ensured that the Iraqi national elections were con-ducted as scheduled on January 30. Nearly 1 million people voted in Karbala andNajaf at more than 430 polling centers. Unlike other areas of Iraq, the Marines,Sailors, and Soldiers in Al Anbar province were requested to provide unprece-dented direct security and logistical support to the IECI. In addition to tightsecurity around polling areas, the MEF accomplished the vast majority of all votereducation efforts in the Al Anbar province. Also, the MEF was solely responsiblefor the unprecedented recruitment, outfitting, housing, and movement of the IECIworkers at the various polling sites throughout the province. It had been a uniquelychallenging effort so soon on the heels of the combat inside Fallujah, but given itsstrategic importance, it was an obvious priority of effort even while reconstructionof the city continued without pause.



HOUSING COMPENSATION

By the end of January, progress was obvious in Fallujah to anyone who visited thecity. But for many officials isolated in Baghdad, the real needs of the people ofFallujah remained misunderstood. The MEF leadership realized, however, that thelocal success of the election in Fallujah could serve as a springboard to gain bettersupport for the Fallujahns. In particular, this meant building support for housingcompensation payments for the residents who had returned to the city.

General Sattler understood very well that money for individual homes wasneeded from the IIG to seal the reconstruction process as a success. The governmentcould rebuild all the buildings in the city, but if the residents moved away fromtheir shattered properties without rebuilding homes, Fallujah would die, and withit would die the symbol of a new Iraqi future. General Sattler first used his ownchain of command to push the idea of $100 million in housing aid to the city.General Hejlik and Colonel Ballard engaged on the same issue every week inthe reconstruction meetings and support was evident from General Kizseley andeven Adel Hillawi, but for some reason the actual allocation of funds alwaysseemed to be out of reach. The IIG did have a survey team in the city that hadestimated the damage to the homes in each district and had developed a formulafor compensation, but still the funds were not provided.

Finally, General Sattler took his appeal to the various Congressional Delegationsthat were so frequently visiting Camp Fallujah in the early months of 2005. ByFebruary, the MEF was giving escorted tours of the most needy areas of the city tovisitors, including the Iraqi Minister of Municipalities. By early March, the logjamseemed to break, and after some very pointed appeals and complimentary offersby members of the U.S. Congress and Ambassador Negroponte, the IIG agreed toallocate nearly $100 million to the housing compensation needs of the residents ofFallujah.

The first compensation payments were made by Basil Mahmoud on March 17,less than 6 months after the beginning of combat operations in the city. At aboutthe same time, the majority of the MEF’s payments for damages and for rentof facilities started, so a large influx of money was available by month’s end tostimulate the economic recovery of the city.


Chapter Eight

✯✯✯

A New Dawn: Lessonsin Modern Warfare

Operation Al Fajr (New Dawn) had for its objective the destruction of theterrorist element in the Iraqi city of Fallujah and the peaceful restoration of thecity to its residents. It was designed very specifically to be a significant new startfor one Iraqi city and the beginning of a new day for Iraq overall. The Novemberbattle resulted in the loss of 71 American lives and injuries to more than 600 moreyoung men. It was the worst month of the war in terms of U.S. fatalities.1 Estimatesof insurgent casualties conclude that over 1,500 enemy fighters were killed in thefighting. Such a costly fight should bring an equally significant outcome, so whatwere the results of operation Al Fajr?

There is no doubt that the fight for Fallujah was important to the overallcampaign in Iraq because the city had become a significant terrorist strongpointwith great symbolic significance; it was the most prominent place in Iraq thathad resisted the combined efforts of both the MNF and the Iraqi governmentto cleanse it of anti-Iraqi influence the previous April. As the planning for thebattle proceeded, it also gained importance as the first major military effort inIraq directed and controlled by the newly installed IIG of Prime Minister Allawi.For these reasons, and its scope and degree of tactical success, operation Al Fajrprovides a number of important lessons to be learned for any future multinationalcombat operation.

Even as the high-intensity combat in Fallujah drew to a close in mid-November2004, it had already became clear that the battle had achieved both its tacticalobjectives and could illustrate a number of key facts that would be importantfor the future of the overall MNF campaign in Iraq. Included among these wereindicators of the importance of information operations, the critical nature ofintegrated (MNF and Iraqi) force structures and command and control, and thedecisiveness of precision fires in an urban environment. Yet something else wasalso becoming clear. Following the tactical victory gained by operation Al Fajr



and the subsequent successful election held in January 2005, the great value ofconflict termination planning and civil military operations to a counterinsurgencycampaign also became very evident. In fact, the future course of the war in Iraqhad changed significantly because of the fight for Fallujah.

Operation Al Fajr employed traditional tactics as well as some very innovativeprocedures and command structures. The MEF planners understood well thediscontinuous nature of the modern battlefield and the need for flexibility inexecution. Pre-assault rehearsals by the 1st Marine Division produced unity ofeffort and a great degree of cohesion during the assault.

It was planned that civil affairs teams and combat engineers would follow intrace of the lead combat battalions to begin assessment of critical infrastructureand to facilitate population and resource control for any civilians remaining in thecity. Because operation Vigilant Resolve had been halted as a result of widespreadnegative media attention, the planners of Al Fajr wanted to ensure that collateraldamage was minimized and civilians could be cared for or evacuated as soon aspossible. This was one reason that the city general hospital was one of the firstobjectives of the attack.

Tactical civil affairs teams were also used with telling effect to manage detaineescaptured in the fighting and to facilitate burials for local fighters who were killedduring the combat. An aggressive PA stance was also employed and found to becritical for the maintenance of popular support. This, in turn, helped assure themaintenance of Iraqi government’s resolve to continue the larger counterinsur-gency effort. As the first major battle directed by the IIG in its own defense, itcould not have been a more important win.

THE COMBAT LESSONS OF AL FAJR

Continuity of Effort. The lack of any steady MNF presence in the Fallujah regionfollowing the fall of Saddam’s regime clearly presented a gap for insurgents toexploit. Initial lack of security forces can be understood simply as a result of thepaucity of troops on the ground in Iraq in the late spring of 2003. However, the ever-changing array of Army forces responsible for operations in Fallujah presented aweak and vulnerable front to agitators in Fallujah and clearly played into the handsof terrorists looking for a fertile zone to incite members of the local population tocounter MNF initiatives.

Although it is too much to expect military planners and intelligence analyststo be able to address every seam in a modern battlefield, it is reasonable forcommanders and their staffs to maintain continuity of effort in key areas of thebattlespace. Fallujah should have been recognized as such by the Army plannersas early as the summer of 2003. Forces assigned to the region should have donemore to ensure tactical transitions and opportunities for the insurgents to infil-trate the city were minimized. Once Fallujah was identified as a trouble spot of


A New Dawn: Lessons in Modern Warfare ✯ ✯ ✯ 101

great importance, the coalition/MNF should have focused long-term, concerted,and forceful actions on the city.

Information Operations. In ways few people understood at the time, informa-tion operations (IO) really shaped the battle. Perhaps most importantly, properinformation techniques convinced the residents of the city to leave prior to thebattle, reducing civilian casualties and permitting the assault forces much greaterfreedom of action. Almost as important, information tools help the MNF splitinsurgents from their base of support (the remaining residents) to reduce theirfreedom of action. There is even evidence that our information campaign turnedmany of the insurgents on one another as they grew fearful of informants withintheir ranks. There is no doubt that information could be employed as a weaponadding significant nonkinetic fires within the battlespace.

Information also played an important role outside the battle zone. Wide-ranging, aggressive, PA activities helped inform the people of Iraq and the Americanpeople about the real issues of the battle. The huge number of weapons cachesand numerous IED factories, as well as multiple incidents when mosques wereused as weapons storages sites, all helped reveal the techniques of the enemy. Thereal horror of the terrorist killing houses in the city only magnified the extent ofinsurgent culpability for crimes against innocents. Making these facts well knownhelped justify the risk and cost of the battle. The cumulative effect of these factsreduced pressure on the Iraqi prime minister to curtail the fighting. In the endit also made the residents more willing to accept their own culpability as un-willing supporters for these acts after they returned to survey the destruction ofthe city.

Robert Kaplan said it well when he wrote, “Because the battles in a counterin-surgency are small scale and often clandestine, the story line is rarely obvious. Itbecomes a matter of perceptions, and victory is awarded to those who weave themost compelling narrative. Truly, the world of post-modern, 21st century conflict,civilian and military public-affairs officers must become warfighters by anothername. They must control and anticipate a whole new storm system represented byglobal media, media, which often exposes embarrassing facts out of historical orphilosophical context.”2

Military Operations in Urban Terrain. Fighting in cities has always been ex-tremely challenging; historically, many of the most devastating battles in Americanhistory have resulted in high casualties because of the complex nature of urban ter-rain. Fallujah was clearly an urban fight and it showed us much about the currentstate of military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). Mechanized and armoredvehicles were critical to the MEF’s success in Fallujah. Both assaults into the citywere spearheaded by armored vehicles, allowing rapid penetration to break upand get behind enemy defensive positions and break through the multiple layersof IEDs that were nested at key locations.

Still, the fight for Fallujah also proved the need for infantry, “boots on theground,” in significant numbers to clear the nearly 20,000 structures in the city.



Current tactics and building assault techniques serviced the MNF forces well,even when pitted against a determined enemy who was fighting to the death.Insurgents booby-trapped themselves, used armor-piercing rounds, establishedinternal ambushes in homes, and worked through a network of interconnecteddefensive positions to hold off the MNF infantry attack, without success.

Joint Fires. Many felt that the risk of “blue on blue”3 friendly casualties fromthe use of artillery in urban operations was too high to accept in modern warfare –particularly in an unconventional environment. However, operation Al Fajr clearlydemonstrated that well-controlled fires, in combination with good target identi-fication and well-trained forces, made artillery safe to use – and it proved itselfinvaluable. Although supported only by one battery of Marine M198 howitzers andone battery of Army Paladin artillery, the 1st Marine Division attack in Fallujahemployed artillery fires to great effect even at extreme “danger-close” ranges withinthe same city block as attacking infantry. Firing nearly continuously during the as-sault and thereafter on-call, ready to rapidly respond for weeks afterward, artilleryfires made a huge contribution to the fight and produced no friendly casualties.

Civil Military Operations. Civil Military Operations (CMO) include popula-tion and resource control, humanitarian assistance, and many forms of coordina-tion with the host nation.4 For operation Al Fajr, civil affairs forces were integratedwithin the assault echelon of the Marine Division so that the needs of the popula-tion could be addressed immediately and continuously throughout the battle. Evenin the first days of the attack, civil affairs units were dealing with the local popula-tion to compensate them for damages, help them bury the dead, and provide themfood and water, as needed. They also helped clarify the real goals of the operationfor those living in Fallujah so the remaining residents of the city could help protectthemselves. As the operation progressed, those same civil affairs forces turned theirattention to the construction and management of sites providing humanitarianassistance.

Before the attack, civil affairs planners had helped identify locations in the citythat should have been protected from MNF fires. During the fighting, they movedto assess the status and functioning of the many essential services areas (most weremunicipal government facilities such as water purification and sewage) so thatany immediate repairs could be started. Without these actions the city would havebeen under water for months and largely uninhabitable.

The initial objectives of the attack were secured early and the entire city wasunder MNF control after 4 days of very hard fighting. Although small pockets ofdetermined, even suicidal insurgents would continue to fight for nearly a month,the MEF staff began to focus on the vitally important transition to local controlduring the first week of combat. The city needed to be secure and made safe,essential services had to be restored to minimal levels, and the residents of thecity had to have some semblance of normalcy in their lives before the promiseof freedom from insurgents would have any meaning. This was the real test ofoperation Al Fajr and, knowing this, Generals Sattler and Natonski ensured that alltheir subordinate commanders valued and supported the CMO effort in the city.



Tactical Transitions. The basic concept of the Fallujah operation depended ona series of transitions: from high-intensity combat operations to restoration ofsecurity and essential services to resettlement, and, finally, to the return to localcontrol by an Iraqi municipal government. Minimum requirements for conflicttermination were identified prior to the beginning of combat operations. Theseincluded a nonlocal (therefore neutral) police force functioning in the city, a civilianor military mayor/city manager to direct the operations of essential services in thecity, and a package of reconstruction projects and necessary funding designedto restore the city’s infrastructure to preconflict levels as soon as possible afterthe terrorist influence was destroyed. These prerequisites were briefed all the wayup the chain of command to the prime minister because, at that time in Iraq, allof these requirements depended on national-level decisions to be effective.

The transition from the combat operations phase to the period when restorationof security and essential services took priority was envisioned to be based ongeographic (spatial) considerations, not time. In other words, even while fightingwas continuing in some areas of the city, where possible, MNF and Iraqi forceswould be rebuilding pump houses and electrical substations in an area not far away.And, in other locations within the city, military forces would also be providinghumanitarian relief supplies to the few remaining Fallujah residents.

With the return of the residents to Fallujah, however, a distinctly different setof priorities was required. This was because the military forces would no longerhave first use of the limited resources in the city once the residents reentered theirhomes. In fact, it was very clear that once the local people returned to the city, thepriority given to the military effort to provide security would be challenged by theneed to assist and support resident’s requests. People would need regular deliveriesof food, supplies of potable water, emergency medical care, and answers to a host ofquestions. . . . And, the more residents who returned, the more military resourceswould be needed to support civil requirements. In fact, with the exception ofproviding police functions [initially using Marine units, then Iraqi Public OrderBattalions (POB) and limited numbers of newly recruited traffic policemen], mostof the military resources in the city after December 23 were used to service theneeds of returning residents.

Such a shift in priorities required a change of mind-set by everyone concerned.Every Marine and Soldier had to understand that the local population was thecenter of gravity in the city after December 23. It is a great credit to the leadershipof General Natonski and Colonel Shupp, and later even of General Mehdi, the POBbrigade commander, that this emphasis on the residents and not the insurgentstook prominence down to the squad level in both American and Iraqi forces.5

Flexibility in Combat Execution. Operations around Fallujah validated theimportance of tactical and organizational flexibility to a high degree. The shortnotice capability to reorganize and integrate forces from 31st MEU into the MEFand the easy integration of U.S. Army Task Forces at the regimental level and Armybrigades at the division level were a testament to tactical interoperability honed andproven in Iraq. Finally the successful reception, staging, and incorporation of Iraqi



units and staff within the MEF in the days prior to the battle was a noteworthy andeventually very significant effort that showed the world that the fight for Fallujahwas as much an Iraqi effort as it was an American fight.

OPERATIONAL POSTCONFLICT ACTIONS

As with any issue of management, planning ahead is fundamental for successfulmultinational relationships. Without the creation of the MST, the effectiveness ofthe MEF’s operations would have been reduced, with no real hub or mechanismfor local control. Like every other facet of war, planning assumptions are nevercompletely fulfilled during execution, but some structure and process is requiredto begin any coordinated activity on the scope and scale of the multinationalpostconflict operations in Fallujah.

In any multinational arena, an understanding of the local culture helps greatlyto properly anticipate requirements. The MNF staffs knew well they needed togain the buy-in of the sheiks and imams of Fallujah, the city of mosques, beforeany sustainable progress would be made. Local ad hoc working groups eventuallyproved to be the answer, but only after much trial mentoring.

In Baghdad, a structure to manage reconstruction was crucial at both the local(city) level and the national level, and a coordinating process linking the two wasfundamental. As is often said, all politics is local, but in Iraq only leaders in Baghdadhad any authority or financial power. Therefore, every important issue needed tobe considered at both levels. Having several of the same members working atboth the Fallujah (local) meeting and the Baghdad (national) meeting helped.But there were still many issues where no agreement was easy. Each ministry haddifferent priorities and very different understanding of the real situation in the cityof Fallujah.

One of the real values of the Fallujah meeting was its setting. No one whovisited the city could fail to observe the situation there and be moved by the basicneeds of the population. Responsibility and authority had to be matched for anymanagement mechanism to work. Basil Mahmoud was appointed quite early inthe process as the senior representative of the minister of industry and minerals.That minister was the government lead for Fallujah reconstruction; still, in theearly days, Basil Mahmoud’s real authority over other ministry functions (powergeneration, sewage treatment, fuel distribution) was uncertain at best and almostalways too weak to generate real action. Without a single (Federal EmergencyManagement Agency-like) government entity and no real recent experience inthe reconstruction of a city, the Iraqi government was extremely ponderous in itsresponsiveness. Only in March 2005, after Basil Mahmoud became first amongequals and was empowered to spend national funds did he gain the authority thatmatched his huge responsibility.

Military-to-military and civil–military relationships had to be created wherenone existed before. In wartime, the civil aspects of any endeavor must be linked



to security and the role of the military. In the case of operation Al Fajr, the Iraqimilitary was present in all phases of the battle and the reconstruction but inrelatively small numbers. They were also plagued by a holdover from the formerregime – reluctance on the part of the local residents to trust their motives.

As combat operations in Fallujah drew to a close in late December 2004, thetactical success of the Iraqi Security Forces and the MNF was clear, but the successof the reconstruction effort remained uncertain. Yet, at the end of the followingmonth, the residents of Fallujah voted in greater numbers than in any other cityin the province. Such voter participation in a city still under military controlsent a strong signal to the national government. Soon Baghdad increased its levelof effort in the processes of reconstruction, and by early March, had committedmore than $200 million in reconstruction funding. Such success within less than6 months after combat operations began was a clear testament to the value of themultinational command and control processes that facilitated the reconstructionof Fallujah. Those processes directly supported the MNF campaign in Iraq. Theimportance of integrated (MNF–Iraqi) force structures and command and control,and the great value of conflict termination planning and civil–military operations,were clear to everyone in the area of operations.

