Jabali the Proto-materialist in the Valmiki Ramayana: A Close Study

Reflections on the Jābāli episode in the

Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa (Ayodhyākāṇḍa)

Ramkrishna Bhattacharya

Pavlov Institute, 98, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Kolkata 700 007, India. [email protected], [email protected].

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Reflections on the Jābāli episode in the

Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa (Ayodhyākāṇḍa)

Abstract Jābāli, one of the priest-cum-counsellors of king Daśaratha, has long been

recognized as an odd character, preaching materialism in order to persuade Rāma to

go back to Ayodhyā after the death of his father. The critical edition of the Vālmīki

Rāmāyaṇa reveals several stanzas interpolated in the vulgate so as to denigrate

Jābāli and brand him as a rank opportunist. In spite of that, whatever remains of

Jābāli’s speech addressed to Rāma evinces one of the basic tenets of materialist

ontology, i.e., denial of the existence of any other-world (paraloka), and hence the

futility of performing rites for the ancestors (śrāddha). However, nothing is said

about the epistemology, (specially concerning the instruments of cognition), ethics,

and metaphysics of materialism as it existed at the time when the Rāmāyaṇa was

redacted. Considering all this it is better to call Jābāli a proto-materialist who speaks

of a philosophy akin to the teachings of Ajita Kesakambala, a senior contemporary of

the Buddha, whose doctrine has been dubbed as that of annihilation (ucchedavāda)

in the Tipiṭaka. Both of them belong to the pre-Cārvāka materialist tradition in India.

Keywords: Instruments of cognition (pramāṇa) · Interpolation · the other-world

(paraloka) · Pre-Cārvāka · Proto-materialism.

Occurrence of the names of philosophical systems in non-philosophical writings is not

always surprising. I am not thinking of such closet plays as Jayantabhaṭṭa’s

Āgamadambara or Kṛṣṇmiśra’s allegorical play, Prabodhacandrodaya or

Śaṅkaravijaya which have philosophical debates as their theme. Nor do I mean a

secondary epic like Śrīharṣa’s Naisdhacarita, in which Mīmaṃsā, non-dual Vedānta,

and Nyāya are satirized (17.60-61, 74, 75). I mean rather such works as the

Kāmasūtra, a work of erotics, or Dhvanyāloka-Locana, a commentary on a work of

poetics (for details see R. Bhattacharya, 2011b, pp.55-64), or Kalhana’s annals of the

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kings of Kashmir, Rājataraṅginī (4.345), and the like. The name of Lokāyata is not

expected in a romance like Bāṇabhaṭṭa’s Kādambarī. Yet in course of a series of

similes the Lokāyatikas are brought in; we find them again in a strange kind of

ascetics’ grove (tapovana) rubbing shoulders with the adherents of several

philosophical systems, both orthodox and heterodox, living and in peaceful co-

existence and arguing to their heart’s content (see Appendix A below).

Similarly there are anonymous floating verses both praising and blaming the

pundits of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā (Subhāṣitaratnabhāṇḍāgāra, pp. 44-45). A besotted

lover in the Amaruśataka, who could think of nothing else but his beloved, finds her

everywhere, and wonders: ‘All things in the world are she, she, she, she; what non-

dualist doctrine is this?’ (sā sā sā sā jagati sakale ko’yam advaitavādaḥ,

Amaraśataka, 102, p.69).

A more intriguing situation is created when the basic doctrines of a

philosophical system are stated in so many words in a poem or a play. But the name

of the system remains undisclosed, one would think, quite unnecessarily. Any

informed reader of the Naisdhacarita would understand who the anonymous

member of Kali’s army is: he must be a materialist whom the gods denounce

(17.37 et seq and 17.84 et seq). Yet Cārvāka is never mentioned.1 There are also

other works in which no name is mentioned at all, but any informed reader would

understand that a materialist is the butt of attack.

Instances of such veiled representation of the darśanas are found both in the

two primary epics, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata, although no names are

named. The Jābāli episode in the Rām Ayodhyākāṇḍa (cantos 100-01 in the critical

edition, cantos 108-09 in the vulgate)2 has often been mentioned as such

1 K.K. Handiqui renders 17.92 as follows: ‘The god of fire blazed in anger and said, rebuking Cārvāka…’ (p.255) and 17.95 as ‘…as if strung by the Cārvāka’s utterance’ (ibidem). But the text does not mention Cārvāka in either of the verses. However, it refers to Lokāyata in the second. Nārayaṇa, the zealous commentator, explains the vocative re as re cārvāka nīca, ‘O the lowly/mean Cārvāka’ in the first instance and Lokāyata as nāstikādhama, the worst of the negativists,’ in the second. 2 The text commented on by Rāma in his Tilaka commentary (which agrees with S (the southern recension) has been generally accepted as representing the vulgate (Bālakāṇḍa, crit. ed., Supplementary Introduction, IV). I have used the Parimal Pub. edition (1983) which contains, besides

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a source. Both the commentators and the translators have almost universally used the

name Cārvāka to the doctrine that Jābāli preaches in Rām Ayodhyākāṇḍa. However, it

is historically inaccurate. The Cārvākas did not appear on the scene before the eighth

century, while the Rām had been redacted between 400 BCE and 400 CE, before the

redaction of the MBh.

But then the appellations Cārvāka and Lokāyata had been widely employed as a

namesake of materialism in India even in pre-modern times. At least from the eighth

century onwards, the terms, Bārhaspatya, Cārvāka, Lokāyata, and nāstika were treated

as synonymous (see n4 below). As to the Rām the commentaries on vulgate 100.38

and Bv1 (Bengali version), 109.29 and 116.22,44, use any of the last three names to

indicate the same person and the doctrine he preaches. Many modern scholars (e.g.

Jacobi p.161) and translators have followed suit.3

Tilaka, two more commentaries, Śiromaṇi by Śivasahāya, and Bhῡṣaṇa by Govindarāja. I have also consulted Manoharā by Lokanātha Cakravarttī, and Amṛtakataka by Mādhavayogin. They all gloss nāstika as cārvāka in their explications of Rāma’s speech equating the nāstika with the Buddhist and the thief (vulgate 109.34; crit. ed. additional passage 2241* lines 13-16). Modern translators have followed them.

