It is about their story How China, Turkey and Russia influence ...

It is about their story

How China, Turkey and Russia influence the media in Africa

Dani Madrid-MoralesDani Madrid-Morales is an Assistant Professor of Journalism at the University of Houston, where he teaches global communication. He has written extensively on Africa-China media relations. His work, based on extensive fieldwork in multiple African countries, has appeared in leading academic journals.

Deniz BörekciDeniz Börekci is a researcher and translator based in Istanbul. She focuses on Turkey’s domestic and international politics, and sociology.

Dieter LöfflerDieter Löffler is a political analyst, author and translator who lived in Istanbul for many years.

Anna BirkevichAnna Birkevich is a Russian sociologist who lives in London.

KAS Media Programme Sub-Sahara AfricaThe Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) is an independent, non-profit German political foundation that aims to strengthen democratic forces around the world. KAS runs media programmes in Africa, Asia and South East Europe.

KAS Media Africa believes that a free and independent media is crucial for democracy. As such, it is committed to the development and maintenance of a diverse media landscape on the continent, the monitoring role of journalism, as well as ethically based political communication.

It is about their story How China, Turkey and Russiainfluencethe mediainAfrica

It is about their story How China, Turkey and Russiainfluencethe mediainAfrica

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Coverphotograph:ChinesePresidentXiJinping,RussianPresidentVladimirPutinandTurkishPresidentRecepTayyipErdoganposeforafamilyphotoduringtheG20summitonJuly7,2017inHamburg,Germany. (GalloImages/Bloomberg)

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Table of contents

Foreword vii

Sino-African Media Cooperation — An Overview of a Longstanding Asymmetric Relationship 9

— DaniMadrid-Morales

I want you to want me — Turkey and Africa’s media 71

— DenizBörekci&DieterLöffler

Weaponry, raw materials and propaganda — Russia’s new arrival on the continent 113

— AnnaBirkevich

vii

Foreword

LookingatmediainvolvementinAfrica,onecanonlystatethatthecontinentismoreimportantthanever.NexttotraditionalactorsliketheBBCorRadioFranceInternational,andtoasmallerextentofDeutscheWelleorRadioSwissInternational,therearenewplayers.Theydonotseemtohavethesameagendasastheolderones,buttheybringaboutnewversionsofjournalism,ofattemptedinfluenceandpropaganda.

Whatdifferentiatesthemis,inthecaseofChina,thatfundsdonotseemtomattermuch.InthecaseofTurkey,thatmoreandmorescholarshipsarebeingofferedandwhenitcomestoRussia,thatoldalliancesoftheUSSRintheColdWararebeingreactivated.

Whatseparatesthemevenfurtherfromtheoldplayersarethevaluesthattheystandforandtrytopropagate.Theyareofferingajournalismthatpraisestheirownautocraticmodelsofruleand,inthecaseofChinainparticular,theypromoteapositivejournalism,thatdoesnotaskuneasyquestions,ajournalismthatdoesnotoffendorhurt,butthatusuallypleasesthepowers-that-be.

KASMediaAfricahasaskedexpertsonChinese,TurkishandRussianmediapoliciestooutlinethestrategiesthatthestateandmediainstitutionsareapplyingwhendealingwithmediahousesandmediapractitionersinAfrica.AsmediaexpertsinSouthAfrica,theDRCorNigeriaarewitnessingagrowingpressureontheirwaysofinvestigatingandpositioningmediaintheircountriesastheFourthEstate,thispublicationtriestogiveanoverview,ahandbookfororientation.

KASMediaAfricastandsforgood,professionalandthoroughjournalismandwillencourageourpartnersalloverthecontinenttocontinuetodoso.Wewishallreadersathought-inspiringreadandlookforwardtoalivelydiscussionaboutourfindings.

ChristophPlate

KASMediaAfrica,Director

Johannesburg,SouthAfrica

9

Sino-African Media Cooperation AnOverviewofaLongstanding AsymmetricRelationship

By Dani Madrid-Morales

ThefootprintofChinesemediacompaniesacrossmostofAfricaisdifficulttomiss.JumponaminibusoutofMaputo,Mozambique’scapitalcity,andyouarelikelytonoticealongtheroadtheorange-paintedwallsofsmallshopssellingsatellitedishesanddigitaltelevisionsetupboxeslabelledStarTimes,aprivatelyownedChinesetelecommunicationscompany.VisitorstotheheadquartersoftheAfricanUnioninAddisAbaba(Ethiopia),builtbyChinesecontractorsandcompletedin2012,mightnoticethatthetelevisionscreensinthebuildingareoftentunedtoCGTN(ChinaGlobalTelevisionNetwork),theinternationalbranchofChina’sState-runtelevision.PickupacopyofsomeofSouthAfrica’smostwidelyreadnewspapers,fromtheCape TimestotheSunday Independent, andchancesarethatyouwillbereadinganarticlewrittenbyjournalistsworkingforChina’sStatenewsagency,Xinhua.Thelistgoeson:2G,3G,4G,andsoon5GnetworksacrossthecontinentarebuiltwithtechnologyprovidedbyHuaweiandZhongxingTechnologies(ZTE),twoChinesetelecommunicationscompanies.AgrowingnumberofChinesesoapoperasaredubbedbyAfricanvoiceactorsinChinaforconsumptionbyAfricanaudiences.Journalists,pressofficers,televisiontechnicians,andalltypesofmediaprofessionalsareregularlyinvitedtoChineseuniversities,institutesandgovernmentagenciestoattendworkshopsandtrainingsessionsinChina,wheretheyhavetheopportunitytoimprovetheirskillsand,atthesametime,geta“chancetoexperiencethetraditionalChineseculture,andstudyChineselanguageandphilosophiesfromChina’sprovinces,”accordingtoChenZhe,headoftheChina-AfricaPressCentre(CAPC).1

Duringavisittosomeofthecountry’slargestmediaorganisationsin2016,ChinesePresidentXiJinpingurgedthemtocreate“flagshipmediawithstronginternationalinfluence,”inordertobeableto“tellChina’sstorywell”.2


10

Thismediaoutreachprojecthad,infact,startedyearsearlier.3Formorethanadecade,ChineseleadershadbeenrepeatedlyexpressingadesiretoseeChinaplayabiggerroleintheworld’smediaecosystemandtoincreasethecountry’s“discursivepower”,thatis,itsabilitytobeheard,andinfluenceglobalnarrativesoninternationalpoliticsandthenewsmedia.4UnderformerChinesePresidentHuJintao,Beijing’sState-sponsoredmediaorganisationstookpartinChina’s“goingoutstrategy”intheearly2000s.ThisState-ledplanspannedmanyeconomicsectorsandreachedeverycontinentaroundtheworld.TheoriginalguidingforcebehindChina’smediainternationalisationintheearly2010swasthegeneralisedperceptionthatforeignpublicopinionwasfailingto“understand”theriseofChinaandthatthiswascausedbynon-Chinesemediarecurrentlyportrayingthecountryinanegativelight.5Inthisambitious,butlooseandfragmentedstrategy,Africancountrieshavebeenplayingacentralrole.

Therearemultiplereasonsforthis.NotonlydoesChinahavevestedeconomicinterestsinthecontinent,butitalsofindsamuchmorefavourablepublicopinionthananywhereelseintheworld.6Moreover,politicalleadersinmostAfricancountries — atleastthosewithwhichChinahasdiplomaticrelations — haveshownlittleinterestindiplomaticriffs,makingthecontinentafertilegroundonwhichChinacanexperimentwithforeignpolicyinstruments,includingmediacooperation.Inthisarea,AfricahasbeenBeijing’s“sandbox”and“testingground”forsometime.TheChinesegovernmentfeelsateaseinAfricabecauseithasfoundapoliticallywelcomingenvironment.IthasavoidedthekindofcontroversieswithcivilsocietyitfacesintheUnitedStates,AustraliaorEurope.Ithas,sofar,matchedwithrealactionsitsnarrativeof“win-win”relations,whichisatthecoreofChina’sforeignpolicyand,moreimportantly,ithasbeenabletoexperimentwithnewformsofoutreachandengagement.Africaisthecontinentofmany‘firsttimes’inChina’sinfluenceoperationsworldwide:thefirstChineseculturalcentresintheworldopenedinMauritiusand Benin,7whilethefirstoverseasFMradiostation8andthefirstbroadcastingcentreoutsideofChinawerebothsetupinNairobi(Kenya).9

OnceestablishedthatAfricaoccupiesacentralpositioninChina’sglobaloutreacheffortsthroughthemedia,thenextquestionweshouldbeaskingis:howdoesChina’scurrentmediatedengagementwithAfricamanifest?Notethestressoncurrent,asChina’smediapresenceinAfricahasbeengoingonforoverhalfacentury.However,thenatureofAfrica-Chinamediarelationstodayisunique.Inthe1950sand1960s,ChinawasengagedinanideologicalconfrontationwithboththeUSSRandtheWest,muchofwhichtookplaceinthenewsmedia.Today,thenatureofmediarelationsbetween

Sino-AfricanMediaCooperation

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AfricancountriesandChinaismorediverse,muchdeeper,substantiallylessideological,andverypragmaticandstrategic.AttheSecondForumofChina-AfricaMediaCooperationinBeijing,CaiFuchao,theministerofChina’sStateGeneralAdministrationofPress,Publication,Radio,FilmandTelevision(SGAPPRFT)describedChina’sapproachtomediacooperationinAfricawiththesewords:“Chinesemediaorganisationswilltakearealisticandpragmaticattitudebytellingthetruth,proposingpragmaticadvice,doingpracticalworkandseekingpracticalresults,andinnovativecooperationmodelsaswellasdetail[ed]cooperationprojects”.10Ifwereadbetweenthelines,theultimatemessageofCai’sspeechwouldseemtobethatChinaispushingitsmediatointernationaliseinAfricaintwodirections:toassistindevelopingmediainfrastructure — whichturnsintoeconomicprofitinthemediumtermandinpotentialpoliticalandstrategicinfluenceinthelongterm — andtotakeanactiveroleinthecraftingofamedianarrativearoundChina’sdevelopment,China-Africarelations,andAfrica’sownstoryofeconomicandpoliticaldevelopment.

ThischapterexploresthediverserangeofmediacooperationactivitiesbyChineseactorsinAfricaoverthelastdecadeandoffersanassessmentoftheimpactthattheseactivitiesarehavingontheAfricanmediaecosystemasawhole,aswellasitsaudiences,mediapractitioners,andpoliticallife.ItstartswithashortdetourintothehistoricalrootsthathavefacilitatedthecurrentupsurgeinexchangesandisfollowedbyadetailedaccountofthesixtypesofengagementthataremostprominenttodayinChina’smediacooperationeffortsinAfrica:infrastructuredevelopment,contentproductionanddistribution,publicopinionmanagement,training,anddirectinvestment.11 Foreachtypeofactivity,thereaderwillfindexamplesdrawnfromacrossthecontinent,inanattempttoprovideageographicallyandlinguisticallydiversepicture.ThechapterconcludeswiththeargumentthatSino-Africanmediacooperationisbroadandfragmented,andisgroundedinalong-standingasymmetricrelationshipbetweenChinaandAfricancountriesandthatsuchasymmetryisunlikelytoshift,giventheprivilegedpositionChinesemediaandtelecommunicationscompaniesenjoy.

Many actors, limited coordination

CoincidingwiththefiftiethanniversaryoftheestablishmentofthefirstdiplomaticrelationsbetweenthePeople’sRepublicofChinaandanindependentAfricancountry(Egypt),in2006,ChinaorganisedtheThirdMinisterialConferenceoftheForumonChina-AfricaCooperation(FOCAC)in


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Beijing,whichwasattendedby41Africanheadsofstate.Themosttangibleoutcomeofthemeetingwasthe“FOCACBeijingActionPlanandDeclaration”.ThetextincludesasectiononSino-Africanmediacooperation,whichcallsfor“newsmediatoplayapositiveroleinenhancingmutualunderstandingandfriendship,”andencourages“morereport[ing]andcoveragebythenewsmediaoftheotherside”.Thetextexplicitlymentionsactionstofacilitate“eachother’snewsagenciesinsendingresidentandnon-residentcorrespondentsfornewsreporting”.TherearealsoreferencestoChina’scommitmenttotrainingAfricanmediapersonnel,andtheagreementtopursueexchangesofpressauthoritiesandcorrespondentsfromAfricatoChina.12SimilarlanguagewasincludedintheFOCACActionPlansthatfollowed.Inthe2009text,referencesweremadetoplansbyChinatoprovidefreetrainingtoAfricanmediaprofessionals,13 while, inthe2015ActionPlan,Chinapledgedtobringsatellitetelevisionto10000Africanvillages.14ThestressonmediaexchangesandcooperationinChina’sforeignpolicywasexclusivetoSino-Africanrelationsforsometime,beforeBeijingbeganincludingsimilarreferencestoothermultilateralforums,suchastheChina-CELACForuminLatinAmerica(2015)andtheChina-ArabCooperationForum (2009).

Despitefeaturingratherprominentlyinofficialpolicydocuments,itisimportanttostressthatChina’sglobalmediacooperationeffortstendtoberatherlooselycoordinatedandoftenlackaclearsharedstrategy,withoverlappinggoalsandcommonactionsbetweenagencies.ThislackofacohesivestrategyisnotuniquetoChina’sactivitiesinAfrica.WritingaboutBeijing’sforeignpolicyingeneral,includingitspublicdiplomacyworkinAfricaandelsewhere,DavidShambaugh,professorofpoliticalscienceandinternationalaffairsattheGeorgeWashingtonUniversityintheUS,hasnotedthatChinalacksa“grandstrategy”,15eventhoughthenewsmediaandsomecommentatorsmightsometimesbesignallingotherwise.16Thewealthofagencies,actorsandinstitutionsinvolvedinpolicymakingandimplementation,whichofteninvolvescompetitionbetweenthem,makescoordinationdifficult,asIngridd’HoogheatClingendael,theNetherlandsInstituteofInternationalRelations,hassuggested.17Inthecaseofthemediaandtelecommunicationssectors,whiletheoverarchingideaisthatallChineseenterprisesoperatinginAfrica,whetherStateorprivatelyowned,arefollowingBeijing’s“call”tobecomemoreglobal,theyoperatewithvariedrationalesandcircumstances,withoutcoordinationfromasingleagencyoverseeingallprojects.Chinesemediararelyexchangecontentorpersonnel,andhardlyevercooperatewitheachotherintheproductionofcontent.Inaddition,theyhavediversestrategicgoals.Whilesomeactorsareconcernedwithcommunicatingofficialpolicy,amplifyingthemessageoftheChineseCommunistParty,orworkingtowardsimproving


13

China’sglobalimage;forothers,commercialinterestsandmarketmaximisationareatthecoreoftheiractivities.18

TreatingallChineseenterprisesinvolvedinmediacooperationactivitiesasacoordinatedsingleunitwithsimilarorganisationalvalues,operationallogic,andlong-termgoalsmightleadtowronglyconcludingthereishomogeneityofaction.ThiswasprobablyanaccuratecharacterisationofChineseState-ownedmediaoverseasoperationsinasomewhatdistantpast,butmightnotreflecttoday’sreality,whereatleastfourdistinctgroupsofplayersareactiveonthecontinent:1)State-ownedmedia,2)diplomaticmissions,3)provincial-andlocal-levelagencies,and4)privatemediaandtelecommunicationscompanies.Notonlyaretheredifferencesbetweenthesefourgroups,suchastheareasinwhichtheyoperateorthegoalstheyaretryingtoachievewiththeirprojects,butthereissignificantdiversitywithinthem.

ThemostactiveandvisibleofallChineseactorsareState-ownedmedia.Theyhavebeenincreasingtheiroperationsonthecontinentsince2006,whenthePRCcelebratedthe“YearofAfrica”inChina.19ItwasthenthatChinaRadioInternational(CRI)launchedanFMradiostationinNairobibroadcastingcontentinChinese,EnglishandSwahili20andXinhuamovedallitsremainingeditorialstaff — thoseworkingfortheFrenchlanguageserviceforSub-SaharanAfrica — fromParistoNairobi.Overtheyears,thenumberofforeignbureaustheagencykeepsaroundthecontinenthasgrown,from16in1965to24in2010andsomewherebetween28and30today.21Inlate2011,NairobiwasalsochosenasthelocationofCGTNAfrica(backthenknownasCCTVAfrica),aproductionandbroadcastingcentreforChina’sCentralTelevisionorCCTV.InJanuary2012,thecentrebeganairingthefirstlocallyproducedprogrammes.Thatsameyear,China Daily,themostwidelycirculatedEnglish-languagenewspaperinChina,launchedaweeklyAfricanedition;and,ChinAfrica, a bilingualmonthlymagazineaboutSino-Africanrelations,setupanofficeinJohannesburg.

Traditionally,ChineseembassiesandconsulateshadnotplayedaprominentroleinengagingwithAfricanmedia,butthisbegantochangeinthemid-2010s,whenanewcohortofdiplomatswasappointedtostrategicallyimportantmissions,suchasthoseinPretoria(SouthAfrica)orKigali(Rwanda).22Moretech-savvyandlesscamera-shythantheirpredecessors,andalsomuchmoreconfrontationalandwillingtosparwiththeircritics,theseofficials,sometimesreferredtoas“WolfWarrior”diplomats,23areferencetoanationalisticfilmthatbecameablockbusterinChinain2017,havebecomeactiveandvociferousonsocialmedia,organisepressconferencestoputforwardBeijing’sviewson


14

localandglobalissues,andareactiveopinion-piecewritersinlocalnewspapersandwebsites.EmbassiesarealsooftenthefirstpointofcontactforagenciesfromlowerlevelsofadministrationinChina,suchasprovincialgovernmentsormunicipalagencies,astheytrytoengageinmediacooperationthemselves.24

AsmoreandmoreStateactorsincreasedtheirfootprintinAfrica,sodidprofit-orientedcorporations,suchasHuawei,ZTE,StarTimesand,morerecently,Opera.Theirbusinessesspanfrombuildingtelecommunicationsnetworks,topaytelevisionservicesanddigitalcontentcreation.Manyofthesecompaniesalsohaveactivecorporatesocialresponsibility(CSR)programmesthatcanbeseenasaformofmediacooperation.25ItisfairtosaythatthelinedividingStateandnon-Statecorporationsisoftenblurred.Forexample,theChinesegovernmentholdsanindirect30%stakeinZTE,whichislistedontheHongKongstockexchange,andwasinfactcreatedasaState-ownedprivate-operatingenterprise.26StarTimeshasenjoyedrelativelyeasyaccesstocreditfromChina’sExportandImportBank,andbenefitsfromcloserelationshipswithhigh-rankingofficialsinChina,whichtendtofacilitatenegotiationswithAfricangovernments.AnotherexampleoftheblurringoflinesbetweenState-andnon-State-ownedenterprisescanbefoundinStarTimes’sCEO,PangXinxing,whohasbeenabletomeetwithhalf-a-dozenAfricanheadsofgovernmentandState,andsecuredlucrativedealstoassistmultiplecountriesintheireffortstocompletethemigrationfromanaloguetodigitaltelevision.27StarTimes’competitorsareunlikelytohavesuchopportunitiestodirectlypitchtheirservicestohigh-rankingofficials.

ToovercometheredundancyineffortsinmediacooperationbetweenChineseactors,attemptstocoordinateactivitieshavebeeninthemakingforsometime,eventhoughtangibleoutcomesofrecentorganisationalchangesappeartobelimitedsofar.Twoannouncementsmadein2018areexamplesofsuchefforts.First,inApril,BeijingannouncedthecreationoftheChinaInternationalDevelopmentCooperationAgency(CIDCA),whichconcentratesforeignaid — andthisincludessomeinstancesofmediacooperationandmediadevelopmentprogrammes — underthesupervisionoftheMinistryofForeignAffairs(MoFA).AccordingtoDenghuaZhangandHongboJiattheAustralianNationalUniversity,“[d]espiteCIDCA’screation,muchhasremainedunchangedinthemanagementoftheaidsystem”.28 A few weeks earlier, adifferentkindofreorganisationtookplacewithinsomeofthecountry’sleadingmediaorganisations.CCTV(includingCGTN),CRIandChinaNationalRadio(CNR)becamepartofanewChinaMediaGroup,sometimesreferredtointhemediaasthe“VoiceofChina”.29Eachentityhaskeptitsbrand,andminimalrestructuringappearstohaveoccurredsincethen,butthenewmedia


15

groupisnowunderthedirectsupervisionoftheStateCouncil — China’sexecutivebranch — andoverseenbytheCommunistParty’sCentralPublicityDepartment.30Alsoin2018,XinhuawasexpectedtomovetoitsnewlybuiltregionalofficeinNairobi.However,theproject’scompletiondatehasbeenpostponedtwice.TheXinhuaToweristohostnotonlytheagency’sofficesandresidenceforitsjournalistsbutalsoCGTNAfrica’sstudiosandnewsroom.31 Thiswouldappeartobeyetanothereffort,atleastonpaper,ofbringingclosertogetherdifferentactorsinvolvedinforeigninfluenceoperations,andtoincreasecooperationbetweenagencies,whichwascharacteristicofChina’smediaoutreacheffortsinthepast.

The historical roots of Africa-China media cooperation

TheearliestexamplesofCommunistChina’smediareachingAfricanaudiencesafterthecreationofthePRCin1949weremagazines,suchasthePeking Review(anditsFrenchversion,Pékin Information), China Reconstructs and China Pictorial.32Thesecirculatedacrossthecontinentinbookstoressympathetictothecommunistcause,alongsidetranslatedcopiesofbooksaboutcommunistthought.SamplesofChinesemagazinesweresenttoreaders,sometimesforfree,hopingthatthosereceivingthemwouldbetemptedtobuysubscriptions,althoughtheprice,between50centsto$1.25USayear,seemedrathersteepformostofthepopulationatthetime.33 China Pictorial,amagazineshortontextandfullofcolourfulpictures,wasalsopublishedforsometimeinSwahili,theonlyAfricanlanguageintowhichitwastranslated.SpeakingspecificallyofTanzania,whichisthecountrywhereSwahiliisspokenmostwidely,PriyaLal,ahistorianatBostonCollegesuggeststhatmostofthetextstranslatedtoSwahilibytheChinese“wouldhavebeenirrelevanttomanyilliterateTanzanians”inthe1950sand1960s,but“anumberofyoungintellectualsandactivistsinurbancentresavidlyreadtheLittle Red Book”,thewell-knowncollectionofMaoquotations.34

ForbothXinhuaandRadioPeking,thetwomostinfluentialChinesenewsmediaatthetime,thefirstpointofcontactwithAfricawasCairo,giventhatEgyptandChinahadestablisheddiplomaticrelationswitheachotherasearlyas1956.XinhuabeganworkingfromCairoshortlyafterand,by1966,had16officesonthecontinent.Theopeningin1959ofXinhua’sfirstbureausinsub-SaharanAfrica,35firstinConakry(Guinea),andtheninAccra(Ghana)istellingoftherolethatjournalistsattheagencyhadatthetime,whichfellbetweenbeingproto-diplomatsandreporters.AsthefirstXinhuacorrespondentinWestAfrica,WangShurecalls,inanessaypublishedin2001,thatoneofhisdutiesatthetime


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wastofacilitatetheestablishmentofdiplomaticrelationsbetweenthePRCandsomeofthecountriesthathewasinstructedtovisit.FromhisbaseinConakry,WangwasoneofthefirstChinesetovisitMaliafteritsindependencein1960.HedidsoafterChinareceivedintelligencethatTaiwanhadsentapotentialambassadortovisitthecountry.Describingwhatseemsincredibleeaseofaccesstothehighest-rankingofficialsofthecountry,Wangrecalls:36

I sent a telegram to [Malian] President Keita. Two days later, he called back and invited me for an interview. I immediately flew from Conakry to Bamako. I had been to Bamako more than three months earlier ... I explained to the President, China’s rejection of the “Two-Chinas” principle. He replied to me frankly by saying that they had not established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. He said he had heard a Taiwanese national was in the country and guaranteed me he would be expelled.37

OneweekafterthatexchangebetweentheXinhuajournalistandtheMalianPresident,ChinaandMaliagreedtoestablishdiplomaticrelations.

ThecontentofXinhuaatthetimewasmonitoredcloselybyforeigndiplomatsandintelligenceagenciesacrosstheglobe.SowasthatofRadioPeking,thenamebywhichChina’sinternationalbroadcasterwasknownfordecadesbefore,in1993,itbecameChinaRadioInternational.TheUnitedStatesInformationAgency(USIA),anofficewithintheStateDepartmentinchargeofexternalpropagandaefforts,regularlydistributedclassifiedreportsthatsummarisedthecontentofChinesemedia.TheweeklyreportofChineseBroadcaststoAfricafor31Julyto5August1962citedstoriessuchas“StatueofFrenchcolonialistsinAlgeriaoverturned”(English);“PortugueseGuineannationalistsintensifystruggle”(English;French;Swahili);and,“ChineseEmbassiesinTanganyika,Somalia,CairoandSudancelebrateChineseArmyDay”(French;Swahili).ContentbyChinesemediaduringmostofthefifties,sixtiesandseventieswasacombinationofappraisalsofChineseachievements,attacksdirectedatinternationalenemies,domesticnewsthatcelebratedthestruggleofliberationmovementsinAfrica,andreportsonChina-Africarelations.

RadioprogrammingspecificallyaimedatAfricanaudiences,atleastpartially,startedin1957withthefirstbulletininArabic.RadioPekinghadbegunbroadcastsinFrenchinthesummerof1956.AnindicationofthestrongideologicalunderpinningofthecontentofradiobroadcastsatthetimeistheexplicitinstructionsgiventothejournalistsworkingfortheArabicdepartment.


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Thestationhadtwogoals:topublicisetheachievementsofChina’ssocialistrevolutionandtopubliciseChina’sforeignpolicy,whichwasto“defendworldpeaceandopposeaggressionandcolonialism”,accordingtooneofthejournalistsworkingfortheArabicserviceinthe1960s,LiuYuanpei.38AftertheArabicbroadcasts,camethelaunchoftheSwahiliandHausaservicesin1961and1963respectively.TheadditionofthetwoAfricanlanguagestotheportfoliowasnoteasy,because,atthetime,therewerenoChinesepeoplewhocouldspeakeitherlanguage.Beijingfirstrecruited“foreignexperts”,TanzaniansforSwahiliandNigeriensforHausa,whowerejettedtoBeijingtotrainlocaljournalists,ratherthantobecomereportersthemselves.Initially,theSwahiliandHausaservicesbroadcastsevenhoursaweek.By1971,Swahiliprogrammeshadincreasedto10.5hoursaweekandremainedlikethatuntilthe1990s.39China’sbroadcastinginlocalAfricanlanguagesnevergrewfurther,andpaledwhencomparedtotheofferingsoftheUSSR:220hoursinhalf-a-dozenormorelanguages,includingPula,Lingala,Malagasy,Ndebele,Shona,Somali and Zulu.40

GiventhatradiojournalistsdidnothaveachancetotravelregularlytoAfricancountriesforreportingbecauseoflimitedfunding,andthereforehadvirtuallynofirst-handcontactwithaudiences,toassesstheirperformance,theyoftenreliedonthelettersthatlistenerssentin.DetailedrecordsofsuchletterswerekeptandhavebeenexaminedbyacademicssuchasÇağdaşÜngöratMarmaraUniversityinTurkey.41AttheHausadepartment,between1963and1978,47414letterswerereceived,withmorethan35000lettershavingbeensentin1990,theyearthenumberreacheditspeak.WhileChinesejournalistsdidnotappeartohaveaccesstoaudienceresearchotherthantheseletters,USIAresearchersdidhavesuchdata.DozensofaudiencestudiesarekeptattheUSNationalArchivesinCollegePark,Maryland.Whatthesesurveysrevealisthat,historically,theimpactofChinesebroadcastswasmuchmorelimitedthanthatofotherinternationalbroadcasters.InFrench-speakingcountriessuchasCôted’IvoireandSenegal,asmallnumberofpeopleclaimedtolistentoRadioPeking.InAbidjan(Côted’Ivoire),only16surveyrespondentsoutof1251interviewedin1960listenedtoChineseradiobroadcastingatleastonceamonthand,inDakar(Senegal),thenumberwasslightlyhigher,25peopleoutof1316respondents.ListenerstoFrance’sRFIaccountedforaround10%ofthepopulation.ThesituationwasslightlybetterinNigeria(3%claimedtolistentoChineseradio)andGhana(1%).Incontrast,41%inNigeriaand22%inGhanasaidtheylistenedtotheBBCeveryday.

ShortlyaftertheCulturalRevolutionbeganinChinain1966,foreignpropagandastoppedbeingapriorityforBeijing,andmanyChineseforeign


18

correspondentsstationedinAfricawererecalledfromtheirpostings.Otherswereexpelledbecauseoftheirintelligencework.42Duringthe1980s,arevisionofforeignpropagandaworkwascarriedout,leadingtothecreationofnewinitiatives,suchasthelaunchin1988ofChinAfrica,amagazineaimedat“middleanduppermiddleclassesandintellectuals”interestedinSino-Africanaffairs.43 A Frenchversion,ChinAfrique,followedin1990.Despitetheattemptstore-engagewithAfricanaudiencesinthe1980s,thelongabsenceofoveradecadeduringtheCulturalRevolutionmeantthatthedifficultiesthatChinesemediahadfacedduringtheearlydaysofthePRCtomakethemselvesvisibleinacrowdedmediaspacewereonlyintensifiedwhentheytriedtoreconnectwiththecontinent.TwodecadeshadtogobybeforeBeijingwouldbeabletoreturntoAfricawithamuchmorerobustmediaeffort.

A classification of Chinese media cooperation in Africa

Today,mediarelationsbetweenChinaandAfricancountrieshavelostmostoftheideologicalcomponentthatcharacterisedthemthroughouttheColdWar,andbecomeincreasinglypragmatic,eventhoughtheyaresignificantlymorefragmented.MostAfricancountrieswelcomeChinesetechnology,investmentandknow-how,and,inreturn,BeijingiscontentwithhavingaccesstoAfricanaudiences,sothatitsmediacanshowcaseanimmaculateversionofwhatlifeinChinaisliketoday.Fivefactorshavecontributedtothisarrangement.

First,thematerialcapabilitieswithwhichChinesemediaoperateinAfricatodayareamongthebestofallinternationalmedia:fundingforcontinentaltravelisavailable,newsroomsarewell-staffed,andthereisawillingnesstocoverthecontinentextensively.ThismakesChinesemedia’scontentmoreattractiveandmarketable.ThisisinsharpcontrasttothehardshipsenduredbythefirstChinesejournalistsinAfrica.Second,China’scurrentoutreacheffortsarenotlimitedtoAfrica,butuseAfricaasasteppingstone.ContentproducedbyglobalChinesemediainAfrica,includingdocumentariesandnewsreportsaboutChina-Africa“friendship”,isrelayedtoaudiencesglobally,asopposedtothelocallytargetedmessagesofthepastandhelppresentanimageofChinaasaresponsibleandwell-likednation.Third,mostoftheexchangesduringtheColdWarwereunidirectional.Chinaprovidedcontent,personnel,andsometimestraining,withlimitedspaceforAfricanagency.Thisisnotsomuchthecasetoday.ChinesenewsroomsinAfricaemploydozensoflocaljournalists,and,althoughlimited,somecontentfromAfricancountriesmakesitswaytoChina.Fourth,inChina’sreturntoAfrica,thereisacoexistenceofState-ownedenterprisesandprivatecompanies,asopposedtothemonopolisticpositionof


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theState/Partyinthepast.Eachofthemplaysadifferentbutcomplementaryrole.Finally,Chinesemediahaveatrulycontinent-widepresence,thatstretchesfromcapitalcitiestovillages,andreachesaudiencesinmultiplelanguagesandthroughmultipleplatforms,requiringdiversifiedmessages.ThiswidespreadpresenceacrossAfrica,whichwasunattainableinthepast,presentsnewchallenges,suchasfragmentationofeffortsandlimitedcoordination.

China’smorepragmaticapproachinitsengagementwithAfricanmediatodaytranslatesintosixmaintypesofactivity.

1. Infrastructure development.Chinesecompanies — someundertheauspicesoftheStateandsomeprivatelyowned — areinvolvedinprojectsaimedatimprovingexistinginfrastructure(suchas,broadcastingequipment,satellitenetworks,andmobiletechnology).Someprojectsareintheformofassistanceandcooperation,whileothersoperateoncommerciallogic.

2. Training and education.Chinesegovernmentagencies(fromtheMinistryofForeignAffairstotheMinistryofEducation,andamyriadofagenciesinbetween)areactivelyinvolvedinofferingworkshopstoAfricanpublicinformationofficers,editorsandjournalists,aswellasnumerousscholarshipstostudyjournalism,mediaandcommunication,andtelecomsengineeringatChineseuniversities.

3. Content production.ChineseState-ownedmediacompaniesareproducingmultilingualcontent — newsandentertainment — aboutAfricancountriesthatisintendedtoreachlocal,globaland,toalesserextent,Chineseaudiencesonlineandthroughlegacymedia,suchasradio,television,magazinesandnewspapers.

4. Content distribution.Audio-visualcontent,includingtelevisionseries,filmsanddocumentaries,isregularlyexportedfromChinatoAfricaandisshownonChinese-ownedplatformsoperatingonthecontinent,suchasthoseoperatedbyStarTimes,oronlocalAfricantelevisionstations.ThiscontentoftenprovidesanuncriticalnarrativeofcontemporaryChina.

5. Engaging with public opinion.Throughsocialmedia,theopinionpagesoflocalnewspapers,andbyorganisingpressevents,ChineseofficialsareincreasinglypresentinthenewscontentofAfricanmedia.Indoingso,theyaretryingtohaveavoiceinpublicdebatesthatrefertoChina(from


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protestsinHongKongtothecountry’sresponsetoCovid-19),andtobetter“manage”publicopinion.

6. Direct investment and acquisitions.Chinesecompanies’,investmentconglomerates’,andindividuals’directinvestmentinAfricanmediacompaniesisstilllimitedbut,whenandwhereithasoccurred,ithasreceivedthemostcriticism.WhenChineseinvestorsacquireda20%stakeinSouthAfrica’sIndependentMedia,CraigMcKune,alocaljournalist,echoingtheviewofothercommentators,raisedquestionsabouttheimpactofthedeal“onmediaindependenceinSouthAfrica”.44

Someoftheseactivitiesoverlap;somearejustemerging,whileothersareacontinuationofeffortsthatstarteddecadesago;and,someappeartobehavingabiggerimpactthanothers.Inthepagesthatfollow,thesesixareasofengagementareexploredindetailand,whenavailable,evidenceoftheireffectivenessispresented.

Infrastructure Development

Between2000and2014,ChinesecompaniesandStateagenciescommittedtospendingaroundUS$4.8billioninover100projectsintheinformationandcommunicationstechnology(ICT)sectorinAfrica,accordingtoAidData,aprojectledbyresearchersattheCollegeofWilliam&Mary,DevelopmentGateway,andBrighamYoungUniversity.45Thissumincludeslow-interestloansforcommercialdevelopmentprojects,donationsandaid,aswellasState-backedmediaassistanceprogrammes.Outof24sectorsforwhichdataareavailable,suchasagriculture,constructionandhealth,ICTranksninthintotalexpenditure,andsixthinthenumberofprojects.Thisrepresentsaround5%oftotalaidandassistanceprovidedbyChinatoAfrica.Somecommitmentsaremodest.Forexample,in2002,EquatorialGuineawasgivenaUS$6.25millioninterest-freeloantofinancetheconstructionofthenewheadquartersofthenationalradioandtelevisionnetwork.ThecontractwasgiventoaChinesecompany.Inothercases,China’scommitmentsareintheformofgrantsandgifts:amulti-camerabroadcastingvandonatedtotheTanzaniaBroadcastingCorporation(TBC);theprovisionofradiojammingequipmenttotheZimbabweangovernment;orcomputers(10)andprinters(5)giftedbytheChineseEmbassyinYaoundétotheCameroonRadioTelevisionCorporation(CRTV).However,therearealsomuchlargerprojects,suchastheagreementbetweenTanzaniaandtheChinesegovernmenttoawardChinaInternationalTelecommunicationConstructionCompany(CITCC)theexpansionofTanzania’s


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broadbandnetworkatacostofUS$403million,financedbyChina’sExport-Import(Exim)Bank.Largetelecommunicationscompanies,suchasHuaweiandZTE,areinvolvedinover20%oftheprojectsrecordedbyAidData.

Historically,telecommunicationsinfrastructure(fromtelegraphandtelephonenetworkstoradiofrequenciesandtelevisionbroadcasting)hasbeenseenbynationstatesworldwideashighlysensitive,giventheriskstonationalsecurityifforeignactorsweretotakecontrolofnetworks,andthereforeithasnotonlybeenhighlyregulatedbutalsokeptclosedtoforeigninvestmentandcontrol.However,startingwiththedeploymentofmobilenetworksinthelate1990s,andmorerecentlywiththedevelopmentofsatellitecommunications,underseacablenetworks,andotherdigitalformsoftelecommunications,boththecostsandthetechnicalknowledgeneededtobuildandmaintainsuchinfrastructurehaveincreaseddramatically.SomeAfricancountries,asisthecasewithAngola,Egypt,EthiopiaandSouthAfrica,havebeenabletopartlyorfullyrelyontheirowntechnology,expertiseandhumancapital,butmanyothershaveseeninChinaaveryconvenientpartner.Chinesetelecommunicationscompanieshavewonpublictenders — somemoreopenlythanothers — acrossthecontinent,primarilybecausetheyhavebeenabletoofferlower-costsolutions,whichareoftenbackedbyStatefinancingatcompetitiverates.ThissomewhatsymbioticrelationshipbetweenAfricangovernmentsandChinesetelecommunicationcorporationshasnotbeenfreeofcontroversy,butithasgenerallyescapedthoroughscrutinyofthepotentiallong-termconsequencesofincreasinglydependingonforeigntechnologyandknow-howinstrategicareassuchasbroadbandconnectivity,mobilecommunicationsandtelevisionbroadcasting.

