REPUBLIC ACT No. 4200AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE
TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF
COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.Section 1.It shall be
unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone
or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described:It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a
participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof,
of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after
the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this
law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or
to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to
any other person:Provided, That the use of such record or any
copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or
trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be
covered by this prohibition.Section 2.Any person who willfully or
knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of
the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who
violates the provisions of the following section or of any order
issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation
shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not
less than six months or more than six years and with the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office
if the offender be a public official at the time of the commission
of the offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be
subject to deportation proceedings.Section 3.Nothing contained in
this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any
peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court,
to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two
preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason,
espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy,
mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to
commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the
Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616,
punishing espionage and other offenses against national
security:Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or
granted upon written application and the examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a
showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any
of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being
committed or is about to be committed:Provided, however, That in
cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal
to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to
commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be
granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition,
as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2)
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be
obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the
solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3)
that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such
evidence.The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the
identity of the person or persons whose communications,
conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard,
intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or
telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the telephone
number involved and its location; (2) the identity of the peace
officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the
communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3)
the offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and
(4) the period of the authorization. The authorization shall be
effective for the period specified in the order which shall not
exceed sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order,
unless extended or renewed by the court upon being satisfied that
such extension or renewal is in the public interest.All recordings
made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours
after the expiration of the period fixed in the order, be deposited
with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be
accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such
authority stating the number of recordings made, the dates and
times covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or
records included in the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates
or copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made, or if
made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the
envelope or package deposited with the court. The envelope or
package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings
replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents revealed, except
upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon
motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person
or persons whose conversation or communications have been
recorded.The court referred to in this section shall be understood
to mean the Court of First Instance within whose territorial
jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be
executed.Section 4.Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained
obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding
sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.Section 5.All laws inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly amended.Section
6.This Act shall take effect upon its approval.Approved: June 19,
1965
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND
DIVISIONG.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986EDGARDO A.
GAANAN,petitioner,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:This petition for
certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No.
4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of
whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited
devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a
private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line.The
facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent
court's decision are not disputed by the petitioner.In the morning
of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client
Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence
discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu
against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed
conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn,
August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).That same morning, Laconico telephoned
appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on
the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular
lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to
the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was
briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp.
4-5).When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to
secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone
extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following
conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.(a)
the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had
been increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been
made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer
for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in
persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault
against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;(b)
Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of
Don Bosco Technical High School;(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the
Don Bosco Faculty club;(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to
another school or another section of Don Bosco Technical High
School;(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the
Maltreatment case earlier filed against Manuel Montebon at the Cebu
City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of desistance on
the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed
later;(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don
Bosco Technical School;(g) Not to divulge the truth about the
settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;(h)
P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981,
pp. 47-48).Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask
Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered
'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on
where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp.
2-12).Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give
the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of
Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel
Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine
Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the
money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he received the money
at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.Appellant executed on the following day an
affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for
the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached
the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion
which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the
telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the
Anti-Wiretapping Act.After trial on the merits, the lower court, in
a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico
guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two
were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not
satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the
appellate court.On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate
Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the
communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was
private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200;
that the petitioner overheard such communication without the
knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension
telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the
telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered
in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.In this
petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the
appellate court and raises the following issues; (a) whether or not
the telephone conversation between the complainant and accused
Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension
telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep.
Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to
listen or overhear said telephone conversation and (d) whether or
not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be
construed in favor of the petitioner.Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200
provides:Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device
or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:It shall be unlawful
for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts
penalized in the next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any
tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or
copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either
before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person
or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally
or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether
complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, that the use of
such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil,
criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3
hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.We rule for the
petitioner.We are confronted in this case with the interpretation
of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence. The issue is not the
admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a
telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person
called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the
conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences
simply because the extension was used to enable them to both listen
to an alleged attempt at extortion.There is no question that the
telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused
Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered
were made between one person and another as distinguished from
words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that
only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen
to and overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension
telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the
Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for an
P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a
direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu
City Fiscal's Office if he knew that another lawyer was also
listening. We have to consider, however, that affirmance of the
criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely
using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter
how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the
word of the caller against the listener's.Because of technical
problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and
the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in
certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called
"crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his
telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate
to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused
under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear
the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the
law was never intended for such mischievous results.The main issue
in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the
meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an
extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would
subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six
years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an alien?
Private secretaries with extension lines to their bosses'
telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording
devices to record business conversations between a boss and another
businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of
the boss be a proscribed offense? or for that matter, would a
"party line" be a device or arrangement under the law?The
petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not
included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or
recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of
enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains
that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was
being considered in the Senate, telephones and extension telephones
were already widely used instruments, probably the most popularly
known communication device.Whether or not listening over a
telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor
of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no
mention was made of telephones in the enumeration of devices
"commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or
walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described." The
omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were
intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.The respondent
People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by
the term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law
because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a
telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a
movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone
receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which can be
detached or removed and can be transferred away from one place to
another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to
get the desired communication corning from the other party or
end.The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a
"device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either
a physical interruption through a wiretap or
thedeliberateinstallation of a device or arrangement in order to
overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.An extension
telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,
dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No.
