J o r d a n i n L e b a n o n a n d W a t e r G o v e r n a …...D i s c o u r s e a n d W a t e r G o v e r n a n c e i n L e b a n o n a n d J o r d a n B y : Hussam Hussein, MedYWat

The Links betweenthe New RefugeeDiscourse andWater Governancein Lebanon andJordan

By:

Hussam Hussein, MedYWat Coordinator, Jordan/Italy

Alberto Natta, MedYWat Member, Italy

Abed Al Kareem Yehya, MedYWat Member, Lebanon

Baha Hamadna, MedYWat Member, Palestine/Lebanon

Photo Credit: World Bank

The links between the new refugee discourse and water governance in Lebanon and Jordan

Hussam Hussein12, Alberto Natta3, Abed Al Kareem Yehya4, Baha Hamadna5

1International Agricultural Policy and Environmental Governance, Faculty of Organic Agricultural Sciences,

University of Kassel, Witzenhausen, Germany

2 Water Security Research Centre and Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, School of International

Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK

3 United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States, Amman, Jordan

4 Food Security Program, Faculty of Agricultural and Food Sciences, American University of Beirut, Beirut,

Lebanon

5 Political Sciences and Public Administration, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, American University of Beirut, Beirut,

Lebanon

The views expressed by the authors are their own and do not represent the views of the institutions they are affiliated with.

Introduction

Within environmental politics, there is a growing interest in, and concern for, the ways in which

discourses1 are constructed, used, and misinterpreted in public political debate about shared water

resources (Hartmann, 2010, Dryzek, 2013). There is also renewed interest in discourse theory and

discourses’ employment in analysing how they shape water governance (Hissen et al., 2017; Hussein,

2016; 2018). This research brings these two together and apply them to an original and timely case-

study focused on the impact of discourses of refugees on water governance in Lebanon and Jordan. This

paper focuses on the discourses and does not aim at comparing the discourses with the impact of

refugees on the water resources in the countries. Historically, discourses about water resources in

Lebanon and Jordan have blamed their neighbours for not respecting international water law and for

the unfair sharing of the Jordan River with its neighbouring countries (Zeitoun et al., 2013). However,

since the Syrian crisis and the so-called “Arab Spring”, new discourses have been created, sparking the

1 As discussed on the next page, a discourse is “a shared way of apprehending the world. […] It enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts,” thus legitimising knowledge and justifying specific policies (Dryzek, 2013). Being discourses the key vehicle to shape people’s understandings and policies, it is very important to investigate how they are constructed, deployed, and the policy solutions they open (or close). This is the core of what discourse theory investigates (Fairclough, 2013).

discursive policy debates around water scarcity and hydropolitics (Müller et al., 2016). Especially in

these two Arab countries – where most water resources are transboundary and where most Syrian

refugees have flown in - new discourses of climate change and especially of Syrian refugees as

exacerbating water scarcity are being deployed by the governments in Jordan (Hussein, 2016) and

Lebanon (El-Fadel et al., 2012), shaping water governance nationally and regionally (transboundary

water governance), calling for renegotiations of the existing agreements (Hussein, 2016) or justifying

unilateral actions (Earle et al., 2015).

The aim of this paper is to investigate the different impact of the new discourses of refugees on

water governance in Lebanon and Jordan. To this end, this study is guided by the following research

question: How is the new discourse of refugees impacting water governance in Lebanon and Jordan?

This study is novel because of the focus on the new discourse of refugees in relation to water

governance in both Lebanon and Jordan.

The project is informed by theory and method of discourse analysis. Dryzek (1997) emphasises

that environmental issues can be framed in different ways, each constituting a discourse, and each

opening a different set of solutions and policy options. Dominant discourses – which are the discourses

that reach more people outside of those creating them, and therefore the ones that have more space in

public and mainstream channels - are powerful and can shape policies, driving towards and opening

specific solutions (Hajer, 1995). “The implicit purpose of these competing ideologies [discourses] is not

just to convince but to control; better stated, they aim to control by convincing” (Scott, 2008: 23). In

fact, as shown by Feitelson (2002), Mehta (2005), and Edwards (2013), discourses can be constructed

and deployed to shape people’s understanding of water issues opening policy-solutions and driving

towards which policies should be adopted. A discourse is “a shared way of apprehending the world.

