Jinnah and the Lahore Resolution

INTRODUCTION

Lahore Resolution 1940 gave the Indian Muslims a deep sense of national identity and a vision of independent state. It was the Lahore Resolution that transformed the Muslim minority into a Muslim nation on a par with the Hindus. It embodied hopes and aspirations of the Indian Muslims which were materialized and were translated into reality by the determination and extraordinary vision of the Great Leader of the Indian Muslims whom the world knows as Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Lahore Resolution was the prelude to the creation of Pakistan which is unique achievement of one individual. As Sir Penderel Moon says: “ Wtihout him (Jinnah) therefore, Pakistan would never have existed. There is, I believe, no historical parallel for a single individual affecting such a political revolution and his achievement is a striking refutation of the theory that in making of history, the individual is little or of no significance. It was Mr. JInnah who created Pakistan and undoubtedly mad history.”1

Wolpert in the preface to his study of Jinnah views the greatness of Jinnah with similar admiration: “ Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with a nation-state. Muhammad Ali JInnah did all three.”2

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PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The great leader like Jinnah, whom Hegel calls heroes or world-historical individuals exist in definite times and circumstances. It is natural that they are sensitive to influence of ideals and deeply perceptive of the changes taking place around them.. This term paper will examine the influence of the ideals and political conditions on Jinnah’s personality particularly during 1930, which brought about radical change in Jinnah’s ideological and political beliefs.This paper argues that Jinnah perfectly fits into the philosophical framework constructed by George. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) to elucidate the role of ‘world-historical’ individual in shaping the course of history. Hegel in his famous Lectures on the Philosophy of the World-History gives vivid description of the individuals of world-historical significance, whom he also calls ‘heroes’ and tells how they differ from the people whose destiny they change by influencing their thoughts and actions. Hegel explains: “world-historical individuals or heroes are those who have willed and accomplished not just the ends of their own imagination or personal opinion, but only those which are appropriate and timely, and have an inner vision of what it is. They are not necessarily men of pure philosophy, as they are men of practice. They do however know and will their own enterprise, because the time is ripe for it….. . And other people flock to their standard, for it is these heroes who express the necessity of their times and age. They are the most far-sighted among their contemporaries. The heroes know best what issues are involved and whatever they do is right. The others have to obey the, and their words and deeds are the best that could be said and done in their time…. . These world-historical individuals are those who were the first to formulate the desires of their fellows explicitly. They know what the people, who are following them, wanted for satisfaction.”3

Jinnah was the only leader in the whole of India towards whom Muslims turned when the question of their ideological, constitutional and political existence was to be debated or decided. Ideological and

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political developments during 1930s, coupled with Jinnah’s own disillusionment with united Indian nationalism, led him to envision a separate state for the millions of the Indian Muslims and to claim a status for separate nation for them. Influence of Iqbal’s thought and the Congress betrayal of its own ideals, for which it was founded, during the Congress rule in seven provinces from 1937 to 1939 paved the way for decision and choices that Jinnah made in the 27th Session of All India Muslim League (AIML) held in Lahore in March 1940 when the historic Lahore Resolution was passed. The first part of this term paper examines the influence of Iqbal’s thought on Jinnah and surveys different partitions schemes brought forward during 1930s; the second part discusses the Jinnah’s efforts to reorganize the Muslim League with the unexampled use of his skill and insight to realize his political goals and ideals and formal espousal of the principle on the AIML platform that Muslims were a distinct nation and the only solution to Indian problem lay in the partition of India.while the third part deals with the atrocities inflicted on the Muslims during Congress rule in eight provinces.The fourth and last part briefly surveys the criticism and objections raised by different historians, politicians an publicists against the 1940 Lahore Resolution.As a whole, the purpose of this term paper is to give detailed and rational analysis of interplay between various conflicting ideas and political forces that prevailed in India at that time and the outcome of the conflict. It unravels Jinnah’s role as a ‘midwife’, a Hegelian metaphor for the heroes in history, to effect partitions which lay dormant in the womb of time in the form of aspirations and dreams of the Indian Muslims to see the light of the day.Lahore Resolution being the rationale of independent homeland for Indian Muslims can not be seen or viewed in isolation from Jinnah’s role in bringing this movement to its logical end, that is, the creation of Pakistan on August 14, 1947. The success of the Lahore Resolution meant the realization of the principle of independence for Muslims that the Quaid stood for.

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INFLUENCE OF IQBAL’S THOUGHT ON JINNAH’S IDEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO INDIAN POLITICAL PROBLEM

While writing a forward for the ‘ Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah, the Quaid admitted to the influence of Iqbal on him in these words: “ His (Iqbal’s) views were substantially in consocance with my own and had finally led me to the same conclusion as a result of the careful examinatioin and study of constitutional problem facing India, and found expression in due course in the united will of Muslim India as admuberated in the Lahore Resolution of All India Muslim League popularly known as the ‘ Pakistan Resolutiion’ passed on 23rd March, 1940.4

Different eminent political personalities and historical figures of India had presented the concept of separate Muslim province or state from 1857 to 1940. John Bright, Jamalud din Afgahni, Kheri brothers, Lajpat Rai, Rehmat Ali, Obaidullah Sindhi, Hasrat Mohani and Allama Iqbal were the prominent among them. The ideal of a separate Muslim state is spread over a period of 82 years and a total 236 schemes were presented in this regard. Such schemes which proposed the establishment of separate Muslim province and state were presented by the individuals in their individual capacities without official signature of any organization or political party. Besides, these schemes lacked clarity or organized thought. Concept or ideal which lie dormant in the minds of the people are articulated by men of philosophy and thinkers. Political leaders select most suitable concept among the emerging idea of their times. Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, articulated and explained the ideal of a separate Muslim state within or without British Empire while delivering the Presidential address at the 21st AIML session at Allahbad on December 29-30, 1930. The poet-philosopher, expressing his idea, said: “I would like to see the Punjab, the Northwest Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan

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amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within British empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North Western Indian state appears to be final destiny of the Muslims at least of North West India”. The letters written by Iqbal to Jinnah left lasting influencing on Jinnah’s ideological approach to settle political problems of Indian Muslims. “The critical situation in India converted the Quaid to carry out the valuable advice of Allama Iqbal which he gave to him soon before his death in 1938 that the Muslim League should struggle for the division of India into Muslim majority and Hindu majority states.”5

Partition Schemes during 1930s:

Within a few weeks of Iqbal’s Allahbad Address, Syed Tufail Ahmad, who had graduated from the Aligarh Muslim College, proposed a separate ‘zone; for Indian Muslims. According to him, the only solution of Hindu-Muslim problem was the “division of India into tow homogeneous provinces leading to the formation of predominantly Hindu and Muslim zones”6

An Englishman, J.coatman came to the conclusion: “ It may be that no united India as we understand it today will ever emerge. It may be that Muslim Inida as we understand it today will emerge. It may be that Moslem India in the north and north-west is destined to become a separte Moslem state. In the following year, GT Garrat, former Indian civilian commenting on the deliberations of the Third Session of the Rooundtable Conference wrote in the Nineteenth Century (London) that within a short period of time, the proposed federal govnment of India would be faced with a strong separatist movement. 7

A young Muslim at Cambridge Ch. Rehmat Ali, after watching the Roundtable Conference, voiced his views in 1933 in his pamphlet Now or Never : “ Our religion , culture, history, tradition, , economic system, laws of inheritance, succession and marriages are basically different from those of the people living in the rest of India.” He ruled out the possibility of peaceful co-existence between Muslims and Hindus in Hindu-dominated Federation “where we can not be the masters of our

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destiny and captains of our soul.” As is wll-known the name of Muslim State ‘ Pakistan’ which Rehmat Ali demanded was coined by him from the first letters of the first four units of Muslim Federation Punjab (P), North-western Frontier Province (which he called Afghania, Kashmir, Sind and last three letters of Baluchistan. Dr. Syed Abdul Latif of Osmania University Hyderabad published in 1938 a pamphlet The Cultural Future of India in which he suggested that solution to Indian problem lay in the cultural autonomy for both Hindus and Muslims. In 1939, his booklet entitled ‘the Muslim Problem in India Together with an Alternative Constitution for India’ criticized the 1935 Act as a danger to Muslim ‘individuality’ and mentioned the loss of Muslims faith in Hindus. The alternative constitution suggested by him was to divide India into four cultural zones for the Muslims (Northwest. North-east. Delhi-Lucknow and Deccan ) and at least eleven zones for Hindus. According to this alternative constitution, the Federal Legislature would deal with only those subjects which relate to political and economic interests of the country and there would be no concurrent list. In March, tow Muslim leaders, Chaudhary Khaliquzzan and Abdul Rahim Siddiq met Secretary of State Lord Zetland and proposed the setting up of three or four federations in India, to be controlled by a small central body, not dominated either by Hindus or by the Muslims. In the middle of 1939, Punjab Government employee, Mian Kifayat Ali, writing under pseudonym ‘ A Punjab’ published his pamphlet ‘ Confederacy of India’. Like Latif, Kifayat Ali also emphasized that Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations. He proposed five federations for India, tow of which would have Muslim majorities, each federation would have a governor-general responsible to the Central Confederal Authority in respect of Confederal subjects. Sir Abdullah Haroon put forward his own scheme “which envisaged the division of India into two separate Federations, each drawing its major support from one of the major communities. The Muslim Federation was to comprise the North-Western part of India and Kashmir.” 8

About the same time, Sir Skindar Hayat Khan, Chief Minister of Punjab, published his own proposal for partition entitled Outline of a

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Scheme of Indian Federation under which India was to be divided into seven zones, two of which would have Muslim majorities. These zones would have their own legislatures which collectively would constitue the Central-Federal Assembly, one-third of its members being Muslims. Syed Zafar ul Hasan andDr. Muhammad Afzal Hussain Qadri published their schemes under the title of ‘The Problem of Indian Muslims and Its Solution’. This scheme proposed the division of India into three sovereign federations, tow of which would be Muslim federations. It also proposed common defense of three federations

Hindu Partitions Schemes

Besides, there were also some definite views maintained by the extremist Hindu politicians regarding partition. V.D. Savarkar formulated the two-nation theory in his essay ‘Hindutva published in 1923.Hindu Mahasabha leader Lala Lajpar Rai wrote in ‘The Tribune’ of December 14,924: “ Under my scheme, the Muslims will have four Muslim states 1) the Pathan Province or North-west Frontier 2)Western Punjab 3)Sindh and 4) eastern Bengal. If there are compact Muslim communities in any other part of India, sufficiently large to form a province, they should be similarly constituted. But it should be distinctly understood that this is not a United India” Furthermore, in a letter to C.R.Das in 1925, Lala LajpatRai explained that he had devoted the most of his time to the study of Muslim history and Muslim Law and he was inclined to conclude that Hindu-Muslim majaority was neither possible nor practicable for the religion provided an effective barrier and that he was not afraid of seven crore of Indian Muslims but crore plus the armed hosts of Afghanistan, Central Asia, Arabia, Mesopotamia and Turkey would be irresistible. It was due to these fears that Lala Lajpar Rai became powerful supporter of the partition of the Punjab, the western Punjab would have Muslim majority and eastern Punjab would have non-Muslim majority. Under the scheme

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Lajpat Rai proposed, the Muslim would have four Muslim States, the Pathan Province, the western Punjab, sindh and the eastern Bengal. 9

Difference Between Lajpat Rai’s Scheme and Iqbal’s Thought of Muslim Nation: K.K.Aziz writes that in ‘in clarity, detail and firmness, this ( Lajpat’s) proposal was landmark in the evolution of the idea of Pakistan’. 10 A Hindu historian, Tarachand writes: “ the partiion of India was not a product of of fertile imagination of Muslim undergraduate of the Cambridge University (Ch.Rehmat Ali) , nor evern poet Iqbal’s fantasy but the brainchild of a hypersensitive Hindu stalwart Lala Lajpat Rai. 11