4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire
or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case
was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there
for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction
that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the
particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken
as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part
thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern,
Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).In the case ofEmpire Insurance Com any v.
Rufino(90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:Likewise, Article 1372 of
the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of a
contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things
that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon
which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of
the same Code provides that 'the various stipulations of a contract
shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones
that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.xxx xxx
xxxConsequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the
decedent' used in paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should be then restricted
only to those listed in the Inventory and should not be construed
as to comprehend all other obligations of the decedent. The rule
that 'particularization followed by a general expression will
ordinarily be restricted to the former' is based on the fact in
human experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed
specially to the particularization, and that the generalities,
though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone,
are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the
parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co.,
134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of
Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).Hence, the phrase "device
or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive
to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend
instruments ofthe same or similar nature, that is, instruments the
use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a
telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence
cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because,
by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their
purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a
telephone conversation.An extension telephone is an instrument
which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not
have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved
from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A
person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the
other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he
runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a
partyline or a telephone unitwhich shares its line with another. As
was held in the case ofRathbun v. United States(355, U.S. 107, 2 L
Ed 2d 137-138):Common experience tells us that a call to a
particular telephone number may cause the bell to ring in more than
one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone
conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an
extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the
conversation. When such takes place there has been no violation of
any privacy of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one
element of 605, interception, has not occurred.In the same case,
the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ
in no way if instead of repeating the message he held out his
hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no
distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider
to use an extension telephone for the same purpose.Furthermore, it
is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in
favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar,
on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase
"device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not
including an extension telephone. In the case ofPeople v. Purisima,
86 SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the
rule:American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to
be the tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the
object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which
mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.
(United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609;
Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224
Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE 1080,
all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The purpose is not to enable a
guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to
provide a precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro,
20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's Handbook on Statutory Construction,
Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).In the same case ofPurisima, we also ruled
that on the construction or interpretation of a legislative
measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent
and spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional
Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate
the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited device or
arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more concerned
with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely
listening to a telephone conversation.xxx xxx xxxSenator Taada.
Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is certainly
objectionable. It is made possible by special amendment which Your
Honor may introduce.Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that
entrapment would be less possible with the amendment than without
it, because with the amendment the evidence of entrapment would
only consist of government testimony as against the testimony of
the defendant. With this amendment, they would have the right, and
the government officials and the person in fact would have the
right to tape record their conversation.Senator Taada. In case of
entrapment, it would be the government.Senator Diokno. In the same
way, under this provision, neither party could record and,
therefore, the court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more
credible, the police officers or the defendant?" In these cases, as
experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with the peace
offices.(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12,
1964).xxx xxx xxxSenator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that
under these conditions, with an agent outside listening in, he
could falsify the testimony and there is no way of checking it. But
if you allow him to record or make a recording in any form of what
is happening, then the chances of falsifying the evidence is not
very much.Senator Taada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to
prevent the presentation of false testimony. If we could devise a
way by which we could prevent the presentation of false testimony,
it would be wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is
the use of tape record and other electronic devices to intercept
private conversations which later on will be used in
court.(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p.
629).It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to
discourage, through punishment, persons such as government
authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing
devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to
intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the
telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order
to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated
devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the
view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or
arrangements.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of
the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the
Anti-Wiretapping Act.SO ORDERED.Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay
and Paras, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995SOCORRO D.
RAMIREZ,petitioner,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S.
GARCIA,respondents.KAPUNAN,J.:A civil case damages was filed by
petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy."1In support of her claim,
petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in
the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and
other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.2The transcript
reads as follows:Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good
Afternoon M'am.Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari
sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka
na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.CHUCHI Kasi, naka
duty ako noon.ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero
ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon ESG Ito and (sic)
masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang
10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik
sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung
kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka
sa akin makakahingi.CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon
i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.ESG Bastos ka,nakalimutan mo na
kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung
gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you
think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan
na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang
duty ko.ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no
(sic) ko.ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel,
kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo.
Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.CHUCHI Kumuha kami
ng exam noon.ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang
nakuha ni Dr. TamayoESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.CHUCHI Eh, di sana ESG
Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasiwala kang utak. Akala mo
ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.ESG
Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung
paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng
nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.ESG Wala na akong pakialam,
dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok,
okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan
ako ng mga taga Union.ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong
kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo
kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.CHUCHI Ina-ano
ko m'am na utang na loob.ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob,
kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.CHUCHI Paano kita
nilapastanganan?ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako
makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.3As a result of
petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes." An information charging
petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is
quoted herewith:INFORMATIONThe Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal
Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200,
committed as follows:That on or about the 22nd day of February,
1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused,
Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to
record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape
recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter
communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other
person.Contrary to law.Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16,
1988.MARIANO M. CUNETAAsst. City FiscalUpon arraignment, in lieu of
a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the
trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner
that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A.
