IZBOR ODLUKA USTAVNOG SUDA REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE 2015pravičnog suđenja. Ustavni sud nadzire – od slučaja do slučaja ‒ jesu li ih kazneni sudovi osigurali. Zaključno, ni u „slučaju

IZBOR ODLUKA USTAVNOG SUDA REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE

2015.

PREDGOVOR

Akademik Davor Krapac, sudac Ustavnog suda u mandatu 2007. ‒ 2016., bio je prvi glavni

urednik godišnjih izdanja Izbora odluka Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske (u daljnjem tekstu:

Godišnjak USRH), iznimno vrijednog dvojezičnog izdavačkog i nakladničkog pothvata koji je

započeo s pregledom prakse Ustavnog suda iz 1996. godine.

U ime Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske i svih čitatelja zahvaljujem akademiku Krapcu i svim

članovima uredništva Godišnjaka USRH na nevjerojatnom poletu koji su pokazali i neiscrpnoj

energiji koju su iz godine u godinu ulagali kako bi domaćoj i međunarodnoj pravnoj zajednici

približili recentnu jurisprudenciju hrvatskog Ustavnog suda i time omogućili njezino

kontinuirano praćenje i objektivnu valorizaciju njezina razvitka.

Sukladno dosadašnjem dobrom običaju, kao glavna urednica Godišnjaka USRH 2015.

podsjetila bih na odluke Ustavnog suda donesene te godine koje su u javnosti izazvale najviše

pozornosti ili su u većoj ili manjoj mjeri utjecale na različita pravna područja domaćeg pravnog

poretka.

1. Apstraktna ocjena ustavnosti zakona

Kad je riječ o apstraktnoj ocjeni ustavnosti zakona, najveću pažnju u javnosti izazvala je odluka

kojom su ukinute pojedine odredbe Zakona o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona izborima

zastupnika u Hrvatski sabor iz veljače 2015. (v. obrazac 12). Tom je odlukom ukinuta nova

zakonska obveza političkih stranaka da prikupljaju potpise birača za svoje stranačke liste. Cilj

te obveze bila je eliminacija iz izbornog natjecanja tzv. malih političkih stranaka. Ustavni sud

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utvrdio je u odluci da u Republici Hrvatskoj postoji neprikladno zakonodavstvo kojim se

uređuju uvjeti za osnivanje i djelovanje političkih stranaka, ali izborni zakon nije i ne smije biti

sredstvo za rješavanje tog problema. Nadalje, ukinuto je i rješenje o povećanju broja potpisa

birača za neovisne liste, također zbog nepostojanja legitimnog cilja i nerazmjernosti.

Međutim, dva su pitanja izazvala posebnu pozornost javnosti.

Prvo je vezano uz zakonsko rješenje o pravnoj mogućnosti kandidiranja počinitelja kaznenih

djela. Hrvatski sabor propisao je opća zakonska pravila da se na parlamentarnim izborima smiju

kandidirati: ‒ sve osobe koje su pod kaznenom istragom; ‒ sve osobe protiv kojih se vodi

kazneni postupak; ‒ sve osobe koje su pravomoćno osuđene za počinjenje kaznenih djela na

uvjetne kazne zatvora; ‒ sve osobe koje su pravomoćno osuđene za počinjenje kaznenih djela

na bezuvjetne kazne zatvora do šest mjeseci. Polazeći od takvog zakonskog rješenja, Ustavni

sud ukinuo je iznimku od tog općeg zakonskog pravila koja se odnosila na kaznena djela

zlouporabe položaja i ovlasti. Naime, zakonodavac je čak i najblaže oblike kaznenih djela

zlouporabe položaja i ovlasti izjednačio s djelima genocida, terorizma, mučenja, ropstva i

teškog ubojstva, za koja su bila propisana posebna pravila kandidiranja, što je bilo očito

suprotno ustavnom načelu razmjernosti. Nažalost, u medijima je opetovano stvarana pogrešna

slika da je Ustavni sud time omogućio svim osobama osumnjičenima, okrivljenima ili

osuđenima za kaznena djela da se kandidiraju na parlamentarnim izborima. Ta pogrešna slika i

danas prevladava u medijima i negativno utječe na povjerenje javnosti u Ustavni sud.

Sličnu sudbinu doživjela je odluka Ustavnog suda o ukidanju dijela zakonskog rješenja o tzv.

spolnim kvotama na kandidacijskim listama. Naime, Ustavni sud potvrdio je kao suglasnu s

Ustavom zakonsku obvezu prema kojoj na kandidacijskim listama mora biti najmanje 40%

pripadnika svakog spola, ali je ukinuo dio koji je propisivao da lista koja ne ispunjava taj

zakonski uvjet nije pravovaljana. Jedan od razloga bio je i taj što je za nepoštovanje tzv. spolne

kvote na kandidacijskim listama za Hrvatski sabor već bila propisana visoka prekršajna

