G.R. Nos. L-61079-81 April 15, 1988 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
appellee, vs. MARIA LOREN QUIZADA, appellant.
The argument of the accused was that the remarks allegedly made
by her imputed to the complaining witness the crime of adultery, a
private crime. Under Rule 110, Section 4 (now Section 5), of the
Rules of Court and Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, no
criminal action for defamation imputing such offense "shall be
brought except at the instance of and upon complaint filed by the
offended party." The trial judge * agreed and granted the motion. 9
The charges were dismissed and the motion for reconsideration filed
by the prosecution was denied. 10
CRUZ, J.: It is the interesting combination of double jeopardy
and defamation that has brought this case all the way up and
directly to this Court. In three separate complaints filed with the
office of the provincial fiscal of Surigao del Sur, Cipriana B.
Tranquilan accused Maria L. Quizada of having spoken of her, on the
occasions therein mentioned, as follows: Si Nanie ka eyat, boring,
bardot, kabiga-on kabit sa akong bana," which words when translated
into English mean: "Nanie is a woman of ill repute, she has a love
relationship with my husband, she has taken from me my husband that
is the reason why she did not get married because she is a woman of
bad reputation. 1 Si Nanie boring, bardal ka eyat, biga-on, dili na
naminggo, nagtan-an sa sine, gikumot and iyang totoy sa akong
bana," which words when translated into English mean: "Nanie is a
woman of ill repute, she will not get married, she went to the show
and her nipples had been squeezed by my husband. 2 Si Nanie boring,
bardal ka eyat, biga-on dill na naminggo, nagtan-an sa sine,
gikumot ang iyang totoy sa akong bana," which words when translated
into English mean: "Nanie is a woman of ill repute, she will not
get married, she went to the show and her nipples had been squeezed
by my husband. 3 On the basis of these complaints, and after
preliminary investigation, the assistant provincial fiscal filed in
the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Sur, on September
14,1981, three separate informations for grave oral defamation
against Quizada for having disparaged Tranquilan in the following
language: Si Nanie ka eyat, boring, bardot, kabiga-on, kabit sa
akong bana, nangilog sa aking bana ugsa wala na naminggo kay hugaw
na babae," which words when translated into the English language
mean: "Nanie is a flirt, a prostitute, a whore, a paramour of my
husband, she grabbed my husband from me, that's why she is not
married because she is a dirty woman. 4 Si Nanie boring, bardot, ka
eyat, dili na maningyo, nagtan-an sa sine, gikumot ang iyong totoy
sa akong bana," which words when translated into English mean:
"Nanie is a prostitute, whore, flirt, she will not get married
anymore, she went to the movies and her nipples were touched and
squeezed by my husband. 5 Si Nanie, boring, bardot, ka eyat,
biga-on dili na namingyot, nagtan-an sa sine, gikumot ang iyang
totoy sa akong bana," which words when translated into English
mean: "Nanie is a prostitute, whore, flirt, she will not get
married anymore, she went to the movies and her nipples were
touched and squeezed by my husband. 6 Upon arraignment on February
18, 1982, the accused pleaded not guilty to all the three
informations. 7 Thereafter, she moved to quash the same on the
ground that the charges should have been initiated not by the
fiscal but upon complaint of the offended party herself. 8
The prosecution then came to this Court to challenge the
dismissal, and that is how double jeopardy entered the picture. The
private respondent now claims that reversal of the dismissal and
reinstatement of the cases would violate her rights under Article
IV, Section 22 (now Article III, Section 21) of the Constitution.
Required to comment, the Solicitor General argued that the crime
imputed by the alleged remarks was prostitution, a public offense.
As such, it could be the basis of a prosecution for defamation
through an information filed by the fiscal. 11 That is doubtless
true. However, the Court notes that in addition to allegedly
calling the complainant a whore the private respondent is also
charged in one information with having described the former as "a
paramour of my husband," which is a clear imputation of adultery. A
paramour is "one who loves or is loved illicitly. One taking the
place without the legal rights of a husband or wife. A mistress;
called also lover." 12 Accordingly, that imputation was covered by
the aforecited Rule 110. It is not denied that the charges were
made through the informations filed by the assistant provincial
fiscal and not formally commenced in court by the offended party.
Nevertheless, it is also clear that these informations were based
on the three criminal complaints earlier filed by Tranquilan with
the fiscal's office, which conducted the corresponding preliminary
investigation litigation thereon. Conformably to the procedural
rules then in force, 13 the complaints and the records of the
preliminary investigation were transmitted to the trial court upon
the filing of the corresponding informations. Hence, although the
charges were not initiated through complaint of the offended party
and the informations did not state that they were based on her
complaint, such circumstances did not deprive the respondent court
of jurisdiction petition. A similar situation arose in People v.
Rondina, 14 where the Court held: Under the rule prevailing at the
time this case was commenced and tried in 1977, the complaint was
considered part of the record at the preliminary investigation and
had to be transmitted to the trial court upon the filing of the
corresponding charge. Such complaint was in fact transmitted as
required and could therefore be judicially noticed by the trial
judge without the necessity of its formal introduction as evidence
of the prosecution. This conclusion is in keeping with the doctrine
embodied in People v. Perido, decided by the Court of Appeals
through Justice Montemayor (later a member of this Court), who
declared in part as follows: The complaint in the case at bar was
duly signed by the mother of the offended party, but the
prosecuting attorney during the trial, failed to introduce such
complaint as part of the evidence of the prosecution. Subsequently,
however, said complaint, which is part of the record of the justice
of the peace court before whom the case was filed, was sent up to
form part of the record in the appeal. This cured the deficiency in
the evidence. Although not introduced in evidence, the complaint
may be regarded as part of the record in the appellate court which
can and does take judicial notice thereof. (Moran's Law of
Evidence, p. 343 and Francisco's Evidence, p. 46, both citing the
case of People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 40621 [unpublished]).'
(Emphasis supplied.)
We note further that apart from the fact that the offended
party's sworn complaint was among the papers elevated to the Court
of First Instance that subsequently tried and decided the case, the
information itself expressly stated that it was being filed 'upon a
sworn complaint signed and filed by the offended woman.
Parenthetically, it is worth observing that the original Rule 112,
Section 12, of the Rules of Court, provided that upon the
conclusion of the pre investigation the judge or corresponding
officer shall transmit without delay to the clerk of the Court of
First Instance having jurisdiction of the offense the records of
the case . . .' By contrast, it is now provided in Section 8 of the
same rule, as revised in 1985, that 'the record of the preliminary
investigation whether conducted by a judge or a fiscall shalll not
form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court'
The allegation of double jeopardy is plainly without merit. As we
have repeatedly stressed, double jeopardy will attach if (a) a
valid complaint or information (b) is filed before a competent
court or tribunal, and (c) after the accused shall have been
arraigned and entered a plea, (d) he is acquitted or convicted or
the case is dismissed without his express consent. 15 The first
three requisites are present in the case at bar but the fourth is
not. It was the petitioner herself who moved to quash the charges
against her on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction.
The dismissal was made not only with her express consent but,
indeed, upon her own motion. There are only two occasions when
double jeopardy will attach even if the motion to dismiss the case
is made by the accused himself. The first is when the ground is
insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution, and the second is
when the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation
of the right to a speedy trial. 16 None of these exceptions is
present here. We hold in sum that the criminal informations were
validly filed under the procedural rules in force at the time of
such filing; that their dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was
erroneous; and that their reinstatement willl not violate the
prohibition against double jeopardy. ACCORDINGLY, this petition is
GRANTED. The Orders of the respondent judge dated March 31, 1982,
and March 24, 1982, are SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases Nos. 942, 943 and
944 are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-43790 December 9, 1976 PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE CITY COURT OF SILAY,
ERNESTO DE LA PAZ, PACIFICO SENECIO, JR. y SEBUSA, ROMEO MILLAN y
DELEJERO and WILFREDO JOCHICO y MAGALONA, respondents. Acting
Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor
General Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor Enrique M. Reyes for
petitioner. Hilado, Hagad & Hilado as private prosecutors.
Benjamin Z. Yelo, Sr. for private respondent Romeo Millan. Ciceron
Severino and Emeterio Molato for other private respondents.
MUOZ PALMA, J.: This is a Petition for Review jointly filed by
the City Fiscal of Silay City, Marcelino M. Paviera, and the Law
Offices of Hilado, Hagad & Hilado, the latter as private
prosecutors, praying that an order of the City Court of Silay dated
December 19, 1975, issued by Judge Reynaldo M. Alon, dismissing
Criminal Case No. 7124-C entitled "People vs. Ernesto de la Paz, et
al." be set aside and that respondent court be directed to continue
with the trial of the aforementioned case. * In compliance with Our
Resolution of July 21, J976, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed its comment on October 13, 1974, joining the Petitioner's
prayer that the order of respondent court of December 19, 1975, be
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. The record
shows that private respondent herein, Ernesto de la Paz, Pacifico
Senecio, Jr. y Sebusa Romeo Millan y Delejero and Wilfredo Jochico
y Magalona, were charged with "falsification by private individuals
and use of falsified document" under Par. 2, Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code, alleged to have been committed as follows. That
sometime on January 4, 1974, at Hawaiian-Philippine Company, Silay
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused Ernesto de la Paz, overseer of Hda. Malisbog
belonging to Deogracias de la Paz, and the other three accused,
scalers of Hawaiian-Philippine Company, with intent of gain and to
cause damage by conniving, cooperating and mutually helping one
another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
alter or falsify the sugar cane weight report card or "tarjeta", a
private document showing the weight of sugarcane belonging to
Deogracias de la Paz, particularly those loaded in cane cars Nos.
