The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 10 | Issue 35 | Number 3 | Article ID 3816 | Aug 26, 2012 1 Japanese Youth: An Interactive Dialogue: Towards Comparative Youth Research 日本の若者−−四者対談−−比較若者 文化へ向けて Tuukka Toivonen, Noritoshi FURUICHI, Mikito Terachi, Tomu Ogawa * Principal translators: Mikael BOURQUI( ブル キ・ミカエル) and Takayuki YAMAMOTO( 山本 貴之) Photo (from the left): Noritoshi Furuichi, Mikito Terachi, Tuukka Toivonen and Tomu Ogawa (photo by Akiko Nakazawa). *This article reviews and assesses two books on Japanese youth: Goodman, Roger, Imoto, Yuki, and Toivonen, Tuukka (2012) A Sociology of Japanese Youth: From Returnees to NEETs, Abingdon: Routledge (216 pages, $51.95 paperback, $155.00 cloth) 1 Furuichi, Noritoshi (2011) Zetsubō no Kuni no Kōfuku na Wakamono-tachi (The Happy Youth of a Desperate Country), Tokyo: Kodansha (304 pages, ¥1,890 cloth) 1. Introduction (Mikito TERACHI) 2. A Sociology of Japanese Youth That Could Not Have Come about in Japan (Noritoshi FURUICHI) 3. The Happy Youth of a Desperate Country and Japan's Shifting Wakamono-ron (Tuukka TOIVONEN) 4. Dialogue: Towards Comparative Youth Research 5. References, further readings and author profiles The authors' colloquium takes place at GLOCOm, Tokyo on August 29. 「若者」とこ れからの日本社会を考える---絶望の国の 幸福な若者たちと静かな変革者 1. Introduction Mikito TERACHI While striving to provide insights into Japan’s young people before and after 3.11, this collaborative article is our first attempt at building a critical platform for international dialogue on youth generally. It is the first substantial product of an ongoing project called PCYR ( Project for Comparative Youth Research ) . The format is somewhat unusual: it contains not only a two-way book review in which the lead authors Noritoshi Furuichi and Tuukka Toivonen critically survey each other's recent
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The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 10 | Issue 35 | Number 3 | Article ID 3816 | Aug 26, 2012
1
Japanese Youth: An Interactive Dialogue: TowardsComparative Youth Research 日本の若者−−四者対談−−比較若者文化へ向けて
Tuukka Toivonen, Noritoshi FURUICHI, Mikito Terachi, Tomu Ogawa
* Principal translators: Mikael BOURQUI(ブルキ・ミカエル) and Takayuki YAMAMOTO(山本貴之)
Photo (from the left): Noritoshi Furuichi,Mikito Terachi, Tuukka Toivonen andTomu Ogawa (photo by Akiko Nakazawa).
*This article reviews and assesses two books onJapanese youth:
Goodman, Roger, Imoto, Yuki, and Toivonen,Tuukka (2012) A Sociology of Japanese Youth:From Returnees to NEETs, Abingdon:Routledge (216 pages, $51.95 paperback,$155.00 cloth)1
Furuichi, Noritoshi (2011) Zetsubō no Kuni noKōfuku na Wakamono-tachi (The Happy Youthof a Desperate Country), Tokyo: Kodansha (304pages, ¥1,890 cloth)
1. Introduction (Mikito TERACHI)
2. A Sociology of Japanese Youth That CouldNot Have Come about in Japan (NoritoshiFURUICHI)
3. The Happy Youth of a Desperate Country andJapan's Shifting Wakamono-ron (TuukkaTOIVONEN)
4. Dialogue: Towards Comparative YouthResearch
5. References, further readings and authorprofiles
The authors' colloquium takes place atGLOCOm, Tokyo on August 29. 「若者」とこれからの日本社会を考える---絶望の国の幸福な若者たちと静かな変革者
1. Introduction
Mikito TERACHI
While striving to provide insights into Japan’syoung people before and after 3.11, thiscollaborative article is our first attempt atbuilding a critical platform for internationaldialogue on youth generally. It is the firstsubstantial product of an ongoing project calledPCYR (Project for Comparative YouthResearch) .
The format is somewhat unusual: it containsnot only a two-way book review in which thelead authors Noritoshi Furuichi and TuukkaToivonen critically survey each other's recent
contributions, but also a more informal in-depthdialogue. We chose this interactive approach tobegin bridging two often disconnected (butpotentially mutually enriching) streams ofliterature, namely, research on Japanese youthby non-Japanese scholars disseminated viaoverseas publishers, and research by Japanesescholars published almost exclusively withinJapan.
The initial idea for this project arose as a resultof my encounter, at the European Associationfor Japanese Studies conference in Tallinn inAugust 2011, with Toivonen and his researchgroup. Towards the end of this internationalgathering, the group, led by Professor RogerGoodman of Oxford University, presented anoverview of its forthcoming volume A Sociologyof Japanese Youth (released in November2011). It is my impression that youth researchin Japan today, highlighting the difficultcircumstances faced by many young people,takes a predominantly pessimistic attitudetowards its subject. In contrast, overseas youthstudies, it seems to me, generally adopt a moreoptimistic tone. Listening to the presentationsof Toivonen and his colleagues, I felt that theirgroup had the potential to help bridge this gap.
At the same time, however, I found myselfharbouring suspicions regarding two particularpoints. First, why focus on ‘Japanese’ youth tobegin with? Second, how and with whomshould discussions on ‘Japanese’ youth bemeaningfully shared? Moreover, compared tocurrent research within Japan, some topicstreated by Toivonen et al. seemed to lack'freshness'. Was this simply due to an inevitableinformational time lag, or perhaps the result ofsome peculiar characteristics of the field ofJapanese Studies?
I nevertheless felt that if the type of approachset out in A Sociology of Japanese Youth wasapplied in a more explicitly comparativefashion, the youth field could make significantadvances. Both those who carry out their
research within the loose field of JapaneseStudies and are based abroad as well asscholars who are mainly based in Japan couldbenefit as a result.
A few days after my return to Japan from theEAJS Noritoshi Furuichi, now the best-knownsociologist among Japanese young people inparticular, published The Happy Youth of aDesperate Country (Zetsubō no Kuni no Kōfukuna Wakamono-tachi). This controversial bookelicited a massive public response, with tens ofthousands of readers flooding to various blogsand Twitter to post comments. Furuichireceived numerous invitations to appear inonline settings, newspapers, magazines, onradio and in prime-time TV programmes suchas Close-up Gendai on NHK. He was alsoinvited to become a delegate to a governmentdiscussion committee.2
Why did Furuichi's book prompt such anenthusiastic, though critical, reaction? Whatdoes this reaction tell us about the status ofyouth − and indeed the public debate on youngpeople (wakamono-ron) − in 21st centuryJapan?
I would like to suggest two specific reasons forthe powerful response to Furuichi 'scontribution. It is obvious to me, first, thatmany found The Happy Youth of a DesperateCountry attractive because it had been actuallywritten by someone who was himself a youngperson (age 26). It must be stressed that in theJapanese context, this was highly unusual andhelped raise interest among scholars as well asgeneral readers. While it is true that a criticalstream of youth research that rejected 'youth-bashing' media discourses emerged in Japan inthe 2000s, in that decade issues around youthwere still being debated largely in the absenceof young participants. I think there was someirritation at the structural conditions thatproduced such a situation.3 In a country whereyounger age-groups remain excluded from thesphere of decision-making, many suddenly had
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high expectations for Furuichi as a youngperson writing about young people.4
Furuichi Noritoshi at Akamon, TokyoUniversity
The second factor that generated a roaringreaction was, quite possibly, the fact that thebook's title, The Happy Youth of a DesperateCountry, seemed to suggest a separation, oreven mutual irrelevance, between Japan thenation (‘a desperate country’) and its youngpeople. It seemed that the author wasobserving both Japan and youth from theoutside, as if the challenges faced by both weresomeone else's problems. Furuichi's stance wasindeed to treat the two rather independently,which probably provoked especially middle-aged and older readers. To them, Furuichi'swriting style probably seemed precisely likesomething that 'young people of today'(imadoki no wakamono) would adopt.5
Alongside the wider response to Furuichi’sbook, I became curious about the author'sreflections. What did he now think of the scopeof his argument and its impact? At the sametime, I wanted readers from outside Japan todiscover Furuichi’s book because I thought itwell captures the mood prevailing in today'sJapan. How would foreign readers react to its
observations?6
I contacted Toivonen and Furuichi andarranged to meet in Tokyo in December 2011.We were joined by Tomu Ogawa (who iscarrying out an historical analysis of Japaneseyouth discourses from a perspective differentfrom that of Furuichi). Although this was thefirst time for Toivonen to meet Furuichi andOgawa, a spir i ted exchange of ideasimmediately unfolded. Since the three showedenthusiasm towards my tentative project, weundertook to turn it into collaborative research.