Nongovernmental Organizations. Many people believe, and in fact NGOs oftenadvertise, that humanitarian assistance is made available across the globe to helpthose in need. In fact, NGOs do provide a great deal of aid to large numbers ofpeople in many nations; however, very few aid organizations, and, in fact, fewgovernment organizations, will venture into areas of active combat or uncertainphysical security. Only the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS) ventured into Fallujahduring the winter of 2004–2005. And it did so more for its own reasons andprovided a negligible amount of assistance to the people.6 Other humanitarianorganizations did provide relief to Iraq, and some of those resources did get to theresidents of Fallujah who had moved into surrounded areas of the country, buteven that aid was delivered with significant military and host nation governmentalsupport.

The danger presented by overestimating the contributions from NGOs in war-torn areas of the world is that governments may assume they do not need tointervene in a humanitarian way and can leave populations at risk. Military forcesshould not be tasked to provide such aide either, so a realistic and well-integrated,combined effort of government, military, and NGO support (where it is available)is the only tenable answer in uncertain postconflict situations.

Civil–Military Operations Center. Although not well understood by most inthe military, the small CMOC in Fallujah was critically important to the operationalsuccess of the fight. It served as the coordinating point for civil affairs and MEGreconstruction efforts in the city, the effective “seat” of local governance throughthe late spring of 2005, and the location where MNF biometric ID cards weremanufactured, but perhaps more importantly, the CMOC itself served as the coor-dinating point for MNF and local Iraqi issues. It became the site of weekly and thennearly daily “town hall meetings” where issues, grievances, and communications



errors were resolved. As the site for these town hall meetings, the CMOC served tobring together the then very disparate groups within the local population.

The CMOC-hosted effort to develop an Iraqi municipal council was strategicallyimportant. It not only bridged local gaps in the subgroups of the city, but alsoprovided a venue for residents to witness their government in action. Numerous keyIraqi government leaders, including the prime minister, the minister of industry,and the minister of public works, all met with and discussed issues with localresidents at the CMOC. Even the U.S. Ambassador and key congressional leaderstraveled “downtown” to the Fallujah CMOC to gain an understanding of what washappening in the city. For all these reasons, the CMOC concept needs to be betterunderstood by military leaders, and a rapidly deployable CMOC kit needs to bedeveloped for use on short notice by military commands around the globe.7

The U.S. State Department State Embedded Team. The U.S. State Departmentdetailed two of its members to the Al Anbar region, and both made significant andlong lasting contributions to the military and political situations in Iraq. Mr. KeithKidd was assigned as a State Embedded Team (SET) chief in Ramadi, and Mr. KaelWeston was the SET chief assigned at Camp Fallujah. These two men bore much ofthe brunt of coordinating key leader engagement up the diplomatic chain, throughthe embassy in Baghdad, and all the way to Washington, D.C. In addition, their rolein facilitating dialog and “connecting the dots” between military and diplomaticleaders was extremely valuable. There is no doubt that the $100 million initiallycommitted to Fallujah restoration would not have been made available withoutthe constant, high-level engagement fostered by Kael Weston.

Finally, the elections of January 30 were not only a high point for the MEF, butwere also clear evidence of the value of committed and effective State Departmentstaff within a military operational framework. Keith Kidd was instrumental ingaining the IECI’s confidence in the MEF’s election plan and the support of theprovincial governor. Kael Weston lived at the Fallujah CMOC for weeks prior to theelection and his dialog with key municipal and religious leaders gave significantimpetus to the high voter turnout in the city. Just as a combatant commanderneeds a political advisor, operational commanders such as General Sattler shouldcontinue to fully integrate members of the SET into planning and operations.

The Inter-ministerial Working Group. The key mechanism for reconstructionin Fallujah was a dual-track interagency working group, operating at both thetactical and the strategic levels and linking issues in Fallujah with intergovern-mental support through the MNF military headquarters and the U.S. and UKembassies in Baghdad. Its operation through twice weekly meetings ensured thatthe gap between local needs and national priorities was bridged for Fallujah. Dur-ing November, MEF civil affairs officers effectively directed the affairs of the citywhile combat operations were the focus of effort, but by January, as the residentswere beginning to return, Engineer Mahmoud had grown to be the key Iraqi figurein the city and the manager of daily activities.

The Baghdad meeting chaired by Deputy Minister of Industry and Miner-als Mohammed Abdullah Mohammed ensured that the sometimes weak and



traditionally vacillating IIG officials applied national resources where they werecritically important and when they were available. Military representatives at-tended both these meetings and acted as a sort of connecting file at the local andnational levels. Generals Kiszely, Farquhar, and Hejlik were critical linchpins inthis effort, ensuring that the issues at all levels were coordinated and consensuswas built as problems arose.

The one gap in coverage of this two meeting process was at the broader opera-tional or provincial level. Like most nations, Iraq has a strong history of provincialgovernment; however, they have rarely been very active because few national re-sources have been made freely available for provincial administrators to applyto situations such as Fallujah reconstruction. For the operation in Fallujah, theprovincial government was in Ramadi, and the appointed Governor there wasnever very well integrated into the coordination process. He was in fact eitherdominated by his own self-interest and the needs of people in the provincial cap-ital in Ramadi or was hamstrung by lack of support in Baghdad. This is an Iraqigovernance shortfall that may pose significant problems as democracy takes rootin the country.

Because operation Al Fajr was an Iraqi government-directed operation, theIraqi government retained primary responsibility for the restoration of power, andsupply of fuel, food, and potable water. By late December 1994, Fallujah was a cityin significant distress and returning residents required immediate humanitarianassistance while the government began to difficult process of restoring essentialservices. A means for providing immediate humanitarian assistance had beenplanned for in advance by the CAG of the MEF, but military planners understoodvery well that they could in no way provide more than a temporary level ofsustenance for nearly 100,000 people. With the construction engineering help ofthe U.S. Navy Seabees, three large parks in the city were used to store and dispenseessential supplies (food, water, blankets, and health items) for a short period whilethe Iraqi government marshaled its resources. MNF maneuver battalions withIraqi Security Forces support provided security in each site (lessons learned theprevious year concerning food riots drove the MEF to use multiple protectivemeasures, including wire, search machines, and security over watch). Luckily, andmost likely a result of the strong security posture, no incidents occurred at any ofthe distribution sites.

The Role of Politics. There was some significant political pressure to resolvethe Fallujah issue quickly. Prime Minister Allawi wanted to show the Sunnis thatthey would be cared for at least as well as the Shia populations in other areas ofIraq. The United Nations and the Iraqi Ministry of Migration had valid concernsabout the residents who had been displaced prior to the fighting. Finally the Iraqigovernment had to allocate and distribute millions of dollars of reconstructionfunds under very difficult circumstances. But even with these pressures, in 2005,it was the MNF who most frequently pushed for relief in Fallujah and it was theU.S. government who provided the first and the bulk of the funds that reachedresidents. Humanitarian pressures did bear on decision making, both during and



after the battle. The displaced people did receive a great deal of aid, to includediscounted fuel from the Iraqi government, for months. Luckily, most of this wasplanned in advance.

Still, operation Al Fajr required significant host nation leadership. The primeminister had to be personally involved on many occasions because of the sensitivenature of the fighting in the Sunni triangle8 and the massive amount of funding re-quired to rebuild and repair the city. Fundamental questions of emergency law andreestablishment of police capability also required a high level of governmental in-volvement, particularly as several of the ministers were reluctant to cooperate witheach other. However, reconstruction of essential civic service sites, battle damagecompensation, payments for damaged homes, and new economic developmentinitiatives were apparent by March 2005. Funding the huge cost of restoring thecity was a problem initially; however, Iraqi funding augmented by $100 millioneventually began to flow into the city.

Coalition C2 Issues. None of this could have been accomplished without thedevelopment of effective host nation C2 structures. The value of having GeneralAbdul-Qader and his deputy, Brigadier General Kassim, on site in Camp Fallujahduring the fight was critical for the proper integration and motivation of the Iraqiforces within the 1st Marine Division. It was even more important during theimmediate posthostilities phase, when General Abdul-Qader approved rules forFallujah residents within the city and the timing of the resettlement plan.

Once the citizens began to return to their homes, having Engineer Mahmoud andhis team available in the city not only helped immensely to restore the functioningof Fallujah public works, but also added much to the confidence and morale of thereturned residents. By February, Mahmoud and his team were conducting townhall meetings in the center of the city (facilitated by civil affairs personnel) dealingwith a multitude of problems but successfully meeting residents needs. None ofthis could have been done without the full involvement of Iraqis in and out ofuniform. In a particularly xenophobic part of the world, local tribal, religious, andcultural influence was critical.

Resettlement and Reconstruction. After the most severe fighting was completedand the residents were returning to the city, the major civil military effort wasdesigned to restore the city public works, food, water, and fuel distribution andtraffic police to prior fighting levels.9 Many thought the city of Fallujah could notbe resettled without a return of the insurgents. Although it is certainly true thatinsurgents did flow back in the city, they did so in such reduced numbers and withso little resident tolerance for their activities that their capability within Fallujahremained insignificant through the early spring of 2005. The elections proved thatFallujahns wanted to be a functioning part of the future Iraq and it is difficult toconceive that they would have voted in such numbers without seeing a commit-ment to restoring their futures on the part of their government and the MNF.

Lack of tolerance for insurgent activity for the 3 months following the assaultdemonstrates that the local residents were no longer providing support. The returnof a fully professional and effective police force in the city by midsummer of 2005will signify the real victory of operation Al Fajr.



VOTING AS A MEASURE OF SUCCESS

Many people ask if the effort in Fallujah made a difference in the campaign againstthe insurgency or improved the lot of the Iraqi people. There can be no doubt thatthe tempo of the insurgency was slowed by the battle, that the price of weaponsincreased significantly, and that the number and types of attacks in the west ofIraq was reduced. Even more significant, however, was the symbolic effort of thereturned Fallujah residents to vote in the national election in January 2005. Inthe immediate aftermath of resettlement, Iraq held its first national elections fora new transitional government; this was in effect a semiplebiscite for the Allawigovernment and a big indicator of popular sentiment in the city. In Fallujah,where little or no significant reconstruction had begun at the time of the election,nearly one-third of the residents stood in long lines to vote. Elsewhere in Al Anbarprovince, their mostly Sunni neighbors were severely intimidated and fewer than18,000 people went to the polls, but in Fallujah a significant percentage felt safeenough to gain “the purple finger.”10 By voting in such numbers, the residents ofFallujah had bridged the past and committed to a new future.

THE ROAD AHEAD

Following from the killings of March 31, 2003, the year-long fight for Fallujah was akeystone in the overall campaign in Iraq because it eliminated a significant terroriststrong point that had symbolized insurgent power in the face of an MNF attack.The city had stood against the MNF in April 2003, and the Iraqi government hadto cleanse it of its anti-Iraqi forces. As the first major battle in Iraq directed andcontrolled by the sovereign Iraqi government, it was a an effort with real strategicconsequences. Because of its success, operation Al Fajr marked a turning point inthe campaign and set a new tone for future operations in Iraq. It not only achievedits tactical objectives but also illustrated a way ahead for the entire MNF campaignin Iraq.

But what does the fight for Fallujah mean for the future of Iraq? The battledemonstrated that multinational forces and their Iraqi partners could work to-gether to ensure the care and feeding of a local population during some of themost ferocious urban combat in modern history. It demonstrated the capabilityof the U.S. military to resettle and restore essential services in a medium-size cityunder extremely adverse circumstances. Operation Al Fajr also proved Iraqi bat-talions could perform well in high-intensity modern combat operations – this wasimportant for those same Iraqi Security Forces are the best and most fundamentalway for Iraq to defeat the insurgency that threatens its livelihood. Finally, the fightfor Fallujah showed the world that the insurgency could not sustain itself in anysanctuary in Iraq and that it did not retain the support of the Iraqi people oncethey were free to make choices without insurgent intimidation.

The fight for Fallujah was not the first success in the MNF’s Iraqi counterinsur-gency campaign. Victories in Najaf and Samarra,11 and even successes in sections



of Baghdad like the former Sadr City, demonstrated that insurgents would be de-feated if they engaged the coalition in conventional combat.12 What made Fallujahdifferent was the willingness of the Iraqi government to direct such a large-scaleoperation and to follow through on the resettlement and reconstruction. Thefighting for Fallujah also set an important precedent for the Iraqi people. Afteroperation Al Fajr, no Iraqis would permit the insurgents to dominate their city –no one was willing to suffer as had the people of Fallujah. Follow-on opera-tions such as River Blitz, Matador, and New Market during 2005 built on theprecedent set by the fight for Fallujah to ever more significantly sever the sup-port that some Iraqis gave the insurgency. And, in every case, the Iraqi armedforces grew in capability and responsibility for maintaining the security of theirnation.

The way ahead for Iraq requires a fully capable and apolitical police militarythat defends its borders and deters and defeats insurgents in Iraq. The Iraqi policecan look back with pride as the primary security force in the country’s successfulJanuary election, where no polling was stopped because of insurgent action. TheIraqi security capability grew significantly during the winter and spring of 2005until large sections of Iraq were defended primarily by Iraqis. The unfortunatebyproduct of the Iraqi military and security responsibility has been the deaths of alarge number of Iraqi soldiers and police. But by their example they have becomethe new heroes for a new nation.

Along with a capable security apparatus, Iraq needs continued economic de-velopment. Although many improvements have been made in Iraq, the coun-try overall remains extremely weak after over two decades of war and author-itarian rule. The only certain way to ensure that insurgents do not continueto disrupt life in Iraq is to improve the basic economic status of the peoplethrough a systematic development scheme that brings modern banking, invest-ment, improved infrastructure, and increased trade to the country. Iraq haslimited natural resources of great value, but its factories and state-run enter-prises are grossly inefficient and bloated with an excess of workers and a lack ofproductivity.

Finally, to function effectively as a nation without dictatorial rule, Iraq needsto develop a capable government that responds to the needs of its people. TheIIG was a solid step forward in that respect, as was the Transitional Iraqi Gov-ernment of 2005, but the growth in the quality of provincial and municipal gov-ernance during the same period was much less reported and much more crucialfor the future stability of the country. Iraq has a well-educated population anda strong culture to maximize its natural resources. It occupies a crucial positionin the Middle East and should benefit from a great deal of regional trade. Witha more efficient government that seeks to improve the livelihood of the Iraqipeople and build a stronger economic base, Iraq can be a strong and prosper-ous regional state. Only then will the specter of terrorism be removed from thecradle of civilization and the Iraqi people gain the standard of living that theydeserve.



A NEW BRIDGE

The old green bridge over the Euphrates was designed to bring trade and prosperityto Iraq from the west. It stood for years on the western edge of Fallujah as a landmarkof Iraqi’s willingness to open up to its neighbors. Although, with the death of theBlackwater contractors, it became the symbolic reason that the United States andits allies brought destruction to the city, the incident at the bridge was not the faultof the people of Fallujah. Openness not only invites progress and growth but alsobrings risk and possibly bad influences along with the good. At a Baghdad meetingin March 2005, a group of IIG government representatives discussed replacingthe old bridge with a newer, more capable span. Some in the room hesitated toreplace the old green bridge, wanting to keep its memory alive. For the good ofall Iraqis, though, a new pathway to the west had to be created in Fallujah, so thegroup decided to allocate precious funds to the building of a new bridge across theEuphrates on the same site. Hopefully, this new bridge will do much more thanease movement to the west; ideally it will be a new venue linking the city to a betterfuture.


GGBK002-ps Ballard-xml March 10, 2006 15:18

Postscript

✯✯✯

On June 24, 2005, a suicide bomber made his way inside the vehicle checkpointon the east side of Fallujah on Highway 10. He waited until a Marine convoyapproached his vehicle and then slammed his car into one of the 7-ton trucksbringing Marines into the city for security duty. Several Marines were killed andmany more wounded in the first insurgent penetration in the city since the previousNovember. Two local residents were also killed in the blast, along with the bomber.The attack resulted in the single greatest number of female American casualtiesthus far in the war as the Marines loaded into the truck were part of the “femalessearching females” detachment created to better serve the female residents ofFallujah.

The attack was also noteworthy because it shattered an otherwise relatively calmperiod of rebuilding in the city. An insurgent group claiming responsibility forthe bombing called on residents of the city “not to rebuild their houses and tosave the money they have in banks . . . to start another battle with the infidelforces.”1 The war in Iraq was still taking a precious toll on Americans, but it wasclear that the incentives offered by the insurgents had fallen to a new low. Byadvocating only more Iraqi suffering to continue attacks on Americans in a futileattempt to stop progress in the city, the insurgents appealed to no one; they hadclearly lost the majority of their former support. In Fallujah, no one took theinsurgent’s bait – they had all seen the effects of war in the most personal way andthey had also benefited from the policies of a new Iraq. Fallujahns had come toaccept a new future.

This event certainly did not signal the loss of any part of Fallujah to the insurgents(quite the opposite in fact); however, it did testify to the fact that continued vigilancewould be required as long as the Iraqi people could not yet control the territory



inside their borders. By the summer of 2005, the Iraqi armed forces were rising incompetence and taking on more and more of the missions in Al Anbar province,but they were still too few in number to give the Marines much of a break fromtheir many responsibilities in the huge province.

Marine operations in Iraq had shifted north, toward the Syrian border, duringthe summer and fall, into towns like Hadditha and Al Qaim. Ramadi remainedrestive and challenging throughout the year, but the population in the provincialcapital shifted ever so slightly against the insurgency and some residents evenbegan to actively support the MNF’s efforts. The new provincial governor was wellknown to the Marines and had the right agenda for the people, so there was muchhope.

The high costs of combat in and around Fallujah continued through the re-mainder of the year. On August 3, 2005, outside of Hadditha, 14 Marines andtheir Iraqi interpreter were killed in a huge explosion that ripped their assaultamphibian vehicle apart.2 This attack was the deadliest roadside bombing of thewar and also resulted in the largest number of reservists killed in a single day of theentire campaign. A second deadly explosion in the first days of December killed10 Marines and wounded 11 others just outside Fallujah.3 Terrorists and theirinsurgent supporters were much more restricted in their attacks, but when theydid strike, they could be very effective.

