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AU/ACSC/GibsonJA/AY08

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

CREATIVE LOGISTICS: THE EVOLVING WAYS OF SUSTAINING CONVENTIONAL AIRPOWER IN IRREGULAR WARFARE

By Jason A. Gibson, Major, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the FacultyIn Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisors: Dr. Donald A. MacCuish, Lt Col John R. Glock

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2008

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; distribution unlimited


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Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not

reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In

accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the

United States government.

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Contents

Disclaimer .................................................................................................................................... ii List of Tables .............................................................................................................................. iv Abstract....................................................................................................................................... vi Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................1

Section 1: Nature of Current Conflict........................................................................1 Section 2: Importance of Current Doctrine................................................................5 Section 3: Current Aircraft Maintenance Theory and Practice ..................................9

Chapter 2: Case Studies .............................................................................................................12 Section 1: Discussion of A-10 AMU Performance in OEF .....................................12 Section 2: Discussion of F-16 AMU Performance in OIF.......................................16

Chapter 3: Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................................20 Section 1: Recommendations for Doctrine ..............................................................20 Section 2: Recommendations for USAF Instructions ..............................................23 Section 3: Recommendations for Training ..............................................................24 Section 4: Recommendations for Future Deployment Planning ..............................26

Endnotes......................................................................................................................................28 Bibliography ...............................................................................................................................30

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List of Tables

Table 1. Maintenance Indicators for the 455th EAMU from Aug Dec 2006. ..........................13 Table 2. Maintenance Indicators for the 332

nd

EAMU from Oct Dec 2007 ............................19

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Preface

I would like to thank Dr. Don MacCuish and Lt Col John Glock for their excellent

support of this research. Their guidance and feedback was essential to its completion. I would

also like to thank Captain Donovan Kneuer and Captain Donald Newton for sharing their combat

experiences for the purposes of this research. Their insights made this research possible.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife Mona and my son Luke for their continued support of my

Air Force career. They make it easy to remember why I serve.

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Abstract

Is traditional logistics and aircraft maintenance doctrine suitable in fulfilling the needed

structure for todays warriors in sustaining airpower during irregular warfare? While a review of

the literature to date shows that current doctrine is useful as a basis for aircraft maintainers to use

in the field, the thesis of this research is that new techniques and non-traditional methods in

aircraft maintenance must be employed by personnel to continue to provide the airpower

necessary to conduct irregular warfare based on the current Air Expeditionary Unit structure. In

fact, practitioners in the field are using creative methods to provide the logistical sustainment

necessary in the face of evolving nature of airpower in the Global War of Terror. This research

outlines the basis for aircraft sustainment described in current doctrine and instructions, the new

methodologies being employed in the field to keep pace with commanders requirements, and the

need to bridge the gap between the two for the USAF practitioner.

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Chapter 1Introduction

The Nature of Current Conflict As America wages on-going wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is helpful to look to the

many lessons learned from past as well as our current irregular wars, to enhance fighting

capabilities and ensure that the political objectives of these conflicts are achieved. American

airpower has been a key player in Americas past victories and defeats in irregular warfare (IW).

The research presented here seeks to understand the numerous lessons American Airmen are

learning in providing conventional fighter airpower when employed against insurgents and

terrorists across two campaigns--Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring

Freedom (OEF).

This research focuses solely on the logistics and maintenance required to support

conventional USAF fighter airpower. While the efforts of US Forces in both OIF and OEF today

have been primarily focused on ground-based efforts, significant amounts of US airpower are

required to support and protect ground forces. The USAF provides this support through

conventional fighter aircraft, small and large reconnaissance aircraft and well as refueling and

cargo aircraft for numerous types of missions.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, America embarked on OEF and OIF using

conventional and Special Operations Forces (SOF) to topple regimes, hunt down terrorists and

uncover caches of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Unfortunately, one of the unintended

outcomes of OIF has been a full-blown counterinsurgency (COIN) to secure Iraq and stabilize a

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fledgling democracy. Similarly, a recent unintended consequence regarding OEF is the

resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters in western Pakistan as US and Allied Forces

have focused their efforts on OIF. The US Armed Forces have found their conventional forces

somewhat ill prepared for COIN. To bridge the gap, services such as the US Army and US Air

Force have recently published new doctrine outlining best practices for COIN and IW.

Similarly, the USAF has recently begun training exercises focused on the use of airpower in

counterinsurgencies and IW, capitalizing on the lessons learned from OEF and OIF.1

Certainly, American conventional fighter and attack airpower has a role to play in current

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The basic strategy of hunting down Taliban and Al Qaeda

fighters in Afghanistan with conventional fighter and bomber air strikes directed via SOF shows

the importance of conventional fighter airpower.2

Techniques used by American and Northern

Alliance fighters in Afghanistan have been dubbed The Afghan Model.3 Similarly, as recent

as January 2008, US airpower has been used to strike at significant numbers of Al Qaeda and

insurgent fighters in Iraq.4 Here, US and Allied forces have been able to destroy enemy fighters,

while ensuring the safety of the Iraqi people and limiting collateral damage through coordinated

precision strikes. Accomplishing highly precise strikes against a mobile enemy that moves

among the population is a challenging problem for US airpower today. Forces simply cannot

strike targets without regard to the effects on the civilian population. As the centers of gravity in

the fights in OIF and OEF are the civilian populations, the ability to disable only the intended

enemy forces is of utmost importance.

The current conflicts in which the US military is engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan can be

characterized as IW. Here, IW is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors

for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations.5

Current US doctrine goes on to

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describe that IW involves indirect and asymmetric approaches to war, but may also encompass

the full range of military operations available through the use of conventional and special US

Forces.6 Currently, US Forces are engaged in a mixture of COIN, foreign internal defense,

unconventional warfare in OIF and OEF.7

What is interesting about the operations described above is the mix of fighter aircraft

used during OIF and OEF and the level of their sophistication in regards to the enemy faced.

