Top Banner
1 September 6, 2017 Takuji Okubo, Chief economist, Japan Macro Advisors (JMA) [email protected] JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September
32

JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

Jun 03, 2020

Download

Documents

dariahiddleston
Welcome message from author
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Page 1: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

1

September 6 2017

Takuji Okubo Chief economist Japan Macro Advisors (JMA)

takujiokubojapanmacroadvisorscom

JMA Monthly Japan Brief

2017 September

2

1 Introduction What we will cover in the monthly webinar

1 Introduction (5 minutes)

2 Recent development (10 minutes)

3 Medium term outlook (10 minutes)

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet (10 minutes)

5 Free QampA (10 minutes)

2 Recent development in Japan

3

2 Recent development

-Japan has enjoyed 6 quarters of growth streak-

4

click here for an interactive version

2 Recent development

-Private consumption provided consistent growth

click here for an interactive version

6

2 Recent development

-Net export also contributed although not in the last quarter

click here for an interactive version

7

2 Recent development

-The growth has mostly exceeded Japanrsquos potential trend growth

click here for an interactive version

8

2 Recent development

-The economy is starting to run above its sustainable capacity

click here for an interactive version

9

2 Recent development

-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-

click here for an interactive version

10

2 Recent development

-Yes in 1997 and in 1990

click here for an interactive version

11

2 Recent development

-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again

click here for an interactive version

3 Medium term outlook

12

13

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy

1987

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

1996

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

2002

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

20021987

14

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)

20142002

2002

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009

2012

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

15

Higher growth and reflation

3 Medium term outlook

Abenomics to succeed scenario

2012

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

2020

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

16

3 Medium term outlook

Stagflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

Growth comes with an excessive inflation

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 2: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

2

1 Introduction What we will cover in the monthly webinar

1 Introduction (5 minutes)

2 Recent development (10 minutes)

3 Medium term outlook (10 minutes)

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet (10 minutes)

5 Free QampA (10 minutes)

2 Recent development in Japan

3

2 Recent development

-Japan has enjoyed 6 quarters of growth streak-

4

click here for an interactive version

2 Recent development

-Private consumption provided consistent growth

click here for an interactive version

6

2 Recent development

-Net export also contributed although not in the last quarter

click here for an interactive version

7

2 Recent development

-The growth has mostly exceeded Japanrsquos potential trend growth

click here for an interactive version

8

2 Recent development

-The economy is starting to run above its sustainable capacity

click here for an interactive version

9

2 Recent development

-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-

click here for an interactive version

10

2 Recent development

-Yes in 1997 and in 1990

click here for an interactive version

11

2 Recent development

-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again

click here for an interactive version

3 Medium term outlook

12

13

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy

1987

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

1996

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

2002

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

20021987

14

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)

20142002

2002

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009

2012

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

15

Higher growth and reflation

3 Medium term outlook

Abenomics to succeed scenario

2012

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

2020

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

16

3 Medium term outlook

Stagflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

Growth comes with an excessive inflation

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 3: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

2 Recent development in Japan

3

2 Recent development

-Japan has enjoyed 6 quarters of growth streak-

4

click here for an interactive version

2 Recent development

-Private consumption provided consistent growth

click here for an interactive version

6

2 Recent development

-Net export also contributed although not in the last quarter

click here for an interactive version

7

2 Recent development

-The growth has mostly exceeded Japanrsquos potential trend growth

click here for an interactive version

8

2 Recent development

-The economy is starting to run above its sustainable capacity

click here for an interactive version

9

2 Recent development

-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-

click here for an interactive version

10

2 Recent development

-Yes in 1997 and in 1990

click here for an interactive version

11

2 Recent development

-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again

click here for an interactive version

3 Medium term outlook

12

13

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy

1987

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

1996

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

2002

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

20021987

14

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)

20142002

2002

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009

2012

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

15

Higher growth and reflation

3 Medium term outlook

Abenomics to succeed scenario

2012

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

2020

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

16

3 Medium term outlook

Stagflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

Growth comes with an excessive inflation

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 4: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

