ITALO-SOVIET MILITARY COOPERATION IN 1933 AND 1934: MANIFESTATIONS OF CORDIALITY

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ITALO-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONS IN 1933 AND 1934: MANIFESTATIONS OF CORDIALITY

Paper Presented to the Duquesne History ForumPittsburgh, PAOctober 27, 1988

byJ. Calvitt Clarke III

https://www.academia.edu/5947459

SeeJ. Calvitt Clarke III. Russia and Italy Against Hitler: The Bolshevik-Fascist

Rapprochement of the 1930s. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991.

Last revised, May 6, 2019

The years 1933 and 1934 were critical ones for European

diplomacy, as statesmen groped to divine precisely what Hitler

represented and how best to deal with him and his resurgent

Germany. In the ensuing welter of diplomatic initiatives, one

intriguing, and insufficiently studied response was the Italo-

Soviet rapprochement, which peaked with their economic accord of

May 1933 and their “Pact of Friendship, Neutrality, and

Nonaggression” of September. The progress of this increasing

cordiality can be measured by the extensive military cooperation

that developed between the Fascist and Soviet states. In the

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ritualized theater of diplomacy, both consciously used military

contacts to encourage further cooperative steps and to prove to

the world and to themselves that what was happening was

important.1

EXCHANGES OF VISITS BY NAVAL AND AIR UNITS AND MILITARY ATTACHES

ITALIAN SUBMARINE VISIT TO BATUM, MAY 1933

Following up and symbolizing the Italo-Soviet economic accord

of May 6, which further developed the traditionally satisfactory

commercial relations between the two states,2 two Italian

submarines, the Tricheco and Delfino, called on the Soviet Black Sea

port of Batum late in the month. This, as TASS pointed out, marked

the first visit of foreign submarines to the USSR—just as four

1 Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 3933/1552, 9/6/34: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Direzione Generale degli Affari Politici, URSS. (Rome). (hereafter abbreviated as MAE (Rome) AP URSS) b(usta) 15 f(oglio) 7.2 Suvich circular telegram 985/C-R, 5/13/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b8f2.

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years earlier, Italo Balbo’s flight to Odessa had been the first

visit of military aircraft.3 The Italian ambassador to the Kremlin

Bernardo Attolico, the military attaché Lt. Col. Aldo de Ferrari,

the Italian consul at Tiflis, and the submarine captains met

Soviet naval commanders who treated them to banquets and tours.

The Italians reciprocated with a reception of their own and visits

to the submarines. The first foreigners to be so honored, Attolico

and de Ferrari went aboard the modern Soviet cruiser, Krasnyi Kavkaz,

which, having been built in the yards at Novorossiisk, was the

pride of the Red Navy.

Early the morning of the 27th of May, the submarines put to

sea. That same day Attolico and de Ferrari boarded the steamer

3 A courtesy call after the Soviet icebreaker Krasin had saved Umberto Nobile and the survivors of the Italia airship, from June 8-10, 1929, Balbo had led in dramatic style 35 seaplanes of the Royal Italian Air Force to Odessa. S.I.A.I. ali nella storia (Florence: Edizioni Aeronautiche italiane S.r.L., 1979), 17-18, 21-24; Moscow Embassy to Mussolini, telexpress 3208/1595, 7/31/33; Izvestia, July 27, 1933. Other Italian naval units had visited Odessa in 1925. In September 1929 two Soviet destroyers, the Frunze and Nezanozhny, had visited Naples while on an instructionalcruise in the Mediterranean. Brassey’s Naval and Shipping Annual, 1930, Charles N. Robinson and N. M. Ross, eds. (London: William Clowes and Sons, Ltd., 1930), 48. A Soviet naval mission visited Italy in December 1930.

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Armenia bound for Odessa, where they arrived three days later to be

met by a foreign commissariat official and the Italian consul

general. At Sevastopol, they honored the fallen of the Crimean War

and visited factories and a sovkhoz. For the benefit of the press,

Attolico found time to praise Soviet hospitality, industry, and

agriculture, as well as Italo-Soviet economic cooperation. Noting

that Odessa was the most important maritime center on the Black

Sea, the ambassador added that the recent economic accord had

extended the jurisdiction of the consulate general in Odessa to

other Black Sea ports.

The next stop was Kiev, whence the Italians left for Moscow

on the 1st of June. In his report describing the tour, the Italian

military attaché lauded Soviet hospitality and naval construction.