The great Muslim thinker, Allama Iqbal in his Allahbad’s address explained raison d'etre of Muslims constituting a separate nation. The tone and tenor of this address is positive and harmonious while Lala Lajpat Rai’s concept of separatism is inspired negatively due to fear of and hostility of ‘Muslim history’ and ‘ Muslim law’. Iqbal defined Islam’s role the evolution of human civilization positively holding that Islam as an ethical ideal and political legal value system has provided generations of Indian Muslims with “those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups and finally transform them into a well-organized people. 12

Dr. Kalb-i-Abid highlights the Iqbal’s generosity and large-heartedness and quotes him as saying: “ I entertain the highest respect customs, laws and religion and social institution of other communities. Yet I love the communal groups which is the source of my life and my behaviour and which has formed me by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture and thereby creating its whole past as a living operative factor in my present consciousness. A community that is inspired by feelings of ill will towards other communities is low and ignoble.” 13

Secondly, the Hindu political body, the Congress did not espouse or won Lala Lajpat Rai’s ideas in its official meetings. Rather, the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha and other anti- Pakistan organizations did all they could to prevent Pakistan scheme from taking roots. 14

The Indian Muslims, taking inspiration from Iqbal’s thought, stood behind the Muslim League which made Muslim independent homeland

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the basis of its struggle after 1940. Moreover, Iqbal had unflinching faith in Jinnah’s insight and leadership to realize his vision. He hoped that Jinnah’ genius would disover some way out of our present difficulties. Lala Lajpat Rai;s principle of partitioning India did not find a leader of high caliber who could serve as instrument for its realization making it a moment of truth in the history of Hindu India.

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JINNAH’S ROLE IN THE REORGANIZATION OF AIML

The reorganization of AIML began in 1934 when its two sections merged under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah to make the League the most representative political body of the Muslims. The challenge that Jinnah faced came in the form of the British plan for new constitution or Federal Scheme, the second part of which was unacceptable to the Muslims. Jinnah called it a ‘treacherous scheme’ and called for unity between Hindu and Muslims to avert it.15

Jinnah remaine for Hindu Muslim co-operation and in 1936, he declared: “ I will not and cannot give it up. It may give me up,but I will not.” 16

Jinnah in his talks with Rajendra Parsad about Congress–League cooperation suggested that the Hindu Mahasabha should also agree to the ‘compromise formula’ but it did not. 16

Unfortunately, the statements made by Jawarlal Nehre after assuming the presidentship of the Congress in 1936, started widening the gap between Hindu and Muslims. In his Presidential Address at the Lucknow Session of the Congress, Nehru declared that the only key to the solution to all the problems of India lies in Socialism and the communal issue is after all a side issue and it can not have importance in the larger scheme of things. Those who think of it as the major issue think in terms of the British Imperialism continuing permanently in this country. REF: The Evolution of the Demand of the Separate State. Dorothy Norman ed Nehru, The First Sixty Years. Even Rajendra Parsad disagreed with this simplistic analysis and said: “ Is it practical politcs to say that all over communal and international differences will vanish in no time if we concentrate our attention on economic problems and solve them on socialistic lines.” 17

However, the Congress leaders saw the benefits of using socialism to sideline Muslims’ demands for greater safeguards and found the 1935 Act to the advantage of Hindu community. In September, 1936, Nehru went a step further and declared ‘the real contest is between tow forces---the Congress representing the will to freedom of the nation, and the British government of India and its supporters.

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Nehru continued to become more provocative and aggressive after his reelection as the Congress President in Dec. 1936. Early in January, 1937, when Jinnah inaugurated League’s Election Campaign, he stated: “Mr. Nehru is reported to have said that there are only two parties in India—the government and the Congress and other must line up. I refuse to line up with the Congress. There is third party in India and this Muslim India”. Jinnah also asked Nehru to leave the Muslims alone. Nehru ridiculed the Muslim League as representing a group of Muslims functioning in the higher regions of the upper middle class and few even with the Muslim lower middle class. He said, “ May I suggest to Mr Jinnah that I came into greater touch with the Muslim masses than most of the members of the Muslim League” 18

Nehru also remarked sarcastically about Jinnah saying: “ There was as much difference between him and the Indian masses as between Savile Row and Bond Street and the Indian village with ist mud huts.” 19

Wolpert commenting on this suggestion of Nehru to Jinnah says, “ It would not be the last of Nehru’s political errors of judgement in his dealings with Jinnah, but it was one of the most fatal mistakes he ever made in moment of hubris” 20 He also appreciated Jinnah’s control of his temper which he used for his ‘calculated political advantage’. About Jinnah, he says: “ He used anger as a barrister or an acor would do to sway his jury audience, never from an uncontrollable flaring of passion. For personal passion had all but died in him and was never to be rekindled.’ 21

Jinnah as the Leader of Muslim Masses On Iqbal’s advice, Jinnah started turning the AIML into the party of the masses. 22The Muslims started calling him ‘Quaid-i-Azam’ in 1937. During 1938-39, the Quaid concerned himself with ‘building a mass party’ and from 1937 to 1940, the Muslim League membership multiplied from a few thousand to well over a half million. Jinnah had advised the Muslim masses to organize themselves at the Luknow session: “ It is essential that the Muslim should organize themselves as

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one party….. .They must realize that time has come when they should concentrate and devoter energies to self-organization and full development of their power to the exclusion o fevery other consideration” 23

Under Jinnah’s advice, Lucknow Muslim Students League, All Bengal Muslm Students League and Aligarh Univeristy Union were mereged to from ‘All India Muslim Students Conference. The students were brought under the League’s banner by Muhmmad Noman. Noman highlights Jinnah’s deep commitment to and interest in students affairs by telling that Jinnah decided to shift the venue of his Council April meeing from Lahore to Culcatta within a minute of receiving an invitation to prieseover over Federations first annual session. He recalls ‘from Calcutta onwards, the Muslim students marched under his guidance. 24

The most memorable of his statements to that newly organized Muslim conference was that “ we don’t want to be reduced to the position of the negroes America’.In January, 1938, while delivering a speech before students of Aligarh Muslim University, the ‘intellectual cradle of the Muslim League, Jinnah began: “ You , Mr. President, have said the Muslim is born free, when was he free? In his country an any rate we have been slaves for one fifty years. This was the first time Jinnah used the word ‘slave’ and he continued to publicize the plight of the Muslim masses.