Fortunately, improvements in responsible governance continued during 2005 aswell. The new Iraqi constitution was endorsed by an overwhelming majority of thepeople and voter turnout in Sunni areas increased over the dismally small levelswitnessed earlier in January. Voter turnout in Fallujah remained the highest in allof Al Anbar province. The national elections held in December demonstrated evenmore Sunni participation, and for many Sunni voters, a very real rejection of theinsurgency.

In Najaf, where the MEF had fought so successfully in August 2004, continuedeconomic development, reconstruction, and improvement in Iraqi Security Forcespermitted the MNF to turn full control back to the Iraqi forces only 1 year later.The handover marked the first transfer of an entire city from U.S. to Iraqi militarycontrol. Although American logistics and advisors would remain to support theIraqis, it was a moment to make all Najafis proud.4

Through 2005, the spirit of the Marines, Soldiers, and Sailors in Iraq remainedhigh. Although many in Congress called for new exit strategies late in the year, thePentagon continued to develop plans for future unit rotations into Iraq. The IraqiSecurity Forces were improving each week and even began to conduct independentoperations without direct U.S. assistance. In fact, multinational force operationsin Tal Afar during September emulated many of the techniques proven effectiveduring operation Al Fajr with an even larger percentage of Iraqi forces, and asimilar level of success.

The operation in Tal Afar included months of preparation, an incentive forthe residents in the affected area to leave their homes, and a significant politicaleffort to smooth relations between the Sunni and Shia groups involved. The Iraqi


Postscript ✯ ✯ ✯ 115

Security Forces were in the clear majority and led most of the operational actions,although the veteran 3rdACR, by then commanded by Colonel H. R. McMaster,contributed a great deal to the operation as well. As in Fallujah, a significantnumber of insurgents were killed when they stood their ground in the city. And,although some enemy fighters escaped, upwards of 150 of them were killed and300 were captured.5

Conventional combat between the multinational forces and the insurgents wasbecoming increasingly rare in Iraq as the year passed. The enemy learned everytime that defeat in conventional operations will not be followed by any rise inlocal support for the insurgency, and although the numbers of people attractedto martyrdom remained amazingly high, inspiring large numbers of fighters toengage in combat operations appeared over time to become increasingly moredifficult for Zarqawi and his subordinates. Slowly but surely, the remaining enemysanctuaries in Iraq were isolated and eliminated. In some cases, it was the localresidents who put the pressure on the insurgents and pushed them on to moreremote, yet still receptive, areas.6

The Iraqi Army made great strides during 2005. It not only grew in numbers ofcombat-ready units, but more importantly, its units also improved their cohesionand skill at arms and their commanders made great strides in combat leadership.7

The Iraqi Army took responsibility for more and more areas of Iraq, and although itcontinued to take casualties, its recruitment numbers remained high. Iraqis beganto see security force personnel, both soldiers and police, as protectors, not as thebullies they had once been under Saddam.

Support for the insurgents among the Iraqis themselves remains variable; theyare extremely tired of such difficult wartime conditions, and even the Sunni res-idents in Iraq are beginning to blame the insurgents for their woes. Some Sunnitribes are now even fighting openly against the enemy in their hometowns. Still,many Iraqis see the presence of American forces in Iraq as very problematic andmost are disappointed that reconstruction projects and a higher standard of livinghave not arrived quickly enough. Fuel and electricity remain in short supply. Formany Iraqi people, the expectations they had when Saddam’s regime fell have notbeen met.

During December 2005, the Iraqi Transitional Government’s new constitutionand another round of national elections testified to the continued development ofdemocracy in the country. The Sunni minority still feels threatened by the risingpower of the Shia majority in Iraq, but both sects are continuing the political dialog.There is no doubt that the central government of Iraq needs to be strengthenedand its processes made more efficient, but those issues will only be solved with thepassage of time.

A little over a year after the bodies of the Blackwater contractors were hungfrom the old green bridge, General Sattler met in Fallujah with General Abizaid,Ambassador James Jeffrey, and key U.S. congressional leaders, to show them theimprovements made in the city. A week later, Deputy Secretary of State RobertZoellick visited Fallujah to discuss the city’s progress with members of the new



city council. By June, one reporter described a Fallujah of “thriving markets, storesselling candy and ice-cream, and scores of children delighted to see Americans,”8

what he didn’t know was that potable water was still problematic and electricitywould not be fully restored for months to come.

Each month essential services in the city were improved and unemploymentwas reduced, but the city remained wounded – perhaps because the amount ofillegal economic activity in Fallujah was at an all-time low. Still, in December 2005,Fallujahns again went to the polls in huge numbers. They turned out in droves,demonstrating they would still give democracy and the new Iraq a chance. Laterin the month, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited the city and itsnearby Marine base. While there, he announced for the first time that PresidentBush had approved proposed troop reductions in Iraq for 2006.

Fallujah remains one of the safest cities in Iraq.

GGBK002-NOT Ballard-xml March 10, 2006 15:20

Notes

✯✯✯

Chapter One. The Old Bridge

1. Blackwater, USA, was founded in 1997 to provide flexible training and security so-lutions. It consists of six separate business units: Blackwater Training Center (the largestprivate firearms and tactical training center in the United States), Blackwater Target Sys-tems, Blackwater Security Consulting, Blackwater Aviation Worldwide Services, BlackwaterCanine, and Raven Development Group. See http://www.blackwaterusa.com.

2. The three former Army Special Forces soldiers were Wesley Batalona, Michael Teague,and Jerry Zovko.

3. The Navy SEAL teams are composed of specially trained sailors who conduct recon-naissance and direct action missions as part of a naval campaign.

4. One of Blackwater’s managers in Iraq, former U.S. Navy Captain Pat Toohey, believedthe men had been set up by local Iraqi Civil Defense Corps members, who lured them intothe city as part of the attack, “Marines Return Hostile Fire in Fallujah,” Friday, April 9, 2004,found at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,116626,00.html.

5. Bing West. No True Glory, A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah. Bantam Books,New York, 2005, 3.

6. Public Broadcasting Online Newshour, March 31, 2004, 12:30 p.m. EST edition, foundat www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/iraq 3-31-04.html.

7. Please see http://www.answers.com/topic/fallujah.8. Mike Tucker. Among Warriors in Iraq. Lyons Press, Guilford, Connecticut, 2005, 89.9. See Jennifer Glass reporting for the BBC in “Town Vents Its Anger at US” at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle east/2989923.stm and CNN’s Karl Penhaulin “Two Killed in Second Clash in Fallujah” at www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/30/sprj.irq.fallujah/index.html.

10. Karl Penhaul, “Two Killed in Second Clash in Fallujah.”


118 ✯ ✯ ✯ Notes

11. Even CNN’s Penhaul was confused about the facts. See his “Karl Penhaul: Con-flicting Stories from Fallujah” at www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/29/otsc.penhaul/index.html.

12. Charles J. Hanley, “Iraq Grenade Attack Hurts Seven United States Soldiers inFallujah,” at http://www.alor.org/Britain/OnTargetBritain%20Liberation%20of%20Iraq%20Part%202%20April2003.htm.

13. One of the insurmountable problems facing the 3rdACR in Iraq was the sheer sizeof its area of operations. No unit the size of an armored cavalry regiment could possiblycontrol the whole of Al Anbar province.

14. This was the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division, commanded by ColonelDavid Perkins. This brigade had previously dominated the very heavy fighting in early Aprilaround the Baghdad International Airport.

15. The 3rdACR continued operations in Al Anbar province from its regimental head-quarters in Al Asad air base until relieved by elements of the 7th Marine Regiment inMarch 2004.

16. The 3rdACR was commanded by Colonel David A. Teeples during its service in Iraq.17. The 3rdID had more soldiers overall and many more vehicles than did the mixed bag

of light infantry assigned to the 82nd Airborne’s Brigade, but the paratroopers and lightfighters provided by the 82nd were more numerous on the ground.

18. Hamza Hendawi, “American Soldiers Involved in Shooting of Iraqi Police Had Arrivedin City a Day Earlier,” Associated Press, September 18, 2003, at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/news/archive/2003/09/18/international0548EDT0488.DTL.

19. This incident resulted in the greatest U.S. loss of life since the end of major combatoperations in the late spring and set off a period of tension that eventually caused the U.S.units to withdraw again from Fallujah.

20. Please see http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/fallujah.html.21. Michael J. Carden, 82nd Airborne Public Affairs, Operation Salm, at http://www.

bragg.army.mil/afvc-c/Stories/Salm.htm.22. Edward Wong, “U.S. Uncovers Vast Hide-Out of Iraqi Rebels,” New York Times,

June 5, 2005, 1.23. These former members of the Ba’ath Party were also referred to as “Saddamists” by

some officials, including President George Bush, who mentioned the residual strength ofthis group in his November 2005 speech to the nation on the nature of the war.

24. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force was composed on one Marine Division, oneMarine Aircraft Wing, one Marine Force Service Support Group, and additional attach-ments, including a brigade of U.S. Army soldiers. Later other units would augment theMEF; however, the 1st Marine Division remained the primary ground combat unit of theMEF.

25. This is not to say the Army units that had served in the region were lacking inaggression – they certainly were highly trained and superbly professional in their actions,but they were operating in the Fallujah area without any operational pause from the initialconvention combat operations of the first phase of the war and had not been able toformulate a distinct concept of operations for counterinsurgency action.

26. The approach of “No Better Friend . . . No Worse Enemy” was a long-standingconstruct of the Corps initially put into practice in the Shia south of Iraq following the firstphase of the war. It did represent a set of techniques that were different from the U.S. Army’sapproach. General Mattis made the concept part of his commander’s guidance – issued to


Notes ✯ ✯ ✯ 119

all of his Marines. See Mackubin Owens, “No Better Friend . . . No Worse Enemy,” NationalReview Online, July 2003, at http://www.nationalreview.com/owens/owens073103.asp.

27. Because the initial assault to Baghdad was a very narrow penetration, significantrestructuring was required to effectively control the entire country. It was during this periodof repositioning forces that the initial leverage over the enemy was lost and opportunitiesfor opponents of the coalition to begin insurgent activities commenced.

28. U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual. Pavilion Press, Philadelphia, 2004.29. For a working bibliography of small wars readings, see http://www.smallwars.

quantico.usmc.mil/reading.asp.30. Conway turned over command of the MEF to Lieutenant General John Sattler

in September 2004 and became the J3, Director of Operations, on the Joint Staff inWashington, D.C.

31. Mattis was promoted to Lieutenant General and assumed command of the MarineCorps Combat Development Command in the fall of 2004. He was followed in commandof the division by Major General Richard Natonski, the former commander of Task ForceTarawa.

32. Dunford was promoted to Brigadier General while in Iraq. Following his service inIraq, he was assigned as the Marine Corps Director of Operations.

33. The Blackwater contractors were not the only Americans to die that day near Fallujah.Five soldiers assigned to the MEF also died on March 31, in Habbaniyah, Iraq, when an im-provised explosive device hit their armored personnel carrier. Killed were First LieutenantDoyle M. Hufstedler of Abilene, Texas; Specialist Sean R. Mitchell of Youngsville, Pennsyl-vania; Specialist Michael G. Karr, Jr., of San Antonio, Texas; Private First Class Cleston C.Raney of Rupert, Idaho; and Private Brandon L. Davis of Cumberland, Maryland.

34. Operation Vigilant Resolve was directed on short notice, to be executed in less than5 days, with the goal of capturing or killing the insurgents responsible for the killing ofthe American contractors. It was also designed to reestablish law and order and preventFallujah from acting as a sanctuary for the anti-Iraqi forces. Vigilant Resolve was essentiallya two-battalion attack, although four Iraqi battalions had been requested in support andtwo additional Marine battalions joined the fight at a later time.

35. There was no doubt that the horrific nature of the attack required a response. CNNnoted, “Paul Bremer, the U.S. civilian administrator in Iraq, promised that the deaths ofthe contractors would ‘not go unpunished.’” “Marines, Iraqis Join Forces to Shut DownFallujah,” Cable News Network, April 5, 2004, at www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/05/iraq.main.

Chapter Two. Showing Resolve

1. The Marines did employ Civic Action Program (CAP) techniques in Iraq, integratingMarine units to live, eat, and sleep with local Iraqi Security Force units. In fact, at least oneCAP unit was employed by the 1st Marines near Fallujah in the city of Naser Wa-Salemthroughout the spring and summer of 2004.

2. The local security forces were frequently attacked by insurgents. In February, duringa daytime raid on a police station, insurgents had attacked and killed 25 local policemen.Tony Perry and Edmund Sanders, “The Marines Roll into Fallujah,” Los Angeles Times,April 5, 2004.


120 ✯ ✯ ✯ Notes

3. After months in the area and with more than $7 million in aid devoted to improvingthe quality of life in and around Fallujah, the leaders of the 82nd Airborne thought the citywas progressing well.

4. Camp Fallujah, not to be confused with the city itself, was a former Iraqi army trainingcenter designed for the use of an Iranian unit loyal to Saddam Hussein. It was a well-designedand organized military camp, located on the main highway less than 5 miles from thecity.

5. PFC Sandoval told his parents he was worried about going into Fallujah following therelief of the 82nd Airborne. “He asked his mom to pray for him; told her they were goinginto a real bad city,” Steve Walters said. “He didn’t like the name of that town from thestart.” Lucas Wall, “Iraqi Battle Claims Local Marine,” Houston Chronicle, March 28, 2004,A37.

6. Interview with Colonel John Toolan, Quantico, Virginia, July 25, 2005. The surgeon,Army Major Mark D. Taylor of Stockton, California, died on March 20, along with ArmySpecialist Matthew J. Sandri of Shamokin, Pennsylvania.

7. The soldier was killed when his vehicle was hit by an IED rigged to the top of theunderpass and then exploded by someone observing the vehicle. His name was not released.

8. The five soldiers were killed when an IED destroyed their vehicle in Habbaniyah,outside of Fallujah. Killed in the blast were Private Brandon L. Davis; Private First ClassCleston C. Raney; Specialist Michael G. Karr, Jr.; Specialist Sean R. Mitchell; and FirstLieutenant Doyle M. Hufstedler.

9. Four members of the MEF were killed during early April in Al Anbar province prior tothe main attack: Private First Class Dustin M. Sekula, Private First Class Geoffrey S. Morris,Lance Corporal Aric J. Barr, and Corporal Tyler R. Fey.

10. A Regimental Combat Team is formed by reinforcing the traditional infantry battal-ions of the regiment with additional ground mobility and firepower assets.

11. The coalition forces also wanted to occupy a downtown photo shop and capture itsowner, who was implicated in the murders of the Blackwater team.

12. Once it became clear that the Iraqi forces were not willing to fight, 3rd Battalion,4th Marines later joined the fight in the northeast along with 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marinesin the southwest.

13. Ideally, the Marines wanted to completely surround the city, but given the localgeography and few available forces, they could only control key points of access.

14. Bret Baier, Liza Porteus, and The Associated Press, “U.S. Forces LaunchMajor Fallujah Operation,” found at http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendly story/0,3566,116144,00.html.

15. “U.S. and Iraqi Forces Encircle Fallujah,” April 5, 2004, found at http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/news/print 040504 nw iraq.html.

16. Lance Corporal Shane Lee Goldman, Corporal Jesse L. Thiry, Private First ClassChristopher Ramos, and Lance Corporal Matthew K. Serio, all from 1/5, lost their lives onMonday, April 5, in Fallujah.

17. Pamela Constable, “Troops Gaining Grip in Sections of Fallujah,” The WashingtonPost, April 7, 2004, 1. “Of the 250k-300 thousand population, it appeared that during April2004 the insurgency totaled around 20 thousand. Some Iraqi police were reinforcing theinsurgents and ICDC-giving them ammo, and Red Crescent Ambulances dropped off ammoand weapons and then picked-up bodies. The typical insurgent came out and fired at theMarines roughly half a dozen times each day, exposing himself for only a couple of seconds.There seemed to be one to two dozen groups of ‘Hard Core,’ or ‘Minute Men,’ each with


Notes ✯ ✯ ✯ 121

approximately two dozen members armed with IEDs, MGs, lots of RPGs, mortars, andsome anti-aircraft weapons.” www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oif-vigilant-resolve.htm

18. Constable, “Troops Gaining Grip in Sections of Fallujah.”19. Ibid.20. April 6 was relatively quiet in Fallujah, resulting in no combat deaths; however, in the

provincial capital of Ramadi, perhaps as a result of the fighting in Fallujah, Private First ClassChristopher D. Mabry, Petty Officer Third Class Fernando A. Mendez-Aceves, Private FirstClass Benjamin R. Carman, Lance Corporal Marcus M. Cherry, Lance Corporal Anthony P.Roberts, Lance Corporal Kyle D. Crowley, Staff Sergeant Allan K. Walker, Lance CorporalTravis J. Layfield, Private First Class Ryan M. Jerabek, and Private First Class ChristopherR. Cobb all lost their lives on that date.

21. Brent Baier, Steve Centanni, and The Associated Press, “At Least 12 MarinesKilled as Iraq Fighting Rages,” found at http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendly story/0,3566,116262,00.html.

22. Interview with Colonel John Toolan, July 25, Quantico, Virginia.23. Brent Baier, Steve Centanni, and The Associated Press, “At Least 12 Marines

Killed as Iraq Fighting Rages,” found at http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendly story/0,3566,116262,00.html.

24. Ibid.25. Pamela Constable, “Marines, Insurgents Battle for Sunni City,” The Washington Post,

April 8, 2004, A10.26. Captain Brent L. Morel was killed in Fallujah. Elsewhere, in Ramadi, Second

Lieutenant John Thomas “J.T.” Wroblewski lost his life the same day.27. Constable, “Marines, Insurgents Battle for Sunni City.”28. Robert D. Kaplan, “The Real Story of Fallujah,” Wall Street Journal, May 27,

2004, 20.29. Ibid.30. The 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines was moved into the outskirts of the northeastern part

of Fallujah and 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines took up positions along the southern edge ofthe city, known as Queens.