(novčana) kazna u Zakonu o ravnopravnosti spolova. Stoga „dvostruko kažnjavanje“, to jest

propisivanje dviju kazni u dva različita zakona za jedno te isto kažnjivo ponašanje nije bilo ni

opravdano ni razmjerno. Nažalost, u javnosti je stvorena pogrešna percepcija da je Ustavni sud

ukinuo samu obvezu poštovanja spolnih kvota na kandidacijskim listama. Štoviše, izravni

„krivac“ za neprihvatljivo mali broj izabranih zastupnica na izborima za 8. saziv Hrvatskog

sabora 2015. godine pronađen je u toj odluci Ustavnog suda. Problem je dodatno otežao

zaključak Državnog odvjetništva Republike Hrvatske (DORH) da neće pokretati prekršajne

postupke protiv političkih stranaka koje na kandidacijskim listama nisu istaknule najmanje 40%

pripadnika jednog spola. DORH se pri tome pozvao na vlastito tumačenje Zakona o

ravnopravnosti spolova prema kojem se takva obveza nije odnosila na izbore za 8. saziv

Hrvatskog sabora.1 Budući da je takva zakonska obveza neprijeporno postojala, što je Ustavni

sud izrijekom utvrdio u svojoj odluci, kažnjavanje svih političkih stranaka koje tu obvezu nisu

izvršile (to jest onih koje na svojim kandidacijskim listama nisu istaknule najmanje 40%

pripadnika svakog spola) zapravo je test urednog funkcioniranja demokratske države

utemeljene na vladavini prava.

1 Pisana obavijest Državnog odvjetništva Republike Hrvatske broj: KR-DO-1673/2015 AŠM/AŠM od 8. veljače

2016. dostavljena Državnom izbornom povjerenstvu Republike Hrvatske, u kojoj je sadržan zaključak "da ne

postoji zakonski osnov za pokretanje prekršajnih postupaka protiv predlagatelja kandidacijskih lista za izbore

zastupnika u Hrvatski sabor, održane 8. studenog 2015., na kojima se nije nalazilo najmanje 40 posto pripadnika

oba spola, te stoga spomenutu obavijest neće dostavljati nadležnim državnim odvjetništvima".

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2. Ustavne tužbe

I pojedine odluke u kaznenim stvarima, donesene tijekom 2015. godine u povodu ustavnih tužbi

u postupcima zaštite pojedinačnih ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda, ostat će zapamćene po

ozbiljnim kritikama rada Ustavnog suda koje su preplavile medije i posljedično izazvale burne

reakcije u javnosti.

Osobitu pažnju zaslužuju dvije takve odluke. U javnosti se prepoznaju pod kolokvijalnim

nazivima „slučaj Glavaš“ i „slučaj Sanader“.

U oba je predmeta Ustavni sud iznova morao isticati da nije redovni sud trećeg ili četvrtog

stupnja i ne odlučuje meritorno o sumnji ili optužbi za kaznena djela u pojedinačnim

slučajevima. Upravo zbog potrebe da se razumije nadležnost Ustavnog suda kad s ustavnog

aspekta preispituje sudske presude donesene u kaznenim predmetima, Ustavni sud je na

internetskoj stranici objavio sažetke tih odluka, objasnivši okvir u kojem se kretao u ispitivanju

prigovora podnositelja tih ustavnih tužbi.

Prigovori podnositelja u „slučaju Glavaš“ (v. obrazac 21.) rasvijetlili su problem različite

sudske prakse kaznenih sudova u vezi s datumom kad je Republika Hrvatska stekla svojstva

suverene države u smislu međunarodnog prava i s karakterom oružanog sukoba na njezinom

području početkom 1990-ih godina. Susrevši se s tim ozbiljnim ustavnopravnim pitanjima

vezanima uz oružani sukob na području Republike Hrvatske 1991. godine, Ustavni sud imao je

obvezu odgovoriti na ta pitanja u okvirima hrvatskog ustavnog prava. Utvrdio je da je oružani

sukob na području Republike Hrvatske imao nemeđunarodni karakter do 8. listopada 1991., a

nakon toga je prerastao u sukob međunarodnog karaktera. Sukladno tome, datum 8. listopada

1991. relevantan je za pravilno vrednovanje karaktera cjelokupnog ustavnog i državnopravnog

temelja Republike Hrvatske. O njemu ovisi sudska primjena pravila međunarodnog prava

(konkretno, Dopunskog protokola II. uz Ženevske konvencije o zaštiti žrtava nemeđunarodnih

oružanih sukoba, odnosno Dopunskog protokola I. uz Ženevske konvencije o zaštiti žrtava

međunarodnih oružanih sukoba) u kaznenim postupcima za ratne zločine počinjene prije i

nakon tog datuma. Vrhovni sud odstupio je u „slučaju Glavaš“ od tih, ali i od vlastitih pravila

koja je ustanovio u svojoj praksi. Ukidajući presudu, Ustavni sud obvezao je Vrhovni sud da

obrazloži svoja stajališta o pitanjima koja proizlaze iz karaktera oružanog sukoba na području

Republike Hrvatske prije i poslije 8. listopada 1991. S obzirom na to da je predmet vraćen

Vrhovnom sudu na ponovno suđenje, o ostalim prigovorima podnositelja (primjerice, o povredi

procesne ravnopravnosti stranaka u postupku, povredi prava na branitelja, i dr.) Ustavni sud

nije odlučivao. Odluku o tim prigovorima prepustio je Vrhovnom sudu jer je riječ o najvišem

sudu u zemlji kojemu je ustavna zadaća da uz domaće pravo osigurava i jedinstvenu primjenu

konvencijskog prava u Republici Hrvatskoj. Time je ustanovljen jasniji odnos Vrhovnog i

Ustavnog suda u primjeni Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda (u daljnjem

tekstu: Konvencija), kao i prakse Europskog suda za ljudska prava (u daljnjem tekstu: ESLJP),

u pojedinačnim slučajevima.