Unfortunately I had no access to the commentary by Rāmānuja, referred to by Phanibhushana Tarkavagisa (I: p.xiv). Rāmānuja, Tarkavagisa reports, mentions two kinds of Lokāyatikas, āstika and nāstika, and distinguishes between the followers of Nyāya and those of the Cārvāka accordingly. Tarkavagisa concurs with the view that in ancient times Nyāya too was known as Lokāyata (I: p.xv). 3 E.g. Gorresio Bv 109.29 ‘Brahmani atei’ p.401, M.N. Dutt vulgate 100.38 ‘atheistical Brahmanas’ p.455 and Pollock crit. ed. 94.32 ‘brahmans who are materialists,’ for lokāyatikān brāhmaṇān. In his note on 101.29, Pollock always writes ‘Cārvāka’: ‘Such is a thief, such a Buddhist; know that in this the Tathāgata and Nāstika are included.’ although the interpolated passage has nāstika, not Cārvāka:

yathā hi coraḥ sa tathāhi buddhastathāgataṃ nāstikamatra viddhi | tasmātddhi yaḥ śakyatamaḥ prajānāṃsanāstikenābhimukho budhaḥ syāt |

(vul. 109.34; crit. ed. Additional Passage 2241* lines 13-16) Jābāli too in his reply uses the word nāstika only, and no such word as Cārvāka or Lokāyata:

‘I do not speak the language of nāstikas nor am I a nāstika, nor is it true that there is naught beyond this world! Suiting the occasion, I assume at times the rôle of an āstika and at others that of a nāstika! It seemed to me the time had come to assume the language of a nāstika, O Rāma, in order to persuade thee to return. It was for the purpose of conciliating thee that I made this declaration! (H. P. Shastri’s trans. (modified) p.417. Shastri indiscriminately writes ‘unbeliever’ and ‘atheist’ for nāstika.)

na nāstikānāṃ vacanaṃ bravīmyahaṃ na nāstiko’haṃ na ca nāsti kiṃcana | samīkṣya kālaṃ punarāstiko’bhavaṃ bhaveya kāle punareva nāstikaḥ | na cāpi kālo’yam upāgataḥ śanair yathā mayā nāstikavāg udīritā | nivartanārthaṃ tava rāma kāraṇāt prasādanārthaṃ ca mayaitad udīritam | (vulgate 109.38-39, crit. ed. Additional Passage 2241* lines 21-26 and 2241 (B)*.)

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It will, however, be improper to think that any mention or allusion to early

materialist doctrine/s found in narratives or even canonical works of the Buddhists

and the Jains always refer to what is now called the Cārvāka/Lokāyata; it may refer

to any Pre-Cārvāka materialist view or even early Sāṃkhya. Concerning the colloquy

on cosmogony in the Bhṛgu-Bharadvāja duologue (Mbh, 12.180.11-18), Nīlakaṇṭha

says that Bharadvāja by adopting (lit. positioning himself on) the Lokāyata doctrine

raises this objection (lokāyatamate sthitvā ākṣipati). Apparently Nīlakaṇṭha did not

distinguish between the two materialisms, one embodied in Sāṃkhya, the other in

Cārvāka. Not only Nīlakaṇṭha but Dahlmann, too, calls Bharadvāja a materialist (Die

Sāṃkhya Philosophie, S. 193ff, mentioned in the Mbh, Śāntiparvan, crit. ed. p.2157

col.2). S.K. Belvalkar, prejudiced as he was against materialism, summarily dismisses

this identification by saying: ‘[T]he question of Bharadvāja is pitched on a much higher

key than that of a mere Cārvāka….’ (ibidem). Presumably Belvalkar, like many others

before and after him, employs the name Cārvāka figuratively (synecdoche, an individual

for the class) to suggest any materialist, Sāṃkhya or Lokāyata or Cārvāka,

indiscriminately, irrespective of the time from when the names are found in

philosophical literature. Apparently, Nīlakṇṭha too could not think of any other variety

of materialism than the Cārvāka/Lokāyata although the so-called epic Sāṃkhya can

always claim such a title. Mādhavayogin, a more perceptive commentator of the Rām,

has pointed out that ‘no revealed or traditional text is it shown that liberation is secured

through logical knowledge, “dialectical reasoning”; all logicians (including Pañcaśikha,

one of the founders of the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy) are materialists, and even

those who accept the word of the vedas do so selectively, and deny that the soul is

pure consciousness, nondifferent from Brahmā, and so on.’ (cited by Pollock in a note

on his translation of the Rām crit. ed. 94.33. For the original see Rām 1965, p.342).

In what follows I propose to offer some reflections on the Jābāli episode which

to all medieval commentators and, since the western scholars got acquainted with

the Rām, has been instantly recognized as a representation of materialism (Muir

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1862). The only materialist doctrine that they knew of was Cārvāka/Lokāyata/

Bārhaspatya/Nāstika (as communicated by H. T. Colebrooke 1827/1837 and H. H.

Wilson 1828), and so Jābāli’s preaching was automatically identified by them with

Cārvāka’s.

#

The name of Cārvāka in the philosophical context (which naturally excludes the

demon Cārvāka mentioned in the MBh (critical ed. 12.39.23-47, vulgate chapters 38-

39), as noted above, does not occur before the eighth century CE..4 Lokāyata in early

Buddhist Pali and Sanskrit, and Prakrit sources stands for disputatio, the science and

art of disputation, vitataṇḍa(vāda)sattham, vitaṇḍāśāstra (R. Bhattacharya

2009/2011 pp.187-96, 2012c pp.98-103). In course of time this name also came to

denote materialist philosophy. Lokāyata as the name of a philosophical system with

Bṛhaspati as its teacher is first found in the Tamil epic Maṇimēkalai (composed

between the fourth and the seventh century), 27.78-80,264,273. This Lokāyata is to

be distinguished from vitaṇḍāvādaśāstra. The Maṇimēkalai also contains a brief

exposition of a doctrine called bhῡtavāda, a term which is the exact Sanskrit and

Tamil rendering of ‘materialism’.5

The text of the Rām had been redacted before all this. The Jābāli episode thus

represents the views of a pre-Cārvāka materialist, or rather a proto-materialist (as

we shall presently see), largely similar but not in all respects identical to a Cārvāka.

For one thing, the episode contains only one aspect of the ontology of old

4 Jinendrabuddhi, 24: atha vā cārvākaṃ pratyetaducyate…. Haribhadra’s ṢDSam chap. 6 is devoted to the exposition of Lokāyata (lokāyatā vadanty evam, etc. ‘The Lokāyatas say as follows,’ v. 80a), but in v. 85d we read: cārvākāḥ pratipedire ‘The Cārvākas contended’. See also Kamalaśīla who, in his commentary (Pañjikā) on Śāntarakṣita’s TS chap. 22 entitled ‘The Examination of the Lokāyata System,’ ‘Lokāyataparīkṣā’, uses the names Cārvāka and Lokāyata interchangeably. See TSP, II: pp.639,649,657, 663,665, also II: 520, 939 and 945. Jayantabhaṭṭa also treats the four names, Bārhaspatya, Cārvāka, Lokāyata, and nāstika, as synonymous. See NM, I: pp.9, 43,102-03,275,387-88, etc. Hemacandra, AC, 3. 526-27, too mentions the four as the names of the adherents of the same philosophical system. The Śabdakalpadruma too treats these four as paryāya words, similar in meaning. 5 Maṇimēkalai 27.265-77 pp.153-54. The bhῡtavādin in Maṇimēkalai, however, distinguishes himself from the Lokāyatas, who are said to be materialists belonging to a different school (27.272-73 p.154).