[…] It enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into

coherent stories or accounts,” thus legitimising knowledge and justifying specific policies (Dryzek,

2013). Being discourses the key vehicle to shape people’s understandings and policies, it is very

important to investigate how they are constructed, deployed, and the policy solutions they open (or

close). This is the core of what discourse theory investigates (Fairclough, 2013).

The implementation of this research requires the deployment of different qualitative methods

of data collection and different sources, as water is a very sensitive issue in Lebanon and Jordan. The

methods of data collection use for this study are: 1) a desk-based review of Lebanese and Jordanian

newspaper articles from January 2012 until January 2017; reports, press releases, and declarations of

the ministries of water and irrigations and of high-level governmental figures; academic articles and

expert evidence produced by national universities and also internationally by international

organisations and international meetings (e.g. COP and UNFCCC meetings); and 2) on semi-structured

interviews with key figures, including governmental personnel, diplomats, academics, and refugees in

camps and in host communities (to capture the refugees’ voices and perceptions).

Lebanon: from focusing on neighboring countries to blaming the refugees

Lebanon is hosting 947,063 registered Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2019), and about 500,000

unregistered Syrian refugees (LCPR, 2018). It hosts the highest number of refugees per capita

worldwide (according to (UNHCR, 2019) 173 refugee per 1000 inhabitant); more than one-fourth of

the population living in Lebanon is Syrian. As for the Bek’aa region, the population of Lebanese and

Syrians is now roughly the same. Most displaced Syrian— about 341,408 — live with Lebanese host

communities, mostly in Baalbeck and the Upper Litani River Basin (UNHCR, 2019). This influx of

refugees has impacted Lebanon’s social and economic growth in various ways: for instance,

infrastructures relating to education, health, employment, water and electricity.

Although Lebanon is considered naturally water-rich in comparison to other countries in the Middle

East, it is suffering from severe water crisis. This can be traced to many reasons including climate

change, government mismanagement of water resources, conflict with neighboring countries such as

Israel and the poor-conditioned, failing infrastructure. All these factors combined with the influx of

Syrian refugees has put the country under pressure regarding water supply and its already failing

hydrological water and wastewater systems.

This section aims at capturing the discourse in Lebanon generated by the influx of refugees in relation

to the water sector. The mainstream dominant discourse we have registered in interviewees with

academics from the American University of Beirut (AUB) and in public declarations of governmental

officials show a narrative that focuses on population growth, especially due to the sudden influx of

refugees. The population growth resulted in an increased water demand, which reduced availability of

adequate water to the local residents of Lebanon. Nadim Farajalla, professor of hydrology and water

resources at AUB told the Guardian "Lebanon, which has many rivers and water sources, is water-rich

compared to Jordan, Israel or much of Syria. But the amount of renewable water available in the

country has dropped from more than 1,000 cubic metres a year per person – considered the threshold

of water poverty – to around 700m3 per person since the refugees arrived" (the Guardian, 2016).

Although many of the refugee communities in Lebanon have minimal access to water, the totality of

them has led to overexploiting the country’s water resources. As an illustration, in informal tented

settlements the demand on water resources was elevated due to increased reliance on trucked water,

unregulated and illegal pumping from surface and subsurface sources, and illegal network tapping

(LCRP, 2017). This intensified demand for water has increased competition over available water

resources in the Bek’aa in particular and Lebanon in general.

The negative impact of refugees on the water sector is seen, in this narrative, as having two elements:

on the quantity as well as on the quality of water resources. In fact, the Lebanon Environmental

Assessment of the Syrian Conflict & Priority interventions (EASC), summarizes the impacts into two

main items. Regarding water resources, the biggest impact studied and emphasized by the ministry of

water and energy is the depletion of water resources. According to the EASC, the refugees’ main sources

of water are public water network, wells and public reservoirs. This increases the stresses on water

resources in general and on groundwater in particular. Studies included in the EASC has also confirmed

the depletion of water. For instance, according to the Litani River Authority (LRA), the basin of the river

has witnessed and is still witnessing a decrease in the water volume since the start of the Syrian

Conflict. The large demand on water supply has led to notable pressures on coastal aquifers in Lebanon.

