Italian political reactions to the Cuban missile crisis

International History of theCuban Missile Crisis~ 50-year retrospective

Edited hy David Gioe, Len Scott andChristopher Andrew

~~ ~~o~1!;n~~~up_ DON ANO NEW YORK

12 Italian political reactions to theCubanmissile crisis

Leonardo Campus

This volume has revealed many new facets of the Cuban missile crisis. Thischapter will add to them by focusing on the Italian political reactions tothe crisis. Naturally, since Italian political reactions were varied andcomplex, it would go beyond the scope of this chapter to present them allin detail. Here, thus, we will present the outlines, referring to our widerstudies on the topic for further details.'

The focus will be on four main aspects in which Italian politiciansreacted to the Cuban crisis: Italian missiles; Italian socialists; Italian leader-ship; and Italian communists. Finally, we will also provide a brief view ofBritish-Italian diplomatic connections during the Cuban crisis. Based onnew evidence, gathered in Italian, American and British archives, comple-mented by oral history interviews conducted with Italian participants inthe event, this chapter will highlight two generaI aspects emerging fromthe four points analysed: the dynamism and the divisions that werespurred in Italy by the Cuban crisis.

Italy-based NATO missiles

In the secret phase of the Cuban crisis, as the White House consideredseveral potential reactions to the missiles in Cuba and the Soviet counter-reactions that they were likely to ignite, Italy emerged from the first as oneof the targets at risk because Italy had NATO missiles on its soil. Theirdeployment had been offered by the US at the meeting of the NorthAtlantic Council in December 1957 and negotiations had taken place in1958-59. Italy had accepted the missiles for a mix of deference toward theUS and a desire to acquire international prestige among European alliesby achieving a nuclear status." The arsenal consisted of 30 interrnediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), visibly and vulnerably placed in theSouthern regions of Puglia and Basilicata." These ]upiters were aimed atthe Soviet's own medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and IRBMs inthe Western USSR and could reach their target in less than 20 minutes,"but they also made Italy among the most likely targets for Soviet militaryretaliation. The plans prepared by the US for an airstrike against the

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Cuban bases, for instance, specifically mentioned possible Soviet counter-attacks against 'Italy, Turkey or Berlin'.5

Italian bases also appeared important as a possible pawn in negotiationsto achieve the removal of the Cuban bases. In this regard, the ExecutiveCommittee of the National Security Council (ExComm) seemed immedi-ately willing to pay such a price. State Department officer George Ball, forinstance, during the Ex-Comm meeting of 18 October said: 'I think theprice is going to be high .... The very least it will be, will be to remove themissiles in Italy and Turkey. I doubt we could settle for that [little].'6 On20 October, Adlai Stevenson proposed that the blockade speech be accom-panied by an offer to negotiate the withdrawal of bases from Italy, Turkeyand Guantanamo. President Kennedy replied that this should not beoffered from the outset, but conceded that at an appropriate time, andupon Soviet request, the US should agree to take out missiles from ltalyand Turkey.?

On 22 October, President Kennedy also ordered special precautions inorder to avoid unauthorized launches of those missiles, 'even in the caseof a nuclear attack ... against those installations on the part of the SovietUnion as a response to actions that we might undertake elsewhere." Alsoaccording to a recent claim by GeneraI Oreste Genta, then Commander ofthe Italian Aerobrigade who managed the bases (36th ABIS), during thecrisis the ]upiters were put in a 'ready to launch' condition, higher thanthe usual 'standby' level.?

In the following days, during the public phase of the crisis, the USAmbassadors in ltaly and Turkey started to discretely probe the potentialreactions to a removal of those bases. As McGeorge Bundy put it to theExComm on 27 October, 'the difference between' the two reports 'isbetween night and day'." From Rome, in effect, Ambassador Frank Rein-hardt wrote in his cable that such a removal from Italy 'would probably bemanageable', provided that the operation is 'very carefully handled' (thatis, consulting with the government of ltaly, presenting it as an Italian con-tribution to the relaxation of tensions, etc.)." Quite the opposi te, the USEmbassy in Ankara warned that the removal would present serious issues,as the Turks attached dee p significance to those missiles, as a symbol ofthe American protection, and their withdrawal would be seen as bargain-ing at the expense of their security. However, the cable from Ankaraadded, should the removal become absolutely necessary, a parallel opera-tion in ltaly 'would have made easier the approach with the government'of Turkey." This, then, is precisely what Robert McNamara suggested inthe ExComm meeting on 27 October: withdrawing the missiles from Italyin order to pressure Turkey for a similar move. McNamara also remarkedthat the ltalian Minister of Defence Giulio Andreotti told him just a fewweeks ago that 'the Italians would be happy to get rid of them if we wantthem out of there'. At that point, President Kennedy, asked: 'Who'sAndreotti?' 13 and then immediately agreed with the idea."

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So, although Khrushchev's letter of 27 October only regarded theTurkish bases (as did the secret promise made that night by RobertKennedy to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin), the Italian missiles also eventu-ally ended up being part of the package of measures adopted in order toresolve the Cuban crisis."

This, then, was the first important consequence of the Cuban crisis forItaly. Thanks to this double withdrawal, as historian Lawrence Freedmanpointed out, 'any direct link with Turkey was obscured by parallel moveswith Italy.'!" Of course, any link between the Italian withdrawal and theCuban crisis would be consistently denied by the US government - evenprivately to the Italian Prime Minister, Amintore Fanfani, on 16 ]anuary1963.17 The operation would be presented as a regular modernization ofthe NATO nuclear arsenal (which was at least partly true, as the substitutePolaris missiles were being placed onto submarines in the Mediterraneansea, making them less vulnerable than the ]upiters). As a matter of fact,however, at the start of 1963 Henry Kissinger reported from his trip toRome that 'almost everyone' among the leading Italian politicians he met'suspected that withdrawal might be result of US agreement with Rus-sians'. The President of the Italian Republic, Antonio Segni, evenexpressed 'pique that US decision on withdrawal had apparently beenmade during Cuban crisis and Italy [had] only [been] informed threemonths later'." In any case, by l ApriI, 1963, the removal of]upiters fromItaly was complete.

This withdrawal might be better understood by reconstructing a storythat proceeded in parallel with it. According to some accounts, the Amer-ican decision to remove the ]upiters from Italy was joined by an Italiansecret offer of such removal. This would have been done in order to facil-itate an agreement between the two colliding superpowers, at a momentwhere escalation appeared increasingly near. As no evidence about thisoffer has yet emerged from either the American or the Italian archives, itseems prudent to consider the story as currently hypothetical. LeopoldoNuti, who also investigated this story, remains uncertain about the realityof such an offer, viewing it as an exaggeration on the part of Bernabei,one of the assertors of this story." However, as will be shown, there arealso several reasons to consider it as plausible. Moreover, the very shorttiming, together with the strict secrecy that the matter required, mightwell explain the lack of official documents available regarding this story.