Building Africa’s digital television

In2006,theInternationalTelecommunicationsUnion(ITU)established 17June2015asthedeadlinebywhichcountriesinEurope,partsoftheMiddleEast,andAfricawouldneedtohavemigratedfromanaloguetodigitalterrestrialtelevisionbroadcasts(DTT).Thisswitchintechnologywasneededtofreeupfrequenciesthatcouldbeusedforotherformsofwirelesscommunication,anditopenedupthepossibilityofofferingaudiencesawiderrangeofchannelstowatchforfreewithouthavingtorelyoncableorsatelliteservices.TheITUdeadlineislongpast,and,today,lessthanadozenAfricancountries,amongwhichareMauritius,UgandaandRwanda,havebeenabletoswitchoffanaloguetelevisionsignalscompletely.Others,suchasChad,SouthSudanandEritrea,areeitherattheearlystagesoftheprocess,orhavenotyetstartedthetransition.Themajorityofcountries,however,fromSouthAfrica


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toNigeria,BeninandMadagascar,haveonlymanagedtopartiallydeployDTTservices.Inatleasttwodozencountries,China’sStarTimeshasbeeninvolvedinthistransitionorhassignedmemorandumsofunderstandingwithlocalgovernmentstoparticipateintheprocessatsomepoint.46

StarTimes’sinvolvementdiffersfromcountrytocountry.Insomecases,thecompanyprovidesthetechnologyandbuildstheinfrastructureneededtoupgradeexistingnetworks.ThatisthecasewithBenin,where,afteryearsofdelays,thegovernmentannouncedinmid-2019thatStarTimeshadcompletedthebuildingofnewtransmissionsites.47Inothercases,theChinesecompanynotonlybuildstheinfrastructure,butitalsooperatesasa“signaldistributor”.Signaldistributorsenlistradioandtelevisionchannels,somelocalandsomeinternational,whopayafeeinreturnforhavingtheirfrequencyrelayed.InKenya,forexample,StarTimes’ssubsidiary,thePanAfricaNetworkGroup(PANG)wasawardedtherightstocompetewithKenya’sState-ownedSignetasoneofthecountry’sfirsttwosignaldistributors.48Inothermarkets,suchasTanzania,StarTimes’sstrategyhasbeentocreateajointventurethatoverseesthedevelopmentofthenetwork,actsasasignaldistributor,andprovidestheequipmentneededbyuserstobeabletowatchcontent,eitherforafeeor for free.49Particularlyinsmallermarkets,jointventuresparticipatedinbyStarTimesenjoyamonopolisticposition.Furthermore,whileothercompetinginternationalcompanies,mostnotablyFrance’sCanal+andSouthAfrica’sMultichoice,haveasubstantialfootprintinthepaytelevisionsectorinmanypartsofthecontinent,nootherfirm,foreignordomestic,rivalsStarTimes’sgeographicreachandabilitytobeinvolvedacrossmultiplelevelsofthedigitaltelevisionindustry.

Foundedin1988byPangXinxing,anengineerwhostartedhisprofessionalcareerinthepropagandaandeducationdepartmentofasmallunitofthePeople’sLiberationArmy(PLA),StarTimesofficiallyenteredtheAfricanmarketin2007inRwanda.SpeakingtoChina’sXinhuanewsagency,Pangsaidin2012thathe“longdreamedofbuildingaglobalmediaempire”,thatcould“counterthenegativeportrayalofChinathathebelievesexistsinWesternmedia”.50 Inmorerecentinterviews,andPangdoesnotoftenspeaktothemedia,StarTimes’sCEOhasfocusedlessonhisambitiontocounterthe“exaggeratedandbiasedreports”aboutChinathathesaw“whilevisitingEuropeancountriesandtheUnitedStatesinthelate1990s”,andinsteadhasbeeninsistingthatthecompany’scoreobjectiveistoprovideaffordabletelevisiontoeveryAfricanhousehold.51Today,StarTimesclaimstobepresentin37Africancountriesandtobereaching30millionusers.52Thesenumberscannotbeindependentlyverified.


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ThecompanyowesmuchofitssuccesstoPang’sabilitytorubshoulderswithAfricanelites.Atthe2018FOCACSummitinBeijing,18delegations,includingthePresidentoftheCentralAfricanRepublic,Faustin-ArchangeTouadéra,theFirstLadyofMalawi,GertrudeMutharika,andthePresidentofSierraLeone,JuliusMaadaBio,visitedStarTimes’sheadquartersinBeijingandwereofferedaprivatetourofthecompany’sstudiosbyPanghimself.53Inaddition,whiletravellingtoAfricancountriesaspartofdiplomaticdelegationsandcommercialvisits,Panghasalsometwithmorethan15headsofstateorgovernmentinAfrica,towhomhehasbeenabletodirectlypresenttheservicesandproductsofferedbyStarTimes.AcaseinpointisthatofSãoToméandPríncipe.ShortlyafterChinare-establisheddiplomaticrelationswiththeWestAfricancountryin2017,Pangwasinthearchipelagotosignamemorandumofunderstandingtobringdigitaltelevisiontothecountry.54NotonlyhasStarTimesbenefittedfromBeijing’spoliticalblessing,butitalsohashadeasyaccesstothenecessarycredittobuilditspresenceacrossthecontinent.In2012,theChina-AfricaDevelopment(CAD)fund,aprivateequityfundoverseenbytheChinaDevelopmentBank,becamethecompany’ssecond-largeststakeholder.Inaddition,China’sEximbankhasprovidedsoftloanstosupportStarTimes’sprojectsrepeatedly.55

StarTimes’provenrecordinAfricawasthereasonBeijinggaveforselectingthecompanytoexecuteoneofXiJinping’sflagshippromisesaftertheFOCACmeetinginJohannesburgin2015:toprovidesatellitetelevisionaccessto10000villagesinAfricabytheendof2019.56HavingacloserelationshipwithChineseleaders,aswellasdirectaccesstoStatefundingtopayfortheproject,mighthavealsohelpedStarTimes.Accordingtothecompany,eachofthe10112chosenvillagesin25countriesreceivedtwoprojectortelevisionsandone(ormore)32-inchtelevisionset,tobesetupinasharedspace,andsomewherebetween20and30decodersandsatellitedishesforfamiliesthatalreadyownedatelevisionset.Toguaranteethepowersupply,thesetsaresaidtobeequippedwithsolarpowerunits.Despitealltheeffortstomakethetechnologyavailable,asKatharineSchluntzwritesinThe China-Africa Project, mosthouseholds — atleastinMozambique — onlyreceivedonemonthoffreeaccesstothemostbasicpaytelevisionbundle(20channels)offeredbyStarTimes.Becausemanyfamiliescouldnotaffordthecost,theylostaccesstotheserviceafterthepromotionalperiod.57Thishasnotstoppedgovernmentofficials,ChineseambassadorsandStarTimesrepresentativesfromlaudingthemanyallegedbenefitsoftheproject:“closingthedigitaldivide”intheCentralAfricanRepublic,58providing“accesstoinformationonagriculturalmarkets”inUganda,59andshowcasingandpromoting“culturalexchange”inRwanda.60


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StarTimes’spresenceonthecontinenthasnotalwaysbeensmooth.Thecompany’scosinesswithpoliticalelites,pairedwithanopaquecorporateculture,andlackoftransparencyinsomeofthedeals,hascreatedtroubleinmultiplecountries.IntheDemocraticRepublicofCongo,StarTimes’ssignalwastemporarilybannedin2013amidstallegationsthatitwasoperatingillegally.61 A coupleofyearsearlier,inKenya,allmajorcommercialtelevisionstationsstagedasignalblackouttoprotestthefactthataforeigncompany — StarTimes’sPANG — hadbeenawardedasignaldistributionlicence.62Eventually,theKenyangovernmentagreedtograntnewlicences.InMozambique,StarTimesfirstsecuredacontractwiththeMinistryofTransportandCommunicationtooverseethetransitionfromanaloguetodigitalwithoutpublictender,twicemissedthedeadlinetoimplementtheproject,andwasforcedtogothroughanewtenderingprocesstwoyearsaftertheoriginalagreementwassigned.63 TherehavealsobeenlegalbattlesinGhanaandZambia64and,inNigeria,in2020,senatorsopenedanenquiryintothefactthat,aftermorethantenyears,thejoint-venturebetweenStarTimesandtheNigerianTelevisionAuthority(NTA)hadreportednoprofit.65

Hardware provision and political alignment

ThenewinfrastructurebuiltfordigitaltelevisionhasrequiredupdatesintheoperatinghardwareofmanyAfricanbroadcasters.Inthisarea,Chinesecompanieshavealsobeenabletoassist,bothwithdonationsofequipment,andcapacitybuildingandtraining.InLiberia,since2008,teamsofChinesetechniciansandengineershavebeenhelpingtheLiberiaBroadcastingSystem(LBS)insettingupandtrainingpersonneltooperateallsortsofnewtechnology,includingsatelliteequipment,antennaeandtransmitters.66 In eachoftheprojects,andtherehavebeenfourofthemintenyears,Chinesecompaniesarecontractedtosetupthetechnology,Liberiantechniciansreceivetraining,someofitinChina,andeventuallya“handover”ceremonyisheld,duringwhich“control”oftheinfrastructureistransferredtolocalactors.AtthehandovereventorganisedattheendofPhaseIVoftheso-called“China-AidedBroadcastingTechnicalAssistanceProject”,theChineseAmbassadortoLiberia,FuJijun,wasclearaboutthegoalsthathiscountryhadfortheinitiative:itwasmeanttohelp“promoteandpropagateLiberia’spolicyagendaacrossthenation.” 67China’sassistancetoLiberiahassystematicallybeendirectedatState-runmedia,andthereforecriticisedbymediafreedomadvocatesoutsidethecountryassupportingthestatus quo.DouglasFarahandAndyMosher,oftheCentreforInternationalMediaAssistance,notethatin2008ChinaalsoupgradedtheinfrastructureofLiberia’sState-runradio,which,as


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opposedto“newlyestablishedindependentradiostations,”isknownforlargelypropagating“theviewsofthegovernmentwithlimitedcoverageofdissentingpoliticalopinions,especiallycoverageofoppositionevents”.68

ThecaseofLiberiaisnotunique.TherehavebeensomewhatsimilarprogrammesinplacesliketheComoros69andZambia,whereChina’sinvolvementinthemediasectorhasbeenunderscrutinyforsometime.Thrice,onorrightbeforeelectionyears(1996,2000and2005),ChinaprovidedtechnicalsupporttoZambia’sstate-runradio.Insupportingapro-governmentmediaoutlet,saysFacksonBanda,aformerprofessoratRhodesUniversityinSouthAfrica,ChinamighthaveultimatelybeentryingtosilencetheoppositionalPatrioticFront(PF),whichwascriticalofthePRCandsupportiveofTaiwan.70 Morerecently,theZambianNationalBroadcastingCorporation(ZNBC)hasalsoreceivedmaterialsupportfromStarTimes.Thetwoentitiesformedaverycontroversialjointventure(60%StarTimes,40%ZNBC)tocreateTopStar,71 aDTTsignaldistributor.Thepowerofsignaldistributorsresidesintheirabilityto“turnoff”signalsattherequestsoflegislatorsand,byextension,foreigngovernments,weretheytobedispleasedwiththecoverageofagivenchannel.Thisexplainswhy,insomecountries,includingZambiaandKenya,awardingStarTimes — aforeigncompany — thisroleofsignaldistributorwasseenascontentious.StarTimeshasalsobeeninvolvedintheremodellingofZNBC’sstudiosandcontrolroom72andintheprovisionofmulti-million-dollarbroadcastingvans.73TheZNBC-StarTimesdealshavefacedcourtproceedingsandneverbeenmadefullypublic.Allofthesehaveledsome,includingformerUSNationalSecurityAdvisorJohnBolton,toaccuseStarTimesofhavingtakenoverZNBC.TheZambiangovernment,aswellasStarTimes,havevehementlyrefutedsuchaccusations.74

Many(relatively)richcountries,includingJapan,Canada,Sweden,GermanyandtheUS,haveactivemedia-assistanceprogrammesdirectedatAfricannations.Theirefforts,however,aresignificantlydifferenttothoseofChina,asmediascholarValerieCooperexplains.75Primarily,asthecasesofLiberiaandZambiashow,Chineseaidisalmostalwaysaimedatsupportingeithergovernmentagenciesandinstitutions,orpro-governmentmedia,andofteninvolvesaChineseprivatecompanythatistobenefitfromtheproject.Mostothercountries’supportgoestowardsindependentmedia,suchascommunityradiostations,andfundingisprovidedforprojectsrunbyNGOsthatsharethefundinggovernment’sviewofdevelopment.Inaddition,Chinesematerialsupporttendstoavoiddirectinvolvementintheactualcontentofthemedia.ProgrammesrunbycountriesthatarepartoftheOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee


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(DAC),whichincludesmostofthoseinEuropeandNorthAmerica,seemediaasatoolforthepromotionofvaluessuchassocialjustice,genderequality,andsupportfordemocracy.Insupportingmediadevelopment,thesecountriesrequirethatprojectsbebasedonthesesharedvalues.Byaligningwithmediathataresupportiveofthegovernment,andbynotimposingconditionsonthetypeofcontent,ChinesematerialsupportactsasareinforcerofAfricanpoliticalelitesthatarealreadyfavourabletowardsChina,asaidisnotdispensedtocountriesthatarecriticalofBeijing’spolicies.Ultimately,“infrastructureandtechnicalsupportisprovidedinordertorealignAfricancountrieswithChinesetechnology,”and“suchtechnologicaldependenceisalmostalwayslinkedtootherformsofdependencies — economic,social,educational,”warnsFacksonBanda,theZambianprofessoratRhodes.

A threat to national security?

OutsideofAfrica,StarTimesremainsfairlyunknown,andfewforeignpowershaveflaggedthecompany’soperationsonthecontinentasamatterforconcern.76Infact,veryfewAfricanpoliticiansandcommentatorshavetakenexplicitaimatPangXinxing’scompany.Thatisnotthecaseoftheothertwomajortelecomconglomerateswithasubstantialpresenceonthecontinent,HuaweiandZTE.BotharewellknownoutsideofChina,andtheiroperationsworldwide,includingthoseinAfrica,havebecomeamajorforeignpolicytopicintheUS,Australia,andtheEuropeanUnion,amongothers.77ThegovernmentsofsomeofthesecountriesareconcernedthatChinesefirms,eventhosethatarenotdirectlyownedbytheState,mightposeathreattotheirnationalsecurityastheycouldbehidinga“backdooraccess”intheirequipmentthroughwhichChinesegovernmentagenciescouldgatherintelligenceandcollectsensitiveinformation.78TheresponsetothisperceivedthreatbycountriessuchasAustraliaandtheUShasbeentobantheuseofcertainChinesetechnologyinthedevelopmentofdomestictelecommunicationnetworksandtorecommendothercountriestodothesame.Huawei,ZTEandtheChinesegovernmenthaverepeatedlycontestedsuchallegations.79

SpeakingtoForeign Policy,HowardFrenchofColumbiaUniversityandaformerNew York TimescorrespondentinChinaandWestAfricahasaslightlydifferentview.The“ideathatHuaweiwouldneverrevealanythingtotheChinesestateifaskedisimplausible”,hesaid,“becauseanyChinesecompanyhastooperatewithintherulesoftheChinesestate”.80NeitherthepossibilityofhavingChinagetbackdooraccesstosensitiveinformation,norpressurefromUSdiplomatstocuttieswithChinesecompanies,81havedeterredAfricangovernmentsfrom


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trustingHuaweiandZTEwiththeupgradeoftheirtelecomnetworks.Whenaskedabouthisviewsonthetopic,SouthAfricanPresidentCyrilRamaphosawasunequivocal:“wesupportacompany[Huawei]thatisgoingtotakeourcountry,andindeedtheworld,tobettertechnologies”,andaddedthat“wecannotaffordtohaveoureconomytobeheldbackbecauseofthisfight”.82 ToEricOlander,editorofThe China Africa Project,anti-Huaweinarrativesarelikelyto“failinAfrica”,astheyhavesofar,becauseChinesecompaniesofferthreethings:cheaperproducts,reliability,andeasyaccesstocredit.83 A reportbyMelanieHartandJordanLinkattheCentreforAmericanProgress,apolicyresearchandadvocacyorganisationbasedinWashington,DC,listsmorethan50deals(2004-2019)betweenHuaweiandAfricangovernmentsinwhichChina’sEximbankactedasasoftcreditor.Totheauthors,this,alongsideBeijing’ssubsidiestoitstelecomcompaniesanditsabilitytointerfereinthestandardisationprocessesattheITU,setthepathforHuaweito“extenditsdominanceinto6Gandbeyond”.84

AccordingtoformerChineseAmbassadortoSouthAfrica,LiSongtian,Huaweitechnologyhasbeenusedin70%of“thebackbonenetworkinginfrastructure”inAfrica,85whichisacrucialcomponentinmobileandotherformsofwirelesscommunication.WithZTEtechnologyaccountingforanother10%,itisratherevidentthatChinesecompaniesdohavetheupperhandonthecontinent,whereHuaweifirststartedoperatingin1997,afterreceivingaUS$4millioncontractinKenya.86Thecompany’soperationalvolumehasjumpedsignificantlysincethen.SalesinAfricatoppedUS$2billionin2006,87andby2011thecompanywasearningalmost13%ofallitsannualrevenueonthecontinent.88 Huawei,whichwasfoundedin1988,isaprivateenterprise,anditsCEO,RenZhengfei,isaformerofficerinthePLA.Inadditiontotelecommunicationsnetworkequipment,Huawei’sbusinessinAfricaalsoincludesconsumerproducts(includingmobilephones,computers,andtablets),whichiswhatmostcitizensknowthecompanyfor.Chinesemobilephonemanufacturers,fromHuaweitoTranssion(makerofpopularbrandssuchasItel,TecnoandInifinix),dominatetheAfricanmarket.89

Huawei’scorporatecampusinShenzhen,inSouthernChina,isnotfarfromZTE’s.FoundedthreeyearsearlierthanHuawei,ZTEhasalwaysbeenpartlyownedbytheStatethroughacomplexownershipstructurethat,accordingtoJapan’sNikkei Asian Review,canbetracedbacktomilitary-linkedconglomerates.90ZTE’soperationsinAfricarepresentedalmost20%ofthecompany’sglobalrevenuein2010,buthasbeendecreasingannuallysincethen.In2017,itstoodataround5%.MostofZTE’ssuccessinAfricahasbeenlinkedtoitsstrategicpartnershipwithEthiopia’sState-ownedEthioTelecom


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in2006,andthenagainin2013,forprojectsworthoverUS$3billion.ZTEhelpedbuildEthiopia’sbackbonenetworkinGSM(GlobalSystemforMobileCommunications)andCDMA(CodeDivisionMultipleAccess)andpartneredwithHuaweitoupgrade3Gand4Gnetworks.BeforeagreeingtoopenuptoChinesecompanies,writesTéwodrosWWorknehofKentStateUniversity,Ethiopia’stelecommunicationssectorhadbeentightlykeptasaverticallyintegratedmonopolyoftheState,andwasseenasa“strategicassetfortheeconomyandnationalsecurity,whichthestate[couldnot]affordto‘letgo’”.91AsthedevelopmentoftelecommunicationsequipmentoutpacedtheState’scapabilitiestobetechnologicallyself-reliant,Ethiopianofficialsfacedachoice.Theycouldkeeppotentialforeigninterferenceofftheirover-stretchedinfrastructureandretaintechnologicalsovereignty,ortheycouldpartnerwithChina,apoliticalally,andopenupthesectortoforeignactors.Thelatterwasseenasthe“lesserevil”.

Chinesetelecoms’reachinAfricaextendsbeyondmobileandwirelesscommunicationsanditisintheseotherareaswhereAfricancivilsocietyandoppositionpartieshavebeensomewhatvocalintheirresistancetosometypesofChinesetechnology.92AspartofXiJinping’s“DigitalSilkRoad”project,93 Huawei,ZTEandothershavebeenencouragedtouptheirbusinessinunderseainternetcabledevelopment;sellingsurveillancetechnology,oftenpackagedas“SmartCity”technology;orallegedlyprovidingtoolstobettermonitor,controland,whenneeded,restrict,accesstotheInternet.94Chinesecompaniesarenotaloneinthesesectors,asnumerouscountries(Iran,US,andFrance)arecashinginonsomeoftheselucrativeindustries,wheredemandishigh.95 WhilepushbackagainstChinesefirmsexists,itremainslimited.In2018,theFrenchnewspaperLe Monde,claimedthatITexpertsattheAfricanUnionhadfoundthatthecomputerserversinthebuildingweresendingdatabacktoShanghai.96Farfromunleashingacontinent-widecondemnationgivenhowmanygovernmentbuildingsinAfricancountrieshavebeenbuiltbyChinesecontractors,thestorywassoonkilled.NotonlywereChinesediplomatsquicktoappearonlocalmediatodiscreditthereport,whichwasneverretractedbyLe Monde,butfewAfricanofficialstookavocalandcriticalstance.AftermorethantwodecadesofChineseengagementinthetelecomssector,manycountriesonthecontinentaresimplytoodependentonChinesetechnologytodoanythingaboutit.


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Content production and distribution

On11January2012,thedayCCTVAfrica,China’sfirstoverseasproductionandbroadcastingcentre,wasofficiallylaunchedinNairobi,LiGuangyuan,China’sAmbassadortoKenya,tookthefloortosuggestthatjournalistsworkingatthestationneededtofocustheirreportingonthreethings.First,theyshouldpresent“theaudienceofChinaandtherestoftheworldwithacolourfulAfricawhichisboldlyandconfidentlymarchingtowardsprosperity”.Second,journalistsshouldintroduce“thesuccessfulexperiencesofChina’seconomicdevelopment,China’sforeignpolicyofpeacefuldevelopment,China’sbrillianthistoryandcultureaswellasChinesepeople’slife,”inordertotellAfricaagood“storyofChina”.And,third,afteraccusingan“unjustinternationalmediaorder”of“makingfalsechargesagainstus[China]bymisleadingpublicopinion,”ambassadorLiaskedCCTVAfricato“telltheworldagood‘storyofChina-Africafriendship’”.97Ayearlater,ataConferenceonPropagandaandThoughtWorkinChina,thenrecentlyelectedPresidentXiJinpingbeganusingthephrase“tellingChina’sstorywell,”whichhehasgoneontorepeatoverandover.98 This messagehasbeencleartothoseworkingforChinesemediainAfricaforsometime,whethertheyareinthenewsorentertainmentindustries.Totell“China’sstorywell”,Chinesemediahavebenefittedfromgenerousfundingthatnotalloftheircompetitorsenjoy;mostcompanieshavebeenabletohireAfricantalent,and,sofar,havenotbeenunderpressuretoreachlargeswathesofthepopulation,giventhatmostofthemarenotoperatingtobeprofitable,atleastnotintheshortandmediumterm.

ThereissomeevidencesuggestingthataudiencesofChineseState-ownedmediaare,infact,rathersmall,buttheirreachhasnonethelessbeengrowingovertheyears,thankstoaplethoraofagreements,contentexchangesandco-productionswithAfricanmedia,mostofthemState-owned.99China’sextendedpresenceacrossmostofAfrica,aswellasitscommitmenttoremainingonthecontinentforsometime,hasmadeitrelativelyeasytodeveloprelationshipswithlocalpartners,whoareeagertoreceivematerialandtechnologicalassistance.MostoftheseagreementsguaranteethatChinesemediawillhaveeasieraccesstodomesticaudiences(forexample,bybroadcastingtelevisioncontentproducedbyChinaonState-runchannelsinAfrica),100butveryfewoftheseagreementsgrantsimilaraccesstoChineseaudiencestoAfricanproducersandcreators.Inotherwords,whenitcomestocooperationinthenewsandentertainmentindustries,aswasthecasewiththedevelopmentoftelecommunicationsinfrastructure,China-Africarelationsarepredominantly


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unidirectional,andtheprospectsthatthiswillchangeinthenearfutureareminimal.

Chinese news content from Africa, for whom?

TherearefiveChineseStatenewsoutletsoperatinginAfricathatgeneratecontentaimedatlocalandglobalaudiences:Xinhua,CGTNAfrica,China Daily, ChinAfrica and ChinAfrique,andCRI.Inaddition,thePeople’s Daily, a newspaper, andHongKongbasedPhoenixTVusuallyhaveoneormorejournalistsstationedonthecontinent,whoreportmostlyinChinesefordomesticaudiences,aswellasdiasporiccommunities.China Daily’sofficeinNairobiemploysfourpeople,twoofwhomareChinese.101Theycontributetothenewspaper’sAfricaWeeklysupplement,whichclaimedacirculationof20 000copiesin2014.102MostofthesecopiesaresenttoChineseembassiesanddistributedfreelytoAfricancompanies,newsrooms,andgovernmentbuildings.Thecombinedcirculationofsubscription-basedChinAfrica and ChinAfrique is saidtobe30000copiespermonth.103TheEnglishversionisprintedandsoldinSouthAfrica,andtheFrenchoneinSenegal.CRI,CGTNAfricaandXinhuahavethelargestoperations,includingbureausinmultiplecountries.Thenewsagency’sheadquartershouseapproximately40people,includingjournalists’familymemberswhoresideinthegatedcompound,whileCGTN’sproductioncentreinNairobiemployssomewherebetween120and150people,themajorityofwhomareKenyan.104EmploymentdataforCRI,whichalsoproducessomeofitsAfricancontentfromBeijing,ishardtocomeby.

EventhoughinternationalstaffarepredominantatCGTN,operationsinNairobiareentirelyoverseenbyChinesenationals.Thebureauchief,managingeditor,anddeputymanagingeditor,aswellasalldepartmentheads(broadcasting,technical,andmediaoperations),programmesupervisorsandproducersareChinese.105Thoseinmanagerialpositionsarerarelyinvolvedintheday-to-daybusinessofthenewsroom,whichiscoordinatedbyadeskeditorandseverallineproducerswhoarenotChinese.However,beforeashowgoesonair,contentisalwayscheckedbyaChinesenational.Becausejournalistsareawareofwhatmightgetflagged,self-censorshipiscommon.106AtXinhua,allnewsstories,manyofwhicharewrittenbyAfricancollaboratorsandfreelancersstationedacrossthecontinent,mustbefiledwiththeNairobieditors,whoareChinese,beforetheyareeventuallysenttosubscribers.107Theseoversighteditorialproceduresarestandardinmostnewsroomsworldwide,includingthoseofotherinternationalmediabasedinAfrica,buttheverycleardivisionofrolesbasedonnationalityisuniquetoChinesemedia.108


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WhenCGTNAfricastartedoperations,severalwell-knownKenyanTVpersonalitiesdecidedtojointhestation.JournalistBeatriceMarshall,afamiliarfacetomanyKenyans,leftKTN,aprivatebroadcaster,tobecometheleadanchoratCGTN.Shewasjoinedbyveteraneditorswithyearsofexperienceinlocalandinternationalmedia,suchastheBBC,aswellasyoungreporters,someofwhomhavebecomehouseholdnamesinKenyasincetheylefttheirjobsatCGTN,likeEricNjokaandMarkMasai.WorkingforaChinesenewsorganisationisseenbymanyKenyanmediaprofessionalsasaformofupwardmobility,particularlyforyoungjournalists,giventherelativelygeneroussalariestheyreceive,ifcomparedtolocalmedia.Thedownside,atleastaccordingtothosewhodecidetoleavethestation,isthattherearelimitationstowhattheyareabletoreporton.109InthewordsofaformerCGTNeditor,“themajoragendaforCGTNinAfricaispropaganda,thatispropagatingChina’sinterestsinAfrica,throughitsownvoiceandmedium”.110Marshall,whohasbeenanchoringthenewsforCGTNAfricasince2012,disagrees:“Icanguaranteeyouthatwehavebeen100%incontrolofourowneditorialcontent.Arethereanyredlines?Upuntilthispoint,absolutelynot”.111

ResearcherswhohavestudiedthecontentofChinesemediainAfricaseemtodisagreewithbothcharacterisationsandsuggestamorenuancedpicture.NotallcontentpublishedbyChinesemedia,includingCGTN,shouldbedisregardedasmere“propaganda”,and,atthesametime,itwouldbeinaccuratetoentertaintheideathattherearenoeditorial“redflags”.Inreality,notonlyarecertaintopics,opinionsandexpressionscompletelyoff-limits,112butsome“unspokenrules”ofwhatcanandcannotbesaidalsoexist.Forexample,newsreportsanddocumentariesonCGTNmustnevershowimagesofSouthAfricanNobelPeacePrizewinnerDesmondTutu,aclosefriendoftheDalaiLama,whohassupportedTibetanindependence,atopicthatisneverdiscussedonChinese media.113

InsteadofdescribingChinesemediainbinaryterms(propagandavs.notpropaganda),itmightbemoreusefultothinkofnewscontentasahierarchyoftopicsthatdetermineshowmucheditorialoversightisenforced.NewsstoriesthatrefertoChinaarecloselymonitoredbyeditors,andareoftenreportedwiththeexactsamewordsacrossallmedia,sincetheytendtohavetofollowtheguidelinessetbyrelevantinstitutionswithintheParty.However,editorialsupervisionisminimalwhennewsstoriesareaboutnon-politicalstoriesinAfricancountries.114WhetherjournalistsarereportingaboutentrepreneurshipinEgypt,orfloodinginSouthSudan,thegeneralprincipleisthat“positivestories”arepreferred.Thatsaid,ChinesemanagersrarelyinterfereonhowAfricanjournalistscoveruncontroversialtopicsinAfrica.ZhangYangqiuof


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theCommunicationUniversityofChinadescribesthisapproachtojournalismas“constructive”.Journalistsareencouragedtofocusonsolutionstoexistingproblems,ratherthanontheproblemsthemselves.115Becauseofthispreferencefor“positivenews”,contentonChinesemediaisrarelycriticalofAfricangovernments,andjournalistsneverengageininvestigationsthatcouldleadtouncoveringcasesofcorruptionorabusesofpower.Inseparatestudies,VivienMarsh,fromWestminsterUniversity,andSelmaMihoubi,fromSorbonneUniversity,haveshownthatreportsonCGTNandCRIfocuslargelyonvoicingtheviewsofpoliticalelitesandgovernmentofficials,whethertheseareAfricanorChinese,ratherthancivilsociety,oppositionparties,orotherpotentiallycriticalvoices.116

Everyday,thestaffatCGTNAfricaproducetwoAfrica-focusednewscastsinEnglish(called“AfricaLive”)thatarebroadcastgloballyonCGTN,thechanneltowhichtheKenyaproductioncentrereports.Thenewsroomalsoputstogetheradailybusinessprogramme(“GlobalBusiness”),andaweeklytalkshow(“TalkAfrica”),sportsmagazine(“SportsScene”),anddocumentaryseries(“FacesofAfrica”).PartofthiscontentistranslatedandairedonCGTN’sFrench-languagechannelduringadailyAfrica-focusednewscast(“AfriqueInfos”).Inalloftheseprogrammes,contentaboutAfricaispredominant.ThesamecouldbesaidaboutXinhua’snewsoutputfromitsNairobiheadquarters.TheagencycoversthecontinentinChinese,FrenchandEnglish,andsomeofthesestoriesarethentranslatedintootherlanguages.In2013,Xinhua’sNairobihubwasdispatching1800storiesinEnglish,2000inFrench,2200photographsand150videoitems.117

However,notallChinesemediainAfricacoverthecontinentasthoroughlyasCGTNandXinhuado.China Daily’sWeeklyAfricaEdition,publishedinEnglish,and ChinAfricafocusmostoftheircontentonChinaandChina-Africarelations.In2019,7outof12magazinecoversofChinAfrica,publishedbythePeople’s Dailygroup,theofficialnewspaperoftheCCP,wereaboutChinesedomesticpolicies:ruraleducation,high-speedtrains,greenerenergy,anddomesticgrowth.TherestcoveredAfrica-Chinatopics,suchastheBeltandRoadInitiative(BRI),ChinesefundingforAfricanstart-ups,andChina’srolewithintheAfricanUnion.118OnCRI,whichhasdailybroadcastsinArabic,English,French,Hausa,andSwahili,listenersarelikelytofindamixofglobalnews.Forexample,CRI’smorningnewsinHausaon4June2020featuredtenstories:twoonChina,threeabouttheUS,fouronAfrica,andoneaboutChina-Africacooperation.119

Despitethedifferentapproachtoreportingthenews,allChinesemediainAfricadohaveonethingincommon:theirreachamongthegeneralpopulation


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islimited.ThatisaccordingtosurveysconductedinKenya,NigeriaandSouthAfrica,120giventhatnoofficialdataonaudiencesisavailablefromChinesemediathemselves.In2018,inKenyaandNigeria,between7%and8%ofpeoplesaidtheyhadwatchedCGTNAfricasometimeinthepreviousweek.InSouthAfrica,thenumberwas2%.ThatisfarbelowtheBBC,forexample,whichwasasourceofinformationforatleast20%ofpeople.CRI’sradiolistenershipwasminimal(lessthan1%inallthreecountries),andsowasreadershipofChina Daily,eitheronpaperoronline(around1%).Afollow-upsurveyin2020revealednosignificantchangeswhencomparedto2018.Accordingtothesamestudy,inallthreecountries,audiencessaytheyknowandtrusttheBBCandCNNbetterthantheyknowortrustCGTN,buttheirperceptionsofanotherinternationalbroadcaster,Russia’sRTarefarworsethanthoseofCGTN.AlJazeeraEnglishfallssomewhereinbetween.

Cooperation, partnerships and local distribution of news

content

FouryearsafterhavingopeneditsfirstoverseasFMradiostationinNairobi,inAugust2010,CRIbeganexpandingitsbroadcastingcapabilitiesonthecontinent.ItsfocushasbeenprimarilyonFrench-speakingcountries,startingwiththewiderSahelregioninWestAfrica(Senegal,MauritaniaandNiger),andthenmovingeastwardstoreachDjiboutiandtheComoros,aswellasotherCentralandEasternAfricannations.Inallofthesecountries,CRIhasbeengrantedlicencestooperateoneormoreFMradiofrequencyaspartofwidercooperationagreementsthatoftenincludetheprovisionofinfrastructure,trainingandcontentexchanges.Between2010and2013,CRIaddedfourfrequenciesinSenegalthatbroadcastcontentinFrench,withsomeverylimitedlocallyproducedcontentinWolof(thefrequenciesoperateinthecitiesofDakar,Saint-Louis,KaolackandZiguinchor);fourinNiger,broadcastinginFrenchandHausa(Maradi,Zinder,andAgadez,plusoneinNiameythatopenedin2007);oneeachinMauritaniaandDjiboutibroadcastinginArabicandFrench;oneeachintheComoros,RepublicofCongo,andtheCentralAfricanRepublic,broadcastinginFrench;andoneinBurundi,with21hoursofFrenchcontentand3hoursinSwahili.SwahilibroadcastsalsoreachTanzania(Zanzibar),Kenya(NairobiandMombasa)andUganda(KampalaandJinja).Inadditiontoallthese,in2019,CRIresumeditsshortwavebroadcastsfromarelaytowerneartheMaliancapital,Bamako,afacilitythathadbeenoperating,withsubsequentupgrades,almostuninterruptedlysincethe1970s.121When,in2017,ChinaandMalirenewedtheirarrangementtooperatetheBamakorelay,Mali’sStateradio


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alsoagreedtorebroadcastcontentfromCRIonitsownfrequencies.122 Similar agreementshavebeensignedinothercountries.123

CRI’sstrategytoaircontentthroughagreementswithdomesticmediahasbeendescribedbythestationshead,WangGengnian,as“borrowingboatstosailoverseas”(jiechuan chuhai).124IthasalsobeenadoptedbyotherChinesemediaoperatinginAfrica.Forexample,CGTNAfrica’sdailynewscastisshownonKenya’snationalbroadcaster,KBC,everydayat10pm.In2010,Liberia’sLBSagreedtobroadcastingthreehoursofChineseproducedcontentonitsELTVstationeveryday.TomostAfricans,directlyaccessingCGTN’scontentimplieshavingamonthlysubscriptiontooneofthemanypaytelevisionprovidersthatcarrythechannelontheirbouquets.WithagreementsliketheonessignedwithKBCandLBS,however,CGTNbypassesthislimitationandmightbereachingawideraudience.Also,becausethisisacasualexposure,audiencesmightbelesslikelytoassociatethecontentwithChina,andbemorereceptivetotheState-sanctionednarrativestowhichtheyareexposed.Thereisanother“boat”thatCGTNhasborrowedtoreachAfricantelevisionaudiences.Insomecountries,CGTN’ssignalisnowpartofthefree-to-airline-upofDTTchannels.Forexample,viewersintheSeychelleswhodonotwanttopayamonthlysubscriptioncanstillwatchninechannelsforfree.Ontopofthenationalbroadcaster,SBC,theline-upalsoincludesCGTNandCGTNFrançais,aswellasFrance’sTV5MondeandFrance24.