The second biggest impact concerns water quality deterioration (EASC, 2014). According to several

studies by the EASC, the bacteriological quality of water in some areas showed ten times higher levels

of contamination than the WHO guidelines (EASC, 2014). According to a study Assessing the

Contribution of Demographic Growth, Climate Change, and the Refugee Crisis on Seawater Intrusion in

the Tripoli Aquifer, seawater intrusion will be noticed as it would move forward inland leading to

salinization of the aquifer. This is mainly due to climate change and the high demand of water caused

by the influx of the Syrian refugees (Kalaoun, O. et al., 2018).

Before the Syrian crisis, the Lebanese governments’ discourse often addressed the topic of water crisis

as a national security issue specifically blaming Israel. Water scarcity in the country was therefore

linked to transboundary water governance. This was mainly done with the help of two discourses. The

first one was the Water Divergence Theory which was broadly presented in the news, governmental

publications and speeches for many years. This theory claims that Israel dug a tunnel linking the Litani

River to its borders during the 1982-1984 occupation. Although this theory was later dismissed by the

Lebanese government, it was accepted by the people for many years and the government has used it to

distract the public and justify most issues concerning water (Amery, 2010). The second discourse

concerns the damages regarding the infrastructure of the water sector by Israel during the several

wars. This narrative was used repeatedly by the Lebanese government to redirect public attention from

government mismanagement and inefficient policies to external factors.

The new discourses often blame the vast influx of the Syrian refugees for the dysfunctional water

sector. This could be seen through the abundance of stories in television, newspapers, political parties’

speeches and conferences during the last 8 years in Lebanon (Walnycki, 2017). For instance, in an

interview with the Guardian, Fadi Georges Comair, the general director of hydraulics and electrical

resources at the ministry of energy and water, said, “Because of the Syrians, a water balance that should

have been negative in 2030 is negative now,”. “We were organised to fulfil water demand management

for about 4.5 million [people]. We were not ready to deal with the one-and-a-half to two million extras

that have come already” (the Guardian, 2015). Although the vast influx of Syrian refugees is a main

constituent of the failure of the water sector, it has shed light on the real factors underlying water

security and scarcity issues and changed governmental discourses. These factors include: the

overexploitation of groundwater due to the high demand, the severe depletion of the water table across

the country, salt water intrusion in coastal areas, and the deterioration of the quality of the available

water (Riachi, 2014). From this, it becomes clear that the discourse of refugees has altered the

Lebanese government narratives about the misfunctions and failures of the water sector from a

regional blame-model to a domestic blame-model. (Baylouny & Klingseis, 2018).

The government reflected to the refugee influx via joint, multi-year plan “Lebanon Crisis Response Plan

(LCRP)” with its international and national partners, which was essential to respond to the challenges

in a holistic manner to maintain the delivery of integrated and mutually reinforcing humanitarian and

stabilization interventions (LCRP, 2017). The plan’s core strategies and operations concerned the

water sector crisis in many aspects. In addition, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR) has worked with the Water Establishment and municipalities to ensure continuous access to

safe water at a household level and basic sanitation facilities.

The Ministry of Energy and Water is responsible for the policies that define the water sector and the

services delivered by the four regional Water Establishments, and four regional Water Establishments

deliver water services and wastewater treatment according to the policies developed by the Ministry

of Energy and Water. Lebanon’s water governance is suffering from several factors. It is undermined

by lack of funds, administrative and technical staffing gaps, incomplete technical data and weak

structural incentives for good integrated water management (including weak tariff collection).

Regulatory, legislative and management initiatives targeted by the 2010 Water Sector Strategy are still

incomplete, with capital projects still prioritized over other essential reforms. The sector as a whole is

still struggling to finance and implement critical mechanisms for water quality and resource

management, contingency planning, supply partnerships and end user responsibility and feedback.

Lack of comprehensive water quality, quantity and health impact data also makes it hard to prioritize

existing funds and develop systems that encourage sustainable water resource management.