1686, 1743 and 1022 by increasing the total actual weight of 22.005
tons to 27.160 tons for said three cane cars, thereby causing
damage to the central and other cane planters of about 8.68 piculs
of sugar valued in the total amount of P618.19, to the damage and
prejudice of Hawaiian Central and other sugarcane planters adhered
thereto in the aforestated amount of P618.19. IN VIOLATION OF
PARAGRAPH 2, ART. 172, R.P.C. (p. 14, rollo) Evidence was presented
by the prosecution showing that: On January 4, 1974, accused
Pacifico Senecio, Jr. Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico who were
then scalers on duty that day at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company,
weighed cane cars Nos. 1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar canes
belonging to Deogracias de la Paz. The weight of the sugar canes
were reflected on the weight report cards (H.P. Co. Lab. Form No.
1) or "tarjetas" showing that for car No. 1743 8.920 tons (Exhibit
"B1"), for Car No. 1686 8.970 tons (Exhibit "C-1") for car No. 1022
8.875 tons or a total weight of 26.765 tons. However, they did not
submit said "tarjetas" to the laboratory section, instead, they
substituted "tarjetas" showing a heavier weight for car No. 1743
10.515 tons (Exhibit "B"), car No. 1686 10.525 tons (Exhibit "C")
and car No. 1022 10.880 tons (Exhibit "D") with a total of 27.160
tons or an additional of 5.155 tons. These were the "tarjetas"
submitted to the laboratory section. Exhibits "B-1", "C-1" and
"D-1" were taken later by the prosecution witness PC Sgt. Rogelio
Sevilla from the wife of Pacifico Senecio, Jr. (pp. 15-16, rollo,
Order of December 19, 1975). After the prosecution had presented
its evidence and rested its case, private respondents moved to
dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidence
presented was not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Acting on this motion, respondent court issued
its order of December 19, 1975, dismissing the
case with costs de oficio principally on the ground that the
acts committed by the accused as narrated above do not constitute
the crime of falsification as charged. Reasoning out his order,
Judge Alon said: To be convicted under paragraph 2, Article 172, an
accused should have committed one of the eight acts of
falsification enumerated under Article 171, R.P.C. Is the act of
substituting the "tarjetas" with higher cane weight for the ones
with lower cane weight fall under one of the acts enumerated. After
going over the acts of falsification one by one and trying to
correlate the act of the accused with each of them, the Court finds
that the said act could not possibly be placed under any of them.
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the inclusion of one is the
exclusion of the other. Following this maxim, we cannot just
include the act of substitution as among those acts enumerated
under Article 171. And, under the rule of statutory construction,
penal laws should be liberally construed in favor of the accused.
This Court, therefore, is of the opinion that the accused have not
committed the act of falsification with which they are charmed.
Obviously, it follows that there could be no use of falsified
document since there is no falsified document. The imputed acts of
the accused in making the substitution, if true, is repugnant to
the human sense of right and wrong. But, however reprehensible the
act may be, it is not punishable unless there is a showing that
there is a law which defines and penalizes it as a crime. Unless
there be a particular provision in the Penal Code or Special Law
that punishes the act, even if it be socially or morally wrong, no
criminal liability is incurred by its commission. (U.S. vs. Taylor,
28 Phil. 599) xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal but notwithstanding said opposition, the trial court
dismissed the case on the ground that Pedro Miguel was a mere agent
of the true owner of the ring and therefore not the real offended
party. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal appealed to this Court, but
the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the
ground that it would place the accused in double jeopardy, and the
Court agreed with the Solicitor General, stating that it cannot be
seriously questioned that the trial court had grievously erred in
his conclusion and application of the law, and in dismissing
outright the case; however, the error cannot now be remedied by an
appeal because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. (per
Eugenio Angeles, J., 25 SCRA 823,826) In the earlier case of Catilo
vs. Hon. Abaya, May 14, 1954, petitioner Catilo was charged with
murder before the Court of First Instance of Batangas presided by
respondent Judge. Petitioner was arraigned and after the
prosecution had rested its case petitioner moved for the dismissal
of the charge for insufficiency of evidence. This motion was
granted by the Judge and his order was promulgated in open court to
the accused. Later in the day, Judge Abaya set aside his order of
dismissal motu proprio and scheduled the case for continuation of
the trial on specific dates. A motion for reconsideration was filed
by the defense counsel but because respondent Judge failed to take
action, the accused filed an original action for certiorari with
this Court. In granting relief to petitioner Catilo, the Court,
through Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor, held: From whatever angle
we may view the order of dismissal Annex "A", the only conclusion
possible is that it amounted to an acquittal. Whether said
acquittal was due to some "misrepresentation of facts" as stated in
the order of reconsideration, which alleged misrepresentation is
vigorously denied by the defendant-petitioner, or to a
misapprehension of the law or of the evidence presented by the
prosecution, the fact is that it was a valid order or judgment of
acquittal, and thereafter the respondent Judge himself advised the
accused in open court that he was a free man and could not again be
prosecuted for the same offense. The inherent powers of a court to
modify its order or decision, under section 5, Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court claimed for the respondent to set aside his order of
dismissal, does not extend to an order of dismissal which amounts
to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case; and the power of a
court to modify a judgment or set it aside before it has become
final or an appeal has been perfected, under section 7, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court, refers to a judgment of conviction and does not
and cannot include a judgment of acquittal. In conclusion, we hold
that to continue the criminal case against the petitioner after he
had already been acquitted would be putting him twice in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense. ... (94 Phil. 1017) The cases
cited by the Acting Solicitor General are not applicable to the
situation now before Us because the facts are different. In Co Te
Hue vs. Judge Encarnacion , 94 Phil. 258, the case was dismissed
provisionally with the express consent of the accused. The same
occurred in People vs. Togle, 105 Phil. 126 there was a provisional
dismissal upon express request of the counsel for the accused, In
Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299, it was the accused who asked
for the dismissal of the case because the private prosecutor was
not in court to present the prosecution's evidence and the
Municipal Court of the City of Iloilo dismissed the case without
prejudice to the refiling of the charge against the accused. 1 In
People vs. Romero, 89 Phil. 672, the dismissal was made at the
instance of the accused because the prosecution was also not ready
with its evidence. The case of People vs. Belosillo, 9 SCRA 836, is
not applicable either, because the order of dismissal of the
Information was made before arraignment, hence, the accused was not
yet placed in jeopardy of punishment for the offense charged. In
the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the
charge against them was one on the merits of the case which is to
be distinguished from other dismissals at the instance of the
accused. All the elements of double jeopardy are here present, to
wit: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction of the crime charged, (2) a court of competent
jurisdiction, and (3) an unconditional dismissal of the complaint
after the prosecution had rested its case, amounting to the
acquittal of the accused. The dismissal being one on the merits,
the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea of double jeopardy
cannot be invoked.
Wherefore, the motion is hereby granted and the case dismissed
with costs de oficio ... (pp. 17-18, rollo) In their comment on
this Petition, private respondents claim that there was no error
committed by respondent court in dismissing the case against them
for insufficiency of evidence and that for this Court to grant the
present petition would place said respondents in double jeopardy.
On the other hand, the People asserts that the plea of double
jeopardy is not tenable inasmuch as the case was dismissed upon
motion of the accused, and the dismissal having been made with
their consent, they waived their defense of double jeopardy, citing
various cases in support thereof. (pp. 58-59, rollo, Comment of the
Solicitor General) We disagree with the position taken by the
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. that the plea of
double jeopardy is not available in the instant situation. It is
true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on
motion of the accused; however, this was a motion filed after the
prosecution had rested its case, calling for an appreciation of the
evidence adduced and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the
merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. Thus, in People
vs. Acosta, L-23657, October 29, 1968, this Court dismissed an
appeal taken by the People against an order of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissing a criminal case upon motion of
the accused after the presentation of evidence by the prosecution
as such appeal if allowed would place the accused in double
jeopardy. There the accused was charged with estafa by obtaining
from Pedro Miguel a ring valued at P16,500.00 and issuing a check
for $5,000.00 in Payment thereof which turned out later to be
counterfeit to the damage and prejudice of said Pedro Miguel in the
aforementioned amount of P16,500.00. After the presentation of the
evidence of the prosecution, the accused moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that the evidence showed that the ring belonged to
somebody else, Banang Jaramillo, and not to Pedro Miguel as alleged
in the information and that the element of damage was absent. This
motion was opposed by the Assistant Provincial
It is clear to Us that the dismissal of the criminal case
against the private respondents was erroneous. As correctly stated
in the Comment of the Acting Solicitor General, the accused were
not charged with substitution of genuine "tarjetas" with false
ones. The basis for the accusation was that the accused entered
false statements as to the weight of the sugar cane loaded in
certain cane cars in "tarjetas" which were submitted to the
laboratory section of the company. The act of making a false entry
in the "tarjetas" is undoubtedly an act of falsification of a
private document, the accused having made untruthful statements in
a narration of facts which they were under obligation to accomplish
as part of their duties- Ernesto de la Paz, as overseer of Hda.