Although no untoward incidents had marred the trip, he and

Attolico did note the incredible misery in the Crimea and Ukraine.

They, for example, passed on the claim by the German consul that

the Soviet had imprisoned 147 mothers for eating their own

children. The horror of this self-imposed suffering did not,

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however, prompt Rome’s representatives to suggest that the Soviet

Union was in any way an unfit partner for Italy.4

THE EXCHANGES CONTINUE, AUTUMN 1933

During August, Moscow and Rome were negotiating the final

touches for the Pact of Friendship, Neutrality, and Nonaggression.

Moscow several times asked Rome to exchange observers to army and

naval maneuvers and expressed its wish to send part of the Black

Sea fleet to Italy soon to repay Rome for the recent submarine

visit.5 Celebrating the pact’s signing on September 2, Soviet

papers rejoiced that Italian Fascism differed from German Nazism,

and they assured their readers that ideology need not get in the

way of the growing friendship between Rome and Moscow.6 To drive

4 de Ferrari to the Naval Ministry 11/M; Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 2519/1277, 6/6/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS, b8 f2; Suvich memorandum, colloquy with Potemkin, 5/31/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b10 f1.5 Suvich memorandum, colloquy with Potemkin, 8/7/33; Quaroni to Attolico, telexpress 227487/158, 9/13/33; Suvich to Baistrocchi, note 224287/C, 8/12/33; Sirianni to Suvich, letter, 8/17/33; Baistrocchi to Suvich, letter, 8/19/33; Balbo to Suvich, letter 05596, 8/30/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b10 f1.6 Pravda, Sept. 3, 1933; Izvestia, Sept. 3, 1933.

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home this point, a Soviet military mission visited Italy early

that month. When it returned to the USSR, Izvestia published the

Kremlin’s thanks for the “exceptional courtesy given the mission

by the military authorities and by the Italian government.”7

Before the end of the month, an Italian mission, which included a

brigadier general, arrived in Moscow for a fortnight’s fêting and

touring.8 The prospects for closer military and political

collaboration sharply escalated.

SOVIET NAVAL VISIT TO NAPLES, OCTOBER 1933

While on his way home from Washington in early December 1933,

Foreign Commissar Maksim Litvinov stopped off in Rome to bask in

the warmth of his recent successes: US recognition of the USSR and

the conclusion of the Italo-Soviet pact. Anticipating the visit,

three Soviet vessels, the cruiser Krasnyi Kavkaz and the destroyers

Petrovskii and Shaumian, left Sevastopol on October 17 to arrive in

7 Izvestia, Sept. 10, 1933; Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 03832/1842 bis., 9/11/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b10 f1.8 Berardis to MAE, telexpress 4129/1983, 10/9/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b10 f1.

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Naples thirteen days later. To dramatize the visit, the Soviets

asked their hosts to allow the captains to call on Mussolini in

Rome.9 Apparently, they did not go to Rome during their brief

three-day stay, but otherwise, the Italians amply celebrated and

dined them and their crews, who also toured shipyards, Mt.

Vesuvius, and the ruins at Pompeii.10

Only two small problems arose.11 The Società Rimorchiatori

Napoletani had a small unpaid bill of 431.80 lire for work done on

the Soviet cruiser. A complaint to the Italian foreign ministry,

which in turn remonstrated to the Soviet embassy, quickly settled

the dispute.12 The other, even more trivial, affair concerned the

9 Quaroni to Attolico, telexpress 227487/158, 9/13/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b10 f1; Suvich to Baistrocchi, letter 224287/C, 8/12/33; Sirianni to Suvich, letter, 8/17/33; Berardis to MAE, telexpress 03987/1925, 9/26/33; telegram 9905PR, 10/21/33; Suvich to Sirianni, phonegram 2981, 9/28/33; Potemkin to MAE, note verbale 322, 10/14/33; Salerno Mele to MAE, telegram 9922PR, 10/22/33; Rossoni to MAE, telegram 9964PR, 10/23/33; Note for Suvich, 10/23/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b11 f4.10 Baratono to MAE, telegrams 10238PR, 10/31/33; 10245, 10/31/33; 10285PR, 11/1/33; 10286PR, 11/1/33; 10331PR, 11/2/33; 10332, 11/2/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b11 f4.11 MAE Servizio Correspondenza Uff. 3 to Attolico, telexpress 329090, 11/27/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b11 f2.12 Puppini to MAE, memorandum 12/9/33; Potemkin to MAE, note verbale, 12/19/33; MAE to Puppini, telexpress 200880, 1/11/34:

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Italian arrest of an individual, born in St. Petersburg, who had

tried to distribute anti-Bolshevik propaganda to Soviet sailors in

Naples. Neither of these petty incidents detracted from the

significance of the visit.