4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a
the taping of a communication by a personotherthan a participant to
the communication.4From the trial court's Order, the private
respondent filed a Petition for Review onCertiorariwith this Court,
which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.On February 9,
1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision
declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and
holding that:[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the
information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not
constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of
discretion correctible bycertiorari.5Consequently, on February 21,
1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution6dated June 19,
1990. Hence, the instant petition.Petitioner vigorously argues, as
her "main and principal issue"7that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She
contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized
taping of a private conversation by a party other than those
involved in the communication.8In relation to this, petitioner
avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be
alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not
constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9Finally, petitioner agues that
R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a
"private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly
taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal
under the said act.10We disagree.First, legislative intent is
determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to its express terms, and interpretation would be
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible11or absurb or would lead to an injustice.12Section 1 of
R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes," provides:Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person,
not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept,
or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.The
aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal
for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those involved in the private communication.
The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
"even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator"13under this provision of R.A. 4200.A
perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our
lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either
by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:xxx xxx
xxxSenator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".Senator Padilla:
So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy
would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the
recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and
involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3
but would cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings
whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but
perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties
because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even
subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their
intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your
Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this
bill or outside?Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of
this bill, Your Honor.Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be
used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used
in Civil Cases or special proceedings?Senator Taada: That is right.
This is acomplete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without
the authorization of all the parties.Senator Padilla: Now, would
that be reasonable, your Honor?Senator Taada: I believe it is
reasonable becauseit is not sporting to record the observation of
one without his knowing it and then using it against him.It is not
fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to
record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties
should know that the observations are being recorded.Senator
Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.Senator Taada:
Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of
directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to
this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose
remarks and observations are being made should know that the
observations are being recorded.Senator Padilla: Now, I can
understand.Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of
persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever you say here may
be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand.
Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements against
his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more.But if you are
going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a
person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded,
without him knowing that what is being recorded may be used against
him, I think it is unfair.xxx xxx xxx(Congression Record, Vol. III,
No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)Senator Diokno: Do you understand,
Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded,if a
party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under
Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done
secretly.Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not
contemplated by the bill.It is the communication between one person
and another person not between a speaker and a public.xxx xxx
xxx(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12,
1964)xxx xxx xxxThe unambiguity of the express words of the
provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from
the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held
by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even
those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.Second, the nature of the
conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretlyoverhearing, intercepting or recordingprivate
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the
Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent
court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one
can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as
well as its communication to a third person should be
professed."14Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase
"private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes
from the latin wordcommunicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In
its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act
of sharing or imparting, as in aconversation,15or signifies the
"process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs
or gestures)"16These definitions are broad enough to include verbal
or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or
thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about
the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the
terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used
by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted
below:It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear
from theirconversationsbeing overheard. But this statement ignores
the usual nature ofconversationsas well the undeniable fact that
most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives
they do not wish to expose. Freeconversationsare often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods,
and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to
be taken seriously. The right to theprivacy of communication, among
others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to
state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized
the nature ofconversationsbetween individuals and the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions
of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange
ofcommunicationbetween individuals free from every unjustifiable
intrusion by whatever means.17InGaanan vs.Intermediate Appellate
Court,18a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping,
we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of
overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not
violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither
among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated
therein,19following the principle that "penal statutes must be
construed strictly in favor of the accused."20The instant case
turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and
circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the
unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of
tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.WHEREFORE, because the
law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and
leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
G.R. No. 121087 August 26, 1999FELIPE NAVARRO,petitioner,vs.THE
COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.MENDOZA,J.:This is a petition for review
oncertiorariof the decision1of the Court of Appeals, dated December
14, 1994, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 5, Lucena City, dated July 27, 1992, finding petitioner
Felipe Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and
sentencing him to ten (10) years ofprision mayor, as minimum, and
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, and (1) day ofreclusion
temporal, as maximum, but increased the death indemnity awarded to
the heirs of the victim, Enrique "Ike" Lingan, from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00.The information against petitioner alleged That on or
about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the City
of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then
a member of the Lucena Integrated National Police, with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault one Ike Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters, where
authorities are supposed to be engaged in the discharge of their
duties, by boxing the said Ike Lingan in the head with the butt of
a gun and thereafter when the said victim fell, by banging his head
against the concrete pavement, as a consequence of which said Ike
Lingan suffered cerebral concussion and shock which directly caused
his death.The evidence show that, at around 8:40 in the evening of
February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who
were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together
with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following
reports that it was showing the nude dancers. After the three had
seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad
dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she
removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a
picture.2At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a
security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to
know why he took a picture.3Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam,
because this is my job."4Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as
he warned the latter that he would kill him.5When Jalbuena saw that
Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint
followed by his companions.6Jalbuena and his companions went to the
police station to report the matter. Three of the policeman on
duty, including petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of
the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to
join them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt.
Aonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco
arrived on a motorcycle.7Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner
Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen
minutes.8Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and,
pushing him to the wall, said to him: "Putang ina, kinakalaban mo
si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba
kilala?"9Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked
it, and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said "Ano, uutasin na
kita?"10At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner
Navarro: "Huwag namang ganyan pumarito kami para magpa-blotter, I
am here to mediate."11Petitoner Navarro replied: "Walang press,
press, mag-sampu pa kayo."12He then turned to Sgt. Aonuevo and told
him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan.13This
angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo diyan"14Petitioner
Navarro retorted: "Talagang ilalagay ko."15The two then had a
heated exchange.16Finally, Lingan said: "Masyado kang abusado,
alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo."17Petitioner
Navarro replied: "Ah, ganoon?"18As Lingan was about turn away,
petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of the pistol above the
left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his
face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist
blow on the forehead which floored him.19Petitioner Navarro turned
to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike
Lingan and naghamon."20He said to Sgt. Aonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan sa
blotter sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan
ang naghamon."21He then poked his gun at the right temple of
Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the blotter.22Jalbuena could
not affix his signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply
wrote his name in print.23Capt. Coronado, the station commander,
called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a policeman took
Lingan to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of
DWTI, Boy, Casaada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been
taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his
injuries.24Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to
record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the
deceased.25The following is an excerpt from the tape
recording:Lingan: Pare, you are abusing yourself.Navarro: Who is
that abusing?Lingan: I'm here to mediate. Do not include me in the
problem. I'm out of the problem.x x x x x x x x xNavarro: Wala sa
akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . .Lingan: Kalaban mo ang media, pare,
Ako at si Stanley, dalawa kami. Okay. Do not fight with me. I just
came here to ayusin things. Do not say bad things against me. I'm
the number one loko sa media. I'm the best media man. . . .Navarro:
Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong mag-takotan!
Huwag mong sabihing loko ka!Lingan: I'm brave also.Navarro: Ay lalo
na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka namang masasabi sa akin
dahil nag-tatrabaho lang ako ng ayon sa serbisyo ko.Lingan: You are
challenging me and him. . . .Navarro: Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag
may problema ka dito sinasabihan kita na may balita tayong maganda.
Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang minomonopoly
mo eh.Lingan: Pati ako kalaban ninyo.Navarro: Talagang kalaban
namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang ikaw!Lingan: You are wrong.
Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?Navarro: Pulis ito! Aba!Lingan: Alisin
mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan tayo,
sige.Navarro: Mayabang ka ah!(Sounds of a scuffle)Navarro: Hinamon
ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan, testigo
kayo. Alisin ko daw ang baril ko. Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo
diyan, hinamon ako sa harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon ako.
Pulis tayo eh. Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa
harap ni Alex, ni Joe, ni Stanley, hinamon ako. Pare, hinamon ako,
kinig nyo ha. Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital
yan.Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who
tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner) was able to duck both
times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice,
each time hitting his head on the concrete.26In giving credence to
the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated:After a
thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and the defense, this court finds that the evidence for
the prosecution is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to
create that moral certainty in the mind of the court that accused
herein is criminally responsible.The defense's evidence which
consists of outright denial could not under the circumstance
overturn the strength of the prosecution's evidence.This court
finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly Stanley
Jalbuena, lacked any motive to make false accusation, distort the
truth, testify falsehood or cause accusation of one who had neither
brought him harm or injury.Going over the evidence on record,
thepostmortemreport issued by Dra. Eva Yamamoto confirms the
detailed account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan sustained
head injuries.Saidpost-mortemreport together with the testimony of
Jalbuena sufficiently belie the claim of the defense that the head
injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by the latter's falling
down on the concrete pavement head first.The Court of Appeals
affirmed:We are far from being convinced by appellant's aforesaid
disquisition. We have carefully evaluated the conflicting versions
of the incident as presented by both parties, and we find the trial
court's factual conclusions to have better and stronger evidentiary
support.In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself
a victim of appellant's aggression does not impair the probative
worth of his positive and logical account of the incident in
question. In fact, far from proving his innocence, appellant's
unwarranted assault upon Jalbuena, which the defense has virtually
admitted, clearly betrays his violent character or disposition and
his capacity to harm others. Apparently, the same motivation that
led him into assailing Jalbuena must have provoked him into also
attacking Lingan who had interceded for Jalbuena and humiliated him
and further challenged to a fist fight.1wphi1.ntx x x x x x x x xOn
the other hand, appellant's explanation as how Lingan was injured
is too tenuous and illogical to be accepted. It is in fact
contradicted by the number, nature and location of Lingan's
injuries as shown in thepost-mortemreport (Exh. D). According to
the defense, Lingan fell two times when he was outbalanced in the
course of boxing the appellant. And yet, Lingan suffered lacerated
wounds in his left forehead, left eyebrow, between his left and
right eyebrows, and contusion in the right temporal region of the
head (Exh. E.). Certainly, these injuries could not have been
resulted from Lingan's accidental fall.Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner Navarro contends:THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. ITS CONCLUSION IS A FINDING BASED
ON SPECULATION, SURMISE OR CONJECTURE; THE INFERENCE IT MADE IS
MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE; IT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION; ITS JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS;
ITS FINDING IS CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD; AND ITS FINDING
IS DEVOID OF SUPPORT IN THE RECORD.The appeal is without
merit.First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the
testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased witness,
having a grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has an
interest in the conviction of the accused is not, for this reason
alone, unreliable.27Trial courts, which have the opportunity
observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a
witness while testifying, are competent to determine whether his or
her testimony should be given credence.28In the instant case,
petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in
according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena.Indeed, Jalbuena's
testimony is confirmed by the voice recording had made. It may be
asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200,
which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The
law provides:Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device
or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as
dictaphone or dictagraph of dectectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:It shall also be
unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or
acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess
any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in
the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any
other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof,
either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions
thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:Provided,
That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in
any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in
section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.x x x x
x x x x xSec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained
obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding
sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing,
intercepting, or recording of private communications.29Since the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its
tape recording is not prohibited.Nor is there any question that it
was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the
testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the
conversations; (2) that the tape played in the court was the one he
recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the
persons such are claimed to belong.30In the instant case, Jalbuena
testified that he personally made the voice recording;31that the
tape played in the court was the one he recorded;32and that the
speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan.33A
sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the
tape presented by the prosecution.Second. The voice recording made
by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police
blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some
form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan,
with the latter getting the worst of it.Furthermore, Dr. Eva
Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body of Lingan, issued
the medical certificate,34dated February 5, 1990, containing the
following findings:Post MortemFindings:= Dried blood, forehead
& face= No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth=
Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right= Lacerated
wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral eyebrow, Left=
Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between the left
& right eyebrow= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in
depth, forehead, Left= Cyanosis of the tips of fingers &
toesCAUSE OF DEATH:= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK= BLOW ON THE
HEADDr. Yamamato testified:Q Give your opinion as to what was the
possible cause of this findings number one, which is oozing of
blood from the forehead?A It may be due to a blow on the forehead
or it bumped to a hard object, sir.Q Could a metal like a butt of a
gun have caused this wound No. 1.?A It is possible, sir.Q And in
the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping on a concrete
floor?A Possible, sir.FISCAL:What could have been the cause of the
contusion and swelling under your findings No. 2 doctor?WITNESS:It
may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.Q Could a butt of a
gun have caused it doctor?A The swelling is big so it could have
not been caused by a butt of a gun because the butt of a gun is
small, sir.Q How about this findings No. 4?A By a bump or contact
of the body to a hard object, sir.Q And findings No. 5 what could
have caused it?A Same cause, sir.Q This findings No. 6 what could
have caused this wound?A Same thing sir.Q How about the last
finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers and toes, what could have
caused it doctor?WITNESS:It indicates there was cardiac failure,
sir.FISCAL:In this samepost mortemreport and under the heading
cause of death it states: Cause of Death: Cerebral concussion and
Shock, will you explain it?A Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog
"naalog ang utak" or jarring of the brain, sir.Q What could have
been the cause of jarring of the brain?A It could have been caused
by a blow of a hard object, sir.Q What about the shock, what could
have caused it?A It was due to peripheral circulatory failure,
sir.Q Could any one of both caused the death of the victim?A Yes,
sir.Q Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death of the
deceased?A May be, sir.FISCAL:Which of these two more likely, to
cause death?WITNESS:Shock, sir.Q Please explain further the meaning
of the medical term shock?A It is caused by peripheral circulatory
failure as I have said earlier sir.x x x x x x x x xFISCAL:Could a
bumping or pushing of one's head against a concrete floor have
caused shock?WITNESS:Possible, sir.How about striking with a butt
of a gun, could it cause shock?A Possible, sir.35The above
testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner
Navarro hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left
eyebrow and struck him on the forehead with his fist.Third. It is
argued that the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation
or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding
the act should have been appreciated in favor of petitioner
Navarro. Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper
conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting
or irritating anyone.36The provocation must be sufficient and
should immediately precede the act.37To be sufficient, it must be
adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must
accordingly be proportionate in gravity.38And it must immediately
precede the act so much so that there is no interval between the
provocation by the offended party and the commission of the crime
by the accused.39In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which
immediately preceded the act of petitioner, constituted sufficient
provocation. InPeople v.Macaso,40we appreciated this mitigating
circumstance in favor of the accused, a policeman, who shot a
motorist after the latter had repeatedly taunted him with defiant
words. Hence, this mitigating circumstance should be considered in
favor of petitioner Navarro.Furthermore, the mitigating
circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave
a wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in favor of
petitioner. The frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after
the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him shows that he had
no intent to kill the latter. Thus, this mitigating circumstance
should be taken into account in determining the penalty that should
be imposed on petitioner Navarro. The allowance of this mitigating
circumstance is consistent with the rule that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.41InPeople v.Castro,42the mitigating circumstance of lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed was
appreciated in favor of the accused while finding him guilty of
homicide.However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a
crime in a place where the public authorities are engaged in the
discharge of their duties should be appreciated against petitioner
Navarro. The offense in this case was committed right in the police
station where policemen were discharging their public
functions.43The crime committed as found by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals was homicide, for which the penalty under Art. 249
of the Revised Penal Code isreclusion temporal. As there were two
mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstances, the
penalty should be fixed in its minimum period.44Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should be sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the
range of the penalty next lower degree,i.e.,prision mayor, and the
maximum of which isreclusion temporalin its minimum period.45The
indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00 is in accordance with the current
jurisprudence.46WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Felipe Navarro is
hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison terms of 18 years ofprision
mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months ofreclusion temporal,
as maximum.