One important motivation for deciding to carryout a two-way book review − beyond simplyintroducing as yet untranslated works to oneanother − was to present, using an innovativeformat, the arguments and essentialbackgrounds of these books to a readershipoutside the language area within which theywere written. In the dialogue section, theauthors expand on these reviews and take upfurther issues. Here the four of us considerpossible future directions for the developmentof this project and for the comparative study ofyouth beyond the boundaries of Japanesesociety.
Clearly, the last thing we wish to accomplishthrough this article is to unwittingly reinforcethe division between Japan-based researchcarried out by native scholars and Japan-focused research carried out by internationalscholars. Nor do we want to end with simplycomparing 'topical' phenomena in Japan andoverseas. This could easily turn into adiscussion of only superficially related, poorlydefined phenomena (e.g. NEETs in Finland vs.NEETs in Japan), leading to relapse into 'catch-up' thinking (e.g. 'Japan must learn fromFinnish education'). An important function ofcomparison is to find not only distinctionsbetween subjects that are compared, but alsocommonalities. As a final goal, the approach weare building through dialogue and reflexivecomparison should be relevant from the
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perspective of individuals grappling withproblems that appear personal but that,through sharing, can be discussed more widely,hopefully to the benefit and even joy of a widerange of people.
These goals are furthered by the fact that weare publishing this article simultaneously inboth English and Japanese. Needless to say,parts of the English and Japanese versions arenot mechanical word-for-word linguistictranslations of one another but instead strive tocommunicate the meaning accessibly and inways appropriate to each language andunderlying academic tradition.
We plan to develop this project further andwelcome contacts from potential collaboratorsand other interested ind iv iduals ororganizations.7 To this end, we have set up aFacebook page where we will record ourprogress and facilitate open discussion onyouth issues in both English and Japanese. Wewould be grateful to have your thoughts on howto develop a more reflexive, academicallyrobust yet personally relevant approach tostudying youth in and beyond Japan from aglobal standpoint.
Finally, this is a project that the four of us havelaunched on our own initiative based on acollaborative, spontaneous spirit. In otherwords, resources are scarce and we are in soreneed of supporters. To ensure the continuationand flourishing of this project, we thereforewarmly welcome any kind of support thatindividuals and organizations who share ourgoals may be able to provide.
2. A Sociology of Japanese Youth ThatCould Not Have Come about in Japan
A review of: Goodman, Roger, Imoto, Yuki, andToivonen, Tuukka (2012) A Sociology ofJapanese Youth: From Returnees to NEETs,Abingdon: Routledge (216 pages, $51.95paperback, $146.81 hardcover)
Noritoshi FURUICHI
There are two reasons, to my mind, why itwould have been very difficult for researcherstrained in Japan to write the chapters collectedin A Sociology of Japanese Youth. First, thisbook stands out for the 'coolness' that theauthors maintain throughout. Fittingly forsociologists, the writers set out to analyse'youth problems' (one of the book’s keyconcepts) from a strictly detached standpoint.As explained in Chapter 1, the analyticalframework adopted in the volume is a variantof the social constructionist approach to socialproblems. This approach postulates that, ratherthan asking whether a given social problem,such as enjo kōsai [compensated dating], existsor not, we ought to examine the claims-makingactivities and other processes through whichparticular issues come to be raised as socialproblems.
I might point out here that, among Japanesesociologists, social constructionism emerged assomething of a fashion in the 2000s.Consequently, this sociological approach hastypically been either praised too highly or toounfairly criticized. Despite all the interest,however, regrettably few studies haveattempted to rigorously apply constructionismto the study of youth problems.
Owing to its consistent constructionistorientation, some readers of A Sociology ofJapanese Youth may feel that the volumeadopts something of a 'mean' attitude towardsthe topics it tackles. In Chapter 7 thatexamines the issue of NEETs (those not ineducation, employment or training), forexample, a simple table is used to show thetremendous extent to which the perceivedprevalence of this 'problem' has been made tovary by manipulating its definition (p. 145).Most people ascribe an objective character tostatistical figures, but in actuality we find thatwhile one study uncovers 760,000 NEETs,another discovers as many as 2.5 million.
Why is there such a large discrepancy? Oneanswer has to do with the age-range appliedwhen defining the underlying category of'youth'. For instance, the Ministry of Health,Labour and Welfare and related bodiescurrently define 'young people' [wakamono] asthose between the ages of 15 and 34, but thisvast age bracket is in fact the outcome ofcontinuous expansion in the postwar period.Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s the popularterm 'working youth' [kinrō seinen] referred tothose aged 15 to 19, during the 1980s, theupper limit for 'youth' was pushed up to 24.This was further extended to 29 in the 1990sand finally to 34 in in the 2000s. Toivonenpoints out that one reason for the extension ofthe category of 'youth' to 15-34 is that certainpolicy-makers’ wish to capture the so-called
lost generation (those who experienced the1993–2005 hiring freeze [shūshoku hyōgaki]) asa target for policy intervention. In short, thelarge NEET figures that were publicized in the2000s were, to some extent, an artefact ofstatistical data and choice of definition.
The dr iv ing fac tors under ly ing theproblematization of NEETs are likewiseanalysed in a somewhat 'mean' fashion inChapter 7. Although several actors are said tohave been involved in the construction of thiscategory, an important role was played byresearchers from the Japan Institute for LabourPolicy and Training (JILPT) and The Universityof Tokyo’s Institute of Social Science (ISS).With the shrinking of research budgets,Toivonen observes, many scholars in Japanhave felt pressured to publish results that arenot merely of high quality but that also lead tomore funding due to being closely aligned withcentral government concerns. This is clearlyone reason why the ‘discovery’ of NEETs, andthe emergence of this group as an object ofheated debate, unfolded entirely in the absenceof the voices of young people themselves.
We thus see that social problems − includingyouth problems − do not have a neutralexistence at all. A Sociology of Japanese Youthargues persuasively that youth discourses arecreated through the interaction of a diverse setof actors. Just as Stanley Cohen explained withreference to his classic concept of moral panic,in many cases a social problem surfaces arounda single incident or a small group that is thenmade to represent some putative wider'malaise' (that goes beyond that particularincident or group). This is why otaku, forexample, has come to be debated (i.e.,constructed into a social issue) in entirelydifferent ways in different periods so that thisgroup at first represented youth deviance butlater came to be held up as a symbol of 'coolJapan'. Not infrequently, this process turns'young people' into nothing but material foradult’ narratives about the society they live in.
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Whatever the reason, the types of cool-headedanalyses collected in A Sociology of JapaneseYouth have been rare in the Japanese literatureon young people. The authors posit thatJapanese youth have in fact been discovered as'vulnerable' again and again, not only in publicdiscourse but also within presumably value-neutral sociological research. Such a critical,reflexive awareness has been all but missingwithin Japan.
Perhaps this difference in orientation betweenA Sociology of Japanese Youth and mainstreamscholarship published in Japan is bestillustrated by reference to a recent volumeedited by Ichiyo Habuchi. The title of thisp a r t i c u l a r p u b l i c a t i o n , D o k o k a’mondaika’sareru wakamonotachi [Theproblematization of Japanese youth] (Tokyo:Kōseisha-Kōseikaku, 2008), taken alone, wouldseem to suggest an approach highly similar tothat of Goodman, Imoto, and Toivonen. Doko ka‘mondaika’sareru wakamonotachi is clearly abook with strong cultural-sociological coloring.Despite this, however, it addresses, withobvious concern and from a normativestandpoint, topics such as 'the increase in‘ fur ī tā ' [ f reeters] who lack fu l l t imeemployment, and 'the flexibilization ofemployees in younger age groups'. It goes on topropose policy solutions based on a belief in'the importance of public support systems'. Tome, going this far appears like something thatpolicy scholars rather than those studying theproblematization of youth should attempt. (Ofcourse, this is not to suggest that Japanesesociology is always this explicitly political andthat overseas sociology is not. To the contrary,my impression is that overseas youth researchis usually quite attuned to the prevailingpolicy/political context.)
As Peter Berger famously writes, sociology canbe unpleasant when it exposes how the worldthat people perceive as self-evident isconstructed. Yet, the more unpleasant it is, themore it also 'succeeds' as sociology. In
particular, for Japanese readers (sociologistsincluded) who have repeatedly constructedyouth as 'a vulnerable party', the detachedorientation of this book may feel unpleasant.That, however, is precisely what proves itssociological relevance.
