Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 1 Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain: Longshore Workers and Drayage Drivers David Jaffee Professor of Sociology Department of Sociology and Anthropology University of North Florida [email protected]Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meetings of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics, Philadelphia, PA, June, 2010. WORKING DRAFT: Do not quote or cite without permission of author.
42
Embed
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 1 · Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 3 organizations. A supply chain is defined as “a set of three or
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 1
Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain:
Longshore Workers and Drayage Drivers
David Jaffee Professor of Sociology
Department of Sociology and Anthropology University of North Florida
system would coordinate the regional demand for containers with drivers delivering
containers directly to the point of use rather than temporary port stockpiles. Two other
proposed enhancements are related to the congestion and delays associated with having to
match a particular driver with a particular container or a particular chassis. Solutions
involve the creation of a “trucking pool” from which drivers working for different firms
could be used to transport containers for any other firms (Payne, 2007). Similarly, a
chassis pool would be established from which drivers could use any available chassis
regardless of which shipping line had ownership. All three of these proposals to address
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 26
bottlenecks in this particular segment of the chain require cooperative and collaborative
relations among separate and potentially competing firms. They also point to the way
cooperation rather than competition can produce a more optimal arrangement for the
efficiency of the supply chain.
None of the proposals above address directly the problematic owner-operator
status of drayage drivers. The conversion of owner operators to employees could
conceivably be either a cause or consequence of improving the efficiency of the system.
On the one hand, if firms were paying drivers as employees they would have an incentive
to fix the system. On the other hand, if the system were more time efficient the firm
might be more willing to pay drivers as hourly employees.
INTERMODAL LABOR SEGMENTATION
We do not have good information on the nature of the relationship between
workers who interact and can potentially contribute to the greater efficiency of the
intermodal system. What is rarely examined are the occasions when the different labor
forces from the different segments come in contact with one another and interact in the
process of moving the goods. In this section, based on research on port truckers
conducted at the Talleyrand terminal in Jacksonville Florida (Jaffee & Rowley, 2009), we
consider some interesting organizational and labor dynamics illuminated by the interface
between the drayage and terminal operations. While the analysis here is preliminary, we
hope that it can point the way to future research on how the intersection of different labor
forces and conditions can impact the quality of work, interorganizational integration, and
prospects for labor unity.
We have already described the work environment and organizational challenges
facing drayage drivers. In a survey distributed to drivers at Jaxport, respondents were
invited to add additional comments and information about their working conditions. The
qualitative data derived from this section of the survey pointed to several key issues not
addressed by the closed-ended survey items in our study. One of the most frequent
comments, or complaints, registered by the drivers concerned the poor treatment they
receive from the terminal employees. This ranged from a lack of respect to an indifferent
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 27
attitude toward the drivers’ need to obtain and transport the container in a timely fashion.
Some representative expressions are as follows:
The ILA clerks are in no hurry to do anything as they are paid on an hourly basis and are SLOW, SLOW, and SLOW! Redundant holdups, dealing with people who could care less that a driver has a time schedule to keep. Arrogant disregard with any problem a driver has. They label us as stupid truck drivers! At the port, they are very nasty to drivers. They discriminate at the port. They treat drivers like dirt when we are the ones responsible for their salary. They treat the minorities very badly. The way that they treat drivers at the port is humiliating
Bonacich and Wilson’s research on the West coast ports reports similar tensions
and animosities between drivers and terminal workers. “Port truckers complain that the
ILWU [International Longshore and Warehouse Union] clerks treat them discourteously
or take breaks, leaving drivers to wait in long lines. Drivers feel that they face some
racism from ILWU members. And the truth is that some ILWU members blame the
immigrants for the downfall of the union in the ports” (2008, pp. 223-224). The study of
port truckers in Seattle (Port Jobs, 2007, p. 39) also highlights this issue:
Conflict between longshore workers and truck drivers at the marine terminals is a
problem that is acknowledged by all stakeholders in the system.