„Slučaj Sanader“ (v. obrazac 51.) obuhvatio je dva različita kaznena djela. S jedne strane,

podnositelju se sudilo za kazneno djelo protiv službene dužnosti ‒ zlouporabom položaja i

ovlasti s obilježjima ratnog profiterstva (tzv. slučaj Hypo). U vezi s tim djelom, Ustavni sud

bavio se u prvom redu primjenom pravila blaže kazne (blažeg zakona) te pravnom utvrđenošću

kaznenog djela ratnog profiterstva u vezi s člankom 5. Promjene Ustava iz 2010. Tim je

ustavnim amandmanom dopunjen članak 31. Ustava novim stavkom 4., koji glasi: „Ne

zastarijevaju kaznena djela ratnog profiterstva i kaznena djela iz procesa pretvorbe i

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privatizacije počinjena u vrijeme Domovinskog rata i mirne reintegracije, ratnog stanja i

neposredne ugroženosti neovisnosti i teritorijalne cjelovitosti države, propisana zakonom ...“

Nažalost, i u tom je slučaju u javnosti opetovano stvarana pogrešna i paušalna slika da je

Ustavni sud ukinuo članak 31. stavak 4. Ustava. Ta pogrešna slika i danas prevladava u

medijima te negativno utječe na povjerenje javnosti u Ustavni sud. Zato na ovom mjestu treba

ponoviti: u ustavnom poretku Republike Hrvatske i danas postoje mogućnosti da se propišu i

normativno urede mehanizmi za kazneni progon i kažnjavanje svih zločina ratnog profiterstva,

kao i pretvorbenih i privatizacijskih kaznenih djela, neovisno o tome kad su počinjeni. Čini se

da objektivno i nepristrano čitanje odluke Ustavnog suda, koje će uzeti u obzir da je ta odluka

bila utemeljena na najboljim suvremenim pravnim standardima zaštite ljudskih prava i na

jedinstvenom razmatranju združenih učinaka članka 31. stavka 4. Ustava i pozitivnog

provedbenog Zakona o nezastarijevanju kaznenih djela ratnog profiterstva i kaznenih djela iz

procesa pretvorbe i privatizacije iz 2011., kao organskoj normativnoj cjelini, tek slijedi.

S druge strane, podnositelju se sudilo kao predsjedniku Vlade za korupcijsko djelo primanja

mita radi utjecanja na sklapanje pravnog posla iz nadležnosti Vlade (slučaj INA-MOL). Taj je

slučaj otvorio različita pitanja vezana uz jamstva pravičnog suđenja u kaznenim stvarima,

posebno u svjetlu europskih pravnih standarda koje je u svojoj praksi stvorio i razvio ESLJP.

Riječ je primjerice o određenju predsjednika Vlade i predsjednika političke stranke kao

„službene osobe“ ‒ primatelja mita u smislu kaznenog zakonodavstva, te načina na koji je

kazneni sud proveo dokazni postupak i ocijenio da je podnositelj primio mito, što su važni

proceduralni aspekti prava na pravično suđenje u kaznenim stvarima.

Sažeto, samo su kazneni sudovi nadležni presuđivati o krivnji osoba za počinjenje kaznenih

djela za koja ih se tereti, ali su pri tome dužni tim osobama osigurati sva proceduralna jamstva

pravičnog suđenja. Ustavni sud nadzire – od slučaja do slučaja ‒ jesu li ih kazneni sudovi

osigurali.

Zaključno, ni u „slučaju Glavaš“ ni u „slučaju Sanader“ Ustavni sud nije ispitivao jesu li

podnositelji krivi za počinjenje kaznenih djela za koja su pravomoćno osuđeni, jer on za to nije

nadležan. Zadaća Ustavnog suda bila je ograničena na ispitivanje je li u tim slučajevima

poštovan pravni okvir države, a osobito je li taj okvir tumačen u skladu s Ustavom i

Konvencijom, te jesu li u granicama koje jamče Ustav i Konvencija podnositeljima bila

osigurana sva jamstva pravičnog suđenja i svi mehanizmi pravne zaštite predviđeni hrvatskim

zakonodavstvom.

a) Otvaranje mogućnosti podnošenja ustavnih tužbi protiv nedjelotvornih istraga

Iako često ponavlja što jest, a što nije u njegovoj nadležnosti u postupcima pokrenutim ustavnim

tužbama (kao u prethodna dva slučaja), Ustavni sud učinio je tijekom 2015. godine još jedan

važan korak prema obuhvatnijoj zaštiti temeljnih prava pojedinaca, stvorivši u svojoj praksi

novo djelotvorno ustavnosudsko sredstvo pravne zaštite. Temeljni razlog njegova stvaranja bio

je veći broj presuda ESLJP-a protiv Republike Hrvatske u kojima je utvrđena povreda

proceduralnog aspekta članka 2. (pravo na život) i članka 3. (zabrana mučenja) Konvencije.