In early August 2014, Minister of Energy and Water Arteor Nazarian launched 17 water projects worth

4.5 million dollars distributed in the North, Bek’aa and, South governorates, benefiting about 412

thousand Lebanese citizens in addition to 200 thousand displaced Syrians. The projects were led by

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Lebanon aimed at coping with the

water sector crisis caused by the increased consumption resulting from the vast influx of refugees. At

that time, 132 villages located between Akkar, Tripoli, Bek’aa, and South Lebanon, were in urgent need

of water. Another 34 villages in Tripoli with no access to water, 35,000 refugees and 60,000 Lebanese.

In addition, in 2016, the Minister of Energy and Water received the Lebanese-Syrian Joint Committee

for International Water Sharing. The meeting held between the two sides under the prevailing climatic

conditions and the necessity of cooperation between the two countries in the field of international

water and developments in the framework of implementing the transfer and storage dams on the

Orontes River within the Lebanese territories (MOEW, 2016). All of these projects were an immediate,

emergency efforts with no long-term planning that attempted to limit the circumference of an ill-timed

catastrophe.

Most of the funding attempting to improve the water sector is granted because of those same refugees,

since most of the resources come from International state and non-state actors concerned with the

Syrian humanitarian crisis. However, it is still marginal and unaccounted for in regard to the crisis.

More over, by end of August 2016, the water sector received only $90 million out of $390 million

requested in the 2016 appeal. This is the lowest level of sectoral funding since the Syrian crisis began

– insufficient to make meaningful investments in infrastructure and water quality systems. This

alongside all the other burdens have led to drastic consequences. Set an example, two thirds of

Lebanon’s natural water resources are contaminated at source level (up to 90 percent in urban areas)

(MOEW, 2010). Protecting and delivering this water is effectively impossible, because of dilapidated

infrastructure, insufficient staff and irregular power.

Instead, many resort to unsafe and more expensive alternative sources. Much of the existing

infrastructure lays dormant (even after repairs) due to lack of power as well as operational and

maintenance capacity of the Water Establishments. Wastewater is a key example: sewage treatment

plants built through international financing are still not operating or operating beneath capacity. This

means only eight percent of wastewater is adequately treated, while wastewater network coverage is

60 percent. Households not connected to wastewater networks often use cesspits and septic tanks

which provide minimal reduction in risk of raw sewage leaking directly into the environment and

contaminating groundwater resources (LCRP, 2017).

Without incentives and options to manage resources, or a reliable supply, people are undermining their

own drinking water quality. MoEW estimates that at least 55,000 - 60,000 unlicensed wells have been

dug. More homes are being constructed outside the water network – sometimes illegally and

sometimes as a result of poor land-use planning. Water networks are being tapped by those unable to

afford bottled or trucked water – which drains resources to the tune of $40 per month per household

in a context of growing poverty (compared to as little as $21 per month for network supply).

Wastewater from kitchens, laundry and bathing is disposed directly into the environment, spreading

pollution and disease, particularly in informal settlements and sub-standard shelters (LCRP, 2017).

This has also transformed the water sector crisis into a major health problem for some communities.

A lack of political will due to sectarian considerations in public policy, ineffective public participation

and tension over transboundary water resources have further intensified this problem and has led to

the continued dominance of traditional security considerations in water policy. In this context, the

negativity in which informal settlements are typically perceived by public authorities, particularly their

common narrative as “vulnerable” urban spots equated to the “weak points” of a city (Seeliger and

Turok, 2014), is balanced by their potential to help the entire urban agglomeration, as in the case of

Beirut, absorb the shock of the refugee influx. Yet in the absence of a long-term resiliency plan where

the physical infrastructure of the neighborhoods absorbing large flows of refugees is upgraded and

consolidated, it is expected that the flexibility that informality provides in helping secure shelter for

the refugees will also be the main cause of their long-term vulnerability. As neighborhood densities

skyrocket without public interventions to buttress the neighborhood’s shared amenities, living

conditions in the neighborhood deteriorate rapidly, increasing also the area’s long-term vulnerability

to any external pressure. Furthermore, and as seen in the essay, the rapid spike in demand precipitates

the takeover of the housing market by realtors whose unchecked power translates in higher threats of

eviction, lower negotiation power for tenants, and hence poorer tenure security. Ultimately, the cost of

the refugee crisis appears unequally distributed, with informal settlement dwellers responding

resourcefully to the crisis, yet bearing the brunt of the pressures exerted on the city.