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materialism (see R. Bhattacharya 2013a p.1), viz. there is no life after death. Jābāli is

absolutely silent about all other aspects of materialism, especially its epistemology.

Another point to be noted in Jābāli’s exhortation to Rāma is the rejection of all

religious law-books as authority. In no uncertain terms he denies the validity of such

books. In this respect he very much resembles the lokāyatika brāhmana against

whom Rāma cautioned Bharata in Rām (Ayodhyākāṇḍa crit ed. 94.32, vulgate

100.28).

Such a representation is not unexpected. Jābāli speaks only as much as is

relevant to the given context; there was no occasion to deliver a thorough discourse

on the tenets of materialism as a whole. The episode thus contains a partial

representation of the doctrine. Despite this limitation, an in-depth study of the

episode is worth attempting.

Barring some casual mention in the Bālakāṇḍa, Book 1 of the epic (crit.

ed.11.6b and 68.4b), Jābāli’s name appears only thrice in the Ayodhyākāṇḍa,

Book 2 (crit. ed. 61.2d, 100.1a and 105.2b). Almost every time he is attributed

such epithets as mahāyaśa ’of great fame’, brāhmaṇottama ‘an excellent

Brahmin’, etc. There is no allusion to this episode or to Jābāli elsewhere in the

whole epic. However, the episode deserves a close study as much as Ajita

Kesakambala’s teachings recorded in the ‘SPhS’ (in DN 1) and elsewhere in the

Buddhist canonical texts do. (e.g., ‘Pāyāsirājaññasuttaṃ’ (DN 2: 10.1.2 p. 236),

‘Apaṇṇakasuttaṃ’ (MN 2: 10.1.3, 4 pp. 78-79), and ‘Sandakasuttaṃ’ (MN 2: 26.1.3 p.

213)).

#

This is how Jābāli, one of the king’s counsellors, asks Rāma to forget all about his

promise of going to and staying in the forest for fourteen years made to his father,

Daśaratha. Jābāli urges him to get back to the capital, Ayodhyā in order to hold the

reign of the state:

As righteous Rāma was consoling Bharata, a prominent brahmaṇ named Jabāli

addressed him in words at variance with righteousness: “Come now, Rāghava,

you must not entertain such nonsensical ideas like the commonest of men, and

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you a noble-minded man in distress. What man is kin to anyone, what profit has

anyone in anyone else? A person is born alone, and all alone he must die. And

thus, Rāma, the man who feels attachment thinking, ‘This is my mother, this my

father,’ should be regarded as a madman, for in truth no one belongs to anyone.

A man travelling from village to village will spend the night somewhere and next

day leave the place where he stopped and continue on – in the same way,

Kākutstha, his father and mother, his home and wealth are mere stopping places

for a man. The wise feel no attachment to them. You must not, best of men,

abdicate the kingship of your fathers and embark upon this unwise course,

painful, rocky and full of thorns. Consecrate yourself in prosperous Ayodhyā; the

city is waiting for you, wearing her single braid of hair. Indulge in priceless royal

pleasures and enjoy yourself in Ayodhyā, prince, like Śakra [Indra, the lord of the

gods] in his heaven. Daśaratha was nobody to you, and you were nobody to

him. The king was one person, you another. So do as I am urging. The king has

gone where he had to go; such is the course all mortals follow. You are merely

deluding yourself. The men I grieve for, and I grieve for no one else, are all who

place ‘righteousness’ above what brings them profit. They find only sorrow in this

world, and at death their lot is annihilation just the same. People here busy

themselves because ‘It is the Eighth Day,6 the rite for the ancestors.’ But just

look at the waste of food – what really is a dead man going to eat? And if

something one person eats here could fill the belly of someone else, one could

simply offer Śrāddha for a traveler, and he would need no provisions for the

road. It was only as a charm to secure themselves donations that cunning men

composed those books that tell us, ‘Sacrifice, give alms, sanctify yourself,

practice asceticism, renounce.’ Accept the idea once and for all, high-minded

prince, that there exists no world to come. Address yourself to what can be

perceived and turn your back on what cannot. Give precedence to these ideas of 6 Aṣṭakā. The word refers to the eighth tithi in every month after the full moon day, but as usual the law books for domestic rites (Gṛhyasῡtras) differ. See Moghe p.487. For further details Kane 4: pp.353-60.

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the wise, with which the whole world concurs. Be appeased by Bharata and

accept the kingship.” (100.1-17. Trans. Sheldon Pollock)

āśvāsayantaṃ bharataṃ jābālirbrāhmaṇottamaḥ |

uvāca rāmaṃ dharmajñaṃ dharmāpetamidaṃ vacaḥ || 1||

sādhu rāghava mā bhūtte buddhirevaṃ nirarthakā |

prākṛtasya narasyeva ārya buddhestapasvinaḥ || 2||

kaḥ kasya puruṣo bandhuḥ kimāpyaṃ kasya kena cit |

yadeko jāyate jantureka eva vinaśyati || 3||

tasmānmātā pitā ceti rāma sajjeta yo naraḥ |

unmatta iva sa jñeyo nāsti kāciddhi kasya cit || 4||

yathā grāmāntaraṃ gacchannaraḥ kaś citkva cidvaset |

utsṛjya ca tamāvāsaṃ pratiṣṭhetāpare|ahani || 5||

evameva manuṣyāṇāṃ pitā mātā gṛhaṃ vasu |

āvāsamātraṃ kākutstha sajjante nātra sajjanāḥ || 6||

pitryaṃ rājyaṃ samutsṛjya sa nārhati narottama |

āsthātuṃ kāpathaṃ duḥkhaṃ viṣamaṃ bahukaṇṭakam || 7||

samṛddhāyāmayodhyāyāmātmānamabhiṣecaya |

ekaveṇīdharā hi tvāṃ nagarī sampratīkṣate || 8||

rājabhogānanubhavanmahārhānpārthivātmaja |

vihara tvamayodhyāyāṃ yathā śakrastriviṣṭape || 9||

na te kaściddaśarataḥstvaṃ ca tasya na kaś cana |

anyo rājā tvamanyaśca tasmātkuru yaducyate || 10||

gataḥ sa nṛpatistatra gantavyaṃ yatra tena vai |

pravṛttireṣā martyānāṃ tvaṃ tu mithyā vihanyase || 11||

arthadharmaparā ye ye tāṃstāñśocāmi netarān |

te hi duḥkhamiha prāpya vināśaṃ pretya bhejire || 12||

aṣṭakā pitṛdaivatyamityayaṃ prasṛto janaḥ |

annasyopadravaṃ paśya mṛto hi kimaśiṣyati || 13||

yadi bhuktamihānyena dehamanyasya gacchati |

dadyātpravasataḥ śrāddhaṃ na tatpathyaśanaṃ bhavet || 14||

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dānasaṃvananā hyete granthā medhāvibhiḥ kṛtāḥ |