Current USAF fighters are some of the most technologically advanced fighting machines ever

produced. Their capabilities range from providing air superiority to providing close air support

(CAS), as well as numerous other capabilities. As so eloquently described by Max Boot in his

discussion of American Small Wars, America has shaped its conventional forces based on the

loss of the Vietnam War.8

There is a belief among many military scholars that because America

did not engage in total war against Vietnam, it lost the war.9 This thought truly shaped the

current strategic approach of the US Armed Forces and propelled a research, development, and

procurement strategy during the latter stages of the Cold War to significantly out-gun any

future opponents.10 The US developed a very large conventional force structure, while playing

down the importance of the lessons learned during previous small wars, particularly those

regarding fighting against an insurgency.

Similarly, what is noteworthy regarding the current use of conventional fighter airpower

in these conflicts is the move away from scheduled packages of fighters to the mode of

supporting troops in contact (TIC). This move has occurred based on direction from the top.

Colonel Howard Belote in a recent description of airpower use in COIN operations in Iraq wrote,

The number one priority, as articulated by the corps commander and echoed in the air

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component commanders air operations directive, called for airpower to respond to TIC

situations.11

This move toward longer average sortie duration (ASD) missions in support of TIC as the

primary focus of conventional counterland airpower is different from typical major combat

operations air warfare. As described in USAF doctrine for counterland operations, normal sortie

production and direction is determined through strict adherence to the joint air tasking cycle. In

particular, Preplanned air interdiction (AI) is conducted within the normal air tasking cycle and

provides enough time for close coordination with other joint force components.12 Similarly,

doctrine describes the preferred method of airpower use in support of ground forces as, A

deliberate attack given adequate time for planning and coordination exists; this is the preferred

mode of ground advance. Air and ground components will have time for properly detailed

coordination, the ability to establish on-call fire support coordination lines, nominate appropriate

AI targets to achieve desired battlefield results, and ensure air superiority that minimizes the

enemys use of air to support their own army.13 This type of preferred use of airpower assumes

a large-scale force on force conventional fight between nation-states.

The move toward CAS missions in support of TIC as the primary use of

conventional fighter airpower drives a push away from strict air tasking order (ATO) planning

for target strikes toward a different type of ATO. In particular, current ATO missions typically

place a two-ship of fighter aircraft on mission status flying long ASD missions. During the early

fighting of OEF, US Navy fighters were the primary source of conventional fighter airpower.

They were immediately exposed to this seemingly different type of mission. For example, as

described by Benjamin Lambeth in his discussion of carrier operations during OEF, he explains

that the farthest distance flown by US Navy fighters in support of TIC were 750 nautical miles

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with an ASD of up to ten hours.14

As the reader can imagine, numerous fighters flying several

hundred sorties of very long ASD could quickly deplete the hours remaining until next

inspection on a particular aircraft. While the US Navy was the primary source of fighter

airpower during the early days of OEF, USAF fighters and bombers soon entered the conflict.

As Lambeth explains, once basing issues were cleared up to allow USAF forces to enter the

fight, soon USAF fighter and bomber aircraft were available to perform strike and TIC support

missions as required.15 The sustainment of such airpower operations is the focus of this research.

Importance of Current Doctrine

While providing airpower support to TIC has been a well-established mission set for US

Forces since World War I, there are numerous other uses of airpower that are often viewed as the

primary use of airpower. A quick review of Air Force Doctrine Document 1 provides a

viewpoint on the strategic nature of airpower and the roles that are preferred by current Air Force

leaders. The following are the seventeen Air and Space Power functions of the USAF: strategic

attack, counterair, counterspace, counterland, countersea, information operations, combat

support, command and control, airlift, air refueling, spacelift, special operations, intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance, combat search and rescue, navigation and positioning and

weather services.16 While counterland missions are described, support to troops on the ground

has not been the preferred mission of USAF fighters throughout the history of the Air Force,

dating back to the day of the Army Air Corps.17

As early as the beginnings of the USAF in 1947,

there was clear tension among Air Force leaders concerning supporting the US Army. As

described by Thomas Hughes in his discussion of General Pete Quesadas use of airpower during

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World War II, there existed true tension between strategic bombing advocates and those who

wanted to ensure support for the US Army existed in fighter aviation.18

To this day, the debate continues regarding the strategic nature of airpower versus its

tactical nature and employment in support of TIC. As stated by the USAF Chief of Staff in his 29

December 2007 White Paper, We should not assume that future conflicts will resemble the current

fight in Iraq or Afghanistanlest we lose the ability to project global power, inflict strategic

paralysis, deter nation-states, destroy their fielded forces, and defend our Homeland, its allies and

friends.19 In the conclusion of her discussion of the rhetoric and reality of strategic bombing

theory, Tami Davis Biddle points out, In the thirty years since Vietnam, strategic bombing has

become even more prominent as a mode of warfare.20 Since strategic bombing rarely focuses on

protecting the civilian population at all cost (as is necessary in IW), it is not the focus of wartime

preparations training. Therefore, supporting TIC has not been perceived as the primary mission

of USAF aircraft in conflicts preceding OIF and OEF.

With the renewed emphasis of providing support to TIC, reviewing the new IW doctrine

produced by the USAF is vital to understanding how the service views future conflict. As

described in a recent article by John Tirpak, The Air Force does indeed have a central role to

play in irregular wars, counterinsurgencies, and urban warfare.21 Tirpak goes on to say that not

until recently did the USAF develop any doctrine for the force to use in understanding the nature

of IW and the services roles in this type of conflict. The new USAF doctrine for IW states,

The Air Forces ability to conduct TST provides a unique capability when targeting leadership

and active participants.22 This ability requires long loiter times, tremendous air-to-ground

coordination, and aircraft that are capable of carrying and directing precision munitions.23

Similarly, new US Army and Marine Corps doctrine explains the nature of IW and the

associated constraints it places on the fighting forces. Field Manual (FM) 3-24 describes IW and

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its subset of COIN as requiring somewhat different maintenance requirements than in

conventional operations.24 Here, doctrine illustrates that vehicles and presumably aircraft

engaged in high mileage activities will require greater sustainment and maintenance

considerations. FM 3-24 goes on to express that logisticians should rethink how to best

configure their support structure to ensure equipment is serviceable when called upon.25 Finally,

this new doctrine discusses the long-term nature of IW versus the fast-paced tempo of

conventional warfare.26 For airpower, the implication is that missions will require both more

dwell time in the air and an associated sustainment plan that parallels the new operations efforts.