Riječ je o dopuštenosti ustavnih tužbi zbog neprovođenja istrage ili zbog nedjelotvorne istrage

kaznenih djela vezanih uz ta dva članka Konvencije, a koje su podnesene prije iscrpljenog

pravnog puta.

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Slijedom toga, u prosincu 2014. godine Ustavni sud donio je Poslovničku odluku o dopuni svog

Poslovnika (NN 2/15.) te je uveo novu signaturu U-IIIBi kojom označava takve ustavne tužbe.

Kao što je prethodno rečeno, do uvođenja ustavne tužbe „U-IIIBi“ u Republici Hrvatskoj nije

postojalo djelotvorno pravno sredstvo kojim bi se povrede prava na život i povrede zabrane

mučenja u smislu Konvencije ispitivale i izricale na domaćoj razini.

U prosincu 2015. Ustavni sud donio je prvu odluku kojom je meritorno odlučio o ustavnoj tužbi

„U-IIIB“. Tu je odluku donio u povodu kaznene prijave jedne podnositeljice ustavne tužbe koja

je tvrdila da je njezin brat bio žrtva kaznenog djela ratnog zločina protiv civilnog stanovništva,

a da je istraga o tom zločinu nedjelotvorna (v. obrazac 71.).

3. Ocjena ustavnosti referendumskih pitanja

Ustavni sud susreo se u 2015. godini i s dva referendumska pitanja postavljena u obliku

prijedloga zakona (v. obrasce 79. i 80.). Riječ je o Prijedlogu Zakona o obavljanju pratećih i

neosnovnih djelatnosti u javnom sektoru (vezanom uz tzv. referendum o outsourcingu) i

Prijedlogu Zakona o dopuni i izmjenama Zakona o cestama (vezanom uz tzv. referendum o

autocestama). Za razliku od redovite naknadne (a posteriori) apstraktne ocjene ustavnosti

zakona, kod koje Ustavni sud ispituje je li zakon koji je na snazi u suglasnosti s Ustavom, u

navedenim se referendumskim slučajevima Ustavni sud prvi put susreo sa zadaćom da utvrdi

jesu li prijedlozi zakona (oblikovani kao referendumska pitanja) u skladu s Ustavom. Riječ je

o posebnoj prethodnoj (preventivnoj, a priori) apstraktnoj ocjeni ustavnosti zakona.

Kad je riječ o takvoj vrsti ustavnosudskog nadzora, Ustavni sud zauzeo je načelno pravno

stajalište da prijedlozi zakona predloženi u obliku referendumskih pitanja moraju imati najviši

stupanj materijalne podudarnosti s Ustavom jer se za njih zahtijeva da budu „u skladu s

Ustavom“. Konkretni prijedlozi dvaju prijedloga zakona koje je razmatrao nisu ispunjavali te

zahtjeve.

4. Privremene mjere

Konačno, u javnosti je izazvalo pozornost i rješenje kojim je Ustavni sud pokrenuo postupak

za ocjenu suglasnosti s Ustavom Obiteljskog zakona iz 2014., privremeno obustavio izvršenje

svih pojedinačnih akata i radnji koje se poduzimaju na osnovi tog zakona i naložio primjenu

ranijeg Obiteljskog zakona (iz 2003.) do donošenja konačne odluke (v. obrazac 1.). Odluka da

djeluje preventivno proizašla je iz ocjene da je riječ o sistemskom zakonu koji ima „kapilarne

učinke na pojedince i cjelokupnu društvenu zajednicu jer ulazi u dom svakog čovjeka i izravno

utječe na socijalnu stvarnost hrvatskog društva“. Proizašla je i iz dosadašnjeg iskustva i

ustavnosudske prakse, koja je pokazala da ustavnosudska odluka, ma kako bila pravilna i

potrebna, ne postiže svoj puni učinak i traženu djelotvornost ako se donese prekasno. Ocijenivši

da mu je potrebno vrijeme kako bi pažljivo i sustavno ispitao mnogobrojne prigovore većeg

broja predlagatelja, Ustavni sud ocijenio je da ne smije na sebe preuzeti teret pravnih i faktičnih

posljedica do kojih bi mogla dovesti njegova buduća odluka sa zakašnjelim učinkom, bude li u

njoj utvrdio da je osporeni zakon nesuglasan s Ustavom. Suprotno pozitivnim ocjenama pravne

struke, ta je privremena mjera izazvala iznimno negativne reakcije predlagatelja tog zakona

(Vlade Republike Hrvatske), ali i dijela zastupnika iz reda parlamentarne većine. Te su

negativne reakcije obuhvatile cjelokupni rad Ustavnog suda, a bile su praćene i sve češćim

isticanjem tvrdnji da je Ustavni sud „političko tijelo“ i da ga treba ukinuti.

