Jihad and Modern Warfare

JIHAD & MODERN WARFARE

https://www.academia.edu/9496391/

Jihad_and_Modern_Warfare

Air

Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal TI (M)

Introduction

War is an organized, armed, and often a prolonged conflict thatis carried on between states, nations, or other parties typifiedby extreme aggression, social disruption, and usually highmortality. War should be understood as an actual, intentional andwidespread armed conflict between political communities, andtherefore is defined as a form of political violence. The set oftechniques used by a group to carry out war is known as warfare.An absence of war (and other violence) is usually called peace.In 1832, Carl Von Clausewitz, in his treatise ‘On War’, definedwar as follows: "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemyto do our will”. There are many ways of categorizing war, forexample: by expanse (total or limited war); by medium (land, sea,air war); by weapon (atomic, biological, chemical etc); by cause( humanitarian, holy, preventive etc).

Evolution of Warfare: A Fast Forward Preview

For the last 100 years or so, war has incrementally been

transforming into a dehumanized human activity. Disproportionate

use of power has become the signature tune of contemporary

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warfare1. Drone and suicide bomber are its latest editions, one

symbolizes a bomb without man and the other represents man as a

bomb. To the former activity, human operator’s attachment is

minimal, may be equivalent to playing video a game, that too

while sipping coffee. To the latter activity, a living human

carrier is tied to the bomb and is certainly on a one way

ticket. The attitude of these two warriors is pegged on the

opposite ends of motivational spectrum: indifference and total

submission towards mission. However, results are strikingly

similar. Alongside intended target, both of them kill innocent

civilians, including women and children; and shrug their

shoulders by dismissing this carnage as collateral damage. It

is paradoxical to condemn one and condone the other.

Since the last decade of the 20th century, strategists have

witnessed profound changes in the world. There has not been any

decade in the history in which the changes have been more

pronounced than the two commencing 1991. Causes behind these

changes are numerous. Nevertheless, only a few reasons are

pointed out rather frequently. One of such reason is the first

Gulf War (1991)2. This war changed the world significantly.

Such a generalized conclusion about a war which occurred one

time in, a limited area, and which only lasted 42 days seems

1 John M. Collins, “Grand Strategy Principles and Practices”, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1973.2 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999), p.4

2

like a gross exaggeration3—indeed breaching the boundaries of

fiction. The second one is America led invasion of Afghanistan

in 2110. War is on for over a decade, with no victory in sight

for the mightiest of the globe. The occupation coalition of 49

countries is gradually falling apart, while morale of rag tag

resistance entities is unwavering. In the history of modern

warfare, the outcome has never been so disproportionate to the

comparative balance of power. Napoleon’s adage that ‘God is on

the side having larger battalions’ no longer seems to hold

ground.

In the wake of First Gulf war, a whole generation of new

terminologies began to surface after January 17,1991: the

former Soviet Union; Bosnia-Herzegovina; Kosovo; cloning;

Microsoft; hackers; the Internet; the Southeast Asian financial

crisis; the Euro; as well as the world's final and only

superpower -- the United States etc4. These tags ever-since

constitute the main subjects. All these are related to that war,

either directly or indirectly. However, caution is due; intent

is not to mythicize war, and romanticize a lopsided war in which

there was such a great difference in the actual power of the

opposing parties. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the war

has itself not changed, rather, it has transformed; from those

wars which could be described in glorious and dominating terms,

which people originally felt was one of the more important roles

3 Ibid.4 Ibid.

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to be played out on the world stage, has at once taken the seat

of a B actor5. However, a war which changed the world,

ultimately changed war itself--not the changes in the

instruments of war, the technology of war, the modes of war, or

the forms of war. The Change was in the function of warfare6.