yajasva dehi dīkṣasva tapastapyasva santyaja || 15||

sa nāsti paramityeva kuru buddhiṃ mahāmate |

pratyakṣaṃ yattadātiṣṭha parokṣaṃ pṛṣṭhataḥ kuru || 16||

satāṃ buddhiṃ puraskṛtya sarvalokanidarśinīm |

rājyaṃ tvaṃ pratigṛhṇīṣva bharatena prasāditaḥ || 17||

The number of verses in the crit. ed. (100. 1-17) is one less than the vulgate

(108. 1-18). Verse 11 in the vulgate (see n6 below) is the only one that is found to

be interpolated (crit. ed. Additional Passage 2239*). In the Bengali (Gauḍῑya) version

(hereafter Bv) there are many more additional verses (116.4-11 and 28-39. See crit.

ed. Appendix 27). But the readings of all the recensions and versions need not detain

us here at this stage.

Jābāli’s speech is a lucid exposition of the basics of the materialist view

concerning life and death of humans. The contention is clear and unambiguous:

there is no other-world (paraloka), therefore it is useless to perform rites for the

ancestors (śrāddha); no credence is to be given to the granthas, that is, the

Dharmśāstras, which urge people to pay gifts (to the Brahmin priests), perform Vedic

sacrifices (yajñas), advocate renunciation, etc. Such things are nonsensical and serve

no purpose. Why is Daśaratha not to be considered as having any relation to Rāma

(as stated in verses 3-4)? The answer is provided in verses 4-6.7 The denunciation of

offering gifts, performing yajñas, etc. also resembles Ajita’s words:

O King, there is no (consequence to) alms-giving, sacrifice or oblation. A good or

bad action produces no result. This world does not exist, nor does the other

world. There is no mother, no father. There is no rebirth of beings after death.

7 The additional verse in the vulgate (108.11) explains the answer further: ‘The father is [supplies] but the seed of an offspring; the sperm and blood combine in a woman during her fertile period to bring about the birth of a person’ (crit. ed. 2239*. Pollock’s translation). It is perhaps in this sense that Ajita Kesakambala, a proto-materialist of the Buddha’s time, used to preach: ‘There is no mother, no father’, natthi mātā natthi pitā. See his speech quoted below.

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In this world, there are no samanas [Śramaṇas] or brāhmaṇas established in the

Noble Path and accomplished in good practice, who, through direct knowledge

(i.e., magga insight) acquired by their own efforts, can expound on this world

and the other world. This being is but a compound of the four great primary

elements; after death, the earth-element (or element of extension) returns and

goes back to the body of the earth, the water-element (or element of cohesion)

returns and goes back to the body of water, the fire-element (or element of

thermal energy) returns and goes back to the body of fire, and the air-element

(or element of motion) returns and goes back to the body of air, while the

mental faculties pass on into space. The four pall-bearers and the bier

(constituting the fifth) carry the corpse. The remains of the dead can be seen up

to the cemetery where bare bones lie graying like the colour of the pigeons. All

alms-giving ends in ashes. Fools prescribe alms-giving; and some assert that

there is such a thing as merit in alms-giving; but their words are empty, false

and nonsensical. Both the fool and the wise are annihilated and destroyed after

death and dissolution of their bodies. Nothing exists after death. Ten Suttas,

p.83, translation slightly modified.)

Natthi mahārāja dinnaṃ. Natthi yiṭṭhaṃ. Natthi hutaṃ. Natthi

sukaṭadukkaṭānaṃ kammānaṃ phalaṃ vipāko. Natthi ayaṃ loko. Natthi paro

loko. Natthi mātā. Natthi pitā. Natthi sattā opapātikā. Natthi loke

samaṇabrāhmaṇā sammaggatā3 sammāpaṭipannā ye imañca lokaṃ parañca

lokaṃ sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedenti. Cātummahābhūtiko ayaṃ puriso

yadā kālaṃ karoti, paṭhavī paṭhavikāyaṃ anupeti anupagacchati. Āpo

āpokāyaṃ anupeti anupagacchati. Tejo tejokāyaṃ anupeti anupagacchati.

Vāyo vāyokāyaṃ anupeti anupagacchati, ākāsaṃ induyāni saṃkamanti.

Āsandipañcamā purisā mataṃ ādāya gacchanti. Yāva āḷahanā padāni

paññāyanti. Kāpotakāni aṭṭhīni bhavanti. Bhasmantā āhutiyo. dattupaññattaṃ

yadidaṃ dānaṃ. tesaṃ tucchaṃ musā vilāpo ye keci atthikavādaṃ vadanti.

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Bāle ca paṇḍite ca kāyassa bhedā ucchijjanti vinassanti na honti

parammaraṇā"ti. (‘SPhS’, 2.4.21-23. DN 1: p. 48-49)

It should be noted that while introducing the doctrine of Kumāra Kassapa in the

‘Pāyasirajaññasutta’ (DN 2:10. 1. 2 p. 236) the opening words of this very discourse are

quoted verbatim albeit in a different order: natthi paro loko, natthi sattā opapātikā,

natthi sukaṭadukkaṭānaṃ kammānaṃ phalaṃ vipāko. In fact, this is the only proto-

materialist doctrine that is known and referred to in the Tipiṭaka and because of the

total rejection of everything that was considered sacred and beyond question by the

Buddhists. Hence it was called ucchedavāda, the doctrine of annihilation.