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THE CONGRESS RULE IN PROVINCES (1937-1939)

The elections were held in India in 1937 under the 1935 Act in which the Indian National Congress (INC) formed its ministries in eight out of eleven provinces of British India. The Congress after winning such an impressive victory found the ‘intoxication of power a bit too exhilarating. The Congress prevented the installation of Muslim League ministry in any one of the four provinces where Muslims were in majority. In the UP, the Congress meted out disdainful attitude toward the Muslim League stalwarts like Liaqat Ali. The Congress demanded from the Muslim League, as the price for its inclusion in the Congress Ministry, the complete merger of the Muslim League Party in the Congress Party. It also demanded the dissolution of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board and pledge not to contest any by-elections.25

Mauland Abul Kalam Azad blamed Nehru for not being generous towards the Muslim League, an attitude which was partly responsible for the creation of Pakistan.26

As Sir Penderal Moon, a British administrator, says: : If the U.P. sample was to be pattern of the Congress political conduct, then what would be the position of Muslims when a federal government for all India came to be formed. There would be no room, no throne for India save for Congress and the Congress stooges.” Sir Harry Haig. Governor of the United Provinces at that time, has recorded: “ The enthusiasm of the masses for Congress Raj melted imperceptibly into ideas of Hindu Raj, which were certainly prevalent throughout the Province. These ideas were deeply resented by the Muslims who were invincibly determined not be ruled by the Hindus.” 27

The policies and programmes which the Congress Ministries followed clearly demonstrated that the Congress leadership was determined that Muslim should give up their separate way of life and become an integral part of single Hindu-dominated Indian nation. Vidya Mandir and Wardha schemes of educational reforms were launched to create

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common Indian cultural sense in the innocent minds of Muslim children. They were forced to sing Bande Matram with folded hands and offer reverence and offer reverence before the Mahatam’s portrait. The Congress ministries started flying the Congress flag on public buildings so as to give impression that the Congress flag was the national flag. In the provinces where Urdu was widely read and understood, the Congress ministries took several steps to replace it with Hindu written in Devanagri script. Bande Matram song began to be recited before Assembly proceedings. This Hindu song was idolatrous with anti-Muslim overtones and adored Kali, the Hindu goddess. It was taken from Bankin chnadra Chaterjea’s novel ‘Anand Math’ in which hostility was expressed against the Muslims. Under the Congress Ministries, even Muslim lives and properties were unsafe. According to government sources in two-year period from October 1937, there were fifty seven serious communal riots in the Congress-governed provinces leading to 1700 casualties and 130 deaths. By the end of 1939, It was widely believed that if the Congress would have lasted much longer, communal fighting have broken out on an unprecedented scale. Thus the Congress conduct and rule was greatly violative of minority rights, civil society and of adequate, if not, good governance issues. The catalogue of ill-treatment and persecution of Muslims in the Congress-rule provinces as contained in Pirpur Committee Report and advocate Sharif’s Report from Patna mirrored the style of the government by the Congress and its Hindu methods to subject Muslims to perpetual inferior position in relation to Hindus. If the Muslims had allowed the Congress to continue with prevailing constitutional and federal schemes as envisioned in the Govt. of India Act 1935, the Congress would have destroyed the Muslim religious and cultural identity.

The Congress rule showed its fascist and authoritarian face to Muslims at this time. Naturally, Qauid-i-Azam was forced to counter it by enlarging the Muslim League’s base. While speaking at AIML annual session in Patna in December, 1938, he said: “It is tragedy that high

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command of the Congress is determined to crush all other communities and cultures in this country and establish Hindu Raj”. He further said: “I challenge anybody to deny that the Congress is not mainly a Hindu body. I ask, does the Congress represent the Muslims? Whos is the genius behind it? Mr.Gandhi. I have no hesitation in saying that it is Mr.Gandhi who is destroying the ideal with which the Congress was started. He is the one man responsible for turning the Congress into an iinstrument for revival of Hinduism. His ideal is reviving the Hindu religion and establish Hindu raj in this country. Today, the Hindu mentality, Hindu outlook are being carefully nurtured, and Muslims are being forced to accept new conditions to submit to the orders of the Congress leaders”. Despite Muslims’ rage against the atrocities of the Congress Ministries, Gandhi made a claim in the newspaper ‘ Harijan’ that the Congress was the only party capable of delivering goods to Indian people, which Jinnah rejected as ‘preposterous’. In Wolpert’s opinion, in the last part of 1930s,Jinnah’s strategy was to teach the Congress ‘to respect and fear’ the Muslim League and to teach his own followers to depend primarily on themselves and to mobilize into ‘one solid people’.

Triangle of Forces:Jinnah, British and the Congress leadership in 1939 German Nazi dictator Hitler declared war in Europe in 1939. The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow issues proclamation on 3rd September 1939 that war had broken out between His majesty, Germany, and that a state of war existed in India. For obvious reasons, the Viceroy was eager to gain support of all major political parties of India in his war efforts. The Congress ignored the British Government of having deliberately ignored the wishes of Indian people on its entry into war and it demanded independence for India as a condition for supporting war. Jinnah, as a seasoned tactician, followed a tactic which he often repeated. ‘He waited for the Congress move before making his own if they were bargaining so could he’.28

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On 18th Septmeber, the Muslim League Working Committee offered its ‘solid support’ to the British Indian government only on two conditions , ‘Justice and fairplay’ for the Muslims in the Congress-ruled provinces, and an assurance that no constitutional advance or declaration would be made or constitution framed ‘without the consent and approval of the League. The Viceroy was anxious to get the AIML support for his war efforts and he promised in October, 1939 that ‘rights of minority groups would be safeguarded in any new constitution. The Congress demand for ‘independent status’ and Muslim League demand for ‘veto’ were ‘mutually exclusive and antagonistic’29