A second major aspect that stands out about ASociology of Japanese Youth is that it analyzesseveral themes that are only rarely includedwithin the scope of youth research in Japan. Asthe table of contents indicates, the book's casestudies comprise bullying [ijime], returneechildren [kikokushijo], compensated dating[enjo kōsai], corporal punishment [taibatsu],child abuse [jidō gyakutai], social withdrawal[hikikomori] and non-employed youth [NEET].Apart from enjo kōsai, hikikomori and NEET,these are topics that have rarely been taken upin the context of the sociology of youth withinJapan. There, corporal punishment wouldprobably be discussed within the sociology ofeducation, while child abuse would be locatedwithin family sociology. In any case, mostJapanese sociologists would not usually definethese issues as 'youth problems'. In this sense,A Sociology of Japanese Youth serves also as anunintended inventory of what categoriesoverseas sociologists apply a priori whenthinking of 'Japanese youth'. What is symbolic,in this respect, is the photograph on the coverof the book. It shows a camera crew engaged inthe construction of media reporting on youngpeople, something that Japanese researchersdid not, until now, consider to be within thescope of studies on Japanese youth. How, then,do sociologists inside and outside Japanproblematize Japanese young people? This isone of the novel research questions invited byA Sociology of Japanese Youth.
By way of conclusion, I want to raise onesomewhat more critical point. One of thethemes that recur throughout this book is acriticism of Nihonjin-ron (theories ofJapaneseness) and theories of Japaneseuniqueness in general. As explained in
particular detail in Chapter 8, 'Japaneseculture' has frequently been employed bycommentators to 'explain' phenomena such asenjo kōsai or ijime. Yet, as Roger Goodmanstresses, youth problems arise at specific timesand then fade away. Youth problems undergofads [būmu], so that at one time it’s enjo kōsaiand at another, furītā. If youth problems reallywere functions of 'being Japanese' or a productof 'Japanese culture', the editors argue, thenthat should not be the case.
This book does not, therefore, describe thekinds of youth problems covered in its chaptersas being something unique or peculiar to Japan.I entirely agree with this basic point. Butthough I agree in principle, for all the emphasisplaced on Japan’s similarity with overseas, itseemed to me that substantive comparison wassomewhat thin. In Chapter 7 there is a partialcomparison between the category of NEET inJapan and the United Kingdom, which I foundinteresting. In the United Kingdom, NEET waspredominantly defined as a problem of thosesocial classes with the lowest rates of entry tohigh school and tertiary education, and hencethe social integration of such classes was heldup as a central policy goal. In Japan, bycontrast, the NEET problem has beenpredominantly talked about as a concomitant ofthe crisis of the middle classes, and an image ofNEET as lazy and lacking in self-esteem hasbecome widespread. As someone from Japanwith limited knowledge of foreign societies, Ifound this kind of a comparison fascinating andwould have liked to read more of it.
Even if we rule out Japanese exceptionalism, Iwould venture to say that paying greaterattention to the differences between Japan andvarious overseas societies would have madethis book attractive to a wider readership. Ofcourse this is asking for something that is farfrom straightforward. Yet I would like to putthis request − essentially for more and bettercomparative youth research − not only to theauthors of A Sociology of Japanese Youth but to
all scholars who choose 'Japanese youngpeople' as the object of their scholarlyresearch. This includes researchers basedoverseas, researchers in Japan, myself and itmight also include you, the reader of theselines.
3. The Happy Youth of a Desperate Countryand Japan's Shifting Wakamono-ron
A review of: Furuichi, Noritoshi (2011) Zetsubōno Kuni no Kōfuku na Wakamono-tachi (TheHappy Youth of a Desperate Country), Tokyo:Kodansha (304 pages, ¥1,890)
Tuukka TOIVONEN
In my view, two dominant perspectives markedthe debate on youth in the 1990s and 2000swithin Japan. The first held that youth are lazymoral degenerates with no work ethic (‘imadoki no wakamono wa keshikaran’). Thesecond, spearheaded by Genda Yūji of TheUniversity of Tokyo and others (see Genda2001/2005), was that youth are in fact theunderdogs who shouldered disproportionatecosts during Japan’s two so-called Lost Decades(they lost the most jobs and/or becamenonstandard or marginal workers). The firstwas the default perspective in the domesticmedia, while the second line of argument was,and sti l l is , endorsed by sympatheticbureaucrats, commentators and policy experts(see Toivonen, forthcoming). The foreign mediahas usually sided with the latter camp whiletaking its cue largely from misleading popularcategories such as parasite singles, hikikomoriand NEETs.
But what if both sides are off the mark? What ifyoung people are not the losers they are madeout to be, hanging desperately on the marginsof a society that denies them access to jobs andall forms of success? What if the whole debateso far has mainly been, well, rubbish?
This is precisely the not-so-subtle stance thatFuruichi Noritoshi, a well-known writer and
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doctoral candidate at the University of Tokyo,advances in his best-selling 2011 book Zetsubōno Kuni no Shiawase na Wakamonotachi (TheHappy Youth of a Desperate Country). His coreargument – shocking to those who havesubscribed to the two dominant perspectivesset out above – is simple: According to publiclyavailable statistics, over 70 percent of Japaneseyouth in their 20s reported being ‘satisfied’with their lives (seikatsu ni manzoku shiteiru)as of 2010. This contrasts with an averagehappiness rate of 60 percent in the high-growth1960s and with a low point of 50 percent in the1970s. Mysteriously, young adults’ happinesslevels shot up to their current heights in thelate 1990s, just when Japan was supposed to beentering its most stagnant, depressing low-growth era. How to explain this?
Furuichi provides a barrage of insights into thismystery in what is probably the mostexhilarating, humorous and daring expositionon the state of Japanese youth ever publishedin print. The thing to note at the outset aboutZetsubō is that it virtually represents a newgenre of writing. While mixing academicanalysis with blogging-style writing andmeshing astute observations of both offline andonline interactions, it wields a scalpel that isessentially sociological. Providing an advancedexample of wakamono-ron-ron, Furuichiqueries – with necessary detachment,skepticism and an unusually high degree ofreflexivity – how youth have been constructedand debated in mainstream Japan. The prosealternates, in a uniquely entertaining fashion,between concise references to scholarlysources, witty commentary and humorouscynicism (without leaving the reader confused).
Zetsubō confronts various absurdities andmyths regarding Japanese youth head on. First,it exposes two key patterns that have recurredin the Japanese youth debate ever since theearly 20 th century. In pattern one, adultcommentators engage in ‘othering’ youngpeople, branding them as different and inferior
compared to their own generation. Thisothering has clearly served as a handy pretextfor punitive interventions such as 'managededucation' (kanri kyoiku) and corporalpunishment (taibatsu), as made clear elsewherein this journal (Miller & Toivonen 2010) . Inpattern two, commentators treat youth asconvenient pawns, commending them as thebeacons of ‘hope’ and ‘a better future’ only tosend them off to die in wars, to sacrificethemselves in the hell of brutally long workinghours, and to become obedient consumers orentrepreneurs at their own risk. In bothpatterns, adult discourses offer l ittleconstructive support or new opportunities toyoung people. Furuichi does not hide hisfrustration at the persistence of these patterns:‘In sum, the quality of the youth debates wagedby ‘adults’ has not progressed one iota in thespan of an entire century’ (p. 66). With evenhigh-profile commentators positing that'present-day youth are becoming just likemonkeys’ or developing ‘game brains’, thisfrustration is easy to share.
Sociologists as well as historians are likely tobenefit even more from Zetsubō’s explanationof the very emergence of the concept of ‘youth’(wakamono) in the Japanese context. While thetwo patterns just discussed were evident fromthe early 20th century onwards (and while theword wakamono itself appears already inclassic Japanese literature), it seems that thekind of youth discourse Japan is currentlyknown for took shape as recently as the early1970s. Why?
A key factor, according to Furuichi, was theestablishment of the famous 100 million middleclass myth (ichi-oku sō-chūryū). It was thisbelief in a universal middle-class thatsimultaneously promoted a homogeneousimage of ‘young people’, defined not in terms ofclass, ethnicity, place of origin or even gender,but exclusively in terms of age. Such strongassumptions of homogeneity continue to shapeyouth discourses and indeed policy discussions
up to the present, as I was shocked to findwhen studying Japan’s emerging youthactivation policy in the mid-2000s. (In the caseof NEETs, the policy debate focused solely onJapanese middle-class youth to the exclusion ofethnic minorities and working class youngadults).
The other main underpinnings of Japan'spostwar wakamono-ron that Furuichi identifiesare (1) larger, more affluent young cohortsfrom the late 1960s onwards, which turned‘youth’ into a major consumer group; (2) adistance of several decades from 1945, makingit possible to contrast present youth withsupposedly ‘superior’ young people in thepreceding decades (tagging the former as ‘thegeneration that never directly experienced X’[war, poverty, high growth, the 1990s...]); (3)the rise of a distinct youth culture, includingmanga, anime and communication technologies(which, beginning with the radio, haveconsistent ly been l inked to forms ofwithdrawal); and (4) the near-universal reach ofnational media, including TV. This elucidationis a welcome contribution that nicelycomplements our accounts in A Sociology ofJapanese Youth, which focus on particularyouth debates and labels but do not necessarilytrace the history of Japan's wakamono-ron inthis more general sense.