Who could imagine that an insufferably arrogant actor, whose

appearance could changed the entire plot, is confronted with a

shocking reality that the pace is unsustainable and that there

is no tenable likelihood that he could again handle the “A”

role--- in which he alone occupies center stage. Perhaps those

who feel this most deeply are the Americans, ambitious to play

multiple roles simultaneously, and that too all alone: saviour;

fireman; global policeman; and yet an emissary of peace, etc7.

In the aftermath of "Desert Storm," America has not been able to

again achieve a comprehensive victory8. Whether it was in

Somalia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, second invasion of Iraq or

occupation of Afghanistan in 2001, this has invariably been the

case. It did win tactical battles, however these did not

translate in to strategic victory—durable peace. The only point

which is certain is that, from Desert storm onwards, war was no

longer poised to follow its traditional trajectory and format.

Each embarrassment augmented the frustration and addition of5 Ibid.6 Ibid.7 Ibid.8 Ibid.

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more power, in terms of quality and quantity---the surge

strategy. Lethality increased many folds and list of achievable

objectives shrank with each new experience.

Faced with political, economic, cultural, diplomatic, ethnic,

and religious issues, etc, which are more complex in reality

than the foggy perception in the minds of most of the current

military men in the world, the limitations of the military

means, which had earlier on been successful, suddenly became

apparent.

The issues of ‘Asabiyya’9 , alongside it’s all attendant

manifestations, under focus by Ibn-e- Khaldoon, back in the 14

century10 have come back to haunt the 20 century warrior,

redefining the extent to which military power could be employed

in the traditional sense and the limitation of the objectives

which could be achieved through such application of military

component of national strategy. Enormity of committed means no

longer bears a traditional linear relationship with the achieved

ends. Law of diminishing returns became more and more relevant.

9 ? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibn_Khaldun (accessed on June 26, 2012. `Asabiyya or asabiyah, an Arabic word, refers to social solidarity with an emphasis on unity, group consciousness, and social cohesion, originally in a context of "tribalism” and "clanism ", but sometimes used for modern nationalism.  it is described as the fundamental bond of human society and the basic motive force of history. `Asabiyya is neither necessarily nomadic nor based on blood relations; rather, it resembles philosophy of classical republicanism. In the modern period, the term is generally analogous to solidarity. 10 Ibid.

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Wars have resulted in more and more destruction with no clear

cut victory in sight. The process that began in Vietnam appears

to be culminating in Afghanistan.

It is premature to determine whether this trend would lead to

making the large armies obsolete. Nevertheless, it will not

cause the war to vanish from this world; its form would

certainly change. In this sense, there is reason for us to

maintain that the financial attack by George Soros on East Asia,

the terrorist attack on the US embassy by Osama Bin Laden, the

gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the disciples of the Aum

Shinri Kyo, and the havoc wreaked by the likes of Morris Jr. on

the Internet, in which the degree of destruction was by no means

second to that of a war. This represents semi-warfare, quasi-

warfare, and sub-warfare, that is, the embryonic form of another

kind of warfare. Even in the so-called post-modern, post-

industrial age, warfare will not be totally dismantled. It has

only re-invaded human society in a more complex, more extensive,

more concealed, and more subtle manner. War which has undergone

the changes of modern technology and the market system will be

launched even more

in atypical forms11.

11

?Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ (Beijing: PLA Literature andArts Publishing House, February 1999), p.8.

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In other words, while we forecast a relative reduction in

military violence, at the same time we definitely are seeing an

increase in political, economic, cultural and technological,

violence. However, regardless of the form the violence takes,

war is war, and a change in the external appearance does not

keep any war from abiding by the principles of war. If we

acknowledge that the new principles of war are no longer "using

armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one's will," but

rather are "using all means, including armed force or non armed

force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal

means to compel the enemy to accept one's interests." This

represents change; indeed a change in war and a change in the

modes of war12.

