Japanese Prisoners of War in America WWII

7/30/2019 Japanese Prisoners of War in America WWII

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Japanese Prisoners of War in AmericaAuthor(s): Arnold KrammerReviewed work(s):Source: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Feb., 1983), pp. 67-91Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3639455 .

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Japanese Prisoners o f W a r i nA m e r i c a

Arnold KrammerThe author is professor of history in Texas A r M University.

F EWAMERICANS today recall that the nation maintained 425,000enemyduring he SecondWorldWar n prisoner-of-waramps romNew York o California.The majorityof thesecaptiveswere Ger-mans, followedby Italians and Japanese.The incarcerationf the5,424Japanesesoldiersand sailors n the UnitedStates,'mostcap-tured involuntarilyduringthe bloodybattlesof the SouthPacific,tested he formidablengenuity f theWarDepartment. hevery irstprisonerof war capturedby Americanorceswas Japanese.EnsignKazuoSakamaki,he commanderf a Japanesemidgetsubmarinewhichhadparticipatedn the attackon PearlHarbor,abandoned isdamaged raftand swamfor shore.Ashe crawledupontoWaimanalo

'For further information about the German prisonersof war in the United States duringWorld War II, see Arnold Krammer,Nazi Prisoners of War in America (New York, 1979);Arnold Krammer,"German Prisonersof War in the United States,"Military Affairs,XXXX(April, 1976), 68-73; Arnold Krammer, comp., Public Administration of Prisoner of WarCamps in America since the Revolutionary War (U.S. Public Administration Series, VanceBibliography P-626, Dec. 1980); and Erich Maschke, ed., Zur Geschichte der deutschenKriegsgefangenen des Zweiten Weltkrieges, vol. X: Herman Jung, Die deutschenKriegsgefangenen in amerikanischerHand-USA (Bielefield, 1972).There are virtually no scholarly accounts available on either the 53,000 Italian POWs orthe relatively small number of Japanese prisonersheld in the United States during the sameperiod. In fact, the very numberof the Japanese prisoners is in question accordingto officialsources. The figures range from 569 (George G. Lewis and John Mewha, "History of Pris-oner of War Utilization by the United States Army, 1776-1945," U.S. Dept. of the ArmyPamphlet No. 20-213 [Washington,D.C., June 1955], 148), to 3,260 ("Investigations of theNational War Effort,"H. Rep. 728, 79 Cong., 1 sess., [June 12, 1945], 6). A detailed exam-ination of the Records of the Provost Marshal General's Office (RecordGroup 389), at theModern Military Branch of the National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited asMMB-NA), resulted in the figure used in this study: 5,424.67

Pacific Historical Review ? 1983, by the PacificCoastBranch,AmericanHistoricalAssociation


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68 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWBeach on Oahu, he was captured by one of the nervousmilitary pa-trols positionedto repel a feared full-scale invasion. When it finallybecame evident that the disheveledPOW knew less aboutTokyo'swarplans than did his captors, he was moved under heavy guard to ahastily constructeddetentioncamp at Sand Island, Hawaii, where heremaineduntil his transferto the mainlandon February29, 1942. Forthe next six months,as German and Italian POWs pouredinto Eng-land and the United States from the battlefields of North Africa,Ensign Sakamaki remained the only Japanese military captive inAmericanhands. In July 1942, he was finallyjoined by nine others.2To house the incoming prisonersfrom Europe-who would even-tually arriveat the rate of twenty thousandper monthby mid-1944-the War Department's Provost Marshal General's Office rushed tocreate a network of permanentPOW camps as well as hundreds ofsmall branchcamps designedas satellites around the larger camps tobring the prisonersclose to potential work sites. Wheneverpossible,the permanent camps were located at or near existing militarybases.Each camp averaged 2,500 prisoners, and adhered generally to therequirementsof the GenevaConventionthat the layoutand food,san-itary, and health services be identicalwith that providedto Americanarmed forces.3The campswere finished even as the first thousandsofGermans and Italiansbegan arrivingat the Norfolk,Virginia, portofembarkation. From the Pacifictheater, the Japanese prisonersnum-beredonly fifty-two.There were several reasonsfor the substantialdisparity n the num-ber of prisonersfrom Europe, and those few from the Pacific. Fore-most was the fact that unlike the German and Italian prisonersofwar, who had been schooled in the provisionsof the Geneva Conven-tion,4the averageJapanese soldier was molded to preferdeath to sur-

2U.S. Office of the Chief of Military History, "United States Army Forces: Middle Pacificand Predecessor Commands during World War II, 7 December 1941-2 September 1945,"mimeographed manuscript, No. 17007, Center of Military History, Historical RecordsBranch, Dept. of the Army, Washington,D.C., Vol. XXIV, part 2, chap. 9, pp. 182-183; andKazuo Sakamaki,I AttackedPearlHarbor,trans. by Toru Matsumoto (New York,1949), 49-50.3Martin Tollefson, "Enemy Prisoners of War," Iowa Law Review, XXXII (1946), 51-77.4The Japanese had not ratified the Prisoner of War Conventionof the Geneva Accords of1929. As a result, neither American POWs in Japan nor the Japanese in the U.S. were pro-tected by internationallaw, though the War Department neverwaveredin the belief that U.S.adherence to the Geneva Convention would somehow benefit the 16,100 American captives inenemy hands. Ibid., 53. Despite the early realization that the Japanese governmentdid not


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JapanesePrisonersof War n America 69render. Moreover, the official Japanese Military Field Codecommandedeach Japanese soldier to remember hat "ratherthan liveand bear the shameof imprisonmentby the enemy, he should die andavoid leaving a dishonorablename!"5Capture by the enemy, even ifwounded or unconscious and unable to move, was equatedwith irre-vocableshame.Japanese soldierswere directed to save the last roundof ammunition for themselvesor to charge the enemy in a suicidalassault. Even on very rare occasionswhen a Japanese soldier mighthave been unable or unwilling to take his own life, the Pentagon'sofficial histories of the war candidly admit that he might not havesurvivedthe heat of combat:"Americantroops, who were fearful ofthe widely publicizedtreacherousnessof the enemy, were reluctanttotake prisoners."6

Major battles in the Pacific theater often accounted for no morethan a dozenJapanese captives,as againstthousands of enemykilled.During the Burma campaign, for example, Commonwealth andAmerican forces capturedonly 142 enemy prisoners (most of whomwere badly wounded or unconscious) while killing 17,166!7 OnGuadalcanal,betweenJanuary 1 and February15, 1943, the Ameri-can XIV Corps took only eighty-fourJapanese prisoners,thirty-threeof whom were too sickor wounded to walk.8In fact, fromthe opening

intend to comply with even the most basic humanitarian provisionsof the rules of war (see"Investigationsof the National War Effort," H. Rep. 1992, 78 Cong., 2 sess. [Nov. 30, 1944],33-37), the War Department distributedto each Japanese captive a translation of the "Gen-eva Convention Relative to Treatmentof Prisonersof War, July 21, 1929," which had beenprepared by the Spanish embassy in Washington,D.C. (The full text is in Provost MarshalGeneral's Office, "Prisonerof War Operations Division," Officeof the Chief of Military His-tory, file 4-4.3, AA, TAB 1. This excellent collection of records is available on microfilm asLibrary of Congress no. 51437 and is hereafter cited as PMGO, "Prisoner of War Opera-tions.")5Tokyo Gazette Publishing House, Field Service Code (Tokyo, 1941). This code wasadopted by the War Ministry on Jan. 8, 1941.6John Miller, Jr., Guadalcanal: The First Offensive (Washington, D.C., U.S. Dept. of theArmy, Historical Division, 1949), 310. In a frank, confidential intelligence memo on the prob-lems of interrogating Japanese prisonersof war, the army conceded that "it took the promiseof three days leave and some ice cream [to tempt U.S. soldiers] to bring in the first live pris-oner." U.S. Fourth Army, Headquarters, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, "Inter-rogation of Japanese Prisoners in the Southwest Pacific,"Intelligence Memo no. 4, July 22,1943, Information Derived from Japanese POWs, Record Group 165, Records of the WarDepartment, General and Special Staffs. MMB-NA.7Miller, Guadalcanal, 310-311.8U.S. Office of the Chief of Military History, "The ProvostMarshal's Office:Campaign ofthe Pacific, 1941-1947," chap. 6, mimeographedmanuscript,OCMH, file 1 (C), 8-6.