Concluding this part, it is quite interesting to say that further discourse changes are seen over the time

due to elections and internal political considerations. The narrative of Lebanese politicians regarding

the Syrian refugees changed drastically in 2016 and in the lead-up to the 2018 parliamentary elections,

fuelling rising tensions and framing refugees as the cause of unemployment and instability (Makdisi et,

al. 2018). For instance, according to the Daily Star, Lebanese MP Mohammad Qabbani blamed the

Syrian refugees in the Bek’aa Valley for the increased pollution of the Litani River. During a news

conference, Qabbani said wastewater from the Syrian refugee camps was one of the main causes

leading to the river’s pollution. He said, “This pollution has increased with the presence of the Syrian

refugee camps in huge numbers on the banks of the river in west Bek’aa,” (Daily Star, 2016). The

narrative especially intensified after the parliamentary elections, when many politicians such as Nabih

Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese parliament, urged the return of the Syrian refugees to Syria several

times. Berri even appealed for Arab help to facilitate the return of refugees and to pressure the Syrian

government into taking them in the 29th Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union’s conference, that took place

in Amman on March 3, 2019 (The Daily Star, 2019). The UNHCR reports that after the parliamentary

elections, host communities demand to force refugees’ return to Syria was amplified. In addition, it

reports that many Lebanese municipalities with the help of local police tightened their restrictions on

Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2018).

Jordan: a multifaceted refugees’ narrative

Since the start of the conflict in Syria in 2011, Jordan has opened its borders to waves of Syrian refugees.

As a result, the country is currently hosting 655 thousand refugees registered with the UN Refugee

Agency (UNHCR, 2018). The Government of Jordan estimates that the number of Syrian refugees is

higher, and usually refers to 1.4 million Syrians in the country, which also includes the number of

Syrians that were living in the country prior to the crisis. According to the Jordanian government,

providing for their needs and ensuring their access to key public services, including health, education,

municipal services and water, has impacted heavily on Jordan’s finances and ability to deliver quality

services for all (GoJ, 2017: 1). The Jordanian government has also calculated that the direct cost of the

Syria crisis on Jordan is around USD 10.2 billion since 2011. (Ibid.: 7)

While there are different views on the extent of the impact of the Syrian refugees on water resources,

the situation in Jordan – which is said to be the second most water scarce country in the world – is that

groundwater depletion is accelerating due to over-pumping beyond the aquifers’ safe yield and water

tables are dropping precipitously. As water levels decline, salinity rises, negatively impacting the

quality of the shrinking groundwater resources.

The Syrian crisis is an additional pressure to the scarce water resources of Jordan, and refugee

demands layer over long-standing challenges of scant supply, unsustainable management, and out-of-

date infrastructure. Over the past years, large-scale investments – deeper wells, bigger pipelines, dams

construction – have bought Jordan time (Mercy Corps, 2014: 4). Yet, by reading the Jordanian

newspapers and listening to Jordanian policy makers, the impact of the Syria crisis seems to have sped

up the clock. Growing popular dissatisfaction over the declining quantity and quality of water services

could have constituted (and still can) a serious threat to the stability of the Government of Jordan,

showing how water security is strictly linked to national security. For instance, in 2013, the people of

Thaghret al-Jub, a small village in rural Mafraq, ran out of water and subsequently barricaded the

principal highway, burning tires and demanding affordable water. The situation escalated to the point

that HM King Abdullah II personally arrived at the protest and promised to construct additional water

pipelines to the village (Francis, 2015: 18).

This and other similar manifestations of dissent and the evident difficulty to cope with the continuously

growing pressure on resources, pushed the government to gradually shift its discourse around

refugees. As a result, by analyzing governmental declarations in national newspapers and strategies

since 2011, we have identified two governmental narratives about refugees in relation to water

resources. The two governmental discourses increasingly sought to use the continuous refugee inflow

for two main purposes:

1) as a justification for the weakened services and the decreasing conditions of living;

2) as an opportunity to mobilize additional support from the international community not only to meet

the refugees’ needs but also to help Jordan and the Jordanian communities address the impact of the

crisis.