Miscommunication and disagreements in this high-stress environment can lead to
physical altercations. This affects working conditions for everyone at the
terminals, and can reduce the efficiency of terminal operations. Drivers report that
they are often treated disrespectfully; while longshore workers report that they are
often frustrated by inexperienced drivers.
In Jacksonville, the clerks and checkers working at the port terminal are
represented by the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA). It is worth noting
that the ILA has a long-standing and largely accepted (on both sides) history of “biracial
unionism” (Nelson, 2001; Arnesen, 1998). This is manifested in a racial division of labor
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 28
with African-Americans dominating the cargo handling and stevedoring functions while
white workers are heavily overrepresented among the clerks and checkers. In fact, in
Jacksonville, as in some other East and Gulf coast ports, there are two separate ILA
locals – one for the stevedores and one for the clerks and checkers. In this context, the
racial dimension becomes somewhat more significant given that African-Americans are
disproportionately overrepresented among the drivers while the clerks and checkers are
largely white.
The divergent working conditions conform with the dual economy and segmented
labor market perspectives where the longshore workers exist in the primary sector (or
core) and the drayage drivers exist in the secondary sector (or periphery). These models
associate different industrial/organizational structural characteristics with divergent labor
market conditions. These sectoral differences have also been alternatively described
above as massification in the primary sector and atomization in the secondary sector. This
situation creates not only potential bottlenecks and supply-chain inefficiencies, but the
juxtaposition in organizational structure is replicated at the level of working conditions in
the two industries. The term “economic apartheid” has been used to describe the
contrasting situation for the two groups of workers. While these labor forces are
sequentially interdependent, the divergent organization conditions have contributed to an
inability to communicate effectively, build solidarity, or act collectively. Kalleberg
(2003) has noted how such segmentation can also have a direct impact on organizational
performance. “Nonstandard employment relations are attractive to employers because
they may often reduce employment costs in addition to enhancing flexibility. On the
other hand, in some cases the use of nonstandard workers may create conflicts with
regular employees and thereby diminish cooperation and teamwork.” (Kalleberg, 2003, p.
171). The same disarticulation that hampers supply-chain efficiency also undermines
cooperation, teamwork, social integration that can translate into high performance
workplace – due to low road strategies and the existence of core/periphery distinctions
throughout the supply chain that translate into flexible labor arrangements and
nonstandard work.
While the data collected at the Jacksonville port only represent the perspective of
the drivers, conversations with longshore workers and terminal operators suggest several
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 29
additional speculative explanations to account for the less than harmonious relations. At
the most rudimentary level, longshore workers may simply disrespect drivers on the basis
of status/racial/ethnic differences. The “racialization” of drayage has already been noted.
In addition, the immigrant status of drivers as well as communication problems stemming
from language differences may also fuel tensions. Further, the longshore workers may
regard the drivers as a disorganized collection of menial laborers who lack any class
consciousness and who undermine and threaten the skill-based and relatively high-wage
environment established by longshore workers. On the surface, these seem to be
operative dynamics.
However, we should consider more carefully the workplace context and the
particular identities of the interacting workers in order to develop a more nuanced
analysis. There is something relatively unique about one group of workers physically
encroaching upon the terrain of another. In this case drivers are entering the terminal, or
“the waterfront”, which is regarded as the sacred jurisdiction of longshore workers. These
workers have a long history of labor solidarity among their members and an established
set of work rules and procedures for moving, organizing, consigning, and physically
arranging shipping containers. The drivers, on the other hand, have one objective – to
obtain the container as quickly as possible in order to complete a trip. They have typically
spent time waiting to get into the terminal, and experienced delays at the gate while their
credentials and truck are checked for security purposes. When they finally reach the
container yard they are ready to grab the load. They are not interested in union-based
protocols or work rules. Further, the sense of urgency and impatience expressed by the
drivers may be regarded as an imposition on the longshore workers. Under such a
scenario, it is not difficult to imagine how tensions and antagonisms can quickly develop
between the two groups of workers. Thus, added to the structural and impersonal
intermodal disarticulation based on poorly integrated transport processes and manifested
in bottlenecks and delays in container transit, are the personal relations between drivers
and longshore workers based on segmented labor markets and manifested in intergroup
antagonisms.