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70 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWsalvo of the Pacific campaign, through the Battles of the Java Sea,Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, Savo Island, BismarckSea, NewGuinea, Kula Gulf, Bougainville,Tarawa, and Makin, a grandtotalof only 604 Japanese were taken prisonerby the Allied forces. Notuntil the beginningof the Philippine campaignsin October 1944 didthe number of Japanese prisonersof war approachthe five thousandmark, including a twenty-nine-year-old sniper captured onEniwetok-the only Japanese woman soldier taken prisoner in theentire war.9The war was nearly over beforesignificantlylarge num-bers of Japanese soldiers, usually malnourished and disillusioned,surrendered o Commonwealthand Americanforces.The second reasonfor the low numberof Japanese prisoners n theUnited Stateswas the War Department'sdecisionto turn the majorityof its captivesfromthe Pacifictheater overto its allies. Since Americanforces lackedboth the personneland the rear-areafacilities to detainlarge numbersof prisoners,an agreementwas reachedwith Australiain September1942 by which all capturedJapanese-except for thosewhose potentialmilitaryintelligencevalue necessitated heir shipmentto the United States proper-were turned overto the Commonwealthof Australia. In return, the United States assumed a proportionateshare of the cost of their maintenance(through lend-lease aid), andwas responsible for their final disposition at the end of the war.10Thus, the Japanese prisoners who arrived in the U. S. were eitherbroughtin for special interrogationor becausethey were closer to theUnited Stateswhen capturedthan to the holding pens in Australia orNew Zealand.The Japanese prisonersarrivedin America at Angel Island, Cal-ifornia, a small mountainousisland in San FranciscoBay. A quaran-tine station of the ImmigrationService before the war, Camp AngelIsland was convertedby the army into a temporarytransit centerforthe incominggroups of Japanese captivesbeforethey were routedtothe main interrogationcenter at Tracy, California. While at AngelIsland the prisonerswere deloused and their belongingsdisinfected;

91bid.;Roy E. Appleman, et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, D.C., U.S. Dept.of the Army, Historical Division, 1948), 383-384, 465-467, 473-474; and the New YorkTimes, May 30, 1945, p. 3.'OOffice f the Chief of Military History, "AdministrativeHistory, Chief ProvostMarshal,United States Army Forces in the Pacific,6 April 1945 to 31 December 1946" (mimeographedmanuscript,OCMH), p. 14, 8-5. 1.


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Japanese Prisoners of War in Americaforms were processedand serial numbersassigned,and the prisonersgiven a much-needed medical examination. The majorityof cases ofmalaria, syphilis, skin disease, intestinal worms, and minor combatwounds were treated in camp, and those few who requiredmore se-rious treatmentwere cared for at LettermanGeneral Hospital in SanFrancisco. When it came time to fill out the mandatorypostal card toinform their families of their safety, and to file their names with theInternational Red Cross Prisoner InformationBureau, nearly all theJapanese captivesresolutely requestedthat their families in Japan notbe advised of their imprisonment."lBetter they be considered deadthan dishonoredby captivity.Then, finally, came their first meals in America,and the prisonerswere astonished at the quality and quantityof their food. Indeed,theyfound themselves better fed in captivity than in their own army. Atypical menu was that offered at Camp Angel Island on September16, 1944:Breakfast: Sausages, rice, browned crusts, apples, coffee, milk,

sugar.Lunch: Sukiyaki, cabbagesalad,rice, caramelpudding,water.Dinner: Spaghetti and hash, baked tomatoes, lettuce andtomatosalad, rice, cakes,cocoa.12While it would not be long before both the Japanese and Germanprisonersdemandedmenus more to their national tastes-which theWar Department, anxious to protectthe interestsof American pris-oners in enemy hands, quickly produced13-the newly arrivedJap-anese captiveshad every reason to be calmedby their treatmentthus

"Their government,moreover,aided the Japanese captives in maintaining their anonymity,much to the frustration of the International Red Cross whose task was to facilitate commu-nication. In its summary report the Red Cross lamented that: "In the official bureaux atTokyo, nominal rolls of Japanese prisoners and prisoner mail were left untouched ... theinformation bureaux would have actedmore cruelly had they sent next of kin news that wouldhave brought them far more sorrow than relief." International Committee of the Red Cross,Inter Arma Caritas (Geneva, 1947), 104.'2Reportof Inspection, Japanese Prisoner of War Camp Angel Island, by the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross, and the Special War Problems Division, Department of State,September16, 1944, R.G. 389, MMB-NA.13Another eason for providingthe prisonerswith menus moresuited to their national tasteswas the belief that they would eat more and throw away less. Camp authorities were notifiedby Washington on July 1, 1944, that the Japanese were to receive substantially more freshvegetables and rice; the German POWs more pork, wurst, and fish soups; and the Italians,spaghetti and a diet heavily seasoned with paprika,onions, and olive oil.

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72 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWfar. For the few days until their shipmentto the Tracy interrogationcenter, the Japanese spent their time listening to the camp gram-ophone, playing cards and Mah-Jong, and whispering among them-selves as they strove to understand the ulterior motives of theircaptors.The Americanauthoritiesdid, indeed,have ulteriormotives.Asidefrom Washington's general adherence to the Geneva Convention,which, admittedly,was losing its appeal as atrocitystories began topour in fromenemy camps,the War Departmentwas followinga spe-cific and calculatedplan of treatment.Since the main reason for theprisoners' shipment to the United States was for interrogationpur-poses, the confidenceof the incomingPOWs had to be won over.Thetask appearedformidable: he prisonersfeared and despisedtheircap-tors, both militarily and culturally-no less, in fact, than they werethemselveshated in return.Moreover,the captivesloathedthemselvesfor their failure to die in combat. Yet army intelligence quickly de-tected an encouragingpattern among these seemingly overwhelmingobstacles.The POWs' psychological makeup evolved into three distinctphases. Immediately upon capture,and up to forty-eighthours after-wards, the Japanese prisoners were of little value to the Americaninterrogators. They were certain that they would be tortured andkilled, and were either unresponsiveor the informationthey offeredwas confusedand unreliable. Afterseveraldays,the armyfoundthat asecondphase set in, as the prisonersrealizedthat they were not to betorturedor in any way mistreated.This was the moment that the in-telligence officersawaited;the prisoners'fear was changingto grati-tude and they were anxious to reciprocateby talking freely. For thenext ten days to two weeks, the prisoners were most receptiveandinformative.Then came the third and final phase, when the Japanesecaptives grew accustomedto the plentiful food and kind treatment,and became annoyed at being questioned. Continued interrogationonly drove them into a shell of indifference and they were no longerreliable sources of military information.14The interrogationof the Japanese prisoners taught army intel-

'4Details of individual interrogations may be found in CINCPAC-CINCPOAIntelligenceBulletins, Japanese Source File, Operations,Archives,U.S. Naval'Historical Center, Wash-ington, D.C.


