1 September 6, 2017 Takuji Okubo, Chief economist, Japan Macro Advisors (JMA) [email protected] JMA Monthly Japan Brief 2017 September
1
September 6 2017
Takuji Okubo Chief economist Japan Macro Advisors (JMA)
takujiokubojapanmacroadvisorscom
JMA Monthly Japan Brief
2017 September
2
1 Introduction What we will cover in the monthly webinar
1 Introduction (5 minutes)
2 Recent development (10 minutes)
3 Medium term outlook (10 minutes)
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet (10 minutes)
5 Free QampA (10 minutes)
2 Recent development in Japan
3
2 Recent development
-Japan has enjoyed 6 quarters of growth streak-
4
click here for an interactive version
2 Recent development
-Private consumption provided consistent growth
click here for an interactive version
6
2 Recent development
-Net export also contributed although not in the last quarter
click here for an interactive version
7
2 Recent development
-The growth has mostly exceeded Japanrsquos potential trend growth
click here for an interactive version
8
2 Recent development
-The economy is starting to run above its sustainable capacity
click here for an interactive version
9
2 Recent development
-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-
click here for an interactive version
10
2 Recent development
-Yes in 1997 and in 1990
click here for an interactive version
11
2 Recent development
-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again
click here for an interactive version
3 Medium term outlook
12
13
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy
1987
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
1996
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
2002
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
20021987
14
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)
20142002
2002
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009
2012
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
15
Higher growth and reflation
3 Medium term outlook
Abenomics to succeed scenario
2012
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
2020
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
16
3 Medium term outlook
Stagflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
Growth comes with an excessive inflation
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
2
1 Introduction What we will cover in the monthly webinar
1 Introduction (5 minutes)
2 Recent development (10 minutes)
3 Medium term outlook (10 minutes)
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet (10 minutes)
5 Free QampA (10 minutes)
2 Recent development in Japan
3
2 Recent development
-Japan has enjoyed 6 quarters of growth streak-
4
click here for an interactive version
2 Recent development
-Private consumption provided consistent growth
click here for an interactive version
6
2 Recent development
-Net export also contributed although not in the last quarter
click here for an interactive version
7
2 Recent development
-The growth has mostly exceeded Japanrsquos potential trend growth
click here for an interactive version
8
2 Recent development
-The economy is starting to run above its sustainable capacity
click here for an interactive version
9
2 Recent development
-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-
click here for an interactive version
10
2 Recent development
-Yes in 1997 and in 1990
click here for an interactive version
11
2 Recent development
-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again
click here for an interactive version
3 Medium term outlook
12
13
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy
1987
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
1996
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
2002
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
20021987
14
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)
20142002
2002
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009
2012
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
15
Higher growth and reflation
3 Medium term outlook
Abenomics to succeed scenario
2012
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
2020
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
16
3 Medium term outlook
Stagflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
Growth comes with an excessive inflation
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
2 Recent development in Japan
3
2 Recent development
-Japan has enjoyed 6 quarters of growth streak-
4
click here for an interactive version
2 Recent development
-Private consumption provided consistent growth
click here for an interactive version
6
2 Recent development
-Net export also contributed although not in the last quarter
click here for an interactive version
7
2 Recent development
-The growth has mostly exceeded Japanrsquos potential trend growth
click here for an interactive version
8
2 Recent development
-The economy is starting to run above its sustainable capacity
click here for an interactive version
9
2 Recent development
-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-
click here for an interactive version
10
2 Recent development
-Yes in 1997 and in 1990
click here for an interactive version
11
2 Recent development
-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again
click here for an interactive version
3 Medium term outlook
12
13
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy
1987
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
1996
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
2002
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
20021987
14
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)
20142002
2002
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009
2012
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
15
Higher growth and reflation
3 Medium term outlook
Abenomics to succeed scenario
2012
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
2020
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
16
3 Medium term outlook
Stagflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
Growth comes with an excessive inflation
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
2 Recent development
-Japan has enjoyed 6 quarters of growth streak-
4
click here for an interactive version
2 Recent development
-Private consumption provided consistent growth
click here for an interactive version
6
2 Recent development
-Net export also contributed although not in the last quarter
click here for an interactive version
7
2 Recent development
-The growth has mostly exceeded Japanrsquos potential trend growth
click here for an interactive version
8
2 Recent development
-The economy is starting to run above its sustainable capacity
click here for an interactive version
9
2 Recent development
-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-
click here for an interactive version
10