Xinhua’smainstrategyinAfricahasbeentoprovideitscontentforfreeoratveryreducedcoststoAfricanmedia.ThisputstheChinesenewsagencyatanadvantageoveritscompetitors,Reuters(UK),AgenceFrancePresse(France),andAssociatedPress(UnitedStates),allofwhichchargenewsoutletsforaccesstotheircontinuousoutputofnewscontent.Xinhua’sagreementshavebeenwithlargemediaorganisations,suchasKenya’sNationMediagroup,thecountry’sleadingnewspaperpublisher,aswellasregionalandcommunitymedia.In2009,forinstance,eightState-runZimbabweannewspapersbeganusingXinhuastoriesintheirforeignnewspages.125Morecrucially,XinhuahasstruckagreementswithalargenumberofofficialandStatenewsagenciesacrossthecontinent,sothattheyalsodistributeitscontent.

FormanynewsmediainAfrica,StatenewsagenciessuchastheGhanaNewsAgency(GNA)orSenegal’sAgencedePresseSénégalaise(SAP),bothofwhichhavecontentexchangeagreementswithXinhua,aretheprimarysourceofnews.Insomecases,AfricannewsagencieswillparaphrasecontentwrittenbyXinhuaandreuseitintheirownreporting,butinmanycasesstoriesfromtheChineseagencyaresenttosubscriberswithoutchanges.Insomeinstance,the


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storymightbeattributedto“Agencies”,ortheremightnotbeanymentionofXinhuaatall.126MostoftheagreementssignedbyXinhuainAfricaimplysomedegreeofreciprocity,andChinesemediatendtoframethemintermsofSino-Africancooperation.ThisreciprocitymeansthatXinhuacanalsomakeuseofthecontentitreceivesfromthenewsorganisationsitpartnerswith.However,giventhatnoAfricannewsagencycreatescontentinChinese,anystoryproducedbyanAfricanpartnerorganisationthatXinhuaeditorsmightdecidetodelivertoChinesedomesticnewsoutletswouldhavehadtobetranslatedand,therefore,adjustedtoconformtoChineseofficialpolicy.

InKenya,Xinhuahasalsosignedcontentexchangeagreementswiththenationalbroadcaster,KBC.In2017,thestationdebuted“MyRailway,MyStory”,athree-partdocumentaryseriesproducedbyXinhuaaboutChina’sconstructionoftheStandardGaugeRailway(SGR)betweenNairobiandMombasa.127 ControversiesrelatedtotheSGRproject,fromitscoststotheenvironmentalimpact,areoftenonthefrontpagesofKenyannewspapers.128Noneofthese,however,werepartofXinhua’sdocumentary.KBCandXinhuahavealsobeencooperatingforyearsintheproductionof“DuniaWikiHii”(“TheWorldthisWeek”),a30-minutecurrentaffairsprogrammeinSwahilithatisprimarilybasedonfootageandnewsstoriesprovidedbyXinhua.129Thenewsagencyhasbeenexpandingitsservices,andin2010launcheditsowntelevisionchannel,ChinaXinhuaNewsNetwork(CNC).130 Althoughthestationisavailableonmanyplatforms,itsimpacthasbeenminimal.Itscontentisratherdry,veryfocusedoncommunicatingtheactivitiesofChineseleaders,andlackstheprofessionalbroadcastqualitythatCGTNhas.DespiteCNCnotbeingpopular,muchofthecontentthatXinhuajournalistsproduceforitsprogrammesisalsoofferedtobroadcastersworldwide,includingKBC.Audiencesareoftenunawarethatthecontenttheyarewatching,listeningtoorreadingcomesfromXinhuaandotherChinesemedia.Inthissense,thestrategyof“borrowingboats”mightbeoneofChina’smostsuccessfulones.

Exporting television dramas and “kung fu” movies

Inorderto“tellChina’sstorywell”,asXiJinpinghasasked,Beijingisnotonlyrelyingonthenewsmedia,butalsotheentertainmentindustry.Inthisarea,StarTimeshasbeenleadingtheway.Inatleast16Africancountries,thecompanyprovidespaytelevisionserviceswhereitisabletodelivercarefullyselectedChinesetelevisioncontent,alongsidelocalandinternationalchannels.InSouthernAfrica,thecompanyoperatesunderthebrandStarSat,andinZambiaitusestheTopStartrademark.Insomecountries,StarTimesonly


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operatesthroughsatellitelinks,whileinotherstheserviceisofferedaspartoftheDTTinfrastructurethatthecompanyishelpingbuild.Morerecently,andinresponsetogrowingcompetitionfromvideostreamingplatformslikeNetflix,StarTimeshasalsobeenpromotingStarTimesON,amobileappthatallowslivestreamingoftelevisionchannelsandvideo-on-demand.Followingthebusinessmodelofsimilarcompanieselsewhere,StarTimesprovidesdifferentsubscriptiontiersforitspaytelevisionservices.TheaveragecostofthebasicpackageisaroundUS$3.76,whichgetsaccesstoanywherebetween14and60channels,dependingonthecountry.Onlytwotelevisionstationsformpartofeveryoneofthesebasicpackages:CGTN(orCGTNFrançais),andSTSportsLife,whichofferslivecoverageofEuropeansoccerleagues,oneofStarTimes’sbiggestsellingpoints.131

InallbutthreeofthecountrieswhereStarTimesoperates,theentry-levelpaytelevisionsubscriptionalsoprovidesaccesstoSTKungfu,achannelthatspecialisesinChinesemartialarts-relatedcontentsuchasfilms,educationalprogrammesanddocumentaries.AsCobusvanStadenoftheSouthAfricanInstituteofInternationalAffairshasnoted,Africancountrieshavealonghistoryofwatching,mostlyHongKong,martialartsfilms,132andthereforemanyhavedevelopedatasteforthegenre,whichisnolongerproduceden masseattheformerBritishcolony,buthasbecomeastapleofChina’sfilmandtelevisionindustry.ByincreasingculturalexportstoAfrica,andthisincludesfilmsandtelevisionseries,Beijingiseagertoharnessmore“softpower”thanitcurrentlyhas.Thatis,itishopingtoigniteinterestinChinaamongthegeneralpopulationbyexposingthemtoaudio-visualcontentwiththeexpectationthatthiswill,inthelong-term,improveitsimageandglobalstanding,andleadtobeingperceivedmorepositively.Inmanyways,Chinaisfollowingtheplaybookthatbroughttwoofitsneighbours,SouthKoreaandJapan,tobecomegloballeadersinwhatDouglasMcGraycalled“GrossNationalCool”.133Tosomeextent,Beijing’sstrategycanalsobecomparedtoHollywood’sroleinhelpingspreadtheideaofthe“AmericanWayofLife”throughfilmsduringmuchofthepost-warperiod.Hollywood’ssuccessistightlylinkedtothesupportitreceivedfromsuccessiveUSadministrationsthatsawfilmasoneofthemostpowerfulpropagandatools.134China’sentertainmentindustryalsoenjoysStatesupport,butisstillstrugglingtomatchHollywood’saudiencesuccess.

Partoftheglobal“coolness”thatJapanandSouthKoreahavebeenabletocultivateinrecentyearscanbeattributedtothepopularityoftheirtelevisionsoap operas and dramas.135Therefore,itisnotsurprisingthattelevisionserieshavebecomeoneofChina’slargestculturalexportstoAfricaandthattheindustryhasreceivedbroadinstitutionalsupport.In2011,thenational


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broadcastersofKenyaandTanzaniaairedforthefirsttimeaSwahili-dubbedversionof“Abeautifuldaughter-in-law,”atelevisionseriessetinurbanChinaaboutthetensionsbetweenabrideandhermother-in-law.136AccordingtoChinesemedia“morethansixmillionTanzanians”watchedtheseries.137Sincethen,thenumberofexportedtelevisionseriestoAfricahasbeengrowingmoreorlesssteadily,inpartbecauseStarTimeshastakenanactiveroleindubbingthemintowidelyspokenlanguagesonthecontinent,includingHausa,Yoruba,Zulu,Luganda,English,FrenchandPortuguese.In2017,thecompanywassaidtohavedubbedmorethan8000hoursoftelevisioncontent.138MostoftheseshowsarebroadcastonStarTimes’schannels,includingonereservedforChinesetelevisionseries(STSinoDrama)andseveralthatfocusonlinguisticcommunities(STYoruba,STSwahili,andSTDadinKowaforHausaandSTEyethuforZulu).Inaddition,agreementsareperiodicallysignedwithAfricantelevisionstations,suchasSenegal’sRTSorKenya’sKBC,toairsomeoftheseries.139

Ina2018videonewsstoryproducedbyChina.org.cn,awebsiteunderthesupervisionofChina’sStateCouncilInformationOffice,ajournalistclaimsthatChinesetelevisionseriesarepopularamongAfricanaudiencesbecause“modesty,valuingfamilyharmonyandothercodesofethicsembodiedinChinesefilmsandTVplaysholdculturalappealinsomeareasofAfrica,whichalsohavealargepopulationandastrongattachmentamongbigfamilies.” 140 ThisisarecurrentnarrativethatChinesemediausewhenpraisingtheallegedsuccessofChinesetelevisioncontentinAfrica.141However,independentaudiencedatadonotexist,andthereforeitisdifficulttoassesstheactualpopularityofthistypeofcontent.MostagreementstobroadcastChinesetelevisionseries,whichareusuallyofferedtobroadcastersatnocost,arespearheadedbyembassiesanddiplomats,ratherthanbeingledbytrueaudiencedemand,asmightbethecaseforTurkishandFilipinosoapoperas,whichcirculatewidelyinAfrica.142ThetypeoftelevisioncontentthatBeijingisofferingtoexporttoAfricanaudiencestendstofocuslargelyonurbanChina,andpresentstheimageofanorderlysociety,inwhichsocialproblemsaredealtwith“harmoniously”.Topicssuchasseverepoverty,theshortcomingsoftheState,orthetreatmentofethnicminoritiesareabsent.143ThetelevisionseriesandshowsthatareexportedarenotnecessarilythemostpopularinChina,buttheyaretunedtothe“mainmelody”,asformerChinesePresidentJiangZeminreferredtoculturalproductsthatfallinlinewiththeofficialdiscourseoftheParty.144

Sometimes“mainmelody”filmsbecomeblockbustersinChina,butexportingthemisnotalwaysaneasytask.Takethecaseof“WolfWarrior2”,afilmdirected,producedandstarredbyWuJing,oneofChina’sbest-knownactors.


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Itwentontobecomethehighest-grossingChinesefilmofalltimes,andbrokeallsortsofboxofficerecords,butnevertookoffoutsideofChina.145InSouthAfrica,wherepartsofthefilmwereshot,theChineseEmbassyorganisedapublicscreening,andthefilmwasreleasedinearlyNovember2017,146butthereisnorecordthatthefilmgeneratedanyincomeintheboxoffice.147Partofthedomesticsuccessofthefilmwasattributedtoitsnationalisticstoryline,whichseesWuJing’scharacterfightingforeignmercenariestorescueagroupofChinesedoctorsworkingoverseas.Themaincharacterhastofaceamilitarycoup,acorruptmilitia,theoutbreakofadeadlyinfectiousdisease,andpervasivepoverty,allofwhichhappeninthespanofafewdaysinonesingleunnamedAfricancountry.BeatonGalafa,aMalawianwriter,hassuggestedthatthefilm“reiteratestropesfromWesterncolonialnarrativesmisrepresentingAfrica,”addingthat“negativeimagesofAfricamarthefilm’sAfricanappeal.” 148 ThediscrepancybetweenBeijing’sofficialnarrativeofChina-Africarelationsandthetypeofrelationshipdepictedinthefilm,whichhadtoreceiveapprovalfromtheauthoritiesbeforeitwasreleased,showsthegapthatexistsbetweenofficialpolicyandtheactorsinvolvedinimplementingsaidpolicies.

Thisgapismuchmorepronouncedintheentertainmentindustrythaninthenewsindustry.Thisis,inpart,becausetherearemanymoreactorsthataretryingto“tellChina’sstorywell”throughfilms,televisionseries,cartoons,andotherformsofaudio-visualentertainment,thantherearenewsmediadoingthesamething.Thismakesitmoredifficulttocraftasingleunifiedmessage.InAfrica,since2014,differentagenciesbelongingtotheBeijingMunicipality,asecond-tierlevelofadministrationinChina,haveorganisedbroadcasting“seasons”and“exhibitions”incountrieslikeTanzania,KenyaandCôted’Ivoire.149 Aspartoftheseefforts,in2017,a“CarnivalofFilmsandTVdrama”brought24filmsto16villagesandcitiesinZambia.Inmostoftheseactivities,thecityofBeijinghaspartneredwithStarTimes,whichhasbecomethemainpointofentryforChineseagenciesandcompaniesinterestedinculturalexportstoAfrica.150 Aspartofthispartnership,theBeijingMunicipalBureauofRadioandTelevisionandStarTimesannouncedtheywouldbecreatingthefirst“Sino-AfricantalentTVshow”in2019.151Thatsameyear,NigeriancomedianAY(AyoMakun)agreedtoco-produceafilm,“30daysinChina,”withShanghai-basedHuahuaMedia.152 Despiteisolatedcaseslikethese,co-productionbetweenAfricanandChinesecreatorsremainslimited.


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Engaging with public opinion

AccordingtodatafromtheAfrobarometer,asurveyconductedperiodicallyinmultipleAfricancountries,in2019/2020,around60%ofpeopleinthe16nationsfromwheredataareavailablesaidthatChinahasaverypositiveorsomewhatpositiveinfluenceonthecontinent.Thisisdownfrom65%in2014/2015.153Despitethesignificantdropinperceptions,viewsonChinaremainmorepositiveamongAfricansthantheyareamongcitizensofmostAsian,EuropeanandNorthAmericancountries.154AstheexchangesbetweenChineseactorsandAfricancountrieshaveincreasedovertheyears,manyofwhichareoverthemedia,sohavethechancesthatpublicsentimentmightbederailedbysmallorlargecrises.Intheperiodthatgoesfrom2014to2020,therehavebeenmanyofthose.InFebruary2018,forexample,China’snationalbroadcasteraireditsannualSpringFestivalGala,atelevisionextravaganzathatwasoncethemostwatchedtelevisionprogrammeintheworld.Forthefirsttime,itincludedacomedyskitaboutChina-Africarelations.Farfromawarmwelcome,itreceivedsignificantbacklash — eventhoughCCTVneversawareasontoapologiseforit — becauseitdepictedaChineseactressinblackfaceandhadseveralAfricanactorsdressedasanimals.155Afewmonthslater,aChinese“businessman”wasexpelledfromKenyaafterreferringtoKenyansonsocialmedia,includingPresidentUhuruKenyatta,as“monkeys”.156In2020,amidsttheCovid-19pandemic,BeijinghadtofaceaccusationsthatAfricanslivinginthesouthernChinesecityofGuangzhouwereraciallyprofiledanddiscriminatedagainst.157AstudythatcomparedviewstowardsChinabeforeandduringtheCovid-19pandemicfoundthat,while,inearly2018,Chinahadafavourabilityindexof56inKenyaand44inSouthAfrica(where100isthemostfavourablescore),inMay2020theindexhaddecreasedto44and37respectively.158

ManyoftheeventsthatmightexplainthedropinpositiveviewstowardsChinaovertimearenotunderthecontrolofChineseauthorities.Nonetheless,Beijinghasseenaneedtobemoreengagedinpreventingcommunicationcrisesfromescalatingandtobemoreinvolvedin“guiding”publicopinion,thesamewaythatauthoritieshavebeentryingtodoinChinaforyears.Toachievethis,Beijinghasbeenaddinganewsetoftoolstoitsmedia“cooperation”repertoirethataremuchmoreshort-term-oriented.Harnessing“softpower”throughentertainmentandbuildinganaudienceforChinesenewsisaslowprocess.Managingpublicdistrustorcriticismrequiresstrategiesthatwillreturnmoreimmediateresults.Withthisgoalinmind,startingin2016,Chineseofficials,includingmanydiplomats,havebegunengagingwithAfricanaudiencesdirectlyviasocialmedia.Afterall,thethreesample“crises”presentedabovestarted


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andwereamplifiedonsocialmedia.Inaddition,toovercomethedifficultiesofhavingChina’svoicereproducedonlocalmedia,Chinesecompaniesanddiplomaticmissionshavebecomemoreactiveinengagingwiththesenewsorganisations.Thesenewstrategieshavearrivedwithamoreassertivetoneinhowpublicofficialscommunicateaboutcertainissues,particularlythosethatBeijingseesassensitiveforitsnationalsecurity.

Wolf warrior diplomacy in Africa

WhileFacebook,Twitter,InstagramandotherUS-basedsocialmediaplatformsarenotallowedtooperateinChina,globalChinesemediahavebeenusingthemforsometimetoreachwideraudiencesoutsidethecountry.CRIandChina Dailyopenedtheirfirstglobalaccountsin2009,whileXinhuafollowedin2012.SomeaccountswithcontentaimedatAfricanaudiences,suchasCRI’sSwahiliandHausapagesonFacebookandTwitter,startedoperatingmorerecently.Theirfollowershavebeengrowingrapidly,amidstaccusationsthattheymighthavebeen“acquired”from“clickfarms”.159InOctober2015,CCTVAfrica’s(nowCGTNAfrica)Facebookpagewaslikedbylessthanhalfamillionusers.ByearlyOctober2020,thatnumberhadgoneupto4.7million.ThosefollowingCGTNAfrica’sYouTubechannelhavegonefrom28000in2015tooverhalfamillionin2020.Xinhua’sglobalFacebookpage — whichhasseverallocalisedplatformsinAfrica,dependingoneachuser’slanguagesettings — hadmorethan86millionfollowersin2020,comparedto2.2millioninOctober2015,and4.8millioninMarch2016.160MostofBeijing’ssocialmediaaccountsfollowa“monologue”approachtoreachingaudiences.161Thatis,theybroadcastmessages,butdonotengagewithaudienceswhentheytalkback.Thereissomeevidencethatthosemanagingsocialmediaaccountswereatsomepointinstructednottoreplytousers,andsometimesaskedtoremovemessagesthatwereoverlycriticalofChina.162

TheaccountsofChinesemediaonFacebookandTwitternowsharetheonlinespacewithagrowingnumberofChinesediplomaticmissions,governmentagencies,andofficials.BetweenJanuary2018andMay2020,morethan30embassiesanddiplomatsbasedinAfricahavecreatedaccountsonTwitter.TheseincludetheembassiesinMauritania,Liberia,Angola,DRC,Algeria,Mali,UgandaandKenya,aswellasseveraldiplomats,suchasChina’sAmbassadortoUganda,theDeputyAmbassadortoZimbabwe,andtheEconomicandCommercialCounsellorattheembassyinRwanda.Some,likeLinJing,China’sConsulGeneralinCapeTown(SouthAfrica),arepostingandretweetingatasignificantpace.Hisaccount(@CGCHINA_CPT)averages38postsperday,many


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ofwhichareovertlycriticaloftheUS.163Otheraccountsaremuchlessactive.TheTwitteraccountoftheChineseEmbassyinBujumbura(Burundi),createdinJune2019,hadonlytweeted95timesbyearlyOctober2020,atanaverageofbarelyfivetweetspermonth.Notonlyhasthenumberofaccountsriseninashortperiod,butthewaydiplomats — andsomeembassies — interactisdifferentfromwhatmostChinesemediahadbeendoingonsocialmediaforyears.Asidefrompromotingtheirownactivities,andrepostingmessagesfromChinesemedia,theseaccountsarenowmoreengagedinsomeformof“dialogue”withaudiencesthroughtheuseofhashtagsandmentions.Inaddition,therearesomeinstancesofproactivecrisismanagement.SoonafterallegationsthatsomeAfricansinGuangzhouwerediscriminatedagainstduringtheCovid-19pandemic,theTwitteraccountsoftheChineseEmbassyinUgandaandNigeria,aswellastheDeputyAmbassadortoZimbabwepostedimagesofhow“normal”lifeinChinawasforAfricansanddeflectedblamebyattackingothercountriesfor“fabricating”theaccusations.164

Thetoneusedbydiplomatsonsocialmediahasalsobeenchanging.Someaccounts,sayscholarsZhaoHuangandRuiWang,arenowexercising“lessrestraint,discretion,andcautionthanmighttypicallybeexpectedfromChineseofficialswhospeakinpublicorpostonsocialmedia”.165 This harsher, moredirect,andmoretargeteduseofTwitterhasgaineddiplomatssuchasformerChineseAmbassadortoSouthAfrica,LinSongtian,thenicknameof“WolfWarrior”diplomats.Muchlikethemaincharacterinthefilm,theyareconfident,proudlydefendingtheircountry,anddonotshyawayfromusingmoreassertivelanguagethantheircolleagues.166InaninterviewwithChina’sGlobal Times,whichtendstorepresentsomeofthemostnationalisticvoicesinthecountry,ProfChuYinoftheUniversityofInternationalRelationsinBeijingjustifiedthisnewapproachto“diplomacy”bysayingthat“China’srisingstatusintheworldrequiresittosafeguarditsnationalinterestsinanunequivocalway”.Headdedthat“thedayswhenChinacanbeputinasubmissivepositionarelonggone”.167

ManyinChinacametothesameconclusionasProfChuafterseeinghowglobalmediacoveredtwoevents:thepro-democracyprotestsinHongKongthattookChinabysurprisein2019andthebacklashagainstBeijingforsettingupforced“re-educationcamps”forUighurs,aMuslimminoritythatlivespredominantlyintheWesternregionofXinjiang.Onsocialmedia,Chineseembassiesanddiplomatsoftenpostabouttheseissues,eventhoughtheyarenotparticularlyrelevanttocitizensinthecountrieswheretheyarestationed.InJuly2020,China’sAmbassadortoChadgaveaninterviewtothecountry’snationalpressagency,ATPE.AmbassadorLiJinjingavelengthyresponsestoquestionsabout


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China’sresponsetotheCovid-19crisis,China’sassistancetoAfrica,andtheapprovalofanewsecuritylawforHongKong.Theshortestofallresponsesintheinterviewwastheonetothequestion,“HowdoyouanalyseChad-Chinacooperation?” 168AmbassadorLiwasdoingwhatmostofhiscolleagueshavebeenaskedtodo:tomakesurethat,oncertainissues,thoserepresentingChinaabroadtakeanactivestancetopresentBeijing’sview.Thisissometimesdonethroughproactivemessagingsuchasofficialstalkingaboutanissueevenwhentheyarenotaskedaboutit,orwhenanissueisnotreallypartoftheconversation.Inothercases,themessagingisreactive,withthegoalofstoppingcriticismthatmightappearastoowidespread.Inreactingtocriticism,Beijingisincreasinglyengaginginextraterritorialpatrollingofpublicopinion.Throughcoordinatedcampaignsonsocialmedia,orbyusingdiplomaticpressure,ChineseauthoritiesaretryingtoinfluencewhichChina-relatedtopicsaretobediscussed,andhow.OntheissueofXinjiang,forexample,BeijinghaslistedthesupportofmultipleAfricancountries,includingmanywithMuslim-majoritypopulations,andlimitedcriticalpublicdiscussion.169

ThegrantingofinterviewsbyChineseofficialsisnotnew,buthascertainlyincreasedinrecentyears.Chinesediplomatswerewell-knownfortheirreluctancetoengagewithforeignjournalists.ThisreachingoutispartofawiderstrategytoengagemorewithlocalAfricanmedia,asawaytogetChina’smessageout,particularlyaroundtopicsthatareofteninthenews,andonwhichChinesemediaareunabletosettheagendaonthecontinent.ItisnotuncommontoseearticlesandopinionpiecespublishedbyChina’sambassadorsinleadingnewspapers.Someofthesearepublishedinopinionpagesalongsideotherviews,whichmightnotnecessarilybeequallyfavourabletoChina.Inothercases,Chinesediplomaticmissions,andsomecompaniessuchasStarTimesandHuawei,buyupspaceonnewspapersandwebsitestopublish“advertorials”,pagesthataredesignedtolooklikeanyothernewsarticlebutareinfactnotwrittenordesignedbythepublishinghouse.ThisapproachwaschosenbyChenXiaodong,whowasappointedasAmbassadortoSouthAfricain2020,forhisfirstarticleinthenewrole.Itappearedas“SponsoredContent”onthewebsiteoftheIndependentMediagroup,whichispartlyownedbyChineseinvestors.170

Inproviding“guidance”toAfricanpublicopiniononissuesrelatedtoChina,Beijing’sultimategoalisnottoengagedirectlywitheverycitizen,buttoreachkeyopinionleaderswhomightpotentiallyhelpChinaamplifyitsnarratives.171 Theseopinionleaders(scholars,commentators,thinktankanalysts,andothers)whoactasbridgesbetweenChineseofficialdomanddomesticaudiencesareoftenquotedbyChinesemediaasawaytolegitimisetheirmessage.Thereis


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noeasywaytomeasurewhetherthisstrategyisworkingornot,eventhoughtherearesomeexamplesthatwouldseemtoindicatethat,fromtimetotime,itdoes.Forinstance,beforeChina’sMinisterofForeignAffairs,WangYin,visitedBurundi in January 2020, Le Renouveau,agovernment-runnewspaper,featuredonitsfrontpageaneditorialsignedbyLouisKamwenubusa,thepresidentofthepublication.ThearticlepraisedtheroleofChinainthedevelopmentofBurundi.ThefrontpagealsofeaturedanadforStarTimes.Afewmonthslater,KamwenubusawasinterviewedbyCGTNonhisviewsaboutHongKong’sdecisiontopostponetheelectionforanewlegislativecouncil.Heisquotedassupportingthedecision,andwonderingwhy“somepeopleintheUnitedStatesandsomeEuropeancountriesareagainstthedecision”.Inhisview,“[p]eopleshouldonlycareabouttheinternalaffairsoftheirowncountry”,apositionwhichisverymuchinlinewithChina’sforeignpolicy.172Thepreviousyear,hehadbeenquotedonCRI’sTurkishlanguageserviceonthetopicofHongKong.173 In2018,KamwenubusawastheBurundianofficialinchargeofsigningacontentexchangeagreementbetweenXinhuaandLe Renouveau.174

Communicating Covid-19

Asopposedtosmallcrisesthathaveshortnewscyclespans,theCOVID-19outbreakinearly2020turnedouttobeatruechallengetohowChineseactorscommunicatedwithAfricanandglobalaudiences.SincethefirstcasesofCovid-19werereportedinWuhan(China),Beijingtriedtopushbackagainstanyaccusationthatitsresponsetotheoutbreakhadbeenanythingbutexemplary.Todothis,theChinesegovernmentreliedmorethaneveronitsownnetworkofglobalmedia,diplomaticmissions,andactivesocialmediausers.Duringthefirstfewmonthsofthepandemic,Chinesediplomatsandthenewsmedia,includingthosebasedinAfrica,becameamplifiersofdebunkedconspiracytheoriesabouttheoriginofthevirus,175offeredcriticismofthestrategiesundertakenbyothercountries,andactivelypromotedmessagesabouttheamountofpersonalprotectiveequipment,masksandmedicalsuppliesthatChinawasofferingtoothercountries.176Socialmediaeffortsweremostlydirectedatcounteringthestronganti-ChinarhetoricthatcameoutoftheUS,primarilyfromright-wingpoliticiansandmainstreamconservativemedia,aswellasfringenewsoutletsliketheEpoch Times,whichiswell-knownforitsanti-CCPcoverage.177AreportbyAliciaFawcettattheAtlanticCouncil’sDFRLabsuggeststhatakeycomponentofChina’scoordinatedsocialmediastrategyduringtheCovid-19crisiscanbelinkedtoideasaroundinformationwarfarethathadbeenproposedbyChinesemilitaryofficialsinrecentyears,buthadnotbeenaddressedbyforeigncountries.178


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Inadditiontousingsocialmedia,inAfrica,twootheractorswereactiveinspreadingState-sanctionednarratives.First,State-ownedmediausedtheirnetworkofcorrespondentstosendthemessagethatBeijinghadmanagedtocontroltheoutbreakinWuhan,andthatitwasprovidingregularassistancetoAfricancountries.Second,forthefirsttime,StarTimesbecameaproducerofnewscontentwhenitlaunched,on23March2020,adailynewscastexclusivelyfocusedonCovid-19.Titled“StarTimesDailyCovid-19Report”,the10-minute-longshowwasproducedinBeijing,withversionsinEnglish,French,Portuguese,Swahili,HausaandChinese.Theshow,whichwasstillrunninginearlyOctober,wasre-broadcastmultipletimesaday,includingtheeveningprimetime,onsevenoftheplatform’sentertainmentchannels(suchSTSportsFocusandSTSinoDrama),andwasavailableforfreeonthecompany’smobilephoneapp.Bychoosingtoairtheprogrammeonpopularchannels,thecompanymighthavemaximisedthepossibilityofexposingawiderangeofAfricanaudiencestoaChina-favourablenarrativeabouttheoutbreak.

ThewayBeijinghascommunicatedwiththeworldduringtheCovid-19outbreaksignalsachangeofapproach.Threethingsstandout:newscontentisincreasinglyadversarialandbelligerent;coordinateddisinformationcampaignsarebecomingmorefrequent;andnewactors,includingprivatelyownedmedia,arebeingmobilised.ToMariaRepnikova,atGeorgiaStateUniversity,China’sresponsetotheCovid-19communicationcrisisshowsthat“China’spropagandahasmatured,”insuchawaythat“[i]nsteadofdeliveringdiktatanddefensiveness,thegovernmentnowengagesinselectivedialoguewithitsaudiencesandtheircriticisms,featuringthoseviewsinitsownstorytelling,oritsretellingofthem”.179

InassessingtheeffectivenessofChina’sstrategiesduringtimesofcrisis,itisimportanttokeepinmindthat,asBatesGillfromMacquarieUniversity,writes,“China’sofficialmessagingabroadoftenhasadualpurpose:bolstertheChineseCommunistParty(CCPorParty)athomewhilealsoseekingtopersuadeinternationalaudiences.Tobesure,theformerobjectiveisparamount”.180 Inthisdualstrategy,engagementwithAfricancountriesthroughthemedia(favourableopinionleaders,positivenewscoverage,limitedcriticismonsocialmedia,amongothers)areincreasinglyseenasavaluablesourceofdomesticandgloballegitimacyfortheCommunistParty.


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Direct investment

WiththenumberofmobileinternetusersinAfricaprojectedtogrowsteadilyinthenextfewyears,techcompanieswithaneyeontheAfricanmarkethaveseenaboomininvestmentflows.Africanstart-upsraisedclosetoUS$300millioninventurecapitalin2015,overUS$400millionin2016,andUS$560millionin 2017.181Itisinthiscontextofaggressiveinvestment,optimisticoutlook,andAfricantechentrepreneurshipthat,in2016,agroupofChineseinvestorsdecidedtoentertheNigerianmobileservicesmarketwitha“superapp”capableofofferingmultipleproducts(suchas,payments,transportation,anddelivery)withinasingleclosedplatform,similartopopularappsinChina,likeWeChat.182 TheyhadjustpurchasedamajoritystakeinOperasoftware,knownforitswebbrowser,andapopularbrandintheGlobalSouthforitsmobiledatasavingproducts.LeadingtheoperationwereZhouHongyi,CEOofQihoo360,aveteranoftheChineseinternetsector,andZhouYahuiofBeijingKunlunTech,whohadexperienceinhigh-stakestechinvestmentsoutsideofChina.183Atonepoint,Opera’sbusinessesstretchedfromcar-sharingtofooddeliveryandavarietyoffintechservices.However,Opera’sexperienceinNigeriahasnotalwaysbeeneasy,andsomeoftheseserviceshaveceasedoperating.184

OneoftheservicesthathasremainedpopularisOperaNews,amobileappthatdeliverscustomnewscontentproducedbythousandsofcontributors(professionalsandamateursalike),whoserevenueislinkedtohowpopulartheirarticlesare.185OperaNewshascountry-specificportalswhereuserscanreadthenewsinmultiplelanguages.186Contentiscuratedtoeachuserbyarecommendationalgorithmpoweredbyartificialintelligence(AI).OntheGooglePlayStore,theappisclassifiedinthe“morethan50milliondownloads”category.Thereisnoapparenteditorialoversightontheplatform;contentissensationalisticandclick-baitingisverycommon.AsearchinOctober2020ofnewsstoriestaggedwiththeword“China”ontheNigerianversionofOperaNewsreturnedheadlinessuchas“CheckoutwhyChinahasthelargesteconomyintheworld”,writtenbyausernamed“CoronaCure”;187“IsChinaactuallyanoppressivecountrytolivein,oristhisalietoldbyWesterncountries?”;188and,“Chinaandit’sSmartToilet”.189Onemonthlater,noneofthestorieshadmorethan20views.

OperaNews’popularitypalesincomparisontothatofTikTok,anappthatallowsuserstocreateandshareshortvideoclips.TikTokisownedbyByteDance,aprivatelyownedChinesecompany.IteffectivelyenteredtheAfricanmarketinmid-2018,afterpurchasingMusical.ly,whichalsohadChinese


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owners.190WhileTikTokdoesnotpublicisehowmanyusersithasineachcountry,itregularlyappearsamongthemostdownloadedappsincountrieslikeSouthAfrica,NigeriaandKenya,whereitsuserbaseappearstobethestrongestinAfrica.191FurtherproofofTikTok’spopularityamongAfricanuserscanbeseeninthe2018launchofVskit,anothervideo-sharingapp.VskitisrunbyTranssnet,ajointventureoftwoChinesecompanies,Transsion,amobilephonemanufacturer,andNetEase,oneofChina’sfirstwebportals.192Vskitsaysthatithasgonefrom10millionusersinAfricain2019,to40millioninlate2020.Transsnet’sbusinessfocusesprimarilyontheAfricanmarket.ItsportfolioalsoincludesBoomplay,whichclaimstobethe“biggestandfastestgrowingmusicappinAfrica”with62millionusers.193VskithasfeaturedprominentlyinChineseState-runmedia.UsingasimilarnarrativeseenwhendiscussingotherformsofChina-Africa“mediacooperation”,anewsstorybyXinhuaconcludedthatplatformslikeVskit“cannotonlyhelptheChinesetobetterunderstandAfricancustoms,butgiveAfricancultureanopportunitytoshinearoundtheworld”.194

Remarkablypopularamongteenagersandyoungadults,TikTok’scontentislargelyapolitical,butthathasnotstoppedtheappfrombeingunderintensescrutinyduetoitsChineseownership.In2020,itwasbannedinIndia,andthen(briefly)inPakistan.195TheUSthreatenedtofollowsuitunlessByteDancedivesteditsUSoperations.TheconcernsraisedbytheUScentredaroundtwoissues:privacyandcensorship.196TheUSgovernmenthaslongbeenconcernedthatTikTokcouldmakepersonaluserdataavailabletoChineseauthorities.Thecompanyhasdeniedsuchaccusationsand,ina2019report,claimedthat,infact,lawenforcementauthoritiesinIndiaandtheUShadrequestedTikToktodiscloseuserdatainnumerousoccasions,whileChineseoneshadnot.TherearenoAfricancountriesonthelist.197Inaddition,TikTokhasalsofacedaccusationsofcensoringcontentaboutissuesthatareconsideredtabooinChina,suchasthe1989TiananmenmassacreortheillegalisationofthereligiousgroupFalunGong.198Facedwithhighlevelsofpoliticalpressureinsomeofitslargestmarkets,ByteDancehastriedtogrowitsbusinesselsewhere.199InAfrica,forexample,ithasmentoredcontentcreatorstolurethemawayfromotherplatforms,suchasInstagram,andithassignedagreementswithmobilephoneoperatorstoincludeTikTokintheirfreemobiledatapackages,whichoftenincludeappssuchasWhatsAppandFacebookLite.200

AsthecaseofTikTokreveals,wheneverChineseprivatefirmshavetriedtoentertheglobalmarketforinternetservices,theyhavedonesoamidst“controversies”arounddataprivacyissuesandtheirpossibleconnectiontotheCommunistParty/Chinesegovernment.ThishasnotbeensomuchthecaseinmostAfricancountries,wheredataprivacyconcernsingeneralrarelyfeature


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prominentlyinpolicydebates.WritingforThe China Africa Project, Alexandria Williams,ajournalistbasedinNairobi,notesthat“ChinesetechcompanieshaveaggressivelypursuedprojectsthatprovidefreeorreducedservicesinexchangeforAfricandata”.201ThatisthecaseofOpera’sbusinessinNigeria,wherethecompanyhasbeenabletoacquireaverylargeanddiversevolumeofpersonaldatafromitsusers.InSeptember2020,amidstdebatesaroundTikTok’sbusinesspracticeselsewhere,FalhadDikow,aKenyanSenator,askedto“investigatetheuseofTikTokandwhetherKenyanusers’dataaresecure”.202 In heraddress,SenatorDikowdidnotraisespecificconcernsaboutTikTok’sbeingownedbyaChinesecompany.Similardebatesarounddataprivacy,specificallyasitreferstotechcompaniesfromChina,haveyettotakeplaceinotherpartsofthecontinent.