31. Lance Corporal Michael B. Wafford, First Lieutenant Joshua M. Palmer, and StaffSergeant William M. Harrell were all killed in Fallujah.

32. Most rooftops in Fallujah include a wall approximately 4 feet high. Marines learnedto sand-bag the rooftop to build them up for sniper teams and mortar positions. Sniperuse was heavy, especially to serve as forward observers and to cover the long axis ofthe roads. Snipers became even more valuable once Marine units assumed static posi-tions. The typical Marine sniper had over 30 kills. The Marines had limited laser desig-nation ability for mortars because there were no laser designators at the platoon level.Psychological operations (PSYOPs) teams were used to attract insurgents and positionthem for snipers. Marine platoons in the fight were organized with almost companystrength.

33. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, “Coalition Provisional Authority Briefing,”Baghdad, Thursday, April 8, 2004, found at: www.defenselink.com.

34. The Marines were initially not opposed to the cease-fires. They never intended foroperation Vigilant Resolve to be such a high-intensity attack or for it to last beyond the week,plus their real intent was always to protect the Iraqi residents and that was becoming evermore difficult. Additionally, their supply lines were under attack in the province becausemost of their maneuver forces had been moved into Fallujah.


122 ✯ ✯ ✯ Notes

35. Private First Class Eric A. Ayon of Arleta, California, died April 9 from hostile firein Al Anbar province, Iraq; he was assigned to 2nd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment. LanceCorporal Chance R. Phelps of Clifton, Colorado, also died April 9 from hostile fire. He wasassigned to 3rd Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment.

36. Numir El-Higazi, “U.S. Claims Fallujah Offensive Suspended,” The Palestine Chron-icle, April 9, 2004, found at www.Islamonline.net.

37. Karl Vick, “Rallying around an Insurgent City,” The Washington Post, April 9, 2004,A01.

38. Kaplan, “The Real Story of Fallujah.”39. Concerns ranged from the international zone in Baghdad, all the way to the White

House, which contacted the MEF staff directly on several occasions to stay abreast of thesituation in the city.

40. Lance Corporal John T. Sims, Jr., of Alexander City, Alabama, died April 10 fromhostile fire in Al Anbar province, Iraq. He was assigned to 2nd Battalion, 4th MarineRegiment. Private First Class George D. Torres of Long Beach, California, died April 11 as aresult of enemy fire in Fallujah. He was assigned to 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. FirstLieutenant Oscar Jimenez of San Diego, California, Corporal Daniel R. Amaya of Odessa,Texas, and Lance Corporal Torrey L. Gray of Patoka, Illinois, also all died April 11 as aresult of enemy fire in Al Anbar province, Iraq. They were assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 4thMarine Regiment.

41. Corporal Kevin T. Kolm of Hicksville, New York, died April 13 from hostile fire inthe initial action. He was assigned to 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion. Lance CorporalRonnie Garcia and Corporal Bruno J. Romera were both awarded Bronze Star medalsfor valor for their actions that day. For the details of this action, see Ross W. Simpson,“Fallujah: A Four-Letter Word,” Leatherneck, March 2005, Vol. 88, Issue 3, p. 14. LanceCorporal Brad S. Shuder of El Dorado, California, and Lance Corporal Robert P. Zurheide,Jr., of Tucson, Arizona, were both killed in Fallujah on April 12; they were assigned to the2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment.

42. Still, Private Noah L. Boye of Grand Island, Nebraska, and 1/5 also died April 13from hostile fire in Fallujah.

43. The Marine demands were always focused on the turn-in of heavy weapons, theapprehension of the Blackwater murderers, the identification of terrorist leaders, and thedeescalation of the fighting. The insurgents wanted a number of things but seemed mostfocused on the withdrawal of snipers and tanks from the city.

44. Lieutenant General Conway was the key decision maker on the coalition side for thenegotiations, although Colonel John Coleman and several Iraqi representatives from theIraqi Governing Council played strong roles.

45. Lance Corporal Austin of Sunray, Texas, died April 26 because of hostile fire inFallujah. On July 22, 2005, he was posthumously awarded the Silver Star for his actionsduring the firefight in the streets of Fallujah. See Tony Perry, “Marine Who ‘Wouldn’t QuitFighting’ Is Honored,” Los Angeles Times, July 22, 2005.

46. Corporal Scott M. Vincent of Bokoshe, Oklahoma, and Corporal Joshua S. Wilfongof Walker, West Virginia, were the last two Marines to die in Fallujah in the month of April;both lost their lives on April 30.

47. John F. Sattler and Daniel H. Wilson, “Operation AL FAJR: The Battle ofFallujah–Part II,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 2005, 12.

48. The Mahdi Militia was the military arm of the followers of Muqtada Al Sadr, ayoung Shia religious leader. They effectively took control of the central part of the holy


Notes ✯ ✯ ✯ 123

city of Najaf and began to conduct Sharia courts and kill accused violators of religious law.This began only days after the arrival in theater of the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit,commanded by Colonel Tony Haslem.

49. Kaplan, “The Real Story of Fallujah.”

Chapter Three. The Lion of Najaf

1. The Mahdi Militia was the military arm of the followers of Muqtada al-Sadr, a youngShia religious leader. They effectively took control of the central part of the holy city of Najafand began to conduct Sharia courts and kill accused violators of religious law. This beganonly days after the arrival in theater of the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, commandedby Colonel Tony Haslem.

2. Muqtada al-Sadr was not a true cleric, having not received a holy degree, but he wasborn in 1974, the youngest son of Muhammad Sadiq Sadr – a senior Shia cleric who wasassassinated in 1999. In June 2003, he had created the Mahdi Militia, in defiance of thecoalition with the stated goal of protecting the Shia religious authorities in the holy city ofNajaf. He was, however, not popular with the locals and his militia was composed mostly ofoutsiders. He began fighting against the coalition in April 2004, but that outbreak was endedby the mediation of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. U.S. forces counterattacked his militia inNajaf after another outbreak in May.

3. It is highly likely that Berg was actually murdered in Fallujah.4. One author, Thomas Hayden, has proposed that the insurgency in Iraq actually started

following the April battle in Fallujah. In his article, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq Started withFallujah,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 2005, 28–29, Hayden demonstrates that vacillation andinconsistency build insurgent power and engender in an insurgency even greater confidence.

5. During May, Captain John E. Tipton, Petty Officer Second Class Scott R. McHugh,Petty Officer Second Class Robert B. Jenkins, Petty Officer Third Class Ronald A. Ginther,Petty Officer Second Class Trace W. Dossett, Petty Officer Second Class Michael C.Anderson, Gunnery Sergeant Ronald E. Baum, Corporal Jeffrey G. Green, Corporal DustinH. Schrage, Specialist Kyle A. Brinlee, Lance Corporal Jeremiah E. Savage, Private First ClassBrandon C. Sturdy, Private First Class Brian K. Cutter, Specialist Mark J. Kasecky, Special-ist Carl F. Curran, Lance Corporal Bob W. Roberts, Private First Class Michael M. Carey,Corporal Rudy Salas, Lance Corporal Andrew J. Zabierek, Specialist Jeremy L. Ridlen, StaffSergeant Jorge A. Molina Bautista, Army Privates First Class Richard H. Rosas and James P.Lambert, Corporal Dominique J. Nicolas, Corporal Matthew C. Henderson, Lance Corpo-ral Kyle W. Codner, Lance Corporal Rafael Reynosa-Suarez, Lance Corporal Benjamin R.Gonzalez, Private First Class Cody S. Calavan, and Lance Corporal Dustin L. Sides all diedin Al Anbar province.

6. Eleven servicemen, Private First Class Markus J. Johnson; Corporal Bum R. Lee; LanceCorporal Todd J. Bolding; Lance Corporal Jeremy L. Bohlman; Private First Class Sean Horn;Staff Sergeant Marvin Best; Corporal Tommy L. Parker, Jr.; Lance Corporal Deshon E. Otey;Lance Corporal Juan Lopez; Lance Corporal Pedro Contreras; and Lance Corporal ManuelA. Ceniceros died in Al Anbar province in June 2004. In July, operations in the provincecost the lives of the following: Lance Corporal Timothy R. Creager; Sergeant KennethConde, Jr.; Army Second Lieutenant Brian D. Smith; Lance Corporal James B. Huston, Jr.;Lance Corporal John J. Vangyzen IV; Lance Corporal Michael S. Torres; Corporal DallasL. Kerns; Private First Class Rodricka A. Youmans; Corporal Jeffrey D. Lawrence; Lance


124 ✯ ✯ ✯ Notes

Corporal Justin T. Hunt; Lance Corporal Scott E. Dougherty; Army Sergeant Michael C.Barkey; Staff Sergeant Trevor Spink; Private First Class Christopher J. Reed; Sergent KrisnaNachampassak; Corporal Terry Holmes; Lance Corporal Bryan P. Kelly; Corporal Todd J.Godwin; Staff Sergeant Michael J. Clark; Lance Corporal Mark E. Engel; Lance CorporalVincent M. Sullivan; Gunnery Sergeant Shawn A. Lane; and Lieutenant Colonel David S.Greene. During August, operations in Al Anbar outside of Najaf cost the lives of CorporalDean P. Pratt; Sergeant Juan Calderon, Jr.; Captain Gregory A. Ratzlaff; Lance CorporalJoseph L. Nice; Gunnery Sergeant Elia P. Fontecchio; Lance Corporal Jonathan W. Collins;Lance Corporal Nicholas B. Morrison; Lance Corporal Kane M. Funke; Army SergeantDaniel Michael Shepherd; Private First Class Geoffrey Perez; Private First Class FernandoB. Hannon; Lance Corporal Caleb J. Powers; Sergeant Harvey E. Parkerson III; SergeantRichard M. Lord; Lance Corporal Dustin R. Fitzgerald; Corporal Brad P. McCormick;Private First Class Nachez Washalanta; Gunnery Sergeant Edward T. Reeder; Lance CorporalSeth Huston; Army Private First Class Kevin A. Cuming; Sergeant Jason Cook; CorporalNicanor Alvarez; Corporal Christopher Belchik; Army Staff Sergeant Donald N. Davis;Lance Corporal Jacob R. Lugo; Corporal Barton R. Humlhanz; Specialist Omead H. Razani;Private First Class Luis A. Perez; Lance Corporal Nickalous N. Aldrich; and Sergeant EdgarE. Lopez.

7. Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed Special Adviser to the United Nations(UN) Secretary-General on January 1, 2004. Brahimi was formerly the UN Special Rep-resentative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and head of the UN Assistance Mis-sion in Afghanistan. He had previously served as the Secretary-General’s Special Envoyfor Afghanistan from July 1997 to October 1999. Between his Afghanistan assignments,Mr. Brahimi served as Under-Secretary-General for Special Assignments in Support of theSecretary-General’s Preventive and Peacemaking efforts. In this capacity, he chaired an in-dependent panel established by Secretary-General Annan to review UN peace operations.Prior to his first Afghanistan appointment, Mr. Brahimi served as Special Representativefor Haiti (from 1994 to 1996) and Special Representative for South Africa (from December1993 to June 1994). In the latter position, he led the United Nations Observer Mission untilthe 1994 democratic elections that resulted in Nelson Mandela taking the presidency ofpostapartheid South Africa. Thus, he was a very experienced and well-respected mediatorfor Iraqi government development.

8. Dr. Iyad Allawi was the cofounder of the London-based Iraqi National Accord (INA),an opposition group supported by the CIA that staged an unsuccessful coup d’etat againstSaddam Hussein in 1996. A secular Shiite, he was a Ba’athist who served in the Iraqi intelli-gence services until falling out with the regime and leaving Iraq in 1971 to study medicinein London. On returning to Iraq, he became a member of the IGC and chair of its secu-rity committee. From the Council on Foreign Relations at http://www.cfr.org/background/background iraq ministers.php.

9. As a part of the ceremony, L. Paul Bremer read the following: “As recognized in U.N.Security Council resolution 1546, the Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to exist onJune 28th, at which point the occupation will end and the Iraqi interim government willassume and exercise full sovereign authority on behalf of the Iraqi people. I welcome Iraq’ssteps to take its rightful place of equality and honor among the free nations of the world.”

10. Allawi was a Ba’ath Party member for 10 years (1961–1971) before going into exilein Beirut and London. After a 1978 assassination attempt, he became even more committedto the cause. In 1990, he formed the INA, his CIA and British intelligence-backed opposi-tion movement, which included many other former Ba’athists who had opposed Saddam


Notes ✯ ✯ ✯ 125

Hussein. Before Saddam was overthrown, the INA operated from Amman, Jordan, but hemoved it to Baghdad in April 2003. According to council members, Allawi was chosen asprime minister because he was most capable of dealing with Iraq’s security; he had beenin charge of security matters in the governing council. He proved to be a very capableadministrator and a firm and decisive leader. See “Allawi Takes on the Job from Hell,” TheEconomist, May 31, 2004.

11. Ambassador Negroponte was a graduate of Yale University and served as Ambassadorto Honduras from 1981 to 1985. He was also Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans andInternational Environmental and Scientific Affairs (1985–1987) and Deputy Assistant tothe President for National Security Affairs (1987–1989) before being named Ambassador toMexico, where he served from 1989 to 1993 and Ambassador to the Philippines from 1993to 1996. Prior to his arrival in Iraq, he had served as the U.S. Ambassador to the UnitedNations from 2001 to 2004.

12. General Casey assumed command of Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I) on July 1from Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, who had commanded Combined Joint TaskForce 7 (CJTF-7) during and after the initial phase of combat operations in Iraq. WhenGeneral Casey assumed command of MNF-I, Lieutenant General Thomas Metz, GeneralSanchez’s deputy commander, assumed command of Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I),which was charged with the operational prosecution of the war in the country under thestrategic guidance of General Casey. Generals Metz and Casey both worked directly forGeneral John Abizaid, the commander of U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida.

13. After General Casey assumed command in Iraq the coalition transitioned to theMultinational Force-Iraq. The terms multinational forces and MNF, will be used from thispoint forward to describe all coalition forces and activities in Iraq.

14. Sheik Ghazi Ajil al-Yawar was a Sunni and an important sheik in the Shammar tribe,one of Iraq’s largest. He was the immediate past president of the Iraqi Governing Council – itspresidency rotated on a monthly basis – and won the support of the majority of its membersfor this post. He won the job after Adnan Pachachi, a former foreign minister, reportedlyrefused an offer from Brahimi. Born in Mosul, Yawar studied engineering at GeorgetownUniversity in Washington, D.C., and spent 15 years in exile in Saudi Arabia. From the Councilon Foreign Relations at http://www.cfr.org/background/background iraq ministers.php.

15. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/najaf.htm.16. The Sunni attacks in Baghdad, Samarra, Ramadi, and Fallujah during the same week

made early April a time of the most serious challenge to coalition control of Iraq.17. The Najaf region was initially secured by American forces of the MEF, which de-

parted Iraq in November 2003. The 1st Armored Division assumed control of the entiresouth central area of Iraq [Multinational Division Central-South (MND-CS)] following thedeparture of the MEF. Later, the Spanish contingent of the coalition was assigned to thearea under the overall control of the Polish Division, which assumed the responsibility forMND-CS. An exclusion zone was set up, comprising the old city of Najaf, the cemetery, andthe town of Kufa, to minimize friction and the appearance of troops in the holy areas of thecity.

18. I MEF and 11th MEU staffs, “Battle for An Najaf, August 2004,” Marine Corps Gazette,December 2004, 10.

19. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who lives in Najaf, is the most respected of the Shiiteimams in Iraq. His position was initially contested by other clerics, including MohammadSadeq al-Sadr, Moqtada al-Sadr’s father, but his role as successor to his teacher Abdul-Qassem Khoei, made him the favorite of most Shia. The assassination of Sadr by Saddam


126 ✯ ✯ ✯ Notes

Hussein made him the most influential Shia cleric in the country. In his role as Ayatollah,Sistani oversees sums amounting to millions of dollars, which he distributes in various ways,including payment for the religious education of would-be scholars across the Muslim world.See http://www.sistani.org/html/eng/.

20. On June 17, a small battalion task force relieved the 2ndACR after the truce. Thissecond unit passed on very few of the pertinent factors of fighting in the area to the Marineswho would follow them – another shortfall in transitioning critical information betweenunits over the course of a relief in place.

21. “This is a revolution against the occupation force until we get independence anddemocracy,” al-Sadr’s spokesman, Ahmed Shaybani, said in a telephone interview withJackie Spinner of The Washington Post; see her “Cleric’s Attack Tests Iraqi Leaders, RebelCleric Declares ‘Revolution’ against U.S. Forces in Iraq,” August 6, 2004.

22. The 11th MEU had been assigned to the area on short notice, as the CENTCOMtheater reserve, working directly for MNC-I (General Metz), after the Spanish contingentwas withdrawn from the coalition. The Spanish government pulled its forces out followingthe intimidation of the Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004.

23. The local police were holding over 100 Mahdi Militiamen. I MEF and 11th MEUstaffs, “Battle for An Najaf, August 2004,” Marine Corps Gazette, December 2004, 12.

24. “A large number of aggressors later confirmed to be members of the radical Shiitecleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s Muqtada Militia, attacked the city of Najaf’s main police stationat 1 A.M. and were quickly repelled by the Iraqi police. Later, at 3 A.M., they attacked again,this time with heavy machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, mortars and small arms.Iraqi National Guardsmen from the 405th Battalion, 50th Iraqi Brigade, were notified andarrived on the scene and helped the Iraqi Police successfully defended the station from theAnti-Iraqi Forces.” Chago Zapata, “11th MEU Battles anti-Iraqi Forces in An Najaf,” MarineCorps News, August 11, 2004. See also Spinner, “Cleric’s Attack Tests Iraqi Leaders, RebelCleric Declares ‘Revolution’ against U.S. Forces in Iraq,” The Washington Post, August 6,2004.