The Soviet press stressed that the naval visit showed the

firm friendship existing between Italian and Soviet military and

civilian authorities.13 For its part, the Italian press described

the festivities without political comment. Meanwhile in Berlin,

Nazi authorities viewed these developments with some concern; they

noted reports that Moscow was expecting the visit of yet another

Italian military delegation. Rome duplicitously denied the

allegation.14

MAE (Rome) AP URSS b11 f4.13 Pravda, Nov. 1, 1933; Izvestia, Nov. 2, 4, 1933; Moscow Embassy toMAE, telexpresses 3484/2082, 11/7/33, 4528/2104, 11/14/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b11 f1. TASS from Rome also recounted the reception given at the Soviet embassy on the occasion of the 16thanniversary of the Revolution. Izvestia, Nov. 10, 1933; Moscow Embassy to MAE, telexpress 4528/2104, 11/14/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b11 f1.14 The Times, Oct. 31; Nov. 3, 1933; Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini: A Biography (New York: Knopf, 1982), 182.

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SOVIET FLIGHT TO ITALY, AUGUST 1934

After this first round of naval exchanges, some months passed

before the tempo picked up again. In July of 1934, just as Nazi

provocations were cresting and breaking in Austria against Italian

resistance, chemical warfare specialists visited each other’s

facilities, and Attolico, somewhat prematurely, called these

military contacts a “tradition.” Pushing for closer ties with

Moscow, he highlighted their political and military utility in

promoting Rome’s policies.15

Quickly thereafter, three Soviet military aircraft visited

Italy in official repayment for Balbo’s 1929 flight to Odessa.16

15 Attolico to Mussolini, telexpresses 1477/573, 4/19/34; 2762/1161, 7/3/34; 2792/1169, 7/4/34; Aloisi to Ministero della Guerra, 214792/134, 5/7/34; Ministero della Guerra to MAE, notes 9903, 5/11/34; 14972, 7/9/34; Quaroni to Attolico, telexpress 215604/68, 5/15/34; Baratono to MAE, note 12424, 7/9/34; telegrams 7226PR, 7/18/34; 7296PR, 7/20/34; Suvich to Ministero della Guerra, telexpress 5483, 7/11/34; MAE to Ministero della Guerra, telegram 7262, 7/11/34; Ministero della Guerra to Suvich,promemorial, 8/13/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15 f5; Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 2297/1005, 6/7/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b14 f1; The Times, July 13, 1934.16 Attolico to Mussolini, telegrams 6765PR, 7/4/34; 7722PR, 8/2/34; 7827PR, 8/5/34; telexpress 3472/1345, 8/2/34; Valle to MAE, telegram 03770, 7/9/34; Suvich to Balbo, telegram 7116PR, 7/9/34; Aloisi to Balbo, telegram 7971PR, 7/31/34; Potemkin to

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The planes left Kiev on August 6 and flew to Rome by way of

Odessa, Istanbul, and Athens. They carried thirty-nine people and

included high-ranking military figures and civilian aviation

technicians. These visitors were shown military and industrial

establishments by their hosts, who wished to secure contracts to

supply the USSR with military goods. On the hot afternoon of

August 8, Mussolini, with General Valle and Undersecretary of

State Fulvio Suvich, received the Soviet mission in the Palazzo

Venezia.17 After the Duce praised Russian aviation, the Soviets

shouted three “hurrahs.” Displaying the growing triangular

cooperation between the USSR, Italy, and France, the planes flew

on to Paris from Rome. The Soviet press extolled the flight and

attendant ceremonies and stressed that the visit had proved the

maturity of its air industry and skills of its personnel and had

reinforced the ties between Soviet and Italian aviation. In a

Mussolini, letter 003, nd: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15 f14; Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 3562/1372, 8/9/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b14 f8.17 Potemkin had delayed his vacation with the hope of personally presenting the Soviet delegation to Mussolini, who, “with his usual cordiality,” had agreed. DVP, 17: 248.