As Fanfani learned of the crisis, he sent Carlo Russo (Undersecretary ofthe Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to New York, as a special envoy ofthe Italian government. His mission, as Fanfani explained it to his ForeignMinister Attilio Piccioni, was 'to recommend, to urge, to motivate.'." Inthe following days, Adlai Stevenson, US Ambassador to the UN, privatelyapproached Carlo Russo suggesting that 'the Italian missile bases mightbecome part of the agreement' to solve the crisis, as supported by bothFanfani's diaries and a subsequent talk between Italian President Segni


and Henry Kissinger." Initially, Russo, according to both Fanfani's diariesand the (newly dec1assified) report that Russo submitted on the meeting,"had replied to Stevenson that 'it would be preferable to use the dismant-ling of the European bases in the framework of the conc1usion of the dis-armament negotiations.?" However, Fanfani of course wished to avoid awar (if nothing else, due to the special vulnerability of Italy to enemyretaliation). Also, as a practising Christian, he was not indifferent to thesolemn appeal for negotiations issued by the Pope, via radio, on 25October. He apparently moved through private channels to correctRusso's initial answer to Stevenson and make sure that the US governmentknew that Italy was ready to give up those missiles at any moment if thatcould help avoid a war. This offer was probably put forward through Russoat the UN. While the Fanfani diaries are silent on the matter and there isno 'smoking gun document' yet available on this, one likelihood is thatthis offer by Fanfani was discretely communicated to Russo during one ofthe two phone calls that Fanfani placed on 26 October." The proposal wasthen relayed to Stevenson on the same day. The answer to this offer wascommunicated, no less privately, to a personal emissary of Fanfani, EttoreBernabei, in a meeting that took place on the morning of Saturday 27October at the White House.

Ettore Bernabei, now 92 years old, was then GeneraI Manager of RAITV, Italian public television. He was given this position by Fanfani, towhom he was a 'trusted man' - or 'uomo di fiducia', as he later titled hisown memoirs." In this book (and in severallater interviews, inc1uding onewith the author) Bernabei told the story of how he happened to getinvolved in this superpower crisis. His account is not without several inac-curacies, partly due to the passage of time, and has a touch of naiveté ininterpreting world affairs, but overall it appears to be trustworthy.i"

Bernabei happened to be already in Washington for an internationalmeeting of TV managers. So, when the crisis broke, Fanfani called himasking to remain there until further notice. Then, on 27 October, he wassummoned to the White House. Arthur Schlesinger had already scheduleda meeting with Bernabei on Wednesday 24 October, as his weekly schedulerevealed. But when President Kennedy decided to send him to New York,to assist Stevenson at the UN, Schlesinger had to cancel all meetings thatweek." It seems relevant that, as soon as he carne back to Washington forthe weekend, still in the midst of the crisis, he decided to summon the rel-atively unimportant Italian Bernabei to the White House. Their meetingcertainly did occur, as shown by several US documents, among which adetailed memo written by Schlesinger himself for President Kennedy, inwhich the meeting was described as 'this somewhat baffling conversa-tìou'." The account of the meeting found in Schlesinger's calendar pre-cisely coincide with those described by Bernabeì.f? Reading Schlesinger'smemo, however, it would appear that the pair discussed different mattersinstead - namely, the possibility of establishing informal contacts between

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the US and the Holy See (the two countries had no diplomatic relations atthe time).

However, confirming Bernabei's claims that the ]upiters were also dis-cussed at that meeting, are the words of Giulio Andreotti. The ltalianMinister of Defence, in a book he published ten years before Bernabei'smemoirs, affirmed having learnt from McNamara 'that an authoritativemember of the ltalian government had sent to Washington a trusted manof his own to advise that the presence of the missiles in Gioia del Colle wasno longer sustainable. He asked me to forge t about this and I ... onlyforgot the name of this freelance player [libero battitore] .'30 In 2009 theauthor managed to ask a few questions of Andreotti (then 90, passing awayin 2013). One of them was if he could confirm that 'libero battitore' wasjust another term for Bernabei. Typically, he confined himself to a simple:'Ask Bernabei. '31 Bernabei not only confirmed he was the man in ques-tion, as was absolutely clear by then," but he ran through the wholeepisode with the author stressing again how Fanfani's offer had beenspurred by the Pope's appeal for negotiations.

Bernabei quoted Schlesinger as telling him, at the end of their meeting:'You can say to your government that that proposal has been definitivelyapproved. '33 An affirmative answer, to be sure, but also a generic one -enough to take note of the political readiness of Italy to get rid of the mis-siles, while reserving the right to implement that offer or no t, in themoment and degree that the White House would have deemed necessary.

Less than 24 hours after their meeting, Khrushchev's radio message,somewhat unexpectedly, announced the solution of the crisis (on partlysecret terms, as we now know). For the White House, then, it suddenlybecame superfluous and even dangerous to let the secret ltalian proposalresurface or be recorded on paper. It might have confirmed suspicionsthat the Arnericans had concluded a missile swap with the Russians. Itmight have even provided grounds for future claims of political credit onthe part of Italy (or Fanfani). lt was much safer, then, for Washington torequire and announce the ltalian missiles' withdrawal on the very sameterms as the Turkish one (that is, simply as part of the modernization ofthe NATO arsenal). The last-minute secret Italian offer was to be quicklyforgotten. Fanfani, however, was less keen on forgetting it, and decadesafter the crisis he publicly claimed credit, on at least two occasions, for therole he felt he had played in those days."

Now, should our hypothesis that Fanfani used the phone to com-municate his offer be confirmed, it may explain the lack of written evid-ence for it. The political sensitivity of the matter that Fanfani was raising,and the fact that he was doing it without consulting with either hisDefence Minister Andreotti or President Segni (Commander-in-Chief ofthe Armed Forces), may well clarify his rationale for not putting it onpaper. Also, in light of the proposed chronology of such a move (i.e. oneof the two phone calls Fanfani placed overseas on October 26), it would


certainly make sense that Bernabei was summoned to the White Housejust the morning after that, being granted a long, private meeting withSchlesinger, in spite of all the frantic activities involving the President'sadvisers at the peak of the crisis. Perhaps Schlesinger may have briefly con-sulted with the President about the answer to give to Fanfani's emissary,before receiving him in the nearby room." Adding to the plausibility ofthis story is its having been confirmed in different decades and forms byatleast three different figures, not even on good terms with each other(Andreotti, Fanfani, Bemabeij.t" An indirect confirmation of such anoffer might also possibly be seen in the Soviet minutes of a meetingbetween Fanfani and Frol Kozlov, an influential member of the Soviet Pre-sidium. According to a Russian scholar who was given access to that docu-ment and the Italian researcher who cited her study, the Soviet record ofthe meeting stated that Fanfani 'gave Moscow reason to hope that theAmerican bases in Italy would be liquidated very soon '." Since thismeeting was held in Rome on Il December 1962, that is two days before theNATO meeting in Paris in which McNamara first mentioned the with-drawal to Andreotti." Fanfani's hint about such an American move mightrepresent an indirect confirmation of his being aware of Washingtonintentions through Bernabei.

In sum, what significance can be attributed to this presumed move byFanfani? For the White House, it might have confirmed the feasibility ofgetting the Italian missiles withdrawn and, consequently, the possibility ofusing this as a leverage to pressure the Turks into accepting the same,"which, in turn, might have enabled the Kennedy brothers to be confidentenough to promise such a deal to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin later onthe evening of 27 October. For Italy, the move would have to be seen as agenuine, if ambitious, mediation effort, aimed at contributing to the pro-tection of both Italian security and international peace, a move thatrepresents the typical dynamism of Fanfani's foreign policy.

One of the main questions regarding the role of the Italian ]upiters inthe Cuban crisis concerns the reasons that prompted Khrushchev tomention only the Turkish missiles in his public letter to Kennedy of 27October, neglecting the Italian ones, which were double in number andno less capable of striking Soviet territory. At least three reasons (geo-graphical, emotional and political, respectively) may be briefly proposedhere.

First, as Turkey shared a border with the USSR, it obviously representeda more immediate parallel with the position of Cuba and the US, makingit easier to equate the two situations for diplomats and also global opinion.In other words, geography may have lead Khrushchev to believe thatachieving a missile swap with Turkey would have been easier than one withItaly (though the reverse was true, as was shown). Second, Khrushchev wasparticularly annoyed by the proximity of the Turkish missiles. Hefrequently complained, with great hyperbole, to foreign visitors that those

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missiles were so dose that he could see them even from his dacha on theBlack Sea.40 It is worth noting here that the basic idea of deploying missilesto Cuba - one that he described as giving the Americans 'a little of theirown medicine"! - had been conceived by Khrushchev while he was in Bul-garia, a country on the Black Sea coast, bordering Turkey.

