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Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa Chameleon and Kazaa
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Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Mar 29, 2015

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Page 1: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Jason I. Hong

January 31, 2006

Usable Privacy and Security

Chameleon and KazaaChameleon and Kazaa

Page 2: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Chameleon Overview

• Motivation– Minimize damage done by malware (viruses, worms)

• Insights– Access control useful but too hard for typical user

– Leverage physical metaphor in home (plumber vs accountant)

• Key Ideas– Compartmentalize things into a few basic roles

• Coarse-grained access control

– Provide a user interface that makes it easy to understand and work with these roles

Page 3: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Stepping Back, Bigger Picture

• Kind of paper:– Design proposal introducing new user interface metaphor

– Several user evaluations of design

• Usable Privacy and Security themes: Make it invisible Make it understandable (better metaphors, visibility) Train the users

Page 4: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Stepping Back, Bigger Picture

• Embodies good usability practices– Lo-fi paper prototypes

– Iterative design (paper, VBasic, interactive version)

– User studies throughout

Example from iteration 1 Example from iteration 2

Page 5: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Lo-Fi Prototype

Page 6: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Interactive Prototype

Internetapp.

Testingapp.

Comm.apps.

Page 7: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Roles, A Short Digression

• Role-based access control (RBAC)– http://csrc.nist.gov/rbac

– Roles are created for various job functions in an org

– Users assigned roles based on their responsibilities

– Users can be easily reassigned from one role to another

– Roles can be granted new permissions (or revoked)

• Example roles:– Specific tasks: physician, doctor

– Authority: project manager

– Specific duties: duty physician, shift manager

Page 8: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Standard Roles in Chameleon

• Five standard roles– Vault - Most sensitive data

– Communications - Email, IM, Web

– Default - No network restrictions

– Testing - Untrusted, no net

– System - Operating system

Page 9: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Standard Set of Roles

• Mixed metaphors, not quite everyday roles:– Vault – a device for physically safeguarding

important stuff

– Communications – a collection of unrelated apps for communicating with people

– Testing – ???

Page 10: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Standard Set of Roles

• Explaining to people what role they are in– Window borders subtle and easy to miss

– Desktop combines multiple roles simultaneously

– Very hard, could be Achilles’ heel

Page 11: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

More Thoughts on Chameleon

• Assumption– Malware will happen, minimize the damage

• Secrets and Lies, Bruce Schneier prevention - facilities and systems to

prevent people getting in and taking information

detection - to find out if anybody has gotten in, and compromised important information or processes

reaction - to allow the "bad guys" to be identified and their activity stopped

Page 12: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Questions about Prevention

• What do you do if a role is compromised?

• How does a person know what role an app or file should be installed into?

• Make sense to group “Communications” together?– IM, Web browsing, Email

– Conjecture: People consider endpoint rather than mechanism used

– Ex. John vs phone or email

Page 13: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

More Thoughts on Chameleon

• Testing role– Personally, I’d really like this

– Combine with a virtual machine

– Temporarily and safely install new app and see what it’s like

– Have virtual machine tell you if it has spyware or not

– However, rather than a role, maybe a different metaphor

Page 14: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Even More Thoughts

• Basic ideas quite good:– Compartmentalization

– Different levels of trust

• But some concerns:– Too sophisticated for average home PC users?

• Unclear about who the participants were

– Too easy to work around the system?

– Unclear how well Chameleon works• p350, People didn’t notice trickery

Page 15: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Some Open Questions

• Is the desktop the right place to do this?– People do risky actions in web browsers, email, etc

– A compromised web browser can be quite dangerous too

• Will changing roles become tedious?– User studies described initial reactions

– Easy to overlook things, requires eternal vigilance?

– Different roles are also different modes• Very easy to make errors• Solution 1: Pseudo-modes• Solution 2: Modeless (how?)

Page 16: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Some More Open Questions

• Is Chameleon’s basic metaphor right?– Mixes application-based metaphor with

file-based metaphor with physical-based metaphor (home)

• Alternatives:– Multiple desktops?

– Multiple file systems?

Page 17: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Some More Open Questions

• Good insight: re-thinking application development– Operating system - traditional security, but no context– Application - security can be part of workflow,

but duplicated work, inconsistency

– Toolkit - provide lots of reusable components, but unclear on useful abstractions

• Idea of a toolkit for building secure apps is a great idea, difficulty is in execution– Would it contain new UI widgets?– Security primitives?– Toolkits tend to be reductionist, but usable privacy and

security seems to be holistic

Page 18: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Kazaa File Sharing Study

• Motivation– Lots of people use P2P file sharing, but how usable are they?