On 9/11, aero-planes carrying innocent non-combatant civilians

were forcibly crashed into the ill-fated towers and other

targets, killing over 3500 civilians. Barring a handful of

hijackers, rest were never part of planning or execution of

these attacks, they wanted to live and let others live. All

hijackers were of Arab origin, yet Afghanistan was chosen for

occupation. Such facets of contemporary warfare haunt the human

conscience. It raises many questions, to which there is no

satisfactory answer.

Generational Models of War and Jihad

12 Ibid.7

Though one could take various routs for a comparative study of

modern war and Jihad, generational models of warfare present an

‘easy to comprehend methodology’. Jihad has striking

resemblances with the 3 GW when we consider it from interstate

warfare perspective; and has amazing resemblances with 4 GW and

5 GW models in the context of today’s asymmetric episodes.

Robert David Steele, who has written extensively about

unconventional and non-traditional threats, was amongst the

first ones to speak of “5th Generation Warfare.” He says, “The

US is stuck between 2nd Generation “mass” warfare and 3rd

Generation “maneuver” or precision warfare13. We have not

adjusted to 4th Generation or “asymmetric” warfare—suicidal

volunteers able to blow up buildings, pipelines, and

transmission towers. We are simply not trained, equipped, nor

organized to find, fix, and fight individuals or sub-state

networked organizations…The Bush Administration has elevated

terrorism to a six-front hundred-year war (which) we may lose.” 14

“5th Generation or “holistic warfare” requires a coherent global

security strategy that places its primary emphasis on nurturing

legitimate governance everywhere. Only legitimate governments

13 The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict andConfrontation,14 Robert Steele; OSS.NET-0- 08/19/2003/, Web sites: www.oss.net.Robert David Steele is a former Marine, former spy, founder ofthe USMC Intelligence Command, founder of OSS.NET, and author oreditor of three books on intelligence.

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can be effective for providing internal security against the

minority seeking to be terrorist.” 15Good governance itself is

not an entity hung in vacuum. It has sound grounding in

ideological and cultural roots and it oozes out of socio-

political justice16.

“5th Generation warfare is total war through total engagement,

and it demands that the first priority be on both homeland

education and infrastructure, followed by very high investments

in global peaceful preventive measures (what Joe Nye calls ‘soft

power’), with narrowly focused military intervention being a

last resort. Absent a Berlin Airlift for Afghanistan and an

immediate Marshall Plan for Iraq, we will ultimately be forced

out of both countries on unfavourable terms.”17

Almost all civilizations, cultures and religions have been using

war as instrument of policy; they have been glorifying their

acts of war as well as warriors, while at the same time

demonizing those of adversary. Rival states have been fighting

each other, also states have been unleashing lethal weapons

against own dissenting citizens. Political struggle by dissident

ethno-religious individuals and entities has a long history.

15 Ibid.16 Fifth Generation Warfare?, William S. Lind (February 3, 2004), Article (electronic) published by William S. Lind on February 3, 2004. Site: Defense and the National Interest, Permalink to original: "Fifth Generation Warfare?"17 Ibid.

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Intra-state conflicts at times did surpass inter-state conflicts

in terms of atrocities.

Some representative non-Muslim cousins of Jihadi organizations

are: LTTE, IRA, Shiv Sena, Naxalites, Vietcong, Khmer Rouge,

Babbar Khalsa, Red Indians etc. Some succeeded in their

struggles; others were extinguished in the process. Likewise,

Crusades and Maha-Bharat are non-Muslim equivalents of Jihad.

Nevertheless, the core questions are whether all that is being

labeled as Jihad falls within its preview or is the terminology

being used as umbrella coverage for additional ulterior motives

as well? Likewise, does all that is being bracketed as terrorism

falls within the scope of terrorism or is the context being used

to advance other politico- strategic objectives?

At the highest levels of civilizational discourse, the antipathy

between historical perceptions of Islam and the Muslim

historical and psychological perceptions of the west still

persist and await a satisfactory resolution.