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flight of hyperbole, the Soviets touted the flight as having

helped to consolidate universal peace.18

EXCHANGES OF MILITARY OBSERVERS, 1934 AND 1935

These exchanges of 1934 culminated in the fall when Moscow

and Rome traded observers to their annual military maneuvers.19

Hoping to encourage contracts to supply the USSR with military

goods, the Italians took the Soviet mission to various military

and industrial establishments. In return, Italian military experts

observed the maneuvers around Minsk from September 6th to the

10th. Given “particular attention and honor” by the Soviets, the

enormous progress of the Red Army impressed the delegation.

Ambassador Attolico again accented the political importance of all

18 Izvestia, Aug. 15, 16, 17, 18, 1934; Pravda, Aug. 15, 16, 17, 18, 1934; Moscow embassy to Mussolini, telexpress 3771/1478, 8/23/34:MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15 f2.19 Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 3580/1381, 8/9/34; MAEb to Ministero della Guerra, telexpress 227509/262, 8/24/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15 f6; Attolico to Mussolini, telexpresses 3933/1552, 9/6/34; 4030/1593, 9/13/34; Buti to Suvich, note, 8/23/34; Aloisi to MAE, telegram 9045PR, 8/29/34; Aloisi to Attolico, telegram 9205PR/107, 9/2/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15 f7.

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these military contacts.20

One year later, even as tensions were building over Italy’s

mobilization and only seven weeks before its declaration of war

against Abyssinia, an Italian delegation attended important Soviet

military maneuvers around Kiev from September 12 to the 16th.21

Given the city’s strategic sensitivity and that also attending

were observers from France and Czechoslovakia, countries with

which Moscow recently had signed mutual assistance pacts, the

Italian chargé in Moscow credited the Soviet invitation to Italy

as having special political significance. Headed by General Monti,

the Italians saw heavily motorized units, many planes, and 500

parachutists. After the exercise, they, with the French and

Czechs, attended a reception. Later they visited a factory complex

and then went to Moscow, where they arrived on the 22nd to another

party with the French and Czech representatives.

20 Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 3933/1552, 9/6/34: MAE (Rome)AP URSS b15 f7.21 Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow to MAE, telexpress 3668/1425, 8/15/35; Arone to MAE (Rome), telexpress 4358/1662, 9/26/35: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b17 f2.

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NAVAL CONSTRUCTION

THE SOVIETS WANT ITALIAN HELP

Productive as these exchanges were, the Soviets wanted more.

With the Second Five Year Plan, Stalin sought foreign offers for

naval machinery, armor plate, heavy guns, and even complete

battleships. Much of this outside help came from Fascist Italy.22

In seeking Italian yards, designs, motors, armament, equipment,

and engineers—and in purchasing Italian ships—the Soviets were

looking back on similar purchases by their tsarist predecessors

and on their own fruitful collaboration in the twenties. But the

key advantages were real, not historical. Having a well-deserved

reputation for warship design, Italy, with its arsenal labor some

6 percent cheaper than France’s and cheaper also than Britain’s,

was receiving a higher return for its naval expenditure than was

22 William H. Garzke Jr. and Robert O. Dulin Jr., Battleships; Allied Battleships in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 308; Siegfried Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy, trans. M. W. Henley (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1970), 22, 24; Jurg Meister, The Soviet Navy 1, Navies of the Second World War (London: Macdonald, 1971), 34-35; Jurg Meister, Soviet Warships of the Second WorldWar (New York: Arco Publishing Co., 1977), 20-21.

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any other major power.23 Despite the depression racking other

nations’ yards, Italian yards were keeping their labor in a higher

state of efficiency by regular work. Enviably, they were receiving

even more foreign than domestic orders, and without labor discord,

they contrasted strikingly with the virtually idle French and

British yards.