26. Private First Class Raymond J. Faulstich, Jr., of the 7th Transportation Group, fromLeonardtown, Maryland; Sergeant Yadir G. Reynoso, of BLT 1/4 and Wapato, Washington;and Sergeant Moses D. Rocha, of BLT 1/4 and Roswell, New Mexico, all died as a result ofinjuries received from hostile action in Najaf on August 5, 2004.


28. The military term chop is peculiar to naval forces and is based on the acronym for“change of operational control.” It signifies that a unit and responsibility for that unit hasbeen shifted from one commander to another and that the receiving commander has fullauthority to organize and employ the unit as needed.

29. This made good sense for a variety of reasons. Najaf bordered the MEF area ofoperations, the MEF by that time had good situational awareness of Iraq (whereas the MEUhad only just arrived in the country), and a MEU is not normally designed to control theoperations of multiple, subordinate coalition commands in such a large area. At nearlythe same time, the 24th MEU, commanded by Colonel Ron Johnson, was also assigned tocombat operations in Iraq, southwest of Baghdad.

30. On May 27, 2004, the 11th MEU had sailed a month early aboard the USS BelleauWood Expeditionary Strike Group, in response to a request from the U.S. Central Command


Notes ✯ ✯ ✯ 127

for additional forces in Iraq. Comprising BLT 1/4, HMM-166, and MSSG-11, the MEUassumed responsibility for the southern Iraqi provinces of Najaf and Qadisiyah on July 31.

31. Corporal Roberto Abad, Los Angeles, California, and Lance Corporal Larry L. Wells,Mount Hermon, Louisiana, both died of injuries received from hostile action in Najaf onAugust 6, 2004.

32. The fighting in Najaf was close, vicious, and costly; by this time the MEF estimatedthat coalition forces had killed over 450 of the enemy. Staff Sergeant John R. Howard,Covington, Virginia, and Lance Corporal Tavon L. Hubbard, Reston, Virginia, were bothkilled in a helicopter crash on August 11.

33. During this fight, Army Special Forces Captain Michael Yury Tarlavsky from Passaic,New Jersey, was killed in action in Najaf.

34. Second Lieutenant James Michael Goins, Bonner Springs, Kansas; Private First ClassBrandon R. Sapp, Lake Worth, Florida; and Specialist Mark Anthony Zapata, Edinburg,Texas were all killed in action on August 15.

35. Sergeant Harvey E. Parkerson III, of Yuba City, California, was killed during thisaction in Najaf.

36. Lance Corporal Alexander S. Arredondo, from Randolph, Massachusetts, died onAugust 25 as a result of enemy fire.

37. Private First Class Nicholas M. Skinner, of Alpha Company BLT 1/4 and Davenport,Iowa, died as the last combat casualty of the August fighting in Najaf on August 26.

38. The day following the cessation of hostilities in Najaf, Private First Class Luis A.Perez from Theresa, New York, was killed when his vehicle hit a roadside bomb outside ofFallujah.

39. John F. Sattler and Daniel H. Wilson, “Operation AL FAJR: the Battle ofFallujah–Part II,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 2005, 12.

Chapter Four. Shaping Operations Prior to the Assault

1. The AC-130 gunship and its internally mounted 105-millimeter cannon was one ofthe most frequently used and most effective systems delivering lethal fires into Fallujah.

2. Strikes against known, positively identified terrorist leaders, such as Zarqawi, were theonly exception to this rule. The mathematical estimates of collateral damage were knownas “bugsplats” because that term describes the likely damage to the target and any otherobjects nearby.

3. MEF staffers came to call the hospital director “Dr. Bob” because his wildly inac-curate and negative reporting of the facts reminded them of the former Iraqi Minister ofInformation, who had been given the nickname “Baghdad Bob.” Still, the negative infor-mation passed at the hospital was of such a level that the MEF staff always ensured that fulldocumentation of their actions was available to counter any claims of excessive damage.

4. On September 3, the 7th Marines lost Lance Corporal Nicholas Perez of Austin, Texas;Major Alan Rowe of Hagerman, Idaho; Lance Corporal Nicholas Wilt of Tampa, Florida;and 1st Lieutenant Ronald Winchester of Rockville Center, New York. Lance CorporalMichael J. Allred of Hyde Park, Utah; Private First Class David P. Burridge of Lafayette,Louisiana; Lance Corporal Derek L. Gardner of San Juan Capistrano, California; LanceCorporal Quinn A. Keith of Page, Arizona; Lance Corporal Joseph C. McCarthy of Concho,California; Corporal Mick R. Nygardbekowsky of Concord, California; and Lance CorporalLamont N. Wilson of Lawton, Oklahoma were all killed just outside Fallujah on September 6.


128 ✯ ✯ ✯ Notes

Lance Corporal Gardner was from Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division, the otherswere members of 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines.

5. Private First Class Sparks, of Monroeville, Ohio, was assigned to the 1st Battalion,503rd Infantry Regiment.

6. First Lieutenant Alexander E. Wetherbee of Fairfax, Virgina, was assigned to 3rdAssault Amphibian Battalion; Private First Class Jason T. Poindexter of San Angelo, Texas,was assigned to 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment.

7. Thirty-four Marines and soldiers assigned to the MEF died as a result of hostile fire inSeptember 2004 of a total of 80 deaths that month.

8. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin M. Shea was from Washington, D.C. Colonel Nicholson wasmedevaced from the theater to recuperate but was back in Iraq by the following spring asthe division operations officer.

9. Marine fatalities in the Fallujah area during the last 2 weeks of the month includedthe following: Lance Corporal Mathew D. Puckett of Mason, Texas; Corporal Adrian V.Soltau of Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and Corporal Jaygee Meluat of Tamuning, Guam, whoall died September 13. They were assigned to 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion. LanceCorporal Dominic C. Brown of Austin, Texas, and Lance Corporal Michael J. Halalof Glendale, Arizona, also both died September 13 due to a non-combat-related inci-dent; such incidents included vehicle accidents, falls, and drowning, all a constant threatin such a very dangerous environment. They were assigned to Headquarters Battalion,1st Marine Division. On September 15, Lance Corporal Drew M. Uhles of DuQuoin,Illinois, died in combat in western Al Anbar and Lance Corporal Gregory C. Howman ofCharlotte, North Carolina, and 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment was killed near Fallu-jah. First Lieutenant Andrew K. Stern, of Germantown, Tennessee, and 1st Tank Battalion;Corporal Steven A. Rintamaki of Lynnwood, Washington, and 3/1; Corporal Christopher S.Ebert of Mooresboro, North Carolina, and 2/1; Sergeant Timothy Folmar of Sonora, Texas,and 2/5; and Sergeant Benjamin K. Smith of Carterville, Illinois, and 1st Tank Battalion alldied near the end of the month in the Fallujah area of operations.

10. Specialist Jessica L. Cawvey of Normal, Illinois, was killed October 6 in Fallujah,when an improvised explosive device detonated near her convoy vehicle. She was a memberof the Army National Guard 1544th Transportation Company, from Paris, Illinois. PrivateFirst Class Andrew Halverson of Grant, Wisconsin, died October 9 near Fallujah; he wasassigned to 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. In nearby north Babil Province, LanceCorporal Daniel R. Wyatt of Calendonia, Wisconsin, died on October 12. Lance CorporalWyatt was assigned to the Marine Corps Reserve’s 2nd Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment,in Chicago, Illinois. Second Lieutenant Paul M. Felsberg of West Palm Beach, Florida, andLance Corporal Victor A. Gonzalez of Watsonville, California, both died on October 13 asresult of enemy action; they were assigned to 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. ThreeSoldiers died in Ramadi as the tempo of operations increased in the whole region. StaffSergeant Omer T. Hawkins II of Cherry Fork, Ohio, and Private First Class Mark A. Barbret ofShelby Township, Michigan, both from the 44th Engineer Battalion, and Specialist Bradley S.Beard, of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, and the 2nd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regiment,died October 14. Sergeant Douglas E. Bascom of Colorado Springs, Colorado, and 2/5, diedOctober 20. Corporal Brian Oliveira of Raynham, Massachusetts died October 25 frominjuries received from enemy action; he was assigned to 3/1. Private First Class Stephen P.Downing II of Burkesville, Kentucky, died October 28 in Ramadi from small arms fire whileconducting combat operations shaping the Fallujah fight. Private First Class Downing wasassigned to the 2nd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery. The following day, Sergeant Maurice


Notes ✯ ✯ ✯ 129

Keith Fortune, of Forestville, Maryland, and the 2nd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery waskilled in Ramadi when a vehicle-borne IED detonated near his vehicle.

11. John F. Sattler and Daniel H. Wilson, “Operation AL FAJR: the Battle of Fallujah–PartII,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 2005, 18.

12. The Corps Order stated, “MNC-I Forces, in partnership with Iraqi Security Forces,conducts full spectrum counter insurgency operations to destroy AIF operating in Fallujahin order to deny the use of Fallujah as a safe-haven from which AIF project terrorist activityagainst the Iraqi people, IIG and Coalition Forces.”

13. On November 7, the MEF released its FRAGO 427 addressing DC operations toestablish control measures and temporarily provide emergency food, water, shelter, andmedical care to mitigate noncombatant/DC interference with military operations.

14. The Marines from 1/3 killed in this attack included Lance Corporal Jeremy D.Bow of Lemoore, California; Lance Corporal Michael P. Scarborough of Washington,Georgia; Lance Corporal Travis A. Fox of Cowpens, South Carolina; Corporal Christopher J.Lapka of Peoria, Arizona; Lance Corporal John T. Byrd II of Fairview, West Virginia; SergeantKelley L. Courtney of Macon, Georgia, Private First Class Andrew G. Riedel of Northglenn,Colorado; and Private First Class John Lukac of Las Vegas, Nevada. The next day, FirstLieutenant Matthew D. Lynch of Jericho, New York, died from an IED attack in Fallujah.Lieutenant Lynch was assigned to 2/5.

15. It was impossible to completely surround the city because it was bordered by theEuphrates River. Some insurgents undoubtedly escaped by the river at night.

Chapter Five. Assault Operations

1. Corporal Jeremiah A. Baro of Fresno, California, and Lance Corporal Jared P. Hubbardof Clovis, California, both died November 4 from injuries received as a result of enemyaction; they were assigned to 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. Three members of thefamed British Blackwatch regiment, Sergeant Stuart Gray, Private Paul Lowe, and PrivateScott McArdle, died while manning a vehicle checkpoint, east of the Euphrates River, nearFallujah on November 5. Lance Corporal Sean M. Langley of Lexington, Kentucky, diedNovember 7 from injuries received as a result of enemy action outside of Fallujah; he wasassigned to 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. Also on that day, Corporal Joshua D.Palmer of Blandinsville, Illinois, and Lance Corporal Jeffrey Lam of Queens, New York, diedearly November 8 as a result of a nonhostile vehicle incident in the Euphrates River westof Fallujah; both men was assigned to the Marine Corps Reserve’s 6th Engineer SupportBattalion, 4th Force Service Support Group, headquartered in Portland, Oregon.

2. The media reported the appointment after the attack had started; see http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200411/s1240087.htm.

3. Given their recent experience under Saddam, the Iraqis felt that written authority wasvery important. Lacking such a document bothered General Abdul-Qader for days.

4. General Abdul-Qader was completely dependent on the MEF staff for everythingfrom communications to food, yet he frequently demonstrated his independence of mindin briefings with the commander of the MNF, General George Casey, the U.S. Ambassador,John Negroponte, and even his own Minister of Defense.

5. For example, the “no weapons” policy he directed in Fallujah was an exception to thepolicy everywhere in Iraq and would certainly have been opposed had it been announcedby a U.S. commander.


130 ✯ ✯ ✯ Notes

6. The rules established by General Abdul-Qader for Fallujah residents were harsh, butwell founded, and surprisingly none of the residents disputed them.

7. Lieutenant Colonel Dave Bellon of 1st Marines wrote in an email home, “Hon-est to God, I don’t think I saw a single Marine even distracted by the enemy fire.Their squad leaders, and platoon commanders had them prepared and they were ex-ecuting their assigned tasks.” Viewed at The Greenside, http://www.thegreenside.com/story.asp?ContentID=11151.

8. Several members of the hospital staff had given frequent interviews indicating largenumbers of civilian casualties during past actions in the city. They were so frequentlyinterviewed, and so very critical of the coalition, that Marines referred to them collectivelyas “Dr. Bob,” a reference to “Baghdad Bob,” the Iraqi Minister of Information during OIF I.

9. That patient was evacuated to another hospital in Ramadi.10. There was some concern that the prime minister might waiver in his convictions

at the last minute and decide to pursue more negotiations (he had already been receivingSunni spokesmen from the city for weeks), but with the 36th Commando attack it was clearthat Allawi would not waiver.

11. See http://www.thegreenside.com/story.asp?ContentID=11151.12. Ibid.13. Jackie Spinner and Karl Vick, “U.S. Forces Launch Attack on Fallujah,” The

Washington Post, November 8, 2004.14. A few reporters actually took up the insurgent offer to cover their side. Film and

photos exist of the first day’s fighting from the insurgent viewpoint. How these reportersescaped the fate of the insurgents and got out of the city remains unknown.

15. Marines often found thick wads of crisp, new $100 bills in these insurgents’ pockets.16. No Marines or Soldiers died in combat in Fallujah on November 8. Elsewhere in Al

Anbar province, five members of the coalition lost their lives in the shaping actions designedto isolate the city. They were Corporal Nathaniel T. Hammond of Tulsa, Oklahoma; LanceCorporal Shane K. O’Donnell of DeForest, Wisconsin; Lance Corporal Branden P. Rameyof Boone, Illinois; Corporal Robert P. Warns II of Waukesha, Wisconsin (all three of 2ndBattalion, 24th Marines); Staff Sergeant David G. Ries of Clark, Washington; and PrivatePita Tukutukuwaqa of the United Kingdom’s Blackwatch Regiment.

17. Kevin Sites, “Street by Street,” November 10, 2004, found at www.kevinsites.net/2004 11 07 archive.html.

18. Ibid.19. Ten Marines and Soldiers died in the fighting in the city on November 9. They were

Command Sergeant Major Steven W. Faulkenburg of Huntingburg, Indiana (he was as-signed to 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment.); Sergeant Lonny D. Wells of Vandergrift,Pennsylvania, and 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment; Lance Corporal Juan E. Segura ofHomestead, Florida; Sergeant William C. James of Huntington Beach, California; LanceCorporal Nicholas D. Larson of Wheaton, Illinois; Lance Corporal Nathan R. Wood ofKirkland, Washington; Lance Corporal Abraham Simpson of Chino, California (all fourof these Marines were assigned to 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment); Staff SergeantRussell L. Slay of Humble, Texas (he was assigned to 2nd Assault Amphibian Battalion);Sergeant David M. Caruso of Naperville, Illinois (he was assigned to 2nd Force Reconnais-sance Company); and Staff Sergeant Todd R. Cornell of West Bend, Wisconsin. SergeantCornell was assigned to the Army Reserve’s 1st Battalion, 339th Infantry Regiment, Fraser,Michigan.


Notes ✯ ✯ ✯ 131

20. Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “Press Release, Iraqi, U.S. General De-scribe Campaign to Liberate Fallujah,” November 10, 2004; see http://iraq.usembassy.gov/iraq/041111 Iraqi u.s. generals.html.

21. First Lieutenant Dan T. Malcom, Jr., of Brinson, Georgia, died November 10 as aresult of enemy action in Fallujah. He was assigned to 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment.Petty Officer Third Class Julian Woods of Jacksonville, Florida; Lance Corporal Erick J.Hodges of Bay Point, California (he was assigned to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment);Lance Corporal Aaron C. Pickering of Marion, Illinois (he was assigned to 1st Battalion,3rd Marine Regiment); Staff Sergeant Gene Ramirez of San Antonio, Texas (he was assignedto 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment); Corporal Romulo J. Jimenez II of Bellington, WestVirgina (he was assigned to 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment); and Lance Corporal WesleyJ. Canning of Friendswood, Texas (he was assigned to 2nd Assault Amphibian Battalion)were also killed in the city that day. In Ramadi, Private First Class Dennis J. Miller, Jr., ofLa Salle, Michigan, died when his unit came under enemy attack and a rocket-propelledgrenade struck his M1A1 Abrams tank. Miller was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 72ndArmor Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division.

22. General Abdul-Qader was quoted saying, “We have found hostage slaughter-houses in Fallujah that were used by these people and the black clothing that theyused to wear to identify themselves, hundreds of CDs and whole records with namesof hostages.” The Associated Press, “Iraq Troops Find ‘Hostage Slaughterhouses,’” USAToday, November 10, 2004. For additional coverage of insurgent atrocities, see MathewMcAllester, “Hostage ‘Slaughterhouses’ Found in Fallujah,” The Age, November 12, 2004,found at www.theage.com.us/articles/2004/11/11/1100131133071.html; Cable News Net-work, “Troops Find Hostage ‘Slaughterhouses’ in Falluja,” November 11, 2004, found athttp://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/11/10/iraq.main/; and James Hider, “US ForcesHunt down Guerrillas in Fallujah’s Shooting Gallery,” TimesOnLine, November 13, 2004,found at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,737-1356086,00.html.

23. At the time, there were two prominent females missing in Iraq, Margaret Hassan andTeresa Borcz. A video was later released showing a woman thought to be Hassan being exe-cuted in Iraq; Borcz was later freed. See News24, “Mutilated Blonde Corpse Found,” Novem-ber 14, 2004, at www.news24.com/News24/World/Iraq/0,,2-10-1460 1620777,00.html.

24. Free Press News Service, “Insurgent Leaders Likely Fled Fallujah,” The Detroit FreePress, November 11, 2004. Found at www.freep.com.