Recent rise of Jihadi mindset can be viewed as a result of the

historic Muslim perception of victimhood at the hands of

dominant West on various counts. Like the failures of the

western dominated international organizations, say the UN, to

deliver a fair deal to Muslims, examples are: Kashmir, Palestine

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and Cyprus conflicts. Muslims also feel that when non-Muslims

are likely to be the beneficiaries of a settlement, western

countries and their affiliate institutions manage a quick

settlement, examples they quote are: East Timor, Ireland, Sudan

etc.

At our domestic level, one set of Jihadis proclaim Jihad against

other states; some entities also view the Pakistani state and

its institutions and agencies as legitimate targets of Jihad. In

the context of Pakistan, Jehadi organizations emerged as a

result of Indian occupation of Kashmir through military

intervention justified by a dubious instrument of accession by

Maharaja of Kashmir18. The matter was taken to the United

Nations by India where it pledged to hold a plebiscite to

ascertain the aspirations of the Kashmiris. Later, India reneged

and has persistently worked to erode the legitimacy of the

plebiscite. Kashmir dispute continues to be on the UN agenda;

UN observers are stationed on the ‘Line of Control’. The first

group of United Nations military observers arrived in the

mission area on 24 January of 1949 to supervise the ceasefire

between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

These observers, under the command of the Military Adviser

appointed by the UN Secretary-General, formed the nucleus of the

18 A G Noorani, Article 370: A Constitutional History of Jammu and Kashmir ( Karachi: Oxford University Press ). As excerpted by Books & Authors, Dawn, March 25, 2012.

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‘United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan’

(UNMOGIP)19. The mission continues to date20.

Furthermore, rise of Jihadi phenomena in Pakistan is also

attributed to state’s abdication of its fundamental social

security obligations like education, health cover, provision and

administration of places for worship, disaster management etc;

the void has been filled by non-government entities, which have

proliferated their sphere of influence at the cost of state’s

writ. This encroachment has reached a critical point, whereby

these outfit tend to take over vital state function of War in

the name of Jihad.

The concept of modern ‘War’ has gone through a process of

evolution. Warfare is violent conflict between armed enemies.

Methods of warfare change continually. 3rd Generation war fare

evolved during WWI, it represents inter-state warfare where

armies are pitched against armies. Warring States have control

over their armies. It is characterized by the tactics of

infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces

rather than seeking to close on and destroy the adversary.

Strategies are: indirect approach, maneuver warfare, defence in

depth, by-passing the enemy to attack his rear. Victory required

19UNMOGIP: United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan.http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/ (accessed onJune 26, 2012).20 Ibid.

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the ability to instill madness — to mess with the enemy’s minds,

paralyze the enemy with doubt. Example is: Second World War21.

Characteristics are: blitzkrieg, fast transitions from one

maneuver to the next. Methods of fighting: tanks/bombers

pitched against cities and armies.

Fourth- generation model of war represents a framework covering

warfare between the state and non-state entities. Likewise, the

concept of fifth- generation warfare has enabled the scope of

‘war’ to expand considerably, and yet remain an undeclared

activity; hence a war may end without the adversary even

realizing that there ever was one!

Moreover, concept of synthesizing kinetic and non-kinetic means

of warfare, in various combinations, to achieve optimum synergy

goes well beyond the scope of traditional concept of military

strategy. The use of soft power for influence peddling,

regularization of intrigue and acceptance of proxy war as, at

least, quasi-legitimate means of furthering national strategic

objectives has blurred the distinction between traditional

concept and the in-vogue concept of war. Towards the end of

twentieth century, the bias of just war shifted from those

oppressed by colonists to those persecuted by their own

government anywhere. Strong doctrinal support has evolved for

legitimizing forcible interventions on the pretext of preventing

21 5GW Theory Timeline (June 2010), (Originally appeared online at http://timeline.dreaming5gw.com). (accessed on march 13, 2012).