The ‘triangle of force’ was thus set up that was to continue ‘until partition and the transfer of power. Premier of the Punjab, Sir Skindar who was jealous of Jinnah’s rising polularity sent a message to Lord Linlighgow which said. “Punjab and Bengal were wholly behind the government in prosecution of war whatever Jinnah and his friend might say”. He advised the Viceroy not to ‘inflate’ Jinnah. Jinnah regretted this move by Skindar and told the Viceroy that Skindar alone could not deliver goods. He appealed to him for doing something ‘positive’ by turning out the Congress Ministries. Jinnah also revealed to the Viceroy that ultimate political solution to Indian problem lay in partition. Gandhi who initially assured the Viceroy of his ‘full and unconditional personal support’ for the war went through a change of heart on September 25, 1939, he applied his creed of non-violence to the conduct of war and asked the British “to lay down arms and die unresisitingly and go down inot history as heroes of non-viiolence”. 30

On October 11, 1939, Nehru told the All India Congress Committee at Wardha: : “ A slave India can not help Britian”. We want to assume control of our government and when we are free we can help democracies.” Next day, Gandhi issued his own statement from Wardha finding the Viceroy’s non-committal declaration of Britain’s unchanged objectives towards India ‘profoundly disappointing’ accusing him following ‘divide and rule’ policy. In the All India Congress Committee on October 22, 1935, the Congress concurred that ‘it could not possibly

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give any support to Great Britain for it would amount to endorsement of the Imperialist policy which the Congress always opposed and sought to end. As a first step, the Congress called upon the Congress Ministries to tender their resignations. On 22nd October, 1939, the All India Muslim League Working Committee again reiterated that it would not accept any federal scheme unltess it completely scrapped the the 1935 federal constitution. Towards the end of the years, Jinnah, in a press interview to the Manchester Guardian , declared unequivocally that “ it is impossible to work a democratic parliamentary government in India”and this belief was expressed by him again in an article which contributed to Time and Tide, an independent British weekly in which he said that democracy of the usual Western variety was not suited to India.31

Jinnah then met Lord Linlithgow, Parsad and Gandhi. In New Delhi, on November 1, 1939, Gandhi concluded after the meeting that “ Jinnah Saheb looks to the British Power to safeguard the Muslim rights. Nothing that the Congress can do or conceal will satisfy him.” On November 5, the Viceroaya reported the ‘failure of talks’ as the Congress ministries resigned one after another. Through his journal ‘ Harijan’, Gandhi appealed to Jinnah to fight for undivided India hoping the League did not want to ‘vivisect India’. But Jinnah had decided in favour of a separate and equal national status for Muslims. He waited for ‘precise timing for announcing his intentions’. As a negotiator of highest caliber, he knew how important timing could be for political as well as for legal advantage. Jinnah had the unique capacity to make the most every political option and opportunity. Jinnah reminded people and politicians in India of the power being enjoying by AIML at that time of intense political wrangling. He announced his choice of Friday, December 22, 1939 as a ‘Day of Deliverance’ and Thanksgiving as a mark of relief at the departure of the Congress ministries. Jinnah’s resolution stated: “ The Congress Ministry has conclusively demonstrated and proved the falsehood of the Congress claim that it represents all interests justly and fairly, by it decidedly anti-Muslim policy. The Congress Ministry both in the discharge of their duties of administration and in the legislature have done their best to

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flout the Muslim opinion to destroy the Muslim Culture and have interfered with their religious and social life and trampled upon their economic and political rights….that in matters of differences and disputes the Congress…..invariably sided with and supported and advocated the cause of Hindus in total disregard and to prejudice of the Muslim interests. The Congress government constantly interfered with the legitimate and routine duties of district officers even in the petty matters to the serious detriment of the Musalmans, and thereby created atmosphere which spread the belief amongst Hindu public that there was established a Hindu Raj, and emboldened the Hindus. Mostly the Congress men, to ill treat Muslims at various places, interfered with their elementary rights of freedom”.

Gandhi and the Congress leadership felt that there was no prospect of resolving the Hindu-Muslim problem by future talks,until in the words of Jinnah “We reach an agreement with regard to the minority problem”. Wolpert rightly says that Jinnah never lost his temperate balance and never discarded the last life line of possible future contact with the Congress and he was always ready to be ‘at disposal’ of the Congress leaders, in case they ‘desired to discuss the matter with him’ In response, the Congress press started dubbing Jinnah “the Dictator of Malabar Hills’.

TOWARDS THE LAHORE RESOLUTION 1940

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Another challenge which confronted Jinnah’s leadership and the principle he espoused came from the Prime Minister of the Punjab, Sir Skindar Hayat who was leader of the Unionist Party and had joined the Muslim League seeing its popularity. Jinnah’s risinig popularity threatened his political position in the Punjab.Sindh presented a picture politically favourable for Jinnah and was moving in the direction which was in harmony with Jinnah’s principle of politics at that time.Sind Muslim League Conference, held at Karachi in October 1938, passed the resolution which expressed the League’s determination to rid the Indian Muslims of the ‘caste-ridden mentality and anti-Muslim policy of the Hindu majority’. The Conference regarded Hindus and Muslim as ‘two nations ‘ and recommended to the Muslim League to devise a scheme of Constitution under which Muslims may attain full independence. It also disapproved emphatically All-India Federation as embodied in the Government of India Act 1935. AIML sub-committee formed in March 1939 was entrusted with the task of considering various partition schemes for India’s political future and it was to present its final scheme in the annual session of AIML scheduled to be held in December, 1939. The commencement of War, party’s ‘internal difficulties’ and Jinnah’s precarious health caused the postponement of the annual session till March, 1940. Sir Skindar Hayat presented his “Outline Of a Scheme of Indian Federation with the support of the British government. The Prime Minister of Bengal Fazul Haq followed him. They both were interested in forming coalition Ministries with other parties including the Congress. The Viceroy had observation that the Muslims in Bengal and Punjab had marginal majority, and it was likely that they would not be able to govern with a comfortable majority. Skindar and Fazal ul Haq were against the ‘Pakistan Demand’ which was being seriously considered by the AIML sub-committee Jinnah and Skindar had differences on ths issue of Federation and Hindu Muslim rapprochement. Federation could be implemented only after a compromise was reached between Hindus and Muslim..32