Third, Khrushchev must have known that asking for a withdrawal fromturo countries (Turkey and Italy) in exchange for one (Cuba) might havebeen too much for Kennedy to concede, and in the event, Khrushchev'smain concern was to quickly reach a compromise. Besides, being anaccomplished politician, he may have also counted on the fact that evenby achieving only the Turkish bases' withdrawal he would lead NATO to ageneraI reconsideration of its nuclear arsenal in Europe, and this couldalso involve Italy, as eventually it did. No less important, Walter Lipp-mann's column of 25 October pointed to Turkey, not Italy, as a subject ofnegotiations, and apparently Khrushchev took the artide as a possibleballon d 'essai from the White House."

Finally, the matter was also discussed in the above-mentioned meetingbetween Fanfani and Frol Kozlov of Il December. Speaking of the recentcrisis, the influential member of the Soviet Presidium told Fanfani, as thelatter reported in his journal:

that in the document for Kennedy at first there was also the request towithdraw the missile bases from ltaly. Then discussing in the Sovietgovernment, the view prevailed to have regard for Italy, in memory ofmy visit [to the USSR of August 1961] .43

It was surely flattering for Fanfani to hear, but it does not appear to be arealistic explanation, at least in these terrns. If the ltalian bases were actu-ally discussed in the Kremlin while drafting Khrushchev's letter of 27October (since this could also have been just a diplomatic way for Kozlovto bring up the matter, in order to sound out Fanfani's reactions on a pos-sible withdrawal), it seems unlikely that the demand for their withdrawalwas then renounced just for personal regard for Fanfani. This is not to saythat the generaI context of the relatively good relations that the two coun-tries enjoyed at the time may not have contributed - if seen together withother, predominant factors, such as those mentioned above and perhapsalso Khrushchev's desire not to damage the thaw that was emerging inrelations with the Vatican."

The Cuban crisis also had important indirect consequences on Italiandomestic politics. Italy was then in a delicate phase of transition, as theruling party, the DC (Christian Democrats), was trying to extend thebasis of parliamentary support by progressively including Pietro Nenni's

Italian socialists

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Socialist Party (PSI) in the government. This change, called 'opening tothe left', was designed both to realize a policy of reforms and to isolatethe Communist Party (PCI), which was still very strong in Italy. Theproject had ripened, and by October 1962 the government alreadycounted on the so-called 'external support' of the socialists, i.e. theirabstention, instead of their previous opposition vote. The opening to theleft, however, remained a difficult process, still opposed by many, bothin Italy and abroad. Washington, in particular, watched with a mix ofinterest and suspicion at this political experiment. After Eisenhower'sopposition, the new Kennedy administration started to follow it moresympathetically;" Still many, both in Italy and in the US, wonderedwhether the socialists had realIy cut their ties with the PCI or instead in acrisis their tendency to neutralism would have eventually placed Italy defaeto on the margins of NATO. In this respect, the Cuban crisis carne asan acid test.

When the crisis broke out, the PSI expressed its position in the Parlia-ment, reiterating its support for the government, stressing 'more thesearch for solutions rather than the attribution of responsibilities'. 46 PietroNenni then issued a cautious declaration. In it, while protesting that 'it isabsurd to talk of Cuba as a threat to peace ... such to justify the measuresadopted by the United States', he also called for a summit and the inter-vention of the UN, for the sake of the only interest of the people and theItalian government: peace."

Beside the public statements, the Italian socialists were shown to be reli-able allies of the government with two discreet yet concrete steps. The firstwas a phone call placed by Nenni to Fanfani at the start of the crisis, assur-ing him that the PSI would not cause him any trouble, whatever positionhe might deem necessary to take." The second was the refusal by thesocialists to participate in the demonstrations organized by the commu-nists, thus isolating their mobilization, something the Americans did notfail to note"

Was this enough to pass the test? Some thought it was (Schlesinger, forinstance), some thought it was not (the Department of State). Meanwhile,the Kremlin, through Pravda, criticized Nenni, for the opposite reason ofhaving 'had nothing to say in condemnation of the recent Americanaggressive steps against Cuba' .50 Criticism of the socialists also carne fromItalian parties of right and left - and even from within the party itself, asthe so-called 'carrista' minority (the leftist faction of the party) consideredNenni too accommodating. One year later the minority would eventuallysplit to form the smaller, more leftist party ofPSIUP (Partito Socialista Ital-iano di Unità Proletaria).

OveralI, however, the socialists had been loyal to the government.Besides, after the crisis had eased they affirmed they were ready to revisetheir initially criticai attitude towards Washington's moves, as revealed byaprivate letter by Nenni about his consultations with the US Embassy."

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Thus, the American assessment of the centre-left performance during theCuban crisis eventually proved to be positive, 'more than the official ana-lyses of the State Department affirmed', as Nuti put it.52 The test had beenpassed." The Cuban crisis, thus, also had some consequences for thedomestic balance in Italy, marking and hastening a turning point in itsrecent political history.

ltalian leadership

How did the Italian Prime Minister react to the news of the crisis? Unlikethe British Prime Minister (first among alI allies to be informed, on 21October) and unlike the French and German leaders De Gaulle and Ade-nauer (both informed during the course of the day of the speech with aspecial envoy equipped with pictures of the bases) ,54 Fanfani got word ofthe crisis only on the evening of Kennedy's speech, 'at 8.45 PM', as he wascareful to note in his diaries. US Ambassador Frank Reinhardt, looking'very concerned', provided him with only half of the text of the speechthat Kennedy was about to give, plus a brief note from the Presidenthimself. Fanfani, surprised and shaken by the news, asked Reinhardt'whether they are not about to spring a trap that will have possible graverepercussions in Berlin and elsewhere'i'" He reserved the right to replythe following day. Then he started an immediate round of phone calls,including one placed to Macmillan. The British Prime Minister sent him aletter the following day - one that Fanfani found to be 'evidently criticaI ofKennedy's decisions and asking for agreement' - and replied 'immediatelyrecommending pro-peace action '."

The evening of 23 October, Fanfani stated his Government's positionon the crisis, reading a carefully calibrated statement in both houses ofParliament. In the words of British Ambassador, Sir John Ward, Fanfani'expressed solidarity with the United States in her recourse to the UnitedNations but not for establishing the blockade'r" It was only 'timid andindirect' support of the US.58

On the morning of 24 October, Fanfani finally delivered his privatereply to Kennedy. The letter did not hide his doubts:

Mr. President, Italy understands and feels the grave concerns for themaintenance of peace ... created by the concentration of offensivenuclear weapons on the island of Cuba. However, I would be derelictto elementary duty of friendship if I did not say ... that the measuresdecided upon by you can cause the gravest risks for alI.

It is important to note that the first draft of this letter originally addedhere: '[your measures] are loaded with unthinkable repercussions' - apoint over which President Segni himself intervened to cancel with astroke of pen, presumably judging it too criticaI. 59Fanfani continued:

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For that reason, we welcomed the recourse of the US to the UN, whichwe will support; your direct appeal to Prime minister Khrushchev; thewarm confirmation that you are ready to conduct in any forum anyexamination of alI the other grave problems which today disturb ...the unstable peace of the world."

AlI too evident here was the implication that the moves not included inthis list, starting with the blockade, were much less welcome. A summaryof this most private and earnest letter was also provided by Fanfani toLondon - a confidential gesture that the British government did not failto appreciate."