25. Lance Corporal Justin D. Reppuhn of Hemlock, Michigan, died November 11 asa result of enemy action in the fight for Fallujah (he was assigned to 3rd Light ArmoredReconnaissance Battalion). Also killed on November 11 were Corporal Theodore A. Bowlingof Casselberry, Florida, and 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment; Staff Sergeant Theodore S.Holder II of Littleton, Colorado (he was assigned to 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment);Second Lieutenant James P. Blecksmith of San Marino, California (Blecksmith was assignedto 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division); and Lance Corporal KyleW. Burns of Laramie, Wyoming (he was assigned to 1st Light Armored ReconnaissanceBattalion). Just outside Fallujah, Staff Sergeant Sean P. Huey of Fredericktown, Pennsylvania,died in Habbaniyah, Iraq, when a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated nearhis Humvee. Sergeant Huey was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment,2nd Infantry Division.

26. Al Jazeera, “Fighting in Falluja Rages amid Confusion,” November 11,2004, found at http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/554FAF3A-B267-427A-B9EC-54881BDE0A2E.htm.


132 ✯ ✯ ✯ Notes

27. “Mosques Bombed in Falluja Fighting” can be found at http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/6E722418-6B50-4D2A-93E1-77C9A8FC6DAC.htm and “Falluja FacingHumanitarian Crisis” at http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/CC347D0D-663E-4BE6-A2C9-BB128D2997D9.htm.

28. Sergeant Morgan W. Strader of Crossville, Indiana, died November 12 as result ofenemy action in Fallujah. Strader was assigned to 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment.Corporal Nathan R. Anderson of Howard, Ohio (he was assigned to 1st Battalion, 8thMarine Regiment); Lance Corporal David M. Branning of Cockeysville, Maryland; LanceCorporal Brian A. Medina of Woodbridge, Virgina (both were assigned to 1st Battalion,3rd Marine Regiment); First Lieutenant Edward D. Iwan of Albion, Nebraska; and SergeantJames C. Matteson of Celoron, New York, were killed when a rocket-propelled grenadestruck their Bradley fighting vehicle. They were assigned to the Army’s 2nd Battalion, 2ndInfantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, Vilseck, Germany. Sergeant Jonathan B. Shieldsof Atlanta, Georgia, also died on November 12 when he was accidentally struck by a tank.Shields was assigned to the Army’s 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment (Armor), 1st CavalryDivision, Fort Hood, Texas. Lance Corporal Nicholas H. Anderson of Las Vegas, Nevada, andCorporal Jarrod L. Maher of Imogene, Iowa, both lost their lives as a result of non-combatincidents near Abu Ghraib.

29. See CBS News, “22 GIs Killed in Fallujah Fighting,” November 12, 2004, found atwww.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/13/iraq.

30. See The Associated Press, “U.S. Clears Marine in Mosque Shooting,” The Inter-national Herald Tribune, May 6, 2005, found at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/06/news/abuse.php and “Marine Involved in Mosque Shooting Will Not Face CourtMartial,” Henderson Hall News, May 13, 2005, found at www.dcmilitary.com/marines/hendersonhall/10 19/national news/34870.html.

31. Eight warriors died on November 13 supporting the fighting in Fallujah: CaptainSean P. Sims of El Paso, Texas, and TF 2-2; Lance Corporal Victor R. Lu of Los Angeles,California, and 3/5; Lance Corporal Justin D. McLeese of Covington, Louisiana, and 3/1;Lance Corporal Benjamin S. Bryan of Lumberton, North Carolina, and 3/1; SpecialistJose A. Velez of Lubbock, Texas, and TF 2-7; Sergeant Byron W. Norwood of Pflugerville,Texas, and 3/1; Lance Corporal Justin M. Ellsworth of Mount Pleasant, Michigan, andthe 1st FSSG; and Corporal Kevin J. Dempsey of Monroe, Connecticut, and 2nd ReconBattalion.

32. Four Marines lost their lives in Fallujah on November 14. They were Lance CorporalGeorge J. Payton of Culver City, California, and 3/5; Corporal Nicholas L. Ziolkowski ofTowson, Maryland, and 1/8; and Corporals Dale A. Burger, Jr., of Bel Air, Maryland, andAndres H. Perez of Santa Cruz, California, both of 3/1.

33. See New24, “No Stone Unturned in Fallujah,” November 14, 2004, atwww.news24.com/News24/World/Iraq/0,,2-10-1460 1620938,00.html.

34. Because of a bombing strike on the one essential water pumping station in the city,a large area of central Fallujah was covered by over 6 inches of Euphrates River water forweeks.

35. Lieutenant Colonel Leonard Defrancisci’s Civil Affairs Detachment 4-4 had beenassisting local Iraqis with enemy burials in Fallujah, but as the numbers of enemy dead rosesome other method of properly handling the corpses had to be found.

36. James Hider, “US Forces Hunt down Guerillas in Fallujah’s Shooting Gallery,”TimesOnLine, November 13, 2004, found at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,7374-1356086,00.html.


Notes ✯ ✯ ✯ 133

37. This important accomplishment in Fallujah cost the lives of Lance Corporal JeramyA. Ailes of Gilroy, California; Lance Corporal Travis R. Desiato of Bedford, Massachusetts;Sergeant Rafael Peralta of San Diego, California; Corporal Marc T. Ryan of Gloucester,New Jersey; Lance Corporal James E. Swain of Kokomo, Indiana; Lance Corporal BradleyL. Parker of Marion, West Virginia, and 1/8; Lance Corporal Shane E. Kielion of La Vista,Nebraska, and 3/5; Lance Corporal Antoine D. Smith of Orlando, Florida, and 3/5; andLance Corporal William L. Miller of Pearland, Texas, and 1/8. Also killed that day, inRamadi, were Captain Patrick Marc M. Rapicault of St. Augustine, Florida, and CorporalLance M. Thompson of Upland, Indiana, both of 2/5.

38. I Marine Expeditionary Force, “Marines Reopen Fallujah Bridge,” Marine CorpsNews, story 20041112015126, found at www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf.

Chapter Six. Clearing and Searching

1. CBS News, “U.S. Takes Fallujah,” found at www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/15/iraq.html.

2. Oliver North, “Hero in Fallujah: Marine Laid Himself on Top of Grenade to Save Rest ofSquad,” Human Events Online, December 16, 2004, found at www.humaneventsonline.com.

3. CBS News, “GIs May Have Found Zarqawi Base,” found at www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/19/iraq.html.

4. Sergeant Christopher T. Heflin of Paducah, Kentucky, and 3/1, and Lance Corpo-ral Louis W. Qualls of Temple, Texas, and 2nd Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment, 4thMarine Division, both lost their lives in Fallujah on November 16. Lance Corporal MichaelW. Hanks of Gregory, Michigan, and 3/1 died November 17. On November 18, LanceCorporal Luis A. Figueroa of Los Angeles, California, and 3/1 lost his life in the city.Also on that day, Army Sergeant Joseph M. Nolan of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, died inFallujah when an improvised explosive device detonated near his up-armored Humvee.Nolan was assigned to the 312th Military Intelligence Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, FortHood, Texas. During the following 2 days, Lance Corporal Dimitrios Gavriel of New York,New York, and 1/8; Lance Corporal Phillip G. West of American Canyon, California, and3/1; Corporal Bradley T. Arms of Charlottesville, Virginia, and the 4th Combat Engi-neer Battalion; Lance Corporal Demarkus D. Brown, of Martinsville, Virginia, and 1/8;Corporal Michael A. Downey of Phoenix, Arizona, and 1/3; Corporal Joseph J. Herediaof Santa Maria, California, and 3/5; and Lance Corporal Joseph T. Welke of Rapid City,South Dakota, and 3/1 all died. Downey died at National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda,Maryland, from wounds received as a result of enemy action on November 11. Herediadied November 20 at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, from wounds receivedas a result of enemy action on November 10. Welke died November 20 at Landstuhl Re-gional Medical Center, Germany, from wounds received as a result of enemy action onNovember 19.

5. This first group did include the Deputy Minister of Industry, Mr. Mohamed AbdullahMohamed, and the man who would eventually make the new Fallujah possible, Mr. BasilMahmoud. It was a strange and strained meeting that succeeded because everyone wascommitted to the same goal – although at the time, no one knew how they would worktogether to accomplish such a task.

6. CBS News, “Troops Find Massive Arms Caches,” November 25, 2004, found atwww.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/26/iraq.html.


134 ✯ ✯ ✯ Notes

7. From November 20 to November 30, ten Marines and two Soldiers lost their livesas a result of the continued fighting in Fallujah. They were Corporal Michael R. Cohenof Jacobus, Pennsylvania, and 1/3; Sergeant Benjamin C. Edinger of 2nd Force Recon-naissance Company and Green Bay, Wisconsin (he died November 23 at Bethesda frominjuries received November 14); Corporal Kirk J. Bosselmann of Napa, California, and1/8; Lance Corporal Bradley M. Faircloth of Mobile, Alabama, and 1/8; Lance CorporalJeffery S. Holmes of White River Junction, Vermont; and Lance Corporal David B. Houck ofWinston-Salem, North Carolina, and 1/8; Lance Corporal Joshua E. Lucero of Tucson, Ari-zona, and 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion; and Sergeant Nicholas S. Nolte of Falls City,Nebraska, and 2nd Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion (who died November 24 at Bethesdafrom injuries received November 9). Corporal Gentian Marku of Warren, Michigan, and1/8 died November 25, and Lance Corporal Blake A. Magaoay of Pearl City, Hawaii, and1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion died November 29. When an improvised ex-plosive device detonated near their military vehicle, Army Sergeants Pablo A. Calderon,of Brooklyn, New York, and Jose Guereca, Jr., of Missouri City, Texas, were both killed inaction. They were assigned to 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division,Fort Hood, Texas.

8. Two Marines died in Al Anbar province on December 3 guarding the border crossinginto Iraq. They were Corporal Binh N. Le of Alexandria, Virginia, and Corporal Matthew A.Wyatt of Millstadt, Illinois. Both Marines died from injuries because of a suicide car bomb.They were assigned to 5th Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment.

9. Three soldiers assigned to I MEF died December 5 in Habbaniyah, Iraq, when animprovised explosive device detonated near their vehicle. They were assigned to the 1stBattalion, 506th Infantry Regiment. Killed were Staff Sergeant Marvin L. Trost III of Goshen,Indiana; Specialist Edwin W. Roodhouse of San Jose, California; and Staff Sergeant KyleA. Eggers of Euless, Texas. Two days later, another soldier from the same battalion died ina similar IED attack. He was Sergeant First Class Todd C. Gibbs of Angelina, Texas, whodied in Khalidiyah, Iraq, when an improvised explosive device detonated while his unit wason a dismounted patrol. On December 8, Sergeant Arthur C. Williams IV of Edgewater,Florida, and the 44th Engineer Battalion, died in Ramadi when his unit was conducting adismounted patrol and was attacked by small arms fire.

10. See CBS News, “Fortress Fallujah Awaits Returnees,” December 9, 2004, found atwww.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/12/09/iraq.html.

11. 1st Marine Division After Action presentation, “Operation Al Fajr, the Battle forFallujah,” undated.

12. For a summary of the speech, see http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/006101.php#iraqi. For interpretation of bin Laden’s message, see also the Middle East Me-dia Research Institute web site: http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP83704.

13. This was one of several references to the lack of equipment on the part of theinsurgents in comparison with the American forces, who did fight with protective helmetsand flack jackets.

Chapter Seven. Civil–Military Operations: The Bridgeto a New Fallujah

1. During the first week of the new year, three Marines lost their lives in combat inAl Anbar province. The first of these was Sergeant Thomas E. Houser of Council Bluffs,


Notes ✯ ✯ ✯ 135

Iowa, who died January 3; he was assigned to 2nd Force Reconnaissance Company. SergeantZachariah S. Davis of Twentynine Palms, California, died January 6 as result of hostileaction in Al Anbar province, Iraq. He was assigned to 3rd Light Armored ReconnaissanceBattalion. Also on January 6, Lance Corporal Julio C. Cisneros Alvarez of Pharr, Texas, died;he was assigned to 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment.

2. During the second week of the year, the action in Al Anbar province had shifted wellaway from Fallujah as the Division began to execute a series of operations targeting thenorthern “ratlines” leading into the country. Three Marines and one Soldier were killedduring these efforts. They were Corporal Joseph E. Fite of Round Rock, Texas, who diedJanuary 9. He was assigned to the Marine Forces Reserve’s 1st Battalion, 23rd MarineRegiment. Specialist Michael J. Smith of Media, Pennsylvania, died January 11 in Ramadi,when his military vehicle was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. Smith was assigned to1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry. Lance Corporal Matthew W. Holloway of Fulton, Texas,and Lance Corporal Juan R. Rodriguez Velasco of El Cenizo, Texas, both died January 13from combat injuries; both were also assigned to Marine Forces Reserve’s 1st Battalion,23rd Marine Regiment.

3. On April 14, 1995, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Counciladopted resolution 986, establishing the Oil for Food program, providing Iraq with anotheropportunity to sell oil to finance the purchase of humanitarian goods and various mandatedUN activities concerning Iraq. From these funds, every Iraqi family eventually received amonthly allocation of food and household essentials such as soap and cooking oil. Thesesupplies were disbursed by the Ministry of Trade in Iraq through local food stores, using anOil for Food Program identification card that included the residential information for thefamily. See: http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/index.html.

4. Staff Sergeant Thomas E. Vitagliano of New Haven, Connecticut; Private First ClassGeorge R. Geer of Cortez, Colorado; and Private First Class Jesus Fonseca of Marietta,Georgia, all died January 17 in Ramadi, when a vehicle-borne improvised explosive devicedetonated near their position. They were assigned to the 1st Battalion, 503rd InfantryRegiment, 2nd Infantry Division.

5. See Edward Wong, “Insurgent Leader in Iraq Vows to Wage Protracted HolyWar,” New York Times International, January 20, 2005. For additional information onthe statement released by Zarqawi, see http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/21/iraq/main668296.shtml, and http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,144928,00.html.

6. There was a Jordanian field hospital that had been established east of Fallujah onHighway 10 in the aftermath of the first battle for the city, but no Jordanian forces partici-pated in the November assault.

7. For additional background, see www.ieciraq.org. The Commission was formed in linewith the U.N. Security Council Resolutions No. 1483 and No. 1511 that stressed upon therights of the Iraqi People to choose in full freedom its political future and in line withthe Iraqi State Administrative Law for the Transitional Period (TAL), which stipulates thatthe Iraqi People should choose its government by way of free and trustworthy elections.

8. In the period preceding the election, five Marines and one Soldier died conductingoperations in Al Anbar province. Sergeant Jesse W. Strong of Irasburg, Vermont; CorporalJonathan W. Bowling of Patrick, Virginia; Lance Corporal Karl R. Linn of Chesterfield,Virginia; and Corporal Christopher L. Weaver of Fredericksburg, Virginia, were all killedon January 26 in Haditha, Iraq. They were all assigned to the Marine Corps Reserve’s4th Combat Engineer Battalion. Specialist James H. Miller IV of Cincinnati, Ohio, diedJanuary 30 in Ramadi from an improvised explosive device detonation near his vehicle.Miller was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry Regiment.


136 ✯ ✯ ✯ Notes

9. Those killed in this accident included Captain Paul C. Alaniz of Corpus Christi, Texas;Lance Corporal Jonathan E. Etterling of Wheelersburg, Ohio; Captain Lyle L. Gordon ofMidlothian, Texas; Lance Corporal Brian C. Hopper of Wynne, Arkansas; Lance CorporalSaeed Jafarkhani-Torshizi, Jr., of Fort Worth, Texas; Corporal Sean P. Kelly of Gloucester,New Jersey; Staff Sergeant Dexter S. Kimble of Houston, Texas; Lance Corporal Allan Kleinof Clinton Township, Michigan; Corporal James L. Moore of Roseburg, Oregon; LanceCorporal Mourad Ragimov of San Diego, California; Lance Corporal Rhonald D. Rairdanof San Antonio, Texas; Lance Corporal Hector Ramos of Aurora, Illinois; Lance CorporalDarrell J. Schumann of Hampton, Virginia; 1st Lieutenant Dustin M. Shumney of Vallejo,California; Corporal Matthew R. Smith of West Valley, Utah; Lance Corporal Joseph B.Spence of Scotts Valley, California; Petty Officer Third Class John D. House of Ventura,California; Staff Sergeant Brian D. Bland of Weston, Wyoming; Sergeant Michael W. Finke,Jr., of Huron, Ohio; 1st Lieutenant Travis J. Fuller of Granville, Massachusetts; CorporalTimothy M. Gibson of Hillsborough, New Hampshire; Corporal Richard A. Gilbert, Jr.,of Montgomery, Ohio; Corporal Kyle J. Grimes of Northampton, Pennsylvania; LanceCorporal Tony L. Hernandez of Canyon Lake, Texas; Corporal Nathaniel K. Moore ofChampaign, Illinois; Lance Corporal Gael Saintvil of Orange, Florida; Corporal Nathan A.Schubert of Cherokee, Iowa; Corporal Timothy A. Knight of Brooklyn, Ohio; and, LanceCorporal Michael L. Starr, Jr., of Baltimore, Maryland. All these men died when theirCH-53E helicopter crashed near Ar Rutbah. Alaniz, Gordon, and Kimble were assigned toMarine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361, Marine Aircraft Group 16, 3rd Marine AircraftWing. The others were assigned to 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment.

10. Lance Corporal Nazario Serrano of Irving, Texas, died on Election Day in Al Anbarprovince; he was assigned to the Combat Service Support Battalion 1, Combat ServiceSupport Group 11, 1st Force Service Support Group. Also killed that day was Army SpecialistJames H. Miller IV of Cincinnati, Ohio, who died in Ramadi from injuries from an IED thatdetonated near his vehicle. Specialist Miller was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 503d InfantryRegiment, 2nd Infantry Division.

Chapter Eight. A New Dawn: Lessons in Modern Warfare

1. The second worst month was the previous April, the month of the first battle inFallujah; see http://icasualties.org/oif/USchart.aspx.