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In March, 1940, the Congress adopted Nehru’s motion as a resolution in which it condemned the War for Imperialist ends and refused to become party to it. It demanded a ‘Constituent Assembly’ elected on the basis of adult franchise, safeguards for minorities by agreement or arbitration and ruled out the role of Princely states and of British community and the applicability of Dominion Status to India. Prior to this Congress session of 1940, Mr Jinnah made a statement in February 1940 announcing the League’s policy that India was not one nation, but two, a stand which he elaborated in the 27th AIML session at Lahore in March 1940. He also refused to accept the arbitrament of any body, Indian or the British and said, “the Muslims would determine their own destiny”. In the middle of March 1940, the Police opened fire on the members of Khaksar organization and there was law and order problem in the Punjab. Skindar Hayat suggested that the League’s Lahore session should be postponed but Jinnah did not agree with this. He arrived in Lahore on March 22, saying that ‘Lahore session is going to be landmark in the future history of Muslim India. Jinnah had sharp sense of the politics of the Punjab; he went straight to Mayo Hospital to visit the wounded activists of Khaksars organization. More than 60000 Muslims were present to welcome the Quaid in Lahore with shouts ‘Quaid-i-Azam Zindabad’ Jinnah inaugurated the AIML 27th Session in Minto Park (now Iqbal Park) Lahore on 22nd March, 1940. In his Presidential address, Jinnah highlighted the developments which had dominated Indian political scene since Lucknow Pact 1916 to Congress Ministries in 1939. He elaborated the two-nation theory, the rationale of separate homeland for Indian Muslims. In this address, he spoke extempore for more than two hours. He said: “The problem in India is not of a inter-communal character but manifestly of international one and it must be treated as such ------. They (Islam and Hinduism) are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact different and distinct social order and it is a dream that Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality. The Hindu and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literature. They neither intermarry nor interdine together and indeed they belong to two

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different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration from different source of history. They have different epics, different heroes and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is the foe of the other, and likewise their victories and defeats overlap ---- Musalmans are a nation according to any definition and they must have their homelands, territory and state.” 33

Jinnah also criticized the demand of introduction of British parliamentary system and discussed its unsuitability in Indian situation. He also pointed out the inherent flaws in the Congress demand for immediate independence and Constituent assembly in the light of past experiences. We naturally have our past experiences and particularly by experiences of the past tow and half years of the provincial constitution in the Congress-governed provinces, we have learnt many lessons. We are now apprehensive and can trust nobody. We never thought that the Congress High Command would have acted in the manner which they actually did in the Congress-governed provinces. I never dreamt they would ever come down as low as that.” He also said, “It is absured to ask the ruling power to abdicate in favour of a constituent assembly.. Suppose we don’t agree to the franchise according to which the Central Assembly is elected, or suppose we the only body of Muslim representation does not agree with the non-Muslim majority in the Constituent Assembly what will happen.” Jinnah insisted that he too stood ‘unequivocally for the freedom of India. But it must be freedom for all India and not freedom of one section, or worse still of the Congress caucus and slavery of Musalmans and other minorities. He therefore suggested that the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations to have separate homelands by dividing Indiaa into ‘autonomous national states”. Towards the end of his speech, Jinnah strongly refuted the view that India was ever united or or that it had ever been a single nation. The only unity that had ever existed was imposed by the British conquest and this artificial unity would collapse as soon as they withdrew. On March, 23, Maulvi Fazlul Haq, the premier of the Bengal, moved a resolution which was endorsed by the leading personalities of the

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League which came from different provinces of India. The Lahore Resolution was passed on 24th March, 1940. The Lahore Resolution stated:

“ While approving and endorsing the action by the Council and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, as indicated in their resolution dated the 27th August, 17the and 18th of September and 22nd of October 1939, and 3rd of February, 1940 on the constitutional issue. This session of the All-Inida Muslim League empathically reiterates that the scheme of federation embodies in the Government of India Act, 1935 is totally unsuited to and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India” “It further records its empathic view that while the declaration dated the 18the of October 1939 made by the Viceroy on behalf of his majesty’s Government is reassuring in so far as it declares that the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties interest and communities in India, Muslim India will not satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered novo an no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval.: Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it designed to on the following basic principles viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslim are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. “That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religions, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them and in other parts of India where the Mussalmans are in a

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minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.” The Resolution was seconded by Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, and supported among others, by Maulan Zafar Ali Khan, Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, Haji sir Abdullah Haroon, Nawab Ismail Khan,Qazi Muhmmad Isa and I.I. Chundrigar. After this meeting Jinnah said to Matlub Saiyid who was there and said, “Iqbal is no more amongst us, but had he been alive he would have been happy to know that we did exactly what he wanted us to do.” The India newspapers coined the phrase, ‘Pakistan Resolution’ for their headline next morning. Jinnah adopted it; and in a speech that he made later in the year, he said, “No power on earth can prevent Pakistan.” 34

CRITICISM OF LAHORE RESOLUTION: OBJECTIONS, AMBIGUITIES AND OMISSIONS

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Objections and Allegations against the Lahore Resolution: The most serious criticism of Lahore Resolution is the allegation that the British inspired this Resolution to promote their imperial ends as a counterweight to the pressure tactics of the Congress. Tara Chand and other official historian of freedom movement for India allege that Pakistan demand was made effective by the ‘will of the British rulers’. Ramji Lal has attributed the Resolution to the ‘role played by the British as it was bent on thwarting the issue of Indian independence by following policy of ‘divide and rule’. In a similar vein Uma Kaura concludes her argument saying that:” Lintithgow was jubilcant at the adoption of the Partition Resolution.” V.B.Kulkarni insists that Lahore Resolution was the product of the British encouragement of separatist politics. Ayesha Jalal supports this argument in her book The Sole Spokesman:Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan. She says that Lord Linlinthgow asked Jinnah to come up with some ‘constructive policy’ as a counterweight to the Congress demand for Independence and a Constituent Assembly.35