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violations of international human rights. This interpretation

has been stretched beyond intended mandate and has been misused

to paddle efforts for forcible regime changes by inciting the

dissident elements within various states. Likewise, UNSCR 1973

and 1979 were misinterpreted and the mandated to establish a no-

fly zone was illegitimately expanded to impose a full fledged

war on Libya, that ended with the killing of President Qaddafi.

4 GW represents a situation where a typical nation state is

pitched against non-state actors, like LTTE, Hezbollah etc.  It

describes warfare's return to a decentralized form. It is

characterized by blurring of distinction between war and

politics, soldier and civilian, state and society, having no

definable battlefields or fronts. 4 GW is widely dispersed and

largely undefined. Actions occur concurrently throughout all

participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not

just a physical entity. Major military facilities, such as

airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters

become rarities because of their vulnerability. Same may be true

of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power

plants, industrial complexes etc22.

4 GW signifies the nation states’ loss of their near-monopoly on

combat forces, returning to modes of conflict common in pre-

modern times. The simplest definition includes any ‘war in which

22 Ibid.14

one of the major participants is not a state but rather

a violent non-state actor.’ It follows classical tactics to

weaken the advantaged opponent's will to win. Chairman Mao

Zedong was the founder of modern version of 4 GW, Vietnam war

was also a 4 G war. Ancient examples include: assassination

of Julius Caesar by members of the Roman Senate & martyrdom of

early Muslim caliphs.

4 GW are complex and long term wars. Violence by non-state

actors also referred to as terrorism is one of the tactics,

having a non-national or transnational base. This type of

warfare lacks formal hierarchy as well as C&C structures and

involves a direct attack on the enemy's culture, civilization,

ideology etc. It incorporates highly sophisticated psychological

warfare, especially through media manipulation. All available

pressures are employed i.e. political, economic, social and

military etc.

4GW occurs in low intensity conflict, involving actors from all

networks. Non-combatants are a tactical dilemma. Elements are

small in size, widely spread out in terms of networks of

communication and financial support.

Contemporary usage of 4 GW can be traced to the cold war period,

as major powers struggled to retain grip over colonies and

captured territories. Unable to withstand direct combat against

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regular armed forces, non-state entities used tactics of

persuasion, movement-building, secrecy, terror, and/or confusion

to overcome the force and technological gaps. It may involve

insurgent groups / violent non-state actor(s), trying to

implement their own government or reestablish an old government

over the current ruling power.

Aim of 4 G Warrior is to force the state adversary to expand

manpower and money in an attempt to establish order, ideally in

such a highhanded way that it merely increases disorder,

struggle continues until the state is overstretched, and it

surrenders or withdraws.

If the older generation wars were like fluids, 4 GW is like a

gas. It spreads everywhere yet regular armies have a hard time

even finding the battle fields23. Like 3 GW, 4 GW focus on the

picture inside the enemy’s head. But while 3 GW tries to destroy

the picture, 4 GW builds a new one. While 3 GW tries to paralyze

the enemy with doubt, 4 GW tries to deny him even that much — 4

GW drains the will of the enemy so he “waits and sees,” robbing

him of his ability to want to do anything. In practice, this

means: 4GW tries to destroy an enemy’s civil society, turning

his population into mindless cowards. Example: Vietnam War.

Characteristic: dispiriting the enemy. Method of fighting:

propagandists-to-populations24.

23 Ibid.24 Ibid.

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4 GW tends to convince the enemy’s political decision makers

that their goals are either unachievable or too costly for the

perceived benefit. The battle is for "hearts and minds" and

winning is defined as controlling the levers of state power.

While 4 GW is "messy" in terms of tactics as it primarily

attacks soft targets, it is "neat" in terms of grand strategy25.

It entails two well-defined sides, each of whom wishes to win.

Recent history is replete with powerful military forces tied up

by weaker rivals like: Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan, Kashmir

etc.