Beyond these personal animosities and tensions are the questions this raises for
organizing different workers that are potentially united by their common involvement in
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 30
moving cargo, possessing interdependent power by virtue of their strategic position in the
supply chain, but practically divided by organization, industry, race/ethnicity and labor
market status. As mentioned, one of the objectives of the ILWU is to “march inland” to
organize cargo moving workers and expand union jurisdiction. How will the divisions
between the adjacent labor forces that we have described impact such a strategy?
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper has examined two segments of the intermodal container supply chain –
the port container terminal and drayage operations. The purpose was to develop a better
understanding of the different organizational and industrial features of the two
interdependent sectors, the divergent labor market and working conditions, and the extent
to which such differences impact the level of integration and seamlessness between the
two interacting segments of the supply chain. The analysis has been informed by the
interorganization theories of transaction cost and resource dependence as well as labor
market theories of segmentation and dualism. The sharp differences in industrial structure
between the two segments – in terms of scale economy, capital intensiveness,
concentration, multinational reach – and consequent labor market conditions generate
both intermodal disarticulation and intermodal labor segmentation that undermine the
supply chain objectives of integrative seamlessness as well as prospects for labor unity.
There are some larger implications, both theoretical and practical, that are also
worth noting. First, the study of interorganizational integration and governance structures
has been heavily influenced by transaction cost theory. However, the analysis here would
suggest that the intermodal transport chain is characterized by unique interorganizational
relations and characteristics that cannot be completely incorporated into the logic of
transaction cost theory. The terminal-drayage nexus does not conform to a “make-or-
buy” calculus or the common supplier-customer relationship inherent to production
processes. More generally, this points to the need for greater specification of the
differences between production and distribution processes in the application of
transaction cost theory and what would constitute optimal governance arrangements in
intermodal supply chains (see e.g. Pirrong, 1993; Lafontaine & Masten, 2002). Even if
we were able to easily apply transaction cost theory to this case, a second related issue
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 31
would immediately emerge – the extent to which costs come into play and, more
specifically, how they are externalized. From the perspective of the terminal operator, the
container has been received, is stacked in the container yard, and is made available for
pickup. The primary costs are associated with container movement, storage and space
utilization rather than expeditious departure. From the perspective of the trucking firm,
there is an interest in moving the container expeditiously to its next destination but while
delays and bottlenecks associated with port terminal entry are widely recognized and
acknowledged, there is no alternative terminal where a container can be obtained, and the
costs are absorbed by the drivers rather than the trucking firms. Externalization of costs,
rather than the absence of costs, in this case, makes the transaction cost model
problematic as a basis for predicting interorganizational arrangements and solutions (see
Bensman, 2009a for a full inventory of externalized costs). This is just one example of
the larger phenomenon in which negative externalities are not cost-accounted for by firms
and, in turn, not reflected in the market price of commodities or services (Patel, 2010).
A second major implication of this study pertains to relations among workers at
different points in the intermodal supply chain. While all are contributing to the
movement of commodities, there are sharp disparities in compensation and working
conditions between workers in the different organizations and industries involved in
intermodal transport and cargo handling. Dual economy and segmented labor market
theories can inform and contribute explanations for these differences but greater theory
and research should be directed toward those occasions of direct interaction between
workers and the translation of structural differences into hostility and antagonism that
impacts both efficiency and labor solidarity. The existence of nonstandard and temporary
labor arrangements, becoming increasingly common, exacerbates social divisions across
the intermodal supply chain.
Among the policy implications, Bensman (2009a) has outlined some of the key
elements in his analysis from the drayage side of the equation. Generally, this would
involve a reregulation of the drayage sector with the objective of more accurately
classifying owner-operators as employees, implementing stricter diesel emission
standards that would remove older trucks from the road, and develop uniform chassis
standards to address highway safety. As already noted, and as Bensman emphasizes,
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 32
internalizing costs to trucking firms would provide a strong incentive to invest in the
technologies and electronic information and communication systems that would tighten
the drayage-terminal and drayage-warehouse interface.