Thirteenth CongressThird Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the nineteenth day of
February, two thousand seven.Republic Act No. 9372 March 6, 2007AN
ACT TO SECURE THE STATE AND PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM TERRORISMBe it
enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:SECTION 1.Short Title.- This Act
shall henceforth be known as the "Human Security Act of 2007."SEC.
2.Declaration of Policy.- It is declared a policy of the State to
protect life, liberty, and property from acts of terrorism, to
condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national
security of the country and to the welfare of the people, and to
make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people, against
humanity, and against the law of nations.In the implementation of
the policy stated above, the State shall uphold the basic rights
and fundamental liberties of the people as enshrined in the
Constitution.The State recognizes that the fight against terrorism
requires a comprehensive approach, comprising political, economic,
diplomatic, military, and legal means duly taking into account the
root causes of terrorism without acknowledging these as
justifications for terrorist and/or criminal activities. Such
measures shall include conflict management and post-conflict
peace-building, addressing the roots of conflict by building state
capacity and promoting equitable economic development.Nothing in
this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or
diminution of constitutionally recognized powers of the executive
branch of the government. It is to be understood, however that the
exercise of the constitutionally recognized powers of the executive
department of the government shall not prejudice respect for human
rights which shall be absolute and protected at all times.SEC.
3.Terrorism.- Any person who commits an act punishable under any of
the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:a. Article 122
(Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine
Waters);b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);c. Article 134-a
(Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private persons;d.
Article 248 (Murder);e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention);f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or
under1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);2. Republic
Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste
Control Act of 1990);3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy
Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);4. Republic Act No. 6235
(Anti-Hijacking Law);5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy
and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and,6. Presidential Decree
No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal and
Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or
Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)thereby sowing
and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give
in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism
and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment,
without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.SEC.
4.Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism.- Persons who conspire to commit
the crime of terrorism shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years
of imprisonment.There is conspiracy when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of the crime of terrorism
as defined in Section 3 hereof and decide to commit the same.SEC.
5.Accomplice.- Any person who, not being a principal under Article
17 of the Revised Penal Code or a conspirator as defined in Section
4 hereof, cooperates in the execution of either the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism by previous or
simultaneous acts shall suffer the penalty of from seventeen (17)
years, four months one day to twenty (20) years of
imprisonment.SEC. 6.Accessory.- Any person who, having knowledge of
the commission of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism, and without having participated therein, either as
principal or accomplice under Articles 17 and 18 of the Revised
Penal Code, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manner: (a) by profiting himself or assisting the
offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing
or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects, or instruments
thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; (c) by harboring,
concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal or
conspirator of the crime, shall suffer the penalty of ten (10)
years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.Notwithstanding the above paragraph, the penalties
prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are
such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants,
legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives
by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of
accessories falling within the provisions of subparagraph (a).SEC.
7.Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of
Communications.-The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wire
Tapping Law) to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law
enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a
written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and
record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic
or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking
devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and means for
that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion,
or spoken or written words between members of a judicially declared
and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons or of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.Provided, That
surveillance, interception and recording of communications between
lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their
sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be
authorized.SEC. 8.Formal Application for Judicial Authorization.-
The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words of any person suspected of the crime of terrorism or
the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall only be granted
by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex
parte written application of a police or of a law enforcement
official who has been duly authorized in writing by the
Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file
such ex parte application, and upon examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce to
establish: (a) that there is probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the said crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism has been committed, or
is being committed, or is about to be committed; (b) that there is
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that evidence, which is essential to the conviction
of any charged or suspected person for, or to the solution or
prevention of, any such crimes, will be obtained; and, (c) that
there is no other effective means readily available for acquiring
such evidence.SEC. 9.Classification and Contents of the Order of
the Court.- The written order granted by the authorizing division
of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if any, to extend or
renew the same, the original application of the applicant,
including his application to extend or renew, if any, and the
written authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council shall be
deemed and are hereby declared as classified information: Provided,
That the person being surveilled or whose communications, letters,
papers, messages, conversations, discussions, spoken or written
words and effects have been monitored, listened to, bugged or
recorded by law enforcement authorities has the right to be
informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the
premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the
legality of the interference before the Court of Appeals which
issued the written order. The written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals shall specify the following: (a)
the identity, such as name and address, if known, of the charged or
suspected person whose communications, messages, conversations,
discussions, or spoken or written words are to be tracked down,
tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and, in the case of
radio, electronic, or telephonic (whether wireless or otherwise)
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words, the electronic transmission systems or the telephone
numbers to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and
recorded and their locations or if the person suspected of the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully
known, such person shall be subject to continuous surveillance
provided there is a reasonable ground to do so; (b) the identity
(name, address, and the police or law enforcement organization) of
the police or of the law enforcement official, including the
individual identity (names, addresses, and the police or law
enforcement organization) of the members of his team, judicially
authorized to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record the
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words; (c) the offense or offenses committed, or being
committed, or sought to be prevented; and, (d) the length of time
within which the authorization shall be used or carried out.SEC.