Malisbog, and the other accused as scalers of the offended party,
the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, thereby causing damage to the
latter. However erroneous the order of respondent Court is, and
although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order, to
paraphrase Justice Alex Reyes in People vs. Nieto, 103 Phil, 1133,
such error cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of
double jeopardy. In Nieto, the background of the case is as
follows: On September 21, 1956, an Information for homicide was
filed with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against
Gloria Nieto who, upon arraignment pleaded guilty to the charge but
-notwithstanding that plea, the trial judge acquitted her on the
Page 254 ground that although the accused was a minor "over 9 and
under 15 years old" the Information failed to allege that she acted
with discernment. Thereafter the prosecution filed another
Information for the same offense stating therein that the accused
Gloria Nieto was "a child between 9 and 15 years" and alleging in
express terms that she acted with discernment. The defense filed a
motion to quash this second Information on grounds of double
jeopardy, and the trial court already presided by another Judge,
Hon. Felix V. Makasiar, now Justice of this Court, granted the
motion. The prosecution appealed to this Court from said order. In
its Decision, the Court dismissed the appeal and sustained the
order of then Judge Makasiar, deploring that as a result of a
mistaken view taken by the trial judge who acquitted the accused
Gloria Nieto despite her plea of guilty there was a miscarriage of
justice which cannot be righted and which leaves the Court no
choice bat to affirm the dismissal of the second Information for
reasons of double jeopardy. 2 We cannot but express Our strong
disapproval of the precipitate action taken by Judge Alon in
dismissing the criminal case against the private respondents at
that stage of the trial. A thorough and searching study of the law,
the allegations in the Information, and the evidence adduced plus a
more circumspect and reflective exercise of judgment, would have
prevented a failure of justice in the instant case. We exhort Judge
Alon to take into serious consideration what We have stated so as
to avoid another miscarriage of justice. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
We are constrained to DISMISS this Petition of the People. Without
pronouncement as to costs. Let copy of this Decision be entered in
the personal file of Judge Reynaldo Alon. So Ordered. Teehankee
(Chairman), Makasiar, Concepcion, and Martin, JJ., concur.
2 Because People v. Nieto is an unpublished decision and the
facts of the case are of unusual interest, We are quoting herein
portions of the Decision of the Court: It appears that on September
21, 1956 an information for homicide was filed in said court
against Gloria Nieto alleging That on or about the 7th day of May,
1956, in the Municipality of Pearanda, Province of Nueva Ecija,
Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused Gloria Nieto, with the
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and
feloniously push one Lolita Padilla, a child eight and one half
(8-1/2) years of age, into a deep place of the Pearanda River and
as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died right
then and there. Contrary to the provisions of Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Upon arraignment, the accused, who was assisted
by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of guilty, but the trial judge
nevertheless acquitted her of the crime charged on the grounds that
she was a minor "over nine and under fifteen years old" and the
information failed to allege that she acted with discernment. The
prosecution thereafter filed another information for the same
offense, the said information stating that the accused Gloria Nieto
was "a child between 9 and 15 years old" and alleging in express
terms that she acted with discernment. But the defense filed a
motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy, and the court,
now presided by another judge, granted the motion. The prosecution
appealed; We find the appeal to be without merit. The pivotal
question is whether the accused could on her unqualified plea of
guilty to the first information, be rightly held answerable for the
offense therein charged. Undoubtedly, she could. For the said
information avers facts constituting the said offense with nothing
therein to indicate that she, as the perpetrator thereof, was
exempt from criminal liability because of her age, and her plea of
guilty to the information is an unqualified admission of all its
material averments. And, indeed, even under the view taken by the
trial judge who acquitted her that because she was between the ages
of 9 and 15 although that fact does not appear in the information
to which she pleaded guilty an allegation that she acted with
discernment must be required, that requirement should be deemed
amply met with the allegation in the information that she, the
accused Gloria Nieto, with the intent to kill, did then and there
wilfully, criminally and feloniously push one Lolita Padilla, a
child eight and one half (8-1/2) years of age, into a deep place of
the Pearanda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got
drowned and died right then and there. ... As the learned trial
judge, Hon. Felix V. Makasiar, who quashed the second information,
says in his order: The allegations in the information that the
accused "with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
criminally and .feloniously push one Lolita Padilla ... into a deep
place in Pearanda River and that as a consequence thereof, Lolita
Padilla got drowned and died right then and there", and her plea of
guilty thereto, preclude the existence of any one of the justifying
or exempting circumstances enumerated in Article 11 and 12 of the
Revised Penal Code including Paragraph 3 of Article 12. The said
allegation can only mean that the accused, who is over 9 but below
15 years of age, was not justified in killing the victim nor was
she exempted from any criminal responsibility therefor. Otherwise,
the term 'criminal and feloniously would have no meaning at all. To
require the addition of the ritualistic phrase 'that she acted with
discernment' would be superfluous. Under a different view,
substances would sacrificed to the tyranny of form.
Footnotes * We treated this Petition as a Special Civil Action
after all parties concerned had submitted their respective
pleadings as comments to the Petition. 1 See People vs. Salico, 84
Phil. 722 & People vs. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249.
... To insist on the necessary of including the phrase 'she
acted with discernment in the information for the purpose of
conveying said in order to make the information sufficient, is to
confess a bankcruptcy is language or vocabulary and to deny that
the same Idea can be expressed in other terms. One need not a
dabbler in philology or semantics to be able to appreciate the
import or connotation or significance of the phrase "with intent to
kill ... wilfully, criminally and feloniously" made more emphatic
by "contrary to the provisions of Article 249." The contrary view
nullifies the existence or value or utility of synonymous in the
communication of Ideas.'" See also People vs. Inting, L-41959,
March 31, 1976 70 SCRA 289. G.R. No. L-54110 February 20, 1981
GENEROSO ESMEA and ALBERTO ALBA, petitioners, vs. JUDGE JULIAN B.
POGOY, City Court of Cebu City, Branch III, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and RICARDO B. TABANAO, as Special Counsel, Office of
the City Fiscal, Cebu City, respondents.
Respondent judge provisionally dismissed the case as to the four
accused who were present because it "has been dragging all along
and the accused are ready for the hearing" but the fiscal was not
ready with his witness. The court noted that there was no medical
certificate indicating that the complainant was really sick. The
case was continued as to the fifth accused who did not appear at
the hearing. His arrest was ordered (p. 23, Rollo). Twenty-seven
days later, or on September 12, 1979, the fiscal filed a motion for
the revival of the case. He attached to his motion a medical
certificate under oath attesting to the fact that Father Tibudan
was sick of influenza on August 16, 1979. The fiscal cited the
ruling that a provisional dismissal with the conformity of the
accused lacks the impress of finality and, therefore, the case
could be revived without the filing of a new information
(Lauchengco vs. Alejandro, L-49034, January 31, 1979, 88 SCRA 175).
The accused did not oppose the motion. Respondent judge granted it
in his order of October 8, 1979 (p. 26, Rollo). On October 24,
1979, Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of double jeopardy. They pointed out that they did not
consent to the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, the
provisional dismissal amounted to an acquittal which placed them in
jeopardy. Its revival would place them in double jeopardy. The
fiscal opposed the motion. He called the court's attention to the
fact that Father Tibudan had appeared in court several times but
the hearing was not held. The court denied the motion to dismiss.
That order denying the motion to dismiss is assailed in this
special civil action of certiorari. The Solicitor General agrees
with the petitioners that the revival of the case would place the
accused in double jeopardy since the provisional dismissal of the
case without their consent was in effect an acquittal. The rule on
double jeopardy (non bis in Idem or not twice for the same) is
found in section 22, Article IV Bill of Rights) of the Constitution
which provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense." This is complemented by Rule 117
of the Rules of Court which provides as follows: SEC. 9. Former
conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. When a defendant shall
have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information. In order that legal jeopardy may exist,
there should be (a) a valid complaint or information (b) before a
court of competent jurisdiction and (c) the accused has been
arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. When
these three conditions are present, the acquittal or conviction of
the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case without his
express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit
the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is included therein (4 Moran's Comments on
the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 240). Previous acquittal
(autrefois acquit), previous conviction (autrefois convict) or the
dismissal or termination of the case without his consent precludes
his subsequent indictment for the same offense as defined in
section 9.