Zetsubō contains far too many further insightsto be introduced here, so I will fast-forwardover several interest ing sect ions onnationalism, responses to 3.11 and the desirefor social contributionm to the book’sconclusions regarding ‘happy youth in adesperate country’ (the dialogue section belowwill touch on the issue of how youth haveresponded to 3.11).
Despite the continuing glorification ofpermanent employees (seishain) and claimsthat present 60-year-olds may, on average, endup about earning 100 million yen more thanpresent 20-year-olds (lifetime wages and social
security benefits), Furuichi holds that the latterwould still not want to transport themselves tothe 1960s or the 1970s after having lived in the2010s. This is not just because schoolchildrenwere far more often beaten up by theirteachers in those supposedly golden decades(when corporal punishment was not yetconsidered particularly problematic; see Miller2012), but because more young people nowpossess decent livelihoods, defined as theability to ‘play Wii with one’s lover and friends’(!) (p.243).
Put more formally, the majority of youth livingin today’s Japan enjoy the two central goods ofeconomic welfare and recognition from peers.With respect to economic welfare, it is thefamily, i.e. parents, who keep millions of youngadults from slipping into poverty, which is thusnot an immediate concern within theexperience of everyday life. Here, it isimportant to clarify that Furuichi indeedchooses to focus on mainstream, middle-classyoung people in Japan, which is somethingmost sociologists (who typically prioritizevarious ‘minorities’ in their studies) have notdone. The internet and social networking offeran unprecedented range of tools, in addition tocheap restaurants and fashion items, forconnecting with others. Many do report feelinginsecure (fuan), but this should not bemisinterpreted as implying that young peopleare longing for the dreary old salaryman life-style.
It is too bad that, as Furuichi explored at lengthin his previous book (Kibō Nanmin Go-Ikkōsama: Peace Boat to ‘Shōnin no Kyōdōtai’,2010) , a l l th is wel l -being and socialconnectivity may be cooling down youngpeople’s aspirations for ‘changing the world’.Even the demonstrations and fund-raisingactivities that unfolded in the wake of 3.11seem to have been more about connectingmore closely with friends than helping victimsand genuinely reforming society (another pointto which we return in our taidan).
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The implications of Furuichi’s book for howyouth are studied and discussed in Japan arevast. Controversially, but with good reason,Zetsubō suggests that not much wi l lnecessarily change in terms of young people'slives simply due to the triple disaster of March2011. It also questions accepted wisdomregarding social disparities (kakusa) bysuspecting that youth may, in fact, not becomeparticularly unhappy even if Japan grows moreunequal. Foreign reporters, meanwhile, willlearn that it is time to stop asking whyJapanese youth are ‘politically passive’, for it israther rational for them to have given up hopein a political system where they have littlepotential for influence (although politicalactivism may also be taking on new, moreimplicit forms; see below).
It should be mentioned that Zetsubō has beencriticized heavily in Japan. This reflects thebook’s popularity as well as its refutation ofnumerous cherished myths and popularassumptions. I t has, moreover, beenmisinterpreted as claiming that ‘all Japaneseyouth are happy’ and that nothing, inparticular, should thus be done to supportgroups of young people. This is beside thepoint, however, for Furuichi does not deny thatsome young people in Japan, especially thosewho do not enjoy the support of the nuclear orextended family, face tangible poverty andeducational exclusion, for example.
To my mind, Furuichi captures, successfully,and with great ethnographic nuance, the spiritof the contented majority within Japanese 20-somethings. Without exaggeration, he has set anew, more self-aware and critical agenda forthe study of Japanese youth in the 2010s. Byclarifying a range of juicy dilemmas that areopen to further empirical scrutiny, his book willcontinue to provide a trove of terrific researchideas for Japanese and international scholarsfor years to come. It needs to be translated intoEnglish as soon as possible.
Of course, all books have their shortcomings,and some may be disappointed to find thatFuruichi delivers few tangible policyprescriptions or sophisticated statisticalanalyses. Some will moreover doubt the validityof the standard happiness statistics Furuichiemp loys and may l ong fo r a deeperengagement with the vast international‘happiness studies’ literature which hasdeveloped various sophisticated approaches tomeasuring this dimension of human existence.It is possible to respond to such criticism bypointing out that Furuichi is clearly merelyexploiting ‘happiness’ − not his main concernper se − as a useful tool for de-stabilizingexisting youth discourses (that many now agreehave been excessively gloomy to the point ofgravely d istort ing var ious researchendeavours). Nevertheless, the author couldhave added at least one substantial section,perhaps towards the end of his volume, wherethe considerable methodological challenges ofmeasuring human well-being could have beendealt with in greater depth.
Also, quite little is said in the book regardingthe role of young creative leaders, includingsocial entrepreneurs such as Kogure Masa(Table for Two) or Komazaki Hiroki (Florence).Such 'quiet mavericks' (see Toivonen,Norasakkunkit & Uchida 2011) may be a key tothe constructive re-organization of society inthe near future and thus warrant moreattention from social scientists in Japan andbeyond. Incidentally, Furuichi's presentresearch activities seem to focus on both therole of young entrepreneurs as well as so-callednomad workers (nomado wākā), suggestingthat his future publications may place greateremphasis on young adults' agency and newwork styles.
Finally, the key prediction that Zetsubō makesregarding the future is that there may nolonger be such a thing as a meaningfulwakamono-ron (i.e. a distinct public debate on‘youth’) once the pillars of this enterprise −
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most saliently, the 100-million middle-classmyth − erode further. While other perspectivessuch as class are likely to re-emerge as focalpoints for scholarship and public debate, thecrucial thing is that the entire Japanesemainstream population is now adopting whatused to be viewed as a ‘youth’ culture, making20-year-olds far less distinctive a group in allrespects except age. Whether one agrees withthis view or not, Furuichi does have a pointwhen he reminds us that we live in an era inwhich even Tokyo University sociologist UenoChizuko tweets.
4. Dialogue: Towards Comparative YouthResearch
Edited by Tomu Ogawa
*This discussion was held in Jinbōchō, Tokyo onApril 6th, 2012.
Two important books on Japanese youth, bothdistinctive in terms of approach, werepublished in 2011. The Happy Youth of aDesperate Country [Zetsubō no Kuni no Kōfukuna Wakamono-tachi] by Noritoshi Furuichi, a'young' researcher aged 26 at the time ofpublishing, and A Sociology of Japanese Youth,co-edited by Roger Goodman, Yuki Imoto andTuukka Toivonen. Both books problematizeJapanese youth issues and discourses frompartly overlapping but original standpoints. Forthis conversation, we asked the two authors,Furuichi and Toivonen, to begin with a briefcommentary on each other’s books and to thenmove on to a spontaneous open discussion on'Japanese youth after 3.11' as well as on futureresearch possibilities.
The problematization of youth in Japan
Terachi: What thoughts crossed your mindswhile you were reviewing each others’ books?
Furuichi: When I read Tuukka's observationthat many books about young people in Japanare written with the aim of leading the reader
to agree with a specific policy goal, I thought:that is absolutely true. But I would like to addthat there are two main types of youth researchin Japan. First, there are contributions likecertain books on otaku that are completelyuninterested in questions of policy and ratherpursue a kind of 'closed' cultural critique. Thenthere are accounts such as books on nīto orfurītā that are written with a view to promotingspecific policies. In a sense, though the first are'value-neutral' (in the sense that they do notcall on youth to conform to certain lifestyleexpectations), they are policy-oriented and theyare not social science. The second streamemphasizes quantitative analysis, so in a senseits methods are socially scientific, but theconclusions skew towards specific policies. Ihave the feeling that until now, most Japanesebooks on youth have tended towards one ofthese two extremes. There have been few high-quality studies that have not fallen into thesetwo boxes. Tuukka’s book, on the other hand,applies social constructionism, which is a very'cool' and detached way of looking at society. Ireally enjoyed reading it. I had the sense thatthe contributors to A Sociology of JapaneseYouth were effortlessly accomplishingsomething that would be difficult for a Japaneseresearcher to do.