In the following days he continued to recommend the path of negoti-ations through the UN, surely by having Russo repeatedly talk with Steven-son and U Thant to encourage their efforts," and perhaps also by secretlyoffering the removal of Italian missiles as detailed above. Overall, the char-acteristics of his policy in the Cuban crisis appear to lie in the discreetdynamism of his diplomatic efforts in the interest of peace, joined by inde-pendence of judgment, loyally but earnestly expressing his doubts to thepowerful ally even at such a criticaI moment.

These, however, were not the views of those on the right wing of theDC. A revealing American document shows how the Italian PresidentAntonio Segni bitterly criticized Fanfani for his Cuban stance according toa CIA source.P" Also, 'a near revolt in the DC party' occurred because ofFanfani's cautious position on Cuba." Christian Democrat deputyGiuseppe Bettiol even confided to the US Embassy how 'at first sign Italywavering in its support of US as result of "PSI neutralism" he and otherconservative DC leaders (Scelba, Gonella, Pella), would move to torpedogovernment'.65 Such a possibility of a government crisis as a result of theCuban crisis also resonated at that time in diplomatic circles abroad." It isno surprise, then, that a cable from the American Embassy in Romedefined Fanfani, with some amazement, as 'this man who has so manyenemies even in his own party'.67 Nor is it surprising that the next DC gov-ernment, formed inJune 1963, was to be entrusted to another DC leader,Aldo Moro.

ltalian Communists

If the ruling Christian Democrats were bitterly divided over Fanfani's cau-tious stance, the assessment of the crisis week was not any happier for themain opposition party, the PCI. Demonstrations organized by the Com-munists had been much less crowded than expected. In an internaI report,the Party euphemistically characterized them as 'd'avanguardia' (van-guards) .68The small number of participants was partly due to the uncer-tainty of the circumstances, and partly to the lack of 'unity of action' withthe ltalian Socialists, who had refused to join with Communists in the

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streets just as they had in the Parliament. Moreover, the leadership of theCommunist Party itself had been caught by surprise. Being confusedregarding the real presence of missiles in Cuba and about what Moscowwould do, they could not help but look uncertain. Furthermore, a fracturehad occurred within the party, as some applauded the USSR for savingworld peace with its moderation, while others would have preferred insteadcontinuing the showdown, rather than appearing weak and willing toabandon Cuba. In the course of a 'very long and very intense't" meeting ofthe Party's Board of Directors, on 31 October, PCI leader Palmiro Togliattidefined these positions as 'two contrasting and paralyzing attitudes'. Hethen asked to verify what had gone wrong in the party mobilization?" andrecommended his comrades 'to avoid the discussions in the party on this orthe other episode' of the crisis. However, Togliatti himself, in spite of whathe wrote in support of the USSR in the Party magazine Rinascita,71 was actu-ally very much perplexed by Moscow's moves. This emerges not only fromthe records of the Party meeting.i" but also from the chronicles of LucianoBarca, a member of the Party's Secretariat. Barca noted on 29 October:

The USSR carne out weakened [from the showdown] .... Togliatti offi-cially supports the USSR and his 'act ofwisdom' carried out at the lastminute reverting the course of the ships ... but inside the Secretariathe is strongly critical of the adventurism of such behaviours. His judg-ment on Khrushchev becomes even more severe. He compares theadventurism of the military operation with that of the secret report[the one denouncing Stalinism in 1956] not based on a serious ana-lysis and lacking in corrective proposals appropriate to the errors andhorrors that were being denounced."

These tough judgments appear particularly significant when taking intoaccount the prestige that Togliatti enjoyed within the international commu-nist movement. Such views, however, remained behind closed doors. Further,during this time Togliatti resolutely sided with the Kremlin in the ideologicalconflict between Moscow and Beijing. Indeed, the Sino-Soviet dispute hadbeen exacerbated because of the Cuban crisis. Maoist leaders were publiclyaccusing Khrushchev of having 'capitulated' in front of the imperialists, con-cluding 'a new Munich' at the expense of little Cuba. The Munich analogywas then a favourite of the hard-liners on both sides of the Cold War, andhad been used several times during the Cuban crisis itself (fìrst against Pres-ident Kennedy by Ceneral Curtis LeMay in their meeting of 19 October,then against Adlai Stevenson, in the aftermath of the crisis, by a journalistwho had a leak from the White House). Surely being labelled 'the newappeaser' at the peak of the Cold War was a most unwelcome accusation.

»> In this context, thus, Palmiro Togliatti, sincerely believing that theChinese were wrong, carne to Moscow's aid by strongly refuting their accu-sations in the speech he delivered at the Tenth Congress of PCI.


It was the merit - he said in front of an international crowd - and notthe guilt, of the Soviet leaders the fact of not having lost their cool. ...How can one compare the Soviet position in the Caribbean crisis withthe capitulation in front of Hitler at the Munich conference? InMunich the independence of a people, the Czech, was destroyed. Inthe Caribbean crisis the independence of Cuba has been defendedand guaranteed."

This part of Togliatti's speech was cheered with warm applause by all ofthe attending international delegates, not least by the Soviets. TheChinese, instead, remained seated and silent."

Italian-British relations

Finally, let us briefly examine how the British government evaluatedItalian behaviour in the crisis. From the outset of the crisis, Fanfani triedto keep in closer touch with London than with any other European ally.The relations between the two countries were particularly dose at thetime," especially in view of their shared diffidence regarding the strongties existing between France and Germany."

Political affinities also emerged in some of their discreet diplomaticmoves of those days. Fanfani's presumed secret offer to the US of with-drawing the Italian Jupiters may indeed be seen as somewhat similar towhat Macmillan had proposed to Kennedy on the phone that same Fridayevening, regarding the immobilization of the British Thors." Both propos-als originated from a desire to mediate and prevent a military escalationthat would have ended up involving the whole of Europe. It seems veryunlikely, however, that the two proposals had been coordinated by the twoleaders, particularly in light of their strict secrecy.

Even in this context of dose relations and complementary diplomaticgoals, however, Macmillan privately described the Italian reactions to theCuban crisis as 'windy'?? and the British Ambassador in Rome judged withseverity the test of reliability provided during the crisis by the Italiancentre-left, "The Cuban crisis', he wrote, 'has brought to the fore the dif-ferences existing between the parties in the Italian government coalitionand the Socialist Party on foreign policy.' The influence of the socialists'so far led to some restraint in words though not in action'i'" However, headded, 'the Cuban crisis was over so quickly ... that it scarcely provided areal test. '81 'In the event of a more prolonged crisis in an area nearerhome, e.g. Berlin, the government might find it difficult to adopt a firmline without forfeiting Socialist support. '82This, in turn, would probablylead, according to Ambassador Ward, to 'a government crisis' followed bythe formation of a 'centre-right government'.83 This was hardly an implaus-ible scenario because we now know that the possibility of such a crisis hadbeen seriously dìscussed."

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Conclusion

The effect of the Cuban missile crisis on Italian politics is of interest forwhat it can tell us about both the events and the characteristics of Italyitself. We have seen how the presence of NATO nuc1ear missiles on its soilmade Italy a target for retaliation, an ally to monitor, a subject of discus-sion for the leadership of both superpowers, and a possible pawn andactor in their negotiations. We have seen how the solution of the crisis ledto the removal of the missiles and how the Prime Minister later c1aimed tohave used them to play an active role as a peace mediator. The politicalsupport offered to the US was relatively half-hearted and focused on therecourse to the UN, rather than on military moves considered too danger-ous. Preserving peace was c1early the top priority of the Italian govern-ment, although serious personal and political rifts existed between thePrime Minister and the President of the Republic.