AQUINO, J.: This case poses the issue of whether the revival of
a grave coercion case, which was provisionally dismissed (after the
accused had been arraigned) because of complainant's failure to
appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy,
considering their constitutional right to have a speedy trial.
Petitioners Generoso Esmea and Alberto Alba and their co-accused,
Genaro Alipio, Vicente Encabo and Bernardo Villamira were charged
with grave coercion in the city court of Cebu City for having
allegedly forced Reverend Father Tomas Tibudan of the Jaro
Cathedral, Iloilo City to withdraw the sum of five thousand pesos
from the bank and to give that amount to the accused because the
priest lost it in a game of cards. The case was calendared on
October 4, 1978 presumably for arraignment and trial. Upon the
telegraphic request of Father Tibudan the case was reset on
December 13, 1978. Because Esmea and Alba were not duly notified of
that hearing, they were not able to appear. The two pleaded not
guilty at their arraignment on January 23, 1979. No trial was held
after the arraignment because complainant Father Tibudan requested
the transfer of the hearing to another date. In the meantime, the
fiscal lost his record of the case. So, the hearing scheduled on
June 18, 1979 was cancelled at his instance. On that date,
respondent judge issued an order setting the trial "for the last
time on August 16, 1979, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning" (p. 21,
Rollo). When the case was called on that date, the fiscal informed
the court that the private prosecutor received from complainant
Father Tibudan a telegram stating that he was sick. The counsel for
petitioners Esmea and Alba opposed the cancellation of the hearing.
They invoked the right of the accused to have a speedy trial. Their
counsel told the court: " ... we are now invoking the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial of the case.
... We are insisting on our stand that the case be heard today;
otherwise, it will (should) be dismissed on the ground of invoking
(sic) the constitutional right of the accused particularly accused
Alberto Alba and Generoso Esmea (pp. 50 and 52, Rollo).
In the instant case, we hold that the petitioners were placed in
jeopardy by the provisional dismissal of the grave coercion case.
That provisional dismissal would not have place the petitioners in
jeopardy if respondent judge had taken the precaution of making
sure that the dismissal was with their consent. In this case, it is
not very clear that the petitioners consented to the dismissal of
the case. It is the practice of some judges before issuing an order
of provisional dismissal in a case wherein the accused had already
been arraigned to require the accused and his counsel to sign the
minutes of the session or any available part of the record to show
the conformity of the accused or his lack of objection to the
provisional dismissal. The judge specifies in the order of
provisional dismissal that the accused and his counsel signified
their assent thereto. That procedure leaves no room for doubt as to
the consent of the accused and precludes jeopardy from attaching to
the dismissal. The petitioners were insisting on a trial. They
relied on their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The
fiscal was not ready because his witness was not in court.
Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the
case. The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity
to the provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in
jeopardy. Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a
speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and, therefore,
consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy.
The use of the word "provisional" would not change the legal effect
of the dismissal (Esguerra vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134; Gandicela
vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299). If the defendant wants to exercise his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the
dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the prosecution's
motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of
the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and,
consequently, fails to prove the defendant's guilt, the court upon
defendant's motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting
to an acquittal of the defendant" (4 Moran's Comments on the Rules
of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 202, citing Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil.
299, 307 and People vs. Diaz, 94 Phil. 714-717). The dismissal of a
criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution
was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses
did not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an
acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for
the same offense (Salcedo vs. Mendoza, L-49375, February 28, 1979,
88 SCRA 811; Lagunilia vs. Hon. Reyes, etc. and Motas, 111 Phil.
1020 citing People vs. Tacneng, 105 Phil. 1298 and People vs.
Robles, 105 Phil. 1016. See Taladua vs. Ochotorena, L-25595,
February 15, 1974, 55 SCRA 528; Acebedo vs. Sarmiento, L-28025,
December 16, 1970, 36 SCRA 247; Baesa vs. Provincial Fiscal of
Camarines Sur, L-30363, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 437; People vs.
Cloribel, 120 Phil. 775; People vs. Abao 97 Phil. 28; People vs.
Labatete, 107 Phil. 697). WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge
dated October 8, 1979, reviving the criminal case against the
petitioners, and his order of December 14, 1979, denying
petitioners' motion to dismiss, are reversed and set aside. No
costs. SO ORDERED. Facts: Petitioners Esmea and Alba were charged
with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City for allegedly forcing
Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the
bank to be given to them because the priest lost in a game of
chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded Not Guilty. No
trial came in after the arraignment due to the priests request to
move it on another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy
issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal
informed the court that it received a telegram stating that the
complainant was sick. The accused invoked their right to speedy
trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case because the trial was
already dragging the accused and that the priests telegram did not
have a medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to
recognize the complainants reason to be valid in order to
reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a
motion to revive the case and attached the medical certificate of
the priest proving the fact that the priest was indeed sick of
influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmea and Alba filed a motion to
dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which
was dismissed earlier due to complainants failure to appear at the
trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy
Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double
jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been dismissed
already without the consent of the accused which would have an
effect of an acquittal on the case filed. The dismissal was due to
complainants incapability to present its evi dence due to non
appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar
further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. For
double jeopardy to exist these three requisites should be present,
that one, there is a valid complaint or information filed second,
that it is done before a court of competent jurisdiction and third,
that the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the
complaint or information. In the case at bar, all three conditions
were present, as the case filed was grave coercion, filed in a
court of competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place
and last the accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the
complaint or the information. When these three conditions are
present then the acquittal, conviction of the accused, and the
dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent
constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged. In the case, it was evidently shown that the
accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for the
trial of the case and not its termination which would mean that
respondents had no expressed consent to the dismissal of the case
which would make the case filed res judicata and has been dismissed
by the competent court in order to protect the respondents as well
for their right to speedy trial which will be equivalent to
acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further
prosecution. G.R. No. L-69270 October 15, 1985 GERRY TOYOTO, EDDIE
GONZALES, DOMINADOR GABIANA AND REY CINCO, petitioners, vs. HON.
FIDEL RAMOS, CAPTAIN ALVAREZ AND CAPTAIN BALLEN, respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J: This is a petition for habeas corpus and the
problem posed is whether the State can "reserve" the power to
rearrest the petitioners even after they had been acquitted by a
court of competent jurisdiction for the offense for which they had
been previously arrested. The following are taken from the petition
and have not been contradicted by the respondents: Gerry Toyoto,
Eddie Gonzales and Dominador Gabiana belong to a group called the
"Urban Poor" which conducted a march, demonstration and rally along
Northbay Boulevard in Navotas, Metro Manila, on October 23,
1983.
Subsequently, Toyoto, Gonzales and Gabiana (among others) were
accused of violating Presidential Decree No. 1835 (Codifying the
Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and Increasing the Penalties for
Membership in Subversive Organizations [January 16, 1981]) in
Criminal Case No. 1496-MN of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon.
No bail was recommended for their provisional liberty. On July 9,
1984, the petitioners were arraigned and they pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged. The prosecution was able to present only one
witness despite repeated postponements. This prompted the accused
to move for the dismissal of the case. In granting the motion,
Judge Vicente B, Echaves, Jr. said inter alia: 1. Since on
cross-examination, prosecution witness Dagui testified that the
primary reason of the marching group was to air their grievances to
the government to allow them to transfer to the Dagat- dagatan
government project for squatters, it is doubtful that the marchers
had, as alleged in the information, the 'intention to undermine the
faith of the people in the duly constituted government and
authorities of the Republic of the Philippines'; 2. Since Dagui
testified on cross-examination that before the dispersal of the
marchers there were no speeches, and he did not see accused Toyoto,
Gabiana or Gonzales deliver speeches, there is no proof at all of
the allegation in the information that the accused "uttered
speeches tending to discredit the government; 3. Considering the
testimony of witness Dagui on direct examination that during that
rally, accused Eddie Boy Gonzales was holding a placard, but that
he did not remember the words thereon, and that he did not see co-
accused Dominador Gabiana and Gerry Toyoto holding a placard, there
is no proof of the allegation in the information that said accused
did 'use and display placards, banners and other subversive
leaflets; 4. It is alleged IN the information that the accused held
a public rally 'without securing the necessary permit from the
proper authorities' but the 'proper authorities' were not presented
to prove this allegation. In any event, considering that, as
admitted by witness Dagui, the primary purpose of the marchers was
to air their grievances to the government to allow them to transfer
to the Dagat-dagatan government project for squatters, it is
doubtful if the 'proper authorities' could withhold the permit for
such a rally and thereby render violence to the Constitutional
'right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. (Rollo, pp. 8-9.) The order
of dismissal was dated November 9, 1984, but on December 5, 1984,
when the petition for habeas corpus was filed, the respondents had
not released and they refused to release the petitioners on the
ground that a Preventive Detention Action had been issued against
them. It is to be noted that the petitioners had been in detention
for over one year for they were arrested on October 23, 1983. We
thus have the sorry spectacle of persons arrested, charged and
tried for merely exercising their constitutional rights. And the
injury was compounded when the over zealous minions of the
government refused to release them even after they had been
acquitted by a court of competent jurisdiction because they were
covered by a PDA. To be sure it cannot be denied that there was a
flagrant violation of human rights. The return filed by the
respondents states that petitioners Toyoto, Gonzales and Gabiana
were released to their relatives on December 8, 1984, pursuant to
the order of the Minister of National Defense. The order (Annex 1)
is dated November 30, 1984, and orders the "temporary release" of
the petitioners. The respondents pray that the petition be
dismissed for having become moot and academic in view of the
release of the petitioners from detention.