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5. Završni osvrt

Već i ovaj vrlo kratki pregled nekoliko odluka koje su obilježile rad Ustavnog suda u 2015.

godini pokazuje da je za Ustavni sud ta godina bila iznimno teška. Zbog pogrešne percepcije

tih odluka u javnosti, kao i loše slike koja se o samom sudu stvarala tijekom 2015. godine, a

koju su posredstvom medija uvelike poticale političke strukture, ali i pojedini suci pogođeni

odlukama Ustavnog suda, na kraju treba utvrditi da Ustavni sud tijekom 2015. godine ‒

vremenu usprkos – nije odustao od ostvarenja svojih zadaća. Ostao je neovisan i nepristran

čuvara Ustava.

U svjetlu kaznenih predmeta koji su prethodno spomenuti, čini se da uvijek iznova treba

ponavljati kako su pojedinačne sudske presude jednostrani akti državne vlasti i kao takvi mogu

povrijediti ustavne norme, u prvom redu one koje svakom pojedincu jednako ‒ ma tko god on

bio ‒ jamče temeljna prava i političke slobode. U toj su mjeri i sudske odluke podložne nadzoru

Ustavnog suda. Međutim, za razliku od sudova koji meritorno odlučuju o pravima i obvezama

stranaka, odnosno o optužbama zbog kažnjivih djela, Ustavni sud nije raspravni sud (trial

court), nego je nacionalni nadzorni sud (review court), slično ESLJP-u na europskoj razini.

Također treba imati na umu da se ustavno sudstvo temelji na povijesnom dostignuću klasične

liberalno-demokratske misli o nadređenosti načela supremacije Ustava svim drugim načelima

državnog uređenja, uključujući i načelo narodne suverenosti i načelo narodnog predstavništva.

Budući da su za ostvarenje ustavnog programa odgovorni i zakonodavna, i izvršna, i sudbena

vlast, svaka u okviru svojih nadležnosti, zadaća je Ustavnog suda nadzirati provode li te grane

vlasti zapisani ustavni program i obavljaju li svoje zadaće u granicama Ustava. Postavljanje

granica trima državnim vlastima temeljno je obilježje ustavnih demokracija.

U tom svjetlu postaje i razumljivo i prihvatljivo da djelovanje Ustavnog suda kao nadzornog

suda ima politički učinak. To je posebno vidljivo kad Ustavni sud ukida zakone Hrvatskog

sabora ili uredbe Vlade Republike Hrvatske zbog njihove nesuglasnosti s Ustavom. Unatoč

tome, Ustavni sud nije političko tijelo. On svojim odlukama samo određuje ustavni okvir unutar

kojega se politika mora razvijati, ali se ne bavi pitanjima političke svrsishodnosti. Jedino i

isključivo mjerilo njegova odlučivanja jest Ustav Republike Hrvatske.

U Zagrebu 6. lipnja 2016.

Jasna Omejec,

glavna urednica

7

SELECTION OF DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

2015

FOREWORD

Dr Davor Krapac, Full Member of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Constitutional

Court judge, within his term of office from 2007 to 2016 was the first editor-in-chief of the

Annual Selection of Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia

(hereinafter: CCRC Annual), a valuable bilingual editorial and publishing endeavour, which

began with an overview of the Constitutional Court’s case law of 1996.

On behalf of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia and all readers, I would like to

thank Member of the Academy Davor Krapac and all members of the Editorial Board of the

CCRC Annual on their incredible zeal and on the inexhaustible energy they have invested from

year to year to bring the recent jurisprudence of the Croatian Constitutional Court closer to the

domestic and international legal community. In this way, they have allowed this jurisprudence

to be continuously followed and its development to be objectively evaluated.

In line with our good tradition so far, as editor-in-chief of the CCRC Annual 2015, I would like

to recall some decisions of the Constitutional Court rendered during that year which drew most

public attention, or which, to a greater or lesser extent, affected different legal areas of the

national legal order.

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1. Abstract review of the constitutionality of laws

With regard to the abstract review of the constitutionality of laws, the decision repealing

particular provisions of the Act on Amendments to the Act on the Election of Members of the

Croatian Parliament of February 2015 attracted most public attention (see Summary 12). This

decision repealed the new legal obligation of political parties to collect voters’ signatures for

their party lists. The aim of this obligation was to eliminate so-called small parties from the

electoral competition. The Constitutional Court established in its decision that inappropriate

legislation might exist in the Republic of Croatia to regulate the conditions for the establishment

and activities of political parties, but electoral law is not, and must not be, a means to resolve

this problem. Further, it also repealed the provision which prescribed the increase in the number

of voters’ signatures for independent lists, also because there was no legitimate aim or

proportionality for doing so.

There were two other issues that drew a great deal of public attention.