2 Recent development

-Japan has enjoyed 6 quarters of growth streak-

4

click here for an interactive version

2 Recent development

-Private consumption provided consistent growth

click here for an interactive version

6

2 Recent development

-Net export also contributed although not in the last quarter

click here for an interactive version

7

2 Recent development

-The growth has mostly exceeded Japanrsquos potential trend growth

click here for an interactive version

8

2 Recent development

-The economy is starting to run above its sustainable capacity

click here for an interactive version

9

2 Recent development

-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-

click here for an interactive version

10

2 Recent development

-Yes in 1997 and in 1990

click here for an interactive version

11

2 Recent development

-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again

click here for an interactive version

3 Medium term outlook

12

13

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy

1987

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

1996

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

2002

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

20021987

14

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)

20142002

2002

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009

2012

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

15

Higher growth and reflation

3 Medium term outlook

Abenomics to succeed scenario

2012

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

2020

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

16

3 Medium term outlook

Stagflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

Growth comes with an excessive inflation

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 5: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

2 Recent development

-Private consumption provided consistent growth

click here for an interactive version

6

2 Recent development

-Net export also contributed although not in the last quarter

click here for an interactive version

7

2 Recent development

-The growth has mostly exceeded Japanrsquos potential trend growth

click here for an interactive version

8

2 Recent development

-The economy is starting to run above its sustainable capacity

click here for an interactive version

9

2 Recent development

-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-

click here for an interactive version

10

2 Recent development

-Yes in 1997 and in 1990

click here for an interactive version

11

2 Recent development

-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again

click here for an interactive version

3 Medium term outlook

12

13

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy

1987

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

1996

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

2002

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

20021987

14

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)

20142002

2002

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009

2012

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

15

Higher growth and reflation

3 Medium term outlook

Abenomics to succeed scenario

2012

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

2020

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

16

3 Medium term outlook

Stagflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

Growth comes with an excessive inflation

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 6: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

6

2 Recent development

-Net export also contributed although not in the last quarter

click here for an interactive version

7

2 Recent development

-The growth has mostly exceeded Japanrsquos potential trend growth

click here for an interactive version

8

2 Recent development

-The economy is starting to run above its sustainable capacity

click here for an interactive version

9

2 Recent development

-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-

click here for an interactive version

10

2 Recent development

-Yes in 1997 and in 1990

click here for an interactive version

11

2 Recent development

-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again

click here for an interactive version

3 Medium term outlook

12

13

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy

1987

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

1996

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

2002

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

20021987

14

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)

20142002

2002

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009

2012

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

15

Higher growth and reflation

3 Medium term outlook

Abenomics to succeed scenario

2012

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

2020

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

16

3 Medium term outlook

Stagflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

Growth comes with an excessive inflation

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 7: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

7

2 Recent development

-The growth has mostly exceeded Japanrsquos potential trend growth

click here for an interactive version

8

2 Recent development

-The economy is starting to run above its sustainable capacity

click here for an interactive version

9

2 Recent development

-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-

click here for an interactive version

10

2 Recent development

-Yes in 1997 and in 1990

click here for an interactive version

11

2 Recent development

-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again

click here for an interactive version

3 Medium term outlook

12

13

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy

1987

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

1996

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

2002

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

20021987

14

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)

20142002

2002

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009

2012

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

15

Higher growth and reflation

3 Medium term outlook

Abenomics to succeed scenario

2012

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

2020

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

16

3 Medium term outlook

Stagflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

Growth comes with an excessive inflation

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 8: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

8

2 Recent development

-The economy is starting to run above its sustainable capacity

click here for an interactive version

9

2 Recent development

-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-

click here for an interactive version

10

2 Recent development

-Yes in 1997 and in 1990

click here for an interactive version

11

2 Recent development

-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again

click here for an interactive version

3 Medium term outlook

12

13

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy

1987

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

1996

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

2002

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

20021987

14

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)

20142002

2002

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009

2012

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

15

Higher growth and reflation

3 Medium term outlook

Abenomics to succeed scenario

2012

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

2020

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

16

3 Medium term outlook

Stagflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

Growth comes with an excessive inflation

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 9: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

9

2 Recent development

-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-

click here for an interactive version

10

2 Recent development

-Yes in 1997 and in 1990

click here for an interactive version

11

2 Recent development

-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again

click here for an interactive version

3 Medium term outlook

12

13

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy

1987

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

1996

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

2002

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

20021987

14

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)

20142002

2002

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009

2012

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

15

Higher growth and reflation

3 Medium term outlook

Abenomics to succeed scenario

2012

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

2020

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

16

3 Medium term outlook

Stagflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

Growth comes with an excessive inflation

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 10: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