The Cuban crisis also constituted a key moment in the process of givingthe political 'green light' to the centre-Ieft formula. As for the mainopposition party, an isolated and confused PCI failed to organize success-fui demonstrations, while its leader Togliatti found himself criticizingKhrushchev in private and praising the Kremlin in public, also in thecontext of the Sino-Soviet split. Finally the UK, third nuc1ear power of thetime, appeared to judge severely Italian reactions to the crisis, as having'brought to the fore the differences existing between the parties'v" Notonly between but also within them, we may add.

In effect, what seems to emerge, as a generai aspect from the reactionsoutlined here is a characteristic tendency, deeply rooted in Italian history,to quarrel- even when a global nuc1ear war was at stake. Political tensions,fuelled by ideological divisions but also, in part, by domestic concerns andpower struggles, found new reasons in the ongoing Cuban crisis. Amomentous emergency that elsewhere (in the US, for instance) hadspurred to unity, here spelled more division." Debate transcended normaldivisions between parliamentary forces, as factions emerged even fromwithin parties, as we have seen happening here in ali of the three mainItalian forces of the time: DC, PCI, PSI. On the other hand, the Cubancrisis also underlined the Italian Government's genuine concern for themaintenance of peace and the dynamism of its foreign policy, as diplo-matic efforts were discretely made to contribute to a negotiated solutionof the confrontation.

Dynamism and division are two long-standing characteristics of Italianpolitical society, and the fact that they emerged also from the reactions tothe Cuban crisis provides a c1ear example of the relevance of adoptingsuch a historical perspective ../


NotesOn the reactions among the Christian-Dernocrats, see Leonardo Campus,'Missili e democristiani. Giorgio La Pira, la DC e la crisi dei missili di Cuba',Nuova Storia Contemporanea, 6 (2012). For a more detailed analysis of the ltalianreactions to the Cuban crisis, both from a political and a socio-cultural per-spective, see L. Campus, I sei giorni che sconvolsero il mondo. La crisi dei missili diCuba e le sue percezioni internazionali (Firenze: Le Monnier, forthcoming, 2014).Previous studies on the Italian reactions to the crisis were Ennio Di Nolfo,'L'ltalie et la crise de Cuba en 1962', in Maurice Vaisse (ed.), L'Europe et la crisede Cuba (Paris: Armand Colin 1993) pp. 109-22, and Leopoldo Nuti, 'L'Italie etles missilesJupiter', in ibid., pp. 123-57. See also Leopoldo Nuti, Gli Stati Unitie l'apertura a sinistra, (Bari: Laterza 1999) pp. 537-85. On the ltalian Jupiters,see Leopoldo Nuti, La sfida nucleare. La politica estera italiana e le armi atomiche1945-1991 (Bologna: Il Mulino 2007); Deborah Sorrenti, L Italia nella Guerrafredda. La storia dei missili Jupiter 1957-1963 (Roma: Edizioni Associate 2003)and Antonio Mariani, La 36" Aerobrigata Interdizione Strategica JuPiter' (Roma:Stato Maggiore Aeronautica, Ufficio Storico 2013).

2 Doubts had apparently been raised by the President of the Republic, GiovanniGronchi and the Chief of Staff of ltalian Arrny, Giorgio Liuzzi. On these aspectssee Nuti, La sfida nucleare, pp. 173-99. Among political forces, unsurprisinglythe Communist and the Socialist Party both opposed the deployment, but theycould not achieve much in order to prevent it, also because the operation waspurposely carried out in low profile by Fanfani's government ('almost as aroutine episode of military nature'). For a summary of the Parliamentarydebates on the issue, see Sorrenti, L Italia nella Guerra fredda, pp. 144-61. Thedecision to accept the missiles was defended by the Minister of Defence (andfuture President of the Republic) Antonio Segni. Atti Parlamentari, VerbaliCamera dei Deputati, Seduta del 30-9-1958, pp. 1863-71.

3 More accurately, the 30 IRBMS were stationed in ten different bases across thebackward, sparsely populated tableland area called Murgia: Acquaviva dellefonti, Altamura (two bases here), Gravina, Irisina, Laterza, Matera, Mottola,Spinazzola and Gioia del Colle (the main one). The deployment had beencompleted in the period betweenJuly 1960 andJune 1961. Nuti, La sfida nucle-are, pp. 200-1.

4 Ibid, p. 208; Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October. Eisenhower, Kennedy and theJupiter 1957-1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1997) p. 2.The threat they represented for these bases presumably forced the Soviets totarget them in turn with other missiles of their own, thus reducing the availablestriking capability of USSR against other areas.

5 'Air strike Pian' (NSA) quoted in Nuti, Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra,p. 539. Much less attention in those days was devoted to the British Thors,whose deployment and high state of readiness during the crisis are describedin Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, 'The Other Other Missiles of October: TheThor IRBMs and the Cuban Missile Crisis', Electronic Journal of InternationalHistory, 3 (2000).

6 Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow (eds), The Kennedy Tapes. Inside the WhiteHouse during the Cuban Missile Crisis (London: Harvard University Press 1997)p.143.

7 Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh (eds), The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. ANational Security Archive Documents Reader (New York: The New Press 1998)p.375.

8 Quoted in Nuti, Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra, p. 540. The procedure oflaunch involved the so-called dual key system, that by requiring both Italian

250 L. Campus

and US officers to subsequently insert the keys in their possession was meant togrant 'each government a physical veto over the launch", as has been writtenfor the similar procedure of the British Thors. The Jupiters were manned bythe Italian 36th Air Brigade together with around 350 US personne!. Nuti,'Italy and the Cuban Missile Crisis', in 'The Global Cuban missile crisis at 50',Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Bulletin, (Fall 2012) p. 672; Twiggeand Scott 'The Other Other Missiles of October'. As for the precautions takento avoid unauthorized launches, it is interesting to note that the PALS (Permis-sive Action Links) system ordered by Kennedy were with ali probability not yetactivated during the week of the Cuban crisis. Nuti, La sfida nucleare, p. 208.

9 Mariani, La 36" Aerobrigata, pp. 28, 299. Operatively this didn 't change much,as the missiles were always ready to launch in 15 minutes. However this ordermay possibly be seen as a political signal of firmness sent by NATO to Sovietintelligence. While this asserted shift in level awaits confirmation from NATOdocuments, it has been confirmed to this author by Marshal Mariani, who wasat the bases then (Interview with Mariani, 2013). It is worth noting that theTurkish missiles had also been placed 'on some higher leve! of alert thannorma!' (Nash, The Other Missiles, pp. 126,202).

lO May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, p. 564.11 Aiso because 'public awareness of Jupiter installation in Italy is, considering ali

circumstances, minirnal.' Rome to SoS, No. 936, October 26, 1962. DNSACU00763. (See also Nuti, Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra, pp. 541-2).

12 Quoted in Nuti, Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra, p. 543.13 Incidentally, it was not the first time during the Ex-Cornrn debates of those days

that the President seemed oblivious of some NATO circumstances. On 16October he even seemed to have forgotten the Turkish missile deploymentaltogether, a point much more relevant to keep in mind than the name of aForeign Minister. May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, pp. 99-100.

14 Ibid, p. 564. It is also worth noting that in the course of that meeting, as McNa-mara talks again about Turkey, Kennedy intervenes to say: 'Or ... and Italy,throw in Italy'. Sheldon M. Stern, Averting the Final Failure. John F Kennedy andthe Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2003)p.35l.