The first concerned the legal solution allowing perpetrators of criminal offences to be proposed

as candidates. The Croatian Parliament prescribed general legal rules that the following persons

may be proposed as candidates at parliamentary elections: any person undergoing criminal

investigation; any person against whom criminal proceedings are conducted; any person on

whom a conditional sentence for a criminal offence has been imposed by a final judgment; any

person who has been sentenced to an unconditional prison sentence for a period not exceeding

six months for a criminal offence by a final judgment. Based on such a legal solution, the

Constitutional Court repealed the exemption from this general legal rule relating to criminal

offences of abuse of office and authority. The legislator treated even the most benign forms of

crime concerning abuse of office and authority in the same way as acts of genocide, terrorism,

torture, slavery and murder, for which special rules of proposing candidates were prescribed.

This was obviously contrary to the principle of proportionality. Unfortunately, the media

repeatedly created the false image that the Constitutional Court thus allowed all persons

suspected, accused, or convicted of crimes to be proposed as candidates at parliamentary

elections. Such a distorted picture is still prevalent in the media and has a negative effect on

public confidence in the Constitutional Court.

The decision of the Constitutional Court to repeal part of the legal solution on “gender quotas”

in candidates’ lists shared a similar fate. The Constitutional Court upheld as being in conformity

with the Constitution the legal obligation according to which candidates’ lists must include a

minimum of 40% of members of each gender, but repealed the part prescribing that lists that

do not meet this legal requirement are not valid. One of the reasons was that the Gender Equality

Act had already prescribed a high misdemeanour fine for failure to meet the “gender quota” in

candidates’ lists for the Croatian Parliament. Therefore a “double punishment” or the

prescription of two sanctions in two different laws is neither justified nor proportionate.

Unfortunately, a false perception was created that the Constitutional Court repealed the very

obligation to respect gender quotas in candidates’ lists. What is more, the direct responsibility

for the unacceptably low number of elected women MPs at the elections for the 8th convocation

of the Croatian Parliament in 2015 was found in this Constitutional Court decision. The problem

was additionally exacerbated by the conclusion of the State Attorney’s Office of the Republic

of Croatia (SAORC) that it would not institute misdemeanour proceedings against political

parties which did not place on their candidates’ lists a minimum of 40% of members of each

gender. By doing so, SAORC invoked its own interpretation of the Gender Equality Act

whereby such an obligation did not concern the elections for the 8th convocation of the Croatian

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Parliament.2 Since such a legal obligation was indisputably in force, which the Constitutional

Court explicitly established in its decision, the sanctioning of political parties that did not meet

this obligation (in other words, those which did not propose a minimum of 40% of members of

each gender in their candidates’ lists) was actually a test of the sound functioning of a

democratic state governed by the rule of law.

2. Constitutional complaints

Some decisions in criminal matters rendered in 2015 following constitutional complaints in

proceedings for the protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals

will be remembered for the serious criticism of the work of the Constitutional Court, which

flooded the media and thus caused turbulent public reactions.

Two such decisions deserve particular attention. They are popularly known by their colloquial

titles “the Glavaš case” and “the Sanader case”.

In both cases, the Constitutional Court had to repeatedly stress that it is not an ordinary third-

or fourth-instance court, and that it does not decide on the merits following a suspicion or

accusation of criminal offences in individual cases. In particular, since a need exists to clarify

the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court when it reviews court judgments rendered in

criminal matters from a constitutional aspect, the Constitutional Court published on its website

the summaries of these decisions, explaining the framework within which it operated in

reviewing the objections of the applicants of these constitutional complaints.

The applicants’ objections in “the Glavaš case” (see Summary 21) highlighted the problem of

the differing case law of criminal courts concerning the date when the Republic of Croatia

acquired the characteristics of a sovereign state in the meaning of international law, and

concerning the nature of the armed conflict on its territory at the beginning of the 1990s. By

facing these serious constitutional-law questions related to the armed conflict in the territory of

the Republic of Croatia in 1991, the Constitutional Court was obliged to respond to these

questions within the framework of Croatian constitutional law. It established that the armed

conflict in the territory of the Republic of Croatia had a non-international nature until 8 October

1991, and after that it grew into an international conflict. Consequently, the date of 8 October

1991 is relevant for the correct evaluation of the nature of the entire constitutional and national-

law foundation of the Republic of Croatia. On this depends the judicial application of the rules

of international law (more specifically, Protocol II additional to the Geneva Convention relating

to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, and Protocol I additional to

the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts) in

criminal proceedings for war crimes committed before and after this date. In “the Glavaš case”,

the Supreme Court departed from these rules, as well as from its own rules established in its

case law. By quashing the judgment, the Constitutional Court obliged the Supreme Court to

give reasons for its positions concerning questions that arose from the nature of the armed

conflict in the territory of the Republic of Croatia before and after 8 October 1991. Since the

case was remanded to the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court did not deliberate on the

2 Written notification of the State Attorney's Office of the Republic of Croatia no: KR-DO-1673/2015 AŠM/AŠM

of 8 February 2016, delivered to the State Election Commission of the Republic of Croatia, including the

conclusion “that there are no legal grounds to institute misdemeanour proceedings against the proponents of the

lists of candidates for the election of members of the Croatian Parliament, held on 8 November 2015, which did

not include a minimum of 40% of members of each gender, and therefore, it will not deliver the said notification

to the competent state attorney offices”.