The petitioners would have their case considered moot and
academic only "if their release would be permanent." We sustain the
petitioners. Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot
and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners
is lifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a
number of cases. But the instant case presents a different
situation. The question to be resolved is whether the State can
reserve the power to rearrest a person for an offense after a court
of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An
affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents because
the release of the petitioners being merely "temporary" it follows
that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by
a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such a reservation
is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle.
Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal
charge he can no longer be detained or rearrested for the same
offense. This concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no
elaboration. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the release of the
petitioners is hereby declared to be permanent. No costs. SO
ORDERED. G.R. No. 136258
October 10, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARLOS
FELICIANO, accused-appellant. VITUG, J.: From being the subject of
moral condemnation, the "Kiss of Judas" appears to attain a
different dimension in criminal procedure. Indeed, by entering into
a "unholy" contract with an accused, so that the latter might
betray his partner in crime in exchange for an acquittal, the State
demonstrates how far its efforts could go to vindicate crime. That
the State should agree to become a party to setting up a premium on
"treachery," and that it should reward conduct from which an
honorable man would ordinarily recoil with aversion, paradoxically
illustrates the perceived necessity of such kind of an arrangement
in criminal procedure.1 It is this doggedness of purpose on the
part of the State which herein accused-appellant, in one of his
assignment of errors, decries "The trial court [has] erred in
discharging accused Rodel de la Cruz to be the state witness
against co-accused Carlos Feliciano despite strong objections from
the defense."2 The accused-appellant, Carlos Feliciano, was a
security guard detailed by the Atlantic Security Agency at the
Kingsmen building, also popularly known in the small community as
the hub of four disco pubs located on four floors of the edifice,
in Kalibo, Aklan. He was assigned to the "Superstar" disco pub and
his duties ranged from refusing entry to dubious characters to
making certain that no customer would leave without first paying
his bill. Rodel de la Cruz, a security guard from another agency,
the Rheaza Security Agency, was stationed at the parking lot of the
same building. In keeping with the nocturnal business hours of the
establishments at Kingsmen, the two security guards would report
for duty at 7:00 in the evening until the wee hours of the next
morning or when the last customer would have by then left the
premises. In the early morning of 05 June 1995, Feliciano and de la
Cruz centrally figured in the investigation over the grisly death
of an unidentified woman whose body was found sprawled in Barangay
New Buswang, Kalibo, Aklan.
Finding a dead body at 5:30 in the morning in nearby Barangay
Buswang was big news to the small community of Kalibo The radio
news about an unidentified lifeless female lying in the Sampaton
Funeral Parlor caught the curiosity of Rosalie Ricarto. The dead
woman, so described as wearing a red jacket emblazoned with the
words "El-Hassan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" and maong pants, fit the
description of Teresita Fuentes. Rosalie, a rice retailer, shared a
stall with Teresita, a vendor of spices, condiments and fruits, at
the Yambing Building. Rosalie last saw Teresita on the afternoon of
04 June 1995. Teresita, who regularly went to twice a week to buy
goods to sell, was scheduled to leave the following morning of 05
June 1995. According to Rosalie, Teresita, who normally would take
the 2:00 a.m. trip to Iloilo, should already be back at Kalibo by
about 4:00 p.m. of the same day. But Teresita did not return that
afternoon. Rosalie said that Teresita wore pieces of jewelry a
necklace, a pair of earrings, a bracelet, four rings and a Seiko
wristwatch all of which, except for the timepiece, were eventually
recovered. Anna Liza Pronton Fuentes, the daughter of Teresita, was
able to identify the bag recovered by Myca Banson from the crime
scene, as well as all its t contents, to be those belonging to her
mother. Likewise, recovered at the crime scene were twelve P100.00
bills, seven P5.00 bills and the broken windshield of the tricycle
owned by Ruben Barte. Turned over to the police by the manager of
the Superstar Disco Club was the sum of P1,000.00. The autopsy
report showed that whoever bludgeoned the hapless Teresita Fuentes
to death had used a blunt instrument, inflicting twelve different
wounds on her head and face. The cause of death was noted to be
severe hemorrhage secondary to lacerated wounds and skull fracture.
On 02 August 1995, an Information was filed against Rodel de la
Cruz and Carlos Feliciano 'That on or about the 5th day of June
1995, in the early morning, in Barangay New Buswang, Municipality
of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, while armed with a handgun, by means of force and
violence, and with intent of gain and without the consent of the
owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal, rob and carry away cash money in the
amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), Philippine currency,
more or less, belonging to TERESITA FUENTES Y OSORIO, to the damage
and prejudice of the owner in the aforesaid amount; that by reason
or in the occasion of said robbery, and for the purpose of enabling
the accused to take, steal and carry away the aforesaid amount, the
above-named accused with intent to kill and conspiring with one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and with evident premeditation and under the cover of darkness,
treacherously attack, assault and wound TERESITA FUENTES Y OSORIO,
thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds, to wit: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
6. 7. 8. Lacerated wound about 1 inches in length left chin.
Lacerated wound about 1 inch in length left lower lip. Fracture of
the left mandible. Fracture of the left upper lateral incisor and
the left upper canine. Lacerated wound about 1 inches in length and
about 1 in depth left face. Punctured wound in diameter and about 1
inches in depth mid-portion base nose bridge left. Lacerated wound
about 2 inches in length and about 1 inches in depth left cheek.
Lacerated wound about 1 inch in length left ear medially.
9. 10. 11. 12.
Lacerated wound about inch in length left face near the left
ear. Lacerated wound about 1 in length below the left eyebrow.
Punctured wound about 1 inch in diameter and about 5 inches in
depth left parietal. Skull fracture occiput right.
"as per autopsy report of Dr. Agrelita D. Fernandez, of the
Rural Health Unit, Kalibo, Aklan, hereto attached and forming an
integral part hereof which wounds directly caused the death of said
TERESITA FUENTES Y OSORIO. "That as a result of the criminal acts
of the accused, the heirs of the victim suffered actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)
PESOS."3 The prosecution sought the discharge of accused Rodel de
la Cruz so that the latter could testify against his coaccused
Carlos Feliciano. Pending resolution by the trial court on the
motion, Carlos Feliciano and Rodel de la Cruz were arraigned on 08
February 1996. The two accused entered a plea of not guilty. On 18
June 1996, the court a quo granted the motion of the prosecution
and the name of Rodel de la Cruz, an accused turned state witness,
was forthwith stricken off from the Information.4 A detailed
account of the incident presented at the trial by the prosecution
was narrated by the Office of the Solicitor General. "In the early
morning of June 5, 1995, before 2 o'clock, appellant went to the
guard post of Dela Cruz to tell the latter to assist him in going
after a customer who did not pay the bill. It was not the first
time that they had to run after a non-paying customer. Dela Cruz
thus accompanied appellant who rented for the purpose a tricycle
from its driver, Ruben Barte, who stayed behind. Appellant
initially drove but about twenty meters past Kingsmen Building, he
asked Dela Cruz to take over while he stayed inside the passenger
sidecar of the tricycle. Somewhere between the Ceres and Libacao
terminals, appellant alighted from the tricycle after instructing
Dela Cruz to stop and wait for him. Appellant subsequently informed
Dela Cruz that they shall wait there for the customer they were
after. About a half hour later, however, appellant decided to leave
the place, apparently because the person he was looking for was
nowhere in sight. As they passed Banga, New Washington crossing,
they saw a woman walking alone. Appellant waved at her, giving Dela
Cruz the impression that they knew each other. Dela Cruz stopped
the vehicle, as he was told by appellant, who then jumped out.