One of the features making this commercial nexus so

attractive was that the technical requirements of both navies were

remarkably similar.24 Both operated on closed, shallow, rather

sheltered seas, close to home ports, air support, and repair and

23 In United States Naval Institute Proceedings, see: “Where Italy Leads,” (Sept. 1933): 1361; “Italy: Brief Notes,” (Nov. 1933): 1650; “Italy: Italian Building,” (Jan. 1934): 128-29; “Italy: Italy Sees Menace,” (Mar. 1934): 427; “Italy: New Battleships for Italy,” (Sept. 1934): 1316-17; “Italy: Mussolini Speaks,” (Aug. 1934): 1163; “Italy: Various Notes,” (Dec. 1934): 1779; “Italy: Various Notes,” 61 (Feb. 1935): 279; “Italy: Cruiser Performance,” (Aug. 1933 or 1935): 1176-77; “Italy: Current Building Program,” (Dec. 1935): 1866. In “Italy: Italy Defies France,” (Aug. 1934): 1163, United States Naval Institute Proceedings reported that the Chicago Tribune, June 20, 1934, claimed that Italywished to fortify her navy with battleships because of her alarm over the possibilities of a Franco-Soviet alliance which would require a robust naval presence not only in the Eastern Mediterranean but also in the Black Sea.24 Garzke and Dulin, Battleships, 315.

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resupply facilities. Neither needed ships with long cruising

ranges or extreme endurance. This allowed high fuel-consuming

speed, increased maneuverability, reduced armor, and heavy guns

requiring more frequent replacement because of their heavier

shells fired at higher muzzle velocities. Additionally, although

the Soviet Union, unlike Italy, had no treaty displacement

limitations on its warships, the relatively shallow depths of the

Baltic and Black seas limited permissible drafts just as

effectively. Historically, in any case, the Russian navy rarely

had ventured great distances from its own coastal waters.

ANSALDO OF GENOA

For political reasons the Kremlin did not want to have its

ships built entirely in foreign yards, and therefore the Soviets

preferred to order essential parts in Italy and assemble them in

the USSR with Italian technical assistance. Moscow’s negotiations

with Italian firms for the supply of materials and expertise,

despite the Italian government’s help, were often tedious.25

25 Suvich to Attolico, telexpress 230320/C, 10/9/33, with

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Overall, however, the contracts decided on seem, in the end, to

have satisfied both sides in all regards—politically,

economically, and technologically.

Among the firms working with Moscow, Ansaldo of Genoa proved

the most active.26 It, for example, built two escort warships

attachment, Potemkin to Suvich, promemorial, 8/14/33; Suvich to Sirianni, telexpress 229482, 9/13/33; Attolico to Mussolini, telegrams 1384PR, 2/14/34; 2878PR, 3/24/34; 2883PR, 3/24/34; 2885PR, 3/24/34; Attolico to Mussolini, telexpresses 3958/1913, 9/23/33; 540/259, 2/14/34; 1193/531, 3/28/34; 4034PR, 4/25/34; 1841/808, 5/10/34; 1957/861, 5/17/34; 1969/866, 5/17/34; Siriannito Consulenza Tecnica all’URSS, note 34814, 9/24/33; Sirianni to MAE, note 34814, 9/29/33; Berardis to MAE, telexpress 4245/2033, 10/22/33, 10/22/33; MAE to Sirianni, telexpress 232974/C, 11/6/33; MAE to Ministero delle Corporazioni, telexpress 205740/C, 2/18/34; Ministero delle Corporazioni to Attolico, note7083, 3/3/34; Undersecretary of State to MAE, Aff. Pol. Uff. 4, note, 3/28/34; Aloisi to Attolico, telegram 3666/44, 4/15/34; Ansaldo to MAE, note, 5/1/34; Suvich to Attolico, telegram 4334PR/52, 5/3/34; MAE to Sirianni, telexpress 216619/C, 5/22/34;Voroshilov to Attolico, letter, 5/16/34; Suvich to Sirianni, telexpress 217309, 5/28/34; Sirianni to Suvich, note B4177, 6/4/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b17 f3; Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 1340/616, 3/20/33; Colloquy with Potemkin, 3/29/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b8 f1; Moscow Embassy to MAE, telexpress 3381/1630, 8/9/33; Suvich to Ministero della Marina-Gabinetto, telexpress 227432, 9/13/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b11 f4.26 For all military construction contracts as of the spring of 1934, See Appendix. For additional documentation for contracts byvarious firms, see Consul at Leningrad to MAE, telexpress 573/87,10/24/34; MAE DGAE Uff. 1 to DGAP, note 228468/1769, 9/1/34; Quaroni to DGAE Uff. 1, note 229186/1816, 9/8/34: MAE (Rome) AP

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designed to protect Soviet fishing smacks in the Vladivostok area.