Heightened scrutiny: Chinese investments in South Africa

SouthAfrica’srelationshipwithChina,includingtheirsharedmembershipintheBRICS(Brazil,Russia,India,ChinaandSouthAfrica)alliance,hasbeenamatterofregularnationaldebate.Itisthereforenotsurprisingthat,in2013,whenaChineseinvestmentholdingacquired20%ofIndependentNews&Media,oneofSouthAfrica’sleadingpublishingcompanies,manysoundedthealarm.SpeakingtotheWall Street Journal,AntonHarber,professoratWitsUniversityinJohannesburg,saidthat“[i]ftheChineseseektoimposeaChinesemodel,therewillberesistance.Thatapproachwillnotsiteasilywithalotofjournalists”.203 Beijing’sroleinthetakeoverwas,however,notpremeditated,orpartofagrandstrategyofmediaacquisitions.Infact,theChineselenders(ChinaAfricaDevelopmentFund,agovernmentinstitutionwhichhadalreadyfundedmediainfrastructureprojectsonthecontinent,andChinaInternationalTelevisionCorporation,aglobalarmofCCTV)werefirstapproachedbythemainSouthAfricaninvestorinthedeal,Sekunjalo,aprivategroup,thatwasseekingsupporttoraisethenecessarycapitaltocompletethetakeover.MuchofthecontroversyaroundthedealatthetimehadtodowiththefactthatSekunjalo’sowner,IqbalSurvé,wasastrongsupporteroftheAfricanNationalCongress(ANC),thepoliticalpartythathasledthecountrysince1994.FearsofChinesemeddlinginthenewsroomoverlappedwithfearsofANC’sinterference.204

Periodically,newspaperspublishedbyIndependentMediaareaccusedofkowtowingtoChineseinterests.Inmostinstances,thereislimitedevidenceofthis.TalktojournalistsattheCape Times and Cape Argus, and you will hear storiesaboutatravelstoryonTaiwanthatwaspulledatthelastminutesothat“theChinese”wouldnotbeoffended.Otherswilldescribeargumentswith


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editorsabouttheangleofcertainstoriesorhowSouthAfrica-Chinarelationsneedtobeapproached.Then,inSeptember2018,AzadEssa,acontributortoseveralnewspapersinthegrouptooktosocialmediatodeclarethathisregularcolumnhadbeencancelledafterhewroteastoryaboutthetreatmentofUighursinChina.“Itisofficial,”Essawroteinahard-hittingopinionpieceon Foreign Policy,“[a]ftermorethanadecadeofplanning,settingup,andbankrollingAfricanmedia,theChinesearefinallyreadytocashinontheirinvestment”.205Independent’sresponsewasthatitwasoverhaulingitsportfolioofcommentators,andthattherewasnorelationshipbetweenthetopicofEssa’scolumn,andhimbeinglaidoff.Theopticsofthecasecouldnotbeanyworse.TheEssaincidenthasbeenusedasproof,again,206again,207andagain,208 ofthe“realdanger”ofallowingChineseinvestmentinthenewsmedia.Itseemsratherunlikelythat,inthiscase,Independent’sChinesecreditorsdirectlyrequestedthejournalist’sremoval.Amoreplausibleexplanationissomesortofpre-emptiveself-censorshipwithinthenewsroom.209

A2018studyontheconsequencesthattheIndependentdealhadonSouthAfricanjournalismingeneralrevealedmanyfearsofthe“possible”impact,butofferedfewexamplesofactualchangesoneditorialagendas,thepreferredapproachtojournalism,orviewsonChina.210Otherformsofpressureonjournalisticcontent,however,havebeendenouncedelsewhere.A2020radiodocumentaryfromtheBBCWorldServicefeaturedKenyanjournalistswhoclaimedthat,afterwritingarticlesontheSGR,theChinese-builtrailway,editorswerewarnedthatChinesefirmswouldreconsiderbuyingadvertisementspaceontheirnewspapers.211InMalawi,reportersworkingforbothprivateandStatemediahavetalkedaboutpressurefromMalawianauthoritiestoreportpositivelyonChina.

BecausetheinvestmentinIndependentMediaistheonlyinstancetodateofChinesecapitalbeingusedtoacquiredomesticmediaassetsinAfrica,itisdifficulttoextrapolatefromthiscasetotherestofthecontinent.WithinChina,somejournalistsandscholarshavebeenlobbyingforothermediaacquisitions,notonlyinAfrica,butglobally.Inearly2020,theeditor-in-chiefofChina Daily, whousedtobetheleadcorrespondentinTokyo,wrotethatChinacouldlearnfromtheacquisitionoftheFinancial TimesbyJapan’sNikkei Shimbun.CaiHonghadfourspecificrecommendationsforChineseinvestorswillingto“borrowboatstosailoverseas”:tofullyacquire,obtaincontrollingrights,holdequity,orpartnerwithforeignmediacompaniestoincreaseChina’sinfluenceabroad.212

SinceSekunjalo’stakeoverofIndependentMediainSouthAfrica,thecompany’scooperationwithChinesemediahasdiversifiedsubstantially.In2015,for


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example,IqbalSurvéannouncedthathewouldlaunchanewsagency,theAfricanNewsAgency(ANA),whichwastoinheritpartoftheassetsofthenow-defunctSouthAfricanPressAssociation(SAPA).Fromthebeginning,ANA,whichhashadIndependentMediaasitsmainclient,cooperatedcloselywithXinhua.Survé,whohastravelledonmultipleoccasionstoChinaaspartofSouthAfricaneconomicanddiplomaticmissions,signedanagreementwithCGTNtocreateasharedmultimediaplatform.Thisproject,however,nevertookoff.AnotherChinese-backedventurethathasbeenstrugglingtomakeanimpactonSouthAfrica’scrowdedmediamarketisStarSat,apaytelevisionoperatorthatispartlyownedbyStarTimes.FormerlyknownasTopTV,thecompanywasunderfinancialdistresswhenPangXinxing’sfirmdecidedtojoinagroupofinvestorstoenterabusinessrescueprocess.In2014,StarSatwasdownto110 000subscribersfrom300000whenitfirstlaunched.ThebiggestcompetitioninSouthAfricacomesfromNaspers’sDStv.ThenumberofsubscriberstoDStvinSouthAfricain2016wassaidtobearound5.7million.213

StarSat’sbumpyrideinSouthAfricaisnotunique.WhileTikTok,forexample,enjoysveryhighlevelsofpopularityamongyoungerSouthAfricans,anotherapp,WeChat,ownedbyTencent,aChinesecompanyinwhichSouthAfrica’sNaspershasa31%stake,hasbeenstrugglingtoenterthelocalmarketforquitesometime.214TencentandNaspers’seffortstomakeWeChatmorepopularinSouthAfricahaveincludedrunningpromotionsandtargetedadvertisingonline;usingtheappasatooltovoteonpopulartelevisionshows,suchasBigBrother,andcreatingcontentthatcouldbeofinteresttoSouthAfricanaudiencesbeyondtheChinesediaspora,whichusestheappregularly.215Despitealltheseefforts,WeChathasbeenunabletomatchtheuptakeofWhatsApp,thenumberonemessagingtoolinthecountry.In2020,WeChateventuallyannouncedthatitwasstoppingitswalletfeature,onwhichithadplacedexpectationsforlong-termgrowth.216AsopposedtoState-runmedia,whicharenotguidedbyeconomicprofit,ChineseprivatecompaniesoperatinginAfricaareoftenundermorepressuretocapitaliseontheirinvestmentsintheshort-tomid-term.Thismightexplainwhy,apartfromStarTimes,whichhasthefinancialbackingoftheState,casesofdirectinvestmentinAfricanmediacompaniesremainlimited.Asmostofthepreviouscasessuggest,theAfricanmediasectormightnotbereadyforityet.

Training media professionals

AccordingtoareportbytheInternationalFederationofJournalists,70%ofdevelopingcountrieshavebeeninvitedtosendsomeoftheirjournaliststo


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attendChinese-sponsoredtrainingschemes.217DatafromReportersWithoutBorderssuggeststhatonesingleeducationalagency,theResearchandTrainingInstituteoftheStateAdministrationofPress,Publication,Radio,FilmandTelevision(SAPPRFT),theadministrativebodyoverseeingthemediainChina,hasofferedtrainingto3400journalistsfrom146countriesinthelastfewyears.218InAfrica,thistypeofmediacooperationwasincludedinthelistofactivitiesplannedinthe2015FOCACActionPlan,inwhichthe“Chineseside”committedto“training1,000Africanmediaprofessionalseachyear”forthreeyears,andinthe2018ActionPlan,wherenoexactnumberswereincluded.219 Trainingprogrammes,workshopsandseminarslastanywherefromaweektotenmonths,andaresponsoredbymultiplegovernmentagencies(liketheMinistryofForeignAffairsorMinistryofCommerce),massorganisations(suchastheAllChinaJournalistsFederation),andmediacompanies(likeChinaRadioInternationalandtheChinaInternationalPublishingGroup).Theseprogrammesarefreeofchargetoparticipants.Theirflights,accommodationanddailyexpensesarecoveredbythehost,and,insomeofthelongerprogrammes,thereisalsoamonthlystipendthatcangouptoCN¥5000(US$750).220

Toorganisesomeofthesetrainingcourses,Chinahassetupspecialisedinstitutions.In2014,forexample,itcreatedtheChina-AfricaPressCentre(CAPC),221whichworksalongsidetheChinaPublicDiplomacyAssociation,anon-profitorganisationthatbringstogethermediaoutlets,learninginstitutions,andglobalfirms.The10-month-longtrainingprogrammeofferedbytheCAPChad8Africanjournalistsparticipatingin2014,10in2015,29in2017,and34in2019.Therearesimilarprogrammestargetingjournalistsinotherpartsoftheworld,mostlyAsiaandthePacific,andLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.Alsoinvolvedinthetrainingofforeignreportersareinstitutionsofhighereducationsuchasuniversitiesandlong-establishedtrainingcentres,liketheonehostedattheChinaInternationalPublishingGroup(CIPG),whichoverseestheBeijing Review, China Pictorial, and ChinAfricamagazines.Establishedinthe1960s,theCIPGTrainingCentrewas,formanyyears,pivotalintheteachingofforeignlanguagesforpropagandaefforts.Now,itspecialisesinshort-termcoursesforAfricanandAsianjournalists.In2018,itorganisedamonth-longprogrammeforGhanaianjournalists222 and a 20-day one for Kenyan professionals.223

Thecontentsofthesetrainingprogrammestendtoberathersimilar,regardlessoftheirlengthandwhatinstitutionisorganisingthem.224ReportersaregivenopportunitiestovisitsuccessfulChinesecompanies,includingmediaorganisations;theyoftenparticipateingroupinterviewsofgovernmentofficials,businessleaders,scholars,andresearchersatlocalthinkthanks;theyareofferedguidedvisitstoprovincesoutsideBeijing,wheremostofthetraining


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takesplace,andareshownexamplesofChina’sdevelopmentalsuccess;theyareinvitedtoattend(andreporton)majoreventssuchasinternationalsummitsormeetingsoftheChineseCommunistParty;andtheyaretaughtavarietyofsubjects,includingChinesecultureandlanguages,Chinesehistoryandpolitics,andsometimesjournalismanddevelopmentcommunication.Reporterswhotakepartintheten-month-longprogrammeorganisedbytheCAPCspendthelasttwomonthsinterningataChinesenewsroom.OnlyState-runoutletssuchasCCTV,CRI,Xinhua,China Daily, People’s Daily and Beijing Reviewarepartofthisscheme.225TheyalsoreceiveadiplomaissuedbyoneofChina’sleadinguniversities,Beijing’sRenminUniversity.

BecausemostAfricannewsorganisationsdonothavethepossibilityofstationingapermanentcorrespondentinChina,participatingintrainingprogrammesorganisedbyBeijinggivesjournalistsaunique(andfreeofcosts)possibilityoffilingstoriesaboutChinaforthemediaorganisationstheyworkfor.TakethecaseofSolomonElusoji,aNigerianjournalist,whowaspartofCAPC’s2018cohort.DuringthefirsthalfofhisstayinChina,hecompleted“13newsassignmentsinthefieldsofpolitics,economics,cultureandtravel”.226 Theorganisersoftrainingprogrammesseethisasoneofthestrengthsoftheinitiative.YuLei,whooverseesthetrainingofjournalistsfromtheAsia-Pacificregion,toldaFilipinojournalistin2018that“ifjournalistscannotcomehereinChina,theycannotgetfirst-handinformationaboutChina;ourobjectiveisalsotohelpthemin10monthstohavemoredirectcontactwithChinesepeople,andthentheycanintroducetherealpictureofChinatotheirpeopleintheircountries”.227Theextenttowhichjournalistsaretrulyabletoseethe“realpictureofChina”couldbeamatterofdebate.JournalistsparticipatinginChinese-sponsoredtrainingprogrammesarerarelygiventhetime,spaceandvisastoreportfreely,andthusfindthemselvesreportingonlyonthetopicsthattheirhostswouldlikethemtoreporton.Afterinterviewingoveradozenparticipantsandorganisersofthesetrainingprogrammes,LinaBenabdallah,fromWakeForestUniversity,notesthatjournalistsdonot“agreethatstudyinginChinaonscholarshipsfundedbytheChinesegovernmentobligesthemtoframetheirreportsonChina–AfricanecessarilyinfavourofapositiveimageofChina”.However,thetraineesunderstoodthatthereare“no-goareasintermsofreporting”,suchas“opencriticismoftheChinesegovernment”.228

Afterreturningfromaten-monthstayinChina,AlphaDaffaeSenkeni,aneditoratLiberia’sFrontPage Africa,toldAndrewMcCormickoftheColumbia Journalism Reviewthathis“tripwasdesignedtosellChina’simage”.However,headded,“IamnotgoingtotrademyprinciplesforsomeChinesebeliefaboutjournalism”.229Participantsinthetrainingprogrammes,likeSenkeni,aretaught


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aboutthenotionof“constructivejournalism”,whichsomeChinesescholarsallegeisthebestdescriptionofthetypeofjournalismpractisedbyChinesemediainAfrica.RetellinghisexperienceinChina,PaulNtambara,areporterfortheNew TimesinRwanda,writesthatconstructivejournalismis“differentfromthesimpleWestern“watchdog”journalism.Itisnotthejournalismofextremesofpositiveandnegativereporting ” ;insteadhegoesontosay,the“Chineseapproachhasbeenmoreaboutreportingwithaviewtofindingsolutionstoproblems,whiletheWesternstylehasdonelittleinthisregard”.230Notalljournalistsreturnfromtrainingprogrammeswiththesameattitudestowardsthiskindofjournalisticpractice.SpeakingtotheColumbia Journalism Review, BonfaceOtieno,fromKenya’sBusiness Daily,wasratherstraightforward:“IftheChinesebroughtmetoBeijingtoinfluencemyjournalism,theyfailed”.231

OfferingtrainingopportunitiestoAfricanjournalistsisnotsomethinguniquetoChina.Inthe1960sand1970s,theFordFoundationintheUSfundedtheInternationalPressInstitutetotrainhundredsofjournalistsfromEnglish-speakingcountriesandintroducedthemto“thenormsofmodernWesternjournalism”.232Today,organisationslikeGermany’sDWAkademie,fundedbytheGermanOfficeforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(BMZ),aswellastheGermanForeignOfficeandtheEuropeanUnion,alsoprovidetrainingforjournalistsindevelopingnations.Asidefromdifferencesinthewayjournalismisconceived(andtaught),whatsetsChineseeffortsapartisthebreadthanddiversityofprogrammesoffered.Forexample,BeijingregularlyoffersscholarshipstoAfricanjournaliststopursuegraduatestudiesinChinaatleadinginstitutions,suchastheCommunicationUniversityofChina,andRenminandTsinghuauniversities.TherearealsotrainingopportunitiesforAfricangovernmentofficials,someofwhichareorganisedbytheCCP,whichkeepsaveryactiveglobaltrainingprogramme.Partofthe“lesson”Chineseauthoritieshopetoteachforeignvisitorsisthattheremightbea“Chinesemodel”fordevelopmentthatothersmightwishtoadopt.Whiletheimpactofthistypeofengagementisnotlikelytosurfaceintheshortterm,therearesomeexamplesthatitmight,infact,beworking.Discussingwaystofightmisinformationonsocialmedia,theNigerianMinisterofInformationandCulture,LaiMohammed,referredtohisownexperiencewhiletravellingtoChinatosuggestthatthereshouldbemorestringentregulationofsocialmediainthecountry.“WhenwewenttoChina”,hetoldtheHouseofRepresentatives,“wecouldnotgetGoogle,Facebook,andInstagram.YoucouldnotevenuseyouremailinChinabecausetheymadesureitiscensoredandwellregulated”.233


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Asymmetric media cooperation

WhencommunicatingitsengagementwithAfricancountriesinthemediasector,Chineseauthoritiestendtorefertoprojectsandactivitiesas“cooperation”betweentwoequalpartners.Undoubtedly,overthelastdecadeortwo,bothChineseandAfricanactors(includinggovernments,mediaorganisationsand,toalesserextent,mediaconsumers)havebenefittedfromtheincreasedlevelsofengagementinthemediasectorbetweenthetwosides.Thus,thepopularuseofthephrase“win-win”cooperation,whichappearsregularlyindocumentsdescribingSino-Africanrelations.However,thebenefitshavenotbeenthesametoChineseandAfricanactors.Someoftheareasinwhichthetwosidesaresupposedtobe“cooperating”,suchasthedevelopmentoftelecommunicationsinfrastructure,havecreatedlong-termdependenciesthatareunlikelytorebalanceinthefuture.Moreover,benefitsformostAfricancountriesareveryshort-term-oriented,whileChinastandstobenefitthemostinthelong-term.Thesedifferencesstemfromaseriesoflong-standingimbalancesinAfrica-Chinarelations,which,inthemediasector,manifestintheformofthreeasymmetries:volumeofexchanges,audiences,andhumanandmaterialcapital.

First,thereisasignificantimbalanceinthenumberofexchangesbetweenChinaandAfricancountries.WhileChinesecompanieshavebenefittedfromhighlyde-regulatedmediamarkets,wheretheentrycostsforforeigncompaniesisrelativelylow,AfricanmediawouldfaceamuchmorerestrictedenvironmentweretheytotrytoexploretheChinesemediaecosystem;thisappliestocontentcreators,techfirms,andtelecommunicationscompanies.Thecountryisnotwelcomingtoforeigninvestmentinthemedia/informationandtelecomsindustries.Chinaalsorestrictssignificantlytheamountofforeignmediacontentthatcanbeimported.Despitethemany“cooperation”agreementsthatChinahassignedwithAfricangovernmentsandSatemedia,accordingtoofficialdata,in2016,ChinaimportednoAfricancartoonsnortelevisionseries,andjustthreedocumentaries.Atthesametime,thecountrywasabletoexportfourtelevisionseries,19cartoons,and106documentariestoAfricancountries.234

Second,thereisanaudienceimbalance.BecauseofthesevererestrictionsthatexistinChina,domesticaudiencesarerarelyexposedtoforeigncontentand,whentheydo,itisnotcomingfromAfricancreators.WhiletherehavebeenpromisestobringNollywoodfilmstoChinesecinemas,andtoexploreco-productions,thecruderealityisthatSino-AfricanmediacooperationhasnotworkedtowardscreatingaspaceforAfricanmediatoreachChineseaudiences


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directly;thesamewaythatChinesecompaniesareabletodointhemajorityofAfricancountries.EffortstoshowcaseChineseTVseriesanddocumentariesonnationaltelevisionacrosstheAfricancontinentareusuallypresentedbyChineseactorsasawayto“help”improvemutualunderstandingbetweenChineseandAfricanaudiences.AsmuchasthiscontentmightbeabletoshapehowsomeAfricansperceiveChina,thereisnosimilarstrategytohelpChinesebetterunderstandthediverserealityofAfrica.

Third,thereisasignificantimbalanceinhumanresourcesandmaterialcapital.Itisinthisareathatthe“Chineseside”hasbeenmoreproactiveintryingtoleveltheplayingfield:ithasprovidedtrainingtoAfricanjournalistsandgiventhemtheopportunitytoreportfromChina,andithascreatedfavourableconditionstofacilitatethebuyingoftelecommunicationstechnologybyAfricangovernmentsandmediacompanies.However,thesesameactionsarecreatinglong-termdependenciesonbothtechnologicalcapabilitiesandknow-how.TherearewaysinwhichChinaandAfricancountriescouldworktowardsrevertingalltheexistingimbalances,but,forthistohappen,thereneedstobeanacceptancethattherelationship,asitstands,ishighlyunequal.Chinaisunlikelytonotice,giventhatitstandstobenefitthemostfromthecurrentasymmetries.Africangovernmentsmightneedtotakeamoreactiveroleindemandingamoreequitablepartnershipthatbenefitsabroadersectorofsociety,includingprivateandindependentmedia.


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Notes

1 PhilippineNewsAgency(2018,February28).46journalistsjoin2018ChinaMediaExchangeProgram.https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1026842

2 Reuters(2016,February19).China’sXiurgesstatemediatoboostglobalinfluence.https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-media-idUSKCN0VS1IF

3 SouthChinaMorningPost(2009,January13).Beijingin45byuanglobalmediadrive.http://www.scmp.com/article/666847/beijing-45b-yuan-global-media-drive

4 Zhao,K.(2016).China’sRiseandItsDiscursivePowerStrategy.Chinese Political Science Review, 1–25.https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-016-0027-x

5 Rawnsley,G.D.(2015).ToKnowUsistoLoveUs:PublicDiplomacyandInternationalBroadcastinginContemporaryRussiaandChina.Politics,35(3–4),273–286.https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.12104

6 Lekorwe,M.,Chingwete,A.,Okuru,M.,&Samson,R.(2016).China’sgrowingpresenceinAfricawinslargelypositivepopularreviews.https://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/ad122-chinas-growing-presence-africa-wins-largely-positive-popular-reviews

7 Zhang,X.(2016).TheEffectivenessoftheChineseCulturalCentresandConfuciusInstitutes.AsiaDialogue.https://theasiadialogue.com/2016/12/02/the-effectiveness-of-the-chinese-cultural-centres-and-confucius-institutes/

8 ChinaDaily(2006,March3).CRILaunchesFirstOverseasFMRadioStation.http://www.china.org.cn/english/culture/160050.htm

9 McKenzie,D.(2012,September25).ChinesemediamakeinroadsintoAfrica.CNN International. http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/05/business/china-africa-cctv-media/index.html

10 ECNS(2014,June16).ThesecondForumonChina-AfricaMediaCooperationopens.http://www.ecns.cn/2014/06-16/119215.shtml

11 ThisclassificationwasfirstintroducedinMadrid-Morales,D.,&Wasserman,H.(2018).ChinesemediaengagementinSouthAfrica:Whatisitsimpactonlocaljournalism?Journalism Studies, 9(8), 1218–1235.https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2016.1266280

12 FOCAC(2006).ForumonChina-AfricaCooperationBeijingActionPlan(2007-2009).https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zyzl/hywj/t280369.htm

13 FOCAC(2009).ForumonChina-AfricaCooperationSharmElSheikhActionPlan(2010-2012).https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/dsjbzjhy/hywj/t626387.htm

14 FOCAC(2015).TheForumonChina-AfricaCooperationJohannesburgActionPlan(2016-2018).http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/t1327961.htm

15 Shambaugh,D.L.(2013).Chinagoesglobal:Thepartialpower.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

16 Nelson, A. (2013). CCTV’s International Expansion: China’s Grand Strategy for Media?Washington:CenterforInternationalMediaAssistance.http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/808885/cima-cctvs-international-expansion.pdf


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17 d’Hooghe,I.(2015).China’s public diplomacy.Leiden:BrillNijhoff.

18 Madrid-Morales,D.(2016).WhyAreChineseMediainAfrica?EvidencefromThreeDecadesofXinhua’sNewsCoverageofAfrica.InX.Zhang,H.Wasserman,&W.Mano(Eds.),China’s Media and Soft Power in Africa: Promotion and Perceptions(pp.79–92).NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan.

19 Traub,J.(2006,November19).China’sAfricanAdventure.The New York Times.https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/19/magazine/19china.html

20 ChinaDaily.(2006,December4).For65years,awindowtotheworld.China Daily, p. 1.

21 TheexactnumberofbureausthatXinhuahas,aswellastheirlocation,isn’tpubliclyavailable.Forsomediscussiononnumbers,seeMorin-Allory,R.(2011).LaChineparleauxAfricains.L’appareilmédiatiquedePékin.Outre-Terre,(4),43–71,andSui,C.(2019,October9).Chinawantsstatemediatopeddleits“softpower”inAfrica,buttechplatformsareabetterbet.Quartz Africa.https://qz.com/africa/1736534/china-daily-cgtn-fight-for-influence-in-africa-vs-bbc-cnn/

22 Olander,E.(2020,May5).MeetLinJing:China’sNewest“WolfWarrior”inAfrica.The China Africa Project.https://chinaafricaproject.com/2020/05/05/meet-lin-jing-chinas-newest-wolf-warrior-in-africa/

23 Deng,C.H.W.andC.(2020,May19).China’s‘WolfWarrior’DiplomatsAreReadytoFight.Wall Street Journal.https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomats-are-ready-to-fight-11589896722

24 Xinhua.(2017,August2).Beijing TV Dramas, Movies Broadcasting Season for Africa Opens in Zambia. http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-08/02/c_136491855.htm

25 Ojo,T.(2017).TheCorporateSocialResponsibility(CSR)activitiesofHuaweiandZTEinAfrica.InK.Batchelor&X.Zhang(Eds.),China-Africa Relations: Building Images through Cultural Cooperation, Media Representation and Communication(pp.218–230).London:Routledge.

26 Strumpf,D.(2019,March13).ZTE’sStateOwnertoCutItsStake.Wall Street Journal.https://www.wsj.com/articles/ztes-state-owner-to-cut-its-stake-11552477396

27 Rønning,H.(2016).HowMuchSoftPowerDoesChinaHaveinAfrica?InX.Zhang,H.Wasserman,&W.Mano(Eds.),China’s Media and Soft Power in Africa: Promotion and Perceptions(pp.65–78).Houndmills:PalgraveMacmillan.

28 Zhang,D.,&Ji,H.(2020,April22).ThenewChineseaidagencyafteritsfirsttwoyears.https://devpolicy.org/the-new-chinese-aid-agency-after-its-first-two-years-20200422-2

29 Jiang,S.(2018,March21).Beijinghasanewpropagandaweapon:VoiceofChina.https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/21/media/voice-of-china-propaganda-broadcaster/index.html

30 Yip,H.(2018,April23).China’s$6BillionPropagandaBlitzIsaSnooze.Foreign Policy.https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/23/the-voice-of-china-will-be-a-squeak/

31 BusinessToday.(2018,March7).Xinhuabuildingmixed-useAfricabureauinNairobi.https://businesstoday.co.ke/xinhua-builds-africa-regional-bureau-nairobi/

32 ChinaPictorialisstillpublishedtodaybythePeople’sDailyGroup,theofficialnewspaperoftheCommunistPartyofChina.TheSeptember2018issuecoveredChina-Africarelationsextensively,


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andisagoodexampleofthetypeofcontentpublishedbythemagazinetoday:http://china-pictorial.com.cn/media/1/Magazine_covers_and_PDF/2018/2018-09.pdf

33 Cooley, J. K. (1965). East wind over Africa: Red China’s African offensive.NewYork:Walker

34 Lal,P.(2014).MaoisminTanzania:Materialconnectionsandsharedimaginaries.InA.C.Cook(Ed.),Mao’sLittleRedBook:AGlobalHistory(pp.96–116).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

35 Xin,X.(2009).XinhuaNewsAgencyinAfrica.Journal of African Media Studies,1(3),363–377.

36 Unlessotherwisenoted,translationsaremyown.

37 Wang,S.(2001).Diyipiheifeizhoufenshedejianli[EstablishingthefirstbureauinSub-SaharanAfrica].InD.He(Ed.),Lishi de Zuji – Xinhuashe 70 Zhounian Huiyi Wenxuan (1931-2001) [Footprints of History — Collection of Memories of the 70 Anniversary of Xinhua News Agency (1931–2001)] (pp. 620–627).Beijing:XinhuaPress.

38 Liu,Y.(1996).Alaboyuguangbosanshijiunian[Thirty-nineyearsofArabicbroadcasts].InD.Huang,Y.Cui,&Y.Hu(Eds.),Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of China’s International Broadcasting].Beijing:ChinaInternationalBroadcastingPress.

39 USIA(7April1988).Communist International Radio Broadcasting Decreased Slightly to Sub-Saharan in 1987[S-4-7-88](Box,File).RecordsoftheU.S.InformationAgency,1900–2003,RecordGroup306,NationalArchivesatCollegePark,CollegePark,MD

40 OfficeofResearchandAssessment(6September1973).Communist Information and Cultural Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa 1972[R-21-73](Box,File).RecordsoftheU.S.InformationAgency,1900-2003,RecordGroup306,NationalArchivesatCollegePark,CollegePark,MD

41 Üngör,Ç.(2009).ReachingthedistantcomradeChineseCommunistpropagandaabroad(1949–1976)(Ph.D.Thesis).StateUniversityofNewYork,Binghamton.

42 Shinn,D.H.,&Eisenman,J.(2012).China and Africa: A Century of Engagement. Philadelphia: UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress.

43 Gan,X.(2004).Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanboshi [History of China’s foreign propaganda].Fuzhou:FujianPeople’sPublishingCompany.

44 McKune,C.(2013,August15).ChinesecompaniesscoopsharesinIndependentNews.Mail & Guardian.http://mg.co.za/article/2013-08-15-chinese-companies-scoop-shares-in-independent-news/

45 AidData.2017.GlobalChineseOfficialFinanceDataset,Version1.0.http://aiddata.org/data/chinese-global-official-finance-dataset.Becausenoofficialrecordexistsofaidandassistancecommitments,researchersusedmediareportstocompilethelistofprojects.Thismeansthatsomemightbemissing,whileothersmighthavenotgonebeyondthepledgestage.

46 BalancingAct.(2018).AnaloguetoDigitalBroadcastingMigrationinAfrica.BalancingActReport,3rdEdition.https://broadcastingandmedia.com/download-file/3027/1594496145INDUSTRY.REPORT_Digital.Teresstrial.Television_Africa.pdf

47 LeBec,C.(2019,May21).Audiovisuel:àquiprofitelaTNT?Jeune Afrique.https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/776471/economie/audiovisuel-a-qui-profite-la-tnt/


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48 Kiti,A.(2015,February16).Kenyanviewersleftbehindafter‘digitalmigration’.DeutscheWelle.https://www.dw.com/en/kenyan-viewers-left-behind-after-digital-migration/a-18260534

49 Dubois,E.(2011).L’aventuredeStarTimesenAfrique.Outre-Terre,(30),73–81.https://doi.org/10.3917/oute.030.0073

50 Xu,L.,&LiQ.(2012,August30).Chineseprivatebroadcasteremergesasgame-changerinAfrica.Xinhua.http://www.china.org.cn/china/Off_the_Wire/2012-08/30/content_26382901.htm

51 Zhang,H.(2018,August31).ChineseTVservice’ssuccessinAfricalinkedtolocalizationplan.Global Times.https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1117831.shtml

52 Emewu,I.(2020,January9).StarTimestakesstockofoperationinAfricain2019.Africa-China Economy.https://africachinapresscentre.org/2020/01/09/startimes-takes-stock-of-operation-in-africa-in-2019/

53 Foralistofallthedelegationsthatvisitedtheheadquartersin2018,seethepaidpostcreatedbyStarTimesandpublished,amongothers,byNigeria’sDaily Post(2018,September12).StarTimes,astarofChina-AfricacooperationatFOCACsummithttps://dailypost.ng/2018/09/12/startimes-star-china-africa-cooperation-focac-summit/

54 MacauHub(2017,September8).ChinesaStarTimesnegoceiadigitalizaçãodarádioetelevisãoemSãoToméePríncipe.https://macauhub.com.mo/2017/09/08/pt-chinesa-startimes-negoceia-digitalizacao-da-radio-e-televisao-em-sao-tome-e-principe/

55 Li,Z.,&Cao,P.(2018,September7).NewChineseTV‘star’risesacrossAfrica.China Daily.https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/254/11/58/1536304664343.html

56 Fang,A.(2018,July5).NeweraforChina-Africamedialinks.China Daily.https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201807/05/WS5b3d5d3da3103349141e0c4e.html

57 Schluntz,K.(2020,May22).TheChineseGovernment’s“10,000AfricanVillages”ProjectinTwoMozambicanVillages:KungFu,ConfusionandFlags.The China Africa Project.https://chinaafricaproject.com/analysis/the-chinese-governments-10000-african-villages-project-in-two-mozambican-villages-kung-fu-confusion-and-flags/

58 Xinhua(2018,May15).Centrafrique:103villagesisolésbientôtdotésd’équipementsdelatélévisionsatellitaire.http://french.xinhuanet.com/2018-05/15/c_137179586.htm

59 Kasemiire,C.(2019,February4).Uganda:ChinaHandsOverSatelliteTVProjecttoUgandaGovernment.The Monitor.https://allafrica.com/stories/201902040222.html

60 Ndungi,R.(2018,September13).ChinesepayTVvowstoboostSino-Rwandaculturalexchange.China Daily.https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201809/13/WS5b9a05d7a31033b4f4655dfe.html

61 RadioOkapi(2014,September11).L’affaireStarTimesenhuitquestions.https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2014/09/11/laffaire-startimes-en-huit-questions

62 Ochieng,Z.(2016,March26).KenyaTVstationsshutdownindigitalmigrationdispute.NewsAfrica.https://www.newsafrica.net/201603268/business-economy/tech/kenya-tv-stations-shut-down-in-digital-migration-dispute


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63 Rønning,H.(2016).HowMuchSoftPowerDoesChinaHaveinAfrica?InX.Zhang,H.Wasserman,&W.Mano(Eds.),China’s Media and Soft Power in Africa: Promotion and Perceptions(pp.65–78).Houndmills:PalgraveMacmillan.

64 Baneesh,M.A.(2015,July3).ResolveDTTdisputeorfacearbitrationinLondon —StarTimes.Daily Graphic.https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/resolve-dtt-dispute-or-face-arbitration-in-london-startimes.html

65 TheGuardian(2020,September18).ReviewNTA-StarTimesunviabledeal.https://guardian.ng/opinion/review-nta-startimes-unviable-deal/

66 Dweh,S.G.(2019,January21).Liberia:ChinaRejuvenates‘OldSchool’State-ownedMedia.Front Page Africa.https://frontpageafricaonline.com/news/liberia-china-rejuvenates-old-school-state-owned-media/

67 MinistryofForeignAffairsofLiberia(2019,June18).Liberia,ChinaSignHandoverandAcceptanceNotes-AsChinaCompletesPhaseFourofChina-AidedBroadcastingTechnicalAssistanceProject.http://mofa.gov.lr/public2/2press.php?news_id=3383&related=7&pg=sp

68 Mosher,A.,&Farah,D.(2010).Winds From the East: How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Influence the Media in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.Washington,DC:CenterforInternationalMediaAssistance.https://www.cima.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/CIMA-China-Report_1.pdf

69 VanSant,S.(2014,November12).WhyisChinainvestingintheComoros?CBS News.https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-china-is-investing-in-comoros/

70 Banda,F.(2009).ChinaintheAfricanmediascape:Acriticalinjection.Journal of African Media Studies,1(3),343–361.https://doi.org/10.1386/jams.1.3.343/1

71 PublicMediaAlliance(2017,February24).Zambiangovernmenttoaward60%shareinZNBCtoChina’sTopStar.https://www.publicmediaalliance.org/zambian-government-award-60-share-znbc-chinas-topstar/

72 PlayboxNeo(2018,June20).Zambia’sZNBCChoosesPlayBoxTechnologyNeoforBroadcastPlayoutfromitsLusakaHeadquarters.ScreenAfrica.https://www.screenafrica.com/2018/06/20/technology/film-tv-video-broadcast/znbc-chooses-playbox-technology-neo-for-broadcast-playout-from-its-lusaka-hq/

73 LusakaTimes(2018,April3).StarTimeshandsovernewZNBCOutsideBroadcastVans.https://www.lusakatimes.com/2018/04/03/startimes-hands-over-new-znbc-outside-broadcast-vans/

74 Jalloh,A.-B-.(2019,July5).China’scontentiousstakeinZambia’sbroadcastmedia.https://www.dw.com/en/chinas-contentious-stake-in-zambias-broadcast-media/a-49492207

75 Cooper,V.A.(2017).Mediadevelopment,DAC,andChina:Differentapproaches,samepublicdiplomacy.Journal of Media Business Studies,14(1),25–37.https://doi.org/10.1080/16522354.2017.1292714

76 TheU.S.couldbeanexception.OnMay1,2020theU.S.-ChinaEconomicandSecurityReviewCommissionreleasedaresearchreportpreparedbyitsstafftitled“China’sEngagementwithAfrica:FoundationsforanAlternativeGovernanceRegime”(https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-


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engagement-africa-foundations-alternative-governance-regime),whichcallsformoreattentionontheoperationsofStarTimesandothers.