• Insights– Seems like Lots of people sharing files accidentally

• What they did– Cognitive walkthrough predicting usability problems

– User study demonstrating usability problems

– Proposed new design guidelines for P2P systems

Page 19: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Stepping Back, Bigger Picture

• Kind of paper:– User evaluations of existing application

– Generalization of results

– Paper is all evaluation, so needs more evaluation than Chameleon (which is design, implementation, plus eval)

• Usable Privacy and Security themes: Make it invisible Make it understandable (better metaphors, visibility) Train the users

Page 20: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Kazaa File Sharing Study

• Good and Krekelberg, CHI 2003• Given arbitrary setup of Kazaa, could people

understand what files were downloadable by others?

• Found lots of people sharing inbox.dbx• Found that some people were downloading a fake

inbox.dbx file

Page 21: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Kazaa Cognitive Walkthrough

• Cognitive Walkthrough– Simple usability technique, put yourself in shoes of users and

try to use the interface from their perspective

• Problem #1: Multiple names for similar things– My Shared Folder - a folder + all shared files

– My Media - all shared files by media type

– My Kazaa - all shared files by media type

– Folder for downloaded files - root folder of all shared files

Page 22: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Kazaa Cognitive Walkthrough

Problem 2: Downloaded files are also shared files

Problem 3: Kazaa recursivelyshares folders

Page 23: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Kazaa Cognitive Walkthrough

Problem 4: Can select a folder, but what files are inside? Error-prone approach. Also riskwith recursive folders.

Page 24: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Kazaa Cognitive Walkthrough

Note: Gives one-time warningif you select an entire hard drive

Page 25: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Kazaa Cognitive Walkthrough

• Problem 5: Inconsistent views– Two UIs for doing similar tasks, but show different

information about state of system

Page 26: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Kazaa File Sharing Study

• 12 users, 10 had used file sharing before• Figure out what files are being shared by Kazaa

– Download files set to C:\ (ie all files on hard drive C:)

• Results– 5 people thought it was “My Shared Folder”

• which one UI did suggest

Page 27: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Kazaa File Sharing Study

• 12 users, 10 had used file sharing before• Figure out what files are being shared by Kazaa

– Download files set to C:\ (ie all files on hard drive C:)

• Results– 5 people thought it was “My Shared Folder”

• which one UI did suggest

– 2 people used Find Files to find all shared files• This UI had no files checked, thus no files shared?

Page 28: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Kazaa File Sharing Study

• 12 users, 10 had used file sharing before• Figure out what files are being shared by Kazaa

– Download files set to C:\ (ie all files on hard drive C:)

• Results– 5 people thought it was “My Shared Folder”

• which one UI did suggest

– 2 people used Find Files to find all shared files• This UI had no files checked, thus no files shared?

– 2 people used help, said “My Shared Folder”

– 1 person couldn’t figure it out at all

– Only 2 people got it right

Page 29: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Usability Guidelines for P2P

• P2P file sharing is safe and usable if users:– Are aware of what files are being offered to others

– Can determine how to share and stop sharing

– Do not make dangerous errors leading to unintentional sharing of files

– Are comfortable with what is being shared and confident the system is working correctly

• Design suggestions:– Only allow sharing of multimedia files (…effective?)

– Better feedforward

– Allow exceptions to recursively shared folders

Page 30: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Are people still accidentally sharing files?

• A rough & ready experiment by your friendly instructor– eMule (open source)

– Combines eDonkey and Kad file sharing networks

– Different from FastTrack (Kazaa file sharing)

• eMule stats– Downloaded by over 85 million people

– 5.3 mil people / 633 mil files on eDonkey

– 1.7 mil people / 300 mil files on Kad

Page 31: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.
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Page 42: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Putting Them Together

• Lessons from Chameleon + Kazaa– Examples of how to run user studies

• Not the most rigorous studies, but good enough to demonstrate main point

– Examples of mental models

Design Model User Model

System Image

Page 43: Jason I. Hong January 31, 2006 Usable Privacy and Security Chameleon and Kazaa.

Putting Them Together

• Difficulty of building a good UI for privacy and security– What are better design methods?

– What are better tools?

– What would have helped Chameleon and Kazaa?