In addition, on the port terminal side, there is a need to organize meetings with
and facilitate greater communications between longshore workers and drayage drivers to
discuss the issues of concern and to establish mutual respect and understanding of the
challenges facing both groups of workers in carrying out their jobs. This raises the larger
question of responsibility and accountability in a port economy, which often becomes
muddled under particular port governance arrangements (Brooks, 2003). For example,
under the increasingly dominant “landlord” model, the port leases its property to various
“tenants” (Slack & Fremont, 2005). The landlord port is often reluctant to impose
prescriptive and/or restrictive guidelines and will typically view actions by tenants,
assuming they don’t violate federal or state laws and regulations, as managerial
prerogatives. This can make it more difficult to align the port economy with the interests
of the larger community or the range of stakeholders (Notteboom & Winkelmans, 2003)
or for the port authority to mitigate negative externalities.
Finally, on the drayage issue the recent implementation of clean ports programs,
most notably at the Port of Los Angeles, has brought the status of port responsibility and
drayage driver classification status to the forefront while also potentially addressing,
maybe unintended, the broader efficiency of the drayage-terminal linkage. Because many
owner operators drive older trucks that expel greater levels of toxic diesel emissions, and
because the cost to either upgrade to new models or retrofit is beyond the financial
capacity of most drivers, the Port of Los Angeles mandated that only employee drivers,
rather than independent owner operators, could enter the terminal. This was designed to
improve air quality by ensuring that newer emission compliant vehicles, bought, owned,
and maintained by trucking companies rather than owner operators, would be doing the
local drayage. As employees paid by the hour, and with newer truck models, incentives
would be in place to reduce time delays and implement electronic information and
communication technologies. The Port of LA policy was challenged by the American
Trucking Association, and the employee only provision was deemed unconstitutional. .
However, recent congressional hearings on the Clean Truck programs at the ports of Los
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 33
Angeles and Long Beach ended up focusing primarily on the plight of the owner
operators, their contractual arrangements with trucking companies, and their
misclassification as “independent” contractors. There is likely to be further investigation
of this issue and some federal policy proposals that could ultimately impact the drayage-
terminal nexus.
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 34
REFERENCES
Aoyama, Y., Ratick, S., & Schwarz, G. (2006). Organizational dynamics of the US logistics industry: An economic geography perspective. The Professional Geographer, 58(3), 327-340.
Arabian Business. (2006). 2006 port acquisitions just the beginning. Arabian Business.Com. December 1. http://www.arabianbusiness.com/4076?tmpl=component&page
Arnesen, E. (1998). Up from exclusion: Black and white workers, race, and the state of labor history. Reviews in American History, 26(1), 146-174.
Baird, A. (2002). Privatization trends at the worlds top-100 container ports. Maritime Policy &# 38; Management, 29(3), 271-284.
Beck, U. (2000). The brave new world of work. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beck, E., Horan, P. M., & Tolbert, C. M. (1978). Stratification in a dual economy: A sectoral model of earnings determination. American Sociological Review, 43(5), 704-720.
Belman, D. L., & Monaco, K. A. (2001). The effects of deregulation, de-unionization, technology, and human capital on the work and work lives of truck drivers. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 54(2A), 502-524.
Belzer, M. H. (1995). Collective bargaining after deregulation: Do the teamsters still count? Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 48(4), 636-655.
Belzer, M. H. (2000). Sweatshops on wheels: Winners and losers in trucking deregulation Oxford University Press, USA.
Bensman, D. (2008a). Globalization and the labor markets of the logistics industry. Industry Studies Conference Paper.
Bensman, D. (2009a). PORT TRUCKING DOWN THE LOW ROAD. New York, NY: Demos.