2. Kaplan, “The Real Story of Fallujah.” Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2004, 20.3. In Iraq, the modern U.S. military’s consistent effort to minimize casualties to U.S.

forces caused by U.S. or other coalition units [blue (friendly) force injuries on other blueforces] was expanded to cover host nation Iraqi security forces as well. Thus, the terms greenon blue and blue on green came into vogue as well.

4. The formal Department of Defense definition is “the activities of a commander thatestablish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmentaland nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in afriendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to facilitate military operations, to consolidateand achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performanceby military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional,or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to othermilitary actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military


Notes ✯ ✯ ✯ 137

forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.” Department of DefenseDictionary, Joint Pub 0-2.

5. There were problems, particularly initially. Theft, inappropriate weapons firing, andheavy-handedness by Iraqi soldiers were a frequent source of complaints by the residentsin the early weeks. There were also complaints that ambulances were not given sufficientfreedom of movement and that the entry control points caused long lines and delays inentering the city. Overall, however, the performance of the forces in Fallujah was roundlyapplauded.

6. It was obvious to most military serving in and around Fallujah that the ICRC wassympathetic to, if not supporting, the insurgency in Iraq. There were a few ICRC convoysthat toured Fallujah, but the entire ICRC aid effort in the city provided nothing of real valueto the population.

7. Of course, resources and understanding are not sufficient. A cadre of officers that reallyunderstand the cultural and religious intricacies of the local area and have negotions andpublic works skills needs to be continually developed within the civil affairs communitiesof both the Army and Marine Corps to make the CMOC tool work.

8. Sunni minority interests were always important, and the prime minister understoodwell the fine line he needed to walk to gain inclusion and yet to resist a negative reactionfrom other parties.

9. Fallujah sits on the banks of the Euphrates River, but much of the city is under thewater level. Fallujah flooded significantly during the fighting (because of broken watermains and pumps), and immediate action was required to get 10 large pump stations backup in operation to keep the water off the streets.

10. Every Iraqi who voted had his/her right index finger marked with blue dye. Insurgentshad claimed all such fingers would be cut off. It took commitment and bravery to gain thepurple finger.

11. “3,000 Americans and 2,000 Iraqis launched a major offensive against insurgents inthe city of Samarra on October 1, 2004. Troops of the 202nd Iraqi National Guard Battalion,7th Iraqi Army Battalion, and 1st Infantry Division were part of the attacking force. . . . U.Sofficials estimated that there were anywhere from 500 to 1,000 insurgents entrenched in thecity. . . . on October 4, 2004 coalition forces were able to claim victory. That same day theU.S military announced that the operation resulted in about 125 rebels killed and 88 werebeing detained. Operations in Samarra then shifted to civil-military operations designed atrepairing parts of the city’s infrastructure and improving basic services.” Overview foundat http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oif-baton-rouge.htm.

12. For an assessment of the success in Sadr City, see Jacon Silverberg, “Iraq’s Sadr CityUnder Control,” The Washington Times, August 13, 2005, 13.

Postscript

1. Andy Mosher, “Blast Kills at Least 2 Marines, Injures 13,” Washington Post, June 25,2005, A16. Lance Corporal Holly A. Charette from Cranston, Rhode Island, and CorporalRamona M. Valdez of Bronx, New York (both from Headquarters Battalion, 2nd MarineDivision); Lance Corporal Veashna Muy of Los Angeles, California and Corporal Chad W.Powell, of West Monroe, Louisiana (both from 8th Marine Regiment); Petty Officer 1st ClassRegina R. Clark of Centralia, Washington; and Naval Construction Regiment Detachment30, Port Hueneme, California, all died June 23 from wounds sustained when a suicide,


138 ✯ ✯ ✯ Notes

vehicle-borne IED struck their vehicle in Fallujah. The following day, Corporal CarlosPineda, from Los Angeles, California, died from wounds sustained from enemy small-armsfire while conducting combat operations in Fallujah. He was also assigned to 8th Marines.

2. Ellen Kickmeyer, “14 Marines Die in Huge Explosion in Western Iraq,” The WashingtonPost, August 4, 2005, A01. Lance Corporal Michael J. Cifuentes of Fairfield, Ohio; LanceCorporal Grant B. Fraser of Anchorage, Alaska; Lance Corporal Aaron H. Reed of Chilli-cothe, Ohio; Lance Corporal Edward A. Schroeder II of Columbus, Ohio; Lance CorporalKevin G. Waruinge of Tampa, Florida; Lance Corporal William B. Wightman of Sabina,Ohio; Lance Corporal Timothy M. Bell Jr. of West Chesterfield, Ohio; Lance Corporal EricJ. Bernholtz of Grove City, Ohio; Lance Corporal Nicholas William B. Bloem of Belgrade,Montana; Sergeant Bradley J. Harper of Dresden, Ohio; Sergeant Justin F. Hoffman ofDelaware, Ohio; Corporal David Kenneth J. Kreuter of Cincinnati, Ohio; Corporal DavidS. Stewart of Bogalusa, Louisiana; and Lance Corporal Christopher J. Dyer of Cincinnati,Ohio, were killed in the attack. All of these Marines died when the amphibious assaultvehicle in which they were riding was hit by an IED while conducting combat operationssouth of Hadditha, Iraq. They were all members of the 3rd Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment,4th Marine Division, Cleveland Ohio.

3. Jonathan Finer and Hasan Shammari, “10 Marines Killed in Fallujah Blast,” TheWashington Post, December 3, 2005, A01. Staff Sergeant Daniel J. Clay of Pensacola, Florida;Lance Corporal John M. Holmason of Surprise, Arizona; Lance Corporal David A. Huhn ofPortland, Michigan; Lance Corporal Adam W. Kaiser of Naperville, Illinois; Lance CorporalRobert A. Martinez of Splendora, Texas; Corporal Anthony T. McElveen of Little Falls,Minnesota; Lance Corporal Scott T. Modeen of Hennepin, Minnesota; Lance CorporalAndrew G. Patten of Byron, Illinois; Sergeant Andy A. Stevens of Tomah, Wisconsin; andLance Corporal Craig N. Watson of Union City, Michigan, were all killed near an abandonedflour factory being used as a patrol base when the IED detonated. All 10 were assigned tothe 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment.

4. Saad Sarhan and Omar Fekeiki, “U.S. Forces Give Iraqis Full Control of Najaf,” TheWashington Post, September 7, 2005, 20.

5. On Tal Afar, see Richrad A. Oppel, Jr., “Under Pressure, Rebels Abandon an IraqiStronghold,” New York Times, September 12, 2005, A6; also Kathleen T. Rehm, “CommanderDescribes Routing Foreign Fighters from Tal Afar,” American Forces Information Service,September 16, 2005.

6. Several authors and thinkers have espoused an “oilspot” strategy designed to relent-lessly reduce the freedom of movement of the insurgent groups and then eliminate the areasthat remain open to them, one after another, until no “spots” remain as sanctuaries. Someof this has already occurred. See Andrew F. Krepinevich, “How to Win in Iraq,” ForeignAffairs, September/October 2005, 87–104.

7. This judgment made by General Robert H. Scales in his “The Emerging Iraqi Army,”The Washington Times, October 14, 2005, 23, was echoed by many other experienced militaryofficers who visited Iraqi units in 2005.

8. Micheal Fumento, “Fallujah Rises from the Ashes,” The Washington Times, June 6,2005, 20.


Glossary

✯✯✯

AAV Amphibious Assault Vehicle

Abdul-Qater, Mohammed Iraqi General, Military Governor of Al Anbarprovince

Abizaid, John General, U.S. Army, Commander, U.S. CentralCommand

Abrams M1A2 main battle tank of the United States

AC-130 Dual-engine gunship aircraft

ACOG Advanced Combat Optical Gunsite

ACR Armored Cavalry Regiment

A-day For operation Al Fajr, the day of the main attack,November 8

AH-1 Small attack helicopter used by Marines

AIF Anti-Iraqi Forces

AK-47 Semi-automatic rifle

Al Anbar Westernmost province of Iraq

Al Fajr Name of the November assault on Fallujah, meaning “newdawn” in Arabic

Al Jazeera Arabic language television network

Al Qaeda Terrorist organization inspired by Osama bin Laden

Al Qaim City in northwestern Iraq, on the Syrian border

Allawi, Iyad Prime Minister of Iraq in 2004

Andalus First district of Fallujah to be resettled


140 ✯ ✯ ✯ Glossary

AO Area of Operations

AV-8B Jet attack aircraft used by the Marines

Ba’ath Party Ruling party of Iraq under Saddam Hussein

BATS Biometric Automated Toolset System

BCT Brigade Combat Team

BIAP Baghdad International Airport

Biometric ID Card Identification card based on computer-generated data fromretina scan and finger prints

BLT Battalion Landing Team

Blue on Blue Friendly fire

Bradley Armored fighting vehicle of the U.S. Army

Brahimi Lakhdar Special Representative of the United NationsSecretary General in Iraq

Bravo Surgical Navy Medical Company in Camp Fallujah

Bremer, L. Paul U.S. Administrator in Iraq

C2 Command and Control

CA Civil Affairs

CACOM Civil Affairs Command

Camp Blue Diamond Base of operations for the 1st Marine Division, inside thecity of Ramadi

Camp Fallujah Base of operations for the MEF, located only a few mileseast of the city of Fallujah

CAP Civic Action Program

CAS Close Air Support

Casey, George General, U.S. Army, Commander, MultinationalForce-Iraq

CAV Cavalry

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CG Commanding General

CH-47 Troop-carrying helicopter

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force

CMO Civil–military operations

CMOC Civil–Military Operations Center

Conway, James Marine general, commander of I MEF 2002–2004

CP Command Post

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

DCG Deputy Commanding General

D-day The day major operations commence, for Al Fajr,November 7, 2004


Glossary ✯ ✯ ✯ 141

de-Ba’athification Exclusion of members of the Ba’ath Party from any form ofgovernment service in the new Iraq

DET Detachment

Dunford, Joseph Marine general, assistant division commander,1st Marine Division

ECP Entry Control Point

EST Election Support Team

Fallujah Predominantly Sunni city just west of Baghdad

Fallujah Brigade Iraqi organization developed to monitor Fallujah

Fallujahn Resident of Fallujah

Farquhar, Andrew British General, deputy commander, MNC-I

F-15 Fighter used by the U.S. Air Force

F/A-18 Fighter/Attack aircraft used by the Navy and Marines

FLT Fallujah Liaison Team

FOB Forward Operating Base

FRAGO Fragmentary Order

FRE Former Regime Elements

FSSG Force Service Support Group

G1 General Staff, Personnel

G3 General Staff, Operations

G5 General Staff, Plans

GBU Guided Bomb Unit

GPS Global Positioning System

HA Humanitarian assistance

Habbaniyah Town between Fallujah and Ramadi

Hadditha City in Al Anbar, site of a hydroelectric dam

Hadid, Omar Insurgent leader in Fallujah

Haslem, Anthony Colonel commanding 11th MEU

Hejlik, Dennis Marine general, the deputy commander of MEF

H-hour Time of Attack

HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle(Humvee/Hummer)

HVT High Value Target

ICDC Iraqi Civil Defense Corps

ICRS Iraqi Red Crescent Society

ICTF Iraqi Counterterrorism Task Force

ID Infantry Division

IECI Independent Electoral Commission in Iraq



IED Improvised explosive device

IIF Iraqi Intervention Force

IIG Interim Iraqi Government

III Corps U.S. Army Corps, normally stationed in Fort Hood, Texas,but assigned to manage operations in Iraq during OIF II

IN Infantry

ING Iraqi National Guard

IO Information Operations

Iron Mountain Build-up of military supplies

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Janabi, Abdullah Insurgent leader in Fallujah

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

Jihadist Someone who advocates war and anti-modern acts in orderto bring about a more pure Muslim world order

Jolan District in northwest Fallujah

JTF Joint Task Force

Karbala City south of Baghdad

Karma Town east of Fallujah

KIA Killed in Action

Kizseley, Sir John British General, deputy commander of MNF-I

Kufa Prominent mosque in Najaf

Kut City in south-central Iraq

Latif, Mohammed Commander of the Fallujah Brigade

LNO Liaison Officer

Mahdi Militia Armed followers of Muqtada al-Sadr

MarDiv Marine Division

Mattis, James Marine general, commanding general, 1st MarineDivision, 2002–2004

MAW Marine Air Wing

MECH Mechanized

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MEG MEF Engineer Group

Metz, Thomas Commanding General III Corps and MultinationalCorps-Iraq

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

MNC-I Multinational Corps-Iraq

MNF Multinational Force

MNF-I Multinational Force-Iraq


Glossary ✯ ✯ ✯ 143

MNSTC-I Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq

Mosul Predominantly Kurdish city in northern Iraq

MOUT Military Operations in Urban Terrain

MP Military Police

MSC Major Subordinate Command

MST Municipal Support Team

Muqtada al-Sadr Leader of a Shia rebellion and the Mahdi Militia

Najaf One of the holy cities of Iraq, southwest of Baghdad

Najafis Inhabitants of Najaf

Natonski, Richard Marine general, commanding general, 1st MarineDivision

NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

Negroponte, John U.S. Ambassador to Iraq

NGO Nongovernmental Organization (such as the Red Cross orRed Crescent)

Nonlethal Tools designed to affect the enemy without causingcasualties (including PSYOPs)

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF occurred from2003–2004; OIF II began in 2004)

OPCON Operational Control

OPORD Operations Order

PA Public Affairs

Phantom Fury Original name for operation Al Fajr

POB Public Order Battalion (Iraqi military police)

PSYOPs Psychological Operations

Ramadi Provincial capital of Al Anbar

RCT Regimental Combat Team

RFA Restricted Fire Area (a protective fire controlmeasure)

ROE Rules of Engagement

RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenade

Sadr City District of Baghdad, also known as Thowra

Saleh, Jasim Commander of the Fallujah Brigade

Sanchez, Ricardo U.S. general, commander of Combined JointTask Force-7

Sattler, John Marine general, commander of MEF

SET Department of State Embedded Team

Sharia Islamic law



Shiite One of the principle Muslim subgroups, the majority ofIraqi are Shiite Muslims

Shupp, Michael Marine colonel, commander of the 1st MarineRegiment

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOP Standard Operations Procedures

Sunni One of the principle Muslim subgroups; most of the Iraqiswho live in Fallujah and Al Anbar province are SunniMuslims

TACON Tactical Control

Tal Afar Sunni city north of Baghdad

Taqaddum Site of 1st FSSG’s main logistics base

TCP Traffic Control Point

TF Task Force

Toolan, John Marine colonel, commander of the 1st MarineRegiment, 2002–2004

TOW Tube-launched Optically-tracked, Wire-guidedMissile

Tucker, Craig Marine colonel, commander of the 7th MarineRegiment

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UH Utility Helicopter

UN United Nations

U.S. United States

USA United States Army

USAF United States Air Force

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

VBIED Vehicle-borne, improvised explosive device

VCP Vehicle Control Point

Vigilant Resolve Name of the April assault on Fallujah

VTC Video teleconference

WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction

Yawar, Ghazi Sunni president of Iraq in the IIG

Zarqawi, Abu Musab Terrorist leader of al Qaeda in Iraq

Ziruffi, Adnan Governor of Najaf province


Selected Bibliography

✯✯✯

BOOKS

Beckett, Ian. Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponentssince 1750. New York: Rouledge, 2001.

Brisard, Jean-Charles. Zarqawi, the New Face of Al-Qaeda. New York: Other Press, 2005.Cordesman, Anthony H. The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons. Washington,

D.C.: CSIS Press, 2003.Crane, Conrad C., and W. Andrew Terrill. Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and

Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario. Carlisle Barracks: StrategicStudies Institute, 2003.

Dobbins, James, et al. America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq. SantaMonica: RAND, 2003.

Dodge, Toby. Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied. New York:Columbia University Press, 2003.

Franks, Tommy R. American Soldier. New York: Regan Books, 2004.Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia Uni-

versity Press, 2002.Habeck, Mary. Knowing the Enemy, Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror. New Haven, CT:

Yale University Press, 2005.Hoffman, Bruce. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq. Santa Monica: RAND, 2004.Ikenberry, G. John. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order

after Major Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.Jennings, Ray S. The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and

Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace,2003.

Kaplan, Robert D. Imperial Grunts, the American Military on the Ground. New York: Random,2005.


146 ✯ ✯ ✯ Selected Bibliography

Keegan, John. The Iraq War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.Kumar, Krishna, ed. Postconflict Elections, Democratization, and International Assistance.

Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1998.Lewis, Bernard. What Went Wrong? New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales, Jr. The Iraq War: A Military History. Cambridge,

MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003.O’Neil, Bard E. Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. Washington,

D.C.: Brassey’s, 1990.O’Neil, Bard E., and Edward C. Meyer. Insurgency and Terrorism. Dulles, VA: Potomac

Books, 2001.Packer, George. The Assassin’s Gate, America in Iraq. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,

2005.Peters, Ralph. Beyond Baghdad: Postmodern War and Peace, with a foreword by Barry R.

McCaffrey. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003.Phillips, David L. Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco. Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 2005.Pugh, Michael, ed. Regeneration of War-Torn Societies. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.Reynolds, Nicholas E. Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second

Iraq War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005.Schultheis, Rob. Waging Peace: A Special Operations Team’s Battle to Rebuild Iraq. New York:

Gotham Books, 2005.Shadid, Anthony. Night Draws Near, Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War. New York:

Henry Holt, 2005.Tucker, Mike. Among Warriors in Iraq. Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2005.U.S. Marine Corps. Small Wars Manual. Philadelphia, PA: Pavilion Press, 2004.West, Bing. No True Glory, a Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah. New York: Bantam

Dell, 2005.Woodward, Bob. Bush at War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.Woodward, Bob. Plan of Attack. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.

ARTICLES AND PAPERS

Cassidy, Robert M. “Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons fromVietnam and Other Small Wars,” Parameters, Summer 2004, 73–83.