Drawing his service gun, appellant suddenly held the woman by the
neck and at the same time poked his gun at her face. He dragged her
towards the tricycle and ordered her to board it. The woman would
later be identified as Teresita Fuentes. Dela Cruz was shocked with
what appellant did and was at a loss on what to do. Still stricken
with panic, Dela Cruz asked appellant what was going on and said he
was leaving as he did not want to be part of whatever plans
appellant had. Appellant retorted that Dela Cruz was already
involved. Dela Cruz was about to alight from the tricycle when
appellant poked his gun at him and ordered him to drive. Thinking
that appellant was in a position to easily shoot him, Dela Cruz did
as he was ordered. "Appellant then instructed Dela Cruz to drive
back to the public market. When they reached the junction of Toting
Reyes and Roxas Avenues, appellant told Dela Cruz to turn right at
Rizal Memorial College of Arts and Trade (RMCAT) They noticed at
this point that another tricycle, which came from the direction of
Kingsmen Building, was following them. This prompted appellant to
order Dela Cruz to turn left at Magdalena Village instead and to
drive faster. During the ride, appellant held Fuentes, who was
crouching, by her hair, pressing her head down. He also kicked her
and struck her head with the butt of his gun whenever she
struggled. Dela Cruz
asked appellant to stop hurting Fuentes and to have pity but his
entreaties fell on deaf ears. Appellant even threatened to shoot
Dela Cruz if he does not stop complaining. 'When they reached New
Buswang, they noticed that the other tricycle they saw earlier was
still trailing them by about 15 meters. As they approached
Magdalena Village after passing Camp Martelino, Fuentes struggled
so appellant hit her again. Dela Cruz told appellant to desist from
striking her. Appellant did not take kindly to the unsolicited
advice and fired his gun in the air. Seeing an opportunity for
escape, Dela Cruz suddenly swerved the tricycle towards Magdalena
Village until the vehicle toppled over. When the tricycle was
lifted from its fallen state, Dela Cruz immediately jumped out of
it and ran towards a feeder road leading to the Cooperative Rural
Bank. He was resting at the back of the bank for a few minutes when
appellant also arrived. Enraged, Dela Cruz this time drew his
service firearm and aimed it at appellant, demanding from the
latter an explanation why he had to involve him (Dela Cruz). With
an assurance that he would own up the responsibility for everything
that had happened, appellant was able to calm Dela Cruz down. After
returning his service gun to the holster, Dela Cruz headed back to
the road. Behind him following was appellant. Then, they saw Barte,
from whom appellant rented the tricycle earlier, trying to start
the engine thereof. It turned out that it was Barte who was in the
other tricycle, driven by Ramon Yael. Appellant assured Barte that
he will pay for all the damages of the rented tricycle. "Meanwhile,
Dela Cruz went back to Kingsmen Building aboard Yael's tricycle to
look for his dancer girlfriend, Myka (or Mika) Banzon (or Vanson),
but she was not there. Dela Cruz, with Yael in his tricycle, were
about to go to Banzon's boarding house when appellant approached
them, insisting that Yael take him first to Magdalena Village.
Afraid of appellant, Yael agreed. When they got there, particularly
where Barte's tricycle turned over earlier, appellant walked
towards a mango tree. Curious, Dela Cruz followed him. Dela Cruz
saw appellant hitting Fuentes on the head with his gun. She was
lying down face up, groaning. Dela Cruz admonished and pushed
appellant away, telling him to have pity on Fuentes. Since he did
not want to get involved further nor did he want to. see any more
of what appellant was up to, Dela Cruz walked back to the tricycle
He took a last look back and saw appellant getting something from
the pocket of Fuentes and putting it inside the pocket of his
chaleco. Soon enough, appellant caught up with Dela Cruz and Yael
as they were about to leave and they all went back to Kingsmen
Building. "Dela Cruz finally found Banzon at the third floor of the
building and informed her that he was going to bring her home
already. She passed by the ladies' room while he stood watch
outside. Appellant arrived and told Dela Cruz and Banzon that they
had to talk inside the ladies' room. He was giving Dela Cruz and
Banzon P600.00 each, but they declined to accept the money.
Appellant threatened Dela Cruz not to squeal whatever he knows or
appellant will kill him and his family. When appellant insisted in
giving the money, Dela Cruz took it only to place it on the sink,
then, he and Banzon left. "Dela Cruz and Banzon were leaving for
her boarding house aboard Yael's tricycle when appellant caught up
with them again and ordered Yael to first take him to Ceres
terminal. As they passed the Tumbokan Memorial Hospital, they came
across Barte driving his tricycle. After signaling for Barte to
stop, appellant gave him money. Dela Cruz and Banzon quickly
transferred to Barte's tricycle since Yael still had to take
appellant to the terminal. In the course of the transfer to the
other tricycle, appellant placed something inside the pocket of
Dela Cruz who thought nothing of it as he was in a hurry to go
home. In Banzon's boarding house, Dela Cruz found out that what
appellant had put in his pocket was a blood-stained necklace
wrapped in a piece of paper. Banzon also showed him a bag she found
at the place where Barte's tricycle turned turtle. Dela Cruz
planned to return the necklace and the bag the next day. "In the
evening of June 5, 1995, Dela Cruz reported for work. Appellant
asked him for the necklace so that he could pawn it. Dela Cruz,
however, was unable to give the necklace back because in the
morning of June 6, 1995, the police raided the boarding house of
Banzon. Among those confiscated by the police was his wallet where
he placed the necklace. The police invited Dela Cruz to the police
station to shed light on what he knew
about a murder committed in Magdalena Village. The police had
earlier confirmed an anonymous call that a dead woman was found at
New Buswang. Twelve 100-peso bills were found at the scene, as well
as a broken windshield that was traced to the tricycle rented by
Barte to appellant. The dead person was identified as Fuentes by
her daughter, Analiza Fuentes Pronton. Thus, Dela Cruz revealed
everything that appellant had done. The police asked Dela Cruz to
go with them to Lalab, Bataan where appellant was arrested.
Appellant was then brought to the Kalibo Police Station for
investigation."5 Carlos Feliciano, in his testimony, denied the
asseverations of state witness de la Cruz. He claimed that the
accusations were motivated out of pure spite and revenge borne of
the hostility between them due to workrelated differences. An
altercation arose between him and de la Cruz two months before the
incident, on 06 April 1995, when a customer had complained to the
Kingsmen Building manager that the toolbox of his tricycle, parked
near the building, was missing. The manager then ordered Feliciano
to go to the parking lot and summon de la Cruz. Feliciano r
reported back to say that he did not find de la Cruz in his
designated post, a fact that de la Cruz later resented. The next
incident happened the following month. On the evening of 01 May
1995, Myca Banson, the live-in girlfriend of de la Cruz, was to be
"taken out" by a customer. Feliciano upon orders of the management,
refused de la Cruz entry within the premises of the pub house, in
order to avoid any possible trouble, which culminated in a physical
tussle between the two men and ended with de la Cruz aiming his gun
at Feliciano. The third incident occurred when a motorcycle parked
at the Kingsmen parking lot could not be located and de la Cruz
again was not at his post. Feliciano reported the matter to the
manager and, two days later, de la Cruz was fired from work.
Feliciano admitted having seen de la Cruz at about 9:30 on the
evening of 04 June 1995 escorting Myca Banson to the pubhouse. De
la Cruz stayed at the billiard house fronting Kingsmen, while
waiting for Myca to finish work, often at 4:00 in the early morning
of the next day. Feliciano said that he knew Ramon Barte, the
driver, being a habitue of the Kingsmen premises. It was Barte who
would often fetch Rodel de la Cruz and Myca Banson from work during
early mornings. The defense placed at the stand two additional
witnesses. Eduardo Magsangya, a cigarette vendor at the Ceres
terminal, testified that on the late evening of 04 June 1995, de la
Cruz went to see him at the Ceres Terminal to inquire whether
Teresita Fuentes had already arrived. Magsangya responded in the
negative. De la Cruz returned to the terminal looking for Teresita
four times that night. Magsangya knew Teresita as being a biweekly
passenger of the 2:00 a.m. bus for Iloilo and de la Cruz as a
security guard at Kingsmen where he would at times sell his wares.
Jefferson Arafol, a pahinante of Ideal Trucking, testified that at
approximately 2:30 on the early morning of 05 June 1995, he and
truck driver "Oca"," were transporting coconut lumber to Iloilo,
when, at the vicinity of Magdalena Village, they spotted a tricycle
running at high speed, eventually overtaking them. Its fast pace
caused the vehicle to turn turtle. When Arafol approached, the
tricycle diver, Rodel de la Cruz, pointed a gun at him and told him
not to come any closer. Arafol was acquainted with Rodel de la Cruz
and Carlos Feliciano because he frequented Kingsmen on Sundays
after getting his salary. The pahinante saw two more persons with
de la Cruz, one male and the other female Arafol was certain that
the male companion of de la Cruz was not Carlos Feliciano. While de
la Cruz was pointing his gun at him, his male companion was
dragging an unidentified woman towards the nearby mango tree. When
the trial concluded, the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan,
found for the prosecution and pronounced accused Carlos, Feliciano
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and r sentenced him to suffer the extreme penalty of death
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused CARLOS FELICIANO Y MARCELINO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide defined and penalized under
paragraph 1 of Article 294 x x x, with three aggravating
circumstances, the court hereby imposes upon the said accused the
supreme penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of Teresita
Fuentes the sum of P50,000.00. "The caliber .38 revolver Squires
Bingham with SN #14223 (Exhibit J) used by Feliciano is hereby
forfeited and confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed
in accordance with law.