10.Effective Period of Judicial Authorization.- Any authorization
granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals,
pursuant to Section 9(d) of this Act, shall only be effective for
the length of time specified in the written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which shall not
exceed a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the
written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals
by the applicant police or law enforcement official.The authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said
authorization for another non-extendible period, which shall not
exceed thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period:
Provided, That the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals is
satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest:
andProvided, further, That the ex parte application for extension
or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been
duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council.In case of
death of the original applicant or in case he is physically
disabled to file the application for extension or renewal, the one
next in rank to the original applicant among the members of the
team named in the original written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals shall file the application for
extension or renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice to the
liability of the police or law enforcement personnel under Section
20 hereof, the applicant police or law enforcement official shall
have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period granted
by the Court of Appeals as provided in the preceding paragraphs
within which to file the appropriate case before the Public
Prosecutor's Office for any violation of this Act.If no case is
filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or
law enforcement official shall immediately notify the person
subject of the surveillance, interception and recording of the
termination of the said surveillance, interception and recording.
The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant police or law
enforcement official who fails to notify the person subject of the
surveillance, monitoring, interception and recording as specified
above.SEC. 11.Custody of Intercepted and Recorded Communications.-
All tapes, discs, and recordings made pursuant to the authorization
of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, including all
excerpts and summaries thereof as well as all written notes or
memoranda made in connection therewith, shall, within forty-eight
(48) hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the written
order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals or within
forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of any extension or
renewal granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals, be deposited with the authorizing Division of the Court of
Appeals in a sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be,
and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant
police or law enforcement official and the members of his team.In
case of death of the applicant or in case he is physically disabled
to execute the required affidavit, the one next in rank to the
applicant among the members of the team named in the written order
of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall execute
with the members of the team that required affidavit.It shall be
unlawful for any person, police officer or any custodian of the
tapes, discs and recording, and their excerpts and summaries,
written notes or memoranda to copy in whatever form, to remove,
delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the
items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext
whatsoever.Any person who removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates,
shreds or destroys the items enumerated above shall suffer a
penalty of not less than six years and one day to twelve (12) years
of imprisonment.SEC. 12.Contents of Joint Affidavit.- The joint
affidavit of the police or of the law enforcement official and the
individual members of his team shall state: (a) the number of
tapes, discs, and recordings that have been made, as well as the
number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written
notes and memoranda, if any, made in connection therewith; (b) the
dates and times covered by each of such tapes, discs, and
recordings; (c) the number of tapes, discs, and recordings, as well
as the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of
written notes and memoranda made in connection therewith that have
been included in the deposit; and (d) the date of the original
written authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the
applicant to file the ex parte application to conduct the tracking
down, tapping, intercepting, and recording, as well as the date of
any extension or renewal of the original written authority granted
by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.The joint
affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or
copies of the whole or any part of any of such tapes, discs, and
recordings, and that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any
part of any of such excerpts, summaries, written notes, and
memoranda, have been made, or, if made, that all such duplicates
and copies are included in the sealed envelope or sealed package,
as the case may be, deposited with the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals.It shall be unlawful for any person, police or law
enforcement official to omit or exclude from the joint affidavit
any item or portion thereof mentioned in this Section.Any person,
police or law enforcement officer who violates any of the acts
prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall suffer the penalty of
not less than ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.SEC. 13.Disposition of Deposited Material.-The sealed
envelope or sealed package and the contents thereof, which are
deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals,
shall be deemed and are hereby declared classified information, and
the sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be opened and its
contents (including the tapes, discs, and recordings and all the
excerpts and summaries thereof and the notes and memoranda made in
connection therewith) shall not be divulged, revealed, read,
replayed, or used as evidence unless authorized by written order of
the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which written
order shall be granted only upon a written application of the
Department of Justice filed before the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals and only upon a showing that the Department of
Justice has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism
Council to file the application with proper written notice the
person whose conversation, communication, message discussion or
spoken or written words have been the subject of surveillance,
monitoring, recording and interception to open, reveal, divulge,
and use the contents of the sealed envelope or sealed package as
evidence.Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority
who violates his duty to notify in writing the persons subject of
the surveillance as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six
years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.SEC.