77 TheEconomist(2020,July16).America’swaronHuaweinearsitsendgame.https://www.economist.com/briefing/2020/07/16/americas-war-on-huawei-nears-its-endgame

78 Pancevski,B.(2020,February12).U.S.OfficialsSayHuaweiCanCovertlyAccessTelecomNetworks.WallStreetJournal.https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-officials-say-huawei-can-covertly-access-telecom-networks-11581452256

79 Horwitz,J.,&Goh,B.(2020,September23).HuaweichairmanurgesU.S.toreconsider‘attack’onglobalsupplychain.Reuters.https://www.reuters.com/article/huawei-tech-china-idUSKCN26E0PX

80 MacKinnon,A.(2019,March19).ForAfrica,Chinese-BuiltInternetIsBetterThanNoInternetatAll.https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/19/for-africa-chinese-built-internet-is-better-than-no-internet-at-all/

81 Albert,E.(2020,February24).Pompeo’sAfricaTripReinforcesMessageofCompetitionWithChina.The Diplomat.https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/pompeos-africa-trip-reinforces-message-of-competition-with-china/

82 Prinsloo,L.(2020,August18).HuaweiStrengthensItsHoldonAfricaDespiteU.S.-LedBoycott.Bloomberg Businessweek.https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-19/china-s-huawei-prospers-in-africa-even-as-europe-asia-join-trump-s-ban

83 Olander,E.(2020,July20).WhytheUScampaignagainstHuaweiwillfailinAfrica.The China-Africa Project.https://chinaafricaproject.com/analysis/why-the-u-s-campaign-against-huawei-will-fail-in-africa/

84 Hart,M.,&Link,J.(2020).ThereIsaSolutiontotheHuaweiChallenge.CenterforAmericanProgress.https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2020/10/14/491476/solution-huawei-challenge/

85 EmbassyofthePeople’sRepublicofChinaintheRepublicofSouthAfrica(2019,June27).ChineseAmbassador:NoEmptyTalksButActionsforChina-SouthAfricaandChina-Africacooperation.http://za.china-embassy.org/eng/dsxx/dsjh/t1676076.htm

86 Xinhua(2001,February22).EastAfricanTelecommunicationsExhibitionOpensinKenya.

87 Tang,L.,&Li,H.(2011).ChineseCorporateDiplomacy:Huawei’sCSRDiscourseinAfrica.InJ.Wang(Ed.),Soft Power in China(pp.95–115).NewYork:PalgraveMacmillanUS.https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230116375_6

88 Ojo,T.(2017).TheCorporateSocialResponsibility(CSR)activitiesofHuaweiandZTEinAfrica.InK.Batchelor&X.Zhang(Eds.),China-Africa Relations: Building Images through Cultural Cooperation, Media Representation and Communication(pp.218–230).London:Routledge.

89 Kazeem,Y.(2019,December10).SamsungismakingacomebackbutChina’sTranssionisstillAfrica’stopphonemaker.Quartz Africa.https://qz.com/africa/1765210/transsion-is-africas-top-phone-maker-but-samsung-is-back/


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90 Kawase,K.(2018,April27).ZTE’sless-knownroots:Chinesetechcompanyfallsfromgrace.Nikkei Asian Review.https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Company-in-focus/ZTE-s-less-known-roots-Chinese-tech-company-falls-from-grace

91 Workneh,T.W.(2016).ChineseMultinationalsintheEthiopianTelecommunicationsSector.Communication, Culture & Critique,9(1),126–147.https://doi.org/10.1111/cccr.12129

92 Parkinson,J.;Bariyo,N.;&Chin,J.(2019,August15).HuaweiTechniciansHelpedAfricanGovernmentsSpyonPoliticalOpponents.The Wall Street Journal.https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-technicians-helped-african-governments-spy-on-political-opponents-11565793017

93 Greene,R.,&Triolo,P.(2020).WillChinaControltheGlobalInternetViaitsDigitalSilkRoad?https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/08/will-china-control-global-internet-via-its-digital-silk-road-pub-81857

94 Prasso,S.(2019,January10).China’sDigitalSilkRoadIsLookingMoreLikeanIronCurtain.Bloomberg Businessweek.https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-01-10/china-s-digital-silk-road-is-looking-more-like-an-iron-curtain

95 Olivier,M.(2020,February3).InsideAfrica’sincreasinglylucrativesurveillancemarket.The Africa Report.https://www.theafricareport.com/22841/inside-africas-increasingly-lucrative-surveillance-market/

96 Tilouine,J.,&Kadiri,G.(2018,January26).AAddis-Abeba,lesiègedel’UnionafricaineespionnéparPékin.Le Monde.https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/01/26/a-addis-abeba-le-siege-de-l-union-africaine-espionne-par-les-chinois_5247521_3212.html

97 Li,G.(2012).SpeechattheOpeningCeremonyofCCTVAfricaNewsProductionCentre.http://ke.chineseembassy.org/eng/zkgx/t894872.htm

98 JiefangRibao(2020,March26).JianghaoZhongguogushi,chuanboZhongguoshengyin[TelingChina’sstorywell,spreadingChina’svoice].https://www.jfdaily.com/journal/2020-03-26/getArticle.htm?id=290323

99 TheEconomist(2018,October20).ChinaisbroadeningitseffortstowinoverAfricanaudiences.https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/10/20/china-is-broadening-its-efforts-to-win-over-african-audiences

100EmbassyofthePeople’sRepublicofChinaintheRepublicofLiberia(2010).CCTV-9ProgramsSoonComingToLiberia.http://lr.china-embassy.org/eng/sghdhzxxx/t674902.htm

101Sui,C.(2019,October29).Chinawantsstatemediatopeddleits“softpower”inAfrica,buttechplatformsareabetterbet.Quartz Africa.https://qz.com/africa/1736534/china-daily-cgtn-fight-for-influence-in-africa-vs-bbc-cnn/

102ChinaDaily(2014).ChinaDailyMediaProfile2014.https://www.chinadailyasia.com/public_resource/public/pdf/HKedition-MediaKit.pdf

103ChinAfrica(n.d.)AboutUs.http://chinafrica.sinoperi.com/about.jhtml

104Sui(2019).Chinawantsstatemediatopeddleits“softpower”inAfrica.


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105Madrid-Morales,D.(2017).Lainternacionalizacióndelosmediosdecomunicaciónchinos:UnestudiodelaproducciónperiodísticaenCGTNÁfrica.Communication Papers,6(11),51–69.https://dugi-doc.udg.edu/handle/10256/14929

106York,G.(2013,September12).WhyChinaismakingabigplaytocontrolAfrica’smedia.The Globe and Mail.https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/media-agenda-china-buys-newsrooms-influence-in-africa/article14269323/

107Madrid-Morales,D.(2018).African News with Chinese Characteristics: A Case Study of CGTN Africa (PhDThesis,CityUniversityofHongKong).CityUniversityofHongKong,HongKong.Retrievedfromhttp://lbms03.cityu.edu.hk/theses/ftt/phd-com-23837390.pdf

108OutsideofAfrica,otherState-fundedbroadcasters,suchasVoiceofAmerica(U.S.),RT(Russia)andAlJazeeraEnglish(Qatar)alsohavesimilarnationalsegregation.ForanaccountofthemanagementstructureatAlJazeera,seeFigenschou,T.U.(2010).Young,female,Westernresearchervs.senior,male,AlJazeeraofficials:Criticalreflectionsonaccessingandinterviewingmediaelitesinauthoritariansocieties.Media, Culture & Society,32(6),961–978.https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443710379667.

109ThisisaconcernedsharedbythoseworkingforotherState-fundedinternationalmedia.ForagooddiscussionoftheseconcernsatCGTN,BBC,VoAandothers,seeWright,K.,Scott,M.,&Bunce,M.(2020).SoftPower,HardNews:HowJournalistsatState-FundedTransnationalMediaLegitimizeTheirWork.The International Journal of Press/Politics,194016122092283.https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161220922832

110Kahura,D.(2019,May2).EntertheDragon:China’sMediaWarinAfrica.The Elephant.https://www.theelephant.info/features/2019/05/02/enter-the-dragon-chinas-media-war-in-africa/

111Wan,J.(2015,August18).Propagandaorproperjournalism?China’smediaexpansioninAfrica.African Arguments.https://africanarguments.org/2015/08/18/propaganda-or-proper-journalism-chinas-media-expansion-in-africa/

112SupChina(2017,August1).HereareallthewordsChinesestatemediahasbanned.https://supchina.com/2017/08/01/words-chinese-state-media-banned/

113Madrid-Morales,D.,&Gorfinkel,L.(2018).NarrativesofcontemporaryAfricaonChinaGlobalTelevisionNetwork’sdocumentaryseriesFacesofAfrica. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 53(6), 917–931.https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909618762499

114Madrid-Morales,D.(2018).African News with Chinese Characteristics, p. 146.

115Zhang,Y.(2014).Understand China’s Media in Africa from the perspective of Constructive Journalism. PresentedattheChinaandAfricaMedia,CommunicationsandPublicDiplomacy,Beijing.https://www.cmi.no/file/2922-.pdf

116ForastudyofcontentonCGTNAfrica,seeMarsh,V.(2016).Mixedmessages,partialpictures?DiscoursesunderconstructioninCCTV’sAfricaLivecomparedwiththeBBC.Chinese Journal of Communication,9(1),56–70.https://doi.org/10.1080/17544750.2015.1105269.ForananalysisofCRIinFrench,seeMihoubi,S.(2019).Lastratégied’implantationdeRadioChineinternationale(RCI)enAfriquesahélienne.Norois,(252),89–102.https://doi.org/10.4000/norois.9420


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117Li,S.,&Rønning,H.(2013).China in Africa: Soft power, media perceptions and a pan-developing identity.Bergen:Chr.MichelsenInstitute.https://www.cmi.no/publications/4943-china-in-africa-soft-power

118AcollectionofallChinAfricacoversisavailableathttp://www.chinafrica.cn/Current_Cover_Story/.

119ThedatacomesfromtheBBCMonitoringservice.June4istheanniversaryoftheTian’anmenevents.However,nomentiontotheeventismadeinthereports,asthetopicisofflimitsforChinemedia.

120Madrid-Morales,D.,&Wasserman,H.(2020).AnAudienceAnalysisofChina’sExternalCommunicationActivitiesinKenya,NigeriaandSouthAfrica.http://danimadrid.net/research/2020_audience_analysis_chinas_external_communication_in_africa.pdf

121Johnson,H.(2019,June4).ChinaRadioInternationalRecommitstoAfrica.RadioWorld.https://www.radioworld.com/news-and-business/china-radio-international-recommits-to-africa

122Mihoubi,S.(2019)Lastratégied’implantationdeRadioChineinternationale(RCI)enAfriquesahélienne.

123ChineseEmbassyinLiberia(2019,November8).LiberianPresidentEllenJohnsonSirleafAttendstheHand-overCeremonyofChina-aidedLBSRehabilitationandExpansionProjectandtheLaunchingofCRIFMProgramsinLiberia.http://lr.china-embassy.org/eng/sghdhzxxx/t522906.htm

124Qing,K.G.,&Shiffman,J.(2015,November2).Beijing’scovertradionetworkairsChina-friendlynewsacrossWashington,andtheworld.Reuters.https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-radio/

125 Li, S. (2017). Mediatized China-Africa Relations.Singapore:PalgraveMacmillan.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5382-5

126Olander,E.(2019,December2).TheGrowingNumberofWaysChinesePropagandaFiltersIntoMainstreamAfricanMedia.The China Africa Project.https://chinaafricaproject.com/analysis/the-growing-number-of-ways-chinese-propaganda-filters-into-mainstream-african-media/

127Mengo,B.,&Wang,X.(2017,May29).DebutofXinhuadocumentaryonMombasa-Nairobirailwayreceivesfavorablereviews.Xinhua.http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-05/30/c_136324676.htm

128Řehák,V.(2016).China-KenyaRelations:AnalysisoftheKenyanNewsDiscourse.Modern Africa: Politics, History and Society,4(2),85–115.https://edu.uhk.cz/africa/index.php/ModAfr/article/view/35

129Lim,L.,&Bergin,J.(2020).TellingChina’sStory:ReshapingtheWorld’sMedia.InternationalFederationofJournalists:Brussels.https://www.ifj.org/fileadmin/user_upload/IFJ_Report_2020_-_The_China_Story.pdf

130Xinhua(2010,July1).XinhualaunchesCNCWorldEnglishcannel.http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zgyw/t713374.htm

131Madrid-Morales,D.(2018).‘Goingout’ — ChinainAfricanmedia.Africa is a country.https://africasacountry.com/2018/04/going-out-china-in-african-media


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132vanStaden,C.(2017).WatchingHongKongmartialartsfilmunderapartheid.Journal of African Cultural Studies,29(1),46–62.https://doi.org/10.1080/13696815.2016.1236720

133McGray,D.(November11,2009).Japan’sgrossNationalCool.Japan’s Gross National Cool.https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/11/japans-gross-national-cool/

134Moody,P.(2017).Embassycinema:whatWikiLeaksrevealsaboutUSstatesupportforHollywood.Media, Culture & Society,39(7),1063–1077.https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443716686673

135Madrid-Morales,D.,&Lovric,B.(2015).‘Transatlanticconnection’:K-popandK-dramafandominSpainandLatinAmerica.Journal of Fandom Studies,3(1),23–41.https://doi.org/10.1386/jfs.3.1.23_1

136Xinhua(2017,August18).LabelleaventurededeuxacteursdedoublagetanzaniensenChine.http://french.peopledaily.com.cn/Culture/n3/2017/0818/c31358-9256914.html

137Han,M.(2018,May18).Opinion:HowcanChinesemoviesandTVdramasgoabroad?.CGTN. https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d774d3555544e77457a6333566d54/share_p.html

138Fang,A.(2018).NeweraforChina-Africamedialinks.

139ForSenegal,Xinhua(2014,August30).Latélévisionsénégalaisevadiffuserlasériechinoise“Go,Lala,Go”(INTERVIEW).http://french.china.org.cn/foreign/txt/2014-08/30/content_33382496.htm;forKenya,Agade,H.(2019,October20).Kenya,ChinasigndealtoairChineseTVseries.CGTN. https://africa.cgtn.com/2019/10/20/kenya-china-sign-deal-to-air-chinese-tv-series/

140China.org.cn.(2018,October12).CAIFF:AnewbridgeoffriendshipbetweenChinaandAfrica.http://www.china.org.cn/video/2018-10/12/content_65833266.htm

141See,forexample,Zita,B.J.(2019).DreamChasinginChina.China Pictorial,pp.44-45http://china-pictorial.com.cn/media/1/Magazine_covers_and_PDF/2019/2019-04.pdf

142Rehal,S.S.(2020).TelevisionSoapOperasastheNewFrontierinAfricanandAsian(Afrasian)Encounters:TheCaseofFilipinoteleseryesinAfrica.InR.Achenbach,J.Beek,J.NjengaKarugia,R.Mageza-Barthel,&F.Schulze-Engler(Eds.),Afrasian Transformations(pp.255–279).Leiden:BRILL.https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004425262_014

143TheEconomist(2018,October12).Softpowerandcensorship.

144Madrid-Morales,D.(2017).Softpowerinthelivingroom:AsurveyoftelevisiondramaonCCTV’sforeign-languagechannels.InP.Voci&L.Hui(Eds.),Screening China’s Soft Power(pp.38–55).London:Routledge.https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315617930

145Talmacs,N.(2020).AfricaandAfricansinWolfWarrior2:NarrativesofTrust,PatriotismandRationalizedRacismamongChineseUniversityStudents.Journal of Asian and African Studies, p. 1230-1245.https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909620920323

146TheDiplomaticSociety(2017,November20).ActionpackedWolfWarriorII.http://www.thediplomaticsociety.co.za/home/16-home/2327-action-packed-wolf-warrior-ii

147Atleast,accordingtodatafromBoxOfficeMojoforSouthAfricaforthethreeweeksafterthereleaseofthefilm:https://www.boxofficemojo.com/title/tt7131870/?ref_=bo_se_r_1.


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148Galafa,B.(2019).TheNew‘HeartofDarkness’:ExploringImagesofAfricainWolfWarrior2(2017).The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus,17(4),1–12.https://apjjf.org/2019/04/Galafa.html

149Jefwa,B.(2015,September16).2015BeijingTVDramas&MoviesBroadcastingExhibitionlaunchesinKenya.CIO.https://www.cio.co.ke/2015-beijing-tv-dramas-movies-broadcasting-exhibition-launches-in-kenya/

150Xinhua(2017,August1).BeijingTVDramas,MoviesBroadcastingSeasonforAfricaOpensinZambia. ChinAfrica.http://www.chinafrica.cn/The_Latest_Headlines/201708/t20170802_800101502.html

151Xinhua(2019,27November).Sino-AfricarealitytelevisionshowtopremiereinKenyainDecember.http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/27/c_138587738.htm.

152Salaudeen,A.,&Busari,S.(2019,November21).ChinaandNollywoodhavesignedupfortheirfirstmajorfilmcollaboration.CNN.https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/21/africa/china-nigeria-film-partnership/index.html

153Selormey,E.(2020,September3).Africans’perceptionsaboutChina:Asneakpeekfrom18countries.http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/africa-china_relations-3sept20.pdf

154Silver,L.,Devlin,K.,&Huang,C.(2019,December5).China’seconomicgrowthmostlywelcomedinemergingmarkets,butneighborswaryofitsinfluence.Pew Research Center.https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/12/05/views-of-the-balance-of-power-between-u-s-and-china-2019/

155Madrid-Morales,D.(2018,February26).China’smediastrugglestoovercomestereotypesofAfrica.The Conversation.https://theconversation.com/chinas-media-struggles-to-overcome-stereotypes-of-africa-92362

156AFP(2018,September6).ChinesebusinessmanarrestedafterdescribingKenyans,includingthepresident,as‘monkeypeople’.South China Morning Post.https://www.scmp.com/news/world/africa/article/2163086/chinese-man-arrested-racist-monkey-slurs-involving-kenyan

157Fifield,A.(2020,April13).AfricansinChinaallegeracismasfearofnewviruscasesunleashesxenophobia. The Washington Post.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/africans-in-china-allege-racism-as-fear-of-new-virus-cases-unleashes-xenophobia/2020/04/13/7f606cd8-7d26-11ea-84c2-0792d8591911_story.html

158Madrid-Morales,D.,&Wasserman,H.(2020).AnAudienceAnalysisofChina’sExternalCommunicationActivitiesinKenya,NigeriaandSouthAfrica.

159Olesen,A.,(2015,July7).WheredidChineseStatemediagetallthoseFacebookfollowers?Foreign Policy.Availablefrom:https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/07/china-facebook-peoples-daily-media-soft-power

160Madrid-Morales,D.(2017).China’sDigitalPublicDiplomacytowardsAfrica:Actors,MessagesandAudiences.InK.Batchelor&X.Zhang(Eds.),China-Africa relations: Building images through cultural co-operation, media representation and on the ground activities(pp.129–146).NewYork:Routledge.http://danimadrid.net/research/2017_chinas_digital_public_diplomacy_towards_africa.pdf

161Madrid-Morales,D.(2017).MappingOutChina’sOnlinePublicDiplomacy.http://danimadrid.net/research/2017_mapping_out_chinas_public_diplomacy.pdf


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162Madrid-Morales,D.(2017).China’sDigitalPublicDiplomacytowardsAfrica:Actors,MessagesandAudiences,p.140

163Olander,E.(2020,May5).MeetLinJing:China’sNewest“WolfWarrior”inAfrica.The China Africa Project.https://chinaafricaproject.com/2020/05/05/meet-lin-jing-chinas-newest-wolf-warrior-in-africa/

164Olander,E.(2020,April21).ChineseOfficialsRespondtoAllegationsofAfricanDiscriminationbyShowingVideosofNormal,DailyLifeinChina.The China Africa Project.https://chinaafricaproject.com/2020/04/21/chinese-officials-respond-to-allegations-of-african-discrimination-by-showing-videos-of-normal-daily-life-in-china/

165Huang,Z.A.,&Wang,R.(2019).BuildingaNetworkto“TellChinaStoriesWell”:ChineseDiplomaticCommunicationStrategiesonTwitter.International Journal of Communication, 13, pp. 2984-3007. https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/11221

166Deng,C.H.W.andC.(2020,May19).China’s‘WolfWarrior’DiplomatsAreReadytoFight.Wall Street Journal.https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomats-are-ready-to-fight-11589896722

167Wang,W.(2020,April16).WestfeelschallengedbyChina’snew‘WolfWarrior’diplomacy.Global Times.https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1185776.shtml

168Sabour,S.M.(2020,July13).“Bâtirunecommunautéd’aveniravecl’Afrique”.L’Info,p.8.https://twitter.com/ambchinetchad/status/1283700678683222017/photo/1

169Putz,C.(2020,October9).2020Edition:WhichCountriesAreFororAgainstChina’sXinjiangPolicies?TheDiplomat.https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/2020-edition-which-countries-are-for-or-against-chinas-xinjiang-policies/

170Chen,X.(2020,October1).StrengthensolidarityandChina-Africarelationsformutualbenefits.IOL.https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/strengthen-solidarity-and-china-africa-relations-for-mutual-benefits-8238afdb-d51c-4647-8dd6-1efb1b68164c

171ThisstrategyhasbeensuggestedbyChinesescholarsforsometime.Forexample,Li,Z.(2013).Thetwo-stepflowstrategyofinternationalcommunication:AcasestudyonChinaCentralTelevision[Duiwaizhuanbozhongde“erjichuanbo”celve–yizhongyangdianshitaiweili].International Communication (Duiwai Zhuanbo),(2),30–33.

172CCTV+(2020,August11).Kenyan,BurundianscholarsvoicesupportforpostponementofHKLegCoelection.http://www.cctvplus.com/news/20200811/8153485.shtml

173CRITürkçe(2019,November18).UluslararasıtoplumdanHongKong’dakişiddetvekaosundurmasınadestek.http://turkish.cri.cn/1781/2019/11/18/1s201309.htm

174Alfred,K.(2018,January4).Partenariatd’échangedenouvellesentreXinhuaNewsetleRenouveau. RTNB.http://www.rtnb.bi/fr/art.php?idapi=2/0/18

175Molter,V.,&Webster,G.(2020,March31).ViralityProject(China):CoronavirusConspiracyClaims.FreemanSpogliInstituteforInternationalStudies.https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/china-covid19-origin-narrative


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176Chen,A.,&Molter,V.(2020,June16).MaskDiplomacy:ChineseNarrativesintheCOVIDEra.FreemanSpogliInstituteforInternationalStudies.https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/covid-mask-diplomacy

177Roose,K.(October24,2020).HowTheEpochTimesCreatedaGiantInfluenceMachine.The New York Times.https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/24/technology/epoch-times-influence-falun-gong.html

178Fawcett,A.(2020).Chinese Discourse Power: China’s Use of Informationa Manipulation in Regional and Global Competition.Washington:AtlanticCouncilhttps://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/AC_China_report_NKPDF1.pdf

179Repnikova,M.(2020,April16).DoesChina’sPropagandaWork?TheCommunistParty’smessagingisbothmoreagileandmorefragilethanitseems.New York Times.https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/opinion/china-coronavirus-propaganda.html

180Gill,B.(2020).China’sGlobalInfluence:Post-COVIDProspectsforSoftPower.The Washington Quarterly,43(2),97–115.https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1771041

181Kazeem,Y.(2018).StartupinvestmentinAfrica.The Atlas.https://theatlas.com/charts/S1dpnqcDz

182Luo,Q.,&Zhou,Q.(2019,December26).Interview:China’stechinnovationspursinternetdevelopmentinAfrica:OperaCEO.Xinhua.net.http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-12/26/c_138659188.htm

183Williams,A.(2020,August5).TheChina-FundedMobileBrowserThat’sZeroinginontheAfricanMarket.The China-Africa Project.https://chinaafricaproject.com/analysis/the-china-funded-mobile-browser-thats-zeroing-in-on-the-african-market/

184Ajene,E.(2020,July14).“Blitzscaling”inAfricanMarkets:Opera’sOpayOptimizesItsOperations.The China Africa Project.https://chinaafricaproject.com/analysis/blitzscaling-in-african-markets-operas-opay-optimizes-its-operations/

185TheGuardian(2019,November5).OperalaunchesNewsHub,targetscontentcreators,readers.https://guardian.ng/technology/opera-launches-news-hub-targets-content-creators-readers/

186Williams,A.(2020,August5).TheChina-FundedMobileBrowserThat’sZeroinginontheAfricanMarket.

187CoronaCure(2020,October11).CheckoutwhyChinahasthelargesteconomyintheworld.Opera News.https://ng.opera.news/ng/en/economy-finance/9983a6a9ec8bd739209feac03d360185

188UEFAboss(2020,October11).IsChinaactuallyanoppressivecountrytolivein,oristhisalietoldbyWesterncountries?Opera News.https://ng.opera.news/ng/en/politics/347ea31b223f3c9c4af858db0f652d9b

189Emose(2020,October11).ChinaAndIt’sSmartToliet.Opera News.https://ng.opera.news/ng/en/technology/0f5a065d71330667f411f2856d44a150

190Okike,S.(2019,July2).HowTikTokisslowlysnatchingyoungNigeriansfromInstagram.Techpoint.africa.https://techpoint.africa/2019/07/02/the-rise-of-tiktok-in-nigeria/


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191Williams,A.(2020,March10).TikTokisquietlysnappingupcreativesfromYouTubeandInstagramforafullAfricaroll-out.Quartz Africa.https://qz.com/africa/1815825/tiktok-is-winning-young-african-stars-from-youtube-instagram/

192Lunden,I.(2019,April5).Boomplay,aSpotify-stylemusicandvideostreamingserviceforAfricanmusicandAfrica,raises$20M.Tech Crunch.https://techcrunch.com/2019/04/05/boomplay-a-spotify-style-music-and-video-streaming-service-for-african-music-and-africa-raises-20m/

193Transsnet(2019).BoomplayandMerlinbringtheworld’sbestindependentmusictoAfrica.http://transsnet.com/news/detail/boomplay-and-merlin-bring-the-worlds-best-independent-music-to-africa

194Xinhua(2019,September4).Feature:China’sVskitvideoappthrillsAfricanyouths.http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/04/c_138363409.htm

195Masood,S.(2020,October19).PakistanRescindsTikTokBan.New York Times.https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/19/business/pakistan-tiktok-ban.html

196“ExecutiveOrderonAddressingtheThreatPosedbyTikTok”(August6,2020).https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-addressing-threat-posed-tiktok/

197TikTok(2020,July19).TikTokTransparencyReport2019H2.https://www.tiktok.com/safety/resources/transparency-report

198Hern,A.(2019,September25).Revealed:howTikTokcensorsvideosthatdonotpleaseBeijing.The Guardian.https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/sep/25/revealed-how-tiktok-censors-videos-that-do-not-please-beijing

199Olander,E.(2020,September8).FacingtheProspectofGettingBootedOutoftheU.S.,TikTokLookstoExpandinAfrica.The China-Africa Project.https://chinaafricaproject.com/2020/09/08/facing-the-prospect-of-getting-booted-out-of-the-u-s-tiktok-looks-to-expand-in-africa/

200Williams,A.(2020,March10).TikTokisquietlysnappingupcreativesfromYouTubeandInstagramforafullAfricaroll-out.

201Williams,A.(2020,August5).TheChina-FundedMobileBrowserThat’sZeroinginontheAfricanMarket.

202Cheruiyot,K.(2020,September17).Kenya’sdataprivacy:SenateaskedtoprobeuseofTikTok.TheStar.https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2020-09-17-kenyas-data-privacy-senate-asked-to-probe-use-of-tiktok/

203Wonacott,P.(2013,August21).SouthAfricanBusinessmanEntersPublishingWithChineseHelp.Wall Street Journal.https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-african-businessman-enters-publishing-with-chinese-help-1377111706

204Harber,A.(2013,June26).Sekunjalo’sIndependentbuyoutandsomethoughtsonaChinesepuzzle.BizCommunity.https://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/90/95532.html

205Essa,A.(2018,September14).ChinaIsBuyingAfricanMedia’sSilence.Foreign Policy.https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/14/china-is-buying-african-medias-silence/


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206Lam,L.,&Bergin,J.(2018,December7).InsideChina’saudaciousglobalpropagandacampaign.The Guardian.https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/07/china-plan-for-global-media-dominance-propaganda-xi-jinping

207Anthony,R.(2018,17September).China’sR370bn‘gift’demandsscrutiny.Mail & Guardian.https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-17-chinas-r370bn-gift-demands-scrutiny/

208 Cook, S. (2020). Beijing’s Global Megaphone.FreedomHouse:Washington.https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/beijings-global-megaphone

209Wasserman,H.,&Madrid-Morales,D.(2018,October16).ThelimitsofChineseinterferenceinAfrica’smedialandscape.The Asia Dialogue.https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/10/16/the-limits-of-chinese-interference-in-africas-media-landscape/

210Madrid-Morales,D.,&Wasserman,H.(2018).ChinesemediaengagementinSouthAfrica:Whatisitsimpactonlocaljournalism?Journalism Studies,9(8),1218–1235.https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2016.1266280

211Walker,R.(2020).“TheCompass:ChineseDreams”.https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/proginfo/2020/02/the-compass

212Cai,H.(2020).Duiwaizhuanbozhi“jiechuanchuhai”celueyanjiu[Regardingthestrategyof“borrowingboatstosailoverseas”inexternalcommunication].Xinwen Zhanxian[ThePress]. http://paper.people.com.cn/xwzx/html/2020-01/01/content_2002728.htm

213Speckman,A.(2016,August21).Rescueends,troublesgoonatbeleagueredStarSat.Sunday Times. https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2016-08-21-rescue-ends-troubles-go-on-at-beleaguered-starsat/

214Motsoeneng,T.(2016,July21).China’sWeChattakesonWhatsAppinAfrica.Reuters.https://www.reuters.com/article/us-messaging-africa/chinas-wechat-takes-on-whatsapp-in-africa-idUSKCN10205A

215Sun,W.(2015).TheConundrumofthe“HonoraryWhites”:MediaandbeingChineseinSouthAfrica.InW.Sun&J.Sinclair(Eds.),Media and communication in the Chinese diaspora: Rethinking transnationalism(pp.32–47).Routledge.

216Vermeulen,J.(2020,June12).WeChatWalletinSouthAfricashutsdown.My Broadband.https://mybroadband.co.za/news/banking/356029-wechat-wallet-in-south-africa-shuts-down.html

217Lim,L.,&Bergin,J.(2020).The China Story: Reshaping the World’s Media.Brussels:InternationalFederationofJournalists.https://www.ifj.org/fileadmin/user_upload/IFJ_Report_2020_-_The_China_Story.pdf

218RSF(2019).China’sPursuitofaNewWorldMediaOrder.Paris:ReportersWithoutBorders.https://rsf.org/en/reports/rsf-report-chinas-pursuit-new-world-media-order

219FOCAC(2018).TheForumonChina-AfricaCooperationBeijingActionPlan(2019-2021).http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/t1594297.htm

220RSF(2019).China’sPursuitofaNewWorldMediaOrder.Paris:ReportersWithoutBorders.


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221McCormick,A.(2019,June20).‘Evenifyoudon’tthinkyouhavearelationshipwithChina,Chinahasabigrelationshipwithyou’.Columbia Journalism Review.https://www.cjr.org/special_report/china-foreign-journalists-oral-history.php

222GNA(2018,September26).Itisourculturetocooperate-China.Ghana News Agency.https://www.businessghana.com/site/news/general/173107/It-is-our-culture-to-cooperate-China

223Mutethya,E.(2018,August9).2018seminarforKenyanjournalistskicksoffinBeijing.China Daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/09/WS5b6c48aca310add14f384f17.html

224Fordescriptionsoftheseprograms,seeYuan,Z.,&Zhang,Z.(2016,October17).Chinaboostssoftpowerbytrainingforeignjournalists.ChinaDaily.https://www.chinadailyasia.com/nation/2016-10/17/content_15511798.html;Musico,J.(2017,December11).ForeignjournalistslaudedforpromotingChina’sdiplomaticachievements.People’sDaily.http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/1211/c90000-9302897.html;and,Johnson,A.M.(2019,February28).ChinaAfricaRelationsonaNewHeightAsCAPC2019Opens.FrontPage Africa.https://frontpageafricaonline.com/news/china-africa-relations-on-a-new-height-as-capc-2019-opens/

225PhilippineNewsAgency(2018,February28).46journalistsjoin2018ChinaMediaExchangeProgram.

226Fang,A.(2018,July5).NeweraforChina-Africamedialinks.

227Crismundo,K.(2019,February27).ChinastartstrainingjournalistsfromAsia-Pacific,Africa.Philippine News Agency.https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1063034

228Benabdallah,L.(2017).Explainingattractiveness:KnowledgeproductionandpowerprojectioninChina’spolicyforAfrica.Journal of International Relations and Development.https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017-0109-x

229McCormick,A.(2019,June20).‘Evenifyoudon’tthinkyouhavearelationshipwithChina,Chinahasabigrelationshipwithyou’.

230ChinaDaily(2015,December2).AfricanjournalistsshareChinaexperience.http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/XiattendsParisclimateconference/2015-12/02/content_22598648.htm

231McCormick,A.(2019,June20).‘Evenifyoudon’tthinkyouhavearelationshipwithChina,Chinahasabigrelationshipwithyou’.

232Jenks,J.(2020).CrashCourse:TheInternationalPressInstituteandJournalismTraininginAnglophoneAfrica,1963–1975.Media History,26(4),508–521.https://doi.org/10.1080/13688804.2019.1634527

233Orizu,U.(2020,October27).LaiMohammedCallsforRegulationofSocialMedia.This Day.https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/10/27/lai-mohammed-calls-for-regulation-of-social-media/

234Madrid-Morales,D.(2019,May27).ChinesemediaintheGlobalSouth:ahistoricaloverviewofanenduringasymmetricrelationship.http://danimadrid.net/research/2019_enduring_asymmetries.pdf

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I want you to want me — TurkeyandAfrica’smedia

By Deniz Börekci & Dieter Löffler

Turkey as a new player on the African continent

UntiltheendoftheColdWar,TurkeywaspoliticallyandeconomicallylargelyalignedwithWesternEuropeandtheUSA.Inthe1990sitbegantobemoreactiveinforeignpolicyinotherregionsaswell.ThefocalpointsofthenewmultilaterallyorientedforeignpolicyweretheCentralAsianstatesofthecollapsedSovietUnionwiththeirTurkic-speakingpopulationsaswellastheBalkanstatesandthestatesoftheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,asformerterritoriesoftheOttomanEmpire.Sub-SaharanAfricawasaddedin1998withtheExpansiontoAfricaActionPlan.1However,duetotheeconomiccrisisinTurkeyattheturnofthemillennium,itwasnotuntil2005thatAfricaactuallybecameanimportantfieldofTurkishforeignpolicy.2

In2003,theStrategyforDevelopmentofEconomicRelationswithAfricanCountrieswasdrawnupundertheleadershipoftheForeignMinistry.TheTurkishgovernmentdeclared2005the‘YearofAfrica’.InMarchthatyear,RecepTayyipErdoğanwasthefirstTurkishPrimeMinistertovisitcountriesinsub-SaharanAfrica,travellingtoEthiopiaandSouthAfrica,andon12April2005TurkeywasgrantedobserverstatuswiththeAfricanUnion.3From18to21August2008,TurkeyhostedthefirstTurkey-AfricaCooperationSummitinIstanbul,inwhich49Africancountriestookpart.4WiththeIstanbulDeclarationonTurkey-AfricaPartnership:CooperationandSolidarityforaCommonFuture5 andtheCooperationFrameworkforTurkey-AfricaPartnership6adoptedthere,thissummitmarkedthebeginningoftherealimplementationofTurkey’sAfricastrategy.7

Inthesetwoagreements,thefieldsofTurkishactivitiesinAfricaareoutlined.TheIstanbulDeclarationstates:


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We agree to cooperate with vigour, in particular in the following areas and as outlined in the Framework of Cooperation annexed hereto: 1) Inter-governmental Cooperation; 2) Trade and Investment; 3) Agriculture, Agribusiness, Rural Development, Water Resources Management and Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs); 4) Health; 5) Peace and Security; 6) Infrastructure, Energy and Transport; 7) Culture, Tourism and Education; 8) Media and Information and Communication Technology; 9) Environment.8

AndtheFrameworkdetailsinSectionVIII,MediaandInformationandCommunicationTechnology(ICT):

Recognising the importance of communication and information flow as a means of promoting knowledge about different cultures and societies in Africa and Turkey, breaking down stereotypes and enhancing mutually beneficial relationships among their peoples, We:

1. Commit ourselves to jointly plan and undertake agreed initiatives to proactively reach out to the African, Turkish and international media, and publicise the African Union, as well as African and Turkish priorities and achievements;

2. Agree to promote opportunities for greater interaction and sharing of experiences among media personnel in Africa and Turkey through exchange programs that will create awareness of issues and challenges confronting Africa and Turkey with a view to establishing a framework of collaboration that can help to resolve them;

3. Agree to support each other in the exploration of new technologies that would facilitate faster and more efficient communication and information dissemination;

4. Agree also to support capacity building in the area of information technology;

5. Agree to cooperate in the implementation of the outcome of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) held in Tunis, Tunisia from 16 to 18 November 2005.9

TurkeyandAfrica’smedia

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TheobjectivesoftheAfricapolicyweredefinedbyRecepTayyipErdoğan,thenPrimeMinister,inacircularpublishedintheofficialjournalResmi Gazete on 26 March2010:

The adoption of an integrated African Strategy in the fields which were accepted in Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit — held in 2008 — and based on joint cooperation has emerged as an immediate need in order to develop political and economic relationships with the rest of the countries in the continent. The Africa Strategy Document will be put into action in order to strengthen the ‘partnership’ outlook with the African Union (AU); to deepen our bilateral political, economic and military relations with the continental countries within the framework of ‘Partnership for a Common Future’; to ensure the active participation of the other ministries, public institutions and non-governmental organisations to the cooperation activities that will be carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; to address the Turkish business environment in sub-Saharan Africa as well as North Africa; to increase support to our country in international organisations; and in order to promote our country effectively in the African countries which do not have adequate information about Turkey.10

TheJointImplementationPlanofAfrica-TurkeyPartnership2015-2019,11whichwasadoptedattheSecondAfrica-TurkeySummitinMalaboinEquatorialGuineainNovember2014,outlinestheconcreteimplementationinmoredetail.Thisagreementcontainsseveralpointsthatarealsoofinteresttothemediasector.InchapterI.InstitutionalCooperation,Section1.4definesTİKA(seesection‘TİKA’below)asacooperationpartnerfor“regionaleconomiccommunitiesandcivilsociety”.ThechapterheadedVIII.Infrastructure,Energy,MiningandTransportmentionsinparagraph12.b)informationandcommunicationtechnologiesasfieldsofcooperation.Furthermore,ChapterXisexclusivelydedicatedtothemediasector:

In view of the catalytic role that media and information and communication technology is playing in advancing development, the Parties agree to: a) Encourage the production and broadcasting of programs, including films and dramas produced by Turkish and African producers; b) Provide training for young African journalists and media members; c) Organise a Turkish-Africa Media Forum during the period of this Implementation Plan; d) Support African centres operating in the field of ICT.12


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ThevolumeoftradewiththecountriessouthoftheSaharahasgrownrapidlyinthelasttwodecades:whileitwasonlyUS$1.075billionin2001,13itwasalreadyUS$7.605billion14in2019.However,thiswasjustaminoriteminthe2019totalforeigntradevolumeofTurkey,whichwasUS$391.178billion.15Atthesametime,TurkishAirlinesexpandeditsnetworkto56destinationsinAfricaandisnowthesecond-largestairlineinAfricaintermsofpassengernumbersafterEthiopianAirlinesandnumberoneintermsofthecargosector.16

However,asimportantasopeningupnewmarketsforTurkeyareexpandingpoliticalrelationsandsecuringthesupportofAfricanstatesinglobalinstitutionssuchastheUnitedNations.17AfirstsuccesswastheelectionofTurkeyasanon-permanentmemberoftheUNSecurityCouncilinSeptember2008,withmanyvotesfromAfricancountries.