This criticism loses weight if viewed in the context of long-term political, economic and strategic interests of the British in India which could be served best if India remained united. The very idea of the partition stirred ‘distaste in the British governing circles’ In his letter of 18 April, 1940, Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, expressed his fear that separate Muslim states might join Islamic commonwealth. Lord Linlithgow asked Jinnah to come up with a ‘constructive policy’ because he tried to convince Jinnah about the usefulness of British parliamentary institutions and about talks with the Congress leadership to settle the constitutional problem. But Jinnah was not moved. Lord Linlithgow wrote to Zetland on 24 March, 1940 a letter in which he criticized the Jinnah’s demand as ‘extreme’ and preposterous’ which was meant as ‘an attempt on the part of Jinnah and the League to free themselves from the damaging charge leveled against them they had no constructive ideas of their own. Zetland agreed with these views and he also called it ‘silly scheme of partition’ and ‘counsel of despair’. Both Linlithgow and Zetalnd thought of Skindar Hayat as a

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‘man of such broad-minded views and so tolerant an outlook because he was opposed to partition demand of the League. So the demand for Pakistan was the logical outcome of the political developments which had been taking place in India over the past half century. V.P. Menon gives details of Jinnah’s interview with Lord Linglithgow and he says: “ Jinnah also wished to make it clear that if His Majesty’s Government could not improve on its present solution for the India’s constitutional development, he and his friends would have no option but to fall back on some form of partition of the country; that as a result of this discussion they had decided first of all, that the Muslims were not a minority but rather a nation; and secondly that democracy fo all-India was impossible.” Menon at the end says that ‘throughout the discussion the Viceroy remained non-commital..’36

The second criticism looks on the Resolution as a tactic or ‘bargaining counter’. Ayesha Jalal advances this criticism in her book when she says: “ By apparently repudiating the need for any Centre, and keeping quiet about its shape, Jinnah calculated that when eventually the time came to discuss an All-India Federation, British and the Congress alike would be forced to negotiate with organized Muslim opinion and would be ready to make substantial concession to create or retain that Centre. The Lahore Resolution should therefore be seen as a bargaining counter which had the merit of being acceptable to the majority-province Muslims and of being totally unacceptable to the Congress and in the last resort to the British also.” 37

Before Ayesha Jalal, Penderel Moon, Kanji Dwarkdas, and Durga Das had suggested the similar criticism of the Resolution. Penderel Moon points to the fact that Jinnah was ready to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan in 1946 suggested that he was not really irrevocably committed to Pakistan demand. Ayesha Jalal’s criticism is based on absence of ‘connecting link between the two zones’ and a clear cut ‘Centre’. She forgets that two zones were ‘grouped together in the Madras session of AIML in 1941. The phrase now used was: the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped together….” The absence of hint of any centre does not mean that the Resolution was meant as ‘bargaining counter”. The

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League deliberately avoided mentioning the ‘centre’ whether in the context of Muslim India or India as a whole, whether in the sense of Indian federation of All-India confederation as it might have compromised the very idea of Pakistan. The League had ‘eliminated’ Skindar’s idea of centre and coordination of the activities of the various units when the Resolution was drafted. Jinnah himself categorical rejected the impression that the Resolution was intended as the bargaining counter. While speaking the Pakistan Session of the Punjab Muslim Students Federation on 2 March, 1941, he said, “ The only solution for Muslims of India, which will stand the test of trial and time, is that India should be partitioned so that both the communities can develop freely and fully according to their own genius, economically, socially, culturally and politically…. The vital contest in which we are engaged is not only for the material gain but also the very existence of the soul of a Muslim nation. Hence I have said often that it is matter of life and death to the Musalmans and is not a counter for bargaining.” 38

The charge of ‘bargaining counter’ is weakened by the fact that both the British and Hindus accused Jinnah of intransigence and obstinacy on the issue of Pakistan. Furthermore, bargaining was not Jinnah’s style of politics.As for his acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan in 1946, it must be kept in mind that Jinnah did not fail to insist on tow separate constituent assemblies and the right to secede from the Union after an initial period of ten years. He accepted the plan for ‘tactical reasons than any compromise on the fundamental principle of Pakisttan.

Ambiguities

Two ambiguities are usually pointed out in the Lahore Resolution.

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1) It was not clear whether the goal contemplated was one or more sovereign states and if the idea was to attain one state, how could the constituent units be ‘autonomous and sovereign’ at the same time. It would be anomaly or self-contradictory. In the Resolution, the details were left imprecise, but principle stood clear. The language used in the Resolution was ‘loose’ which suggests something of a federation type. The League’s Madras session made it clear.The Muslims dropped all Idea of unity and stood for separate homeland. The confusion as to one or more states was finally laid to rest in 1944 when Jinnah in his vital talks with Gandhi emphatically stated what the League really sought for the Indian Muslim in Lahore Resolution was the establishment of a single Muslim state comprising both the North-Western and eastern zones. 2). Lahore Resolution is allegedly in clear about the areas to be included in the states. In response to Beverly Nicholas’s question that why Pakistan has not been defined in detail, Jinnah replied, “ All details were left to the future and future is often an admirable arbitrator…. It is beyond the power of any man to provide in advance a blue print in which every detail is settled.” 39

The Resolution was deliberately kept vague to take full advantage of element of uncertainty and the power of manipulability. It also distracted the Congress from targeting a visible goal set by the League. The League had purposely left this matter ambiguous to get as many Muslim majority areas as possible, including some in the Muslim-minority provinces.