As shown above, flying support for TIC requires adaptive planning, keen precision from

the air, and a robust logistical tail to sustain airpower. While there are numerous historical

examples recounting the achievements of those flying and providing the combat power necessary

to succeed in IW, there is little information available regarding the actions and plans of those

who actually provided the airpower (i.e., the aircraft) to the pilots flying. It is as important to

understand the lessons learned in providing airpower as it is in understanding the techniques that

are most useful in employing it.

Since the earliest days of Army aviation, the importance of logistics and maintenance

cannot be overstated. For example, during the early days of the John Pershings expedition to

hunt down Pancho Villa in Mexico, the US Army sent a detachment of eight JN-3 light aircraft

to provide support to the soldiers on the expedition.27 This first use of airpower in a small war

was somewhat dismal because it took just one month for six of the eight aircraft to be rendered

unserviceable. The aircraft were plagued with engine problems, cracking of the wooden

propellers in the dry conditions of Mexico, and wear and tear during normal use of the aircraft. 28

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Because of the poor state of readiness of the aircraft, the 82-person maintenance team was

augmented by three additional mechanics from Curtiss Aeroplane Company.

Since these aircraft were not equipped with the types of weaponry required for CAS, they

were relegated to reconnaissance and observation duties plus carrying the mail.29

However, the

immediate state of disrepair rendered the aircraft rather useless. This early example of

airpowers inability to help in a small war highlights the importance of the support, logistics and

maintenance mission to keep the aircraft flying.

A more recent example of the necessity of a solid logistics sustainment organization is

seen through the foreign internal defense (FID) efforts of the US in supporting the El Salvadoran

Armed Forces (ESAF) during the 1980s. Here, the US provided extensive maintenance training,

pilot training, and aircraft to ESAF as they conducted COIN operations against the Farabundo

Marti National Liberation Front.30 Airpower played a key role in the ESAFs operations against

insurgents through airlift, helicopter gunship support, and armed reconnaissance.31

Despite the dramatic amount of training support and aircraft provided to the ESAF, they

were unable to fully utilize their aircraft for several reasons. The ESAF were constantly

hampered by low mission capable (MC) rates and very low operational readiness.32 They never

had more than 50 percent of the ESAF fleet operational at any given time because of severe

maintenance problems and a shortage of qualified pilots.33 It is obvious that proper aircraft

sustainment is essential in not only ensuring airpower availability, but also ensuring aircraft

durability during combat.

While Americas airpower capabilities have grown significantly from those early days of

reconnaissance in support of John Pershing and more recently the ESAF, senior leadership is

currently dependent on airpower to provide the ability to interdict insurgent forces and to provide

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CAS to TIC. As described in the Afghan model of warfare, the USAF is using SOF troops and

Airmen to target enemy forces on the ground.34 This way of war is necessarily changing the

ways in which logistics personnel perform their jobs to provide airpower, and thus the impetus

for this research.

Current Aircraft Maintenance Theory and Practice

History has shown that providing the necessary sustainment for airpower is not always an

easy function. The USAF has developed numerous types of guidance to help the aircraft

maintainer manage the health of the fleet. AF Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 3-21.1 states

that the prudent use of resources and an intimate understanding of maintenances capabilities

and internal requirements are required to balance operations needs with long-term fleet health

and combat readiness.35

Determining mission parameters such as the ASD, types of weapons to

be utilized, and the like give maintainers the ability to plan for the sustainment of the airpower

mission. The management of scheduled maintenance actions and time-phased inspections is

most important for the aircraft to ensure both airworthiness and safety. Furthermore, the

maintenance leaders philosophy should be to produce aircraft: producing the maximum fleet

availability with the highest achievable MC rate will enable flexibility in scheduling.36

Achieving the highest possible fleet MC rate is key to scheduling and flying directed utilization

(UTE) rates in order to meet operations requirements. In order to achieve the highest MC rates

and the highest possible UTE in a deployed location, maintainers must have a clear idea of the

hours expected to be flown per aircraft.

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Current USAF doctrine provides aircraft maintenance leaders specific guidance on the

management of scheduled maintenance and phase inspections prior to reaching a contingency

theater. Specifically, maintenance leaders should prevent inspections from coming due within

the first weeks of arriving in the area of responsibility (AOR) to minimize the impact on

contingency operations.37 Scheduled maintenance that can not be accomplished in the AOR

must be done prior to the deployment.38

This guidance is very sound in that it suggests that

maintenance leaders should front load as many maintenance actions as possible to ensure aircraft

are mission ready for immediate employment upon reaching the AOR. However, this mentality

does not consider the current nature of the flying being conducted by USAF and other US forces.

As previously mentioned, USAF and US Navy fighter aircraft are flying extremely long

ASD missions. This long mission status necessarily drives down the hours remaining until the

next scheduled maintenance actions. Furthermore, USAF doctrine states the following:

Maintenance leaders should not rely on ability to do phase immediately upon arrival in theater

though, and should plan to accomplish required inspections at home station in preparation for

deployment, so that a good waterfall can be maintained throughout the deployment.39 Thus,

USAF logisticians immediately face a quandary prior to entering current operations in OIF and

OEF: managing scheduled maintenance actions knowing that they are not to rely on phase

inspections capabilities immediately upon arrival in theater, and that they will likely need those

exact capabilities upon the initial portion of their deployments.