15 In this regard, it is significant of the implicit Iink existing between the twobases' withdrawals, the fact that - while neither of the two official memos byKennedy and Dobrynin on their meeting originally mentioned Italy - thiscountry appears in the account of the same episode in both Robert Kennedy'sbook, Thirteen Days (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1969) p. 82, and Khrush-chev's memoirs, Khrushchev Remembers. The Last Testament (New York: LittleBrown & Co. 1974) p. 512; Memoirs oJ Nikita Khrushcheu, Statesman, 1953-1964(Providence: Brown University 2007) p. 350. See also James Hershberg,'Anatomy of a Controversy: Anatoly F. Dobrynin's Meeting with Robert F.Kennedy Saturday 27 October 1962', Cold War International History Project Bul-letin, (Spring 1995).

16 Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam (New York:Oxford University Press 2000) p. 222.

17 This occurred on the occasion ofFanfani's visit to Washington. The denial onlyreferred to the fact of not having explicitly negotiated the bases with theSoviets, as the notes of the talks taken by both sides show. Here is the US gov-ernment account: "The Secretary [Dean Rusk] opened the discussion by assur-ing the Prime Minister [Fanfani] that during the period of peak danger overCuba no other topics had been discussed with the Soviets, nor had other topicsbeen raised following the Soviets' suggestion that the Cuban situation providedan opportunity for other negotiations' (Memo of Conversation, Jan. 16, 1963,

Italian political reactùms lo the CMC 251

inJFKL, NSF, Italy, Box 121). Here are Fanfani's own manuscript notes on thetalk: 'Kennedy e Mac Namara [sic] exclude to have negotiated with the USSRremoval [of] our bases. They say, however, that on October 28 they were afraidthat they might be bombed, provoking the nuclear retaliation of US.' (16Gennaio 1963, Diari Fanfani, Archivio Storico Senato della Repubblica: ASSR).

18 Rome to DoS,Jan. 17, 1963, DNSA, CC02859. Also see Nuti, 'L'Italie et les mis-silesJupiter', in Vaisse, L'Europeet la crisede Cuba, p. 153.

19 "The story has a certain aura of plausibility ... but unless any new evidence isfound, the story about an Italian proposal to swap the missiles must be regardedas apocryphal, as an attempt to play up the role played by Fanfani-and byBernabei himself-to ease the solution of the confrontation'. Nuti, 'Italy andthe Missile Crisis', in "The Global Missile Crisis at 50', CWIHP Bulletin. (Fall2012), p. 662.

20 See Roberto Ducci, I capintesta (Milano: Rusconi 1982) p. 146.21 26 October 1962, Diari Fanfani, ASSR. (The quotation, taken from the Segni-

Kissinger talk, is in Nuti, 'Italy and the Missile Crisis', p. 565.22 Telegram No. 712, 26-10-1962, 0.40 AM (US Eastern Time). Archivio Storico-

Diplomatico, MAE, Telegrammi Segreti, 1962, O.N.U., NewYork, VoI. Il.23 26 October, 1962, Diari Fanfani, ASSR.24 The first cali, 'a long talk' between Fanfani and Russo, occurred in the morning

and is reported by the press (La Giustizia, 27 October 1962, p. 1 'ColloquioFanfani-Russo'). The second cali is mentioned in Fanfani's diaries ('In theevening comes the news about a stiffening in the US position. I have a cali madeto the US and at half past midnight I learn that the stiffening is of the morningbut that now it's been reduced a bit.' 26 October 1962, Diari Fanfani, ASSR).

25 Fanfani, for instance, had already assigned him a most private talk with theSoviet ambassador Kozyrev in June 1962. See Pietro Neglie, La stagione deldisgelo: il Vaticano, l'Unione Sovietica e la stagione di centrosinistra in Italia1958-1963 (Siena: Cantagalli 2009) pp. 166-7.

26 Such naiveté often leads him to exaggerating the importance of some factors:in this case, the role of Fanfani's Italy and the Vatican in solving the Cubancrisis. Particularly in the last version of his account (Ettore Bernabei, L 'Italiadel miracolo e del futuro (Siena: Cantagalli 2012) pp. 121-8) where historicalinaccuracies increase, Bernabei presents Fanfani and PopeJohn XXIII almostas successfully opposing, alone, the machinations of unspecified internationalcircles of power willing to go to a world war. This, however, need not lead toconclude that ali his account of the episode must be considered as unreli-able, once inaccuracies have been filtered out by checking with othersources.

27 JFKL, Schlesinger Papers, Box 52 (White House Daily Schedules).28 2 November 1962, Memorandum for the President, 'Relations with the

Vatican', inJFKL, POF, Box 428.29 'Calendar for Saturday October 27' (meeting started at: 11.30 AM), JFKL, Sch-

lesinger Papers, Box 52.30 Giulio Andreotti, Gli USA visti da vicino (Milano: Rizzoli 1989) p. 55. (The ellip-

sis here does not indicate an omission in the quotation but is part of the text).Andreotti wrote again on this episode in an article about Pope John XXIII for. the catholic monthly magazine he directed (Trenta Giorni, April 2002). Heaffirmed there that 'there was ... an initiative by our President of the CouncilAmintore Fanfani, that I carne to learn just now in spite of being the Ministerof Defence then'. By saying this, Andreotti unintentionally contradicts himself,as he had already mentioned the episode in his book of 1989, explaining ofhaving learned it from McNamara a few weeks after the crisis. He thencontinues:

In order to correspond to the appeal by the Pope [for negotiations] - inthe last 24 hours left before the ultimatum of Washington [expired] -Fanfani instructed Bernabei, who was in the US for business reasons relatedto RAI, to communicate to Washington that ltaly was ready to have the mis-siles withdrawn from Gioia del Colle ... The swap between Italian-Turkishand Cuban-Soviet missiles was actually concluded, but I don't know whetherFanfani's idea was at the core of the agreement or added to it.

It must be specified that Bernabei only received the 'answer' to the proposal,he did not raise the idea himself, as he confirmed to us (Interview with Berna-bei: Campus-Nuti, 2009).

31 Correspondence with Andreotti (2009).32 Interview with Bernabei (Carnpus-Nuti, 2009).33 Interview with Bernabei (Carnpus-Nuti, 2009); Ettore Bernabei, L'uomo di

fiducia (Milano: Mondadori, 1999) p. 169.34 In 1983, Fanfani made a reference to this episode in a speech he gave at the

University of Chicago (see Il Tempo and Il Messaggero, 15 December 1987, p.4). Then again, in 1987 - when the ltalian magazine Il Mondo publishedextracts from the first released transcripts of the 27 October Ex-Cornrn tapes- in which the removal of the Italian bases was also discussed - Fanfani feltconfident to finally have some proof of his role, and issued a press statement,drafted by himself.

These revelations confirm that Fanfani was right, unlike thejournalists whotried to contradict him, when he recalled, in the past years, how the govern-ment that he presided had also contributed to avoid the clash of Cuba inOctober 1962, by agreeing with the US request to proceed at the withdrawalof ]upiter missiles placed in ltaly and by putting the USSR in condition torecede from the clash with the USA.

(ASSR, Carte Fanfani, Sez. I, Serie I, busta 71)

Nor does it appear to be irrelevant the presence, in his diaries, of the manu-script note that he inserted into the pages of 1963 regarding the ]upiter with-drawal, with the caption: ]upiter bases - see October 1962 Cuban crisis'. ltmight easily be seen as an indication to future scholars not to miss the causainexus between the two events (ASSR, Diari Fanfani).