Toivonen: Reading Furuichi’s book, I thought itshould definitely be made generally available tooverseas readers. I think it would deal a shockto foreign [non-Japanese] media in particular.For example, The New York Times recentlyasked why Japanese young people do not holdmore demonstrations and why they do notprotest more against the presumably'deplorable' state of their society. Clearly,overseas media have their own biases andagendas. They have certain impl ic i texpectations for what kind of society they wantJapan to be. In fact, they expect Japan to fulfilideals that they wish could be fulfilled by theirown countries, such as the United States. Forinstance, they demand that Japan become amore equal society. Surprisingly, even the
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supposedly conservative British magazine TheEconomist follows this pattern. What I enjoyedin Furuichi’s book was that where before thediscussion was only about whether the youthare a 'problem' or whether they are 'losers' and'underdogs' that we should feel sorry for, hesends out a simple message that, hey, two-thirds of young people claim that they are quitehappy. I suspect this kind of an approach couldbe applied to youth discourses in othercountries as well. When writing about youth,analysts tend to problematize them and end uppreoccupied with those perceived as a'problem', or those who are believed to be most'at risk'. I think Furuichi’s contribution is animportant in broadening our attention so thatwe come to notice all kinds of layers of youngpeople and that reality is multi-dimensional.
Terachi: Furuichi, as Tuukka just pointed out,you argue that young people who are usuallydescribed as unfortunate are actually quitehappy. Is there not, however, a risk oftriggering a backlash whereby the publiccomes to think that if there is no need to feelsorry for young people, there is also no need toprovide them with any support?
Furuichi: It seems to me that since the late2000s, people have come to problematize'pitiful youth' [kawaisōna wakamono] in thisway, but ultimately this has led to only half-hearted results. Even though people often talkabout how hard things are for the 'lostgeneration' [rosujene] or for irregularemployees [hiseiki], it is doubtful whether thishas had any real policy impact. I think that isbecause few young people themselves havebeen able to participate in the debate. Inreality, not that many young people areunhappy including many in irregularemployment who perfectly fit the lostgeneration stereotype. When I began toseriously consider these issues, I realized thatthere were clear limitations to framing theproblem in terms of 'pitiful youth'.
In a nutshell, if you want to discuss youngpeople in a policy context, you need totranscend arguments that call for more support'because young people are suffering' or'because youth are in an unfortunate position'. Ithink that a more productive way of framingthe discussion is to say that young people areuseful to society, and that if we do notempower youth then society will cease to besustainable. Another danger is that if you buyinto the premise that 'youth are in a pitifulsituation', that can lead to a progressivelyuncharitable, or mean, attitude towards youngpeople. Basically, the risk is that we becomeless and less accommodating, to the point thatwe start criticizing youth by asking questionslike 'why don’t you stand up for yourself sinceyou are in such a terrible situation?' This feelswrong. Because there is no reason to believethese problems impinge on young peopleexclusively, given that they have wider societaland sustainability-related implications, it doesnot make sense to reduce them to 'youthproblems'. This is an assumption that underliesmy thinking.
Toivonen: In every country, the transition topost-industrial society is proceeding in a similarway and youth unemployment is rising, but inthe case of Japan, this transformation in thestate of society was immediately blamed onyoung people. If you look, on the other hand, atEuropean countries such as Finland or theUnited Kingdom, for example, where there arestill echoes of social democracy, problems areblamed not on individuals but on socialinstitutions and labor demand. When it comesto exp la in ing why th is labe l ing andproblematization of youth occurs in Japan, Ithink that an important underlying reason isthat young people are excluded from spheres ofdecision-making concerning policy, as you havejust pointed out. They are a so-called 'mutedgroup' [koe naki shūdan].
Furuichi: It seems to me that in Japan, untilrecently, there was such a close relationship
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between schools and the labor market that itwas not necessary to think about those who fellin the grey zone in between. Because peoplewere either in work or in education, it wasenough to have an education policy and a laborpolicy, and there was no need to think seriouslyabout policies for young people who were inbetween the two. I think one could also say thatbecause there were no policies in place foryoung people, discussions of young peoplewere prone to being reduced to 'cultural'discussions. Conversely, in Europe, since it haslong been common in many countries thatpeople in their 20s go back and forth betweeneducation and the labor market, perhaps it isthe case that turning ‘youth’ into a policy issueand considering how to support them via socialpolicy is something that simply could not beavoided.
Japanese youth after 3.11
Toivonen: From the po int o f v iew ofinternational readers, such as those who followJapan Focus and who are examining Japan fromthe 'outside', your book contains some rathersurprising arguments. For example, you writethat Japanese youth have not particularlychanged as a result of the triple disaster thathit their country on March 11, 2011; yousuggest that actions that did unfold wereessentially 'within the realm of prediction'[sōteinai].
Terachi: I think that in the past, too – includingwhen the Great Hanshin Earthquake struck theKansai area in 1995 – there was a strongexpectation that young people would somehowstand up. Even if you hold that major changesin youth behaviour did not take place in thewake of 3.11, do you see any differences at allbetween the period before and after this recentcalamity?
Furuichi: I do of course agree that there was asurge of activity immediately after the disaster.Especially in the Kantō area, amidst worriesthat electricity could go out and that
radioactive materials might be coming in, therewas a widespread trend of youth taking action(as s takeholders) , whether throughdemonstrating or participating in volunteeractivities in the disaster-stricken areas. Butwhen it comes to the question of whether theseactivities have been sustained in the long term,the answer is no. On the other hand, if youconsider a variety of groups and focus on thosecommitted to a specific geographic area, thenmany of these have continued longer than youmight have expected. In other words, althoughthe aftermath of 3.11 was a momentary'festival' [matsuri] for many youth, for aminority it served as a trigger for greater socialcontribution [shakai kōken]. Either way, it isnot sensible to exaggerate the extent orimportance of such activity.
For me, the crucial question is how toeffectively support young people's involvementthrough policy action. To begin with, thoughthe Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake initiallyled to enthusiastic talk about 1995 being the'year zero of volunteering' [borantia gannen],when you examine the stats you find that thenumber of people actually involved involunteering did not increase very much.Granted, it is true that the NPO Law was putinto place in the wake of the disaster, and thatthere have been continuous developments inthis sphere since. When it comes to 3.11, whileit is not unimportant to observe what youngpeople were doing right after the calamity, Iwould say it is far more constructive to ask howwe can lend solid support to those few youngpeople who did act. How can we back them upthrough policy? Of course, as I sit here talkingabout what I think should be done, many activeexchanges are already taking place between'young people' and 'grown-ups', includingdiscussions led by certain governmentdepartments and well-established NPOs.
Toivonen: Whenever we begin to wonder aloudwhy young people did not react as actively toan occurrence as we might have liked them to,
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why they were not more active than they were,it is all too easy to revert to typical wakamono-ron, or entrenched theories and assumptionsregarding the nature of Japanese youth. Westart giving reasons such as 'young people areintroverted' [wakamono wa uchimuki da], 'theylack courage', 'they are passive' – that is whythey did not act. The critical thing to ask,however, is: if we agree that young peoplereally did not act and respond to a sufficientextent, what can be done to activate them? Thisis but one example, but when I was researchinga student-led organization called Youth for 3.11that dispatches student volunteers to disaster-struck areas [see Toivonen 2011], I noticed howyoung people were confronted with all kinds ofsignificant obstacles and problems, and howthe leaders worked hard to overcome them toenable more youth to volunteer. To successfullysend more young people to the front lines,Youth for 3.11 created a viable 'business model'that helped them identify potential sponsorsand collaborating institutions, which eventuallymade it possible for student volunteers totravel to the disaster-affected areas for free [asopposed to typical travel costs of 30,000-40,000yen, depending on distance].
I found it extremely interesting to observe thisgroup and the battery of serious obstacles thathindered student volunteering, includingsystemic barriers and resistance from largeorganizations as well as parents. Wheneveryoung people in Japan fail to act in the face of apressing situation, I would argue that this is atleast half due to societal reasons – it is notnecessarily true that young people lackmotivation at the individual level. Following3.11, many young people wanted to work in thefront lines to provide relief, but their parentsdid not welcome this. Many lacked the moneyto pay for transport, and many had a hard timetaking days or weeks off from university. Thesekinds of obstacles, among other challenges,prevented many a young person from acting.Shockingly, most universities were extremelyreticent to support relief activities – in the case
of universities in the Kansai area for which Ifound figures, only about 0.6 percent of theirstudents were sent to the disaster-strickenareas through university-based schemes. Therewere very few universities that dispatchedmore than one percent of their students. Whenuniversities did send students to Tōhoku, it wasusually for short periods such as three days andtypically was not counted towards coursecredits. On the positive side, because there isan increasing number of social entrepreneurssuch as those who lead 'Youth for 3.11' andwho search for intelligent solutions toovercome precisely these kinds of barriers, nowis a great time to examine new mechanismsthat can empower young people. Rather thanthinking in terms of 'motivation' at the personallevel or young people's 'character', researchthat takes such a dynamic perspective is likelyto yield constructive results.
The future of Japanese society
Terachi: Even if, as Furuichi-san has said,today’s young people consider themselveshappy, some would argue that the situation islikely to change in one or two decades' time.What do you think will change for Japanesesociety and Japanese young people in the nearfuture?