Omissions: 4) The critics of the Resolution usually ask questions why the word ‘Pakistan’ was not mentioned in the Resolution and why there is no reference to princely states like Kashmir. As for reference to word Pakistan is concerned, the word ‘Pakistan’ as coined by Chaudhary Rehmat Ali was used in specific context in which he proposed the idea of Bengal and Assam to constitute a separate Muslim state of Bang-i-Islam’. The Lahore Resolution pointed to the

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areas of both North-western and eastern India. The Resolution did not favour the exchange of population. The word was not used as it could give the impression of pan-Islamism and scare the British and provoke Hindu propaganda. But when Hindu press regarded the Lahore Resolution as the ‘Pakistan demand’, the Quaid owned it without hesitation. Madras session of the League in April 1941 formally adopted ‘Pakistan demand’ as the goal of the Muslim League. As for not making any reference to the ‘princely states’, they did not lie within the constitutional jurisdiction of the British India and the League’s interest was confined to Kashmir whose ultimate fate depended on the League’s strength in the British India.5) The critics of the Resolution are of the view that it had ignored the

Muslims of minority provinces and it did not solve the problem it stood for.

The Resolution was directed more at the Muslim-majority provinces and could offer no more than promise of “adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards” to the minority-provinces. These safeguards could be ensured reciprocally with the Hindus. The Muslim League leadership was convinced that a separate Muslim state would better protect the Muslim rights in Hindu India. B.R. Ambedkar who had been an influential actor in the Indian political drama brushes aside the main thrust of these criticisms in these words: "It is doubtful if there is a politician in India to whom the adjective incorruptible can be more fittingly applied. Any one who knows what his relations with the British government have been, will admit that he has always been their critic, if indeed, he has not been their adversary. No one can buy him. For it must be said to his credit that he has never been a soldier of fortune."40

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Conclusion Quaid-i-Azam was the statesman and constitutionalist of the highest stature. The constitutional process by its very nature progresses slowly. Jinnah kept his hand on the pulse of the Muslim nation which was waking up slowly from the slumbers of the past. The long journey of the All India Muslim League from its inception in 1906 to the adoption of the Lahore Resolution in 1940 is manifestation of this reality. Jinnah demonstrated full control of his emotions when the Congress leadership subjected him to the sarcasms and taunts. Jinnah, in Hegel’s words, was concerned with ‘formulating the desires of his fellows explcitly’ and he diverted his personal rage into the creative process of fathering a separate state for them. Jinnah and Iqbal both experienced the anguish of falsehood of ‘united’ Indian nationalism and they both came to Muslim nationalism but by different routes. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Allama Iqbal were not the inventors of two-nation theory. It was implicit in the minds of the Muslims already. They only realized this implicit principle.Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Sir Muhmmad Iqbal espoused the nationalism which was ideological in character but Jinnah’s nationalism had a territorial ring about it. The adoption of Lahore Resolution and its materialization in the creation of Pakistan proved beyond doubt that Jinnah played a role of ‘world-historical’ significance.

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REFERENCES

1. Sir Edward Penderel Moon, “Mr. Jinnah’s Changing Attitude to the Idea of Pakistan,” in World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Muhmmad Ali Jinnah, ed. Ahmad Hasan Dani (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, 1979) , 270.

2. Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1989) , .

3. G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of the World History trans. H. B. Nisbet (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980) ,

4. Muhammad Ali Jinnah ford. Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah (Faisalabad: Daira Ma aref-i-Iqbal, 2001) , 9-10 5. “Prelude to Pakistan,” Dawn, 23 March, 1940.

6. Latif Ahmad Sherwani, “ The Evolution of the Demand for Separate State,” in Pakistan Resolution Revisited ed., Kaniz Yusuf (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998) , 28-29 7. Ibid., 29

8. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) , 111.

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9. S. Qalb-i-Abid, Jinnah, Second World War and the Pakistan Movement (Multan: Becon Books, 1999) ,

10. K.K. Aziz, History of Idea of Pakistan Vol 1 (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978) , 143-147

11. Ibid., 143-147 12. Anwar H. Syed, “Allama Iqbal and the Quaid-i-Azam On the Issue of Nationhood and Nationalism,” in World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Muhmmad Ali Jinnah, ed. Ahmad Hasan Dani (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, 1979) , 207. 13. S. Qalb-i-Abid, 99

14. S.Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Struggle for Independence (Lahore: Sange-e-Meel Purblications, 1997) , 98.

15. Sharif ud Din Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan Vol II (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Acaemy, 1970) , 233 16. Z.H.Zaidi, “Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy,” 1937-47, in The Partition of India , ed. C.H.Philips and M.D. Wainwright ( London:George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1970) , 25. 17. Sherwani, 34 18. . Ibid., 35 19. Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography ( London: The Bodley Head, 1958) , 68

20. Wolpert, 148

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21. Ibid.,

22. P.H.L. Eggermont, “The Pakistan Concept: Its Background,” in World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Muhmmad Ali Jinnah, ed. Ahmad Hasan Dani (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, 1979) , 236

23.Wolpert, 155

24. Mukhtar Zaman, Students’ Role in the Pakistan Movment ( Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Acadmey, 1978) , 25 25. Sayeed, 84-85

26. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (New York: Longman, Green & Co., 1960) , 160-162 27. Sayeed, 85 28.H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britian, India and Pakistan ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969) , 77. 29. Ibid., 30. Wolpert, 174

31. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan ( Karachi: Karachi University Press, 1999 ) , 107-10832. Muhammad Aslam Malik, The Making of the Pakistan Resolution ( London: Oxford University Press, 2001) , 109.

33. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Speeches and Writings of Mr.Jinnah, Vol I (Lahore: Sheik Ashraf, 1960) ,, 159-163

34. Hector Bolitho, Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan (London: John Murraay Allies Book Corporation) , 129

35. Skindar Hayat, “Lahore Resolution: A Review of Major Criticisms,” in Pakistan Resolution Revisited ed., Kaniz Yusuf (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998), 47

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36. V. P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1957) , 81.

37. Ayeshaa Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnaha, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Lahore: Sange-e-Meel Publications, 1999) , 57.

38. Skindar Hayat, Aspects of the Pakistan Movement ( Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998) , 212..

39. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheem, “Quaid-i-Azam As A Strategist” in World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam ed. Ahmad Hasan Dani (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, 1979) , 225. 40. B.R.Ambedkar, Pakistan And The Partition of India (Bombay: Thacker & Co. 1946) , 323

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