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Japanese Prisoners of War in Americaligence officers several additional curious lessons. For example, nothreatof physicalviolenceor solitaryconfinement ucceeded n extrac-ting information from a prisoneras effectivelyas the simple threat offorwardinghis name to his relatives in Japan. Another lesson was thecaptives'realizationthat they knew no rules of life which applied inthis situation. They were dishonoredand their life as Japanese hadended. When their earnest requests to be allowed to kill themselveswere denied, many discarded their traditional views and becamemodel prisoners. An American official later recalled that "Old[Japanese]Army hands and long-timeextremenationalslocatedam-munition dumps, carefully explained the disposition of Japaneseforces, wrote our propagandaand flew with our bombing pilots toguide them to military targets.It was as if they had turned overa newpage; as if, having put everythingthey had into one line of conductand failed at it, they naturallytook up a differentline."15One groupof Japanese prisonersof war changedits outlookso dramatically hatthe men announcedthat "theyhad been badly misledby the Emperorand the Japanese military clique ... and wished to fight back toJapan side by side with Allied soldiers!"16Still anotherimportantlesson discovered n the interrogationof theJapanese prisonerswas that, unlike German or Italian captiveswhohad to be questionedin isolationbefore olderprisonershad the oppor-tunity to intimidatethem or alter their stories,the new prisonerswerefar more willing to talk freely after being consoledby those capturedbefore them. Time and again it was found that the old prisonersad-vised the new ones to discloseeverythingto the authorities est they allbe blamed for lying or falsifyingmilitary information.One Americanarmy reportnoted that on numerousoccasions,"a Japanese prisonerwho had been doubtful regardingcertain points would come of hisown volition the following day and state that he had discussed thepoint with other members of the same group and his version wasright-or wrong-as the case might be."17 Having learned these les-sons about Japanese captives at the interrogation outposts onGuadalcanal and New Guinea, American intelligence officers now

'5Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemumand the Sword (London, 1967), 28-29.'6OkaNaoki, Shioda Sh5bei, and FujiwaraAkira, eds., Sokokuo teki to shite-ichi zai-BeiNihonjin no hansen undo [The Fight against the Fatherland-The Anti-War Activities of aJapanese in America] (Tokyo, 1965); and the New YorkTimes, July 8, 1945, p. 2.17"Interrogationof Japanese Prisonersin the Southwest Pacific,"5-6.

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74 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

brought them to bear on select prisoners being shipped from AngelIsland to Tracy.There were two interrogationinstallations in the United Statesduring the war: Fort Hunt, a former Civilian ConservationCorpscamp about seventeen miles from Washington,D.C., and Byron HotSprings,an isolatedspot west of San FrancisconearTracy. Both werekept so secret that architecturalplans used by constructionworkerswere labeled "Officers'School,"althoughthese men must have won-deredwhy officersneededeight-footfences,hiddenmicrophones n thelong rows of cells, barredwindows, and heavy gates at the entrances

fromthe main highway. The locations were knownonly as "P.O. Box1142" and "P.O. Box 541," respectively. While, strictly speaking,these interrogationcenterscontravenedor, at the very least, "bent" adozen or so articles of the Geneva Convention of 1929 relatingto therights of prisonersof war, the War Departmentwas convincedthatnot only was the potentialmilitary informationwell worth the inter-national ramifications but also that the treatment of Americanpris-oners in Japanese hands could not have been made much worse byviolationsof the GenevaAccords.In any case, the interrogationswereso shrouded in secrecythat there was little chanceof disclosure.18The interrogationswere generallyconducted n an informalatmo-sphere by American intelligence officers,many of whom were Jap-anese-American specialists from the army's Military IntelligenceService Language School (MISLS) in Minnesota.19It was a closedsociety;each of the forty-five interrogatorswas assignedto one pris-oner whom he continued to interview until the authoritieswere satis-fied that no further military informationcould be learned from thecaptive. The few surviving time sheets indicate that the interviewsusually lasted from forty-fiveminutes to an hour and were conductedat a rate of two or three each day for a week or more.20

'8John Hammond Moore, "Getting Fritz to Talk," Virginia Quarterly Review, LIV(1978), 264-265. So secret was this installation that its existence was not revealed to thepublic until mid-1947. New YorkTimes, July 11, 1947, p. 34.'9Masaharu Ano, "Loyal Linguists, Nisei of World War II Learned Japanese in Min-nesota," Minnesota History, XXXXV (1971), 273-278; and Tamotsu Shibutani, The Dere-licts of CompanyK: A Sociological Study of Demoralization (Berkeley, 1978).20Fora complete list of the American interrogatorsat Tracy, their aliases, and the names ofthe Japanese prisonersto whom they were assigned,see R.G. 165, General and Special Staffs,G-2, Captured Personnel and Materiel Branch-Misc-y, P.W. Camp Tracy, folder 4, 1945,MMB-NA.


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JapanesePrisonersof War n AmericaYet,howeverinformalthese interviews,the interrogatorswere wellaware of the seriousnessof their task, and approachedeach Japanese

prisonerin deadlyearnest.Every questionwas planned,andthe inter-rogators followed a lengthy and detailed checklist of questions con-cerning military equipment, fuel, rations,morale at the front as wellas at home, rumors, personalitiesof commanders,postwar expecta-tions, and so forth.21The resultingreports,by contrast,were brief-usually two or three single-spaced pages-concise, and frequent.Rather than chancethe accumulationof criticalmilitaryinformation,the interrogatorsnearly every four days forwardedtheir findings:apotpourriof items rangingfrom the deterioratingquality of Japaneseclothing to the number of boiler rooms in the enemy aircraft carrierHiryu.22As the war progressedand the number of incomingJapanesecaptives increasedsubstantially,so did the number of interrogationsand reports. During 1944 the number of Japanese prisonersof warinterrogatedat Tracy were as follows:January 13 August 174February 5 September 74March 36 October 101April 132 November 75May 105 December 129June 87July 146 TOTAL 1,07723

When it was clear that the prisonershad no further information ofvalue, they were assembledinto groups and shipped to several POWcampsacross the country.The War Department's network of prisoners-of-war camps bymid-1943 had reachedfive hundredmain and branch enclosures andcovered the nation from coast to coast. Their prime task, of course,was to house the thousands of Germans and Italians arriving eachmonth from the battlefieldsof North Africa, which reached360,000by 1944. Since the number of Japanese prisonerswas so small, theywere simply shunted to existing camps as space and transportationbecame available. Although they would appear in dozens of camps,

21 "Outline for Interrogations" (mimeographed,May 1945), box 651 (Tracy); "A Guide toPreparationof Interrogation Reports" (mimeographed,May 1945), ibid.22 "Information and Opinions from Various Japanese Naval Ps/W, Obtained in U.S.,"January-March 1943, ReportsA-10 to A-13, ibid.23 "Report of Activities, MIS Section, P.O. Box 651, Tracy, California, for 1944," ibid.

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76 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWoftenjust in transit,the bulk of the Japanese spent the remainingwaryears in one of three camps: McCoy, Wisconsin; Clarinda, Iowa; andAngel Island, California. While the largest and most representativewas McCoy, the distributionof the Japanese in the United Stateswasas follows:CAMP SER VICE OFFICERS NCO ENLISTED TOTALCOMMANDAngel Island 9 24 71 312 407Clarinda, Iowa 7 - 73 982 1,055McCoy, Wisconsin 6 3 10 2,749 2,762Meade, Maryland 3 1 - 1 2Kenedy, Texas 8 91 499 - 590Madigan General 9 3 - 2 524Hospital, Wash-ington, D.C.