If traditional war centered on enemy’s physical strength, and 4

GW on his moral strength, the 5 GW focuses on his intellectual

strength. War might be fought with one side not knowing who it

is fighting. One side may remain completely ignorant about

whether there ever was a war. 4GW is executed over a very long

time frame, sometimes decades. 5GW is conceived in terms of

strategic vision over an even longer time frame, sometimes

before an opponent realizes that they will be opponents but the

execution time may be very short in comparison to 4 GW26.

It co-opts enemy by manipulating the enemy’s decision making

process so that he becomes “entangled” without being aware of

25 The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation. http://www.d-n-i.net & http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm26 Ibid.

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what entangles him; a scenario in which multiple, seemingly

unrelated events hurt one nation or a group of nations

repeatedly, as if ‘the hand of God’ were behind those events”

are as an example of unfolding of 5 GW27.

5 GW fighters need not influence all members of a target

population but only need to influence the most powerful within

that population or those members of the population who are in a

position to institute policy changes. The fighter tries to hurt

without being hurt — at all. If the world knows the Secret

Warrior exists, he loses. 5th Generation War allows very weak

fighters to attack, because the world does not know about them.

Warriors may implement changes “from above” but not as a result

of revolution; rather, “by moving up through legitimate channels

to implement an invisible evolution from above.”28

In 4GW the enemy attempts to use the target country’s media as a

vehicle to sap the people’s and political leaders’ will to

fight. In 5GW the enemy actually becomes the media and the

political leadership29.

In 4 GW a terrorist organization might attack a school or a

court house in order to show that the government can’t defend

27 Thomas PM Barnett, ‘System Administration’ based Global Transaction Strategy”, http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/28 Ibid.29 Ibid.

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itself; in 5 GW the enemy would become the teacher and the

judge30.

5 GW (unrestricted) may be described as the employer of “all

means whatsoever – means that involve the force of arms and

means that do not involve the force of arms, means that involve

military power and means that do not involve military power,

means that entail casualties, and means that do not entail

casualties31.

Given the rate at which change in warfare is accelerating it is

reasonable to accept that 5 GW is already making its appearance.

It took hundreds of years from the development of the musket and

cannon for 1 GW or the Formation Warfare to evolve. Trench

Warfare or 2 GW evolved and peaked in the 100 years, between

Waterloo and Verdun. Maneuver Warfare (3 GW) came to maturity in

less than 25 years. Fourth Generation or Insurgency Warfare was

implemented immediately upon its conception in China around the

same time that Third Generation Warfare was implemented in

Europe32.

30 Ibid.31 Ibid.32 Dr Somnath, Default Is india prepared for 5th generation warfare, July 07,2011. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.indiandefence.com/forums/indian-strategic-forces/9248-india-prepared-5th-generation-warfare.html, (accessed on June 22. 2012)

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It includes the appearance of super-empowered individuals and

groups with access to modern knowledge, technology, and means to

conduct asymmetric attacks in furtherance of their individual

and group interests. It has also given rise to interesting

terminologies like ‘Strategic NCO’ & ‘Tactical General’ etc, in

terms of respective impact they could have on the situation and

in the context of the effects they could generate. Arguably, its

first identifiable manifestations occurred in the United States

during the anthrax attacks of 2001 and the ricin attacks of

2004. Both sets of attacks required specialized knowledge,

included attacks upon federal government offices and facilities,

succeeded in disrupting governmental processes, and created

widespread fear in the public. The attacks were quite successful

in disrupting government processes and creating public fear but,

thus far, their motivation remains unknown. Today’s computer

hackers, capable of disrupting governments and corporations on a

global scale by attacking the Internet with malicious computer

programs, may also be forerunners of super-empowered individuals

and groups. They have already demonstrated that they are capable

of single-handedly waging technological campaigns with overtones

of 5GW33.