As the two vessels neared completion in early 1934, the questions

of their transfer to Soviet nationality and their physical move

from Genoa to Vladivostok raised some minor legal and political

obstacles. Fearing that the trip would be politically more

difficult under the Soviet flag, Moscow wanted the ships to sail

under the Italian mercantile flag with Italian captains and crews.

After all, the two ships would have to traverse oceans controlled

by the British and Japanese empires.

The problem was that, according to Italian maritime law, no

foreign national could fully own Italian-flagged commercial

vessels unless he had resided in the kingdom for at least five

years; yet the ships, as property, would pass to the ownership of

the Soviet government on their consignment in Genoa.

Desiring to accommodate the Soviet request, Rome batted the

matter about. One possible solution was to have an Italian consul

at Vladivostok perform the formalities of nationality transfer,

but that would relieve the Soviet Union of any financial and

USSR b17 f3; MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15 f4.

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insurance responsibilities during the trip. Alternatively, Ansaldo

could consign the ship to the Soviet trade representative, who had

more than the five years’ required residency. Mussolini, himself,

finally intervened to ensure the transfer of the two ships

according to Soviet desires. And to get around the problem of a

warship flying a mercantile flag, he ordered the ships to sail

unarmed to Vladivostok, their weapons and munitions to be carried

as cargo. For them, the Soviets owed Ansaldo more than 18 million

lire, with payments spread over fifty-one months from the date of

consignment. The Italian government guaranteed payments to 65

percent.27

The two diesel-powered ships, the PS 8 and PS 26, left Genoa

on October 27, 1934, manned by probably 87 Italians commanded by

officers of the Lloyd Triestino Company and, learning the ropes,

27 Puppini to MAE (Rome), note 7049, 7/13/34; MAE to Sirianni, telexpress 223997/296, 7/21/34; MAE to Giannini, note 224939/1561, 7/31/34; Potemkin, note verbale 003, 7/23/34; MAE toSirianni, n.d.; Campioni to MAE, notes 43846, 7/25/34; 438 UC, 7/25/34; 472, 8/4/34; Suvich to Sirianni, telexpress 224995/317, 7/31/34; Suvich to Puppini, telexpress 226923/900; letter 235069/1142, 11/3/34; Puppini to Mussolini, letter, 10/25/34: MAE(Rome) AP URSS b17 f3.

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18 Soviets. Capable of reaching twenty knots and armed with twelve

rifles to guard against pirates in the eastern seas, the ships

passed through the Suez Canal on November 2. The long trip, in

effect a shakedown cruise, needed only a few repairs despite the

monsoon encountered between Singapore and Hong Kong. The purchases

pleased Moscow. The Italian captains were equally happy with the

cruise and with their treatment at the hands of the Soviets, who

at the transfer ceremonies saluted the Italian tricolor and

shouted “long live” for both the king and Duce.

Returning home on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the Italians

spent two days in Moscow, where again the Soviets showed them

every courtesy. The entire group left for Warsaw on the day

following Christmas, the captains carrying a military report for

Rome.28 The Soviets armed the two escort vessels with three 100 mm

28 Consul at Port Said to MAE, telexpress 3508/382, 11/2/34; Puppini to Suvich, letter, 11/7/34; Campioni to MAE, note 11/16/34; Consul at Colombo, Ceylon to MAE, 11/22/34; Bianconi toMussolini, letter, 1/3/35: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b17 f3; Attolico toMussolini, telexpress 5602/2149, 12/27/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b18f10; Puppini to MAE, note 328, 2/2/35: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b18 f12.

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guns.29

DIRIGIBLE CONSTRUCTION AND TRAINING

In the air as well as on the sea, the Italians helped Moscow

with military technology, specifically in constructing dirigibles.