Bensman, D. (2009b). Port trucking: The weak link in the US global logistics train. Industry Studies Association,
Bensman, D., & Bromberg, Y. (2008b). Port truckers survey at New Jersey ports. . New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University.,
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 35
Betcherman, G., & Rebne, D. (1987). Technology and control of the labor process: Fifty years of longshoring on the US west coast. Workers, Managers, and Technological Change: Emerging Patterns of Labor Relations, , 73-89.
Bichou, K., & Gray, R. (2004). A logistics and supply chain management approach to port performance measurement. Maritime Policy & Management, 31(1), 47-67.
Bonacich, E. (1972). A theory of ethnic antagonism: The split labor market. American Sociological Review, 37(5), 547-559.
Bonacich, E. (2003). PULLING THE PLUG: Labor and the global supply. New Labor Forum, , 12(2) 41-48.
Bonacich, E., Alimahomed, S., & Wilson, J. B. (2008). The racialization of global labor. American Behavioral Scientist, 52(3), 342.
Bonacich, E., & Wilson, J. B. (2008). Getting the goods: Ports, labor, and the logistics revolution Cornell University Press.
Brooks, M. (2004). The governance structure of ports. Review of Network Economics, 3 (2), 168-183.
Capineri, C., Leinbach, T. R., & Gips, D. (2006). Freight transport, seamlessness, and competitive advantage in the global economy. EJTIR, 6(1), 23-38.
Castells, M. (1996). Rise of the network society: The information age: Economy, society and culture.
Coalition for Healthy Ports. (2009). Driving on fumes: port truck congestion exposes the high cost of doing business in Newark. July. http://www.healthyports.org/fileadmin/files_nynj/Driving_on_Fumes_low_FINAL.pdf
Coase, R. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386-405.
Coe, N. M., Hess, M., Yeung, H. W., Dicken, P., & Henderson, J. (2004). 'Globalizing'regional development: A global production networks perspective. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 29(4), 468-484.
Cummings, S. (1980). White ethnics, racial prejudice, and labor market segmentation. American Journal of Sociology, 85(4), 938-950.
Davis-Blake, A., & Uzzi, B. (1993). Determinants of employment externalization: A study of temporary workers and independent contractors. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(2), 195-223.
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 36
Dickens, W. T., & Lang, K. (1988). The reemergence of segmented labor market theory. The American Economic Review, 78(2), 129-134.
Dill, W. R. (1958). Environment as an influence on managerial autonomy. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2(4), 409-443.
Dube, A., Evans, R., Hall, P., Olney, P., Swearington, V., Willis, A., & Wolff, G. (2004). On the waterfront and beyond: Technology and the changing nature of cargo-related employment in the West coast. Institute for Labor and Employment. University of California. August.
East Bay Alliance for a Sustainable Economy. (2007). Taking the low road. Oakland, CA.: East Bay Alliance for a Sustainable Economy.
Edwards, R., Reich, M., & Gordon, D. M. (1975). Labor market segmentation DC Heath.
Evangelista, P., & Morvillo, A. (1999). Alliances in liner shipping: An instrument to gain operational efficiency or supply chain integration? International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications, 2(1), 21-38.
Finlay, W. (1987). Industrial relations and firm behavior: Informal labor practices in the west coast longshore industry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 32(1), 49-67.
Fisher, E. G., & Kondra, A. (1993). Responding to environmental change in longshoring: Four north american experiences. Journal of Labor Research, 14(1), 1-27.
Frémont, A. (2009). Empirical evidence for integration and disintegration of maritime shipping, port and logistics activities. OECD/ITF Joint Transport Research Centre Discussion Papers,
Gereffi, G., & Korzeniewicz, M. (1994). Commodity chains and global capitalism Greenwood Pub Group.
Gereffi, Gary and Gary G. Hamilton. 1996. “Commodity Chains and Embedded Networks: The Economic Organization of Global Capitalism.” Paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, New York City.
Hacker, J. S. (2006). The great risk shift: The assault on american jobs, families, health care, and retirement and how you can fight back Oxford University Press, USA.
Harrison, B., & Sum, A. (1979). The theory of" dual" or segmented labor markets. Journal of Economic Issues, 13(3), 687-706.