The writings of Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, one of the Islamic

jihad prime theorists, provide insight into not only the

emergence of Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare, but also

33 Ibid.20

the evolution of al Qaeda as the forerunner of United States

adversaries.34

Abu Musab al-Suri’s "The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance,"

draws heavily on lessons from past conflicts. It serves as a

strategy guide for uniting isolated groups of radical Muslims

for a common cause. It proposes a strategy for a truly global

conflict on as many fronts as possible and in the form of

resistance by super-empowered small cells or individuals, rather

than traditional guerrilla warfare. To avoid penetration and

defeat by security services, he says, organizational links

should be kept to an absolute minimum. He says it would be a

mistake for the global movement to pin its hopes on a single

group or set of leaders. He clearly says that al-Qaeda was an

important step but is not the end step and is not sufficient in

itself. His theories of war call for the most deadly weapons

possible, and offer a new model aimed at drawing individuals and

small groups into a global jihad. Manifestation of these

theories can be seen in Casablanca in 2003, Madrid in 2004 and

London in 2005. In each case, the perpetrators organized

themselves into local, self-sustaining cells that acted on their

own, but also accepted guidance from visiting emissaries of the

global movement.35

34 Ibid.35 Ibid.

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A successful national strategy, as well as transformation of

that strategy to match the emergence of 5 GW threat, in the

information age, is necessary if future attempts to attack are

to be defeated or prevented. In a protracted and continuous war

of finite conventional resources arrayed against infinite

asymmetrical threats, the victim states must strive to

comprehensively understand the character of the emerging threat

and adapt accordingly.36 Ten rules to fight a 5 GW are:37

Speed it up. Use the tools that transmit information orders

faster than adversary, be as close to real-time as

possible.

Microchunk it. Small resources, like messages, are

more efficiently transmitted and utilized than big ones.

Meta-attack. Facts don't matter, so attack meta-

information about how to value facts.

Anti-defend. It is difficult to protect a centralized

complex structure against a network attack in the

traditional sense. So anti-defend against a network attack,

by decentralizing your own resources to the edges and

diversify own networks through multiple redundancies so

that whenever one node goes down, the others stay up.

36 Ibid.37 Ibid

22

Darwinian counterattacks. What happens after an attack

is a counter-attack. If one node is knocked off, the

remaining nodes link up, share resources, and then launch

an assortment of counterattacks. The death dance resumes

and the most robust ones survive.

Hack your enemy's weapons. In a 3G or 4G war, one

could not hack enemy's guns, bombs, or knives. In a 5G war,

it is possible to hack the enemy's information weapons.

Try to Normatize it. 5G warfare is problematic because

it is unrestricted warfare, so anything could happen or

made to happen. There are no Geneva conventions to enforce

norms of acceptable behaviour. But it shouldn't: a powerful

tactic in 5G warfare is setting norms for what's acceptable

and what's not (it is indeed a paradox in itself: trying to

restrict the activity which is unrestricted by definition,

default and design).

Decentralize and Self-organize hyper-locally. Reality

Check is a good start. People should be able to self-

organize into networks linked by the information, so that

alliances form. These networks shouldn't just be online,

but offline - real-world networks that influence and

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counterinfluence hyper-locally: street by street, community

by community.

Remix it. Make the information micro-chunked and re-

mixable, so it can be used and reused in more and more

efficient ways. So that recipients could further distribute

it to others depending upon what is important to whom and

when.

Attack the base. Though controversial is often the key to

winning a 5G war. Physical wars have to be fought on the

front-lines. But information wars don't.38

Motivation for 5 GW is as likely to be micro-economic as it

could be ideological, and may be social or–most likely–some

blend of these. To conflate these under any label, be it

"jihadists", "losers and dead-enders" or "militias” is to

misunderstand them completely.

Modern weapons and technologies have conferred tremendous power

on small actors. One person with a kilo of plastic explosive and

a simple detonator can do millions of dollars in damage to key

38 Dr Somnath, Default Is india prepared for 5th generation warfare, July 07,2011. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.indiandefence.com/forums/indian-strategic-forces/9248-india-prepared-5th-generation-warfare.html, (accessed on June 22, 2012).

