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TJ. T. PLACE 45

statements about sensations and mental images are reducible to or analysable into state-

merits aboul brain processes, in the way in which ' cognition statements ' are analysable

into statements about behaviour. To say that statements about consciousness are state-

ments about brain processes is manifestly false. This is shown (a) by the fact that you can

describe your sensations and mental imagery without knowing anything about your

brain processes or even that such things exist, (b) by the fact that statements about one's

fi h consciousness and statements about one's brain processes are verified in entirely different

ways and (e) by the fact that there is nothing self-contradictory about the statement

adent correlated ' X lias a pain but there is nothing going on in his brain ' . What I do want to assert, however,

given pattern of is that the statement ' consciousness is a process in the brain ', although not necessarily

ice to the brain apysiologica1

true, is not necessarily false. ' Consciousness is a process in the brain ', on my view is neither

self-contradictory nor self-evident ; it is a reasonable scientific hypothesis, in the way that

iiigs are deserip- the statement ' lightning is a motion of electric charges ' is a reasonable scientific hypothesis.

The all but universally accepted view that an assertion of identity between conscious-

ness and brain processes can be ruled out on logical grounds alone, derives, I suspect, from

a failure to distinguish between what we may call the ' is ' of definition and the ' is ' of

which cannot be composition. The distinction I have in mind here is the difference between the function

nger commands of the word ' is ' in statements like ' a square is an equilateral rectangle ', ' red is a colour',

ad psychologists to understand an instruction is to be able to act appropriately under the appropriate

sm of the seven- circumstances ', and its function in statements like ' his table is an old packing case ', ' her

s view is either a hat is a bundle of straw tied together with string ', ' a cloud is a mass of water droplets or

viour as Tolman other particles in suspension '. These two types of ' is ' statement have one thing in corn-

orexample being mon. In both cases it makes sense to add the qualification and nothing else '. In this they

I like knowing ', differ from those statements in which the ' is ' is an ' is ' of predication ; the statements

re 'wantrng' and 'Toby is 80 years old and nothing else', 'her hat is red. and nothing else' or 'giraffes are

of dispositions to tall and nothing else ', for example, are nonsense. This logical feature may be described by

- the other hand, saying that in both cases both the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate are

md the notions of expressions which provide an adequate characterization of the state of affairs to which

Tile sort of inner they both refer. hat a satisfactory In another respect, however, the two groups of statements are strikingly different.

found. For our Statements like ' a square is an equilateral rectangle ' are necessary statements which are

i that statements true by definition. Statements like ' his table is an old packing case ', on the other hand,

things dreamed of are contingent statements which have to be verified by observation. In the case of state-

ocesses which are merits like ' a square is an equilateral -rectangle ' or 'red is a colour ', there is a relationship

heated. The ques- between the meaning of the expression forming the grammatical predicate and the

ay committed to a meaning of the expression forming the grammatical subj ect, such that whenever the

category of pro- subject expression is applicable the predicate must also be applicable. If you can describe

a which they are something as red then you must also be able to describe it as coloured. In the case of

ses does not entail statements like ' his table is an old packing case ', on the other hand, there is no such

muet be dismissed relationship between the meanings of the expressions ' his table ' and ' old packing case';

it merely so happens that in this case both expressions are applicable to and at the same

time provide an adequate characterization of the same object. Those who contend that

ON .

-

the statement 'consciousness is a brain process' is logically untenable base their claim,

usness is a process J suspect, on the mistaken assumption that if the meanings of two statements or expres-

uns, fantasies and sjos are quite unconnected, they cannot both provide an adequate characterization of

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. U. T. PLACE 47

posed of tiny particles in suspension. There is no contradiction involved in supposing that

clouds consist of a dense mass of fibrous tissue ; indeed, such a consistency seems to be

implied by many of the functions performed by clouds in fairy stories and mythology. It

is clear from this that the terms ' cloud ' and mass of tiny particles in suspension ' mean

quite different things. Yet we do not conclude from this that there must be two things, the

mass of particles in suspension and the cloud. The reason for this, I suggest, is that

although the characteristics of being a cloud and being a mass of tiny particles in suspen-

sion are invariably associated, we never make the observations necessary to verify the

statement ' that is a cloud ' and those necessary to verify the statement ' this is a mass of

tiny particles in suspension ' at one and the same time. We can observe the micro-structure

of a cloud only when we are enveloped by it, a condition which effectively prevents us from

observing those characteristics which from a distance lead us to describe it as a cloud.

Indeed, so disparate are these two experiences that we use different words to describe them.

That which is a cloud when we observe it from a distance becomes a fog or mist when we

are enveloped by it.

Iv. WHEN ARE TWO SETS OF OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS OF THE SAME EVENT?