Harrison, R., Hutson, N., West, J., & Wilke, J. (2007). Characteristics of drayage operations at the port of houston, texas. Transportation Research Record, 2033(-1), 31-37.
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 37
Harvey, D. (1989). The condition of postmodernity: An enquiry into the origins of cultural change Blackwell Pub.
Heaver, T., Meersman, H., Moglia, F., & Van De Voorde, E. (2000). Do mergers and alliances influence european shipping and port competition? Maritime Policy & Management, 27(4), 363-373.
Heaver, T., Meersman, H., & Van De Voorde, E. (2001). Co-operation and competition in international container transport: Strategies for ports. Maritime Policy & Management, 28(3), 293-305.
Heaver, T. D. (1995). The implications of increased competition among ports for port policy and management. Maritime Policy & Management, 22(2), 125-133.
Henderson, J., Dicken, P., Hess, M., Coe, N., & Yeung, H. W. C. (2002). Global production networks and the analysis of economic development. Review of International Political Economy, 9(3), 436-464.
Hesse, M., & Rodrigue, J. P. (2004). The transport geography of logistics and freight distribution. Journal of Transport Geography, 12(3), 171-184.
Hesse, M., & Rodrigue, J. P. (2006). Global production networks and the role of logistics and transportation. Growth and Change, 37(4), 499-509.
International Asset Systems. n.d. “The Virtual Container Yard: Reducing the Operational and Environmental Costs of Container Management”
Ircha, M., & Garey, D. (1992). Labour/management relations in north american ports. Maritime Policy & Management, 19(2), 139-156.
Jacobs, W., Ducruet, C., & De Langen, P. (2010). Integrating world cities into production networks: The case of port cities. Global Networks, 10(1), 92-113.
Jacobs, W., & Hall, P. V. (2007). What conditions supply chain strategies of ports? the case of dubai. GeoJournal, 68(4), 327-342.
Jaffee, D. (2001). Organization theory: Tension and change McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages.
Jaffee, D. (2009). Cargo votes with its rudder: The geographic mobility of shipping and the role of labor. Unpublished Manuscript.,
Jaffee, D., & Rowley, A. (2009). Hauling containers: Port drayage drivers in the logistics supply chain. Paper Prepared for Presentation at the Annual Southern Sociological Society Meetings, April, 2009, Atlanta.,
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 38
Janelle, D. G., & Beuthe, M. (1997). Globalization and research issues in transportation. Journal of Transport Geography, 5(3), 199-206.
Kalleberg, A. L. (2003). Flexible firms and labor market segmentation: Effects of workplace restructuring on jobs and workers. Work and Occupations, 30(2), 154.
Kalleberg, A. L. (2009). Precarious work, insecure workers: Employment relations in transition. American Sociological Review, 74(1), 1-22.
Kalleberg, A.L. and Schmidt, K. (1996). Contingent employment in organizations: Parttime, temporary, and subcontracting relations. Organizations in America: Analyzing their Structures and Human Resource Practices, , 253-275.
Kalleberg, A. L., & Marsden, P. V. (2005). Externalizing organizational activities: Where and how US establishments use employment intermediaries. Socio-Economic Review, 3(3), 389.
Kalleberg, A. L., Reynolds, J., & Marsden, P. V. (2003). Externalizing employment: Flexible staffing arrangements in US organizations. Social Science Research, 32(4), 525-552.
Kasarda, J. D. (2000). New logistics technologies and infrastructure for the digitized economy. 4th International Conference on Technology Policy and Innovation, 28-31.
Killingsworth, C. C. (1962). Industrial relations and automation. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 340(1), 69.
Lafontaine, F., & Masten, S. E. (2002). Contracting in the absence of specific investments and moral hazard: Understanding carrier-driver relations in US trucking. NBER Working Paper,
Langlois, R. N., & Robertson, P. L. (1995). Firms, markets, and economic change: A dynamic theory of business institutions Routledge.