To complicate the maintenance management problem further, under the Air

Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept, small numbers of aircraft deploy to a given AOR for

roughly 120 days. Of late, timing on the length of deployment has varied based on mission

requirements. Typically, 12 to 16 aircraft deploy from a given unit for OEF and OIF. Aircraft

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maintenance personnel must then build a program to sustain the number of aircraft required for

daily operations along with the required scheduled maintenance actions and time-phased

inspections required on each aircraft. In addition, aircraft maintainers must devise a plan to

provide the needed spare parts to sustain aircraft in combat. As an abundant number of spare

parts is rarely the norm, aircraft maintainers typically designate a cannibalization (CANN)

aircraft to pull parts from when the supply system cannot provide the parts necessary to sustain

needed repairs. USAF guidance regarding CANN actions is as follows: CANN actions may be

necessary when a non-mission capable condition will prevent the accomplishment of a mission

and the required assets are not immediately available from supply.

40

Furthermore, maintenance

doctrine states, Ideally, there is no CANNing of parts from the phase/ISO aircraft. The

consequences could be detrimental to the overall objective of returning a serviceable aircraft to

the flightline.41 Thus, USAF guidance makes it clear that CANN actions are allowed, but

specifies intricate guidance on how these actions will be conducted.

However, USAF doctrine and policy concerning management of phase inspections and

CANN management does not address contingency situations outside of shortening inspections.

Similarly, neither form of guidance provides specific advice regarding building a schedule for

aircraft inspections or CANN rotations for steady state operations in a COIN environment or

engaging in operations such as the Afghan Model. As there is a gap both in instructions and

doctrine for maintenance leaders in building the required plans to deal with these issues,

maintenance leaders have taken it upon themselves to develop new ideas and techniques to

adequately provide the aircraft when needed during OIF and OEF.

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Chapter 2Case Studies

The methodology used during this research is the case study format. This particular

methodology lends itself to an in-depth study of a particular system or function using real work-

based behavior so that researchers can better understand practical solutions to problems.42 In

particular, this research will perform a focused analysis of the techniques and best practices used

by two different aircraft maintenance units (AMUs) deployed in support of OIF and OEF. This

research will study both an F-16C Block 50 unit and an A-10 unit. Both AMUs are assigned to

the 52 Fighter Wing (FW) in Spangdahlem, Germany. The deployments of each unit have

occurred since 2006.

Because this research uses a case-study methodology, it is understood that there are

limitations to the generalizations that can be made to the larger USAF. Case studies rely on

small sample size to provide in-depth understanding of real problems. In this case, the leaders of

the AMUs faced very challenging logistics problems in providing the airpower required for the

mission. Despite small sample sizes, the challenges and inventive ways in which the AMUs

overcame those challenges are relevant from a doctrinal and practical standpoint.

A-10 Case Study

To begin, the 52 FW deployed 12 A-10 aircraft to support OEF in May of 2006. Upon

reaching the AOR, the aircraft were designated as belonging to the 455th

Expeditionary Aircraft

Maintenance Unit (EAMU), based in Afghanistan. The expected amount of hours to be flown by

the pilots of the 455th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron was 4,700.43 This information was

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provided to the maintainers prior to deployment as a consideration when deciding if in-theater

aircraft phase inspection capability would be necessary or not. Based on the assessment that the

aircraft being deployed had a cumulative average that would support the majority of the

deployment, phase maintenance capability was brought on the deployment to Afghanistan, but

not expected to be used immediately.44

Table 1 shows the types of maintenance indicators captured by maintenance analysts

during the deployment.

Table 1. Maintenance Indicators for the 455

th

EAMU from Aug Dec 2006.

45

It is readily discernable that the maintainers within the 455th

faced a daunting challenge as they

began to support operations. As shown in Table 1, the ASD for missions in OEF averaged 3.8

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hours per mission during the 4-month deployment. Similarly, the total hours flown for the

deployment totaled over 7,100 hours. This total is roughly equivalent to an entire years number

of hours allocated to this EAMUs total flying hour program (FHP) of 7,800 at their home station

in Germany.46

Thus, in effect, this EAMU was tasked to sustain a years worth of flying

operations during a 4-month time span with only 12 of its normally 18 assigned aircraft.

As the unit did not immediately begin aircraft phase inspections on at least one aircraft in

theater for the first two weeks after operations had begun, it quickly became apparent based on

the hours being flown on each aircraft, that a new and immediate phase management program

was required.

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Complicating the aircraft sustainment effort was an immediate shortage of parts

necessary to make needed repairs on the aircraft flying in operations, and those being repaired

for discrepancies found during the phase inspections. Maintenance leaders immediately

developed a plan to combine the phase aircraft with the CANN aircraft concepts.48

Maintenance leaders made the decision to combine phase inspection and CANN

operations with tremendous thought and foresight. To begin, the leaders understood that

combining the concepts of phase inspection with CANN activities is very risky. Removing

serviceable parts from aircraft typically disables multiple systems, requires tremendous tracking

and documentation activities to ensure all removed parts are accounted for, and this could

potentially prolong the phase inspection process by adding additional operational checks to the

post-phase inspection process. Previous research and operational experience, particularly with

helicopter maintenance, has shown that combining phase inspection and CANN activities while

not optimal, is a viable practice. However, virtually no guidance exists on combining the two

functions for daily maintenance activities in the form of USAF instructions or doctrine. As

described previously, current AF doctrine does not recommend this practice.

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Maintenance leaders understood that with limited aircraft availability, if they did not take

definitive steps to limit the number of aircraft unavailable for maintenance reasons, they would

not be able to produce the daily number of aircraft required, nor be able to sustain flight

operations necessary to support the war effort. To deal with the impending sustainment problem,

455th EAMU leaders developed a highly regimented aircraft forms documentation and tracking

process to ensure that all serviceable parts removed from the CANN/phase aircraft were known

and properly accounted for. They scrutinized the phase inspection process ensuring that as the

look phase of the inspection was being completed so that required inbound parts were secured

in order to rebuild the CANN/phase aircraft.