2 Recent development
-Yes in 1997 and in 1990
click here for an interactive version
11
2 Recent development
-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again
click here for an interactive version
3 Medium term outlook
12
13
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy
1987
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
1996
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
2002
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
20021987
14
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)
20142002
2002
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009
2012
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
15
Higher growth and reflation
3 Medium term outlook
Abenomics to succeed scenario
2012
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
2020
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
16
3 Medium term outlook
Stagflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
Growth comes with an excessive inflation
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
2 Recent development
-Private consumption provided consistent growth
click here for an interactive version
6
2 Recent development
-Net export also contributed although not in the last quarter
click here for an interactive version
7
2 Recent development
-The growth has mostly exceeded Japanrsquos potential trend growth
click here for an interactive version
8
2 Recent development
-The economy is starting to run above its sustainable capacity
click here for an interactive version
9
2 Recent development
-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-
click here for an interactive version
10
2 Recent development
-Yes in 1997 and in 1990
click here for an interactive version
11
2 Recent development
-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again
click here for an interactive version
3 Medium term outlook
12
13
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy
1987
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
1996
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
2002
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
20021987
14
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)
20142002
2002
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009
2012
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
15
Higher growth and reflation
3 Medium term outlook
Abenomics to succeed scenario
2012
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
2020
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
16
3 Medium term outlook
Stagflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
Growth comes with an excessive inflation
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
6
2 Recent development
-Net export also contributed although not in the last quarter
click here for an interactive version
7
2 Recent development
-The growth has mostly exceeded Japanrsquos potential trend growth
click here for an interactive version
8
2 Recent development
-The economy is starting to run above its sustainable capacity
click here for an interactive version
9
2 Recent development
-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-
click here for an interactive version
10
2 Recent development
-Yes in 1997 and in 1990
click here for an interactive version
11
2 Recent development
-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again
click here for an interactive version
3 Medium term outlook
12
13
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy
1987
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
1996
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
2002
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
20021987
14
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)
20142002
2002
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009
2012
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
15
Higher growth and reflation
3 Medium term outlook
Abenomics to succeed scenario
2012
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
2020
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
16
3 Medium term outlook
Stagflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
Growth comes with an excessive inflation
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
7
2 Recent development
-The growth has mostly exceeded Japanrsquos potential trend growth
click here for an interactive version
8
2 Recent development
-The economy is starting to run above its sustainable capacity
click here for an interactive version
9
2 Recent development
-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-
click here for an interactive version
10
2 Recent development
-Yes in 1997 and in 1990
click here for an interactive version
11
2 Recent development
-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again
click here for an interactive version
3 Medium term outlook
12
13
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy
1987
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
1996
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
2002
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
20021987
14
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)
20142002
2002
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009
2012
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
15
Higher growth and reflation
3 Medium term outlook
Abenomics to succeed scenario
2012
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
2020
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
16
3 Medium term outlook
Stagflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
Growth comes with an excessive inflation
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
8
2 Recent development
-The economy is starting to run above its sustainable capacity
click here for an interactive version
9
2 Recent development
-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-
click here for an interactive version
10
2 Recent development
-Yes in 1997 and in 1990
click here for an interactive version
11
2 Recent development
-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again
click here for an interactive version
3 Medium term outlook
12
13
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy
1987
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
1996
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
2002
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
20021987
14
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)
20142002
2002
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009
2012
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
15
Higher growth and reflation
3 Medium term outlook
Abenomics to succeed scenario
2012
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
2020
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
16
3 Medium term outlook
Stagflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
Growth comes with an excessive inflation