Camp McCoy, which began, typically, as a CCC camp in 1935,was located somefive miles from the small town of Sparta,Wisconsin.It was ideal as both a training center and a prison camp since it wasisolated yet locatedon the main line of the Milwaukee Railway be-tween Milwaukee and Minneapolis, as well as on the branch line ofthe Chicagoand NorthwesternRailway. Commissionedas an intern-ment site by the ProvostMarshal General's Office in March 1942,25McCoy within weeks became the new home for 293 enemy aliensbroughtin by the FBI (106 Germans,5 Italians, and 181 Japanese),and one Japanese prisoner of war (none other than Ensign KazuoSakamaki from Hawaii). Eventually, he would be joined by nearlythree thousand otherJapanese military prisoners,as well as someonethousandGermans,and five hundred Koreanswho had beencapturedserving with the Japanese. Despite the apparentlysubstantialnum-bers of enemy prisoners at Camp McCoy, they constitutedonly asmall segmentof the tumultuouseventstaking place there. Thousandsof soldiers-indeed several hundred thousand soldiers-were trainedat McCoy and preparedfor shipment overseas.26The few thousandforeign prisonersof war, relegatedto a remote area of the militarypost and heavily guarded,went almost unnoticed.

24 "Semi-Monthly Reporton Prisonersof War as of 1 August 1945," PMGO, "Prisoner ofWar Operations," TAB 116.25HQ Camp McCoy to the Provost Marshal General, March 27, 1942, Camp McCoy,MMB-NA, R.G. 389.26Ironically, t was to Camp McCoy that the 100th Battalion, a Hawaiian Nisei unit, wassent without weapons in the nervousearly days of the war. Later it became part of the much-decorated442nd Regimental Combat Team.


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Japanese Prisoners of War in AmericaThe world for the Japanese prisoners consisted of Compounds 1and 2 (with the Germans in Compounds3 and 4, and the Koreans n

Compound 5). Within each compoundwere two rows of old CCCbarrackswith approximatelyfifty army double-deckedbunks in each.Several additionalbarrackswere used as mess halls, and one barrackin each compoundwas fitted as a day-roomand equippedwith furni-ture, playing cards, a gramophone,and an assortment of Japanese-language books donatedby the YMCA. Each camp was required bythe Geneva Conventionto maintain a canteenwhere, during certainhours, the prisoners could purchase toothpaste, shoe polish,.hand-kerchiefs, candy, crackers,cigarettes, soft drinks, and locally grownproduceat the prevailingmarketprice. In some campseven beer andlight wines were permittedat the prisoner'sown expense.27Each enlisted POW received eighty cents a day to spend at thecamp canteen.A trifling sum by today'sstandards,perhaps,but dur-ing the war years it would buy eight packsof cigarettesor eightbottlesof beer.Officerswere paid a graduatedsalarybased on rank-lieuten-ants, $15 per month; captains, $25; and majors through generals,$35-despite the fact that AmericanPOWs in Japanese hands wererarely paid anything. A later agreementwith the Japanese govern-ment that was publicizedas the Army'sPrisoner of War Circular No.28, 6 May 1944, listed the following higher salaries for captiveJap-anese officers,though they were now to be chargedfor the cost of theirfood, clothing, laundry, and orderlyservice:

Equivalent grades in United StatesArmy Navy Monthly Pay Army Navy

Taisho Taisho $128.91 General AdmiralChujo Chujo 113.29 Lieutenant General Vice AdmiralShosho Shosho 97.66 Major General Rear AdmiralTaisa Taisa 81.08 Colonel CaptainChusa Chusa 62.90 Lieutenant Colonel CommanderShosa Shosa 45.51 Major Lieutenant CommanderTaii Itto (Tokumu Taii 40.53TaiiNito ii Itto 37.11Taii Santo Taii Nito 32.23 Captain LieutenantTaii Santo 28.71Chu Chuitto Chui First Lieutenant Lieutenantjunior gradeChui Nito Tokumu Chuif 28.00Shoi cShoibkumuhoi28.00hoi Shoi 5.00 Second Lieutenant Ensign(Tokumu Shoi I

27Maxwell S. McKnight, "The Employment of Prisoners of War in the United States,"International LabourReview, L (1944), 57. The POWs were entitled to purchasebeer even

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78 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWSince War Department regulations (and common sense) prohibitedthe prisonersfrom obtainingreal money which might enable them tobribeguardsor makegoodtheir escape,their pay was maintained n aU.S. TreasuryTrust Fund (#218915), and all sums were paid to thecaptivesin canteencoupons.28While the military was responsiblefor the overall maintenanceofthe prisoners'existence,nearly everythingelse, the daily amenities oflife, were suppliedby a religiousor humanitarianorganization-usu-ally the YMCA. The War PrisonersAid of the YMCA, as the cap-tives soon learned,constitutedan influence over their lives secondonlyto the U.S. Army. The Japanese prisoners,no less than the Germans,Italians, and Koreans,receivedfrom the YMCA such items as theirstationery,musical instruments, ibrarybooks,sportsequipment, pho-nographrecords,hobbymaterials,handicraft ools,and religiousitemsof all sorts. No requests were too insignificant. During one of hismonthly inspectionvisits to Camp McCoy, for example,the represen-tative of the YMCA, Dr. Howard Hong, noted that the prisoners ap-preciatedhis organization'searlier donationsof Japanese volumesforthe library, the colored crepe paper and thin wire needed by thosemaking artificialflowers,and the Mah-Jong sets and Go games. Buthe cited the need for incense sticks for Buddhist services;a clarinet,flute, snare drum, and large harmonica;and some tennis equipment.He closed his reportwith the conclusionthat the "Health and moraleamong the prisonersare excellent."29Yetbeneaththis idyllic surface,there were seriousproblemsin theJapanese prisoner community.A majordifficultywas the strainwhichexisted between the three nationalities imprisonedat McCoy. The

when their camps were located in "dry counties" where the sale of alcohol was prohibited toAmericans. Local regulations, such as prohibition,did not apply on federal property.See, forexample, Fort WorthStar-Telegram, June 20, 1945, p. 1.28U.S. Dept. of War, Enemy Prisonersof War(Technical Manual TM 19-500, April 20,1945), chap. 4, sec. 111, para. 8-10.29Howard Hong, "Report on Visit to Prisoners of War Camp, Camp McCoy, Sparta,Wisconsin, January 5-7, 1944," Inspection Reports:Camp McCoy, R.G. 389, MMB-NA.After describing the soup, chickendinner, and ice cream servedto Japanese prisonersinone American camp he visited, the General Secretaryof the International YMCA announcedto Swedish newsmen that, "The Japanese prisonerof war camps in the United States are thecleanest [I] have seen anywhere in the world." [New YorkTimes, April 5, 1944, p. 10.] Someembittered observersnoted that "the Japanese prisoners of war were being treated with fargreater consideration than American soldiers who happened to be black." [Shibutani, Com-pany K, 355.]