Levinson, M. (2006). The box: How the shipping container made the world smaller and the world economy bigger Princeton Univ Pr.
Lieb, R., Millen, R., & Van Wassenhove, L. (1993). International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management, 6(23), 35-44.
Marlow, P. B., & Paixão Casaca, A. C. (2003). Measuring lean ports performance. International Journal of Transport Management, 1(4), 189-202.
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 39
Masters, J. K., & Miles, G. (2002). Predicting the use of external labor arrangements: A test of the transaction costs perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 45(2), 431-442.
Meersman, H., & Van de Voorde, E. (2001). International logistics: A continuous search for competitiveness. Handbook of Logistics and Supply-Chain Management, , 61.
Mentzer, J. T., DeWitt, W., Keebler, J. S., Min, S., Nix, N. W., Smith, C. D., et al. (2001). Defining supply chain management. Journal of Business Logistics, 22(2), 1-26.
Milkman, R. (2002). High road or low road? Industrial Relations: Critical Perspectives on Business and Management, , 87.
Monaco, K., Grobar, L., (2005). A study of drayage at the ports of los angeles and long beach METRANS Transportation Center; Available through the National Technical Information Service.
Monaco, K., & Olsson, L. (2005). Labor at the ports: A comparison of the ILA and ILWU. Unpublished Paper, Department of Economics, California State University, Long Beach,
Morlok, E., & Spasovic, L. N. (1994). Redesigning rail-truck intermodal drayage operations for enhanced service and cost performance. Transportation Research Forum, , 34 16–31.
Nelson, B. (2001). Divided we stand: American workers and the struggle for black equality Princeton University Press.
Nickerson, J. A., & Silverman, B. S. (2003). Why firms want to organize efficiently and what keeps them from doing so: Inappropriate governance, performance, and adaptation in a deregulated industry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 48(3), 433-465.
Notteboom, T. E. (2004). Container shipping and ports: An overview. Review of Network Economics, 3(2), 86-106.
Notteboom, T. & Rodrigue, J-P. 2010. The corporate geography of the global container terminal operators. in K. Dobrowolski and J. Zurek (eds), Enterprises on the Global Market, The Foundation of the Development of Gdansk University: Gdansk. Nooteboom, T. & Rodrigue, J-P. (2009). Economic cycles and the organizational and geographical attributes of global value chains: Is the pendulum changing direction. Paper presented at Integrating Maritime Transport in Value Chains workshop, Montreal, June.
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 40
Notteboom, T. E., & Rodrigue, J. P. (2005). Port regionalization: Towards a new phase in port development. Maritime Policy & Management, 32(3), 297-313.
Notteboom, T. E., & Winkelmans, W. (2001). Structural changes in logistics: How will port authorities face the challenge? Maritime Policy & Management, 28(1), 71-89.
Olivier, D., & Slack, B. (2006). Rethinking the port. Environment and Planning A, 38(8), 1409-1427.
Osterman, P. (2000). Securing prosperity: The American labor market: How it has changed and what to do about it Princeton University Press.
Panayides, P. M. (2002). Economic organization of intermodal transport. Transport Reviews, 22(4), 401-414.
Panayides, P. M. (2006). Maritime logistics and global supply chains: Towards a research agenda. Maritime Economics &# 38; Logistics, 8(1), 3-18.
Panayides, P. M., & Dong-Wook Song. (2008). Evaluating the integration of seaport container terminals in supply chains
Patel, Raj. 2010. The Value of Nothing: How to Reshape Market Society and Redefine Democracy. Picador. Payne, G. (2007). "Everyone in the pool!," Containerisation International, July.
Peoples, J., & Talley, W. K. (2004). Owner-operator truck driver earnings and employment: Port cities and deregulation. Transportation Labor Issues and Regulatory Reform, Research in Transportation Economics, 10, 191-213.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1976). The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective Stanford Business Books.
Piore, M. (1972). Notes for a theory of labor market stratification. Working Papers,
Pirrong, S. C. (1993). Contracting practices in bulk shipping markets: A transactions cost explanation. Journal of Law and Economics, 36(2), 937-976.