Inadiplomaticoffensive,TurkeyopenednumerousnewembassiesinAfrica.In2002,Turkeyonlyhad12embassiesthere.By2020,thenumberroseto42andeightmoreareplanned.18Duringthesameperiod,thenumberofAfricanembassiesinTurkeygrewfrom10to35.Todate,RecepTayyipErdoğanhasvisitedAfricancountries42times,firstasPrimeMinisterandthenasPresident.EvenifErdoğancanbedescribedas‘keentotravel‘,thisshowsthatAfricahasbecomeanewfocusofTurkishforeignpolicy.

What are Turkey’s activities in Africa’s media sector?

Theareaofmediaandinformationandcommunicationtechnology,definedintheIstanbulDeclarationof2008,isbeingcultivatedindifferentways.Ontheonehand,statetreatieshavebeenconcludedwithmanycountries;ontheotherhand,variousTurkishorganisationsareactiveinthissector.ThespectrumrangesfromthestatepressofficetoTurkishmediaanddevelopmentorganisationstopurelycommercialTurkishcompanies.However,thestateinstitutionthatawardsscholarships,YTB,andtheMaarifFoundation,whichrunsTurkishschoolsabroad,arealsoactiveinthissector,atleastindirectly.

However,theAKPgovernmentinAnkaraalsoaddressesthepeopleofAfricadirectly.Thus,thecurrentForeignMinister,MevlütÇavuşoğlu,lasthadhismessageofgreetingforAfricaDaypublishedinvariousAfricanmediaon 25May2020.19


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Intergovernmental treaties

AspartoftheOpeningtoAfricapolicy,numerouscontractshavebeenconcludedwithalmostallAfricanstates.Theymainlyaffecttheeconomicsector,butalsomilitarycooperation,thehealthsector,agricultureandmuchmore.AtleastwithDjibouti20(2005),Senegal21(2010),Gambia22(2014),Ghana23 (2015), Kenya24 (2016), Benin25(2017),Guinea26(2020)and,morerecently,theRepublicofCongo27(2020),explicitagreementsonculture,education,media,youthandsportshavealsobeensignedandpublishedintheResmi Gazete, theofficialjournaloftheTurkishRepublic.Theseagreementsdonotdiffersignificantlyintermsoftheircontent.Forexample,the2010agreementwithSenegalcontainsthefollowingparagraphsthatarerelevanttoTurkishactivitiesinthemediasector:

(1) The Parties promise to develop their relations in the fields of education, culture, science, arts, information, sports and tourism.

(2) The parties will allocate scholarships for undergraduate, graduate, research and language education in order to provide education to the citizens of the other party within the framework of existing laws and educations.

(3) Mutual cultural and historical recognition: Exchange of books, publications, journals and researches that are focused on the civilisation and national assets of both countries; … Exchange of knowledge and experience in the field of cultural assets and exchange of various publications such as books and researches.

...

(6) The Parties promote cooperation in the field of press and information; particularly cooperation between news agencies and their institutions responsible for radio, television, cinema, broadcast and advertising. The Parties facilitate the exchange and publication of culturally and educationally beneficial productions and publications. The Parties will develop cooperation between broadcasting regulatory authorities (Radio and Television Supreme Council and Senegal Broadcasting Regulatory Board) and encourage academic exchange including broadcasting research and studies in


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order to prepare more effectively for the new broadcasting environment by following the developments in technology.

Onlythe2017agreementwithBeninisalittlemorespecificonthepressandmedia.ThereitsaysinArticle5 — CooperationinthefieldofPress:

The Parties shall encourage cooperation between the news agencies, press organisations, radio and television institutions of both countries.

(1) Direct contact between the editors of the newspapers and periodical publications.

(2) Exchange of journalists and correspondents of press, radio and television.

(3) Radio and television programs exchange for enhancing knowledge about each other.

(4) The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to facilitate wider distribution of all forms of news freely by respecting the legislation in force.

(5) Cooperation in the fields of written and visual media, including advanced communication opportunities such as satellite and cable.

Itisnotknownwhetherotherintergovernmentalagreementsalsocontainpassagesthataffectthemediasector.BecausethePresidential9thDecreeontheProceduresandPrinciplesofEndorsementofInternationalTreaties,published on 20 July 2018 in Resmi Gazete,article4states:

Based on an International Treaty or the mandate of the law; technical and administrative treaties made by the President, a) if not being of an economic and commercial nature, b) if not concerning the rights of real and legal persons subject to the provisions of private law, c) if not changing the Turkish laws, may not be published in the Official Gazette. The President’s decisions regarding the ratification of the treaties described in this paragraph may not be published in the Official Gazette.28


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Government press offices

AtthebeginningoftheOpeningtoAfricapolicy,twogovernmentagenciestookcareofmediaactivitiesinAfrica:ThePublicDiplomacyCoordination(Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü’nün, KDK)andthePrimeMinistryPressandInformationGeneralDirectorate(Başbakanlık Basın-Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, BYEGM).Today,botharepartoftheRepublicofTurkeyDirectorateofCommunications(Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İletişim Başkanlığı),whichisattachedtothePresidencyOffice.29

ThePressandInformationGeneralDirectoratewasresponsibleforinitiatingcontactswiththemediasectorinAfrica.UnderthepatronageofVicePrimeMinisterBülentArınç,itorganisedtheTurkey-AfricaMediaForum,whichtookplaceinAnkarainMay2012andattractedalmost300mediamembersfromTurkeyand54Africancountries.TopicsoftheforumincludedTurkishforeignpolicy,theTurkishmedia,thepoliticalandeconomicsituationinAfrica,traininginthemediasector,conflictsandterrorisminthemedia,socialmedia,communicationtechnology,andthepossibilitiesofcooperationbetweenTurkishandAfricanmedia,aswellasmediasupportforthedevelopmentofeconomicrelationsbetweenTurkeyandAfrica.30

Asafollowup,theGeneralDirectorateparticipatedinthe5thAfricanMediaLeadersForum31inDakarinNovember2012,whichwasorganisedbytheAfricanMediaInitiative(AMI),basedinNairobiatthattime.Atthisforum — againunderthepatronageofBülentArınç — twoagreementsforfurthercooperationweresignedbetweentheGeneralDirectorateandAMIon7November2012:theDeclarationontheEstablishmentofTurkey-AfricaMediaPlatformandtheMediaMemberExchangeProtocol.32Itisnotpubliclyknownwhatthetwoagreementscontain.

ThethengeneraldirectoroftheGeneralDirectorate,MuratKarakaya,explainedinaninterviewin2016:

One of the concrete steps for the future was to establish a shared organisation for the institutionalisation of Turkish and African media consultations and members. The second one was to establish a journalist exchange program and the third one was, in the presence of our General Directorate and AMI, to build a mechanism to ease the access to technical devices and other devices of African media organisations and to improve African media sector ... Thanks


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to the Turkey-Africa Media Forum, over 300 press members from 54 African states came together.33

Theintentionbehindit,Karakayaexplainedinthisinterview,wastosupporttheMinistryofForeignAffairs,tocampaignnationallyandinternationallyfortheTurkish‘Africainitiative’andtodevelopcooperationinthemediasector.

ThenumberofAfricanmediamemberswhovisitedTurkeyaspartofvarioustrainingprogrammesorattheinvitationofTurkishorganisationsalsoincreasedsharplyafter2012.So,sometechnicalequipmentprojectsforradioandTVstations,andtrainingcoursesformediastaffonsitewererealised.ButthefirstTurkish-Africanmediaforumwasnotfollowedbyanother,incontrasttothemediaforumswithCentralAsiancountries,forexample.

Littleisknownaboutthesecondinstitution,KDK.34Itisonlymentionedintwoarticlesandonebook,35whichdescribeitsactivitiesonlysummarily.AsthePrimeMinistry’sPublicDiplomacyOffice,itshouldensurethecooperationandcoordinationbetweenpublicandnon-governmentalorganisationsinthefieldofstrategiccommunicationandpromotionalactivities.Accordingtothesearticles,theKDKfocusedoninfluencingTurkey’sperceptionabroad.Thegovernmentthoughtthebestwaytoachievethiswouldbebystrengtheningitsrelationswithinternationalmedia.PartofitspromotionalactivitieswerepressreleasestointernationalmediaoutletsandorganisingtheJournalistCommitteesProgramincooperationwiththeBYEGM.

TheJournalistCommitteesProgrampromotedbilateralexchangesamongTurkishandforeignjournalists.In2013,21journalistsfromNiger,Gabon,SenegalandKenyacametoTurkeyandvisitedvariousinstitutionsand,in2015,therewasatourby16medicaljournalistsfromMiddleEasternandAfricancountries.36Inaddition,in2015,aJournalistCommitteesProgramwasheldinUgandaand15journalistsfromUgandavisitedTurkeyforfivedays.37

Anadolu Agency (Anadolu Ajansı, AA)

AnadoluAgencyseesitselfasaglobalpressagencythatoffersitscontentinTurkish,English,French,ArabicandSpanishandotherlanguages,andalsowoosAfricanmediaascustomers.38Itmaintainsaregionalbroadcastcentreforsub-SaharanAfricainAddisAbaba(Ethiopia)andanofficeinAbuja(Nigeria).FurtherofficesareplannedinKhartoum(Sudan),Mogadishu(Somalia)andJohannesburg(SouthAfrica).Thepressagencyisalreadyrepresentedtherewithcorrespondents,asisthecaseinKenya.39


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AsTurkey’sstatenewsagency,however,AAisalsodirectlyinvolvedintheimplementationoftheabove-mentionedintergovernmentalagreements.Forexample,duringameetingwithSenegal’sMinisterofCommunication,SheikhAbdoulayeDieye,inDakarinNovember2012,DeputyPrimeMinisterBülentArınçannouncedthatAAwouldtrainjournalistsfromthestateagencySenegalPress.40

AAalsoconductssuchtrainingcoursesincooperationwithotherTurkishorganisations(seesections‘TİKA’and‘YTB’furtherdown).TheyareorganisedbyAA’sNewsAcademy(Haber Akademisi)aspartoftheCorrespondentTrainingPrograms(Medya Eğitim Programı, MEP)andareofferedtoforeignjournalistsandmediaprofessionalsinEnglish-languagecourses.Theprogrammeincludesin-housetraining,ageneralmediaprogrammeand,since2012,aspecialwarjournalismeducation.41Forthelastone,a12-daycourseofferedseveraltimesayear,theAAcooperateswiththeTurkishgeneralstaff,theSecurityDepartment,thePoliceAcademyandtheemergencymanagementorganisationAFAD.JournalistsfromAfricancountriesregularlyparticipateintheseprogrammes,forexample,intheSeptember2019programme,Chad,Ethiopia,Nigeria,Sudan,andSouthSudanwererepresented.42

Turkish Radio and Television (Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu, TRT/TRT World)

In2013,theMinistryofForeignAffairsinitiatedaprojecttosupplementradioandtelevisionofthestatebroadcasterTRTwithinternationalnewschannelsthat,amongotherthings,shouldconveythepositionsoftheTurkishgovernmentanditsperspectiveonworldevents.AlreadyinMarch2014,TRTlaunchedradiochannelsinHausaandSwahili,whichwerealsobroadcastasweb radio.43InAugust2015,44TRTWorldwaslaunched,initiallybroadcastingonlyviasatellite.Today,allmajorsocialmediaplatforms,suchasYouTube,45 Facebook46andTwitter,47arealsoserved.

TRTWorldstartedasanEnglish-onlytelevisionandradiostationwithnews,backgroundreports,documentariesandculturalprogrammes.Today,TRTWorldbroadcaststelevisionandradioprogrammesin41languages,includingHausa and Swahili.48TRTdoesnotyethaveanofficeinAfrica,49butaseparatestation,TRTAfrica,isplannedforsub-SaharanAfrica.50

LikeAA,TRTalsoranatrainingprogrammeforjournalists,theInternationalMediaTrainingProgram(Uluslararası Medya Eğitim Programı, UMEP).51 The programmecoveredallaspectsofjournalisticradioandtelevisionproduction


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andlastedoneweek.52Itwasadvertisedas“anefforttobuildauniversalbridgebetweenhearts,todevelopnewcollaborationopportunities.” 53 The programmebeganin2009,butseemstohavebeenabandonedafter2017,theyearthelastreportsarefound,andalsotheTRTwebsitementionsnotrainingdatesafterwards.54AnumberofparticipantsfromAfricaalsoattendedtheprogramme.Thepublishedlistsofparticipantsfor2015and2016show27visitorsfromsub-Saharancountries.55

TheseUMEPlistsshowthatmanyoftheparticipantswereemployeesofstateTVandradiostations.56ThissuggeststhattraineesattendedUMEPtrainingundercooperationagreements,suchasthoseconcludedduringstatevisitsbyErdoğanasPrimeMinisterorPresident:inJune2016betweenTRTandKenyaStateTVKBC,57inJanuary2017betweenTRTandTanzaniaNationalTelevisionand Radio Channel,58alsoinJanuary2017betweenTRTandMadagascarRadioandTelevisionCorporation59andinApril2019betweenTRTandBurkinaFasoStateTVBRT.60

TRTcurrentlyrunstheMediaTechniquesTrainingProgram(Medya Teknikleri Eğitim Programı, METEP),whichcoversthetechnicalaspectsofbroadcastproduction.Inaddition,TRTalsoprovidestechnicianswhosetupstudiosonsite,forexample,forTİKAprojects(seesection‘TİKA’below).61InthecontextofsuchTİKAprojects,mediastaffattendedbothUMEP62andMETEP63training.

Private media companies

NaturalTV,acommercialTurkishchannel,hasbeenbroadcastingfromAnkaratoAfricaviasatellitesince2017.64ItisalsopresentonYouTube,65Twitter,66 Facebook67andInstagram.68CurrentbroadcastinglanguagesareEnglishandFrenchbut,accordingtoGeneralDirectorTuncayDemir,thegoalistobroadcastinAfricanlanguagesinthefuture.69ThestationhasarepresentativeinCotonou(Benin)70andcanbereceivedin18countriessouthoftheSahara.71 Accordingtothestation,themainlocationofviewersisinGhana,Nigeria,Niger,BurkinaFaso,LiberiaandSenegal.72ThestationisoperatedbyNTROdakRadyoTelevizyonAŞ.73

AnarticleinthenewspaperHürriyetgivesaglimpseintotheinnerworkingsofthecompany.74About30ofthestaffarepermanentlyemployed,plusfreelanceproducers.ThemajorityoftheteamcomesfromKenya,Rwanda,GhanaandNigeria.Theaverageageis20years.Noneofthemcomefromthemediaorjournalism,butmostofthemarestudyingorhavestudiedinTurkey.Hürriyet’sarticlegivesthreeexamples:RwandannewsanchorOdileNtualwasstudying


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aviationmanagement;talkshowhostAnissaMugeni(Rwanda)wasstudyingbusiness,andhealthprogrammehostFaustinRutayisirewasstillstudyingmedicineatthetimethearticlewaswritten.GeneralManagerTuncayDemirsaid,“Whenwestartedbroadcasting,wemetwithAfricanswhohadadoctorateandabusinessmanwhowasreceivingmedicaltraining.Overtime,ourstaffgrewandwegotideasfromthem.” 75

Thestationoffersnews,sports,health,agriculture,culture,tourism,education,films,seriesandcartoonfilms.76However,NaturalTVdoesnotproducethenewsitself,butgetsitfromAnadoluAgency.77Moreover,sinceMay2020,thereisacooperationagreementwithTRTWorld,whichcontributes3.5hourstothedailyprogramme.78

Thestationwasfounded,accordingtoDemir,tohelptheTurkisheconomytodeveloptheAfricanmarket.InHürriyet’sarticle,heisquotedassaying:“BringingTurkishcultureandeconomyintoAfricanhomeswiththisstationmakesmementallyveryhappy.” 79Thewebsiteproclaims:“NaturalTVwillalsopromoteallproductsmanufacturedinTurkeyneededontheAfricanmarketcreatingagreatcontributiontoboththecompaniesandthenationaleconomy.” 80Therefore,theTurkishstatealsopays70%to80%oftheadvertisingratesforeachadvertisementofacompanythatexportsitsproductstoAfrica,and65%oftheproductioncostsoftheadvertisingclips.81

However,thisexportpromotionisnottheonlycontactwiththeTurkishgovernment.Undertheheading‘WhyAfrica’,theoperatorsannounce:“Theeconomic,socialandculturalinitiativeobjectivesofHEourPresidentdirectedtoAfricabecamethefundamentalcriteriainestablishingpoliciesandareasofcoverageforourchannelNaturalTV.”Thus,itisnotsurprisingthatthechannel,incooperationwiththeDEİKTurkish-AfricanEconomicBusinessForum,isstreamingErdoğan’scountlessspeecheslivetotheAfricancontinent.Inaddition,NaturalTValsosupportsthecampaignoftheAKPgovernmentagainsttheGülenmovement,whichsuccessfullyranmanyprivateschoolsinAfrica,andwhichisnow,inthegovernment’sview,aterroristorganisationagainstwhichtheAfricanpeoplemustalsobewarned.82

TheinternationallyquitesuccessfulTurkishtelevisionandfilmindustryalsosellsitstelevisionseriesandfeaturefilmstoAfrica.Forexample,thetwoseriesKuzey Güney and Kara para aşk(BlackMoneyLove)randubbedintoAmharicinEthiopia83in2016,thehistoricaldramaMuhteşem Yüzyıl(TheMagnificentCentury),whichissetatthetimeofSultanSüleymantheMagnificent,wasdubbedintoSwahiliinTanzania84in2018,andin2019thetwoseriesAdını Sen


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Koy(Younameit)andBöyle bitmesin(Don’tletitendlikethis)weredubbedintoHausaonlocalNigeriantelevisionchannels.85TheseexportsarenotonlyasuccessfortheTurkishfilmindustry,butaccordingtoTurkishmediareportstheyarealsosuccessfulmediaforadvertisingTurkishproducts.ExportstoSenegal,TanzaniaandKenyaaresaidtohaveincreasedby153%,134%and63%respectivelyafterKara para aşkwasshownthere.86“EspeciallyTurkishproductsusedinTurkishhistoricalTVseriesaredemandedbyforeigncustomers,”saidEyüpKerem,thefounderoftheBazareaecommercewebsite,whostressedthatTVseriesareTurkey’ssoftpowerandthattheygainmoreinfluencewitheachpassingday.87

Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Coordination (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı, TİKA)

TİKAwasfoundedin1992tocoordinateandpromoteeconomic,socialandculturalcooperationwithdevelopingcountriesandisnowunderthesupervisionoftheMinistryofCultureandTourism.88From2005to2019TİKA,openedofficesin18sub-Saharancountries.89TİKAthustookapioneeringroleinTurkey’sOpeningtoAfricapolicyandwasthefirstTurkishstateorganisationtoimplementprojectsinsub-SaharanAfrica.

EvenifthemediaarenotexplicitlymentionedintheobjectivesofTİKA,anarticleonthewebsiteofTİKAstates:

In particular, enhancing the cooperation in the media field with African countries has significant importance in terms of Turkey’s opening strategy to Africa. TİKA promotes the economic, commercial, cultural and social relations between Turkey and African countries by providing technical equipment supplies and training programs to media organisations.90

Between2012and2017,TİKAmainlysupportedStatemediawithtechnicalequipmentinadozensmallerprojects.


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Supply of Technical Equipment

Year Country Media Organisation Equipment

2012 Guinea-Bissau MansoaLocalRadio Technicalequipment 91

2013 Kenya AfricanMediaInitiative(AMI)

Technicalequipment,telephoneswitchboard,assistancefortheinstallationofateleconferencesystem 92

2013 Tanzania TanzaniaRadio&TelevisionCorporation

Cameras,VTR,charactergenerator,cuttingset,laptops 93

2013 Uganda BilalFM ModernisationoftwoFMradiostations,TVchannel 94

2014 Guinea-Bissau NationalChannel Technicalequipment 95

2014 Sao Tome and Principe

StateTelevision&Radio,NewsAgency

Camcorder,airconditioner,teleprompter,editingcomputer,wirelessmicrophone 96

2014 Senegal SenegalRadio&Television(RTS)

18computers,2printers,1serverand2projectorsforavocationaltrainingclassroom 97

2014 Somalia MogadishuUniversityRadio

Broadcastingequipment 98

2015 Mauritania RadioMauritania Technicalequipment 99

2015 Uganda StateFMRadioStation

Extensionofthecoveragearea 100

2015 –

2016

Namibia WalvisBayMunicipalityMediaEducationCentre

Materialsandequipmentforvocationalmediatraining 101


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Year Country Media Organisation Equipment

2016 Zambia NationalBroadcastingCooperation,Zambia News andInformationServices

Sixcamerapackageswithcamcordersandtripods,computereditingsystem,monitor,soundsystem 102

2017 Ethiopia EthiopianNewsAgency

Newsandimageproductionequipment 103

2018 Gambia GambiaRadio&Television(GRTS)

Technicalequipmenttotelevision 104

Enlighteninginformationaboutthereasonsforthishelpcanstillbefound

fortwoearlyprojects.In2013,ShabanMbuaje,ChiefMuftiofUgandaand

PresidentoftheUgandaHighIslamicCouncil,stayedinTurkeyattheinvitation

oftheTurkishreligiousauthority.Duringhisvisit,heaskedTİKAforsupport

insettingupthreeFMradiostationsandatelevisionchannel.TİKAproposed

modernisingtwostudiosofRadioBilalinKampala,asonlythreeof220

radiostationsinUgandaareIslamicradiostations,whiletherestarerunby

Christians.105

SupportfortheAfricanMediaInitiative(AMI)2013wasprovidedbecauseTİKA

sawtheorganisation,whichalsoorganisedtheAfricanMediaLeadersForum,

asthelargestpotentialinfluencemultiplierinAfrica’smedialandscape,which

couldbehelpfulindevelopingrelationswiththemediainAfrica.Amadou

MahtarBa,thenAMIChairman,declaredhehopedthatthiswasjustthe

beginningandthecooperationwithTurkishmediainstitutionswouldcontinue

increasing,whereuponHüseyinAvniAksoy,theTurkishAmbassadorinNairobi,

promisedfurtherassistanceinthetechnicalfieldandinbuildingupmedia

personnel.106

Anotherprojectstandsout.In2014,SaoTomeandPrincipeaskedforsupport

forhealthinfrastructure.AtechnicaldelegationofTİKAvisitedthecountryand

decidedinsteadtosupporttheStatetelevisionandradioaswellasthenews

agency.Anexplanationforthischangeofplanswasnotpublished.107


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TİKAalsoorganisestrainingcoursesinthemediasector,someofthemwithexternalpartnerssuchasAnadoluAgency(AA)andTurkishRadioandTelevision(TRT).

Media Training Programmes

Year Country Media TİKA Partner

2013 Mauritania JournalistsUnion

AA Fivedays’warcorrespondenttrainingfor12journalistsattheMiddleEastandAfricaNewsService/IstanbulRegionalOffice 108

2014 Guinea-Bissau

NationalChannel

– TrainingonTVbroadcasting 109

2015 Burkina Faso,IvoryCoast

Variousradiostations

TRT&Türkmek 110

Lecturesaboutprogrammeproduction,livebroadcasttechniques,technicalequipmentmaintenanceandrepair,newstechniquesandprogrammepresentation,andtrainingincomputermanagement,officeapplications 111

2015 Ghana – – Trainingonradiobroadcasting 112

2015 Somalia MogadishuUniversityFMRadio

– Sponsorship of radio personnel’svisittoTurkey 113

2015 SouthSudan

– – Mediacapacitybuildingprogramme 114

2015 Uganda StateRadio – Vocationaltrainingfortheradio’spersonnel 115


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2015 UnionoftheComoros

Comoros Radio

_ Improvementinhumanresources 116

2016 Kenya Variousmedia

AA TwelvemediaemployeesvisitedAAinTurkeyandgotinformationaboutAA’sactivities,broadcastlanguagesandgoals. 117

2016, on-going

Namibia WalvisBayMediaEducationProgram

– Vocationalmediatrainingforyoungpeople 118

2017 Chad Chad JournalistsFederation

Chad MinistryofInformation

Workshop,“ImplementationofMediaEthics”,with80Arabic-speakingjournalists 119

2018 SouthEastAfrica

– AA Twelvedays’trainingindiplomacyjournalism,78hoursofpracticalandtheorylessonsonforeignpolicy,diplomacy,energy,practicalinterviewtechniquesandphotoshooting 120


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2018 Somalia, Sudan

– AA Tendaysenergyjournalismtraining,78hoursoftheoreticalandpracticalcoursesonenergyeconomy,diplomacy,securityandlaw,regionalenergypoliciesandenergyreporting 121

2018 SouthSudan

GeneralDirectorateofRadio&Television,PresidentialPressUnit

TRT One-weektrainingprogrammefor12participantsoncamerause,lighting,sound,montage,newswritingtechniques,andprogramminginAnkara 122

2018 Ethiopia,Gambia,Namibia, SouthSudan, Zambia

Namibia StateBroadcastingCorporation&others

TRT Trainingincameraoperation,lightingdirection,voicedirectionandvisual-mediainformationtechnologiesfor75participantsinAnkara 123

2019 Kenya TRT Four-weektrainingfor4journalistswithcoursesinvideo,audioandphotoproductionandediting 124

InadditiontotheseindividualprojectsforthefurthertrainingofAfricanmediapeople,TİKAalsofinancestheirvisits125andtheparticipationofmediaemployeesinfurthertrainingprogrammesinTurkey,suchasMEP(seesection‘AA’above),UMEPandMETEP(bothseesection‘TRT’above)andisalsoinvolvedinthecurrentAfricanMediaRepresentativesTrainingProgram(AFMED,seesection‘YTB’below).


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TwofacetsofTurkishpoliticsarereflectedintheprojectsofTİKA:Ontheonehand,TİKAactsasanextendedarmoftheTurkishForeignMinistryandimplementsprojectswithintheframeworkofpoliticalagreementswithAfricanstates.Ontheotherhand,TİKA,whichasanorganisationisdirectlysubordinatetotheOfficeofthePresident,addressesAfricancitizensdirectly,withoutthedetourviatheStateinstitutionsofthesecountries.

Aprojectfrom2017showsthatTİKAisnotonlylookingforeconomic,culturalandsocialcooperation,butisalsodirectlyusedforpoliticalpropagandaabroad.Tomarktheanniversaryoftheattemptedcoupon15July2016inTurkey,TİKAorganisedpanels,pressconferencesandexhibitionsaboutthisincident.TheAnnualReport2017states:“Thehorrificcoupattemptwasexplainedtothepeopleoftheconcernedcountriesinthenewspapers,newsfeedsandbillboards.” 126

Presidency for Turks Abroad and related communities (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, YTB)

TheYTBwasoriginallyfoundedin2010toprovidescholarshipstoTurksandTurkishspeakersabroad.In2012,theinstitution,whichisattachedtotheMinistryofCultureandTourism,wasentrustedwiththeTurkeyScholarshipProgramandawardsallofTurkey’sinternationalscholarships.127 These scholarshipsalsoresonatewithmanyAfricans.Between2010and2019,accordingtoYTB,5259studentsfrom52AfricancountriesstudiedinTurkey;abreakdownbycountryisnotpublished.128Atthemomenttherearenocoursesinjournalismofferedwithinthescholarshipprogramme,butitispossibletostudyradio,televisionandcinema.129AstheexampleofNaturalTVshows(seesection‘PrivateMediaCompanies’above),severalacademicsfromotherfieldsalsotransferredintojournalisminTurkey.

In2019,theYTB,togetherwithAnadoluAgency(AA),theAfricanResearchersAssociation(Afrika Araştırmacıları Derneği, AFAM),andtheAfricanCoordinationandTrainingCentre(Afrika Koordinasyon ve Eğitim Merkezi, AKEM)launchedtheAfricanMediaRepresentativesTrainingProgram(Afrika Medya Temsilcileri Egitimi Programi, AFMED).YTBisthesponsorandAKEMthecoordinatoroftheproject.130

AFMEDisathree-weektrainingprogrammeforpeoplewhoarealreadyprofessionallyactiveinthemediasectorintheircountries,butarestillunder40yearsold.ThetrainingtakesplaceinAnkaraandIstanbul.ItincludestheoreticalandpracticalcoursesheldinEnglish,aswellasopportunitiesforinternshipsat


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AA and TRT.131ThetrainingprogrammethatYTBoffersontheAFMEDwebsitedoesnotrevealwhatcontentthecoursescover.However,thecostsofflightticketsandaccommodation,aswellascitytoursandotherculturaleventsarecoveredbytheprogramme.Participantsonlyhavetopayforvisafees.

Theapplicationismadeusingarelativelyshortonlineformthatasksforyourpersonaldata,employerandmotivationfortheapplication.132Inaddition,anapplicationvideoofuptofiveminutesinlengthmustbesubmitted.Fromsub-SaharanAfrica,applicationsfromthefollowingcountrieswereacceptedforthefirsttrainingcourse:Chad,Ethiopia,Kenya,Mali,Niger,Nigeria,Senegal,Somalia,SouthAfrica,andSudan.

AccordingtoanAAreport,thefirstandsofaronlytrainingcoursein2019wasattendedby20participantsfromMorocco,Tunisia,Libya,Liberia,Chad,Ethiopia,Kenya,Mali,Nigeria,Senegal,Somalia,andTanzania.Youcanalsofindoutaboutthecontentinthereport:expertsheldpresentationsontopicsrangingfrominternetjournalismtodatajournalism,fromcrisisreportingtointerviewtechniques.Asthecontentoftraining,anotherreportmentionssocialmedia,agendaandresourcesinjournalism,theworldmediaeconomics,mediaeffectsonsocialtransformation,traininginsubjectssuchasphotoandvideoapplicationsandTurkey’simage.AAandTRTstudioswerealsovisited.133

Turkish Maarif Foundation (Türkiye Maarif Vakfı, TMF)

AftertheattemptedcoupinTurkeyinJuly2016,theState-runTurkishMaarifFoundation,whichwasfoundedinJune2016,tookovermanyoftheprivateschoolsrunbytheGülenmovement,alsoinAfrica.ItcontinuedtoexpandthisnetworkofTurkishschoolsandnowoperates144schoolsand17studentdormitoriesinAfrica.134

TheMaarifschoolsalsoofferjournalismclubsintheirprogrammeinadditiontonormalclasses.135Moreimportant,however,isitsfunctionasanadvertisingmediumfortheAKPgovernmentandasasteppingstonetotheTurkishuniversities.136InanarticleinInsight Turkey,apoliticalmagazineofthegovernment-affiliatedthinktankSETA,itissaidthatthefoundation,

promotes Turkish universities ... and thus contributes to the internationalisation of the Turkish educational system by attracting appropriately qualified students to Turkey for further education. In addition, the educational activities of the foundation constitute an


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important example of cultural and educational diplomacy, which enables the positive promotion of Turkey’s image abroad.137

What are Turkey’s intentions in Africa’s media landscape?

IfonereadstextsbyTurkishpoliticians,publicistsorscientistsonthesubject,twotermsstandout:‘win-win’and‘publicdiplomacy’.TheformerclaimsthatTurkey’sOpeningtoAfricapolicyisbeneficialforbothTurkeyandAfrica,incontrasttotherelationsthatAfricancountrieshavewithEurope,particularlytheoldcolonialpowers.ManyseetheseasharmfultoAfrica.Accordingly,‘win-win’appearsaboveallinthestatementsmadebyTurkishpoliticiansandgovernmentofficialswhicharedirectedtowardsAfrica,orinpressreleasesintendedtoconvincethedomesticaudienceofthemoralsuperiorityoftheirownAfricapolicy.

Thesecondterm‘publicdiplomacy’appearsprimarilyinpoliticalanalyticaltexts.138InthecaseofTurkey,thissoftpowerapproachincludes,amongotherthings,allactivitiesintheemergencyaidanddevelopmentsector,butalsotheMaarifschools,theawardingofTurkishscholarshipsorthetrainingofjournalistsonsiteorinTurkey,aswellasthetechnicalsupportofmediaorganisationsinAfrica.ItdescribestheattempttoestablishcloserelationshipswithpartsoftheAfricanpopulationandtoactivelyinfluencepublicopinioninAfricancountriesoutsidetheofficialpoliticalchannels,intheinterestsofthegovernmentinAnkara,aboveallthroughinfluencemultipliers,suchasjournalistsorpublicfigureswhoshapegeneralopinion.

Publicdiplomacyhasbecomeacomponentofforeignpolicyinmanycountries.FortheAKPgovernment,ithasbecomethecentralapproachtogaininfluenceinthetargetedcountriesandtoachieveitsforeignpolicygoals.139 Three commontopicsshowwhattherealpolicyoftheAKPgovernmentlookslike,whichhasbecomeincreasinglyIslamist,nationalistandaggressiveinrecentyears.

Operation Peace Spring

MehmetKorkut,thecoordinatoroftheAFMEDprogramme(seesection‘YTB’above)saidinaninterviewwiththenewspaperDaily Sabah:“WestartedtoarrangethetrainingprogrammeafewmonthsagoincooperationwithYTBand200peopleappliedfortraining.Weknowthattheselectedjournalistsareimportantpeopleintheircountryandtheyareeffectivepeopleintheirfield.” 140


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ThesejournalistswouldbeinfluentialfortheideasaboutTurkeyintheircountries,hecontinued,accordingtoDaily Sabah.