Furuichi: I have in fact already had theopportunity to craft two possible scenarios.One scenario that I wrote for a magazinerecently, describes a hopeless situation in theyear 2042 ('2042: Shūen o matsu kimyō nakōfuku-kokka' ['2042: A strange happiness statethat awaits its end'], Shincho no. 45, May2012). The other scenario called 'Japan in 2050'was presented at a conference organized by theCabinet Office.8 You might not believe it butthere really was such a conference to considerthis country's situation in the year 2050! Infact, the particular committee I joined wascalled 'the happiness section of the frontiersubcommittee', which sounds more like thename of a religion [laughs].9
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For the moment, pessimistic future scenariosfeel most 'real' to me personally. To be moreexact, what I mean by a hopeless scenario isone in which stable employment graduallydisappears, younger age groups increasinglyleave Japan, and a society that is characterizedby widening disparities [kakusa shakai] comesto be taken for granted. Within such a scenario,the shift towards class polarization continues,meaning that the dream of social mobility allbut evaporates. People’s main reference groupswill therefore come to comprise those closest tothem within the same social class. Hence in thispossible future scenario, people’s sense ofinequality may increase very little despite an'objective' rise in inequality, and for this reasonriots or protests may not be triggered. Youcould, in this situation, imagine a last-resortsocial security system that relies heavily on thewide dissemination of antidepressant drugs anda restricted basic income scheme. It is a visiono f w h a t w i l l h a p p e n i f w e p u r s u e aparticularistic as opposed to universal policythat treats each social class and referencegroup. Other more favourable scenarios hinge,to some extent, on reaching an agreement as anation on the distribution of public burdens. Inshort, in this kind of an alternative scenario,whoever is able to work works, irrespective ofage or gender. Whoever can pay taxes paysthem. No separation is made, as is donecurrently, between the 'active generation'[gen’eki sedai] and the 'elderly'. In theconference I just mentioned, we called thissecond pattern the 'total participation society'[zen’in-sanka-gata shakai]. The possibility ofsomething like it emerging is not zero. Ofcourse, at this point we do not know which ofthese two futures will be realized.
Toivonen: Relating to this topic, I might addthat Generation X, the baby boomers andothers born immediately after WWII, naturallyjudge the world from their own points of viewand they often that warn society is moving inan undesirable direction. This is the case withinsociology, with people like Beck, Sennett, or
Putnam. In the sociology of work as well,including studies of the so-called 'neweconomy' especially, you quickly realize thatmany pundits demonstrate considerablenostalgia when they denounce the currentsituation of increasingly flexible and mobileindividual trajectories. Looking through thiskind of a nostalgic lens, you cannot help butfeel pessimistic about society. On the otherhand however, when you head out andinterview real young people living in today'ssociety, they are not necessarily concernedabout successes of the past. In other words, ifyou switch evaluative lenses, the future doesnot necessarily look so bleak. So there is aproblem: the way in which you forecast thefuture depends on whose lens you adopt.Authors of pessimist ic theories are,generalizing somewhat, British or American,aged 50s to 60s, and one reason they see alargely dark future is that they themselvesgrew up in an employment-based society. Nowthey are seeing it fall apart, and they think 'thissystem has no future': we will never be able tomatch the old level of pension payments; socialprotection is crumbling; and so forth. I thinkthe first thing to do is to become stronglyconscious that such biases are at work.
Furuichi: Emblematic of your book is the finalchapter by Roger Goodman. The message thereis that Japan is a rather good country, after all.A good country in the sense that average lifeexpectancy is high, that it is a safe place to live,and that people have social capital. I think it ispossible to maintain that even though it facesvarious different problems, Japan continues toseem attractive when viewed from abroad. Ifwe closely scrutinize different countries aroundthe world today, there really are not that manywe can consider 'successful'. In fact, the futureof the European countries is far from certainwhen you consider the impact of the economictroubles spreading via Greece and Spain. Ipersonally agree with those who find Japanesewriters too pessimistic.
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It may be that it is possible for me to hold theseviews since I work in both the academic andcorporate world, I belong to neither sphereexclusively. It is true that nowadays it is nolonger clear whether being a regular employeeof a large firm offers good long-term prospects.Because the seniority wage curve is still there,while you are young they make you work hardfor a low salary, except that now there is achance the company itself may go bankrupt inthe future. On the positive side though,provided you manage to stay outside thishopeless system, I think there has also neverbeen a freer time. In that respect, I havecertain expectations, a certain degree of hope.Setting aside the question of how to provideeffective policy support towards this morehopeful scenario, which requires a separatediscussion, the present era is more free interms of the possibilities open to individuals, soI am not convinced things are really so bad.
Toivonen: There are all kinds of resources herein Japan: there is incredible wealth and thereare dense linkages within the global economy.And there is ample social capital. If you decideto undertake a project, you benefit from pre-existing relations of trust and things moveforward quickly. Because of this, if people inJapan come to increasingly belong to amultiplicity of social contexts – which is onesuggestion you have put forward elsewhere –information is likely to circulate even faster andall kinds of combinations and new ideasbecome possible. So I think that Japan, throughnew rearrangements and intensive sharing ofresources, can multiply its current resources.There are countries, including some in EasternEurope, where there is practically no suchsocial capital, and there you really could saythat circumstances are 'hopeless'. But Japanhas these basic relationships of trust and thisorganizational potential.
Towards comparative youth research
Terachi: I would like to hear your current ideas
regarding the future development of researchon young people, whether with reference to thedomestic or global dimension.
Furuichi: I am really interested in youth-relatedphenomena overseas. I view each country, eachadministrative area as a site of continuouspolicy experimentation. The fact that socialinstitutions are so different in each countrydespite being the creation of the same humanspecies is remarkable – every country has itsparticular history, its particular institutions,whereby the present-day situation is the resultof a very long process. Since it is not possibleto set up more than one large experiment in agiven area at a given time, it is incrediblyinteresting to study diverse countries as'laboratories' where different experiments arebeing carried out.
Toivonen: In the place of the kinds ofexperiments conducted in the natural sciences,in the social sciences the comparative methodplays a comparable role. However, the cost ofcomparative studies tends to be high and theya r e n o t a l w a y s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r dmethodologically, either. In the field of youthstudies, because you inevitably operate withinthe 'fog' of emotionally charged theories andassumptions about youth [wakamono-ron] thatare deeply entrenched in any society, this ofteninfluences the aims and targets of researchwithout one’s even noticing it. For example,from any sensible scholarly standpoint, aproject that that sets out to compare NEETs inEurope and the US with those in Japan basedon the contention that there are an increasingnumber of NEETs in the latter country wouldbe a frightening case in point. In these kinds ofstudies, key actors (not necessarily with anybad intention, but certainly with particulargoals in mind) end up applying to othercountries categories that are strongly coloredby the Japanese context. I do not think it ispossible to obtain neutral data from suchresearch – this is a variety of research markedby strong biases and preconceptions from the
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start. That is why in order to conduct soundcomparative research on youth, one needs tobe firmly aware of dominant theories andassumptions about young people. This includesunderstanding who defined existing categoriesand why. One must then search for anindependent approach better suited tocomparison. In this sense, we wrote ASociology of Japanese Youth as a first steptowards the comparative study of youth, and Ithink Furuichi's book, too, is an extremelyvaluable guide to understanding howpresumably scientific research has beeninfluenced by the biases implicit in youthdiscourses.
Finally – and this applies equally to country-specific research as well as to internationalcomparisons – there is a higher chance one willproduce original results when going beyond asingle paradigm or analytical dimension toexamine several relevant dimensions. GostaEsping-Andersen, who might be called thefather of comparative social policy, crafted atheory of welfare state regimes that draws onseveral key dimensions [decommodification,stratification, defamilization; see Esping-Andersen, 1990]. One could say that the impactof Furuichi’s book derives from the fact that itputs forward an unconventional analytical axis– that of happiness – which is not reducible tomore established dimensions such as 'economicgrowth' or rates of 'regular’ vs. ‘irregularemployment'. The effectiveness of employingnew analytical axes springs from their power tounsettle unconscious preconceptions. So just byswitching the analytical lens, an alternativereality may become visible, and anotherpossible future may come into view as well. Thecomparative method is profound, and I wouldlike to propose it as a new fundamental methodfor the field of youth research.
Furuichi: I might add that Esping-Andersen’swork is of course well-known for its criticism ofconvergence theories that hold that anysociety, provided economic growth continues
long enough, will ultimately develop the samekind of welfare state. Though I am not surewhether it is appropriate to draw a simpleparallel between youth and welfare statestudies, in any case, we can think of countlessstudies in both areas that fai l to freethemselves from the author’s own normativeideas regarding the 'ideal society' or the 'goodsociety'. I believe most pundits are thereforetacitly building convergence theories or modelsin their minds. Within such a scholarly context,sound comparative studies can potentiallymake a very valuable contribution. Ultimately, Ido not think there is that much sociology cando. 'Comparing', 'dividing' and 'naming' isabout the limit. Of these, I expect that'comparing' will become even more valuablethan it is already.