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
9
2 Recent development
-Will inflation follow the higher output gap-
click here for an interactive version
10
2 Recent development
-Yes in 1997 and in 1990
click here for an interactive version
11
2 Recent development
-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again
click here for an interactive version
3 Medium term outlook
12
13
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy
1987
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
1996
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
2002
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
20021987
14
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)
20142002
2002
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009
2012
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
15
Higher growth and reflation
3 Medium term outlook
Abenomics to succeed scenario
2012
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
2020
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
16
3 Medium term outlook
Stagflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
Growth comes with an excessive inflation
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
10
2 Recent development
-Yes in 1997 and in 1990
click here for an interactive version
11
2 Recent development
-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again
click here for an interactive version
3 Medium term outlook
12
13
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy
1987
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
1996
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
2002
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
20021987
14
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)
20142002
2002
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009
2012
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
15
Higher growth and reflation
3 Medium term outlook
Abenomics to succeed scenario
2012
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
2020
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
16
3 Medium term outlook
Stagflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
Growth comes with an excessive inflation
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
11
2 Recent development
-Trimmed CPIs show trend inflation is on the rise again
click here for an interactive version
3 Medium term outlook
12
13
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy
1987
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
1996
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
2002
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
20021987
14
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)
20142002
2002
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009
2012
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
15
Higher growth and reflation
3 Medium term outlook
Abenomics to succeed scenario
2012
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
2020
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
16
3 Medium term outlook
Stagflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
Growth comes with an excessive inflation
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
3 Medium term outlook
12
13
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy
1987
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
1996
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
2002
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
20021987
14
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)
20142002
2002
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009
2012
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
15
Higher growth and reflation
3 Medium term outlook
Abenomics to succeed scenario
2012
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
2020
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
16
3 Medium term outlook
Stagflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
Growth comes with an excessive inflation
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
13
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Introducing Japan Risk Typhoon Map copy
1987
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
1996
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
1987
1991
19961998
2000
2002
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
20021987
14
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)
20142002
2002
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009
2012
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
15
Higher growth and reflation
3 Medium term outlook
Abenomics to succeed scenario
2012
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
2020
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
16
3 Medium term outlook
Stagflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
Growth comes with an excessive inflation
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
14
Source Japan Risk Forum JMA
3 Medium term outlook
Japan Risk Typhoon Map (2002-2012)
20142002
2002
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2002
2007
2009
2012
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
15
Higher growth and reflation
3 Medium term outlook
Abenomics to succeed scenario
2012
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
2020
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
16
3 Medium term outlook
Stagflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
Growth comes with an excessive inflation
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
15
Higher growth and reflation
3 Medium term outlook
Abenomics to succeed scenario
2012
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2012
2014
2017
2020
-30
-20
-10
00
10
20
30
-80 -60 -40 -20 00 20 40 60
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
16
3 Medium term outlook
Stagflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
Growth comes with an excessive inflation
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
16
3 Medium term outlook
Stagflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
Growth comes with an excessive inflation
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
17
3 Medium term outlook
Back to deflation scenario
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
2014
2017
2020
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
No growth and deflation
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
18
3 Medium term outlook
What actually happened
2012
2014
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
2012
2014
2015
2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
GrowthGDP gap (CAO) + Potential Growth )
InflationDomesticdemand deflator(yoy )
Some growth but no inflation
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
Which scenario looks the most likely -Back to deflation scenario has become dominant
19