49

As the CANN/phase aircraft was being rebuilt, 455th EAMU leaders carefully selected

the next aircraft for CANN/phase inspection based on the amount of hours remaining until the

next inspection. Because of the high ASD being flown on a daily basis in support of OEF, 455th

EAMU personnel were not able to complete the CANN/phase inspection and rebuild process as

quickly as needed. Additional maintenance manpower in the form of a regional logistics support

team was requested.50 Smart maintenance management and a keen understanding of the

capabilities of the personnel within the 455th EAMU allowed them to be successful in sustaining

the aircraft despite difficult challenges.

An additional challenge that the leaders of this EAMU faced was the placement of

munitions in relation to the flight line.51 As aircraft flying in OEF typically remain airborne for

long ASD sorties, maintenance leaders were forced to deliberate over aircraft turn times. Here,

an aircraft turn time is defined as the amount of time between when an aircraft lands, and when

it must be ready to fly its next sortie. As the following vignette from the 455th EAMU officer-in-

charge (OIC) shows, this was a dynamic procedure: However, the only changes were to take-off

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and land times. This changed on an hourly basis, which just meant my super (senior non-

commissioned officer managing daily sortie production), and TOP 3 (senior pilot maintaining

communications with airborne aircrew) had to be in constant communication. Most take-off

changes were due to new Army troop movements causing our time on target (TOT) to change.

All late landings were due to extended need for air coverage at the original TOT destination or

new targets coming available in the same area as the original TOT/TIC.52

Similarly, The

challenge came when we had to replenish 30 millimeter rounds in too quick of a sequential

order. Our policy was that once the rounds went below 800 remaining in the gun, we reloaded.

Combine that with constant universal ammunition loader breakage, loading new bombs on every

sortie of the day, the turn times became very tight.

The 455th

EAMU OIC went on to describe how meeting those dynamically changing turn

times with fully configured aircraft was a rather daunting challenge. To meet the challenge,

maintenance leadership in concert with munitions storage specialists, base safety specialists, and

wing leadership, developed a munitions build up area that was closer to the flightline operation.53

While this change in operations was not a cosmic decision by any means as it made perfect

sense for all parties involved, current quantity distance standards for the safe storage of

explosives in relation to military personnel conducting combat operations had to be considered.54

F-16 Case Study

While the maintainers stationed in Afghanistan used a logistics concept of operations

(CONOPS) of combining their CANN/phase aircraft together for availability and moving

resources closer to the maintenance operation for sustainment, this is not the only CONOPS that

has been employed in recent conflicts. In November of 2007, maintainers from the 52nd Aircraft

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Maintenance Squadron from Spangdahlem, Germany deployed in support of 12 F-16 Block 50

aircraft to Iraq for OIF.55 Upon arrival in the AOR, the sustainment of the F-16 unit was

redesignated as belonging within the 332nd Expeditionary Maintenance Group.

Similar to that of the 455th

Expeditionary Maintainers, the newest members of 332nd

EAMU immediately faced multiple challenges in sustaining the airpower that had deployed to

the AOR. Here, the OIC of the expeditionary EAMU relayed that due to pre-deployment

constraints, the phase average of the 12 aircraft deploying into theater equaled 169 hours.56 This

average is well below the desired average of 220 hours for an F-16 unit where phase inspections

are conducted every 400-flight hours. Based on the similar operational concept to that of OEF,

operations required a minimum of 2-ship employment of the 332nd F-16s for TIC support driven

missions as well as non-traditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)

missions.57 As multiple 2-ships would be expected to launch throughout any given day, usually

eight of the 12 aircraft were dedicated to daily sortie production efforts. Additionally, as

experienced in OEF, operations in OIF took on a longer ASD than expected, thus using up the

400-hour time between major inspections at a quicker pace than expected by 332nd EAMU

leadership. On a normal day, the unit would launch 12 sorties with an ASD of 4.1 hours.58

As described above, eight of the 12 F-16 aircraft deployed into the theater for OIF were

required for daily sortie production. Additionally, maintenance leadership dedicated one aircraft

daily as a spare to cover for contingencies such as ground or air aborts. This left a balance of

three aircraft that could be dedicated to maintenance actions. EAMU leadership, in concert with

higher 332nd Group leadership, tackled the phase management problem head on by double-

docking two F-16s at a time for 400-hour aircraft phase inspections. This increased workload

put pressure on the phase inspection team, but this particular maintenance CONOPS allowed the

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332nd

EAMU to split its resources and focus in a parallel fashion across two aircraft.

Additionally, the 332nd EAMU dedicated one aircraft to CANN actions.59

By attacking the phase management problem in a parallel manner with two aircraft at a

time, 332nd

EAMU leadership was able to meet sortie production requirements as well as bring

the fleet phase average up to an acceptable and sustainable level. Table 2 shows the maintenance

indicators for the 332nd

EAMU deployment timeline. It is important to note the amount of hours

flown by the 12 F-16s during this deployment (over 4,600 hours). Similar to their A-10 brethren

in OEF, 332nd Expeditionary Fighter Squadron personnel flew almost an entire years FHP

during their OIF deployment.