Terachi: In order to compare, you need to payattention both to points of commonality andpoints of difference. In that sense, I think therewill be an increasing need for platforms thatmake it possible to also discern similaritiesbetween different societies and contexts. Whatwe are striving to achieve with this projectcould, I think, become such a platform forinternational comparison in the future. Thankyou both for this initial discussion.
5. References, further readings and authorprofiles
References
Berger, Peter and Luckman, Thomas. 1967. TheSocial Construction of Reality: A Treatise in theSociology of Knowledge. London: The PenguinPress.
Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. The ThreeWorlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge:Polity.
Furuichi, Noritoshi. 2010. Kibou-nanmin Go-Ikkou-Sama: Peace Boat to 'Shounin noKyoudoutai' Gensou (The Hope Refugees: ThePeace Boat and the Illusion of Communities of
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Recognition). Tokyo: Koubunsha.
Furuichi, Noritoshi. 2011. Zetsubou no Kuni noKoufuku na Wakamono-tachi (The Happy Youthof a Desperate Country). Tokyo: Koudansha.
Furuichi, Noritoshi. 2012. "2042, Shuuen womatsu kimyou na koufuku kokka (2042, Astrange happiness state awaiting its end)."Shincho45 (May 2012).
Genda, Yuji. 2001/2005. A Nagging Sense ofJob Insecurity: The New Reality FacingJapanese Youth (Originally published asShigoto no Naka no Aimai na Fuan). Tokyo:International House Press.
Goodman, Roger, Imoto, Yuki and TuukaToivonen, eds. (2012). A Sociology of JapaneseYouth: From Returnees to NEETs. Abingdon,Routledge.
Habuchi, Ichiyo, Ed. 2008. Doko ka "Mondaika" sareru Wakamonotachi (The problematizationof Japanese youth). Tokyo, Kōseisha-Kōseikaku.
Mil ler , Aaron. 2012. Taibatsu: Fromeducational solution to social problem tomarginalized non-issue. A Sociology ofJapanese Youth: From Returnees to NEETs. R.Goodman, Y. Imoto and T. Toivonen. Abingdon,Routledge: 81-97.
Miller, Aaron and Toivonen, Tuukka. 2010. "Tod isc ip l ine or accommodate? On therehabilitation of Japanese 'problem youth'."Asia-Pacific Journal (Japan Focus) (2012/08/13).
Toivonen, Tuukka. 2011. "Japanese youth afterthe triple disaster: How entrepreneurialstudents are overcoming barriers tovolunteering and changing Japan." HarvardAsia Quarterly, (8): 4
Toivonen, Tuukka. forthcoming. Japan'sEmerging Youth Policy: Getting Young AdultsBack to Work. Abingdon: Routledge.
Toivonen, Tuukka, Norasakkunkit, Vinai, et al.
2011. "Unable to conform, unwilling to rebel?Youth, globalization and motivation in Japan."Frontiers in Cultural Psychology 2 (article 207)(2012/08/13).
Further readings
Pilling, David. 2012. "Youth of the ice age."Financial Times, July 6th, 2012 (2012/08/13).
Terachi, Mikito. 2011. "Doryoku and YouthCultures in Japan." Forum21 - EuropeanJournal on Child and Youth Research, (7):114-121 (2012/08/13).
The Yomiuri Shimbun. 2011. Perspectives onthe reality and future of youth, November 12th,2012 (2012/08/13).
The Asahi Shimbum (Asia & Japan Watch):Shingo Takano (Staf f Writer) . 2012.INTERVIEW / Noritoshi Furuichi: Today's 20-somethings not so 'unfortunate,' January 1st,2012 (2012/08/13).
Toivonen, Tuukka. 2012. "Japanese Youth after3.11: From Underdogs to Change-makers? "Wochi Kochi Magazine (2012/08/13).
Toivonen, Tuukka. 2012. "Lost in Transition:Youth, Work, and Instability in PostindustrialJapan (review)." The Journal of JapaneseStudies, 38(2): 493-498 (2012/08/13).
Toivonen, Tuukka and Furuichi, Noritoshi.2012. "'Quiet mavericks' will be the ones tochange society: Similarities and differencesbetween 'youth problems' in Japan and theWest ('Shizuka na henkakusha' ga shakai wokaeru: Nihon to Oobei no 'wakamono mondai'no kyoutsuuten to sai)." Kotoba 8(2012Summer Issue): 16-21.
Author profiles
Noritoshi Furuichi is a Ph.D. student at theGraduate School of Arts and Sciences of theUniversity of Tokyo. He also serves as a visitingscholar at Keio University’s SFC research
centre as well as an executive at Zent, Ltd., aconsulting firm at which he engages inmarketing work and IT strategy planning. He iscurrent ly researching young soc ia lentrepreneurs from a historical sociologicalperspective while actively writing aboutcurrent issues. Among his recent publicationsare: The Hope Refugees: Peace Boat and theIllusion of Communities of Recognition (2010,Kobunsha: Tokyo) and The Era of Excursion-Type Consumption: Why Your Wife Wants toShop at Costco (with Akiko Nakazawa; 2011,Asahi Shimbun Shuppansha: Tokyo).
Tuukka Toivonen holds a Ph.D. in Social Policyfrom the University of Oxford. He serves as aJunior Research Fellow at Green TempletonCollege, University of Oxford, and as a visitingscholar at the Research Institute for Economicsand Business Administration (RIEB) of KobeUniversity. His current scholarly work iscentered around youth, policy and socialinnovation. He is now recruiting researchcollaborators for a new global project on socialinnovation communities, based on theobservation that such dense online/offlinecommun i t i e s bes t exp la in soc ia l l yentrepreneurial activities by young people. Aco-editor of A Sociology of Japanese Youth:From Returnees to NEETs, his monograph,Japan’s Emerging Youth Policy: Getting YoungAdults Back to Work (Abingdon: Routledge) willbe published later this year.
Web Site: http://www.tuukkatoivonen.org/
Mikito Terachi is a Research Fellow / AssistantProfessor (Jokyo) at the Center for GlobalCommunications (GLOCOM), InternationalUniversity of Japan. He specializes in thesociology of education, work and youth. Hecurrently analyzes social images of "Doryoku(effort, work hard)" in Japanese society.
W e b S i t e :http://glocom.academia.edu/MikitoTerachi/
Tomu Ogawa is a Ph.D. student at the
Interfaculty Information Initiative of theUniversity of Tokyo in the fields of sociologyand media studies. He is currently conductinghistorical-sociological research into the shiftingmeanings of ‘youth’ and ‘young people’ inJapan. He is particularly interested in thequestion of what it means, from the perspectiveof culture and society, to be ‘young’.
I would like to express, on behalf of our entireteam, my sincerest thanks for the enthusiasticcooperation afforded to us by Japan Focus andparticularly for the editorial stewardship ofMark Selden. Our principal translators MikaelBourqui and Takayuki Yamamoto at the NissanInstitute of Japanese Studies of the Universityof Oxford also deserve a heartfelt recognitionfor their concise work.Recommended Citation: Noritoshi FURUICHI(古市憲寿), Tuukka TOIVONEN(トイボネン・トゥーッカ), Mikito TERACHI(寺地幹人) andTomu OGAWA(小川豊武), "Japanese Youth: AnInteractive Dialogue: Towards ComparativeYouth Research," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol10, Issue 35, No. 3, August 27, 2012.
Notes
(1) A Sociology of Japanese Youth was firstmade available in November 2011 (though with2012 set as the official year of publication).
(2) Some reacted to Furuichi's book with fiercecriticism. This criticism may have partly beentriggered by Furuichi's complex writing style,which is simultaneously frank and detached.Hence, though possessing the sensibility of acontemporary young person himself, Furuichianalyses youth as if from the outside, but in away that is decidedly different from the wayadults usually debate (and one-sidedly criticize)'today's youth'. Ultimately, Furuichi commits to
a reflexive sociological stance. His accountshave, it may be added, attracted criticism fromthose who believe that a 'true researcher' issomeone with overwhelming knowledge whocan talk confidently and imposingly about theirspecialty. Others, meanwhile, have been criticaltowards Furuichi because they would like himto do more to defend young people by speakingup actively so as to help overcome a deplorablestatus quo. However, both of these streams ofcriticism are proof that 'youth' remains a topicconsidered worth discussing in Japan. Further,the responses prompted by Furuichi’s workmay offer an occasion for those with a certainfixed idea of 'what a true researcher should belike' – including those who have stood alooffrom this particular youth debate – to reflect ontheir own reactions and perhaps think of whatthey might be able do that Furuichi has notmanaged to accomplish.