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Japanese Prisoners of War in AmericaJapanese maintainedan aloof distancefrom the Germans in the ad-joining compound, separatedas much by their respectiveracist ide-ologies as by remindersthat GermanyandJapan had been enemiesinthe First World War. The German prisoners, on the other hand,openly ridiculed their Japanese allies, often gesturing or mimickingacross the fence that separatedthem. Every evening was potentiallyexplosivesince they all sharedthe same canteen,barbershop, and PXfacility. "Afterdinner,they gulp theirdaily ration of two bottlesof 3.2beer and soft drinks,"camp commanderLt. Colonel Horace I. Rogerstold a reporterfrom Collier's,"but for each race,the other is nonexis-tent. They never look at each other, even in furtive curiosity. Theyhate each other."30Relations between the truculentJapanese and themore cooperativeKoreans were even more acrimonious and deeplyrootedin the centuriesof discriminationand subjugationby the Jap-anese over their peninsular neighbor.The captureof the Koreansgavethem an opportunityto assert their national independence.VisitingState Department, Red Cross, and YMCA officials were alwayspleasantly surprised to learn that the Koreans generally requestednothing more than ChristianBibles and cloth to make Koreanflags-requeststhat the authoritieswere understandablyhappy to grant.Visiting officials to the camp were soon grittingtheir teeth when itcame to meeting with the spokesman for the Japanese prisoners-who, at Camp McCoy, was Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki.The complaintsby the Japanese were pettyand unending. They did not want to workwith American women in the camp laundry; they resented beinghoused with three Marshall Island natives; they demanded coal forthe barracks stoves instead of the wood made available by the campauthorities; they wanted more books and dictionaries;they did notwant American personnelpresent in their barracksduring Saturdaymorningcleaning;and on and on. On severaloccasions,the Japanesewent over the head of the American camp commander,Lt. ColonelHorace Rogers, and lodged complaintswith the Spanish embassy inWashington,D.C., which undertook o look aftertheir interests. Eachsuch complaintwas immediatelyfollowedby a visit from the Spanishconsul in nearby Chicagowho would investigatethe chargesand helpsmoothout the difficulties.31

30RobertDevore, "Our 'Pampered'War Prisoners,"Collier's, Oct. 14, 1944, p. 57.31 "Reporton Visit to Prisoner of War Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, by Seior Gonzales, Span-

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Finally, there were majordivisions and animosities within the Jap-anese prisoner community itself. The most persistent and difficultproblem was the rivalry between army and navy personnel. Whilesuch rivalriesare commonto all armedservices,they were especiallyprevalentamong capturedsurvivorsof a societybased on the venera-tion of the warrior,and exacerbatedby the need to blame someonefortheir nation'smilitarydefeats.Naval prisonersfar outnumbered hosefrom the army,and each incominggroupof Japanese sailors from thebattles of Midway or the Coral Sea increased the preponderanceofnaval prisonersover their increasinglyhostile army colleagues.

Another problem among the prisonersderivedfrom the timing oftheir capture.The later in the war they were captured,the greatertheimplied resistanceto the enemy, and the less shame and dishonorforhaving been captured.Consequently,each arrivinggroupof prisonersviewed those who greeted them with arroganceand disdain, forcingyet anotherlayer of hostilityon an already highly anxious and intro-spective prisoner community. Each party was aware that the nextlayer of hostility was only as far away as the next arriving group ofcaptives.Lastly, there was the ever-presentquestion of honor and suicide.While suicide in a prison camp was not as glorious as death on thebattlefield,to some, death by any means was preferableto living withthe shame of failure. "Our desire for suicide, however,was thwartedon every hand," recalls Kazuo Sakamaki rather melodramatically,consideringthe tiny numberof self-inflictedinjuries among the Jap-anese POWs. "We had no knivesto cut our throats. We had no ropesto hang ourselves with. Some of us banged our heads against everyobjectin sight; some men refused to eat. And yet we did not die....Our life was a dilemma. We wanted to die and yet we could not die.We wanted to kill ourselves and we could not."32This issue was

ish Consul in Chicago, Illinois, September 30, 1944," Inspection Reports: Camp McCoy,R.G. 389, MMB-NA.32Sakamaki,Pearl Harbor, 81-82. One prisoner who killed himself at McCoy apparentlydid so by accident.Accordingto a teletype to FBI Headquarters from the Milwaukee Divi-sion, Chief Petty Officer Ichiro Yamashitaevidently found a dud bazooka rocketwhile work-ing around the camp artillery range and smuggled it into his barracks.For six weeks he kept itas a souvenir. On October 16, 1944, Yamashitawalked throughhis barrackscalling for volun-teers for a camp wrestling match and banging the rocket shell on the edges of the passingmetal bunks. The shell exploded, killing Yamashitaand injuringfiveothers. (Reportto authorfrom Special Agent William E. Trible, FBI Headquarters, July 15, 1980, p. 17.)


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JapanesePrisonersof War n Americanearly always at the boilingpoint and was keptthereby a small num-ber of unruly hard-liners who rejectedany compromisewith their re-quired fate. On occasionthey went so far as to challengethe authorityof their ranking POW officer, the venerable naval Lt. CommanderKametaro Matsumoto, for attempting to promote peaceful hobbiesamongthem. While their challengefailedto dislodgethe old officer,orferment suicidal militarism among the prisoners, or swing controlfrom the naval to the army officers, the event helped highlight theproblemswith which the American authorities had to contend.The War Department had a solution to these difficulties:put theprisonersto work. The captiveswould be kept occupiedand, it washoped, too tired to contemplatemischief.They could also help allevi-ate the domestic labor shortagecausedby the shipmentof millions ofAmericans overseas.The Geneva Conventionpermittedbelligerents outilize the labor of able prisonersof war, officersexcepted,so long astheir labor did not aid directlyin the war effort. Such work fell intotwo broad categories:maintenanceof military installationsand con-tract work for private employers. With the initiation of the govern-ment's laborprogramon January 10, 1943, the German, Italian, andJapanese prisonersof war immediatelybegan performinga varietyofmenial and clericaljobs within their own compoundsand on militarybases across the nation. They crated and packagedsupplies, took in-ventoriesof equipment,operatedlaundries and sawmills, loadedcre-osote poles, marked surplus property, worked on company trashdetails, toiled at general constructionwork, did kitchen work, andserved as orderlies to their seniorofficers.Contract aborwas a differ-ent matter,though no less important.Farmersand small businessmenlocatednear POW campspetitionedthe local office of the War Man-power Commissionfor groupsof twenty or more prisoners,althoughthe regulations, certificationsof need, objectionsfrom labor unions,and bureaucraticdelays often exasperated all but the most labor-starvedemployers.The more than five thousandJapanese prisonersposeda particularproblem. Unlike the German prisonerswho went to work with theknowledgethat it was not only unavoidablebut perhapseven prefera-ble to idleness, the Japanese provedto be poor workers.They werewrackedby inner conflicts,indecisivelyled by their noncommissionedofficers,and, most importantly,distrustedby their captors. Anti-Jap-anese sentiment was implacable in some American communities.

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82 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWWhen, for instance, the War Relocation Board released three Jap-anese Americans from an internmentcamp on the West Coast andshippedthem to the labor-starved own of Marengo, Illinois, the resi-dents arose in a storm of protest.The three startled farm boys fromCalifornia were marchedbackto the train stationby an angrymobledby the mayor,the presidentof the ParkBoard,and the commanderofthe local post of the AmericanLegion.33Officialsrecognizedthat thiscommunity, or others like it, would likely respond no better to theappearance of Japanese military captives. The result was that theoverwhelming majority of Japanese prisoners worked on militaryposts, underguard,ratherthan on contractwork in the civilian sector.To overcome the reluctance of some commanders o make maximumuse of their Japanese prisoner-of-war labor, General Wilhelm D.Styer, commanderof the U.S. Army in the Western Pacific, thun-dered:"We must overcomethe psychologythat you cannotdo this orthat. I want to see these prisonerswork like piss ants! If they do notwork, put them on bread and water!"34

Yet a portionof the Japanese prisoners,in some cases as many asfifteento twenty percent, simply refused to work. On a few occasions,the cause was strife within the prisonercommunity,especiallythe re-fusal of army prisonersto take orders fromnaval prisoners.But mostof those who refused to work did so on the groundsthat their laborwould assist the American war effort.Somefeignedillness while oth-ers refused to work. Nearly everyroutine camp reportto the ProvostMarshal General's Office (PMGO) mentions such recalcitrantpris-oners.The problemwas how to get the prisonersto work without violat-ing their rights or jeopardizingthe safety of Americanprisoners.Forthe first two years of the war, the War Department preventedPOWcamp commandersfrom exercising any more pressure than a repri-mand, an admonition,the withholdingof privileges,and, in extremecases, a courtmartial. Generally speaking,these were useless gesturesthat held no fear for combat-hardened nemy soldiers.Finally, in Oc-tober 1943, the PMGO reinterpretedArticle 27 of the Geneva Con-vention to permitthe use of reasonablepressurein getting prisonerstocomplywith a work order. Called "administrativepressure,"the pol-

33ChicagoTribune,April 26, 1943, p. 1.34Quoted n Lewis and Mewha, Prisonerof WarUtilization, 253-254.