This program, however, suffered several unfortunate setbacks. One

ship they were helping the Soviets to build was destroyed in an

accident in 1933.30 The next year, engineer Felice Trojani helped

build another dirigible, but a fire destroyed it and a third ship

29 Other vessels of the same pattern perhaps were built in Soviet yards. The three Albatross-class ships, whose presence in the Black Sea was reported but whose existence was never confirmed, may have been of this type. Not until 1938 did the Soviets independently develop a class of escorts, the Iastreb-class, three of which were completed during the war. In dimensions and gun armament, they resembled the Italian-built class, but they provedsignificantly faster, and their torpedo armament was more like that of older destroyers and torpedo boats. Breyer, Guide, 100; Meister, Soviet Warships, 144; John Cambell, Naval Weapons of World War Two (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985), 363. The Soviets also inquired for help in building a salvage vessel to raise sunken ships. Consul at Leningrad to MAE, telexpress 595/92, 11/6/34; Quaroni to Puppini, telexpress 237078/1200, 11/21/34; Puppini to MAE, note, 11/29/34; Quaroni to Consul at Leningrad, telexpress 238563/2, 12/4/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15 f430 Attolico to Mussolini, telexpresses 2016/995, 5/21/33; 2729/1365, 6/19/33; 3534/1714, 8/21/33; 03942/1886, 9/25/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b11 f11.

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with the wooden hangar housing them.31 A new dirigible,

substantially a copy of the Italian airship Italia, was then

constructed according to the plans of the famous arctic explorer,

Umberto Nobile. Appendicitis, hospitalization, and a long vacation

in Italy, however, circumscribed his extensive activities and

projects.32

Nobile’s contract with Moscow was due to end in February

1936.33 Eight months before then, the head of Dirigiablestroi, the

Soviet trust for airship construction, tried to convince him to

renew his contract. While interested, Nobile had several

reservations and made his acceptance contingent on participation

in an Arctic expedition. Meanwhile, in a personal letter to

Mussolini, Nobile placed himself at the Duce’s disposal. By

31 Attolico to Balbo, telexpress 524/225, 2/14/34; Balbo, note 00992, 2/23/34; Attolico to Mussolini, telexpresses 2496/1087, 6/19/34; 3714/1435, 8/21/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15 f14.32 Berardis to MAE, telexpress 4958/1894, 11/13/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15 f4. For Nobile’s health problems, see MAE (Rome) AP URSSb15 f9. This is the same Umberto Nobile who had been dramaticallyrescued by the Soviet icebreaker Krasin in the arctic wreckage of the Italia airship. This incident was depicted in the film, The Red Tent, starring Sean Connery and Albert Finney.33 Nobile to Mussolini, letter, 8/11/35, with attachment: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b22 f13.

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November 1935 he had decided not to stay. He wrote the Italian

ambassador, “at this time [that is, the war with Abyssinia] . . .

it seems intolerable that I should serve a foreign government

rather than my own.”34 In that same letter, Nobile asked for the

ambassador’s help in case the Soviets, anxious for his expertise,

decided to keep him after the expiration of his contract. While

his fears were perhaps not unfounded, he got out without

difficulty.

By that time, however, Soviet relations in all fields with

Italy were crumbling, buffeted first by the Italo-Abyssinian War

and then all but destroyed by the Spanish Civil War.

CONCLUSION

Looking back, this series of military visits, consultations,

technical collaborations, and military constructions palpably

carried forward the Italo-Soviet political rapprochement of 1933.

Despite the lack of Soviet documents revealing the deepest

thoughts of the Kremlin’s leaders, it is reasonable to guess that

34 Nobile to Arone, letter, 11/27/35: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b22 f13.

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Moscow valued these contacts especially for the triple pressure

they put on Berlin. Most important, they honed to a sharp edge

Rome’s opposition to Nazi designs on Austria by implicitly opening

the possibility of Soviet support—even military support—for

Italy’s defense of that country. Next, these contacts reminded the

German military establishment and industrialists of the value of

their own lost Rapallo-era cooperation with the Soviets.35 By

drawing closer to Italy, Moscow also was telling Berlin that

ideology need not get in the way of friendly relations. Often

criticizing Berlin for causing the breakdown in Soviet-German

relations, Mussolini, himself, tried to drive this point home to

Hitler.36 And, finally, paralleled by Franco-Soviet exchanges, the

military contacts were useful in greasing the ways for Italo-

French cooperation. This, with Italo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet

35 On January 13, 1934, e.g., at a farewell dinner given by the Red Army for the departing Italian military attaché, de Ferrari, Yegorov told the German military attaché that he desired a returnto military cooperation. To put an edge on his wish, he also intimated that Moscow was considering equipping Soviet submarineswith Italian torpedoes. DGFP, C, 2: 191.36 For one example of Soviet appreciation for Rome’s intercession in Berlin, see Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 1640/758, 4/10/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b10 f1.