60

Additionally, it is important to note that a USAF wide-stand

down of the F-15C and F-15E fleet occurred during the 332nd EAMUs deployment to OIF. This

F-15E stand-down directly affected the F-16s of the 332nd

EAMU, as they were now required to

cover the daily sorties of the grounded F-15Es. During the last month of their deployment, an

additional four F-16 Block 50 aircraft from Spangdahlem, Germany were deployed to Iraq to

cover the additional sortie requirements.61

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Table 2. Maintenance Indicators for the 332nd EAMU from Oct 2007 Dec 2007.62

Similar to that of the sustainment operations in OEF, maintenance professionals during

OIF also dealt with munitions challenges. However, sustainment and quick turn times did not

seem to be a large detractor for operations. What is more significant is the range and type of

munitions used during the conflict to support COIN operations. COIN operations require a

definitive declaration of friend versus foe in targeting and a strict minimization of collateral

damage during kinetic activity.63 Members of the 332nd EAMU noted the continual shift away

from large precision-guided munitions (2000 lb net explosive weight) down to just 30 lbs of

explosives in a 500 lb precision-guided bomb.64 Maintenance and munitions specialists received

continual just-in-time training in munitions build-up and loading operations as newer forms of

munitions reached the AOR for use.65

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Chapter 3Recommendations and Conclusions

While it is important to see how maintainers in the field are adapting the ways in which

aircraft sustainment is conducted in IW operations, it is also important to understand how those

adaptations mesh with current doctrine and USAF guidance on aircraft sustainment. Similarly, it

is imperative to understand how improvisation in the field should be viewed from both training

and pre-deployment perspectives. What follows is a discussion of each these areas for the

aircraft maintenance professional.

Recommendations for Doctrine

Previous discussion of current USAF tactics, techniques and procedures for aircraft

maintenance has shown that there is a gap between pre-deployment recommendations and

doctrine and the actions that should be taken once in theater. The reader may ask, is the lack of

guidance there to allow maintenance professionals the leeway to improvise in the field? This

author does not believe that the lack of guidance regarding in-theater operations exists simply to

allow freedom of action to professionals in the field, but rather that planners did not foresee the

types of sustainment that would be required during IW operations. AFTTP 3-21.1,Aircraft

Maintenance, is written to provide best practices to maintenance professionals regarding steady-

state conventional training operations with some guidance focused on preparing individuals to

deploy. It was not developed with the rigors of IW in mind.

This is not to say that AFTTP 3-21.1 is not a useful document. Specifically, this doctrine

does not deal with the how to options of sustaining a small fleet flying tremendous numbers of

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hours as is required in current IW operations. As FM 3-24 points out, Some of the most

valuable services that military logisticians can provide to COIN operations include the means

and knowledge for setting up or restarting self-perpetuating sustainment designs.66 While

current USAF doctrine for maintenance professionals falls short of dealing with this variant of

combat, it does describe a few ways to mitigate the problem of producing the hours required.

These ways include focusing on manipulating manpower (if available), shift length, and

considering facility capabilities when tackling phase inspection requirements that exceed current

capabilities.67 Similarly, current maintenance doctrine attends to the idea of contingency

phases which are inspections that reset the number of hours remaining until the next inspection,

but do not complete all the required inspections that would occur during normal operations.68

Here, doctrine advocates not utilizing contingency phases based on the likely amount of

inspection actions that will be required once aircraft have returned to home station.

Current maintenance doctrine also leads the practitioner to consider regionalization of

maintenance activities inside or outside the theater to help pool manpower and supply resources

to maximize productivity.69 While regionalization is considered a pragmatic approach to

consolidating resources, it is not practical considering the basing requirements and aircraft

availability issues that are stretched because of the nature of IW. Most IW theorists and

practitioners do not advocate more bases in theater (i.e., a larger logistics footprint). As shown

in FM 3-24, The potential for ill-considered bases to substantially disrupt the local populaces

daily lives and produce other unintentionally negative effects is significant, even if

counterinsurgents arrive with positive intentions. Bases must be set up so that they do not

project an image of undue permanency or a posture suggesting a long-term foreign occupation.

Thus, recent doctrine clearly shows that adding more bases and facilities to a state in conflict

21

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could be detrimental to operations, and regionalizing maintenance activities must be carefully

considered because of the possible negative indirect effects it may have on the populace.

Since maintenance best practices for dealing with the sustainment of IW fall short of

the needs of the professional, one must consider actions that maintainers are currently taking in

the field. As shown by the actions of members of the 455th and 332nd EAMUs, creative phase

and CANN management can be successfully conducted to sustain operations in the field.

Members of both groups developed CONOPS that are different from those dictated by doctrine.

While these actions are not new, they are somewhat controversial and have been the subject of

recent research. For example, recent research conducted by Maj Matt Powell, a USAF

maintenance officer conducting research at General Command and Staff College, explored the

impact of combining phase inspections and CANN activities over a six-year period at Hill AFB,

Utah.71 Maj Powell found that combining phase inspections with CANN activities not only led

to an increase in overall F-16 mission performance across the 388 th Fighter Wing, but also led to

the CANN program becoming more well managed and consistent.72 While the operations

scrutinized by Maj Powell were conducted during peacetime in the United States, the

applicability of combining these programs is likely to have been considered by maintenance

professionals in all types of settings. Efficiency and economy of scale are often hallmarks of

successful programs, as described by Maj Powell, and these attributes of a combined

phase/CANN program were definitely seen in OEF.73

While the concept of double-docking phase inspections is not specifically addressed in

doctrine, it follows with the idea of managing personnel, capacity and shift-length as described in

AFTTP 3-21.1. As members of the 332nd EAMU increased the workload in the phase dock, they

also increased the associated manpower and lengthened the shift duration to accommodate the

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workload.74

Thus, it is now necessary to update USAF maintenance doctrine to show how

practitioners in the field are dealing with the rigors of IW by adding in sections that deal with

both nature of IW (by referencing related doctrine, i.e. FM 3-24 and AFDD 2-3) and the

acceptable best practices from the field. Clearly, combining phase and CANN operations are

feasible in both peace and wartime operations as is double-docking the phase inspection

operation to sustain an IW air effort.

Recommendations for USAF Instructions

While updating current doctrine may be a palatable option to help practitioners in the

near term, changing current Air Force instructions may be more difficult. As described in AFI

21-101, compliance with current maintenance instructions is mandatory.75 The advent of Air

Force Smart Operations (AFSO21) has led maintenance personnel to seek out ways to reduce

overhead costs, reduce personnel actions and lean maintenance practices where available.76

However, initiatives to garner cost and manpower savings by combining phase and CANN

actions for fighter aircraft have recently been considered, mainly under the guise of AFSO21.