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Japanese Prisoners of War in America 83icy authorized the camp commander to impose a restricted diet andreduced privileges for any recalcitrant prisoner. This was not apunishment, the War Department reasoned, since the prisoner couldterminate the pressure at any time simply by complying with theorder; such "administrative pressure" was just an inducement to obeya proper command.35Given this new latitude, prison camp commanders now met eachpotentially explosive situation with vigor. At Camp McCoy, for exam-ple, even the normally "generous and kind"36 Lt. Colonel Rogers star-tled his Japanese POWs by his swift action. According to an amuseddelegation from the Spanish consulate:

On May 30, 1944, about 22 Japanese officers ordered their men not towork.ColonelRogersspentseveralhoursin attempting o persuade he officerprisonersto changetheir minds. That night he approached he 90 non-comsand asked them whether they would cooperatewith him. After 9 had abso-lutely refused to cooperatehe put them in the guardhouse for the night andmade no attemptto interviewthe rest.The next morningthe prisonersstageda sit-down strike,refusingto turnout for roll-call,breakfastor work. After issuing a clearwarningto the non-coms,ColonelRogersorderedout his troopswith bayonetsand forcedall pris-oners to march at the doublefivemiles to a placeof work,to work all morningwithout the usual 10 minutesresteveryhour,and to returnto the campat thedoubleat noon. The prisonersof coursebecameexhaustedand about12 strag-glersreceivedminorbayonetwounds.A few were so overcome hattheyhad tobe picked up by a truck which was orderedalong for the purpose.This treat-ment effected a cure, for a spokesmanfor the non-coms informedColonelRogersthat therewould be no furthertrouble.37Each incident had to be handled individually. Normally, prisonerswho refused to obey a work order were sentenced to the stockade forfourteen days; in extreme cases the prisoners spent fourteen days athard labor. In rare instances when the number of striking POWs raninto the hundreds and posed the threat of a camp uprising, the troopswere called out. On only one occasion-when three Japanese naval

35GeneralGeorge C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, "Regulations Governing Prisoners of War,"Prisoner of WarCircular No. 1 (Sept. 24, 1943), pp. 43-6, TAB 6; General J.A. Ulio, TheAdjutantGeneral, to all ServiceCommands,Oct. 27, 1943, "Administrativeand DisciplinaryMeasures for Prisoners of War," TAB 14; and U.S. Dept. of War, "Policies Governing Ad-ministration of Disciplinary Punishment of Prisoners of War," Prisonerof War Circular No.34 (June 24, 1944), PMGO, "Prisonerof War Operations," TAB 8.36Sakamaki,Pearl Harbor, 55-56.37"Reporton Visit to Prisoner of War Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, by Sefor Gonzales."


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prisoners being treated for tuberculosisat Denver's Fitzsimons Gen-eral Hospital rushed their guards-were prisonersshot dead on thespot.38Curiously, the War Department'sgreatestfear never materialized.From the moment that the first shiploadsof prisonersarrivedin theUnited States,the governmentworried that thousandsof escapedNaziand Japanese prisonerswould sabotageand rape their way acrossthecountrywhile Americanmilitary forceswere locked in combatover-seas. Elaborateprecautionswere taken in the locationand construc-tion of the camps,and campcommanderswere encouraged o findthemost efficient balance of securitymeasures from among such optionsas additional floodlights,patrolling war dogs, the censoringof pris-oner mail, sporadic bed checks, a network of prisoner informants,shakedowninspections,and a generalaura of firmmilitary discipline.FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, the symbol of domestic security,heightened public anxiety by warningthat "even one escaped prisonerat large,trained as he is in the techniquesof destruction, s a dangertoour internal security, our war production,and the lives of our cit-izens!"39 Communities which hosted Japanese prisoners, such asSparta, Wisconsin, near McCoy, were constantlywarned to be es-pecially vigilant and to report immediatelyany suspicious activities."The Japanese, with their reputationfor trickiness and sneakiness,"the authorities cautioned,"are apt to make a greaterattemptto dis-turb our homefrontsecuritythan the Germans ever did."40Despite the many obstacles to prisonerescape-substantial securitymeasures; a fatiguing labor program;an array of artistic, musical,athletic, educational,and spiritual outlets; and the most compellingobstacle of all: there was simply nowhere to go-some captives stillsoughtto flee. Since mostprisoners n the U.S. were German,they notsurprisinglyaccountedfor most of the escapes,1,036.41Someescapeesmerelywalkedaway while a guard'sattentionwas directedelsewhere,

38NewYorkTimes, Oct. 31, 1944, p. 21.39J.EdgarHoover, "Enemies at Large,"AmericanMagazine, CXXXVII (April 1944), 97;New YorkTimes, May 21, 1945, p. 21.40SpartaHerald, June 11, 1945, p. 2.41Thesefigures might seem alarming at first glance, but consideringthat there were morethan 360,000 German POWs, the 1,036 escapes constitute less than one percent. The WarDepartment was justifiably able to boast a lower ratio of escapes than that achieved by thefederal penitentiary system with its permanentwalls and the latest in security devices. "Inves-tigations of the National War Effort,"H. Rep. 728, p. 10.


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Japanese Prisoners of War in Americawhile others cut fences, passed through the camp gates in makeshiftAmerican uniforms, smuggledthemselvesout aboard commercialde-livery trucks,jumped over the compoundfences from barracksroof-tops, climbed out of hospitalwindows, or tunneledunderground.TheJapanese, to the government'sastonishment and relief, seldom at-temptedto escape.Unlike the Germans who were breakingout at themonthlyrate of three escapesper ten thousandcaptives,the Japaneseattempted only fourteen escapes throughout the war, all from Mc-Coy.42The first to flee was TerumasaKibata,who slipped away fromhis work detail, ten miles north of the camp, on July 3, 1944. Whilethe records indicatedthat Kibata suffered from shell shock and wasprobably not in full controlof his faculties, a near-hystericalsearchwas initiated by the police, military authorities,and FBI. Two armyplanes were broughtin for air surveillance.Even before this collectiveweight could be brought fully to bear, a bewildered Kibata wanderedback into camp the day after his escape. He explainedto the startledguards that he had hoped to "catch a train," though he was unsureabout his destination or purposefor escape.43The next escapesdid not occur until nearlya year later. During theearly morning hours of May 22, 1945, three Japanese POWs, TakeoNakamura, Kokei Tanaka, and Hajime Hashimoto, all twenty-fouryears of age, dug under a fence enclosure in what was probablythemost well-planned escapeof them all. They had plottedsinceSeptem-ber of the previousyear, stealing a Texaco road map from the glovecompartmentof the camp ambulance,a pair of bolt cutters from astorage area, and extra food from the mess hall. When finally ap-prehended, Nakamura had a duffel bag filled with enough items tocovera two-page list by the FBI, and included a styptic pencil, sixteenassorted fish hooks, a hundred "U.S. Army" matchbooks,and sevenchanges of socks.44A Wisconsin farmerspottedhim a week after hisescape as he poled down the Mississippi River on a makeshift raftnear the town of Prairie du Chien. His comradesdid not make it that

42Tollefson,"Enemy Prisoners of War," 63n. There are, however, a score of "less serious"escapes on record;prisoners who just wandered away from their work sites or who felt theneed to walk through the woods by themselves for a couple of hours. They usually rejoinedtheir work group without even alerting their guards, or turned themselves over to the campauthorities (who were usually unaware that the prisoners had escaped in the first place) toaccept their fourteen days in confinementin exchange for a few hours of freedomand privacy.43Report o author by FBI Special Agent Trible, p. 1.44Ibid.,3-4.