Ajita’s view concerning the other-world is also quoted almost verbatim in the

commentaries on Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamakaśāstra:

nāstyaṃ lokaḥ, nāsti paro lokaḥ, nāsti sukṛtaduṣkṛtānāṃ karmaṇāṃ phalam,

nāsti vipākaḥ, nāsti sattvānām upapāduka iti… Bhāvaviveka on 18.5, 2: p 60.

nāstyaṃ lokaḥ, nāsti paro lokaḥ, svattvānāmupapādako nāsti, iti… Nāgārjuna

on MŚ 18.6, .2: p 63.

nāstyaṃ loko, nāsti paraloko, nāsti sukṛtaduṣkṛtānāṃ karmaṇāṃ phalavipāko,

nāsti sattva upapāduka iti… Candrakῑrti, on 18.6, .2: p. 64.

yadayaṃ loko nāsti, paraloko nāsti, svattvānāmupapādako nāsti ityādi…

Buddhapālita on 18.7, .2: p. 66.

Similar views are expressed by a nāstika (not identified by any name but

definitely a Pre-Cārvāka materialist) in Mbh Śāntiparvan 211.22-28. The denunciation

of sacrificial acts, involving oblations, paying fees to the priests, etc., mentioned in

the first part of Ajita’s speech, is echoed in the words of the heretical king Vena in

the VDhMPu 1.108.19: ‘There is (no consequence to) offering gifts, oblations, rites,

nor are there gods and sages’, nāsti dattaṃ hutaṃ ceṣṭaṃ na devā ṛṣayo na ca.

Medhātithi probably refers to a part of this line in his commentary on Manu 3.150:

nāsti dattaṃ nāsti hutaṃ, and adds: ‘there is no other-world’, nāsti paralokaḥ (2:

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p.160). Explaining the word ‘reasoner’, haituka in Manu 4.30 Medhātithi repeats the

clauses in reverse order: nāsti paralokaḥ nāsti dattaṃ nāsti hurtaṃ… (2: p.315).

Similarly nāstikya in Manu 11.65 is glossed by him as nāsti paraloko nāsti dattaṃ

ityādyabhiniveśaḥ (6: p.62).

This is how Ajita’s words appear and reappear in diverse works and in

unexpected places, for prior to the appearance of the Cārvākas with their sharply

defined epistemology, Ajita’s doctrine of annihilation, ucchedavāda was the most

well-known exposition of proto-materialistic ontology. Ajita, however, covers a wider

ground than Jābāli does in his exhortation to Rāma. He also describes what happens

to the elements which make the body of humans. Jābāli says nothing about it.

#

Rāma does not offer a point-by-point reply to Jābāli’s advice but expatiates on the

duties of a warrior (kṣatriya) and the righteousness expected of him, the importance

of keeping words given to one’s father, etc. He focuses on what an editor of the Rām

has rightly described as ‘praise of truth’ satyapraśaṃsā (Madras ed. 1958, p.283);

Gaspare Gorresio, the Italian editor and translator of Rām Bv, also calls this canto

(118 in his ed.) lode del vero (1851 p.132).

It has been noted before that although one aspect of the materialist

ontology (viz. nothing remains of a human after her/his death) is presented by

Jābāli, there is no reference to its epistemology which, since the eighth century

CE, became the chief point of controversy between the Cārvākas and all other

Vedist schools. The words pratyakṣa and parokṣa (crit. ed.100.16 vulgate 108.17)

are apparently used to suggest what is immediately obtainable and what is not.

They do not carry any technical significance relating to sense-perception and

inference (anumāna), word or verbal testimony (śabda), or any other instrument

of cognition (pramāṇa) as used in the philosophical texts in India. Among the

commentators only Rāma (Tilaka) glosses parokṣa as inference, verbal testimony,

etc., anumānaśabdādi gamyaṃ; others remain true to the context: pratyakṣa is

happiness (in enjoying) the kingdom, rājyasukhaṃ (Śivasahāya), while parokṣa

suggests effects to be gained by complying with the words given to father, etc.,

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sukhaphalakaṃ pitṛvacanaparipālanādikam (Govindarāja). The Pre-Cārvāka

materialists, it is also known from other Buddhist and Jain sources,8 did not

believe in the existence of heaven and hell; they considered all religious rites,

particularly rites for the ancestors, to be futile. This view is forcefully reiterated by

Jābāli. Echoes of his words will be heard in the closing verses of S-M’s fourteenth-

century epitome, SDS, chap.1 pp.13.110–15.132. Some of them, particularly verses

3-4, 6, and 8-10, are similar to the anti-Vedic stanzas known at Patañjali’s time

(second century BCE) as ‘wild songs,’ pramattagīta, as opposed to the pro-Vedic

bhrāja (See R.Bhattacharya 2013c pp. 622-23).

It should, however, be kept in mind that the rules of śrāddha in an

authoritative Smṛti like the Manu involve, as in some other sacrificial rites, offering

flesh to the departed ancestors (3.268) and because of this alone such rites were

anathema to both the Jains and the Buddhists.9

Significantly enough, Jābāli says nothing definite about the grounds for

rejecting and ridiculing Vedic rules for the performance of śrāddha. Nor does he

speak even once of the departing self (ātman) which is credited by the immaterialists

with the power of existing/surviving without any substratum, that is, the mortal

body, because the self is imperishable. Jābāli’s opposition to post-mortem rites stems

from the philosophical conviction that there being no other-world, no heaven and

hell,10 and hence, no reward and punishment after one’s death for one’s deeds

during one’s life-time, such rites are futile and meaningless.

8 E.g., Maṇimēkalai, Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra and its commentaries, Vasudevahiṃḍῑ, etc. For details see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011 pp. 33-44, idem 2009 pp.102-09. 9 Cf. SVM p.69; DA p.321, verses 22-28. For further details see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011 pp. 213-18. One verse cited in the SDS (p. 13.14-15) that is attributed to Bṛhaspati by S-M is in fact similar to a verse found in VPu Vangavasi ed. 3.18.26. But it is not a materialist but the demons, asuras converted to the Jain and Buddhist faiths who say so. No mention is made of Bṛhaspati or any materialist in the VPu. See R. Bhattacharya, 2013c p. 619. 10

Whitney observes that according to the KUp the unworthy people do not go to hell ‘(of which there is no trace in the Hindu religion of this period), but to a repeated return to earthly existence [as stated by Yama in KUp 1.2.6d]. Transmigration, then, is not the fate of all, but only of the unworthy’ (p. 92). It should, however, be noted that heaven, svargaloka and the Fire leading to

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There is thus a vital difference between the Jains and the Buddhists on the

one hand and the materialists on the other in their rejection of performing rites for

the ancestors according to the Smṛtis. The former objected to the offering of animal

flesh for the consumption of the ancestors: their opposition to śrāddha was based on

the doctrine of non-injury (ahiṃsā). There was no philosophical foundation; the

objection was purely religious. On the other hand, the materialists’ satire on śrāddha

follows from their ontology which knows death to be the end of life, with nothing to

follow.