While AFI 21-101 discusses sustaining the flying operation in theater by utilizing available

intermediate repair facilities and centralizing as much maintenance capability as possible, it does

not direct maintenance leaders to consider the various types of maintenance CONOPS that can

be used.77

Improvisation in the field, coupled with the impetus of AFSO21, has highlighted the

shortcomings of AFI 21-101. By combining phase and CANN actions, units can produce a

manpower savings in deployment footprint (in line with current IW guidance for logistics), and

also increase aircraft availability in theater once flying operations begin. As shown by the two

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case studies, the combination of both types of maintenance can work, but is only necessitated by

the requirement for maximum aircraft availability and maintaining an even phase flow. AFI 21-

101 should include a section regarding deployment planning and preferred maintenance

CONOPS based on the type of conflict to be entered.

Recommendations for Training

As updating current doctrine and maintenance instructions is very important to lead our

Air Force preparations for future conflict, an equally important focus area should be training.

The case studies presented show that maintenance leaders faced daunting challenges with aircraft

sustainment, munitions loading, and aircraft turn times. It is important to determine if changes in

current training can be made. The current basic Aircraft Maintenance Officer Course objectives

do not cover the intricacies of managing phase and CANN forms of maintenance. However, this

course is developed for young officers just beginning their service career, and this course should

not focus on such advanced topics. However, there is a course taught to officers at the

intermediate level, known as the Maintenance Officers Intermediate Course (MOIC). This

course is targeted at mid-grade captains in the USAF, which are the relevant population leading

USAF forces in combat in the AOR. Currently, this course focuses on leadership skills

applicable to peacetime operations as well as preparations for deployment. It also addresses the

ATO cycle officers will encounter in theater.78 It does not discuss actual obstacles an officer

leading troops in the AOR are likely to face. The course outline for MOIC clearly shows that

officers should articulate to senior leaders the maintenance capabilities that are essential to

meeting ATO tasking, but does not discuss how officers should manage the health of their fleets

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in such an endeavor.79

As has been clearly shown, IW poses different challenges from those

normal day-to-day training and exercises.

While this course does not currently focus on the planning principles for sustaining

aircraft operations during IW, this research, coupled with the experiences of countless other

units, which have deployed in support of OIF and OEF, should provide the impetus for inclusion.

In addition, an actual scientific job analysis study of the work being performed in the AOR could

be conducted by the Air Force Occupational Measurement Squadron (AFOMS) to better justify

training and educational shifts.80 In addition, training should focus on determining when creative

aircraft phase management should be utilized and the inherent safety considerations when

changing munitions siting plans.

While updating training curricula should provide officers with a better understanding of

the level of effort required to sustain operations in IW, training should also focus on hands on

planning and real-time decision-making as well. The USAF has recently recognized the

importance of training for IW both in doctrine development as well as limited training exercises

near MacDill AFB, FL.81 While CAS was the focus for the operators during this exercise, and

maintenance concept planning should be a prime training target for the maintenance officers and

senior non-commissioned officers deployed in support of such an exercise. While their aircraft

would likely be used in long ASD mission during the exercise, it is unlikely and unwanted that

they would need to conduct phase inspections during the 2-week exercise. However, focusing

discussion and planning efforts around the types of challenges personnel would likely face in the

AOR is necessary. As both case studies showed, a small contingent of 12 aircraft flew an entire

years flying hour program during a 4-month deployment. Thus, hands-on training at exercises

should consider the phase management problem. This realistic training should also focus

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frontline maintenance crews on the types of weapons they are likely to employ in IW. As the F-

16 case study showed, small diameter precision guided munitions are necessary for COIN

operations and maintenance crews should be exposed accordingly. Finally, discussions with

exercise planners should be conducted regarding bomb build-up locations to address the quantity

distance issues that were raised in the AOR. Training in peacetime for IW should flush out those

contentious issues regarding munitions build-up areas such that smoother operations can be

started in the AOR as required.

Recommendations for Future Deployment Planning

Updating doctrine, USAF instructions and training will help remedy the USAFs ability

to deal with the rigors of IW. Pre-deployment planning is also of vital importance. There are

numerous factors that future deployers to the AOR must consider specifically related to IW prior

to leaving their home stations. These factors include the types and durations of missions to be

flown, maintenance footprint while in theater, munitions support, and manpower needed to

sustain the operation. As the case studies showed, longer ASDs are the norm in IW. This

necessarily consumes the hours remaining until the next major inspection at a very fast pace.

Planners must have a clear understanding of the expected use of its phase inspection operation,

required turn times, munitions support, and associated actions pre-determined prior to entering

the AOR. While this seems elementary, these types of considerations have been missing from

USAF doctrine and basic instructions. USAF doctrine for IW does not specify the logistics

considerations in relation to airpower. Thus, it can be inferred that the same planning

considerations for conventional operations must apply. It has been shown throughout this

document that the obstacles facing maintenance professionals in theater are not the same as

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conventional warfare and thus, planning must be conducted appropriately to prepare our warriors

prior to entering the theater.

Final Thoughts and Conclusion

Throughout the course of this paper, it has been shown that the current operations in Iraq

and Afghanistan can be characterized as IW and that both of these conflicts have had unexpected

logistics implications in regards to sustaining airpower. Deployed units, without specific

guidance for conducting IW operations, are ingeniously developing ways to successfully sustain

combat airpower despite real logistical challenges. As a result, maintenance professionals in

both OIF and OEF have ensured that mission objectives can be achieved through airpower.