10

remaining complaints of the applicant (for example, on the infringement of the principle of the

equality of arms, the breach of the right to an attorney, etc.). It left the decision regarding these

complaints to the Supreme Court, since this is the highest court in the state whose constitutional

task is to ensure the application of domestic law, as well as the uniform application of

Convention law in the Republic of Croatia. By doing so, a clearer relationship was determined

between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court in applying the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter: the Convention), as well

as the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR), in individual

cases.

“The Sanader case” (see Summary 51) involved two different criminal offences. On the one

hand, the applicant was prosecuted for the criminal offence against official duty – abuse of

office and authority with elements of war profiteering (popularly known as “the Hypo case”).

Regarding this offence, the Constitutional Court primarily dealt with the application of the rule

of the more lenient sentence (the more lenient law) and the legal establishment of the criminal

offence of war profiteering in conjunction with Article 5 of the Change of the Constitution of

2010. This constitutional amendment supplemented Article 31 of the Constitution with a new

paragraph 4, which reads: “The statute of limitations shall not apply to the criminal offences of

war profiteering, nor any criminal offences perpetrated in the course of economic

transformation and privatisation and perpetrated during the period of the Homeland War and

peaceful reintegration, wartime and during times of clear and present danger to the

independence and territorial integrity of the state, as stipulated by law...”.

Unfortunately, in this case, too, an incorrect and imprecise image was again created in the public

eye that the Constitutional Court had repealed Article 31.4 of the Constitution. This false image

is still present in the media and has a negative effect on public confidence in the Constitutional

Court. Therefore, we have to reiterate that in the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia

there are today possibilities to prescribe and regulate mechanisms for the criminal prosecution

and sanctioning of all war profiteering crimes, as well as crimes concerning economic

transformation and privatisation, regardless of the time when they were committed. It seems

that there has not yet been any objective and impartial reading of the decision of the

Constitutional Court, which would take into account that this decision was based on the best

modern legal standards for the protection of human rights, and on the uniform consideration of

the joint effects of Article 31.4 of the Constitution and the positive implementing Act on

Exemption from the Statute of Limitations of Crimes of War Profiteering and Crimes

Committed in the Process of Ownership Transformation and Privatisation of 2011, as an organic

normative whole.

On the other hand, the applicant was prosecuted as Prime Minister for the corruption offence

of accepting a bribe to exert influence on the conclusion of a legal transaction under the

competence of the Government (“the INA-MOL case”). This case raised various questions

related to the guarantees of a fair trial in criminal matters, especially in the light of European

legal standards created and developed by the ECtHR in its case law. This is related, for example,

to a president of a political party being defined as an “official person” – who accepted a bribe

in the meaning of criminal legislation – and to the manner in which the criminal court

approached to the issues of evidence and proof, and assessed that the applicant had accepted a

bribe, which are important procedural aspects of the right to a fair trial in criminal matters.

In brief, only criminal courts are competent to render judgments on whether an individual is

guilty of committing the criminal offences with which they are charged, but, in so doing, they

11

have the duty to ensure that these individuals have all the procedural guarantees of a fair trial.

The Constitutional Court reviews – from case to case – whether the criminal courts have

ensured this.

In conclusion, neither in “the Glavaš case” nor in “the Sanader case” did the Constitutional

Court examine whether the applicants were guilty of the criminal offences of which they had

been convicted by a final judgment, because this is not within its jurisdiction. The task of the

Constitutional Court was limited to examining whether the national legislative framework had

been respected, and, in particular, whether the said framework had been interpreted in

conformity with the Constitution and the Convention, as well as whether, within the limits

guaranteed for accused persons by the Constitution and the Convention, the applicants had been

provided with all the guarantees of a fair trial and with all the legal protection mechanisms

provided for by Croatian legislation.

a) Opening up the possibility of filing constitutional complaints against ineffective

investigations

Although it often reiterates what is and what is not within its jurisdiction in proceedings

instituted on the basis of constitutional complaints (as was the case in the two examples above),

the Constitutional Court in 2015 took another important step towards the more comprehensive

protection of the fundamental rights of individuals by creating in its case law a new effective

Constitutional Court legal remedy. The reason for its creation was the greater number of ECtHR

judgments against the Republic of Croatia where a breach of the procedural aspect of Article 2

(right to life) and Article 3 (prohibition of torture) of the Convention was established.

This concerns the admissibility of constitutional complaints filed before all legal remedies are

exhausted for failure to conduct an investigation or for conducting an ineffective investigation

of criminal offences related to these two Articles of the Convention.

With regard to the above, in December 2014, the Constitutional Court adopted a Procedural

Decision on supplementing its Rules of Procedure (Official Gazette no. 2/15), and introduced

a new designation mark U-IIIBi, designating constitutional complaints of this nature. As

mentioned above, before the introduction of constitutional complaint “U-IIIBi”, there had been

no effective legal remedy in the Republic of Croatia to examine and determine violations of the

right to life and violations of the prohibition of torture in the meaning of the Convention at a

national level.