Constable, Pamela. “Marines, Insurgents Battle for Sunni City,” The Washington Post, April8, 2004, A10.

Constable, Pamela. “Troops Gaining Grip in Sections of Fallujah,” The Washington Post,April 7, 2004, 1.

Chiarelli, Peter W., and Patrick R. Michaelis. “Winning the Peace, The Requirement for FullSpectrum Operations,” Military Review, July–August 2005, 1–13.

Hamre, John J., and Gordon R. Sullivan. “Toward Postconflict Reconstruction,” WashingtonQuarterly, 25, 2002, 85–96.

Hayden, Thomas. “Counterinsurgency in Iraq Started with Fallujah,” Marine Corps Gazette,July 2005, 28–29.

I MEF and 11th MEU staffs. “Battle for An Najaf, August 2004,” Marine Corps Gazette,December 2004, 10–16.


Selected Bibliography ✯ ✯ ✯ 147

Kaplan, Robert D. “The Real Story of Fallujah,” Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2004, 20.Krepinevich, Andrew F. Jr. “How to Win in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005,

87–104.Manwaring, Max G. “Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia,” Parameters, Winter 1998,

28–38.Metz, Steven. “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly,

Winter 2003–2004, 25–36.Perry, Tony. “Review Clears Marine Who Was Filmed Killing Iraqi Insurgent,” Los Angeles

Times, May 5, 2005, A32.Perry, Tony. “For Marine Unit, Fallouja Is ‘One Big Ordnance Dump,’” Los Angeles Times,

January 9, 2005, A7.Perry, Tony. “After Leveling City, U.S. Tries to Build Trust; In Fallouja, Marines,” Los Angeles

Times, January 7, 2005, A3.Perry, Tony. “Falloujans Return to All They Lost,” Los Angeles Times, January 5, 2005,

A3.Perry, Tony, and Edmund Sanders. “Marines Roll into Fallujah,” Los Angeles Times, April 5,

2004, A1.Sattler, John F., and Daniel H. Wilson, “Operation AL FAJR: the Battle of Fallujah–Part II,”

Marine Corps Gazette, July 2005, 12–24.Simpson, Ross W. “Fallujah: A Four-Letter Word,” Leatherneck, March 2005, Vol. 88, Issue

3, 14–18.Spinner, Jackie. “Cleric’s Attack Tests Iraqi Leaders, Rebel Cleric Declares ‘Revolution’

against U.S. Forces in Iraq,” The Washington Post, August 6, 2004, A10.Spinner, Jackie. “U.S. Feeling Pressure to Rebuild Fallujah Troops Have Little Time to Secure

Residents’ Faith,” The Washington Post, February 20, 2005, A24.Spinner, Jackie. “In a Calmer Fallujah, Marines Still Feel the Insurgents’ Pulse,” The

Washington Post, February 16, 2005, A15.Spinner, Jackie. “A Return to Fallujah to See What Remains Residents Pass Military Check-

points before Reentering Devastated Iraqi City,” The Washington Post, February 14,2005, A09.

Spinner, Jackie. “More Fallujah Hostage Sites Found Troops Locate Cage Believed to HaveHeld British Engineer,” The Washington Post, November 22, 2004, A14.

Spinner, Jackie. “Insurgent Base Discovered in Fallujah U.S. Troops Find Ammunition,Written Orders in House Used by Zarqawi’s Network,” The Washington Post,November 19, 2004, A18.

Spinner, Jackie. “Fallujah Residents Emerge, Find ‘City of Mosques’ in Ruins,” TheWashington Post, November 18, 2004, A01.

Spinner, Jackie. “Fallujah Battered and Mostly Quiet after the Battle,” The Washington Post,November 16, 2004, A13.

Spinner, Jackie. “Fighting in Fallujah Nears End; U.S., Iraqi Forces Target Small Pockets ofInsurgents, Commanders Claim Victory,” The Washington Post, November 15, 2004,A16.

Spinner, Jackie. “In Fallujah, Marines Feel Shock of War ‘We Knew When We Got to theSouth We Were Going to Get Pounded,’” The Washington Post, November 14, 2004,A31.

Spinner, Jackie, and Karl Vick. “U.S. Forces Launch Attack on Fallujah,” The WashingtonPost, November 8, 2004, A01.


148 ✯ ✯ ✯ Selected Bibliography

Spinner, Jackie, and Karl Vick. “Troops Battle for Last Parts of Fallujah; Senior Iraqi OfficialsClaim City Is Liberated,” The Washington Post, November 14, 2004, A01.

Spinner, Jackie, and Karl Vick. “Troops in Southern Fallujah Encounter Fierce Resistance,Mosul Police Force Splinters under Wave of Rebel Attacks,” The Washington Post,November 14, 2004, A22.

Spinner, Jackie, and Karl Vick. “U.S. Forces Meet Fierce Resistance in Fallujah; Push SouthGreeted ‘Hornet’s Nest,’” The Washington Post, November 13, 2004, A01.

Vick, Karl. “Rallying around an Insurgent City,” The Washington Post, April 9, 2004, A01.Vick, Karl, and Omar Fekeiki. “U.S. Forces Battle into Heart of Fallujah; Units Meet Scattered

Resistance Attacks Continue Elsewhere,” The Washington Post, November 10, 2004,A01.

Vick, Karl, and Omar Fekeiki. “Defense Minister Exhorts Iraqis: ‘Liberate This City’ Battlefor Fallujah Will Test New Force as U.S. Military Partner,” The Washington Post,November 8, 2004, A18.

Wong, Edward. “U.S. Uncovers Vast Hide-Out of Iraqi Rebels,” New York Times, June 5,2005, 1.

INTERVIEW

Colonel John Toolan, USMC, Quantico, Virginia, July 25, 2005.

GGBK002-ind Ballard-xml March 10, 2006 15:26

Index

✯✯✯

1–5 Cavalry (TF 1–5), 32, 34–351st Battalion, 3rd Marines (1/3), 49,

531st Battalion, 4th Marines (BLT 1/4), 32–371st Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5), 14–15, 17,

641st Battalion, 8th Marines (1/8), 53, 61, 641st Cavalry Division (1stCavDiv), 32, 481st Force Service Support Group (1st

FSSG), 67, 82, 88, 95–961st Light Armored Reconnaissance

Battalion, 881st Marine Division (1st MarDiv), 8–9, 15,

46–51, 53, 61, 72, 74–75, 77, 81–82,95–97, 100, 102, 108

1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF),xi, 8–9, 13, 18–20, 22–23, 32–33, 36, 40,44–45, 49–50, 54–55, 57–58, 65, 67, 69,71–72, 74–77, 80, 82–83, 86–88, 91,93–98, 100, 104, 107, 114, 118

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (11thMEU), 30, 32–36

1st Marine Regiment (RCT-1), 12–13, 53,55, 58–59, 64, 72, 88, 90

2-2 Infantry, 53, 61, 642nd Armored Cavalry Regiment

(2ndACR), 30

2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (2/1), 12–13, 202nd Battalion, 2nd Marines (2/2), 1212–7 Cavalry (TF 2–7), 33–35, 53, 58–59,

602nd Reconnaissance Battalion, 533rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3rdACR),

4–5, 115, 1183rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1), 53, 58–60,

64, 66, 713rd Battalion, 4th Marines (3/4), 1213rd Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5), 53, 59,

693rd Infantry Division (3rdID), 4–5, 1183rd Marine Air Wing (3rd MAW), 9631st Marine Expeditionary Unit (31st

MEU), 46–47, 79, 10336th Commando Battalion, 33, 36, 50–51,

57–583rd Light Armored Reconnaissance

Battalion (3rd LAR/Task ForceWolfpack), 50, 57, 59

4th Civil Affairs Group (4th CAG), 44–46,49, 62, 65, 69, 71–75, 82, 93, 95

445th Civil Affairs Battalion, BravoCompany, 62

505th Parachute Infantry Regiment(505PIR), 5–6


150 ✯ ✯ ✯ Index

7th Marines (RCT-7), 47, 49, 53, 56, 58, 61,64, 79, 80

82nd Airborne Division (82ndABN), 4–6,8–9, 11–12

Abdul-Qader, Mohammed, General,49–50, 54–55, 58, 62, 65, 72, 74–76,79–80, 85, 89, 108, 129

Abizaid, John, General, 28, 115Abu Ghraib, 65, 67, 97Al Anbar province, 4, 7, 16, 24, 50, 54,

74–75, 87, 93, 96–97, 103, 114Alexander, Ray, Admiral, 72Al Fajr (New Dawn), 54, 79, 82–83, 86, 91,

99–100, 102, 105, 107–110, 114Al-Goud, Fassel, Governor, 86–87Al Jazeera, 64–65Allawi, Iyad, 27, 33, 37, 40, 42, 50, 54,

58–59, 63, 65, 78–79, 84, 86–87, 89,99–100, 107, 109, 124

Al Qaeda, 7, 16, 76, 84Al Qaim, 96, 114Al-Sadr, Muqtada, 16, 29–31, 33–37, 123,

143Al-Sistani, Ali, Grand Ayatollah, 36, 92, 124Al Ziruffi, Adnan, Governor, 31, 143Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF), 22, 39, 51AO Atlanta, 45

Ba’ath Party, 4–5, 140Baghdad, 2, 4–5, 9, 16, 25, 47, 63–66,

74–75, 83, 90–91, 98, 104–105, 111Balad, 66Ballard, John, Colonel, 47–48, 61, 72, 76,

81, 98Ballard, Scott, Lieutenant Colonel, 73Bellon, David, Lieutenant Colonel, 58, 130Berg, Nick, 26, 123Bethesda Naval Hospital, 66Bin Laden, Osama, 7, 84, 91Blackjack Brigade, 48–49, 51, 53, 58Black Watch Regiment, 75Blackwater, USA, xi, 1, 10–12, 21, 115, 117Blankenship, Albert, Master Sergeant, 73Brahimi Lakhdar, 27, 124, 140Brahma Ranch, 88, 90–91Brandl, Gareth, Lieutenant Colonel, 53

Bravo Surgical Company, 66Bremer, L. Paul, Ambassador, 7, 16, 28–30,

140Buhl, Willy, Lieutenant Colonel, 53Bush, George, President, 92Byrne, Brennan, Lieutenant Colonel, 13–15

Camp Blue Diamond, 46–47, 140Camp Fallujah, xi, 1, 11, 19, 32, 45–46,

48–49, 54, 62, 65–66, 78, 89, 98, 120, 140Camp Victory, 44Casey, George, General, 28, 43, 74, 140Civil–Military operations, 102, 136, 140Civil–Military Operations Center

(CMOC), 19, 61–62, 69, 71, 73, 78–79,86–87, 89, 94, 105–106, 140

Coalition Provisional Authority, 7, 18,21–23, 27, 29, 140

Coleman, John, Colonel, 9, 46, 54, 122Conway, James, General, 9, 19, 32, 119,

122, 140

Dave’s Field, 88, 90de Ba’athification, 7, 23, 28, 141Defrancisci, Leonard, Lieutenant Colonel,

132DesGrosseilliers, Todd, Major, 69Diamond, Miles, Colonel, 95Dinauer, Steve, Lieutenant Colonel, 50Drinkwine, Brian, Lieutenant Colonel, 6Dunford, Joseph, General, 9, 141Dysart, David, Lieutenant Colonel, 73

East Fallujah Iraqi Camp (EFIC),50, 80Election Support Team (EST), 95, 141

Fallujah Brigade, 19–22, 24, 141Fallujah General Hospital, 4, 44, 50, 57–58Fallujah Liaison Team site (FLT), 71, 76,

141Farquhar, Andrew, General, 75, 107, 141Former Regime Elements (FRE), 5–7, 26,

118, 141Formica, Michael, Colonel, 58

Habbaniyah, 74, 141Hadditha, 114, 141


Index ✯ ✯ ✯ 151

Hadid, Omar, 37, 40, 141Hagee, Michael, General, 17Hansen, Kevin, Lieutenant Colonel, 47Haslem, Anthony, Colonel, 32, 141Hassani, Hajim, Minister, 78Hejlik, Dennis, General, 33, 43, 46, 72, 82,

98, 107, 141Hider, James, 67Hillawi, Adel, 79, 98Hussein, Ra’ad, 89Hussein, Saddam, xii, 7, 16, 29, 41–42Hydra Mosque, 57, 61

Imam Ali Mosque and Shrine, 29, 35–36Improvised Explosive Device (IED), 5,

12–13, 35, 43, 63, 80, 83, 101, 141Information Operations, 20, 101Intelligence, 40, 52Interim Iraqi Government (IIG), 22–23, 27,

33, 37, 40, 76, 79, 83, 85, 87, 89, 90–93,98–100, 107, 110–111, 141

International Electoral Commission in Iraq(IECI), 93, 95–97, 106, 141

Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF), 53Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), 6, 11,

13, 18, 24–25Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force (ICTF), 33,

36Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF), 33, 53Iraqi National Guard (ING), 31–32Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office

(IRMO), 78Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS), 64, 74,

76–77, 105, 141Iron Mountain, 96, 141

Janabi, Abdullah, 37, 41, 77, 141Jihadists, 7, 10, 141Joint fires, 102Jolan District, 15, 60, 64, 141Jolan Park, 88

Kaplan, Robert, 101Karbala, 141Karma, 141Kassim, Mohammed, General, 49, 89,

108

Kerry, John, Senator, 89Kidd, Keith, 106Kizseley, Sir John, General, 74, 98, 107, 141

Landstuhl Army Hospital, 66Latif, Mohammed, 19, 21–22, 141L’etoile, Joseph, Lieutenant Colonel, 48,

64

Mahdi Militia, 22, 26, 29–36, 122, 141Mahmoud, Basil, 79, 86, 98, 104, 106, 108,

133Makuta, Ronald, Colonel, 40, 46Malay, Patrick, Lieutenant Colonel, 53Mattis, James, General, 9, 17, 21, 141Mayer, John, Lieutenant Colonel, 32McDonnell, Patrick, 59MEF Engineer Group (MEG), 47, 50, 69,

72, 77, 82–83, 88, 95–96Mehdi, Mohammed, General, 80, 103Metz, Thomas, General, 30, 32–33, 36,

44–45, 49, 141Ministry of Electricity (MOE), 75Ministry of Industry and Minerals

(MOIM), 79, 83, 86–87Ministry of Interior (MOI), 55, 76, 79, 85,

87Ministry of Municipalities (MOM), 98Ministry of Oil (MOO), 82–83, 88Ministry of Trade (MOT), 41, 87–88, 90Mohamed Abdullah, Mohamed, Minister,

86, 106, 133Montgomery, Gary, Lieutenant Colonel, 73Mosul, 143Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), 30, 36,

44, 47–49, 72, 74, 141Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), 28, 45,

47, 72, 76, 89, 142Multinational Security and Training

Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), 55, 142Municipal Support Team (MST), 73, 86,

90, 104

Najaf, 12, 16, 22, 25–36, 39, 43, 57, 96–97,114, 143

Natonski, Richard, General, 48–49, 61, 64,66–67, 102–103, 143


152 ✯ ✯ ✯ Index

Negroponte, John, Ambassador, 28, 78, 98,124, 143

Newell, Peter, Lieutenant Colonel, 53, 61Nicholson, Larry, Colonel, 46, 128Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs),

19, 105, 143

Olsen, Greg, Lieutenant Colonel, 13

Paulk, Michael, Lieutenant Colonel, 47Peralta, Rafael, Sergeant, 71Phantom Fury, 45, 49, 54, 83, 143Public Affairs, 20, 101Public Order Battalion/Brigade (POB), 80,

103, 143

Queens District, 64

Rainey, James, Lieutenant Colonel, 34, 53Ramadi, 2, 16, 22, 86, 90–91, 94, 97, 106,

143Ramos, Michael, Lieutenant Colonel, 53Regner, Michael, Colonel, 43, 46Reynaldo, Brian, Captain, 73Rumsfeld, Donald, Secretary of Defense,

116Rutbah, 96

Sadr City (Thorwa), 29, 110, 137, 143Saklawyiah, 55, 74Saleh, Jasim, 19, 21,143Sanchez, Ricardo, General, 18, 143Sattler, John, General, 43–46, 49–50, 54, 62,

65, 74, 76, 89, 93, 98, 102, 106, 115, 119,143

Seabees, 48, 77, 80, 90, 107

Shupp, Michael, Colonel, 48, 53, 57, 64, 67,71–73, 79–80, 99, 103, 143

Sites, Kevin, 60, 67Spinner, Jackie, 59State Department Embedded Team (SET),

106, 143Suleiman, Lieutenant Colonel, 37Sunni Triangle, xii, xiv, 26, 94

Tal Afar, 114, 138, 143Taliban, 22Taqaddum, 95–97, 143Targeting process, 43Task Force Rushmore, 68Taylor, William, Ambassador, 78Toolan, John, Colonel, 12, 17, 22, 46, 143Tripoli, Louis, Commander/Dr., 65Tucker, Craig, Colonel, 48, 53, 56, 61, 79,

143

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), 47,140

Vehicle-borne, Improvised ExplosiveDevice (VBIED), 49, 76, 83, 143

Vigilant Resolve, 10, 12, 21, 39–40, 43, 54,100, 143

Walsh, Steven, Lieutenant Colonel, 51Weston, Kael, 94, 96, 106Williams, John, Captain/Dr., 51, 57

Yawar, Ghazi, 27, 143

Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 7, 16, 37, 41, 63, 68,76, 84, 91–92, 115, 143

about Ballard-xml March 10, 2006 17:5

About the Author

JOHN R. BALLARD is currently assigned to the office of the Secretary of Defensein the Pentagon. He commanded the Marine Corps’ 4th Civil Affairs Group inIraq during operations Iraqi Freedom and Al Fajr. He is Professor of Joint MilitaryOperations at the U.S. Naval War College.






[John R. Ballard] Fighting for Fallujah a New Daw(BookFi.org)

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