35 Alternatively, the President himself might have received word of the ltalianoffer and Bernabei's presence from Stevenson during the long phone conver-sation that the two had on that Saturday morning, as recorded by the tapes(May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, p. 321; Sheldon M. Stern, The Week That TheWorld Stood Stili (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2005) p. 155. Unfortu-nately, in that phone conversation Kennedy listened most of the time, andStevenson's voice is not caught on tape. AIso, at a certain point of thatmeeting 'the recording suddenly cut off - probably because the backuprecorder ran out of tape' (Stern, The Week That the World Stood Stili, p. 155),preventing any potential mention of the ltalian offer or of Bernabei's pres-ence to be recorded.

36 A fourth, more implicit, confirmation of these initiatives might be found in thespeech delivered in the Italian Parliament by Attilio Piccioni. The ltalianForeign Minister affirmed in his official account of the crisis that during thattense week his government

has not stopped to strive .... The recurrent and constant contacts of Hon.Russo with Mr. U Thant have provided our encouragement for the concili-atory action he was taking and allowed us to follow closely alI the negoti-ation's phases. Furthermore, we have not failed to let the most directly

252 L. Campus


concerned parts receive our word, in order to facilitate the reaching of aconsensual solution.

(Atti parlamentari, Verbali della Camera dei Deputati, seduta del30-10-1962, pp. 35346-7)

This last sentence clearly is the one that leaves more space to speculation.37 Alessandro Salacone, L'Unione Sovietica e l'Italia del centro-sinistra (1958-1968),

PhD dissertation, p. 208 (citing Irina Chorma, SSSR - Italija i Blokovoe Pro-tivostojanie v Evrope, 2005, pp. 800-1).

38 See the letter from McNamara to Andreotti, 5 ]anuary. 1963: 'Dear Mr.Minister: You will recall that, during our conversation in Paris on December 13,I expressed the view that the ]upiter missiles should be replaced by moreeffective missiles now available .... ' Istituto Sturzo, Fondo Andreotti, Scritti ('GliUsa visti da vicino'), Busta 632.

39 Even more so considering the new evidence of a possibly more open attitude ofthe Turks provided at this very conference by Don Munton in Chapter 13.

40 Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight. Kennedy, Khrushcheo and Castro on theBrink oJNuclear War (New York: Random House 2008) p. 37.

41 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushcheu's Cold War. The Inside StoryoJ an American Adversary (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 2006) p. 434. Not ran-dornly, in the passage on Turkey of his letter to Kennedy, Khrushchev wascareful to note that 'our sentries patrol back and forth and see each other'.Mark J. White, Missiles in Cuba. Kennedy, Khrushcheo, Castro, and the 1962 Crisis(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee 1997) p. 135.

42 'The only piace that is truly comparable with Cuba is Turkey. This is the onlypiace where there are strategie weapons right on the frontier of the SovietUnion .... There are some in Italy. But Italy is not on the frontier of the SovietUnion.' Washington Post, 25 October, 1962. Walter Lippmann, 'Blockade pro-claimed'. On Khrushchev's interpretation ofLippmann's column, see Fursenkoand Naftali, Khrushcheu's Cold War, pp. 487-8, 616.

43 Il December 1962, Diari Fanfani, ASSR.44 After decades of silence and mutuai distrust between the Holy See and the

Kremlin,]ohn XXIII had been giving unprecedented, if prudent, signs of open-ings, that Moscow had somewhat reciprocated. An example was the greetingscard personally sent by Khrushchev to the Pope on the occasion of his 80thbirthday (November 1961), or the invitation sent out to delegates ofthe RussianOrthodox Church to attend the Vatican Council as observers, in that very monthof October 1962. Also, during the Cuban crisis the Papal public appeal for nego-tiations of 25 October would later be described by Khrushchev as 'a real ray oflìght', for which he was 'grateful'. Other openings would follow in the nextmonths. Norman Cousins, The Improbable Triumvirate. John F. Kennedy, PopeJohn,Nikita Khrushcheo (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1972) p. 45.

45 On these aspects see Nuti, Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra. Between 1961 and1963, the two American groups (pro and against the 'opening to the left')fought what Schlesinger would later describe as 'an endless struggle', 'a longand exasperating fìght', in which 'one felt entrapped as in a Kafka novel'.Arthur Schlesinger ]r., A Thousand Days. John Fitzgerald Kennedy in the WhiteHouse (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company 1965) pp. 878, 880.

46 Atti parlamentari, Verbali della Camera dei Deputati, Seduta pomeridiana del23-10-1962, pp. 34924-5.

47 Avanti!, 24 October 1962, p. l ('Nenni: Chiediamo un incontro K-K el'assemblea generale dell' ONU').

48 Nuti, Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra, p. 549 ('Informai tour d'horizon withPrime minister', 8 December 1962).

254 L. Campus

49 This results from severa I documents: Rome to DoS, Oct. 26, 1962 (in NARA,611.37, Reel 27); 'Our major European allies and the Cuban crisis' (in DNSA,CC01937); 'Italy's Center-Left government and the Cuban crisis' ('The PSI didresolutely refuse to take any joint action with the Italian Communist Party'. InJFKL, Schlesinger papers, WH, Box 12A).

50 'Nenni's November 4 Editoria!': unsigned and undated memo, containing thetext ofNenni's editorial on the party's newspaper (Avanti!, 4-11-1962, 'Ed ora,negoziare un accordo generale'), plus the American comment to it and theTASS bulletin with the English translation of the Pravda artici e (13 November1962). JFKL, Schlesinger Papers, WH, Box 12-A. Pravda's criticism of the PSIwas significant also because the Soviet press usually treated the Italian Socialists'with more respect than their counterparts in West Germany or France', as aBritish document remarked. Moscow to F.O., FO 371/163716, UK TheNational Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA).

51 Nenni explained to them that 'at beginning generai impression was createdU.S. was using bases as pretext to invade, especially in view of abortive attemptto land Cuban exiles last year', adding that 'there was also genuine fear amongpeople of outbreak of nuclear war'. After having quickly realized himself 'thatreal aggressor was not U.S.', 'in the first few days of crisis he was unable con-vince colleagues of real culprit. In any case he would see to it that originai"error of judgment" ... was gradually corrected'. Rome to DoS, 'Nenni's viewon political situation', 19 November 1962, in JFKL, Schlesinger Papers, WhiteHouse Files, Box 12-A.

52 Nuti, Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra, p. 553.53 This is also the view of the historians Ennio Di Nolfo and Leopoldo Nuti. The

first described the Cuban crisis as the 'definitive leap', the latter described it as'the decisive proof to test the solidity of the centre-Ieft government'. Di Nolfo,Nuti, in Vaisse, L'Europe et la crise de Cuba, pp. 120, 156.

54 May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, pp. 207, 214.55 22 October 1962, Diari Fanfani, ASSR.56 23 October 1962, Diari Fanfani, ASSR. Fanfani's papers also contain the text of

such letters. Here is Macmillan's:

I have received the message from the President about the situation inCuba .... This affair seems to me to have very grave implications. I would begrateful if you would let me know your thoughts .... I thought it right toassure President Kennedy that we would give him full support in theSecurity Council but at the same time to point out some of the obviousrepercussions which may follow both in Caribbean and possibly in Europe.We must surely keep in the closest touch.

Fanfani's reply to Macmillan:

I share your concerns about the very serious implications that this affair mayhave. Italy today is not part of the Security Council and for the momentmust confine to wish that a peaceful solution will be found within il. Wemust not lose time in order to avoid dangerous repercussions.

(Carte Fanfani, ASSR, Sez. I, Serie I, Sottoserie 4, Busta 14, Fasc.1)

57 'Differences existing between the parties in the Italian Government coalition &the Socialist Party on foreign policy, emphasized by the Cuban crisis', Rome toF.O., 21-11-1962. FO 371/163714, TNA. In this regard, it is also worth notingthat such emphasis on the UN in phrasing the national line of reaction to theUS policy was similar to the position adopted by the Australian government, asshown in detail in Laura Stanley's Chapter Il in this book.