This point has been missed again and again by even the most meticulous

scholars. Sadānanda Kāśmīraka in his ABS chapter 2 (chapters are called

mudgaraprahāras, hitting with a club) in which he demolishes the Cārvāka to his

satisfaction, quoted (pp.100-01) four verses (with some variants) from the VPu

(Kalikata Vangavasi ed., 3.18.24-27, Bombay ed. 1910, 3.18.26-29). Probably this

misled both H.H. Wilson (p.492 n7) and John Muir (C/L p.353-54) to think that the

said verses ‘represent the sentiments of Vṛhaspati’s school’ (although whether Wilson

and/or Muir were influenced by the ABS is not definitely known). Many other scholars

in the last two centuries have followed their footsteps. Every one of them, however,

overlooked the obvious fact that these verses are placed in the mouths of demons

(asuras), not any materialists. The demons were seduced by a Jain monk and a

Buddhist preacher who were none but Māyāmoha, a personification of illusion-cum-

delusion created by Viṣṇu to help the gods overcome their adversaries, the demons.

(For further details see R. Bhattacharya 2013c).

#

Franco and Preisendanz maintain that ‘Lokāyata ontology seems to be largely

subordinated to the school’s ethical agenda’ (6: p.179). Furthermore, they are of the

opinion that ‘[t]he main aim of all theories of elements and consciousness is to deny

rebirth and thereby to destroy the cornerstone of Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jaina

the heaven, svargya agni are mentioned in KUp 1.1.12-14, 19 as also in other Upaniṣads. See EPU, Index to words and clauses.

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socio-religious and ethical ideals that presuppose karmic retribution over many lives’

(p.179-80). This view is later repeated in Franco 1997 p.142.

All philosophical system-builders, I contend, first decide on their ontology;

everything else – not only ethics, but also epistemology, metaphysics, etc. – is

formed accordingly, not the other way round. The issue of fixing which instruments

of cognition are acceptable is determined by the answer to the question: which

instruments would suit and best promote the ontology of the system concerned.

The Rām passage, it should be noted, is absolutely silent about both karman

and rebirth. Whenever Rāma in his speech refers to karman (as in vulgate 109.28)

he means duty, kartavya (of a son to his father) and nothing else. On the other

hand, Jābāli focuses on the falsehood contained in the religious texts11 that urge

people to donate liberally to the Brahmins, perform sacrifices, consecrate

themselves, and give themselves up to asceticism and renunciation (crit. ed. 100.15,

vulgate 108.16). Ajita Kesakambala, too declared so, equally unambiguously (see

above).

Ajita, however, denied the twin doctrine of karman and rebirth categorically:

‘A good or bad action produces no result’, natthi sukaṭadukkaṭānāṃ kammānāṃ

phalaṃ vipāko, and ‘There is no rebirth of beings after death’, natthi sattā upapātikā.

These two vital issues are not mentioned in Jābāli’s speech. The other exhortation,

‘Accept the idea once and for all, high-minded prince, that there exists no world to

come),’ sa nāsti param ityet kuru buddhiṃ mahāmate (crit. ed. 100.16, vulgate

108.17), is significant, for it unequivocally denies the other-world as Ajita too had

said natthi paro loko.12 Jābāli’s position represents that of the denier of the other-world

11

Crit. ed. 100.15ab vulgate 108.16ab. Commentators differ in their opinions as to which books are meant. Rāma glosses granthāḥ as ‘books such as the Veda and others’ (i.e., similar sacred texts), vedādayo granthāḥ. Śivasahāya and Govindarāja mention only books related to gifts and yajña, i.e., Ghṛyasῡtras and Smṛti texts, not the Veda (vulgate ed., p.992). In any case, no secular book could be meant. 12

Ajita Kesakambala in his characteristic way, however, said: ‘This world does not exist, nor does the other-world’ (DN 1: p. 48, Ten Suttas p. 83), which has caused much confusion: was Ajita Kesakambala a nihilist or a materialist? An attempt has been made to show that such a double

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as mentioned by Naciketas in his prayer to Yama: ‘some say, ‘”He (sc. the man who is

departed) is” and some say, “He is not”,’ astīti eke nāyamastīti caike (KUp, 1.1.20.

Whitney’s translation). The story of King Paesi (Pāyāsi) in Buddhist and Jain works13

and the story of King Bena in the VDhMPu 1.108 were planned with the sole aim of

depicting the materialists as deniers of the other-world. As in the KUp so in the Rām

there is no other issue or doubt, either ontological or epistemological, but this: what

happens to humans after death.

One point is clear: the conflict between idealism and materialism in India began

with this question, viz. whether or not there is the other-world. Such issues as the

reality of the world (denied by Yājñavalkya in BṛUp 4.3.10), the primacy of matter or of

consciousness, which instruments of cognition are to be regarded as valid, etc., were

raised later.14

In view of all this, it is better to describe both Ajita (most probably a historical

character, in any case a legendary one) and Jābāli (a fictive figure) as ‘proto-

materialists’. They do represent materialist views but of a materialism that was yet to

be systematized. It is, we may say, materialism in the making.15 There was as yet no

negation is a mere turn of phrase found both in Sanskrit and modern Indian languages (such as Bangla) for emphasizing an idea. See R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011 pp. 45-54. 13

For details see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011 pp. 22-24. Erich Frauwallner 2: pp. 216-219, and perhaps following him Franco and Preisendanz 6: p.179, have taken this fictitious narrative as a real-life story. All of them overlook the fact that the same narrative contains variations in the names of the interlocutors: in the Pali legend it is Kassapa, a Buddhist monk and in the Prakrit legend, Kesi, a Jain monk. In Haribhadra’s reworking of the legend, SKa pp.163-81, the debate is between Piṅgakesa, a follower of a minister (not the king himself) and Vijayasiṃha, a Jain monk. Such imaginary conversations are invented by the authors who have an axe to grind. The purpose is to extol their respective religious and philosophical systems at the expense of materialism or any other system opposed to theirs. 14

The second meaning of nāstika, the defiler of the Veda, vedanindaka, as given in Manu 2.11, seems to have its origin in the MaiUp. It contains not only an intriguing word, avaidika, non-Vedic (7.10), a word that is unique in the Upanisads, but also an injunction: ‘Hence, what is set forth in the Vedas – that is true! Upon what is told in the Vedas – upon that wise men live their life. Therefore a Brahman (brāhmaṇa) should not study what is non-Vedic.’ (7.10. Hume’s translation). 15

Frauwallner believed in the story of Paesi as ‘a lively picture of an old Indian Materialist on the King’s throne. And Paesi was certainly not the only one of its kind’ (2: 218-19). Paesi thus becomes a type, not just an individual. In spite of this genralisation, he admitted: ‘[B]ut however interesting and characteristic such accounts are, they can rarely claim a place of the same kind in a history of Indian philosophy.