This research has also described the implications of sustaining combat aircraft in the IW

environment. It has been shown that doctrine, USAF instructions and training all require updates

to ensure that maintenance leaders, just like operators, understand the nature of the fight they are

about to embark upon and can plan accordingly. The author submits, based on this research, that

there is a dramatic difference in the employment of traditional fighter aircraft in IW, and that this

consideration drives a maintenance sustainment plan that has to be robust and keenly planned for

operations to remain effective. American forces can no longer simply go big as described so

often as the American Way of War without regard to the consequences of operations and the

impacts on the populace at large.82 All American forces, whether they are logistics professionals

maintaining aircraft or operators putting steal on target, must clearly understand the nature of the

conflict in which they are engaged, then plan and act accordingly.

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Endnotes

1 Capt. Nathan D. Broshear and Airman 1st Class Stephenie Wade, Close air support exercise challenges aircrews,ground forces and base support. MacDill AFB News Service, 8 November 2007, http://www.macdill.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123075111.2 Stephen D. Biddle, Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq, International Security, (Winter 2005/6): In the Applied Warfare Coursebook, 172. 3 Ibid, 172. 4 Josh White, U.S. Boosts Its Use of Airstrikes In Iraq, Washingtonpost.com, 17 January 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/16/AR2008011604148.html. 5Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), 11 September 2007, 6.

6Ibid, 6.

7 AFDD 2-3,Irregular Warfare, Aug 2007, 2. 8 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, Basic Books, 2002, 315. 9 Ibid, 315. 10

Ibid, 315. 11 Howard. D. Belote, Counterinsurgency Airpower: Air-Ground Integration for the Long War,Air and Space Power Journal (Fall 2006): In the Applied Warfare Coursebook, 318. 12 AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland Operations, 11 September 2006, 26. 13 Ibid, 87. 14 Benjamin S. Lambeth, "American Carrier, Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century," inJoint Forces Academic Year 2008 Coursebook, edited by Sharon McBride (Maxwell AFB, AL, 2007), 411. 15

Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Air Power Against Terror, Americas Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom," inJointForces Academic Year 2008 Coursebook, edited by Sharon McBride (Maxwell AFB, AL, 2007), 244.16 AFDD 1, Chapter 3, Nov 2003: In the Joint Forces Coursebook, 212.17 Tami Davis Biddle. Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, Princeton University Press, 2002, 300. 18 Thomas Alexander Hughes. Overlord. New York, NY. The Free Press, 1995, 306. 19

General T. Michael Mosley, THE NATIONS GUARDIANS AMERICAS 21stCENTURY AIR FORCE, White Paper, 29 December 2007, 9. 20 Ibid, 300. 21 John A. Tirpak, Air Force Seeks a COIN Flip. Air Force Magazine, Sep 07, 14.22

AFDD 2-3,Irregular Warfare, Aug 2007, 24.

23John A. Tirpak, Air Force Seeks a COIN Flip. Air Force Magazine, Sep 07, 14.

24 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, 8-8.25 Ibid, 8-8. 26 Ibid, 8-2. 27 James S. Corum & Wray R. Johnson. Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists. Lawrence, KS. University Press of Kansas, 2003, 18. 28

Ibid, 17. 29

Ibid, 16. 30 Ibid, 327.31 Ibid, 333. 32 Ibid, 337. 33 Ibid, 337. 34 Richard Andes, Craig Willis, and Thomas E. Griffith, Jr., Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model,International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006): In the Applied Warfare Coursebook, 134.35 AFTTP 3-21.1, Aircraft Maintenance, 30 April 2005, 5-1. 36 Ibid, 6-10. 37 Ibid, 6-10. 38 Ibid, 6-10. 39

Ibid, 6.9. 40

AFI 21-101,Aircraft and Equipment Maintenance Management, 29 Jun 2006, 295. 41 AFTTP 3-21.1, Aircraft Maintenance, 30 April 2005, 6-6.

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42Thomas G. Obrien & Samuel G. Charlton. Handbook of Human Factors Evaluation and Testing. Mahwah, NY.

Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996, 213. 43 Jason D. Kneuer, Capt. 52 AMXS/MXAA, Spangdahlem Airbase, Germany. To the author. E-mail. 10 October 2007.44 Ibid. 45

Ibid.

46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 The look portion of the phase inspection process is simply inspecting the aircraft. It is differentiated from the fix portion of the inspection process where actual repairs are conducted. 50

Ibid. 51

Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 AFI 21-201, Conventional Munitions Maintenance Management, 6 January, 2007, 154.55 Donald Newton, Capt. 332 AMXS/MXA. Iraq. To the author. E-mail. 15 October 2007.56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62

Ibid. 63

AFDD 2-3,Irregular Warfare, Aug 2007, 44. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, 8-1. 67 AFTTP 3-21.1, Aircraft Maintenance, 30 April 2005, 11-6. 68 Ibid, 11-8. 69

Ibid, 11 -8. 70 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, 8-5. 71 Matthew J. Powell, The Effects Of Consolidating F-16 Phase And Cannibalization Aircraft On Key Maintenance Indicators, (Masters Thesis, General Command and Staff College, 2007).72 Ibid, 85. 73

Ibid, 87. 74 Donald Newton, Capt. 332 AMXS/MXA. Iraq. To the author. E-mail. 15 October 2007.75 AF Instruction 21-101,Aircraft and Equipment Maintenance Management, 29 June 2006, cover page. 76 Col Paul Dunbar. Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century: CONOPS and Implementation Plan. https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=32344(accessed 11 Mar 2008). 77 AF Instruction 21-101,Aircraft and Equipment Maintenance Management, 29 June 2006, 386. 78 Captain Andre G. Lecours, Plan of Instruction for the Maintenance Officer Intermediate Course, updated 27November 2006, 106. 79 Ibid, 106. 80 The author is a former scientist for this organization and knows the capabilities are resident within AFOMS to conduct such a study. 81 Captain Nathan D. Broshear and Airman 1st Class Stephenie Wade, Close air support exercise challenges aircrews, ground forces and base support. MacDill AFB News Service, 8 November 2007,http://www.macdill.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123075111. 82 Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can The American Way of War Adapt?" inApplied Warfare Course Academic Year 2008 Coursebook, edited by Sharon McBride (Maxwell AFB, AL, 2007),57.

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