Piven, F. F. (2006). Challenging authority: How ordinary people change america Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc.
Port Jobs. (2007). Big rig, short haul: A study of port truckers in seattle. Port Jobs, Seattle, WA,
Prince, T. (2005). Endangered species: Economic instability threatens drayage operators and their customers. Journal of Commerce, , 12–16.
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 41
Reich, M., Gordon, D. M., & Edwards, R. C. (1973). A theory of labor market segmentation. The American Economic Review, 63(2), 359-365.
Robinson, R. (2006). Port-oriented landside logistics in australian ports: A strategic framework. Maritime Economics & Logistics, 8(1), 40.
Rodrigue, J. P., & Notteboom, T. (2009). The terminalization of supply chains: Reassessing the role of terminals in port/hinterland logistical relationships. Maritime Policy &# 38; Management, 36(2), 165-183.
Rodrigue, J-P, Comtois, C., Slack, B. (2009). The Geography of Transport Systems. New York: Routledge. Available online at: http://www.people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/index.html
Schwarz-Miller, A., & Talley, W. K. (2002). Technology and labor relations: Railroads and ports. Journal of Labor Research, 23(4), 513-533.
Scott, W. R. (1981). Organizations: Rational, natural, and open systems Prentice hall Upper Saddle River, NJ.
Silver, B. J. (2003). Forces of labor: Workers' movements and globalization since 1870 Cambridge Univ Pr.
Slack, B., 2007, The Terminalization of Seaports, in J. Wang et al. (eds) Ports, Cities, and Global Supply Chains, Aldershot, Ashgate, pp. 41-50.
Slack, B. (1993). Pawns in the game: Ports in a global transportation system. Growth and Change, 24(4), 579-588.
Slack, B., & Frémont, A. (2005). Transformation of port terminal operations: From the local to the global. Transport Reviews, 25(1), 117-130.
Song, D. W., & Panayides, P. (2008). Global supply chain and port/terminal: Integration and competitiveness. Maritime Policy and Management, 35(1), 73-88.
Srour, F. (2010). Dissecting drayage: An examination of structure, information, and control in drayage operations.
Stratton, S. (2000). Marxist theory, the globalization of port development and the role of labour. Journal of Social Change and Critical Inquiry, 2, 11-12.
Taylor, J., & Jackson, G. (2000). Conflict, power, and evolution in the intermodal transportation industry's channel of distribution. Transportation Journal, 39(3), 5-17.
Jaffee, “Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain…” 42
Teese, D. J. (1976). Vertical Integration and Vertical Divestiture in the U.S. Oil Industry: Analysis and Policy Implications. Stanford: Stanford University Institute for Energy Studies.
Theofanis, S., Boile, M., Janakiraman, S., & Naniopoulos, A. (2007). Reducing unproductive empty container movements around marine container terminals: The role of a virtual container yard. Proceedings of the 2007 IAME Conference, Athens, Greece,
Turnbull, P. J., & Wass, V. J. (2007). Defending dock workers-globalization and labor relations in the world's ports. Ind.Relat., 46(3), 582-612.
Turner, J. H. (1986). Toward a unified theory of ethnic antagonism: A preliminary synthesis of three macro models. Sociological Forum, , 1(3) 403-427.
Van Der Horst, M. R., & De Langen, P. W. (2008). Coordination in hinterland transport chains: A major challenge for the seaport community. Maritime Economics &# 38; Logistics, 10, 1(2), 108-129.
Watson, R. 1999. "National Drayage Company: Idea Whose Time Has Come?", The Journal of Commerce Home Page, October 19, pp. 1-2.
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies, analysis and antitrust implications Simon & Schuster.
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.
Williamson, O. E. (2008). Outsourcing: Transaction cost economics and supply chain management.. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 44(2), 5-16.
Wright, E. O. (2000). Working-class power, capitalist-class interests, and class compromise 1. American Journal of Sociology, 105(4), 957-1002.