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clear-cut epistemology; its metaphysics too was in a rudimentary state. At first, most

probably in the sixth/fifth century BCE, the so-called heretical or anti-Establishment

ideas occurred to individual thinkers like Ajita Kesakambala and the like in different

parts of India and at different times, quite independent of and unbeknown to one

another. It is only after the fourth century CE that we hear of the adherents of two

such schools, bhῡtavādins and Laukāyatikas in the Tamil epic, Maṇimēkalai (27.264-77

and 26.78). Prior to that, the anti-paraloka and anti-Vedic ideas might have been

current among a section of the people too. Their doubts and denials find expression in

late Vedic and Upaniṣadic texts (for some instances see Sarup pp.78-81, Radhakrishnan

and Moore pp.34-36, 227 n1, Del Toso pp.138-41). As A. Barth observed long ago:

It is, therefore, not surprising that in the course of those idle barren discussions

[found in Vedic texts] rugged good sense has at times had its revenge, and that

to such day-dreams it has been able to reply with scepticism, scoffing, and

cynical negation…. In the Brâhamaṇas the question is sometimes asked if there

really is another life [TS 6.1.1.1; KUp 1.1.20]; and the old scholiast Yâska…finds

himself obliged to refute the opinion of teachers of much more ancient date than

himself, who had pronounced the Veda to be a tissue of nonsense [Nirukta

1.15.16]. This vulgar [i.e., popular] scepticism, which must not be confounded

with the speculative negations of the Sâṅkhya and Buddhism, whose sneering

attitude contrasts so forcibly with the timorous spirit of the modern Hindus

appears to have reached at one time a goodly number of adherents. The most

ancient designation we find applied to them is that of Nâstika…. (p. 85)

Materialism gains for it an importance from the moment only when it emerged in the form of a regular doctrine and took up arms against the remaining philosophical schools’ (2: p. 219).

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Even after the sudden and inexplicable disappearance of the Cārvākas in or

around the twelfth century, such ideas were not altogether lost. Richard Garbe once

acutely observed (and, significantly enough, Radhakrishnan, who had no sympathy for

materialism, quoted Garbe’s words in his Indian Philosophy 1: p. 278):

Several vestiges show that even in Pre-Buddhistic India proclaimers of purely

materialistic doctrines appeared; and there is no doubt that those doctrines had

even afterwards, as they have to-day, numerous secret followers. (p. 25.

Emphasis added.)

Jābāli’s speech is one such specimen that has come down to us, thanks to some

interpolators and later the redactors of the Rām in several versions and recensions.

#

One last problem: Could the Jābāli episode be an interpolation or was it a part of

the Ur-Rām ? Hermann Jacobi firmly believed that the whole of the section beginning

with vulgate 107.17 and ending with 111.11 are insertions and Vasișṭha’s speech in 110

is an insertion within an insertion, einen Einschub in einen Einschub (p.89 n1, English

trans. p.68 n24). Camille Bulcke wholeheartedly endorses this view (p.306). So does J.

L. Brockington (1984 p.333 n14).

Walter Ruben, on the other hand, claimed that the episode was a part of the

original poem, since all the mss of all the versions that form the basis of the archetype

contain it (1965 p.460). He declared confidently: ‘[T]he poet brings the materialist

Jābāli in a pre-planned manner’ (1965 p.461). The constituted text of the crit. ed.

supports Ruben’s contention. Nevertheless, the haphazard pattern of redaction of the

verses in the available mss and the large number of additional verses and passages in

different versions still point to an earlier stage of the ‘fluid text’16 (before the archetype

16 This name was coined by V.S. Sukthankar, the general editor of the crit. ed. of the Mbh, pp.96, 104 = Prolegomena pp. 75, 82. However, as Franklin Edgerton (p.XXXVI) and D.D. Kosambi (1948/2000 p.2) complained, he never defined it. The idea, however, is quite clear: the śrauta (or mantra) literature, i.e. the Vedic Saṃhitās, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas, and, to a certain extent, the Upanișads have a fixed text, remaining unchanged for millennia, whereas the sauta literature (so named by S.V. Ketkar, see Karve

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of the Rām mss was shaped). Most probably there was no intervening episode/s

between Rāma’s departure from Ayodhyā and his entrance to the forest of Daṇḍāka.

But it is a mere conjecture. At the present stage of textual scholarship, the Jābāli

episode is definitely a part of the Rām but an addition that was made in the second

stage of redaction, as Brockington has proposed (1985 pp. 329, 333-34). It is possible

that the episode was first introduced only with a view to glorifying Rāma but with no

intention of vilifying Jābāli. Interpolators utilized the story either to strengthen the

hands of Jābāli (as in Bv Calcutta ed. 116.28-39) or, conversely, to denigrate him by

making Rāma abuse him in the strongest conceivable terms, comparing him with a thief

and a nāstika, and most anachronistically equating both of them with the Buddha, i.e. a

Buddhist (vulgate 109.34a-d= crit. ed. Additional Passage 2241* 13-16). An interpolator

even made Jābāli confess to his being a shameless time-server, becoming an āstika or

a nāstika as circumstances demanded (vulgate 109.38-39, crit. ed. Additional Passage

2241* 21-26). Since the publication of the crit. ed. of the Ayodhyākāṇḍa in 1962 all this

has been found to be later interpolations and consequently excised from the constituted

text (see crit. ed. editor’s note, p.703). Yet the character of Jābāli and his discourse had

their own appeal. R. C. Dutt in his very brief abridgement of the Rām retains the

episode (Book II Section V) but omits the passage in which Jābāli confesses to be a

rank opportunist.

Some ‘netizens’ contend either for or against Jābāli on the internet (see

‘atheism,’ ‘Javali ramayana,’ and other related items). Apparently all of them are

blissfully ignorant of this fact. Such persons, however, need not be taken seriously, for

both parties are working on the basis of the vulgate, and that too read in English

translation only.

pp.4-5), such as the Itihāsas (primary epics) and the Purāṇas continuously grow ‘not only upwards and downwards but also laterally, like the Nyagrodha tree, growing on all sides’ (ABORI 11, p.262= Sukthanakar p. 228), insertions being made at different times and places by all sorts of sῡta (bard)s and scribes. S. M. Katre has identified the fluid text with the Amorphous (text), ‘shapeless, anomalous, unorganized, applied to a text which is not fixed; such a text is also called a fluid text. In general it refers to such popular texts like the epics and the purāṇas which already exist in different versions at different places before being reduced to writing’ (p. 88).