Cihangirİşbilir,whospokeforAnadoluAgencyatthekick-offeventforAFMEDtrainingin2019,said:“TurkeyandAfricancountrieshaveestablishedprogressivelystrongerpoliticalandeconomicrelationsanddeepenedthediplomaticties.…Withoutanydoubt,AFMEDandsimilarprogrammeswillmoveTurkey-Africarelationsforward.” 141

HedescribestheAANewsAcademyasanimportanttooltobreakupthenotionsofAfricacreatedbytheglobalmediabystrengtheninglocalmediainAfricaandbuildingsustainableandstrongcooperation.Throughthis,truenewscouldbeusedtocombatthedoublestandards,distortionsandliesofglobalmediaorganisations.142

Bythat,hemeanslessthereportingonAfrica,asisregularlyputforwardbytheTurkishside,butrathertheinternationalreportingonTurkishpolitics,asbecomesclearbyanexamplethatisintendedtosubstantiatehisstatements:

‘Operation Peace Spring’ carried out by Turkey in order to combat terrorism, was described as ‘occupation’ by some global media organisations. They reported the operation which targeted PKK/YPG as an attack on the Kurds. They insist on these kinds of fake news. They propagated the most recent fake news as ‘Turkey used chemical weapons’, although the Turkish Armed Forces owns no chemical weapons. Turkey neither invaded Syria nor was carrying out an operation against Kurds or using chemical weapons. We can duplicate these examples. In order to eliminate the damages of these fake and distortional news, we have to grow strong media organisations that are reporting accurate news and bring up brave journalists. I believe that the AFMED program we initiate today will serve this purpose. I hope that these kinds of programs will be extended and deepened.143

AbdullahEren,PresidentofYTB,playedthesametuneatthisevent:

Turkey’s struggle in ‘Operation Peace Spring’ was rightful. Here, there are 20 young journalists from 13 different African Countries. While they are being trained here, they will also receive information about Turkeys Peace Spring Operation and foreign policy and they will spread this information in the places they go or in their own


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countries. Therefore, we also describe this programme as efforts of explaining and illustrating Turkey’s position in the Operation Peace Spring.144

YTBalsopublishedonitsFacebookpageapropagandaposteroftheTurkishgovernment,whichexplainstheTurkishgovernmentalviewonOperationPeaceSpring.145

Nevertheless,attheendoftheevent,thetraineeswerepresentedwithawell-balancedpackage:MetinMutanoglu,theagencyʼsDeputyDirector-GeneralandEditor-in-Chief,presentedtothevisitinggroupofAFMEDtraineestwobookspublishedbyAnadoluAgency,Rising Africa and Operation Peace Spring.146

FETÖ

Bytheendof2013atthelatest,apoliticalstruggleforsupremacybrokeoutwithintheAKPbetweentwofactions:themembersoftheGülenmovementandthefactionaroundRecepTayyipErdoğan.WhenpartsoftheTurkishmilitaryattemptedacoupinJuly2016andpartsoftheseputschiststurnedouttobemembersoftheGülenmovement,Erdoğanandhiscomrades-in-armsusedthistobrandtheentireGülenmovementasaterroristorganisationunderthenameofFETÖandtopersecuteallitsmembers.Tothisday,whathappenedonthenightofthecoupattemptandwhoorganiseditisonlypartlyknowntothepublic.Atransparent,publicenquirydidnottakeplace.

Atthattime,theGülenmovementwasoperatinginnumerouscountriesaroundtheworld,includingmanyAfricancountries,147companies,schoolsandthemedia.Therefore,theAKPgovernmenttookitsfightagainsttheGüleniststoAfricatoo.148Intheyearsafterthecoupattempt,theAKPgovernmenturgedtheAfricancountrieswithGülenschoolstoexpropriatetheseprivateschoolsandtransferthemtotheState-runTurkishMaarifFoundation(TMF),whichhadbeenestablishedonlyonemonthbeforethecoupattempt.149

ForeignMinisterMevlütÇavuşoğluendedhisgreetingmessageonAfricaDayon25May2017,whichwasalsoprintedinAfricannewspapers:

I would like to acknowledge the support and solidarity displayed by our African friends after this attempt against our democracy and basic freedoms. FETÖ has numerous networks in Africa, and poses an imminent threat not only to Turkey, but also for African


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countries and their current leadership. Several African countries have swiftly and wisely taken action against FETÖ, by either closing or transferring FETÖ-affiliated schools to the Turkish Maarif (Education) Foundation or banning affiliated organisations. We call on all our African friends to follow suit.150

InSeptember2017,MinisterofEducationIsmetYilmazonceagainurgedtheAfricanambassadorsinAnkara,accordingtoanAAarticle,that:

FETÖ’s activities focus on education and the economy and that it uses hospitals, media organs, public and private institutions, and NGOs as a mask. Their private schools employ terrorists and pursue FETÖ’s goals under the cover of education, Yilmaz added. ‘ FETÖ-linked schools pose a threat not only to Turkey’s security but also to the countries they are active in,’ he explained. ‘So we want our African counterparts, who are friendly countries, to rid these schools of FETÖ elements.’ he said.151

Thepressurehadaneffect.InNovember2017,fivecountrieshadalreadytransferredtheformerGülenschoolstoTurkey,152withoutanyevidencethattheformeroperatorsandemployeestherehadbeeninvolvedinthecoupattempt,letaloneposinganobviousthreattotheirAfricanhostcountries.

However,notonlypoliticiansanddiplomatswere‘enlightened’.TİKAtoostartedapresscampaignatleastonthefirstanniversaryofthecoupattempt,amongothersinAfrica(seesection‘TİKA’above).WhenaSouthAfricanmediadelegationvisitedAnadoluAgency’sheadquarterinAnkarainJune2018onatripwiththeYunusEmreInstitute,theTurkishculturalinstitute,HasanOymez,theeditorialdirectoroftheTurkeyNewsDepartmentinformedthevisitorsaboutFETÖandtheattemptedcoup.AccordingtoAAnews,hesaidtheterroristorganisationgivesanimpressionabroadthatitisasan“armyofeducation.”Finally,hehandedthedelegatestheAAbookMinute by Minute FETO coup attempt,whichcoversthechronologyofthedefeatedJuly15coupanditsaftermath.153Furthermore,latelyTRTWorldshoweditselfoncemoreasthegovernment’smouthpiece.İbrahimKalın,SpokespersontothePresident,explainedtotheworldon14July2020inaTRTWorldprogrammetheimpactofthecoupattemptonTurkey’spolitics.154

NeitherTRTnorAAhavetooffercriticalanalysesandresearchonthebackgroundandcausesoftheattemptedcoup,letaloneanyformofcriticismof


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howthegovernmentwasdealingwithandcomingtotermswiththiscrisis.Allthatcanbefoundisreportingthatiscompletelyalonggovernmentlines.

‘The Anti-Colonial Battle’

Africa’s huge potential for sustainable development will be realised only when new forms of modern slavery, exploitation and dependence come to an end and instead Africans are allowed to develop their own potential in ways that are in tune with the spirit and traditions of the African continent in the 21st century. Turkey’s win-win approach to Africa should be seen as a humble yet important contribution to this precious goal.

ThustheofficialwebsiteoftheTurkeyAfricaForumquotesthespokesmanforPresidentRecepTayyipErdoğan,IbrahimKalin.155

InTurkey’seyes,theEuropeans,abovealltheoldcolonialpowersFranceandGreatBritain,aretoblameforthefactthattheAfricancontinentcannotfullyrealiseitsgreatpotential.Theymaintainthecolonialstructuresandonlyseektheirownadvantageonthecontinent,awin-losesituationforAfrica.

ThisiscompletelydifferentregardingTurkey.FortunatelyforTurkey:“Unlike forpastcolonialpowers,historyisonourside.Ontheonehand,thereisthehumanelement,Turkeyhasdeep-rootedhistoricalandculturaltieswiththecontinentdatingbacktotheOttomanEmpire.” 156ThiswaswrittenbytheTurkishForeignMinisterMevlütÇavuşoğluinagreetingmessageonAfricaDayon25May2017.Because,withtheexpansionoftheOttomanEmpireintoNorthAfrica,“theOttomanEmpirepreventedcolonialexpansioninNorthAfrica.Similarly,theOttomanEmpire,anAfricanState,playedamajorroleinpreventingthepenetrationofcolonialisminEastAfrica.Inthe16thCentury,theOttomanNavycommandedbyAdmiralSeydiAliReisdefendedthepeopleoftheZanzibarIslandagainsttheoccupyingforces”,statesacurrentdocumentonTurkish-AfricanrelationsfromtheTurkishForeignMinistrythatadds,“Inthelandswhereitwasoncepresent,theOttomanEmpirehasbuilttheinfrastructure,watersystems,bridges,madrasahs,mosques,hammamsforthebenefitoflocalpeoples.” 157

ThiscloseandunselfishrelationtoAfricancountries,whichwerepartiallyincludedintheOttomanState,suchasSudan,Eritrea,Ethiopia,Djibouti,Somalia,Niger,andChad,endedwiththecolonialera.158 Turkey, now strengthenedagain,willhelpthemtoloosenthecolonialfetters.TheTurkish


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mediaispartofthatfight.AnadoluAgency,forexample,notonlywantstowinnewcustomersinAfrica,but — accordingtoKemalÖztürk,DirectorGeneraloftheAgency — alsowantstocreateanewinformationorderandbreakthedominanceofthe‘globalmediaorganisation’withitsnegativereportingonAfrica.159

IbrahimTığlı,theheadoftheAAofficeinAddisAbaba,wroteaboutthisinapleaforaradiostationTRTAfrika:

It is a fact that Europeans exploited Africa (colonialism), but now let’s leave this aside. If we want to exist in Africa with a non-colonial mentality, as we have been before and if we do not want to shut our eyes to the imperialist attitudes of the Europeans, then we have to be present in Africa. Being present in Africa cannot be achieved with only drilling water wells or distributing aid al-adha meat. Of course, these are necessary, however, above all we have to do all of these with press coverage. We have to announce the great things we have done in Africa to the world. If these people learn what we are doing, then awareness could be increased and they feel more protected against colonists.160

Acurrentexampleshowswhatthissupportcanlooklikeinreporting.On23June2020,TRTWorldpublishedafast-pacedvideoonitsTwitterchannelentitledAfrica’s French Problem. We break down France’s legacy of colonialism, political, economic, and military hegemony over Africaandtweeted:“FrancehasalwaysbeeninterestedinAfrica,butforallthewrongreasons.Here’saquicklessononcolonialisminlessthan5minutes.” 161

Init,inaself-righteouslysmugtone,rightthingsaremixedwithdistortions,twistsandpolemics,andthewholethingisthengarnishedwithfactualerrors.TheyoungpresenterdeclaresGhanatobeanex-colonyofFrance — themapinthebackgroundgenerouslyaddstheDemocraticRepublicofCongotoo — andclaimsthatthetwoCFA-FranczonesarecontrolledbytheFrenchMinistryofFinance;162theFrenchneverwithdrewfromAfricaevenaftercolonialtimes;FrancestillmaintainsmilitarybasesinAfricaandwagesnumerouswarsthere;withacliqueofpoliticiansandbusinessmenwhoweresubservienttoFrance,theywouldcontinuetorule;thissystemwouldbekeptrunningbybribingAfricanleaders,workingwithdictatorssuchasIdrissDéby(Chad)andAliBongo(Gabon);theaimistoprocureenergy,moneyandrawmaterialssuchasuranium,gold,diamonds,oilandgasthere.Theundertoneofthewholesermon


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isTurkeyisdifferent;Turkeyisbetter;Turkeyisonthesideoftheoppressedpeoples.163

A win-win situation?

Whataboutthe‘win-winpartnership’thatTurkishpoliticiansandmediaproclaimanytimeandanywhere? 164Inadditiontothesearchfornewpoliticalandmilitarypartners,theeconomywasoneofthedrivingforcesbehindtheTurkishOpeningtoAfricapolicy.HasitbeenworthitforAfricasofar?In2001,Turkishexportstosub-SaharanAfricaamountedtoonlyUS$0.371billion,butTurkishimportsfromthisregionamountedtoUS$0.704billion.By2008,TurkeyhadalreadyreversedthisratiowithUS$3.212billioninexportsandUS$2.503billioninimports.Sincethen,thegapintradehaswidenedinfavourofTurkey,withtheratioofUS$5.794billionexportstoUS$1.811billionimportsin2019.165

Andwhatisthesituationinthemediasector?NairobiAmbassadorforTurkey,HüseyinAvniAksoy,statedin2013inaTİKAreportthatthemediaplayasignificantroleinpromotingpeaceandachievingdemocraticgovernanceinAfrica.HeaddedthatTurkeyhasdecidedtosupporttheincreaseinhumanresourcecapacityinAfricainthemediasector,aswellasinotherareas,andsaidthatTurkeywillcontinuethesekindsoftechnicalprojectswithina‘win-winprinciple’,withoutexpectingsomethinginreturn.166

TheTurkishseriesexportedtoAfricaseemtohaveapositiveeffectonTurkey’simage.WhenKara para aşk(BlackMoneyLove)raninEthiopiain2016,theyoungpeoplequotedinareportbyAnadoluAgencywereenthusiastic:

Female teenagers like Bethlehem Tilahun, Megdelawit Daniel, and Hawi Yadessa, are hooked to Turkish TV serials dubbed in Amharic and broadcast by a private television, Kana. ... ‘From what we came to know, Turkey and Turks are infinitely creative,’ said teenager Daniel. His friend Yadessa also said that dramas have brought Turkey closer to his generation.167

Inthesamearticle,communicationexpertHenokMekonenexplains:

The positive perceptions which begin with a section of society becomes a general opinion and belief over time. ‘Positive attitudes about nations is a foundation of trustworthy all-rounded relations. Turkey and Ethiopia shall protect the growing positive perceptions from actions that invalidate the attitudes,’ he said.168


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Thetrainingofjournalistsseemstoworkevenbetterinthisrespect.AnadoluAgencyinterviewedAfricanparticipantsaftertheAFMEDtrainingcoursein2019,oneofwhomsaid:“Throughthisprogram,journalistsinAfricaareinformedaboutTurkey’seconomy,politicsandculture.Wereturnfromtheprogramasambassadorstoourcountries.WhensomeoneinourcountrywillsaysomethingbadaboutTurkey,weareTurkey‘sadvocate.”AndparticipantFatmaDaurafromNigeriasaid:“TurkeyhasdonealotforAfricaandwithoutknowingmuchaboutAfricans.IfacountrydoesagoodjobforAfrica,thenIthinkyoushouldtellthepeople.TurkeyisnotlikeotherEuropeancountries;theTurksdonotcometoAfricatoexploitus.” 169

TVseriesandjournalistictrainingcoursesthusdevelopthedesiredeffectofmakingTurkeybetterknownasacountryinAfricaanddrawthepositiveimageofaTurkeythatstrivesforanequalpartnershipwithAfrica.

OntheAfricanside,the‘winners’arenotonlytheyoungpeoplewhowatchtheTurkishserieswithenthusiasmbutalso,forexample,therecipientsofthetechnicalequipmentdonatedbyTurkishinstitutionsorthenumerousstudentswhoareabletostudyinTurkeyonscholarships.Butwhataboutthejournalistictraining?

ThetwomostimportantmediaplayersinTurkey,TRTandAA,arebothfirmlyinStatehands.WithadecreeinJuly2018,TRThasbeentiedtotheDirectorateofCommunications,whichmeansitisdirectlyunderthecontrolofthePresidency.170AAisajointstockcompanyfoundedbythestateofTurkeyandformallyownedbytheUndersecretariatofTreasury.On17January2018,AAandtheAKP-affiliatedthinktankSETAsignedacontractinwhichtheyagreedtocooperate.SETAistoprovideconsultingservicesandtocontributetothetrainingofAAstaffintheproductionofreports,analysesandnews.171Thetwostate-ownedmediahouseshavedegeneratedintomeremouthpiecesoftheAKPgovernment.

PresidentRecepTayyipErdoğan’sfamilyandalliesintheprivatesectorcontrolmorethan90%ofthenewschannelsandnewspapersinTurkey.172TheWorldPressFreedomIndexrankedTurkeynumber157outin180countriesin2018.Sincetheanti-governmentGeziprotestin2013,mediafreedominTurkeydecreasedcontinuallyandthegovernmenttodaylargelycontrolsthepublishingofanynews.ReporterswithoutBorderswrites:

Many journalists who were critical of the government were fired from once-mainstream media outlets; owners of critical media


98

have been threatened with tax suits that could bring down a whole company, while owners of outlets that seem to support the government have made better and better in their investments in other sectors.173

Ajournalisticeducationinandthroughacountrywithsuchconditionsinthemediasectorpromotesjournalismthatservesonlyasapropagandainstrumentoftherulers,anddoesnotreportcriticallyandtruthfully.Inthisrespect,itismorethanquestionablewhetherAfrica’smediasectoractuallybenefitsfromTurkishengagement.

ChristopherKayumbaofThe ChroniclesfromRwandaaptlysummarisesitinananalysis:

Countries like China, UK, Turkey and Russia are investing in media because they are outward looking, seek global influence and power and have clearly defined economic and strategic interests to secure on the continent. In other words, these states not only recognise the soft power media wields to win heart and minds but also know that controlling the airwaves on the continent is one of the best ways they can achieve their articulated goals ... these states have even defined the general message or narrative their media are wiring stories around.174

Epilogue

Unfortunately,Turkishstateinstitutionsarenotverywillingtoprovideinformationtoday.WetriedtogetinformationfromseveralinstitutionsbyphoneandemailabouttheirprojectsintheAfricanmediasector,butwereeitherturnedawayorpassedonfromoneemployeetoanotherwhowassupposedlyresponsibleforsuchinformation.Intheend,wedidnotgetanyinformationfromthere.

TheinformationinthepublicationsoftheseinstitutionsisgenerallymoreofapropagandisticratherthandescriptiveorevenanalyticalnatureandisprimarilyaimedathighlightingandpraisingtheworkoftheinstitutionsandtheTurkishgovernment.Detailsonindividualprojects,forexample,onthecontentoftrainingcoursesandadvancedtrainingcourses,areonlydisclosedinsummaryform.Unfortunately,figuresonthefinancialscopeofindividualprojectscannotbefoundeither.ReportsontheseprojectsfromAA,TRTorin


99

Turkishnewspapersdonotdiffersubstantiallyfromthesepublicationsintermsofcontent.

OnepossibleexplanationforthisisthatallTurkishactorsintheAfricanmediasectorarestateorstate-affiliatedinstitutionsandforthemostpartaredirectlysubordinatetothepresidentialoffice.The Presidential 9th Decree on the Procedures and Principles of Endorsement of International Treaties of 2018 shows howthisrelatestotransparencyandopenness.


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Notes

1 RepublicofTurkeyMinistryofForeignAffairs,Turkey-Africa Relations,w/odate:www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa(accessed8Sep2020);MehmetÖzkan,Turkey’s Rising Role in Africa, in Turkish Policy Quarterly,Vol.9,No.4,2010,p94.MehmetÖzkan&BirolAkgün,Turkey’s Opening to Africa, in The Journal of Modern Africa Studies,Dec2010,p532.

2 MehmetÖzkan,Turkey’s Rising Role in Africa, in Turkish Policy Quarterlyvol.9,no.4,2010,p100.HacıMehmetBoyraz,Küreselleşme Sürecinde Afrika ve Türkiye-Afrika İlişkileri,INSAMER,3Sep2015:insamer.com/tr/kuresellesme-surecinde-afrika-ve-turkiye-afrika-iliskileri_225.html(accessed8Aug2020).Volkanİpek&GoncaBiltekin,Turkey’s foreign policy implementation in sub-Saharan Africa: A post-international approach, in New Perspectives on Turkey,vol.49,Sep2013,pp128.

3 RepublicofTurkeyMinistryofForeignAffairs,Turkey-Africa Relationsw/odate:www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa(accessed17Jul2020).

4 Turkey- Africa Relations Continues Growing Stronger in Media,InterviewwithMuratKarakayainSiyasal Hayvan,24Apr2016:siyasalhayvan.com/turkey-africa-relations-continues-growing-stronger-in-media(accessed17Jul2020).

5 The Istanbul Declaration on the Africa-Turkey Partnership,Istanbul19Aug2008:www.iri.edu.ar/publicaciones_iri/anuario/CD%20Anuario%202008/Africa/ua/istambul%20declaration%20august%202008.pdf(accessed3Aug2020).

6 Framework of Cooperation adopted on 19 August 2008 at the Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in İstanbul,ForeignMinistryofTurkey,19Aug2008:afrika.mfa.gov.tr/framework-of-cooperation-adopted-on-19-august-2008-at-the-turkey-africa-cooperation-summit-in-istanbul.en.mfa(accessed24 Jul 2020).

7 MehmetÖzkan,Turkey’s Rising Role in Africa, in Turkish Policy Quarterly,Vol.9,No.4,2010,p99.


9 Framework of Cooperation adopted on 19 August 2008 at the Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in İstanbul,ForeignMinistryofTurkey,19Aug2008:afrika.mfa.gov.tr/framework-of-cooperation-adopted-on-19-august-2008-at-the-turkey-africa-cooperation-summit-in-istanbul.en.mfa(accessed24 Jul 2020).

10 PrimeMinisterRecepTayyipErdoğan,Genelge 2010/7: Afrika Stratejisi, in Resmi Gazete,26Mar2010:www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2010/03/20100326-16.htm(accessed23Jul2020)

11 Joint Implementation Plan of Africa-Turkey Partnership 2015-2019,ForeignMinistryofTurkey,w/odate:afrika.mfa.gov.tr/data/turkey-africa-joint-implementation-plan-2015-2019.pdf(accessed30Aug2020).

12 Ibid.

13 FatmaRiyamiDiwani,Economic and Trade Relations between Turkey and Africa: Perspective of Business World,Presentationatthe9thInternationalTurkish-AfricanCongress,24-25Apr2014:www.tasam.org/Files/PDF/pdf%20sunumlar.rar(4Sep2020);sourcewastheUndersecretariatofForeignTrade‘swebsitewww.dtm.gov.tr,whichdoesn’texistanymore.


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14 TurkishStatisticalInstitute,Foreign Trade Statistics:iz.tuik.gov.tr/#/showcase/SC-2851FY777F34D2R/db-3819a0e8a9b0f9a?filters=19516%3D2013%2619516%3D2014%2619516%3D2015%2619516%3D2016%2619516%3D2017%2619516%3D2018%2619516%3D2019%2619516%3D2020%2619508%3D5290%20-%20Diğer%20Afrika&mode=&token=8d79727fff862a891ce574d27220bfebbf66fecd(accessed9Sep2020).

15 TurkishStatisticalInstitute,Foreign Trade Statistics:iz.tuik.gov.tr/#/showcase/SC-2851FY777F34D2R/db-5jlb1c29xcw0899?filters=18792%3D2019&mode=&token=8d79727fff862a891ce574d27220bfebbf66fecd(accessed9Sep2020).

16 AddisGetachew,Turkish Airlines prioritizes expansion in Africa,AnadoluAgency,30Apr2019:www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkish-airlines-prioritizes-expansion-in-africa/1466079(accessed28Jun2020)


18 TuğçenurYılmazÇavuşoğlu Afrikalı Büyükelçilerle bir araya geldi,AnadoluAgency,18Jan2019:www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/cavusoglu-afrikali-buyukelcilerle-bir-araya-geldi/1368520#(accessed14Jul2020).

19 MevlütÇavuşoğlu,Union with Africa is now more essential than ever,RepublicofTurkeyMinistryofForeignAffairs,Ankara25May2020:www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu_nun-afrika-gunu-makalesi-25-5-2020.en.mfa(accessed7Sep2020).

20 www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2005/12/20051214-2.htm(accessed28Aug2020).



23 www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2017/07/20170707-2.pdf(accessed28Aug2020).


25 www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2017/06/20170606M1-5.pdf(accessed28Aug2020).


27 Meeting of Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu with Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and Congolese Abroad Minister Jean-Claude Gakosso of the Republic of Congo, 8 September 2020,RepublicofTurkeyMinistryofForeignAffairs,w/odate:www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-kongo-cumhuriyeti-db-ile-gorusmesi.en.mfa(accessed9Sep2020).

28 Milletlerarasi Andlaşmaların Onaylanmasına İlişkin Usul Ve Esaslar Hakkında Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnamesi, Kararname Numarası: 9, in Resmi Gazete,15Jul2018:resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/20180715-6.htm(accessed3Aug2020).

29 TheRepublicofTurkeyDirectorateofCommunications:www.iletisim.gov.tr/

30 Turkey-Africa Media Forum in Ankara,AnadoluAgency,8May2012:www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-africa-media-forum-starts-in-ankara/369174(accessed30Jun2020).Turkey-Africa Media Forum starts in Ankara,AnadoluAgency,9May2012:www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-africa-


102

media-forum-starts-in-ankara/369174(accessed30Jun2020).Turkey-Africa Media Forum,SAM–CenterforStrategicResearch:sam.gov.tr/turkey-africa-media-forum/(accessed30Jun2020).

31 AfricaMediaInitiative(Ed.),Fifth African Media Leaders Forum. 7 - 9 Nov 2012, Dakar Senegal, p 40: africanmediainitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/AMLF-2012-Book-English-11-July-133.pdf(accessed28Jun2020).

32 Turkey-Africa Relations Continues Growing Stronger in Media,InterviewwithMuratKarakayainSiyasal Hayvan,24Apr2016:siyasalhayvan.com/turkey-africa-relations-continues-growing-stronger-in-media(accessed17Jul2020).AfricaMediaInitiative(Ed.),Fifth African Media Leaders Forum. 7-9 Nov 2012,DakarSenegal,p40:africanmediainitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/AMLF-2012-Book-English-11-July-133.pdf(accessed28Jun2020).

33 Turkey- Africa Relations Continues Growing Stronger in Media,InterviewwithMuratKarakayainSiyasalHayvan,24Apr2016:siyasalhayvan.com/turkey-africa-relations-continues-growing-stronger-in-media(accessed17Jul2020).Ankara hosts Turkey-Africa media forum, in Hürriyet Daily News,10May2012:www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ankara-hosts-turkey-africa-media-forum-20404(accessed23Jul2020).

34 ‘kdk.gov.tr’todayautomaticallyforwardsto‘www.iletisim.gov.tr/’(accessed30Aug2020).

35 ElemEyriceTepeciklioğlu,AliOnurTepeciklioğlu&BetülAydoğanÜnal,Türkiye’nin Sahra-Altı Afrika’da Yürüttüğü Kamu Diplomasisi Faaliyetleri, in Ege Akademik Bakış / Ege Academic Review,Vol.18,No.4,4Oct2018.B.SenemÇevik&PhilipSeib(Ed.),Turkey’s Public Diplomacy,NewYork2015,pp15.AyhanNuriYılmaz&GökmenKılıçoglu,Türkiye’nin Afrika’daki yumuşak gücü ve kıtadaki artan etkisinin analizi,pp487-490,inİsmailErmağan(Ed.),Dünya Siyasetinde 4: Afrika, 2018, pp 461-521.

36 B.SenemÇevik&PhilipSeib(Ed.),Turkey’s Public Diplomacy,NewYork2015,pp16.

37 twitter.com/iletisim/status/598057177140572160?lang=en(accessed30Aug2020).

38 AfricaMediaInitiative(Ed.),Fifth African Media Leaders Forum. 7-9 Nov 2012, Dakar Senegal, p 40: africanmediainitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/AMLF-2012-Book-English-11-July-133.pdf(accessed28Jun2020).TİKA,Kenyalı Medya Heyetinden Ziyaret,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/kenyali_medya_heyetinden_ziyaret-22350(accessed30Jul2020).

39 InternationalofficesofAnadoluAgency:www.aa.com.tr/tr/p/yurt-disi-burolar(accessed30Jul2020).

40 EmreSolak,Turkish Deputy PM meets Senegal’s Minister of Communication Dieye, Anadolu Agency,8Nov2012:www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkish-deputy-pm-meets-senegals-minister-of-communication-dieye/311200(accessed25Jul2020).

41 AA’nın “Savaş Muhabirliği» eğitimi başlıyor,AnadoluAgency,28May2012:https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/kurumsal-haberler/aanin-savas-muhabirligi-egitimi-basliyor/365319(accessed1Sep2020)

42 TİKA(Ed.),AnnualReport2019,Ankara,p87.TİKA(Ed.),“15th Term War Journalism Training» Begins, AnkaraJul2019:www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/15th_term_war_journalism_training_begins-52801(accessed23Aug2020).

43 TRT’den Afrika açılımı,İhlasHaberAjansı,11Apr2014:www.iha.com.tr/haber-trtden-afrika-acilimi-347726/(accessed23Jul2020).


103

44 Turkey enters the global media stage with TRT World,TRTWorld,15Nov2016:www.trtworld.com/turkey/trt-world-celebrates-official-launch-229797(accessed30Aug2020).

45 www.youtube.com/channel/UC7fWeaHhqgM4Ry-RMpM2Yyw(accessed25Aug2020).

46 www.facebook.com/trtworld(accessed25Aug2020).

47 twitter.com/trtworld(accessed25Aug2020).

48 Foreignlanguages,whichTRTWorldisbroadcasting:www.trtvotworld.com(accessed25Aug2020).

49 OfficesofTRTWorld:kariyer.trt.net.tr/yurt-disi-temsilciliklerimiz/(accessed13Aug2020).

50 İbrahimTiğlı,TRT Afrika da gerekli, in Gerçek Hayat,12Nov2018:gercekhayat.com.tr/yazarlar/trt-afrika-da-gerekli/(accessed12Aug2020).

51 TRT, UMEP – Homepage:www.trt.net.tr/umep/(accessed30Aug2020).

52 ProgramoftheTRTUMEPtraining2016:http://www.trt.net.tr/umep/genel/4th-international-media-training-programme/(accessed30Aug2020).

53 Ibid.

54 TRT, UMEP – About us:www.trt.net.tr/umep/trt/about-us/(accessed30Aug2020).

55 ListofparticipantsfromtheTRTUMEPtrainings2015and2016:www.trt.net.tr/umep/program/konuklar/(accessed28Aug2020).TheparticipantscamefromCameroon(2),Djibouti(1),Ethiopia(3),Kenya(5),Namibia(2),Nigeria(1),Senegal(3),Somalia(4),SouthSudan(3),Sudan(3).

56 Ibid.

57 Türkiye ile Kenya arasında imzalanan anlaşmalar,TRTHaber,2Jun2016:www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/turkiye-ile-kenya-arasinda-imzalanan-anlasmalar-254065.html(accessed25Aug2020).

58 Türkiye ile Tanzanya arasında 9 anlaşma imzalandı,TRTHaber,23Jan2017:www.trthaber.com/haber/ekonomi/turkiye-ile-tanzanya-arasinda-9-anlasma-imzalandi-295314.html(accessed25Aug2020).

59 İlhanToprak,Türkiye ile Madagaskar arasında 4 anlaşma imzalandı,AnadoluAgency,25Jan2017:www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/turkiye-ile-madagaskar-arasinda-4-anlasma-imzalandi/734645(accessed27Aug2020).

60 Cumhurbaşkanımız Erdoğan, Burkina Faso Cumhurbaşkanı Kabore ile ortak basın toplantısı düzenledi, AKParti,11Apr2019:www.akparti.org.tr/haberler/cumhurbaskanimiz-erdogan-burkina-faso-cumhurbaskani-kabore-ile-ortak-basin-toplantisi-duzenledi/(accessed11Jul2020).

61 TİKA(Ed.),Annual Report 2014, Ankara, p 138.

62 TİKA(Ed.),Annual Report 2015,Ankara,p105:ParticipantscamefromEthiopia,Kenya,Nigeria,Senegal,Somalia,SouthSudan,andSudan.

63 TİKA(Ed.),Annual Report 2019, Ankara, p 88.


104

64 TuncayDemir,Message from us,NaturalTV:naturaltv.com.tr/en/message-us(accessed26Jul2020).

65 www.youtube.com/channel/UC4FDY-cb2e8P4WhOq_i-NxA(accessed26Jul2020).

66 twitter.com/ntrtvtr(accessed26Jul2020).

67 www.facebook.com/ntrtvtr/(accessed26Jul2020).

68 www.instagram.com/tvnaturaltv/(accessed26Jul2020).

69 Ankara’daAfrikaTV,inHürriyet, 20 Apr 2019, p 1, 10.

70 Temsilciliklerimiz,NaturalTV:naturaltv.com.tr/temsilciliklerimiz(accessed26Jul2020).

71 AccordingtoNaturalTVinAngola,Benin,BurkinaFaso,Cameroon,CongoDC,RepublicofCongo,GabonGambia,Ghana,Guinea,Guinea-Bissau,IvoryCoastLiberia,Niger,Nigeria,Senegal,SierraLeone,Togo:naturaltv.com.tr/index.php/en/why-africa(accessed26Jul2020).

72 ZeynepBilgehan,Reytingler Afrika’dan, in Hürriyet,20Apr2019:www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/reytingler-afrikadan-41188486(accessed27Jul2020).

73 NTR – Afrika’nın İlk Türk Televizyon,NaturalTV:naturaltv.com.tr/en/flipbook/1(accessed26Jul2020).

74 Zeynep Bilgehan, Reytingler Afrika’dan, in Hürriyet,20Apr2019:www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/reytingler-afrikadan-41188486(accessed27Jul2020).

75 Ibid.



78 NTRTVTRTWOLDOrtak Yayın,NaturalTV:naturaltv.com.tr/en/node/1510(accessed26Jul2020);www.facebook.com/permalink.php?id=414419492423583&story_fbid=774766516388877(accessed26Jul2020);www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xt5qYU9omjw(accessed26Jul2020).

79 Ankara’da Afrika TV, in Hürriyet, 20 Apr 2019, p 1, 10.

80 Why Natural TV,NaturalTV:naturaltv.com.tr/en/why-natural-tv(accessed26Jul2020).

81 Ads & Pump Priming,NaturalTV:naturaltv.com.tr/en/advertisement(accessed26Jul2020).


83 Seleshi Tessema, Ethiopia takes delight in watching Turkish drama series,AnadoluAgency,12Nov2016:www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/ethiopia-takes-delight-in-watching-turkish-drama-series/684000(accessed30Aug2020).SeleshiTessema&TufanAktaş,Etiyopya’da en çok Türk dizileri izleniyor, AnadoluAgency,11Nov2016:www.aa.com.tr/tr/kultur-sanat/etiyopyada-en-cok-turk-dizileri-izleniyor/683369(accessed29Aug2020).

84 Muhteşem Yüzyıl,inWikipedia:en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhte%C5%9Fem_Y%C3%BCzy%C4%B1l.


105

85 GökhanKavak&AdamAbuBashal,Nijeryalılar Türk aile kültürünü Türk dizilerinden öğreniyor, AnadoluAgency22Nov2019:www.aa.com.tr/tr/kultur-sanat/nijeryalilar-turk-aile-kulturunu-turk-dizilerinden-ogreniyor/1652593(accessed28Aug2020).

86 Türk dizilerinin yurt dışı reytingi hizmet ve mal ihracatını artırdı, in Hürriyet,9Nov2019:www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/turk-dizilerinin-yurt-disi-reytingi-hizmet-ve-mal-ihracatini-artirdi-41370181(accessed30Aug2020).GökhanErgöçün,Turkish TV series hawk exports in living rooms worldwide, AnadoluAgency,17Nov2019:www.aa.com.tr/en/culture/turkish-tv-series-hawk-exports-in-living-rooms-worldwide/1647699(accessed23Aug2020).

87 GökhanErgöçü,Turkish TV series hawk exports in living rooms worldwide,AnadoluAgency,17Nov2020:www.aa.com.tr/en/culture/turkish-tv-series-hawk-exports-in-living-rooms-worldwide/1647699(accessed17Jun2020).

88 TİKA(Ed.),Annual Report 2019,Ankara,p25;TİKA,HistoryofTİKA:www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/history_of_tika-8526(accessed23Jul2020).

89 AccordingtotheTİKAwebsitetheofficesareinDakar/Senegal,Bangui/Gambia,Conakry/Guinea,Niamey/Niger,N’Djamena/Chad,Khartoum/Sudan,DjiboutiCity/Djibouti,AddisAbaba/Ethiopia,Yaoundé/Cameroon,Juba/SouthSudan,Mogadishu/Somalia,Kampala/Uganda,Nairobi/Kenya,DarEsSalaam/Tanzania,Nigeria/Abuja,Moroni/Comoros,Windhoek/Namibia,Maputo/Mozambique,Pretoria/SouthAfrica:www.tika.gov.tr/en/overseasoffices(accessed23Jul2020).

90 TİKA’dan Medya Desteği,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/tikadan_medya_destegi-4021

91 Gine Bissau Televizyonu’na Malzeme Desteği,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/gine_bissau_televizyonuna_malzeme_destegi-7154(accessed23Jul2020).

92 Kenya’da Medya Altyapısı ve İnsan Kapasitesinin Gelişmesine Destek,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/kenyada_medya_altyapisi_ve_insan_kapasitesinin_gelismesine_destek-5517(accessed23Jul 2020).

93 TİKA’dan Medya Desteği,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/tikadan_medya_destegi-4021(accessed23Jul2020).Tanzanıa Broadcastıng Corporatıon Kuruluşuna Malzeme Desteği,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/tanzania_broadcasting_corporation_kurulusuna_malzeme_destegi-5121(accessed23Jul2020).

94 TİKA’dan Medya Desteği,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/tikadan_medya_destegi-4021(accessed23Jul2020).

95 Gine Bissau Televizyonu’na Malzeme Desteği,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/gine_bissau_televizyonuna_malzeme_destegi-7154(accessed23Jul2020).

96 Sao Tome ve Principe Demokratik Cumhuriyeti’nin Medya Alt Yapısı Güçlendirildi,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/sao_tome_ve_principe_demokratik_cumhuriyetinin_medya_alt_yapisi_guclendirildi-8087(accessed23Jul2020).

97 TİKA(Ed.),Annual Report 2014, Ankara, p 135




106

100TİKA(Ed.),Annual Report 2015, Ankara, p 104

101 Walwis Bay Medya Eğitim Programı İlk Mezunlarını Verdi,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/walwis_bay_medya_egitim_programi_ilk_mezunlarini_verdi-39505(accessed23Jul2020).