"Costs against the accused."6 In an automatic review before this
tribunal, appellant Carlos Feliciano raised the following
assignment of errors "I. "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING THE
ACCUSED RODEL DE LA CRUZ TO BE THE STATE WITNESS AGAINST CO-ACCUSED
CARLOS FELICIANO DESPITE STRONG OBJECTIONS FROM THE DEFENSE. "II.
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE WELL-REHEARSED
TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES. "III 'THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT CARLOS FELICIANO FOR THE CRIME CHARGED
IN THE INFORMATION DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AGAINST
HIM."7 The Court is inclined to agree with appellant that state
witness Rodel de la Cruz appears to be far from being the
inculpable young man who has simply been an unwitting and reluctant
accomplice to a gruesome crime. Several incidents militate against
his innocence. The events, related by him, make tenuous the
purported threat and intimidation exerted by appellant over him.
The behavior of Rodel de la Cruz during and immediately after the
crime could not be that of a threatened, frightened man. If he
indeed wanted to escape, he had in his possession his own service
gun, and he was in control of the tricycle. He had enough advantage
and chances to escape, if he really wanted to, from Feliciano who
was at that time engrossed at restraining a struggling victim. In
fact, it was de la Cruz who was caught in the possession of the
dead woman's necklace. Another damning evidence against de la Cruz
was the letter introduced by police inspector Winnie Jereza, Chief
of Intelligence of the Philippine National Police of Kalibo, Aklan,
who, after taking the witness stand for the prosecution, testified
for the defense. The letter, dated 02 June 1995, came from one
Roger R. Zaradulla, proprietor of the Rheaza Security Agency,
addressed to SPO3 Gregorio F. Ingenerio of the Kalibo Police
Station, to the effect that the detail order of Rodel de la Cruz to
the Kingsmen Disco pub had expired as of 31 May 1995. According to
Zaradulla, de la Cruz was nowhere to be found and his whereabouts
were unknown. Apprehensive that de la Cruz had gone on AWOL without
first surrendering to the agency the firearm issued to him,
Zaradulla sought the arrest of de la Cruz by the police. The
evident attempt, nevertheless, of the accused turned state witness
to mitigate his own culpability did not adversely affect his
discharge nor did it render completely weightless the evidentiary
value of his testimony. The rules of procedure allowing the
discharge of an accused to instead be a witness for the state8 is
not a home grown innovation but is one with a long and interesting
history. It has its origins in the common law of ancient England
where faithful performance of such an agreement with the Crown
could entitle a criminal offender to an equitable right to a
recommendation for executive clemency. The practice, soon
recognized through widespread statutory enactments in offer
jurisdictions, finally has found its way to our own criminal
procedure in a short and compact military General Order No. 58
issued in 1900. Its adoption highlights the emphasis
placed by the new system on the presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused, on the requirement that the State must first
establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt before an accused can
be called upon to defend himself, and on the proscription against
compelling an accused to be a witness against himself as well as
against drawing inferences of guilt from his silence.9 Underlying
the rule is the deep-lying intent of the State not to let a crime
that has been committed go unpunished by allowing an accused who
appears not to be the most guilty to testify, in exchange for an
outright acquittal, against a more guilty co accused. It is aimed
at achieving the greater purpose of securing the conviction of the
most guilty and the greatest number among the accused for an
offense committed.10 In this jurisdiction, it is the trial court
judge who has the exclusive responsibility of ensuring that the
conditions prescribed by the rules exist.11 This grant is not one
of arbitrary discretion but rather a sound judicial prerogative to
be exercised with due regard to the proper and correct dispensation
of criminal justice.12 But that there would be the possibility of
error on the part of the judge is understandable. A trial judge
cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute
certainty at the outset of the trial as to everything which may
develop in the course of the trial in regard to the guilty
participation of the accused in the commission of the crime charged
in the complaint.13 If that were possible, the judge would
conveniently rely on large part upon the suggestion and the
information furnished by the prosecuting officer in coming to the
conclusion as to the "necessity for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested, as to the "availability of other
direct or corroborative evidence," and as to who among the accused
is the "most guilty," and so the like.14 Then, there would be
little need for the formality of a trial.15 Thus, here, even while
one might be convinced that state witness Rodel de la Cruz would,
on the basis of evidence ultimately submitted, appear to be equally
as, and not less than, guilty in conspiracy with appellant Carlos
Feliciano, the hands of the State are now stayed and the Court must
assure the exemption of the witness from punishment. It is widely
accepted that the discharge of an accused to become a state witness
has the same effect as an acquittal. The impropriety of the
discharge would not have any effect on the competency and quality
of the testimony, nor would it have the consequence of withdrawing
his immunity from prosecution.16 A discharge, if granted at the
stage where jeopardy has already attached, is equivalent to an
acquittal, such that further prosecution would be tantamount to the
state reneging on its part of the agreement and unconstitutionally
placing the state witness in doubt jeopardy. The rule, of course,
is not always irreversible. In an instance where the discharged
accused fails to fulfill his part of the bargain and refuses to
testify against his co-accused, the benefit of his discharge can be
withdrawn and he can again be prosecuted for the same offense. In
US vs. de Guzman,17 one of the earlier cases discussing this issue,
Justice Carson had occasion to briefly touch on the immunity
clauses in the Acts of the United States Congress and some States.
In Wisconsin, the immunity clause contained a proviso providing
that persons committing perjury when called upon to testify could
be punished therefor.18 Oklahoma law suffered from the absence of
any reservation; thus observed Justice Carson "x x x We have no
such reservation in our constitutional provision; and, as before
said, if we should follow the precedents, when the witness does not
speak the truth, the State would be left without redress, although
the witness had violated the purpose and spirit of the
constitution. We cannot believe that it was the purpose of the
intelligent and justice-loving people of Oklahoma, when they voted
for the adoption of the constitution, to grant immunity to any man,
based upon a lie, or, in other words, that they intended that the
commission of perjury should atone for an offense already
committed. It is a familiar rule of common law, common sense, and
common justice that a legal right cannot be based upon fraud. We
therefore hold that the witness who claims immunity on account of
self-incriminatory testimony which he had been compelled to give
must act in good faith with the State, and must make truthful
replies to the questions which are propounded to him, and which he
had been compelled to answer, and that any material concealment or
suppression of the truth on his part will deprive him of the
immunity provided by the constitution; and the witness must testify
to something which, if true, would tend to criminate him. This
immunity is only granted to those who earn it by testifying in
good
faith. In our judgment any other construction would be an insult
to and a libel upon the intelligence of the people of Oklahoma, an
outrage on law, and a prostitution of justice."19 Despite an
obvious attempt to downgrade his own participation in the crime,
state witness de la Cruz, nevertheless, did not renege from his
agreement to give a good account of the crime, enough to indeed
substantiate the conviction of his co-accused, now appellant Carlos
Feliciano, by the trial court. On significant points, the damaging
testimony of de la Cruz against appellant was corroborated by Ruben
Barte and Ramon Yael. On the night of the incident, Feliciano hired
his vehicle and drove it himself while De la Cruz was seated on its
passenger seat. When the two did not return at the appointed time,
Barte asked Ramon Yael, another tricycle driver who happened to be
at the Kingsmen parking area, to accompany him to look for them.
Myca Banson decided to come with them. After a while, the trio
spotted Barte's tricycle being driven by de la Cruz, and followed
it. Barte testified how the first tricycle turned turtle at the
junction towards Magdalena Village. When the tricycle tilted, he
saw a person in red falling from the vehicle, while another person
who was in white, lifted the first person. When the first tricycle
precariously lurched, its occupants hurriedly abandoned the
vehicle. The obfuscating foliage, however, blocked his view so
Barte was not able to identify who was with appellant and de la
Cruz nor ascertain where the two men were later headed. When the
three of them approached the overturned tricycle they found no one.