10

2 Recent development

-Yes in 1997 and in 1990

click here for an interactive version

11

2 Recent development

-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again

click here for an interactive version

3 Medium term outlook

12

13

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy

1987

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

1996

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

2002

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

20021987

14

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)

20142002

2002

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009

2012

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

15

Higher growth and reflation

3 Medium term outlook

Abenomics to succeed scenario

2012

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

2020

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

16

3 Medium term outlook

Stagflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

Growth comes with an excessive inflation

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 11: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

11

2 Recent development

-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again

click here for an interactive version

3 Medium term outlook

12

13

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy

1987

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

1996

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

2002

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

20021987

14

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)

20142002

2002

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009

2012

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

15

Higher growth and reflation

3 Medium term outlook

Abenomics to succeed scenario

2012

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

2020

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

16

3 Medium term outlook

Stagflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

Growth comes with an excessive inflation

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 12: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

3 Medium term outlook

12

13

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy

1987

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

1996

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

2002

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

20021987

14

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)

20142002

2002

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009

2012

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

15

Higher growth and reflation

3 Medium term outlook

Abenomics to succeed scenario

2012

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

2020

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

16

3 Medium term outlook

Stagflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

Growth comes with an excessive inflation

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 13: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

13

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy

1987

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

1996

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

1987

1991

19961998

2000

2002

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

20021987

14

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)

20142002

2002

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009

2012

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

15

Higher growth and reflation

3 Medium term outlook

Abenomics to succeed scenario

2012

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

2020

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

16

3 Medium term outlook

Stagflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

Growth comes with an excessive inflation

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 14: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

14

Source Japan Risk Forum JMA

3 Medium term outlook

Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)

20142002

2002

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2002

2007

2009

2012

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

15

Higher growth and reflation

3 Medium term outlook

Abenomics to succeed scenario

2012

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

2020

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

16

3 Medium term outlook

Stagflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

Growth comes with an excessive inflation

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 15: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

15

Higher growth and reflation

3 Medium term outlook

Abenomics to succeed scenario

2012

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2012

2014

2017

2020

-30

-20

-10

00

10

20

30

-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

16

3 Medium term outlook

Stagflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

Growth comes with an excessive inflation

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 16: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

16

3 Medium term outlook

Stagflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

Growth comes with an excessive inflation

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 17: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

17

3 Medium term outlook

Back to deflation scenario

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

2014

2017

2020

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

No growth and deflation

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 18: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

18

3 Medium term outlook

What actually happened

2012

2014

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

2012

2014

2015

2016

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )

InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )

Some growth but no inflation

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 19: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant

19

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 20: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

Abenomics to succeed Projection table

A benom ics to succeed

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20

P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12

G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30

P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25

N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351

P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116

20

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 21: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

Stagflation Projection table

S tagflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05

P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08

P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23

N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15

Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135

21

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 22: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

Back to deflation Projection table

B ack to deflation

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03

P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02

P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05

N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757

P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83

22

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 23: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

Risk-weighted Projection table

R isk-w eighted scenario

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

G row th

G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05

P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03

G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11

P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04

Inflation

D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14

N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20

C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11

Fiscal

N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06

Financial

S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05

Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12

E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110

23

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 24: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet

24

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 25: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

25

BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018

click here for an interactive version

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 26: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

26

IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market

Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 27: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers

27

Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA

Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2010 2012 2014 2016

(Trillion yen)

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 28: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

28

BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018

click here for an interactive version

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 29: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

29

Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-

BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017

Liability Asset

Bank note (00) JGBs

100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen

Current deposit

Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)

208 trillion yen

Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs

103 trillion yen 41trillion yen

Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs

22 trillion yen 13trillion yen

Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset

47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen

Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)

8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen

Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 30: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

Does it matter if a central bank run a loss

30

Many argue it does not matter becausehellip

1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay

2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year

3-A central bank is a part of a government

Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip

1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue

2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank

3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy

And Japan

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 31: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

Helicopter money Japan has been there

31

click here for an interactive version

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32

Page 32: JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September · JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September. 2 1. Introduction: What we will cover in the monthly webinar 1. Introduction (5 minutes) ... 19.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of

an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based

upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro

Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade

in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA

reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not

accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research

document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this

report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek

independent financial advice

32