14.Application to Open Deposited Sealed Envelope or Sealed
Package.- The written application with notice to the party
concerned to open the deposited sealed envelope or sealed package
shall clearly state the purpose or reason: (a) for opening the
sealed envelope or sealed package; (b) for revealing or disclosing
its classified contents; (c) for replaying, divulging, and or
reading any of the listened to, intercepted, and recorded
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof
and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection therewith); [
and, (d) for using any of said listened to, intercepted, and
recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or
spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts and
summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in
connection therewith) as evidence.Any person, law enforcement
official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify as
defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to
eight years of imprisonment.SEC. 15.Evidentiary Value of Deposited
Materials.- Any listened to, intercepted, and recorded
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words, or any part or parts thereof, or any information or
fact contained therein, including their existence, content,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning, which have been secured in
violation of the pertinent provisions of this Act, shall absolutely
not be admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative
investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.SEC. 16.Penalty for
Unauthorized or Malicious Interceptions and/or Recordings.- Any
police or law enforcement personnel who, not being authorized to do
so by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, tracks
down, taps, listens to, intercepts, and records in whatever manner
or form any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or
spoken or written word of a person charged with or suspected of the
crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism
shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten
(10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.In
addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the
commission of any other offense, the penalty of ten (10) years and
one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment and the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office
shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel who
maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to
track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record in whatever
manner or form any communication, message, conversation,
discussion, or spoken or written words of a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism: Provided, That notwithstanding Section 13 of this Act,
the party aggrieved by such authorization shall be allowed access
to the sealed envelope or sealed package and the contents thereof
as evidence for the prosecution of any police or law enforcement
personnel who maliciously procured said authorization.SEC.
17.Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Association, or Group
of Persons.- Any organization, association, or group of persons
organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, or which,
although not organized for that purpose, actually uses the acts to
terrorize mentioned in this Act or to sow and create a condition of
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in
order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand
shall, upon application of the Department of Justice before a
competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and opportunity to
be heard given to the organization, association, or group of
persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed
organization, association, or group of persons by the said Regional
Trial Court.SEC. 18.Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of
Arrest.- The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to
the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement
personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the
Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with
or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy
to commit terrorism shall, without incurring any criminal liability
for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper
judicial authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to
the proper judicial authority within a period of three days counted
from the moment the said charged or suspected person has been
apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the
said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the
arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy
to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section
7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this Act.The
police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before
detaining the person suspected of the crime of terrorism, present
him or her before any judge at the latter's residence or office
nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the
day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among other
things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement
personnel and the person or persons they have arrested and
presented before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why
they have arrested the person and determine by questioning and
personal observation whether or not the suspect has been subjected
to any physical, moral or psychological torture by whom and why.
The judge shall then submit a written report of what he/she had
observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper
court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus
arrested. The judge shall forthwith submit his/her report within
three calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to
his/her residence or office.Immediately after taking custody of a
person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement
personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest
the place of apprehension or arrest: Provided ,That where the
arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office
hours, the written notice shall be served at the residence of the
judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested.The penalty
of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment
shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who
fails to notify and judge as Provided in the preceding
paragraph.SEC. 19.Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or
Imminent Terrorist Attack.- In the event of an actual or imminent
terrorist attack, suspects may not be detained for more than three
days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial
or regional official of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the
municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of
the Court of Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest
is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours,
the arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the
person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials
mentioned above that is nearest the place where the accused was
arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said officials
shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel
concerned within five days after the date of the detention of the
persons concerned:Provided, however, That within three days after
the detention the suspects, whose connection with the terror attack
or threat is not established, shall be released immediately.SEC.
20.Penalty for Failure to Deliver Suspect to the Proper Judicial
Authority within Three Days.- The penalty of ten (10) years and one
day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any
police or law enforcement personnel who has apprehended or
arrested, detained and taken custody of a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism and fails to deliver such charged or suspected person to
the proper judicial authority within the period of three days.SEC.
21.Rights of a Person under Custodial Detention.- The moment a
person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the
crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism is apprehended or arrested
and detained, he shall forthwith be informed, by the arresting
police or law enforcement officers or by the police or law
enforcement officers to whose custody the person concerned is
brought, of his or her right: (a) to be informed of the nature and
cause of his arrest, to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel of his or her choice, the police or
law enforcement officers concerned shall immediately contact the
free legal assistance unit of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) or the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). It shall be the duty
of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the PAO thus
contacted to immediately visit the person(s) detained and provide
him or her with legal assistance. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of the counsel of choice; (b)
informed of the cause or causes of his detention in the presence of
his legal counsel; (c) allowed to communicate freely with his legal
counsel and to confer with them at any time without restriction;
(d) allowed to commu