One element of the first discourse is that the Syrian refugees have increased the water demand in the

country, contributing to and exacerbating water scarcity in Jordan. In fact, in October 2014 the then

Minister of Water and Irrigation (MWI) Hazem Nasser said that Jordan had borne the burden of

hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees, stressing in a statement e-mailed to The Jordan Times that

the influx of refugees caused water demand to increase by 40 per cent in the north, 10 per cent in Karak

in the south and by more than 20 per cent of the Kingdom’s average water demand (Namrouqa, 2014a).

In a similar statement earlier in the year the Minister had also clearly identified how such impact had

negatively affected the national projects and strategies, almost to scapegoat refugees and take off the

responsibility from the shoulders of the government. “We are operating the Disi Water Conveyance

Project at 92 per cent of its capacity, which is a figure we planned to reach in three to four years,” he

noted.2 He underscored that hosting thousands of Syrian refugees “ruined” the ministry’s strategies

and plans, which were replaced by “emergency plans” formulated every summer (Namrouqa, 2014b).

While some light variations can be noted in such discourse over the past years, depending on the

political circumstances, the overall message of this narrative has remained the same over the years.

This can be noticed even recently from the statement by the former Minister of Water and Irrigation,

Ali Ghezawi: “The Syrian exodus has fatigued us. Despite all efforts to explore new water resources, the

gap between supply and demand remains substantial” (Namrouqa, 2014c). It is interesting to notice

from such quote that, seven years since the beginning of the crisis and with the number of refugees

almost unchanged since 2015 (UNHCR, 2018), the language remains strong and clearly intended to

point the fingers against the refugee population to justify water scarcity and why the government is

struggling to ensure water security for all.

The emphasis of this discourse is often placed on the refugees’ influx as an external factor that increases

the demand of water, but that also negatively affects the supply. In fact, the Jordan Response Plan 2018-

2020 notes for instance that “non-revenue water is as high as 50-70% in the hard-affected

governorates by the crisis, mainly due to the poor condition of the networks as a result of extreme

pumping pressure arising out of the increased demand on water. Water and sanitation vulnerabilities

have increased because of the refugee crisis, […] the water demand increased by 40% in Northern

governorates […], and the frequency of water supply in some locations reduced from once a week to

once every four weeks, resulting in a daily per capita share 50% less than the standard” (GoJ, 2017,

p.36).

2 The Disi canal project connects the Disi Aquifer, which is shared between Jordan and Saudi Arabia, to Greater Amman region. Through this canal, water is being pumped for a distance of around 325 km, and it has been operating since July 2013 aiming at providing drinking water to the capital, where most of the water demand is concentrated.

As noted by Hussein (2016; 2018), this narrative took the blame away from governmental

responsibilities, as it emphasized that if there is water scarcity in the country, this is not due to the

mismanagement of the water resources (and therefore to the governmental mismanagement), but

rather to the limited water resources in Jordan; and these limited water resources are due to the strong

increase in water demand mainly caused by the increased population – which is a result of the waves

of refugees. While the utilization of such discourse was geared towards diverting popular anger over

water scarcity away from the government, that has instead redirected it towards the refugee

population. According to Mercy Corps, this has contributed, together with similar ‘blames’ over other

services, to undermining social cohesion between Syrians and Jordanians and leading to an

environment ripe to scapegoating (Mercy Corps, 2014: 4). Access to water resources in this volatile

security context is an essential condition to peace and stability, and scarcity of quality and quantity is

aggravating social tensions between refugees and host communities (GoJ, 2017: 36).