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
Abenomics to succeed Projection table
A benom ics to succeed
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 12 15 15 15 05 20 20
P otential grow th rate 04 04 06 08 10 12 12 12
G D P gap -08 00 09 16 21 14 22 30
P rivate consum ption -04 07 15 18 18 -02 15 15
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 -06 05 11 16 15 19 25
N om inal G D P grow th rate 25 06 20 26 31 20 39 45
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 10 18 28 25 22 20
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1361 1376 1377 1386 1372 1351
P rim ary balance -52 -52 -51 -44 -39 -32 -31 -30
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 -01 01 03 05
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 03 05 07 11 15
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 117 124 130 130 124 116
20
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
Stagflation Projection table
S tagflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 10 10 08 -15 -10 -05
P otential grow th rate 02 01 00 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
G D P gap -08 01 11 22 32 19 11 08
P rivate consum ption -04 10 12 15 08 -15 -10 -05
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 12 20 32 35 34 30 23
N om inal grow th rate 25 22 30 42 43 19 20 18
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 16 30 40 35 25 17
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1313 1344 1358 1367 1401 1434 1468
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -65 -65 -60 -50 -45 -40
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -01 -01 01 05 15 15
Long-term interest rate 04 -01 01 05 15 29 30 25
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 122 132 145 150 145 135
21
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
Back to deflation Projection table
B ack to deflation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 08 02 -05 -04 -03 -03 -03
P otential grow th rate 04 03 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 -02
P rivate consum ption -04 06 02 01 00 -01 -01 -01
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 00 -01 -04 -05 -05 -05 -05
N om inal grow th rate 25 08 01 -09 -09 -08 -08 -08
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 -02 -04 -04 -05 -05 -05
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 1281 1331 1387 1460 1532 1607 1682 1757
P rim ary balance -52 -55 -55 -60 -60 -65 -65 -65
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 00 -01 -03 -05 -05 -05 -05 -05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 -02 -03 -03 -03 -03 -03
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 102 95 92 89 86 83
22
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
Risk-weighted Projection table
R isk-w eighted scenario
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
G row th
G D P grow th rate 12 10 09 07 07 -03 04 05
P otential grow th rate 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
G D P gap -08 00 06 11 15 08 09 11
P rivate consum ption -04 08 10 12 09 -05 03 04
Inflation
D om estic dem and deflator 04 01 07 12 15 14 14 14
N om inal grow th rate 25 11 16 19 21 10 18 20
C onsum er price inflation 08 -02 08 14 21 18 14 11
Fiscal
N et D ebt to G D P 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
P rim ary balance 06 05 03 03 02 03 05 06
Financial
S hort-term interest rate 01 -01 -02 -02 -02 00 04 05
Long-term interest rate 03 00 00 02 05 10 12 12
E xchange rate (JP Y U S D ) 121 109 113 117 122 122 117 110
23
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
4 Thematic issue BoJ Balancesheet
24
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
25
BoJ on course to own 50 of JGB by end-2018
click here for an interactive version
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
26
IMF sees the limit of BoJrsquos JGB purchase at 400-450 trillion yen or 41-45 of the market
Source IMF 2015 WP ldquoPortfolio Rebalancing in Japan Constraints and Implications for Quantitative Easingrdquo
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
Analysis of JGB investors Life insurers
27
Source The Life Insurance Association of Japan JMA
Life insurersrsquo JGB Holding
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2012 2014 2016
(Trillion yen)
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
28
BoJ will not be able to pass a market stress test beyond 2018
click here for an interactive version
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
29
Japanrsquos central bankrsquos profitability is wafer thin -BoJrsquos balance sheet at the end of March 2017-
BoJs balancesheet as of March 2017
Liability Asset
Bank note (00) JGBs
100 trillion yen 377 trillion yen
Current deposit
Basic balance (+01) average yield in FY2016 (034)
208 trillion yen
Macro-add-on balance (00) TBs
103 trillion yen 41trillion yen
Policy rate balance (-01) Equity ETFs
22 trillion yen 13trillion yen
Others (gov deposits etc) Foreign currency asset
47 trillion yen 7 trillion yen
Capital reserveprovision Others (loans etc)
8 trillion yen 52 trillion yen
Total 490 trillion yen Total 490 trillion yen
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
Does it matter if a central bank run a loss
30
Many argue it does not matter becausehellip
1-A central bank will not become illiquid It can print to pay
2-Temporary loss can be off-set by profits in the coming year
3-A central bank is a part of a government
Even when the above arguments are true it may matter becausehellip
1 Remittance to its government is a source of revenue
2 Recapitalization process threatens the independence of the central bank
3 Uncertainty threatens the credibility of the monetary policy
And Japan
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
Helicopter money Japan has been there
31
click here for an interactive version
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER The information herein is not intended to be an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities and including any expression of opinion has been obtained from or is based
upon sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness although Japan Macro
Advisors (ldquoJMArdquo) believe it to be clear fair and not misleading Each author of this report is not permitted to trade
in or hold any of the investments or related investments which are the subject of this document The views of JMA
reflected in this document may change without notice To the maximum extent possible at law JMA does not
accept any liability whatsoever arising from the use of the material or information contained herein This research
document is not intended for use by or targeted at retail customers Should a retail customer obtain a copy of this
report they should not base their investment decisions solely on the basis of this document but must seek
independent financial advice
32