In December 2015, the Constitutional Court rendered its first decision where it decided on the

merits about a constitutional compliant with a “U-IIIB” designation mark. This decision was

rendered on the basis of the criminal report of an applicant of a constitutional complaint who

claimed that her brother had been the victim of a war crime against the civilian population, and

that the investigation regarding this crime had been ineffective (see Summary 71).

3. Review of the constitutionality of referendum questions

In 2015, the Constitutional Court also dealt with two referendum questions in the form of

proposals of laws (see Summaries 79 and 80). This concerned the Proposal of the Act on the

Performance of Auxiliary and Non-core Activities in the Public Sector (regarding what was

known as “the outsourcing referendum”) and the Proposal of the Act on Amendments to the

Roads Act (regarding what was known as “the referendum on motorways”). As opposed to the

12

regular, a posteriori, abstract review of the constitutionality of laws, where the Constitutional

Court reviews whether a law that is in force is in conformity with the Constitution, in these

referendum cases the Constitutional Court for the first time had the task of establishing whether

proposals of laws (in the form of referendum questions) were in conformity with the

Constitution. This constitutes a specific preventive or pre-emptive, a priori, abstract review of

the constitutionality of a law.

With regard to such a type of Constitutional Court review, the Constitutional Court took the

general legal position that proposals of laws tabled in the form of referendum questions must

have the highest degree of alignment with the Constitution since they are required to be “in

accordance with the Constitution”. Specific parts of the two proposals of laws it deliberated on

did not meet these requirements.

4. Interim measures

Finally, what also caught public attention was the ruling by which the Constitutional Court

instituted proceedings for a review of the conformity of the Family Act of 2014 with the

Constitution, temporarily suspended the execution of all individual acts and actions undertaken

on the basis of this law, and ordered the application of the earlier Family Act of 2003 until the

rendering of a final decision (see Summary 1). The decision to act preventively or pre-emptively

was based on the finding that this was a systemic law which had “capillary effects on individuals

and the entire social community, since it enters every person’s home and directly affects the

social reality of Croatian society”. It was also based on the previous experience and

jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, which showed that a Constitutional Court decision,

as correct and necessary as it may be, does not achieve its full effect and required effectiveness

if rendered too late. By assessing that it needed time to thoroughly and systematically examine

the many objections of a large number of proponents, the Constitutional Court considered that

it could not bear the burden of the legal and factual consequences to which its future decision

with a delayed effect could lead if it established by its decision that the impugned law was not

in conformity with the Constitution. As opposed to the positive evaluation given by the legal

profession, this interim measure caused extremely negative reactions of the proponents of this

law (the Government of the Republic of Croatia), as well as of part of the MPs from the

parliamentary majority. These negative reactions spread to the entire work of the Constitutional

Court, and were accompanied by increasingly frequent claims that the Constitutional Court was

“a political body” and that it should be abolished.

5. Final remarks

This very brief overview of several decisions that marked the work of the Constitutional Court

in 2015 shows that this was an extremely difficult year for the Constitutional Court. In spite of

the false perception of these decisions by the public, as well the poor image that was created of

the Court itself in 2015, and which was largely backed by the political structures through the

media, as well as by some judges who felt aggrieved by the decisions of the Constitutional

Court, it can still be concluded that the Constitutional Court in 2015 did not abandon its tasks.

It has remained the independent and impartial guardian of the Constitution.

In the light of the criminal cases mentioned above, it seems that it must continuously be

reiterated that individual court judgments are unilateral acts of state authority, and, as such, they

can infringe constitutional norms, primarily those that guarantee equally to each individual –

whoever he or she may be – their fundamental rights and political freedoms. To this extent,

13

court decisions are also subject to the review of the Constitutional Court. However, as opposed

to courts which decide on the merits about the rights and obligations of parties, or about

accusations of punishable offences, the Constitutional Court is not a trial court, but a national

review court, similar to the ECtHR at the European level.

It must also be kept in mind that the constitutional judiciary is based on the historical

achievement of classical liberal-democratic thought concerning the primacy of the principle of

the supremacy of the Constitution over all other principles of state order, including the principle

of national sovereignty and the principle of national representation. Since legislative, executive

and judicial powers, each within their competence, are all responsible for the realisation of the

constitutional programme, it is the task of the Constitutional Court to check whether these

branches of power implement the recorded constitutional programme, and whether they

perform their tasks within the boundaries of the Constitution. The setting of boundaries for the

three branches of power is the fundamental characteristic of constitutional democracies.

In this light, it can be understood and accepted that the activity of the Constitutional Court as a

review court has a political effect. This is particularly evident when the Constitutional Court

repeals laws adopted by the Croatian Parliament, or regulations adopted by the Government of

the Republic of Croatia, due to their non-conformity with the Constitution. In spite of this, the

Constitutional Court is not a political body. By its decisions, it simply determines the

constitutional framework within which politics must develop, but it is not concerned with issues

of political expediency. The sole and exclusive benchmark for its deliberations is the

Constitution of the Republic of Croatia.

Zagreb, 6 June 2016

Jasna Omejec,

Editor-in-chief