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collaboration, would put Germany in a vise to squeeze Hitler to

impotence or—even better—to force him to return to loyal Rapallo-

like cooperation.37

As for Rome, Italy needed the military contracts to pay for

its imports of Soviet oil and timber, and in trying to balance its

trade deficit, Rome had little else that Moscow wanted.

Politically, Italy had to find support against Nazi encroachments

on Austria. And further, Rome needed Paris, and the French desire

for Soviet support forced Rome to sublimate its rivalry with the

USSR in Slavic Southeast Europe.

Italy had a most important role to play in forging the

incipient collective security coalition designed to keep Germany

in its place. Until 1936 or so, it was the one power with both the

will and the means to stop German expansionism in its tracks

through direct political and military intervention in Austria

37 Vasilii Ivanovich Achkasov, A. B. Basov, N. V. Bol’shakov, G. M. Gel’fond, R. N. Mordvinov, and A. I. Sumin, eds., Voevoi put’ sovetskogo voenno-morskogo flota (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1974), 135; Eric Morris, The Russian Navy: Myth and Reality (New York: Stein and Day, 1977), 27 n.12.

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against Anschluss.38 And it was only through Rome that its

protégées, Austria and Hungary, could be brought to cooperate with

the French allies in East and Southeast Europe—Poland,

Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Italy’s critical place in

the anti-German coalition is easily demonstrated. Witness only

that the ramshackle structure did collapse in 1935 and 1936

following the strains of the Italo-Abyssinian War when Rome

withdrew itself from anti-German cooperation.

APPENDIX

In late April 1934, Attolico sent Rome a complete list of

Italian military contracts on the account of the Soviet

government.39

38 For one Soviet propagandist’s appreciative description of the role Rome played in putting down the Nazi putsch of July 25, 1934, in Austria, see Ernst Henri (pseudo.), Hitler Over Russia? The Coming Fight Between the Fascist and Socialist Armies, Michael Davidson, trans.(London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1936), 38-53, 82-120. Henri believed that an Italo-German war almost had broken out; further,under Hitler’s aegis, there was being formed in the mid-thirties in Central and East Europe, a bloc of fascist states whose objectwas to conquer the USSR.39 Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 1566/706, 4/25/34: MAE (Rome)AP URSS b15 f4.

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1) S. A. Ansaldo of Genoa was building, along destroyer lines, twocoast guard/escort vessels of 776 tons displacement and 76 meters in length. Endowed with Tosi motors and costing 18,650,000 lire, the ships were to be consigned about April or May. (These were thePS 8 and PS 26.)

2) Ansaldo also was building factories for the construction of complete motors for cruisers. The firm was to supply technical collaboration as well to the USSR for cruiser construction. These contracts were worth 34,000,000 lire.

3) Odero-Terni-Orlando of La Spezia was building 12 twin-barrel anti-aircraft cannons.

4) Società S. Giorgio of Sestri had finished in March the consignment of 46 range finding devices of 4 meters at the base and detachable in 3 parts.

5) Officine Galileo of Florence was in the process of supplying 4 complete fire control systems including search lights, range finders, sight mechanisms, and gyrocompasses for 4 torpedo boat destroyers. Three of these already had been delivered, and the 4thhad passed its trials and was ready.

6) Officine Galileo also was supplying 15 attack periscopes for submarines, of which 5 already had been sent, 4 had passed their tests, and the rest were 90 percent completed.

7) Officine Galileo was supplying 14 range finders of which 10 were of 6 meters, and 4 were of 8 meters. Some were undergoing testing and some were being mounted.

8) Officine Galileo additionally was supplying 100 mirrors for 150mm searchlights of which 30 had been sent and the others were being tested or were still under construction.

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9) Silurificio Italiano of Naples was in the course of consigning 50 torpedoes of 533mm x 7.5 and 45 of 533mm x 7.27, as well as 2 3-tube torpedo launchers of 533mm.

10) Silurificio Whitehead of Fiume was delivering 80 torpedoes of 533mm of which 25 were as yet incomplete and 15 torpedoes of 450mm, none of which was completed.

11) Ditta Isotta Fraschini of Milan was supplying spare parts for Asso 750 motors for 606,850.72 lire, plus 51 marine units of the type Asso 1000 MAD.

12) Ottico Meccanica Italiana of Rome and Aeronautica Macchi of Varese had made offers of aeronautical material for Soviet aviation, but no concrete orders had yet come to pass.