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One word more about what Jacobi called an insertion within the insertion.

Vasișṭha’s speech in crit. ed. 102 = vulgate 110 is not without a purpose. He says:

Jābāli likewise understands the true course of this world. He only said

these things in his desire to dissuade you.

jābālir api jānīte lokasyāsya gatāgatim ||

nivartayitu kāmastu tvāmetadvākyam abravīt | (1cd-2ab)

His opening words are meant to persuade not only Rāma but also the readers

that Jābāli did not really mean what he said; it was a mere subterfuge to bring Rāma

back to Ayodhyā. Why does Vasișṭha say so after Jābāli’s frank confession to his being

an opportunist (as in the vulgate)? This anomaly is retained in the constituted text too.

Jābāli keeps absolutely mum after Rāma’s strong condemnation in the constituted

text. A long speech is then delivered by Vasișṭha on, of all things, cosmogony and the

genealogy of the Ikṣvākus which is found both in the vulgate and the crit. ed., and

continues down to the end of the canto. It is so out of place that one cannot but have a

feeling that this canto was designed to take the readers’ mind away from the heretical

speech of Jābāli, whether spoken in earnest or not. This interpolation-within-an-

interpolation thus takes the tale back to the glorification of righteous Rāma, who does

not fall prey to any temptation or tolerate heresy. Ruben thinks that ‘Vālmīki

introduces Jābāli at this place as a sort of tempter’ (p. 464) and compares him to the

seducer in the Daśakumāracarita, Ch. 8 (p. 465) and concludes: ‘It thus becomes

clear that Rāma accuses Jābāli of speaking only to please him, which means he

speaks as a lackey, flatterer and tempter and as such Rāma is not supposed to keep

his word and accept the kingdom’ (p. 465).

The solution of all such problems concerning interpolations in the Rām calls for

Higher Criticism. But it would take us away to a wholly different area and demand

another study of an altogether dissimilar nature. I earnestly hope that such a project

would be taken up and executed on the basis of more and better mss collected from all

regions of India, including Karnataka and Odisha (see Brockington 1989-90 p. 80).

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Appendix A

Lokāyata in non-philosophical texts

In Vātsyāyana (fourth century)’s Kāmasūtra six aphorisms 1.2.25-30 are followed by

the statement ‘So (said) the Laukayatikas,’ iti laukāyatikāh. However, the aphorisms

are more in the nature of popular maxims, laukika nyāya, or, as the Jayamaṅgalā

commentary says, idioms well known in the world (or, among the people),

lokaprasiddhi. For a detailed analysis see R. Bhattacharya 20009/2011 pp.94-95.

Bāṇabhaṭṭa (sixth century) in Kādambarī uses a simile: ‘As the science of the

Lokāyatika is to one, who has no taste for religion,’ lokāyatika-vidyayevādharma-ruceḥ

(p.513). This agrees well with Rāma’s view of the lokāyatika brāhmaṇa (Rām crit. ed.

Ayodhyākāṇḍa 94.32 = vulgate 100.38), but the very next verse (crit. ed.

94.33=vulgate 100.39) seems to indicate a reasoner, haituka, or better still, a casuist

or a sophist, rather than a materialist or an atheist, as the word lokāyata means in all

Pali and Sanskrit Buddhist works and dictionaries (see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011,

p.191).

In Bāṇabhaṭṭa’s Harṣacarita (p.356), however, the Lokāyatikas appear in an

ascetics’ grove, tapovana, among a number of religious communities such as the

various sects of the Buddhists, the Jains and the Maskarins, as also the adherents of

some philosophical schools such as the Kāpilas (Sāṃkhya), the Kāṇādas (Vaiśeṣika),

etc. This kind of peaceful co-existence seems to have been modelled on a similar

description found in Mbh crit. ed. Ādiparvan 64.37: ‘The words of the chief Lokāyatikas

resounding on all sides,’ lokāyatikamukhyaiśca samantād anunāditam. This line is

reproduced verbatim in HV, Bhaviṣyaparvan vulgate 67.30 (omitted as interpolated in

the crit. ed.). Cowell and Thomas in their notes to their translation of the Harșacarita

explain the Lokāyatikas as ‘an atheistic school’ (p.236 n4). Apparently they did not

wonder why the Lokāyatikas would be present in the grove along with the Jains and the

Buddhists as well as such a motley crowd comprising the assayers of metals, students

of the legal institutes, and adepts in grammar. All of them revel in continuous disputes

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and this grove provides them with the opportunity to indulge in ceaseless debates. Such

a picture is too good to be true. As Rhys Davids observes:

We cannot, unfortunately, draw any certain conclusion as to whether or not

there were actually any Lokāyatikas living in Bāṇa’s time. In expanding previous

descriptions of the concourse of hermits in the forest he may be merely including

in his list all the sorts of such people he had ever heard or read of. (C/L p. 373)

Appendix B

Āstika and nāstika .

H. P. Shastri in his translation of Rām vulgate canto 108 and elsewhere has used

‘man of faith’ for āstika, and ‘unbeliever’ and ‘atheist’ for nāstika. The meanings

of these two words have always been somewhat problematic. They are originally

personal nouns (as evidenced by Aṣṭ 4.4.60: asti nāsti diṣṭaṃ matiḥ) used to

suggest totally different persons (and then, also views, when used as adjective)

in different contexts at different times. The pair could mean (i) a believer and a

non-believer in the other-world, (ii) one who abides by the Veda and one who

does not (as in Manu 2.11), (iii) a theist and an atheist, and many more (See R.

Bhattacharya 2009/2011 pp.227-31, and 2009 pp.49-50). Hence it is highly

probable that in the Rām the words are used in the first sense, which is most

probably their original meaning (Cf. Jayāditya and Vāmana, Kaśikā on Aṣṭ 4.4.60). In

any case the question of theism or belief in Vedic rituals was never raised in Jābāli’s

speech, only the issue of the other-world featured most prominently (see crit. ed.

100.16, vulgate 108.17), as it did in Naciketas’ prayer to Yama in KUp 1.1.20: ‘this

doubt (viciktsā) that [there is] in regard to a man that is departed –“he is,” say

some; and “this one is not,” say some ….’ (W.D. Whitney’s translation), yeyaṃ prete

vicikitsā manuṣye 'stīty eke nāyam astīti caike . The KUp passage may very well be

the source for the word pair. In any case asti is the present indicative form of √as,

‘to be’, in the third person singular and its negative is na asti, turned into nāsti

according to the rules of sound liaison (sandhi).

24

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Acknowledgements: Amitava Bhattacharyya, Siddhartha Datta, Sunish Kumar Deb, Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, and Arindam Saha.