The second element of the first discourse is that Syrian refugees are wasting the Jordanian water

resources because of their different lifestyle when it comes to water resources. Whereas Jordanians

have rationed water since the 1980s, refugees from comparatively water-rich Syria lack basic habits of

water saving and conservation. Jordanian families wash clothes and do dishes, quickly shower, and

store enough to get through the week. Refugees arriving in Jordan do not always quickly adjust, and

many lack basic habits of conservation (Mercy Corps, 2014: 22). For this reason, several development

agencies (e.g. UNICEF, GIZ) have launched awareness campaigns and projects to enhance water

conservation strategies, in collaboration with the MWI.

Concerning the second discourse - the use of the refugee narrative as a leverage to call for support from

the international community - in 2014 the Government of Jordan in partnership with the United

Nations (UN) and the broader donor and NGO community developed the first response plan. The

National Resilience Plan, and especially the following Jordan Response Plans, were short to medium-

term strategies to address the impact of the Syria crisis both from a humanitarian and resilience

perspectives. On average, every year from 2014 to 2018 the Government of Jordan requested around

US$ 240 million for a total of about US$ 1.2 billion for the water sector alone3.

Government officials continuously exerted pressure on donors to bridge the funding gap, noting that

otherwise refugees’ and local communities’ needs would not be met, thereby risking worsening

3 Data was extracted from the individual WASH sectoral financial needs of the National Response Plan (2014-2016), replaced and followed by the Jordan Response Plans (2015; 2016-2018; 2017-2019; 2018-2020). The plans can be found on the website of the Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis www.jrpsc.org

humanitarian and living conditions. At the National Conference on Water and Sanitation organized by

the MWI and UNICEF in 2015 for instance, the then Minister Nasser stressed that “if the required funds

[$750 million for 2015-2017] are not secured, there will be a negative impact on Syrian refugees’

health, security and environment” (Namrouqa, 2015). Such discourse was not softened overtime and

in 2018 Minister Ghezawi expressed on several occasions his dismay over the international

community’s “low level of response, below the needed level” to Jordan’s challenging water situation

(Namrouqa, 2014c).

While a portion of the resources requested would serve to meet the immediate water and sanitation

requirements of refugees and host populations, another portion would be directed to enhance or

rehabilitate water networks and systems in the areas most affected by the crisis. It is difficult to assess

whether such interventions actually constitute a need directly resulting from the impact of the crisis,

or whether the refugee influx is used as a pretext to finance more structural and development projects.

Irrespectively, the Government of Jordan has been able to ride the wave of resilience-based approach

promoted by the international community as a way not only to respond to the crisis, but also to

strengthen infrastructures and national capacities (UNDP).

It must be noted, however, that 79% per cent of the Syrian refugees in Jordan live in host communities

and only 21% in refugee camps, placing additional strain on local services such as schools, hospitals,

etc. of urban centers (GoJ, 2017: 8). These facts, which informed the discourse, contributed to the

decision of the government to introduce a policy whereby projects for refugees need to include at least

30% of beneficiaries from Jordanian host communities – as noted in a statement by former Minister of

Planning and International Cooperation Emad Fakhoury (JT, 2018). This explains the need to support

and build the resilience of local communities so that they are not excessively overburdened by the

growing population, can sustainably meet their demands over the years and develop capacities to face

possible future shocks.

The refugee discourse has not only been used by the Government of Jordan to externalize the blame

and to mobilize resources to address the impact of the Syria crisis, but it has also been exploited to

recalibrate national policies on water management. The most vivid example of it is the new National

Water Strategy 2016-2025, that attributes the drop in the per capita consumption (from 88 to 66 liter

per day) to the influx of Syrian refugees. Similarly, the strategy notes that “revenues only partially cover

operations, maintenance and capital costs, mainly due to high cost of new resources, energy and Syrian

Refugees (MWI, 2016: 49). The main objective of the strategy is to bridge a growing gap between supply

and demand, mainly through interventions directed at increasing the supply.

While keeping the cost of water unchanged to consumers, the strategy seeks to explore new resources

by increasing dams’ capacity, reducing water losses, implementing strategy projects such as the so-

called Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project (Red-Dead), and investing in energy projects to

reduce the cost of electricity used for water pumping. According to the Government Spokesperson

Mohammad Momani, the new national water strategy will cost the Kingdom around US$ 7.5 billion

over the next 10 years (Malkawi, 2016).