58 Nuti, Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra, p. 547.


59 This highly revealing detail is to be found in the first draft of the letter, con-taining the following red caption on the top corner of the page: 'Text submit-ted to the Head ofState and revised'. Carte Fanfani, Box11, Fase. 10.2, ASSR

60 Fanfani toJFK, Oct. 23,1962, inJFKL, POF, Box 119 (Italy).61 See the 25 October cable from Ambassador Ward to London and the answer

sent back from the F.O. the same evening: PREM 11/3690, MF R37, TNA.62 On these talks, see Telegrams No. 714, 722, Archivio Storico-Diplomatico,

MAE, Telegrammi Segreti, 1962, O.N.U., NewYork, VoI. II.63 According to Segni:

While France, West Germany, Great Britain, and the U.S. having strongleaders, Italy is led by a man, whose lack of courage and whose ambiguousattitude is taking her away from her allies toward an unrealistic and danger-ous neutralism .... A typical example of Fanfani 's unreliability was his declar-ation at the height of the Cuban crisis when he merely said that Italysupported the view that the issue should be referred to the United Nations.While under the law, Fanfani was free to issue such a statement withoutclearing it first with the President of the Republic, courtesy and commonsense certainly required that he consult with Segni. That Fanfani did not soshowed that he realized fully that Segni would not have approved of so weakstatement at so crucial a momento

(Segni's view on the Italian political situation', December 31,1962, CIASecret - Telegram Information report, inJFKL, NSF, Italy, Box 121)

64 'Italian reactions to the Cuban crisis', 28 November 1962, inJFKL, SchlesingerPapers, vVHFiles, Box 12A, (ltaly).

65 Rome to DoS, 25 October 1962, No. 932. In DNSA, CU00721.66 Italian Ambassador to Paris, Manlio Brosio, noted in his private diaries the

content of the talk he had on 24 October: 'Cattani [Generai Secretary ofForeign Affairs Ministry] does not exclude a government crisis in Italy if theinternational crisis aggravates.' Manlio Brosio, Diari di Parigi, 1961-1964(Bologna: Il Mulino 2009) p. 254.

67 Rome to DoS, 'Informai tour d'horizon with Prime Minister', 8 December1962, inJFKL.

68 Relation of Mario Alicata to the PCI Board of Directors, 31 October 1962.Onofrio Pappagallo, Il PCI e la rivoluzione cubana: 'la via latino-americana al social-ismo' tra Mosca e Pechino (1959-1965) (Roma: Carocci 2009) p. 183. However, inone of the few demonstrations organized in Milan (by the leftist trade unionCGIL), on 27 October, a student, named Giovanni Ardizzone, was killed by anItalian Police jeep used to disperse the crowd. A generai strike and a wave ofprotests followed. See for instance Avanti!, 28 October 1962, pp. l, lO; l'Unità,30 October 1962, p. 1.

69 So Pappagallo defines it, as he quotes from the records of that meeting. Pappa-gallo, Il PCI e la rivoluzione cubana, pp. 181-91.

70 Togliatti remarked that 'the limits of the movement are evident ... in manycities nothing or almost nothing has been done, just some leaflets.' Ibid.,p.184.

71The Soviet Union has punctually accomplished the duty that is entitled toher as great Socialist power. It has defended the independence of a smallpeople, that the American imperialism would like to subjugate; ... at thesame time it acted with extreme sense of realism and responsibility, neverlosing sight of the fact that the gravest problem of our days is to avoid a war.Rinascita, 3 November 1962, pp. 1-2 (Palmiro Togliatti, 'Potenza socialista,

potenza di pace')

256 L. Campus

72 In the record of that Party meeting one can find Togliatti's 'impression that wedon't know everything' about the reasons of Moscow's conduct in the crisis(Pappagallo, Il PCI e la rivoluzione cubana, p. 184).

73 Luciano Barca, Cronache dall'interno del vertice del PCI - Vol. I (Catanzaro: Rub-bettino 2005) pp. 303-4. See also Carlo Spagnolo, Sul memoriale di Yalta (Roma:Carocci 2007) p. 244.

74 l'Unità, 3 December 1962, p. 4 ('Intervento di Togliatti').75 ABC, December 1962, p. 14 (Renata Pisu, 'I cinesi attaccano Togliatti'). On the

Sino-Soviet ideological dispute about the Cuban crisis, see also Lorenz Luthi,The Sino-Sooiet Split (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2008) pp. 224-8, 231,252-4; Pappagallo, Il PCI e la rivoluzione cubana, pp. 70-1; Silvio Pons, La rivoluz-ione globale. Storia del comunismo internazionale 1917-1991 (Torino: Einaudi,2012) p. 30!.

76 Evidence of this emerged on both sides. Italian Foreign Minister Piccioni, justafter the crisis had eased, affirmed in the Parliament that 'Italian-British friend-ship has perhaps never been more intense and solid than today' (Atti parlam-entari, Verbali Camera dei Deputati, Seduta del 30-10-1962, p. 35344);Ambassador Ward, on his part, a few weeks later reported to London that 'theAnglo/ltalian relations were excellent throughout the year' (Rome to F.O.,11-2-1963 'Italy: Annual report for 1962', FO 371/169339, TNA).

77 Besides the differences on Cold War policy (Fanfani's line was more open tothe USSR, while De Gaulle and Adenauer's were more anti-Soviet), Italy wasafraid of the strong French-German ties also for continental reasons. In aEurope formed by only six countries without the UK, Italy would have riskedbeing left at the mercy of Paris and Bonn, ending up counting for no morethan the Benelux countries: hence the Italian support to the British accessionto the ECC, strongly opposed instead by De Gaulle. Also, on a personal level,as Ambassador Ward noted, 'Fanfani makes no secret of his dislike and dis-trust of GeneraI De Gaulle' (Rome to F.O., 'Italy: Annual report for1962',TNA).

78 On this British offer, proposing to temporarily immobilize the Thor missilesin exchange for a Soviet stop to the work on their Cuban bases, so to convenea summit, see L.V. Scott, Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Polit-ical, Military and Intelligence Aspects (London: Macmillan Press 1999)pp. 158-9.

79 It should be considered, however, that his note was not kind to any of the othercountries it mentioned: the French, he said, 'were anyway contemptuous; theGermans very frightened, though pretending to want firmness; the Italianswindy; the Scandinavians rather sour. But they said and did nothing to spoilthe American playing of the hand' (Scott, Macmillan, Kennedy and the CubanMissile Crisis, p. 181).

80 That is, modifying not the international position of Italy, but the language inwhich it was expressed, avoiding anti-Soviet tones and underlining the import-ance of negotiations.

81 TNA: Rome to F.O., 21-11-1962, 'Differences existing between the parties inthe ltalian Government coalition & the Socialist Party on foreign policy,emphasized by the Cuban crisis'. FO 371/163714.

82 TNA: Rome to F.O., 11-2-1963 'ltaly: Annual report for 1962', FO 371/169339.83 TNA: Rome to F.O., 21-11-1962, 'Differences existing between the parties in

the Italian Government coalition & the Socialist Party on foreign policy,emphasized by the Cuban crisis'. FO 371/163714.

84 As has been shown here, President Segni was angry against Fanfani, while hisparty fellows mentioned plans to move 'to torpedo government' (see above).

85 See Rome to F.O., 'Differences existing between the parties'.


86 On the US reactions to the Cuban crisis, see Alice George, Awaiting Armaged-don. How Amencans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press 2003) and the US chapter from Campus, I sei giorni chesconvolsero il mondo.