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86 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWfar. They were captured several days later, less than twenty mileswest of the camp and near the communityof West Salem, as theymarchedalong Highway 16 in their Japanese uniformswith the let-ters "PW" stenciled in brightyellow on both front and back.45No sooner had local farmersbegun to relax than two more Jap-anese broke out in early July. The populace was warned that thePOWs would try to steal food fromlocal farmsor take milk from cowsin pastures, and that "these men, with their strange philosophy of'dyingforthe Emperor,'could cause a greatdeal of damage.Residentsin the countyare urged to reportanything they may see or hear thatmight aid authorities to track down the Japs."46After being goneabout a week, one escapeewas capturedat a local farmwhere he hadknocked at the back door, rubbedhis stomach to indicateto the star-tled farmwife that he was hungry, and was given some breadby theterrifiedwoman who then dashed to the telephone.The highway pa-trol took him into custodyas he waited politely at the back door forthe next course. His comrade was apprehendedon July 17 on theoutskirts of West Salem, Wisconsin, where he was discoveredby aChicago & Northwestern railroadpolicemanhuddled in a boxcar.Heoffered no resistance and, in the vernacularof the front-pagenewsannouncement,"the Nip was returned to confinement."47mmedi-ately, however, another Japanese prisoner slipped away. The localpopulation,doubtlessbeginningto wonder aboutthe highly touted se-curitymeasures at McCoy, girdedthemselvesfor yet another"desper-ate Jap on the loose."48The policeand FBI were alertedas usual, dogpatrols scoured the countryside,and two days later the escapee wassighted while creeping along the outer perimeterof the camp on hishands and knees. Apprehendedwithout resistance,he told his captorsthat he escapedfor fear that he would be beatenby the otherprisonerswho suspected him of being an informant. He was nonetheless re-turnedto his compoundwith unknown results.Four more escapes occurredbefore the end of the war, but all thecaptiveswere returned n a matter of days.The lastJapaneseprisonerto escapeduringthe war was YuzoOhashi, a recentcaptivefrom IwoJima. Earlyon the morningof August29, 1945, he slippedaway from

45MonroeCountyDemocrat,May 24, 1945, p. 1; Sparta Herald, June 4, 1945, p. 1.46MonroeCountyDemocrat,July 5, 1945, p. 1.47SpartaHerald, July 9, 1945, p. 1.48MonroeCountyDemocrat, July 19, 1945, p. 1.


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Japanese Prisoners of War in Americahis work detail and, under the mistaken belief that "Mexico was lo-cated about 300 miles south of Camp McCoy," spent the next fourdays moving south and foraging for food. He was apprehendedonSeptember 2-the day of Japan's official surrender-at Cashton,Wisconsin, about twenty-two miles south of McCoy. He told hisguardsthat Japan had clearlylost the war and that he did not wish toreturn home in shame. It was escape, Ohashi explained,or suicide.49As the end of the war with Japan approached, American au-thorities worried about the possibility of mass suicides among thePOWs. Imaginationsran wild, fueled by stories about the mass sui-cides on Iwo Jima and Okinawa;the riots by the Japanese prisonersat Camps Featherstonand Cowra in New Zealand;50 nd by the ap-pearance of a lengthy alarmist article in the Rocky Shimpo, a Jap-anese-language newspaper published in Denver, which predictedadreadedmass suicideof the prisonersat Camp McCoy.51Despite suchfears, the end of the war passed uneventfullywith no suicidesamongthe POWs.

With Japan's surrendercame the questionof democracyn postwarJapan. The public mood was perhaps best summarizedby a Texascowboy in a "man-on-the-street"opinion poll, who stated that "Youcan't civilize or educate Germans or Japs in a short length of time.We'vegot to give them a new form of governmentso we might as wellstart making Democrats out of them right now."52The War Depart-ment agreed.As early as April 1945, the Special ProjectsDivision ofthe PMGO had considereda programto reeducatethe Japanese pris-oners despite a ban on such activityby the Geneva Convention. Fol-lowing a secret study conducted among the Japanese POWs atMcCoy, Clarinda, and Angel Island, the PMGO determined that

49Report o author by FBI Special Agent Trible, p. 16.50CharlotteCarr-Gregg, Japanese Prisonersof War n Revolt:The Outbreaksat Featherstonand Cowraduring WorldWar II (New York, 1978).51Rocky himpo (Denver), Dec. 25, 1944 (microfilmreel no. MJ-117, Libraryof Congress,Washington,D.C.) There is no evidence that the prisonershad access to the Rocky Shimpo orany of the other Japanese-language newspapers published in the U.S. (Hawaii Hochi, LosAngeles Do ho Weekly,San FranciscoNichi Bei, or Salt Lake City Nippo). Indeed, while theWar Department authorized the prisonersof war to receiveapprovednewspapersin German,Slovak, Polish, Croatian, Serbian, Spanish, Russian, and Hungarian, no Japanese-languagenewspapers were offered. (U.S. Dept. of War, "Newspapers and Magazines for Prisoners ofWar," Prisoner of WarCircular No. 52 [Nov. 29, 1944], PMGO, "Prisonersof War Opera-tions," TAB 8.52HuntsvilleItem, Aug. 16, 1945, pp. 1, 10.

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88 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWsuch an indoctrinationeffort would not only provide the Americanoccupation forces in Japan with reliable governmentofficials, butwould serve as a laboratoryto test the educational and rehabilitationprogramsunderconsideration or the postwar period.The projectwassecretly authorizedby the Secretaryof War on July 18, 1945, afterwhich the prisonerswere screened,evaluated,and the most coopera-tive among them selected for reeducation.The potential converts todemocracy,a total of 205 men, were then sent to one of three speciallydesignated "re-orientationcenters":Camps Huntsville, Kenedy, orHearne, Texas.53

The programwas directedby Lt. ColonelBoude C. Moore, borninJapan to missionaryparents,educatedin the United States, and resi-dent of Japan from 1924 until 1941. He was assistedby Dr. CharlesW. Hepner, a luminaryfromthe Far Eastern Branchof the OfficeofWar Information,who had spentsomethirty years in Japan. Togetherthey organizeda dazzlingprogramof lecturesby the facultyof nearbySam Houston State Teachers College, with simultaneoustranslationinto Japanese; study of the English languageand literature;compari-sons of American and Japanese newspapers, books, and magazines;and the translation of material for distributionto the Japanese pris-oners not participatingin the program.The most importantactivitywas the assignmentevery two weeks of a new "study topic" whichrequired group and individual research and discussion. The topicsrangedfrom an assessment of Japan's civilian and militarymoraletothe comparisonof various segmentsof Japanese and Americanwaysof life. Moore and Hepner hopedthat these exerciseswould cause theprisoners to consider the nuances of the subjectsand require somemeasure of democratic nput by all members.They also believedthatthe reportswould serveas a barometerof the POWs'moraleand alle-giance to the Emperor.Augmenting these pursuits was a heavy dose of Americanmusic,newspapers, movies and cartoons,and such recreationalactivities assoftball, table tennis, and baseball. The prisonerswere also encour-

53PMGO,"Re-education of Enemy Prisoners of War, Japanese Program"(Dec. 15, 1945),p. 18, OCMH. Camp Kenedy,a branchcampof Fort Sam Houston, was used earlierto housemore than a thousandJapanese internees from Latin America. See Bernard Gufler to StateDept: "Reporton Civilian Detention Station, Camp Kenedy,Texas, May 22, 1942," file 254,Camp Kenedy, R.G. 389, MMB-NA; and Edward N. Barnhart, "Japanese Internees fromPeru," Pacific Historical Review, XXXI (1962), 169-178.