These very significant financial needs are hard to be met, also considering the ‘donor fatigue’ after

many years of heightened support to address the needs arising from the impact of the Syria crisis –

where water is only one of many sectors. To mitigate such risk, it would be appropriate for the

government to combine supply-oriented projects with ways to reduce the overall demand, while better

managing the existing water resources. However, such interventions are more difficult, also politically,

to implement. In fact, they would need the cooperation of the public (who should cut down on wasting

water and reporting water theft cases) – and in particular of farmers – as the agricultural sector is the

biggest water consumer in the country- they would ensure increased sustainability to the water sector

and delink its development from the response to the Syria crisis.

Comparative analysis:

The findings that stemmed out from the above analysis portray a very similar picture of the new

refugee discourses in the water governance sectors of Lebanon and Jordan, although some differences

exist. Such country comparison can be undertaken from five main perspectives.

First, both Lebanese and Jordanian governments’ discourses attempted to shift water scarcity towards

the influx of Syrian refugees. This has been instrumental to divert growing public dissatisfaction over

the decline of water quality and quantity away from governmental responsibilities, and rather place

the focus on exogenous factors. Such political strategy is not new to Lebanon, which used to put the

blame on Israel and transboundary water issues. In the case of Jordan instead, the shift to exogenous

factors was more marked, identifying the refugee influx as a spoiler of all the government regional and

domestic efforts to address the issue of water scarcity.

Second, in Lebanon the discourses mainly revolve around the pressure that the wave of refugee placed

on existing resources and infrastructure, further affecting water quality and quantity. There is,

however, a recognition that a critical issue for Lebanon is also the inefficient and poorly maintained

systems and networks and management its water resources sector (MOEW, 2015). The discourses in

Jordan seem instead more multifaceted. While also in this case the predominant point is on the

increased water demand and pressure on strained systems, discourse around the non-efficient and

sustainable water use by Syrian refugees also emerged.

Third, both Lebanon and Jordan developed discourses on the effect of refugees’ influx on water-related

issues to exercise pressure on the international community in a quest for additional financial support.

In both cases, the national response plans to the Syria crisis, the LCRP and the JRP respectively,

constituted the main resource mobilization tools by the governments. In Lebanon, the resources

mobilized under the LCRP were mainly directed towards UN agencies or implementing partners with

an almost exclusively humanitarian angle. In the case of Jordan instead, the government has been

looking to mobilize funding to also strengthen the resilience of its water infrastructure and its overall

water governance system.

Fourth - and where probably the two countries differ the most – the new refugee discourse has also

served to reshape national water governance policies. This is particularly applicable for Jordan, which

developed a new water strategy where it places heavy weight on the pressure of Syrian refugees as a

key determinant for new water investments. This is a clear shift towards the short- to medium-term

response developed during the peak of the crisis, to a longer-term and more sustainable strategy –

staying away from unpopular demand-driven policies. Such shift has not been yet registered in

Lebanon, where the only tangible response to address water scarcity issues has been the LCRP with,

however, weak signs of longer-terms investments.

Conclusion:

This research analysed the impact of discourses of refugees on water governance in Lebanon and

Jordan. Historically, discourses about water resources in Lebanon and Jordan have blamed the

neighbours for not respecting international water law and for the unfair sharing of the Jordan River

with its neighbouring countries. However, this paper showed that since the Syrian crisis, new

discourses emphasising how Syrian refugees exacerbating water scarcity have been developed and

gained prominence in governmental declarations and national mass media.

These discourses have been used by the Lebanese and Jordanian government to shift the blame on the

causes behind water scarcity in the countries towards refugees. At the same time, it helped the two

governments to seek for international support and donors aid in order to face the “water crisis” due to

the refugees’ arrivals. Nevertheless, this study only focused on the impact of Syrian refugees from a

discursive perspective. Therefore, future research should analyse the impact of refugees on water

resources in the two countries, and compare the findings with the discourses emerged from this article,

thereby allowing a discourse-reality check.

Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to Dr. Anders Jägerskog for his supervision and feedback on earlier versions

of this paper. This paper has been written for the Mediterranean Youth for Water (MedYWat) network

call for papers on Water and Migration.

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