(3) It is true that in the beginning of the lostgeneration debate that flared up in themid-2000s, young people's voices received afair bit of attention, but I would say that theseauthentic voices then quickly became asecondary concern (as certain generalassumptions regarding the losu-jene took holdand were spread by leading pundits).
(4) To be more exact, many people probablywelcomed the volume because it was one of thefew 'youth books' where the starting point wasthe author's own immediate surroundings. Twothings made this possible. First, by virtue ofbeing a young person himself, thinking aboutyouth issues and thinking about his ownimmediate surroundings were closely relatedtasks for Furuichi. Second, the societal imageof consumption-oriented yet socially concernedyoung people that Furuichi describes in hisbook was an image generally being applied bymany to the author himself. Thus, instead ofexpecting him to be a 'representative' of or'advocate' for youth, many looked to Furuichias someone who could shed light on the sharedconsciousness of, and challenges faced by,
today's Japanese youth.
(5) I think that these two points relate closelyto two images of youth discussed by Furuichi inhis book, ‘convenient collaborators’ (tsugo-no-ii-kyoryokusha) and ‘strange Others’ (ishitsu-na-tasha). See Section 3 for further context.
(6) For further discussion of these points, seethis recent dialogue between Furuichi and EijiOguma. Also see this blog article by NaotoMori.
(7) See individual profiles at the end of thisarticle regarding our evolving personalresearch interests. These interests will partlyinform the direction of this collaborativeproject.
(8) The conference material written byFuruichi.
(9) Website for the happiness section thatFuru i ch i men t i oned . The F ron t i e rSubcommittee report (overview) has tentativelybeen translated into English.
*翻訳者:ブルキ・ミカエル ( M i k a e lBOURQUI)、山本貴之(Takayuki YAMAMOTO)
*この記事に含まれる書評が対象としているのは、以下の2冊である。
Goodman, Roger, Imoto, Yuki, and Toivonen,Tuukka (2012) A Sociology of Japanese Youth:From Returnees to NEETs, Abingdon:Routledge1 (明石書店から『若者問題の社会学』(仮)として近刊予定)
しかし同時に、なぜ「日本の」若者なのか、それを論じる意義を誰とどのように共有できるかという点については、議論の余地があると思った。また、彼らが扱っている事例は、日本国内の最新の研究の関心と比較すれば、若干新鮮味を欠いているようにも感じたのだが、これが単に情報が届くまでに生じるタイムラグによるものなのか、日本研究のユニークさなのか、探ってみたいと思った。いずれにせよ、彼らが取り組んだ「若者の問題化」を国際比較の観点から行うことができれば、日本研究( J a p a n e s eStudies)と日本国内で行われている研究(Studiesin Japan)、双方にとって何らかの有益な示唆をもたらすのではないかと考えた。
『A Sociology of Japanese Youth』の二つ目の特徴は、日本の若者研究では中々題材にされないテーマが多く扱われていることだ。章構成を見てもらえばわかるように、「いじめ」「帰国子女」「援助交際」「体罰」「児童虐待」「ひきこもり」「ニート」が主なトピックスだ。「援助交際」「ひきこもり」「ニート」以外は、中々「若者」の社会学としては取り上げられることの少ないテーマである。「体罰」は教育社会学、「児童虐待」は家族社会学などで扱われるのだろうが、少なくとも日本の多くの社会学者はそれが「若者問題」だとは認識していない。その意味で図らずも本書は、海外の研究者たちがどのようなカテゴリーをアプリオリのものとして「日本の若者」を考えているかを提供する材料になっている。象徴的なのは表紙の写真だ。それは、翻って、日本の研究者たちが何を「日本の若者」と考えてこなかったかを明らかにもしている。一体、内外の社会学者は「日本の若者」をどう「社会学的問題化」してきたのか。本書の存在は、そのような新しい社会学的問いを誘発する。
もちろん、世の中のあらゆる本には必ず欠点がある。古市氏の本には詳細な政策提言や洗練された統計分析がないことに、がっかりする人もいるかもしれない。また『絶望』では、若くてクリエイティブなリーダーの役割にはほとんど触れられていない――たとえば、小暮真久氏(NPO法人TABLE FOR TWO International 代表理事)や駒崎弘樹氏(NPO法人 フローレンス 代表理事)などの社会起業家たちが代表的だ。こ
2011年、日本を舞台にこれまでにないスタイルの2冊の若者研究が発刊された。著者自身が当時26歳の若者だった古市憲寿の『絶望の国の幸福な若者たち』。海外研究者の視点から日本の「若者問題」を問題化したトイボネン・トゥーッカ他編『A Sociology of Japanese Youth』。今回の対談(2012年4月6日、東京の神保町で実施)では二人の相互書評を出発点にして、日本の若者や若者論、そして今後の若者研究の在り方などについて、縦横無尽に語ってもらった。
【トイボネン】われわれは、なぜ若者が動かなかったのかを考えている時に、すごく「若者論」的になってしまいやすいんですよね。若者は内向きだし、臆病だし、パッシブだし、だから動かなかった、と。しかし、若者が動けないのだとしたら、彼らをいかにアクティベートするのかが重要になってくるのです。あくまで一つの例ですが…、「Youth for 3.11」という組織を研究しているなかで、若者は小さい色々な障害や問題に直面していて、非常に苦労していて、ひとりひとり考え、乗り越えようとしていることを知りました。その組織はどうやったら若者が障害を乗り越えて現場に行けるのかを考えて、無料で被災地へ行けるようにスポンサーや協力団体をつけるといったビジネス・モデルを作ったのです。
そういう団体を見ていると、具体的な障害、例えば制度的な妨げとか、上の大きな団体からの抵抗などが分かってきて、興味深いと思いました。若者が動かないのは半分は社会的な理由というか、自らモチベーションがないわけではない。現場に行きたい人も多かったとは思うのですが、親が理解してくれないとか、お金がないとか、学校が休ませてくれないとか、何か障害があって動けなかったのです。大学も非常に消極的で、調べてみたら被災地に若者を送るのは0.6%くらいで、そういう大学は関西で多かったです。1%以上派遣している大学はほとんどないと思います。派遣したとしてもほんの3日ぐらいとか、単位をあげなかったりする。そうした妨げがものすごくあったのです。このような制度による妨げによって若者がレスポンスできないという側面もあると思います。と同時に、「Youth for 3.11」の他にもこのような妨げに賢く対処しようとしている社会起業が増えているので、若者をエンパワーする新しい仕組みを研究するのに、今はとてもいいタイミングですね。
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Miller, Aaron and Toivonen, Tuukka. 2010. "Tod isc ip l ine or accommodate? On therehabilitation of Japanese 'problem youth'."Asia-Pacific Journal (Japan Focus) (2012/08/13).
Toivonen, Tuukka. 2011. "Japanese youth afterthe triple disaster: How entrepreneurialstudents are overcoming barriers tovolunteering and changing Japan." HarvardAsia Quarterly, (8): 4
Toivonen, Tuukka. forthcoming. Japan'Emerging Youth Policy: Getting Young AdultsBack to Work. Abingdon: Routledge.
Toivonen, Tuukka, Norasakkunkit, Vinai, et al.2011. "Unable to conform, unwilling to rebel?Youth, globalization and motivation in Japan."Frontiers in Cultural Psychology 2 (article 207)(2012/08/13).
参考資料
Pilling, David. 2012. "Youth of the ice age."Financial Times, July 6th, 2012 (2012/08/13).
Terachi, Mikito. 2011. "Doryoku and YouthCultures in Japan." Forum21 - EuropeanJournal on Child and Youth Research, (7):114-121 (2012/08/13).
The Yomiuri Shimbun. 2011. Perspectives onthe reality and future of youth, November 12th,2012 (2012/08/13).
The Asahi Shimbum (Asia & Japan Watch):Shingo Takano(Staf f Wri ter) . 2012.INTERVIEW / Noritoshi Furuichi: Today's 20-somethings not so 'unfortunate,' January 1st,2012 (2012/08/13).
Toivonen, Tuukka. 2012. "Lost in Transition:Youth, Work, and Instability in PostindustrialJapan (review) ." The Journal of JapaneseStudies, 38(2): 493-498 (2012/08/13).
トイボネン・トゥーッカ:社会政策学のPh.D.をオックスフォード大学で取得し、現在同大学のグリーン・テンプルトン・カレージの研究員および神戸大学経済経営研究所の客員研究員。主な研究テーマは「若者」「政策」「社会的イノベーション」。現在、若者による社会起業を説明する上で大切な要因となる「社会的イノベーション・コミュニティ」について新しい研究企画を立ち上げている最中であり、共同研究希望者を募集している。2012年秋に、単著『Japan'sEmerging Youth Policy: Getting Young AdultsBack to Work』(Routledge:Abingdon)を出版予定。