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JapanesePrisonersof War n Americaaged to attend Sunday religious servicesin an effort "to replacetheirtraditionalEmperor-worshipwith a more positivephilosophy,and toshow them the close relationship between democracyand Christianprinciples."54When the program ended in December 1945 and thePOWs preparedfor repatriationhome, the authorities believed that asignificant, if unknown, number of the prisoners had embracedtheprinciplesof the Americandream.Unfortunately,no follow-up inves-tigation tracedthe careers of the Japanese "graduates"and their im-pact, if any, on postwar politics.No sooner was the war over than Washingtonbegan repatriatingJapanese POWs as promptly as shipping permitted.55While Jap-anese prisoners in the Philippines, Hawaii, and Okinawa were notreleased for anotheryear-due as much to Allied fears for the securityof postwarJapan as to the need for cheap labor-the prisonersin theU.S. startedhomeless than a month after the war ended.BeginninginOctober 1945, the Japanese POWs at McCoy, Clarinda, Hearne,Kenedy, and Huntsville were sent to a cluster of holding camps atLamont, California. There they kept busy with the usual militarypost-relatedtasks as carpenters,cooks, and janitors and also as con-tract workers on local farms. By the end of December 1945, vesselspace became available for 1,120 men (including675 sick and badlywounded) and the captives were trucked to the Los Angeles Port ofEmbarkation or immediateshipmentoverseas.56Each departingmanwas fingerprintedonce again, his recordsupdated,and his belongingssearched for "contraband"or money in excess of the 500 yen ($125)or 200 yen ($50) which the officers or enlisted men respectivelywereallowed to bring back to Japan.57A week later, on January 5, 1946,another 1,462 Japanese departed;on January 20, three days after athird group of 441 prisonersleft Lamont for Los Angeles, that campwas deactivated.58 lso duringJanuary the remaining2,376 Japanese

54ColonelMoore's final reportmade the expansive claim that "the maximum percentageofprisonersin the camp attending any one Sunday service was 42 per cent plus, and the averageattendancewas over 25 per cent." PMGO, "Re-educationof Enemy Prisoners of War," p. 18.55Memo rom Lt. Col. Kunzig, June 18, 1946: "Retentionof Japanese Prisonersof War inthe PacificAreas," file (TS), 383.6, Records of the Office of the AdjutantGeneral, R.G. 407,MMB-NA.56PMGO,"Prisonerof War Operations," TABs 3, 6, 22, 24.57WalterRundell, Jr., Military Money: A Fiscal History of the U.S. Army Overseas inWorld WarII (College Station, Texas, 1980), 183.58Memo, rom Major C.N. Elliot, AssistantAdjutantGeneral, to the Prisoner of War Divi-

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90 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWprisoners departed from a similar system of camps in Corcoran, Cal-ifornia, to the piers of San Francisco and Japan. A single Japaneseprisoner remained to recover from his wounds, and on June 1, 1948,he waved an indifferent farewell to Angel Island from the railing ofhis departing ship. It was over. For the 5,400 repatriated Japanesecaptives,59 however, numerous difficulties still lay ahead.The events which greeted the returning Japanese were bitter-sweet.The emotion of seeing the port of Uraga and Mt. Fuji was mixed withshame of returning alive from enemy captivity. Ensign KazuoSakamaki became something of a public figure, not only as a formerPOW, but as the first Japanese prisoner of the war. "Everyday, letterspoured in," Sakamaki recalls, quoting from a representative sample:Yourpast is not wrongat all. Youneed not feel ashamed.On the contrary,weowe you thanks. With a new heart, please work for a reconstruction f ourbelovedcountry.No wonderwe lost the war, Mr. P.O.W.No. 1. AlthoughI am a mere mer-chant, I know how to commit hara-kiri.A man who does not know whatshameis, is a beast. If you want to die now, I will gladlycome and show youhow it's done.Which is the moremanlylife-live long and cheap,or live short butglorious?Shame on you.And finally,I cannotunderstandhow you could return alive. The souls of the bravecom-rades who foughtwith you and died must be cryingnow over what you havedone. If you are not ashamedof yourselfnow, please explainhow come.If youare ashamedof yourselfnow, you shouldcommitsuicide at onceand apologizeto the spiritsof the heroeswho died honorably.60

sion of the PMGO: "Prisoner of War Camp Labor Report, 19 February1946," file Lamont,California (Japanese), R.G. 389, MMB-NA.59Ofthe original 5,424 Japanese prisoners in the U.S., 24 died in captivity and, with theexception of 3 still buried in the Fort Sam Houston National Cemetery, 3 at Fort Riley,Kansas, and 1 at the Presidio in Monterey, California, all bodies were returned to Japan by1954. (PMGO Report, "Deceased Enemy POWs Interred in the United States Correctedto19 April 1951," file 66A3055, container #17, R.G. 389, MMB-NA). Of those who died incaptivity, two apparentlykilled themselves, three were shot during an escape attemptat Den-ver's Fitzsimons General Hospital, one died in an agricultural accident, and the remainingeighteen succumbed to earlier war wounds or natural causes. PMGO, "Prisoner of War Op-erations," pp. 28, 229.60Sakamaki,Pearl Harbor, 108-109.


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JapanesePrisonersof War n AmericaMany years passed before Sakamaki and his more than 1,500,000 fel-low former prisoners of war held by Russia, China, Britain, and theUnited States61 became comfortably integrated into Japanese society,a process made far easier for those who had been held in the UnitedStates. They returned better fed and clothed than their comrades inother Allied camps. They were also more emotionally stable and oftenhad at least a smattering of the language of their new occupiers. Sum-ming up his four years of war, Sakamaki described a metamorphosiswhich startled even himself:My stepswere these: all-outattack,failure,capture,a senseof dilemma,men-tal struggle, attemptsat suicide,failureagain, self-contempt,deep disillusion-ment, despair and melancholy,reflections,desire to learn and yearning fortruth, meditation,rediscoveringmyself,self-encouragement, iscoveryof a newduty, freedomthroughlove,and finally,a desire for reconstruction.I claim no credit for this transformation. wish to preachto no one. I onlyhopethat this will showto all ... thatman is capableof beingmade anew....The key to it all, Sakamaki concluded, was the concept of democracy."I learned it as a prisoner. It was the best education of my life."62

61Forfurther information on the experiences of Japanese prisoners in Russian, Chinese,and British hands, see Nakamura Taisuke, Siberiayo sayonara,Shiberiayokuryuninenkannokiroku [Farewell to Siberia, a Record of Two Years' Internment] (Tokyo, 1966): UchimuraGosuke, Iki isogu Sutarin goku no Nihonjin [Getting By: The Japanese in Stalin's Prisons](Tokyo, 1967); Nakazona Eisuke, "Kokkyonaisen, nihonhei made kachuni," [The National-ist-Communist Civil War: Japanese Soldiers Caught in the Middle], in Mainichi Shimbun(Tokyo), Aug. 15, 1965; and Yuji Aida, Prisoner of the British, trans. by Hide Ishiguro andLouis Allen (London, 1966).62Sakamaki,Pearl Harbor, 129, 133. However difficult Sakamaki'sreintegrationinto post-war Japanese society, the onus of having been captured in battle did not prevent him fromreaching a position of corporate responsibilityand financial success. After the war, Sakamakijoined the Toyota company and rose to become chief of its operations in Brazil. Today, thesixty-year-old businessman-still a life-long champion of democracy-heads the Japanese-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce in S5o Paulo.

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Japanese Prisoners of War in America WWII

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