The example of the cloud and the mass of tiny particles in suspension was chosen because

it is one of the few cases of a general proposition involving what I have called the ' is ' of

composition which does not involve us in scientific technicalities. It is useful because it

brings out the connexion between the ordinary everyday cases of the ' is ' of composition

like the table/packing case example and the more technical cases like 'lightning is a

motion of electric charges ' where the analogy with the consciousness/brain process case is

most marked. The limitation of the cloud/tiny particles in suspension case is that it does

not bring out sufficiently clearly the crucial problem of how the identity of the states of

affairs referred to by the two expressions is established. In the cloud case the fact that

something is a cloud and the fact that something is a mass of tiny particles in suspension

are both verified by the normal processes of visual observation. It is arguable, moreoever,

that the identity of the entities referred to by the two expressions is established by the con-

tinuity between the two sets of observations as the observer moves towards or away from

the cloud. In the case of brain processes and consciousness there is no such continuity be-

tween the two sets of observations involved. A closer introspective scrutiny will never

reveal the passage of nerve impulses over a thousand synapses in the way that a closer

scrutiny of a cloud will reveal a mass of tiny particles in suspension. The operations re-

quired to verify statements about consciousness and statements about brain processes

are fundamentally different. To find a parallel for this feature we must examine other cases where an identity is

asserted between something whose occurrence is verified by the ordinary processes of

observation and something whose occurrence is established by special scientific procedures.

For this purpose I have chosen the case where we say that lightning is a motion of electric

charges. As in the case of consciousness, however closely we scrutinize the lightning we

shall iiever be able to observe the electric charges, and just as the operations for deter-

mining the nature of one's state of consciousness are radically different from those involved

in determining the nature of one's brain processes, so the operations for determining the

occurrence of lightning are radically different from those involved in determining the

occurrence of a motion of electric charges. What is it, therefore, that leads us to say that



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U. T. PLACE 49 brain leads to a psychical, which however contains no hint of the brain or any other bodily part . . . . The supposition has to be, it would seem, two continuous series of events, one physico-chemical, the other psychical, and at times interaction between them ' (Sherring- ton, 1947, pp. xx-xxi).

Just as the physiologist is not likely to be impressed by the philosopher's contention that there is some self-contradiction involved in supposing consciousness to be a brain process, so the philosopher is unlikely to be impressed by the considerations which lead Sherrington to conclude that there are two sets of events, one physico-chemical, the other psychical. Sherrington's argument for all its emotional appeal depends on a fairly simple logical mistake, which is unfortunately all too frequently made by psychologists and physiologists and not infrequently in the past by the philosophers themselves. This logical mistake, which I shall refer to as the ' phenomenological fallacy ', is the mistake of supposing that when the subject describes his experience, when he describes how things look, sound, smell, taste or feel to him, he is describing the literal properties of objects and events on a peculiar sort of internal cinema or television screen, usually referred to in the modern psychological literature as the ' phenomenal field '. If we assume, for example, that when a subject reports a green after-image he is asserting the occurrence inside himself of an obj set which is literally green, it is clear that we have on our hands an entity for which there is no place in the world of physics. In the case of the green after-image there is no green object in the subject's environment corresponding to the description that he gives. Nor is there anything green in his brain ; certainly there is nothing which could have emerged when he reported the appearance of the green after-image. Brain processes are not the sort of things to which colour concepts can be properly applied.

The phenomenological fallacy on which this argument is based depends on the mistaken assumption that because our ability to describe things in our environment depends on our consciousness of them, our descriptions of things are primarily descriptions of our conscious experience and only secondarily, indirectly and inferentially descriptions of the objects and events in our environments. It is assumed that because we recognize things in our environment by their look, sound, smell, taste and feel, we begin by describing their phenomenal properties, i.e. the properties of the looks, sounds, smells, tastes and feels which they produce in us, and infer their real properties from their phenomenal properties. In fact, the reverse is the case. We begin by learning to recognize the real properties of things in our environment. We learn to recognize them, of course, by their look, sound, smell, taste and feel; but this does not mean that we have to learn to describe the look, sound, smell, taste and feel of things before we can describe the things themselves. Indeed, it is only after we have learnt to describe the things in our environment that we can learn to describe our consciousness of them. We describe our conscious experience not in terms of the mythological ' phenomenal properties ' which are supposed to inhere in the mythological ' objects ' in the mythological phenomenal field ', but by reference to the actual physical properties of the concrete physical objects, events and processes which normally, though not perhaps in the present instance, give rise to the sort of conscious experience which we are trying to describe. In other words when we describe the after-image as green, we are not saying that there is something, the after-image, which is green, we are saying that we are having the sort of experience which we normally have when, and which we have learnt to describe as, looking at a green patch of light.

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'j) - FAUbressler/EDU/CogNeuro/Readings/Place... · 2019-06-06 · 'siiub op pAJosqo uj ouqo ndoosopioj o jnuicuoo o oÇqu i ocfuq soq. iqdom ut popuodsn rnxo Aoe : eii pnoo y uoiudn

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