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infrastructure. 5 GW is “holistic” warfare, total war through

total engagement39.

Countering of 5GW requires a coherent global security strategy:

legitimate governance and internal security, education and

infrastructure, high investments in global peaceful preventive

measures. Narrowly focused military intervention is a last

resort. 5 GW means systemic liquidation of enemy networks and

their sympathizers; it is essentially a total war on a society

or subsection of a society40.

Comparison

If we treat Jihad as a synonym of war, inclusive of an

assortment of contemporary facets of warfare, and a Jihadi as a

typical insurgent; many questions stand answered. Through

equivalence of Jihad with interstate warfare and, going by the

3G model, we accept that at interstate level Jihad is primarily

a function of state. Only a legitimate state has the authority

of declaring Jihad upon another state. The government executing

such war bears responsibility for its outcomes and is held

accountable for it. There is a mechanism for punishing

defaulters of the law of war through the ‘International Criminal

Court’. The ‘International Law of War’ binds the belligerents to

abide by certain norms and obligations. 39 Unto the Fifth Generation of War, Mark Safranski (July 17, 2005)Blog Post published by Mark Safranski on July 17, 2005; Site: ZenPundit, Permalink to original: "Unto the Fifth Generation of War. 40 Ibid.

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Jihadi organizations are not an equivalent of the armed forces

of a state. These are non- government entities; hence

international public law is not applicable to them. However if a

state employs these entities as a declared policy, it is

accountable for the foreseen or unforeseen consequences of such

an application. Nevertheless, such obligations are limited in

the case of an internationally recognized dispute to which such

state(s) is a party. If such organizations operate within the

boundaries of a state and confine themselves to intra-state

militant activities then these would be treated as mutinous

elements and the government would confront them through its law-

enforcing agencies. The problem becomes complex when these

entities are employed by another state without openly

acknowledging such application. In such cases, though the state

using these entities is responsible for hurting another fellow

state, it refuses to become accountable for the effects created

by these outfits.

From another perspective, recent concepts of out-sourcing or

contracting certain combative military functions to civilian

entities such as Black Water, XE etc and involving secret

agencies into formal soldierly/military roles, like the CIA

managing drone campaigns, have given a new twist to formal

military operations and provided a raison d’être to the Jihadi

type entities. Indeed it has enhanced their legitimacy, more so

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in the context of their utility in the role of freedom fighters

in the occupied or disputed territories.

Jihadi organizations have their variants under various brands

such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Al-Fatah etc. These are struggling

for political rights and or independence in the disputed

territories, recognized as conflicts by the UN. Muslim character

of these organizations does not imply that such struggles have

an inherent Muslim character. History is replete with examples

of such struggles by non-Muslim entities as well. Most of the

Jihadi tactics have been practiced by their non–Muslim

equivalents. Academic inquiry needs to grant similar allowances

to Jihad and Jihadis while making a comparative evaluation.

Conclusion

To conclude lets ponder over what is that a Jihadi performs

differently from his non-Muslim equivalent in 4 & 5 GW? If

nothing, then why attach negative tags to a typical insurgency &

insurgent and categorize as Jihad and Jihadis, just because the

terminology and its operatives belongs to a particular faith?

Let’s also try to find an answer as to whose war are we

fighting? And last but certainly not the least, if the

international political disputes leading to emergence of Jihadi/

insurgent organizations find just solutions, such organizations

would certainly melt away. This is where the comity of nations

needs to put its act together; otherwise, the entire effort

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would just be an exercise in lawn mowing. Moreover, Muslin

academia needs to take a fresh look at Jihad in terms of what it

is intended to be as a tenant of Islam, what it has become and

how the gap could be bridged so that ‘Jihad’ is not loosely

interpreted and erratically practiced.

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