Near the vehicle, they saw an abandoned bag which Myca Banson
hastily retrieved. While Barte struggled to turn his vehicle
upright, Myca left with Ramon Yael. Later, while riding his vehicle
on his way back, Ruben Barte was forced to stop because its engine
stalled. While inspecting the tricycle engine, appellant and de la
Cruz approached him, and the former told him not to worry as he
would pay for the damages. After a while, at the parking lot of the
Kingsmen Building, appellant told him to take his vehicle to a dark
place where he wiped off the blood from the tricycle's seats. When
they met again several hours later, appellant gave him P450.00 for
the damages sustained by the vehicle. Much later, Yael handed him
another P250.00 given by appellant as additional payment. Ruben
Barte kept quiet about the incident because appellant warned him
against reporting the matter to anyone. Ramon Yael corroborated the
testimony of Barte, adding that while they were chasing appellant
and de la Cruz, one of the two fired a gun in the air, constraining
them to decrease their speed. Militating against the unbiased
nature of the testimony of these two witnesses was their admission
of having willingly accepted the blood money which appellant gave
them that could well qualify them as being themselves accessories
to the crime.20 Appellant Carlos Feliciano was not able to
sufficiently dispute his participation therein. Neither his blanket
denial nor his alibi, both inherently weak defenses, was amply
proved. Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, provides "1. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death [shall be imposed], when by reason or on occasion
of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or
when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson." (Emphasis supplied.) Given the evidence in
this case, heretofore narrated, the Court is not convinced that the
prosecution has succeeded in establishing beyond reasonable doubt
any of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information
that can warrant the imposition of the maximum of the penalty
prescribed by law. Evidence is wanting that appellant has
especially sought nighttime to perpetrate the crime or that the
criminal act has been preceded, required in evident premeditation,
by cool thought and reflection. Not only is treachery an
aggravating circumstance merely applicable to crimes against
persons but neither also has the mode of attack on the victim of
the robbery been shown to have been consciously adopted. WHEREFORE,
the judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED except insofar as it
imposed on appellant Carlos Feliciano the penalty of death which is
hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua. Costs de oficio. SO
ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and VILMA CAMPOS, Petitioners,
-versusLOUEL UY, TEOFILO PANANGIN, HON. JUDGE MAMINDIARA P.
MANGOTARA, Acting Judge, Br. 44, Initao, Misamis Oriental,
Respondents. G.R. No. 158157 Present: PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, and GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated: September 30, 2005
xx------------------------------------------------------------------------------xx
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Decision dated April 7, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, Branch 44, granting the separate demurrer to
evidence of accused Louel Uy and Teofilo Panangin resulting in
their acquittal for murder due to insufficiency of evidence, but
nevertheless holding them jointly and severally liable to pay
P35,000 to the heirs of the victim Rabel Campos representing vigil
and burial expenses is being assailed in the present petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court by the
People and the mother of the victim. The victim, Rabel Campos, was
found dead with several stab wounds in the morning of March 23,
2001 along the National Highway of Maputi, Naawan, Misamis
Oriental. A suspect in the commission of the crime, Teofilo
Panangin (Panangin), was arrested on January 22, 2002 by elements
of the Special Operation Group and Police Community Precinct 1 of
Iligan City. During the investigation conducted by the National
Bureau of Investigation-Iligan District Office (NBIILDO) on January
23, 2002, Panangin executed a Sworn Statement[1] with the
assistance of Atty. Celso Sarsaba of the Public Attorneys Office
(PAO). In his January 23, 2002 Sworn Statement, Panangin related as
follows:
On March 22, 2001, around 8:00 p.m., while he was at the Justy
Inn, Tibanga, Iligan City, his former employer Louel Uy (Uy), in
whose house he stayed from 1993 to 1997, arrived, telling him that
he had a problem and that it was he (Panangin) who could help him.
He and Uy thereafter repaired to the Sanitarium Hospital where Uys
grandmother had just died, after which they proceeded to the house
of Uy where the latter gave him a stainless steel knife,
instructing him to keep it as they had work to do. Later that
night, he and Uy, on board a red Isuzu vehicle, proceeded to Quezon
Avenue near the Cathedral where they stopped. Uy then called by
cellular phone his live-in partner Rabel, who later was to be the
victim of a gruesome death, and instructed her to proceed to where
they were. As instructed, Rabel repaired to where they were and
joined them on board the vehicle. The three of them thereupon
proceeded to the direction of Pagahan, Initao, Misamis Oriental and
on reaching this place, Uy negotiated a U-turn. Upon reaching the
National Highway in Naawan, Misamis Oriental, Uy stopped the
vehicle and alighted. Uy then forcibly pulled Rabel out of the
vehicle and as Uy was holding Rabel tightly, he instructed him to
stab her. Albeit he was hesitant, as Uy shouted at him and
threatened to shoot him with his cal. 45 pistol tucked at his
waist, he had no choice but to follow Uys instruction. He thus
stabbed Rabel once at the stomach. After he stabbed Rabel, she was
able to run away. Uy, however, took the knife from him and chased
Rabel. On catching up with her, Uy dragged her to the ground and
stabbed her several times until she expired. He and Uy then left
for Iligan City, arriving thereat at 1:30 a.m. of March 23, 2001.
At the time Panangin gave his Sworn Statement, he was shown a pair
of sandals, found and taken by the police at the scene of the
crime, bearing the markings Neckersman Switzerland which he
confessed to be his, he adding that it was given to him by Edgar
Uy, a cousin of Uy. He was also shown a pair of sandals, also
recovered from the crime scene, bearing the markings WAGON &
RACKS, which he identified to be Rabels. Following the execution by
Panangin of his sworn statement-extrajudicial confession on January
23, 2002, Atty. Patricio S. Bernales, Jr., District Agent-in-Charge
of the NBI-ILDO, filed on even date a case for murder against
Panangin and Uy before the 10th Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Lugait-ManticaoNaawan. During the preliminary
investigation before the MCTC, Panangins sworn statement and
witnesses were presented. After the preliminary investigation of
Panangin was concluded or on January 24, 2002, MCTC Investigating
Judge Jose U. Yamut, Sr. issued a Resolution,[2] the pertinent
portions of which read: From the evidence adduced or submitted, we
are of the OPINION that the killing of CAMPOS was attended by (a)
craft; (b) superior strength and evident premeditation (For UY x x
x). The OVERT ACTS OF UY AND PANANGIN show that BOTH had the UNITY
OF DESIGN and both agreed to kill CAMPOS and decided to kill
CAMPOS. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, let a WARRANT OF ARREST issue against
TEOFILO PANANGIN, for the FELONY of MURDER with NO BAILBOND
RECOMMENDED. PANANGIN is principal by direct participation in the
killing of CAMPOS. (Citations omitted)
xxx
The investigating judge then directed the issuance of subpoena
to Louel Uy for him to appear at a preliminary investigation
scheduled on February 4, 2002. The records do not show if the
preliminary investigation scheduled on February 4, 2002 pushed
through and if it did, what the result was. The records, however,
show that Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Mayorico M. Bodbod found
the evaluation of the investigating judge to be in order, hence, he
affirmed the same by Resolution[3] dated March 19, 2002 and
recommended the indictment of Uy and Panangin for murder. An
Information[4] was thus filed on April 5, 2002 charging Uy and
Panangin with murder as follows: That on March 22, 2001 at around
11:30 oclock more or less in the evening at Maputi, Nawan, Misamis
Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court the above-named accused, Louel Uy and Teofilo Panangin with
intent to kill and treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab one Rabel Campos, several times which resulted to
her untimely death. CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7659.
When arraigned, both accused entered a plea of not guilty.[5]
Aside from the sworn statement-extrajudicial confession of Panangin
and photographs[6] of the victim Rabel taken when she was found
dead lying on a grassy area, the prosecution presented 11
witnesses, the most vital of which insofar as the resolution of the
petition at bar is concerned are the testimonies of PAO Atty. Celso
Sarsaba, NBI agent Gerardo Tamayo, Uys girlfriend Iris Paumar and
her moth er Julieta Paumar which follow after their respective
names. Atty. Celso Sarsaba[7] of the PAO: He assisted Panangin
during the investigation conducted on January 23, 2002 at Police
Station I. Before Panangin gave a statement, Gerardo Tamayo
(Tamayo) of the NBI informed him of his constitutional rights and
warned him that his statement might be used against him, but
Panangin went ahead and gave his statement. Tamayo then proceeded
to investigate Panangin who was handcuffed at the inception of the
investigation, although in the course thereof his handcuffs were
removed as he was allowed to smoke. The investigation was in the
form of question and answer, and Panangin had the opportunity to
review every item thereof which was translated into the Visayan
dialect. After the interview, he asked Panangin whether he had
something to replace or amend or substitute in his statement to
which Panangin replied in the negative. Panangin thereafter affixed
his signature on his statement in his presence. NBI agent Gerardo
Tamayo:[8] He investigated Panangin who informed him that he had no
counsel to assist him. He thus requested PAO lawyer Atty. Sarsaba
to assist Panangin who had earlier been arrested not in connection
with the death of Rabel but with another case. In apprising
Panangin of his constitutional rights, he spoke to him in
Visayan.
Iris Paumar:[9] Echoing the contents of her affidavit executed
on May 2, 2001,[10] she related that Uy, with whom she had a
five-month romantic relationship, together with Panangin, went to
her house on March 23, 2001 for her birthday. A few weeks before
Rabels death, she and Rabel figured in a slapping incident. Julieta
Paumar:[11] Her daughter Iris had a romantic relationship with Uy
who, together with Panangin, went to their house at Purok 8,
Tipanoy, Iligan City at dawn of March 23, 2001 for her daughters
birthday. She affirmed the contents of her affidavit[12] dated
April 10, 2001 which she executed in connection with the case.
Following the filing and the subsequent adm