102 TİKA’nın Desteğiyle Zambiya Medya Organlarına Ekipman Desteği Sağlandı,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/tika%27nin_destegiyle_zambiya_medya_organlarina_ekipman_destegi_saglandi-24532(accessed23Jul2020).

103 Seleshi Tessema, Turkey donates media equipment to Ethiopian News Agency,AnadoluAgency,23Jun2017:www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-donates-media-equipment-to-ethiopian-news-agency/847968(accessed25Jul2020).

104TİKA(Ed.),Annual Report 2018 Ankara, p 86.

105 TİKA’dan Medya Desteği,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/tikadan_medya_destegi-4021(accessed23Jul2020).


107 Sao Tome ve Principe Demokratik Cumhuriyeti’nin Medya Alt Yapısı Güçlendirildi,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/sao_tome_ve_principe_demokratik_cumhuriyetinin_medya_alt_yapisi_guclendirildi-8087(accessed23Jul2020).

108 Moritanyalı Gazetecilere Eğitim,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/moritanyali_gazetecilere_egitim-5335(accessed23Jul2020).AA’dan Moritanyalı gazetecilere eğitim,AnadoluAgency,15Nov2013:www.aa.com.tr/tr/kurumsal-haberler/aadan-moritanyali-gazetecilere-egitim/204075(accessed7Aug2020).

109TİKA(Ed.),Turkey’s Cooperation with the Least Developed Countries 2016,2016,p40:www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2016/INGILIZCE%20SITE%20ESERLER/TANITIM%20BROŞÜRLERİ/PDF/Turkey’s%20Cooperation%20with%20the%20Least%20Developed%20Countries%202016.pdf(accessed12Aug2020).Gine Bissau Televizyonu’na Malzeme DesteğiTİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/gine_bissau_televizyonuna_malzeme_destegi-7154(accessed23Jul2020).

110 Uluslararası Mesleki ve Teknik Eğitim Programı (TÜRKMEK)isavocationaltrainingprogramofTİKAincooperationwiththeIstanbulChamberofCommerce(İstanbulTicaretOdası,İTO).Itaimsto“…traineesfromAfricancountriesandthecountrieswhichhavehistoricalandgeographicaltieswithTurkey,[they]areprovidedwithvocationalandculturaltrainingin3,6and8monthsduration.»:www.turkmek.org.tr/About.aspx(accessed1Aug2020).

111TİKA(Ed.),Annual Report 2015,Ankara,p104;Fildişi Sahilleri ve Burkina Faso Radyo Personeline Eğitim,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/fildisi_sahilleri_ve_burkina_faso_radyo_personeline_egitim-16066(accessed23Jul2020).

112TİKA(Ed.),Annual Report 2015, Ankara, p 104.




107



117 Kenyalı Medya Heyetinden Ziyaret,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/kenyali_medya_heyetinden_ziyaret-22350(accessed23Jul2020).

118 Walwis Bay Medya Eğitim Programı İlk Mezunlarını Verdi,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/walwis_bay_medya_egitim_programi_ilk_mezunlarini_verdi-39505(accessed23Jul2020).

119 Çad’da Medya Ahlakının Meslekte Uygulanması Çalıştayı’na Destek,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/cad%27da_medya_ahlakinin_meslekte_uygulanmasi_calistayi%27na_destek-40640(accessed23 Jul 2020).

120TugcenurYilmaz,Anadolu Agency diplomacy journalism training ends,AnadoluAgency,11May2018:www.aa.com.tr/en/corporate-news/anadolu-agency-diplomacy-journalism-training-ends-/1142567(27 Jun 2020).

121FirdevsYüksel&HaleTürkeş,Anadolu Agency, TIKA energy journalism trainees graduate, Anadolu Agency,w/odate:www.aa.com.tr/en/newsacademy/turkey/anadolu-agency-tika-energy-journalism-trainees-graduate/532953(accessed1Aug2020).

122 TİKA and TRT Jointly Provide Training to Media Personnel in South Sudan,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/tika_and_trt_jointly_provide_training_to_media_personnel_in_south_sudan-42885(accessed23Jul2020).

123 50 Yıllık Tecrübe Afrika Ülkeleri ile Paylaşılıyor,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/50_yillik_tecrube_afrika_ulkeleri_ile_paylasiliyor-46188(accessed23Jul2020).

124MagdaleneMukami&AndrewWasike,Turkey trains Kenyan journalists in Ankara,AnadoluAgency,1Apr2019:www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-trains-kenyan-journalists-in-ankara/1439965(accessed20 Jul 2020).

125KenyalıMedyaHeyetindenZiyaret,TİKA,w/odate:www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/kenyali_medya_heyetinden_ziyaret-22350(accessed23Jul2020).

126TİKA(Ed.),Annual Report 2017, Ankara, p 79

127TürkiyeBurslari/TurkishScholarships:turkiyeburslari.gov.tr

128Country-specificfiguresareonlygivenforGambia(167)andSenegal(127).Türkiye-Afrika İş Birliğine YTB’nin Türkiye Bursları Damgasını Vurdu,YTB,27Jan2020:www.ytb.gov.tr/haberler/turkiye-afrika-is-birligine-ytbnin-turkiye-burslari-damgasini-vurdu(accessed2Sep2020).AccordingtothewebsiteEducationinTurkey,theTürkiye Africa Scholarship Programcoversthefollowingcountries:Angola,Benin,Botswana,BurkinaFaso,Burundi,Algeria,Djibouti,Chad,Ethiopia,Morocco,IvoryCoast,Ghana,Kenya,SouthAfrica,UnionofComoros,Congo,DemocraticRepublicofCongo,Libya,Madagascar,Mali,Niger,Nigeria,CentralAfrica,Senegal,Somalia,Tanzania,Tunisia,Uganda,EquatorialGuinea,Gabon,Gambia,Guinea,GuineaBissau,Cameroon,Lesotho,Liberia,Malawi,Mauritius,Mauritania,Mozambique,Namibia,Seychelles,SierraLeone,Swaziland,Togo,Zambia,Zimbabwe,Egypt,Sudan,SouthSudan,Eritrea,Rwanda,CapeVerdeandDemocraticRepublicofSãoToméandPríncipe:www.educationinturkey.org/en/video/9792/WHICH-COUNTRIES-DOES-THE-TURKIYE.html(accessed2Sep2020).


108

129EducationinTurkey,Search:www.educationinturkey.org/en/search(accessed2Sep2020).YasarUniversity,ProgramSearch:apply.yasar.edu.tr(accessed2Sep2020).

130 African Media Representatives Training Program,YTB:www.ytb.gov.tr/current/african-media-representatives-training-program(accessed5Sep2020).MeltemSarsılmaz,Training for African Journalists to boost ties with continent, in Daily Sabah,27Oct2019:www.dailysabah.com/education/2019/10/27/training-for-african-journalists-to-boost-ties-with-continent(accessed5Sep2020).

131GökhanKavak&AdamAbuBashal,Afrikalı gazeteciler Türkiye’deki medya eğitiminden övgüyle bahsetti,AnadoluAgency,12Dec2019:www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/afrikali-gazeteciler-turkiyedeki-medya-egitiminden-ovguyle-bahsetti/1671687(accessed23Jul2020).

132AFMEDapplicationform:ytbweb1.blob.core.windows.net/files/documents/Revizyon!%20%20africa_mediaa-başvuru%20formu-5d6514aae67ff%20(1)-5d70ba85987bd.pdf(accessed5Aug2020).

133 Afrikalı gazetecilerden TRT World ve TRT Arapça’ya ziyaret,AAHaberAkademisi,w/odate:www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberakademisi/haberler/afrikali-gazetecilerden-trt-world-ve-trt-arapcaya-ziyaret/533050#(accessed23Jul2020).

134MevlütÇavuşoğlu,Union with Africa is now more essential than ever,RepublicofTurkeyMinistryofForeignAffairs,Ankara25May2020:www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu_nun-afrika-gunu-makalesi-25-5-2020.en.mfa(accessed7Sep2020).

135FacebookpagewiththeTurkishMaarifFoundationprogramfortheschoolyear2019/20inSomalia:www.facebook.com/TMFSOMALIA/posts/1133319810191653(accessed2Sep2020).

136BirolAkgün&MehmetÖzkan,Turkey’s Entrance to International Education: The Case of Turkish Maarif Foundation, p 66, in Insight Turkey,Vol.22,No.1,March2020,pp59-70.

137 Ibid, p 64.

138Examplesare:MehmetÖzkan,Turkey’s ‘New’ Engagements in Africa and Asia: Scope, Content and Implications, in Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs,Vol.16,1Jan2011,pp115-137;UfukTepebaş,Turkey in Africa: Achievements and Challenges, in Diş Politika/Foreign Policy,Vol.42,No.1,2015,pp47-70;BaharDilşaKavala,Turkey’s Education Diplomacy With Africa, in Florya Chronicles of Political Economy,Vol.2,No.2,2016,pp93-122;TASAMAfricaInstitute,2nd Turkey-Africa NGOs and Thinking Forum – Istanbul Declaration,Istanbul22Apr2016:tasam.org/Files/Etkinlik/File/SonucBildirisi/ASF2_deklarasyon_EN_pdf_ae4e567d-b7b2-47c9-bbd0-92b18dd47a37.pdf(accessed7Sep2020);ElemEyriceTepeciklioğlu,AliOnurTepeciklioğlu&BetülAydoğanÜnal,Türkiye’nin Sahra-Altı Afrika’da Yürüttüğü Kamu Diplomasisi Faaliyetleri, in Ege Akademik Bakış / Ege Academic Review,Vol.18,No.4,4Oct2018,pp605-618

139ElemEyriceTepeciklioğlu,AliOnurTepeciklioğlu&BetülAydoğanÜnal,Türkiye’nin Sahra-Altı Afrika’da Yürüttüğü Kamu Diplomasisi Faaliyetleri, in Ege Akademik Bakış / Ege Academic Review,Vol.18,No.4,4Oct2018,pp605-618.

140MeltemSarsılmaz,Training for African Journalists to boost ties with continent, in Daily Sabah,27Oct2019:www.dailysabah.com/education/2019/10/27/training-for-african-journalists-to-boost-ties-with-continent(accessed5Sep2020).


109

141LaleBildirici&ElifKüçük,‘Afrika Medya Temsilcileri Eğitim Programı’ başladı,AnadoluAgency,22Oct2019:www.aa.com.tr/tr/kurumsal-haberler/afrika-medya-temsilcileri-egitim-programi-basladi/1622295(accessed27Aug2020).

142 Ibid.

143 Ibid.

144KardeşTopluluklar,YTB Başkanı Eren: Afrikalı medya temsilcileri harekâtı ülkelerinde anlatacak, YTB,23Oct2019:www.ytb.gov.tr/haberler/ytb-baskani-eren-afrikali-medya-temsilcileri-harekati-ulkelerinde-anlatacak(accessed17Jul2020).

145Turkishpropagandaposterto‘OperationPeaceSpring’onYTBEnglish‘sFacebookaccount:www.facebook.com/ytbenglish/posts/397735930866661(29Aug2020).

146AhmetFurkanMercan,Journalists from Africa visit Turkey’s Anadolu Agency,AnadoluAgency,11Nov2019:www.aa.com.tr/en/newsacademy/turkey/journalists-from-africa-visit-turkeys-anadolu-agency/533053(accessed23Jun2020).

147AccordingtoAnadoluAgency,theGülenMovementhadschoolsinBenin,BurkinaFaso,Burundi,Cameroon,CentralAfricanRepublic,Chad,Comoros,DemocraticRepublicofCongo,RepublicofCongo,Djibouti,Ethiopia,EquatorialGuinea,Guinea-Bissau,Gabon,Gambia,Ghana,Guinea,IvoryCoast,Liberia,Madagascar,Malawi,Mali,Mauritania,Niger,Nigeria,SaoTomeandPrincipe,Senegal,SeychellesSierraLeone,Somalia,SouthAfrica,Sudan,Togo,Uganda,Zambia,andZimbabwe, in: Alioune Ndiaye, Senegal permits Turkish foundation to run schools,AnadoluAgency,8Nov2017:www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/senegal-permits-turkish-foundation-to-run-schools/959942(accessed2Sep2020).

148TugbaYardimci,FETO won’t find ease anywhere: Turkish envoy,AnadoluAgency,16Aug2018:www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/feto-won-t-find-ease-anywhere-turkish-envoy/1232736(accessed4Sep2020).

149AkgünBirol&MehmetÖzkan,Turkey’s Entrance to International Education: The Case of Turkish Maarif Foundation, in Insight Turkey,March2020:www.insightturkey.com/file/1222/turkeys-entrance-to-international-education-the-case-of-turkish-maarif-foundation(accessed11Sep2020).

150MevlütÇavuşoğlu,Africa and Turkey at the threshold of a lasting partnership,RepublicofTurkeyMinistryofForeignAffairs,Ankara25May2017:www.mfa.gov.tr/article-by-h_e_-mr_-mevlüt-çavuşoğlu-entitled-_africa-and-turkey-at-the-threshold-of-a-lasting-partnership__-published-in-various-newspapers-from-african-countries-_-daily-sabah-on-the-occasion-of-25-may-africa-day_.en.mfa(accessed18Jul2020).

151 Selma Kasap, Turkish official warns African countries of FETO threat,AnadoluAgency,19Sep2017:www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkish-official-warns-african-countries-of-feto-threat/914069(accessed21 Jul 2020).

152 Alioune Ndiaye, Senegal permits Turkish foundation to run schools,AnadoluAgency,8Nov2017:www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/senegal-permits-turkish-foundation-to-run-schools/959942(accessed2Sep 2020).

153 Dildar Baykan, South African media delegation visits Anadolu Agency,AnadoluAgency,11Jul2018:www.aa.com.tr/en/corporate-news/south-african-media-delegation-visits-anadolu-agency/1201271(accessed26Jun2020).


110

154 TRT World Forum Digital Debates to Discuss July 15 Coup Attempt on its 4th Anniversary, press release ofTRTWorld,Istanbul13Jul2020,sentbymailfromTRTWorld.

155 Bilateral Relations,TurkeyAfricaForum:www.turkeyafricaforum.org/bilateral-relations.html(accessed7Sep2020).

156MevlütÇavuşoğlu,Africa and Turkey at the threshold of a lasting partnership,RepublicofTurkeyMinistryofForeignAffairs,Ankara25May2017,forexamplepublishedintheUgandannewswebsiteNewvision:www.newvision.co.ug/news/1454033/africa-turkey-threshold-lasting-partnership(accessed8Sep2020).

157 Turkey-Africa Relations,RepublicofTurkeyMinistryofForeignAffairs,w/odate:www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa(accessed8Sep2020).

158MehmetÖzkan,Turkey’s Rising Role in Africa, in: Turkish Policy Quarterly,Vol.9,No.4,2010,p95.

159AfricaMediaInitiative(Ed.),Fifth African Media Leaders Forum. 7 - 9 Nov 2012, Dakar Senegal, p 40: africanmediainitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/AMLF-2012-Book-English-11-July-133.pdf(accessed28Jun2020).AA aims to broadcast Africa’s true voice,AnadoluAgency,9Nov2012:www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/aa-aims-to-broadcast-africas-true-voice/311144(accessed29Aug2020).

160İbrahimTiğlı,TRT Afrika da gerekli, on: Gerçek Hayat,12Nov2018:gercekhayat.com.tr/yazarlar/trt-afrika-da-gerekli/(accessed8Sep2020).

161 Africa’s French Problem,TRTWorld,23Jun2020:twitter.com/trtworld/status/1275383100328022018(accessed8Sep2020).

162ForthehistoryandfunctioningoftheCFAFrancZonessee:en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CFA_franc(accessed8Sep2020);www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/africa/franc-zone/(accessed8Sep2020).

163FrenchdiplomacyrespondedtotheTRTWorldvideointhisway:twitter.com/francediplo_EN/status/1276185121016643585(accessed8Sep2020).

164 10th International Turkish-African Congress – Dakar Declaration,TASAM,Dakar21Nov2015:tasam.org/Files/Etkinlik/File/SonucBildirisi/AFK10_deklarasyon_EN.pdf_fcc6a8d5-98f8-4777-9744-7e336a734a27.pdf(accessed9Sep2020).2nd Turkey-Africa NGOs and Thinking Forum – Istanbul Declaration,TASAMAfricaInstitute,Istanbul22Apr2016:tasam.org/Files/Etkinlik/File/SonucBildirisi/ASF2_deklarasyon_EN_pdf_ae4e567d-b7b2-47c9-bbd0-92b18dd47a37.pdf(accessed7Sep2020).SedatAybar,ANALYSIS–What is next in Turkey’s Africa strategy?,AnadoluAgency,25Nov2016:www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/analysis-what-is-next-in-turkey-s-africa-strategy/692864(accessed9Sep2020).MevlütÇavuşoğlu,Africa and Turkey at the threshold of a lasting partnership, RepublicofTurkeyMinistryofForeignAffairs,Ankara25May2017:www.mfa.gov.tr/article-by-h_e_-mr_-mevlüt-çavuşoğlu-entitled-_africa-and-turkey-at-the-threshold-of-a-lasting-partnership__-published-in-various-newspapers-from-african-countries-_-daily-sabah-on-the-occasion-of-25-may-africa-day_.en.mfa(accessed18Jul2020).HuseyinErdogan&OmerKilic,Turkey focuses on win-win in Africa: Business leader,AnadoluAgency,3Jul2017:www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-focuses-on-win-win-in-africa-business-leader/853483(accessed9Sep2020).DiyarGuldogan,Erdogan: Turkey wants to walk with Africa,AnadoluAgency,3Mar2018:www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/erdogan-turkey-wants-to-walk-with-africa/1078865(accessed9Sep2020).MevlütÇavuşoğlu,Union with Africa is now more essential than ever,RepublicofTurkeyMinistryofForeignAffairs,Ankara25May2020:www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu_nun-afrika-gunu-makalesi-25-5-2020.en.mfa(accessed7Sep2020).


111

165TurkishStatisticalInstitute,Foreign Trade Statistics:iz.tuik.gov.tr/#/showcase/SC-2851FY777F34D2R/db-3819a0e8a9b0f9a?filters=19516%3D2013%2619516%3D2014%2619516%3D2015%2619516%3D2016%2619516%3D2017%2619516%3D2018%2619516%3D2019%2619516%3D2020%2619508%3D5290%20-%20Diğer%20Afrika&mode=&token=8d79727fff862a891ce574d27220bfebbf66fecd(accessed9Sep2020).


167 Seleshi Tessema, Interactions, investments boost Turkish-Ethiopian ties,AnadoluAgency,10Jun2020:www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/interactions-investments-boost-turkish-ethiopian-ties/1872000(accessed29Aug2020).

168 Ibid.

169GökhanKavak&AdamAbuBashal,Afrikalı gazeteciler Türkiye’deki medya eğitiminden övgüyle bahsetti,AnadoluAgency,12Dec2019:www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/afrikali-gazeteciler-turkiyedeki-medya-egitiminden-ovguyle-bahsetti/1671687(accessed9Sep2020).

170ThepresidentialdecreeontyingTRTtotheGeneralDirectorateofCommunication:www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/07/20180724-11.pdf(accessed10Sep2020).

171 Faruk Zorlu, Anadolu Agency, SETA sign cooperation agreement,AnadoluAgency,17Jan2018:www.aa.com.tr/en/corporate-news/anadolu-agency-seta-sign-cooperation-agreement/1033582(accessed10Sep2020).

172ReporterwithoutBorders(Ed.),Turkey Media Ownership,w/odate:turkey.mom-rsf.org/en/owners/(accessed10Sep2020);AykanErdemir&MerveTahiroglu,The Islamist Takeover of the Turkish Media,in:IlanBerman(Ed.),Digital Dictators: Media, Authoritarianism, and Americaʼs New Challenge, London2018;ZehraYildiz,Türkiye’de medyayı kim kontrol ediyor?, on Euronews,3May2019:tr.euronews.com/2019/05/03/medya-sahipligi-turkiye-de-medyayi-kim-kontrol-ediyor-(accessed10 Sep 2020).

173 Turkey Media Ownership – FAQ 9. Why Turkey?,ReporterwithoutBorders,w/odate:turkey.mom-rsf.org/en/about/faq/(accessed10Sep2020).

174ChristopherKayumba,Why China And The West Invest In Media In Africa But Our Gov’ts Fund “Disrupters”, in The Chronicles(Rwanda),2Sep2019:www.chronicles.rw/2019/09/02/why-china-and-the-west-invest-in-media-in-africa-but-our-govts-fund-disrupters/(accessed29Aug2020).

112

113

Weaponry, raw materials and propaganda Russia’snewarrivalonthecontinent

By Anna Birkevich

Introduction: Mali’s 2020 coup d’état leaves traces to Russia

JubilantcrowdsinBamakoholdingupsignssaying,“Mali,Russia,Thankyou”aftertheoustingofPresidentBoubacarKeitainAugust2020couldnothavebeenclearer.1

Forawhileitwasrumouredthejuntaleaders,ColonelMalickDiawandSadioCamara,weretrainedinRussia.Theyareallegedlythechiefarchitectsofthecoupd’étaton18August2020.Bothofthemtookpartinayear-longmilitarytrainingprogrammeinRussia.SomeexpertstracebackRussia-Malirelationstothe1960s,followingtheindependenceoftheWestAfricannation.

“WhenMalianstooktothestreetslastJanuarytodemandthedepartureofforeignforcesinMali,theirgoalwas[tocallfor]Russia’sreturn,”FatoumataCoulibaly,aprofessorattheUniversityofBamako,toldDeutscheWelle.

ResearchbytheCentreforStrategicandInternationalStudies(CSIS)inWashingtonshowsthatMoscow’sinfluenceontheAfricancontinenthasbeengrowing,especiallyafterinternationalsanctionsfollowingRussia’stakeoverofCrimeaintheUkraine.Russiaislookingfornewmarketsandpartnerstopositionitselfasaglobalpower.2

“OneofthereasonswhyRussiaissointerestedinAfricaistocompetewiththeWest.ThemoreinfluenceithasinAfrica,thelesscontroloftheWest”,IrinaFilatova,ResearchProfessorattheHigherSchoolofEconomicsinMoscow,toldDeutscheWelle.


114

The Russia-Africa Summit: Moscow and the liberation of

African countries from Western narratives?

Thelocationcouldnothavebeenmoresymbolic.MoscowchosetohosttheRussia-AfricaSummitinSochiwherethe2014WinterOlympicGameswereheld.ThesportingeventwascelebratedinRussiaasadecisivesteptowardsbecomingaglobalpower.On23February2014,duringtheclosingceremonyfortheOlympics,RussiacarriedoutamilitaryoperationintheUkrainianpeninsula of Crimea.3Wasitacoincidence?

Russia’stakeoverofCrimeaandtheWinterGamesinSochihighlightedRussia’snewambitionsontheworldstage.AndMoscowdidnotstopthere.RussianmilitaryinvolvementinSyriafollowedinSeptember2015.Afteryearsofeconomictroubles,domesticconsolidationandcrackdownonanti-governmentprotestsin2010-2011,MoscowbelieveditwaspoisedtoreturntotheworldstageasanassertivesuperpowerandincreasinglypopularalternativetotheclubofWesternliberaldemocracies.

InOctober2019,theformerpresscentreofthe2014WinterGamesinSochibecamethevenueforanotherhigh-profileinternationalevent,thefirstRussia-AfricaSummit.Moscowdidnotspareapenny.ItwasoneofthemostexpensiveconferencestheRussiangovernmenthadfundedinadecade.Stateagenciesspentmorethan4.5billionrubles(anestimated64millioneuros)forthetwo-daysummitthathosted43Africanheadsofstateandgovernment.4

Thefocusofthetwo-daysummitwaseconomiccooperation.ThecombinedvolumeofRussia’sexportstoAfricafrom2009to2018reachedanestimated$100billion.Itisoneofthemainsuppliersofmilitaryequipmentandarms,accountingfor36%oftotalarmsimportsinsub-SaharanAfricafrom2015to2019.5Russia’stradeinterestsinAfricahavebeenrising.Exportsreached$17billionin2018.Thisgrowthintradeisnotlinkedtonaturalresources.Africaisnowthemaindestinationofnon-oilexportsfromRussia.ThecontinentisnotbuyingRussianfossilfuels.Onlytwocountriesareaccountingfornearlytwo-thirdsoftheamount:Egypt($37.5billion)andAlgeria($25.8billion).Theothercountrieswerefarbehind(Morocco–$8.4billion,Tunisia–$4.7billion,Nigeria–$3.2billionandSouthAfrica–$2.1billion).TheoverallbreakdownofRussianexportsisverydifferentfromthepost-industrialage.In2018,approximately80%ofexportsfellintothefollowingfivecategories:“secretcode”(mostlyweapons)–25%,cereals(wheat)–23%,oilproducts–17%,blackmetals–8%,shipsand“othervessels”–5%.6

Russia’snewarrivalonthecontinent

115

ThesummitwasanopportunityforRussiatodomorebusinesswithAfrica.InSochi,Russianstateagenciesandcompaniessigneddealsworth800billionrubles (around 10 billion euros).7ButtheeventwasnotjustaboutsellingmoretoAfrica.ForRussiaanditsAfricanpartners,therewasanotherimportanttopiconthetable—fightingWesternnarrativesinmediaandpublicopinion.Onepaneldiscussionatthesummitwasdedicatedtomass-mediacooperationbetweenRussiaandAfricancountries.Africanspeakerslamentedandcriticisedthe“verynegative”coverageofAfricain“Westernmedia”ononehandandthelackof“credible”informationonRussiaontheother.

“Weshouldstopseeingthethingsthroughtheeyesofothers—throughtheeyesofReutersorAssociatedPress,”saidKhalilHashimiIdrissi,thedirectorofMoroccannewsagencyMaghrebArabePresseagency.

AfricancountriesgetnewsaboutRussiafrom“WesternandAmerican”media,andthatdistortstheperceptionofRussia.8

“Weshouldbuilda[Russian-African]partnership,whichwillallowustochange the narratives on the whole continent,”saidAlbertKofiOwusu,thedirectorgeneraloftheGhanaiannewsagency.

State-runRussiannewsagencyTASSismorethanhappytohelp.Atthesummit,itsCEOSergeyMichailowannounceditwouldintensifycooperationwithAfricancounterpartswiththeaimofgrantingthecontinent’spopulationaccessto“anotherviewonworldnewsandaffairs,”onethatisdifferentfrom“mostwesternmedia.” 9

Russiahasattacked“toonegative”and“toocritical”coverageofthecountry,inparticularitsgovernment,andturneditintooneofthesignatureissuesforcriticisingWesternmedia.

“Wejournalistsshouldn’tjustreportdeaths,murderandmassprotests,wemustalsoshowsuccessandachievements,”saidAlexejVasilyev,editor-in-chiefofAsia and Africa Todayandco-chairmanofAfricaInstituteoftheRussianAcademyofScience.

TheAfricanmediaalltoooftenreproduceone-sidednarrativesandsometimesanti-RussianclichésinWesternmedia,hesaid.10

InanattempttoimprovecoverageandhelpreadersandviewersgetamorepositiveviewofRussiaanditsactivitiesinAfrica,statenewsagencyTASSplans


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toopenofficesinsomeAfricancountries,withthesupportoftheRussianMinistryofForeignaffairs.TheinitialphaseincludesSenegal,NigeriaandEthiopiain2020.ThenAngola,Madagascar,TanzaniaandGuineawillfollow.11

Meanwhile,Russia’sMinistryofCommunicationsannouncedinitiatives,fromofferingcontentproducedbyState-runmedia(RTandSputnik)toAfricanmediatotrainingjournalistsfromthecontinent.BothRTandTASSsaidtheywerereadytohostAfricanjournalists.RussianexpertsaremorelikelytotraveltoAfricatoprovidetrainingworkshops,duetohighairfares,becauseitscheapertobringRussianstoAfrica.

RT(formerlyRussiaToday)willplaythekeyroleascontentprovider.Thebroadcasterisreadytoprovideafullpackageofvideocontent—news,analysisanddocumentariesinthreelanguages:English,FrenchandArabic.12ThevideonewsagencyRUPTLY(asubsidiaryofRT,headquarteredinBerlin,Germany)isplanningtodistributevideocontentproducedbyTVstationsinAfrica.Lessthanaweekafterthesummit,RTFrancedeclareditwouldopenasubsidiaryinaMaghrebcountry.13

TheRussiangovernmentgainedexpertiseinbringingthe“rightnarratives”totheindependent(orWesternminded)media.AfterreplacingBorisYeltsinasPresident,VladimirPutinhadthestatetakeoverelectronicmedia(TVstations)tobringpublicopinioninlinewithofficialpropaganda.Then,overtheyears,thesystemofcarrot-and-stickoppressionhasbeenperfected.14

Soft power: Russian players in Africa

RT,SputnikandRuptlyareallofficiallyregisteredState-fundedmediaentities.Thatmeanstheyareobligedtoadheretolocalmedialawsandtobe“objective,”ortoatleasttry.Non-stateactorsarethesecondpartinthe,“liberationofAfricafromWesternnarratives.”Whiletheymaypretendtoactindependently,theyhaveobviouslinkstopeopleandcompaniesclosetotheRussiangovernment.

Russia’snon-militaryarmiscoordinatedbytheFoundationforNationalValuesProtection.ItspresidentisjournalistAlexanderMalkevich.HebeganhiscareeratalocalnewspaperinSt.Petersburg.Thefoundationwassetupin2019withthegoaltospreadthe“Russianideologyofgood”withoutbeinglimitedtonationalmedialaws,journalisticethicsorinternationalstandards.AmongthosepresentduringthepressconferenceatwhichthenewfoundationwaspresentedwasVitalyMilonov,aMemberoftheRussianDuma(parliament)


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andauthorofthescandalouslawprohibiting“homosexualpropaganda,”whichledtoanincreaseinhomophobicattacksacrossthecountry.15 The foundation’sself-declaredgoalis“todefendagainsttheactivitiesoftheforeignnon-governmentalorganizationsthataretryingtoimposethewrongvaluesonRussians.Russialackssoftpower,andweconfrontEuropewithallthelieswhicharebeingspreadaboutus.”ThisfitswiththegenerallineofRussia’spushbackagainstUS-andEU-sponsoredeffortstosupportregimechangesthroughmassdemonstrations(so-called“colourfulrevolutions”).Afterthe“OrangeRevolution”inKiev,Ukraine,fromlate2004toearly2005,Moscowintroducedlegislationlimitingforeignsupportfornon-stateorganisations.In2014,itrestrictedforeigninvolvementinRussianmediaandintroducedthelabelof“foreignagent”forNGOsandthemediaoranyactorsreceivingfinancialsupportfromabroad.

ThefounderoftheFoundationforNationalValuesProtectionespeciallyemphasisedthatitwillactindependentlyofentitieslikeRTbecausemassmediamustremainobjective,andanon-governmentalorganizationhasmorefreedomtocommunicateitspositions.16Amonthafteritslaunch,theFoundationtransferred5millionrubles(nearly62500euros)toMariaButina—aRussianwomanconvictedofespionageintheUS.17ThefundsweretobespentappealingButina’sconvictionbytheUScourtsandgettingherprisonconditionsimproved.Itisunclearwherethemoneycamefrom.AlexanderMalkevich,whohasdeclinedtonamethefoundation’sfinancialbackers,coordinatedthewebsite“USAReally,”whichwaslinkedbyRussianmediatothe“trollfactory”inSt.Petersburg.Asaresult,helandedontheUSsanctionlistforhisroleinUSAReally,whichtheUSgovernmentsays“engagedineffortstopostcontentfocusedondivisivepoliticalissuesbutisgenerallyriddenwithinaccuracies.” 18

AlexanderMalkevichattendedtheRussia-Africasummit.Thefoundationhostedapaneldiscussiontitled,“Africa’sfuture—Sovereigntyandtraditionalvaluesaskeyelementsofdevelopment.”TheRussiangovernmentispushingAfrican“traditionalvalues‘‘asanalternativetoWesternliberaldemocracy,andthisisnotjustlimitedtoLGBTIQrights.Partofthebacklashaimedattheoppositionmovement,whichfollowedthe2011-2012anti-governmentmassprotests,wasdirectedattheLGBTIQcommunity.ThegroupisconsideredoneofthemainplayersspreadingliberalideastoRussia.Promoting“traditionalvalues‘‘canbeusedasarationaleforthestatetodefenditselfagainsttheWestern(andliberal)narratives.

Thefoundationwillbecollecting“trustworthynews”inAfricancountriesandspreadingit.Such“objective”informationwouldhelpbalancethenewsfield,


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overcrowdedwith“unverified”newsfromtheWest,Malkevichsaidatthesummit.19

African“projects”representathirdoftheportfolioofthefoundation,accordingtoMalkevich.20

“WehaveunderstoodthatthereisanicheinthemarketofpoliticalconsultinginAfrica,”hesaid.“WewanttohelpRussiancompaniestoevaluatethesituationontheground.”

Onesuch“politicalconsultant”wasarrestedinLibyainMay2019.RussiansociologistMaximShugaleiandhislocaltranslatorwereimprisonedforallegedlymanipulatingtheelectionsinLibya.TheRussiansociologist’steamwasonassignmentfortheFoundationinLibya.Itsgoalwastocollect“sociologicalstudiesanddata”aheadoftheRussia-AfricasummitinSochi.21Theanti-governmentforcesdidnotbelievetheywereconductingsociologicalstudiesinthemiddleofacivilwar.Shugaleiandhisteamwerearrested.

“Africaisahugemarket,whichisinterestingforRussiancompanies.Theyneedanoverviewaboutdomesticissuesintheircountriesofoperations,”Malkevichsaidinaninterviewthatshedmorelightonhowhethinks.Inhisopinion,RussiaandAfricancountriesshareawishtoprevent“liberalsexuallessonsinschools,imposedbyforeigners.” 22

ButthemainfocusofthefoundationliesnotattheopposingWesternstandardsofsexualeducation,butinpushingbackonUS-backed“regimechanges”worldwide.TheFoundationforNationalValuesProtectionpublishedtheresultsofanopinionpollinLibyaduringthefirsthalfof2020.23 The majorityofrespondentsinthephonesurveydidnotsupportforeignmilitaryintervention,andtheywereagainstTurkishinterventionintheircountry.“ThecrisisinLibyawasprovokedbyforeignplayers,whicharepreparingasimilarplanforRussia[sic],forthatreasonitisimportanttowatchtheresultscloselytopreventsuchascenarioinourowncountry”.

“ThedemocratizationfromabroadwhichwasbroughttoLibyain2011hastransformedarichandblossomingcountryintowhatweseetoday—afragmentedcountry,withforeignplayersfightingforresourcesandcriminalsrunningthegovernmentinTripoli,”Malkevichsaid.Thepollshowsthatforeigninterventionleadstodomesticconsolidationwherecitizensovercomepoliticaldivisionsanddifferenceswithinthecountryinthefaceofaforeignpower.


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ForeigninformationalcampaignsarespreadingfakenewsontheconflictinLibya(Malkevich).Whileitmaynotcomeasasurprise,thepolls,studiesandotherfindingsbytheFoundation’sexpertsoftenoverlapwiththeactivitiesoftheWagnerGroup,aprivatearmywhichhashadactivitiesthatcanbetracedtoeasternUkraine,Syria,Libyaandevensomesub-SaharanAfricancountries.ThegrouphasbeenlinkedtoRussianbusinessmanYevgenyPrigozhin.HeisagoodexampleofapersoninvolvedinMoscow’sstealthoperation,inwhichnon-governmentalactorspushtheinterestsofthestate.Whilethegroup’sprivatearmyisnotpartoftheRussianarmedforcesandhasnojuridicalstatus,itisestimatedtohaveasmanyas1300to2500members.Moreover,ithasallegedlycarriedoutVladimirPutin’sdirtyworkabroad.

TheWagnerGroup’sinterestsinsub-SaharanAfricagrewin2017afterMoscow’sinvolvementinthenegotiationswithgovernmentsinSudanandtheCentralAfricanRepublic.Thegroup’sinvolvementinSudancanbetracedto2017,accordingtoBBCreports.Some100RussianmilitaryinstructorstrainedthemilitaryinSudan.24Duringthatperiod,twoRussiancompanies,MInvestandMeroaGold,weregrantedconcessionsforgoldmininginSudan.Insummer2020,bothfirmswereplacedontheUSgovernment’ssanctionslist.25 SudanisoneofthekeycountriesofRussianinvolvementinAfrica.

RussianspecialistsdrewupapoliticalandeconomicreformprogrammedesignedtokeepPresidentOmaral-Bashirinpower,accordingtoreportsby The Guardian.Thisincludedaplantosmearanti-governmentprotesters.ThetacticswerenotdissimilartothoseusedinRussiaagainsttheanti-Putinopposition.Oneploywastousefakenewsandvideostoportraydemonstratorsas“anti-Muslim,”“pro-Israel”and“pro-LGBTIQ.”RussiaalsoallegedlyadvisedtheSudanesegovernmenttoraisethepriceofprintmedia,therebymakingitharderfortheregime’scriticstogettheirmessageout,andtodiscriminateagainstthemas“foreigners”atanti-governmentrallies.26

Meanwhile,RussianfirmLobayeInvestwasgrantedamininglicenceforgoldanddiamondsintheCentralAfricanRepublic.ItsCEO,YevgenyKhodotov,startedacareerinthedepartmentfororganisedcrimeatthepolicedepartmentinSt.Petersburg.HeworkedforacompanyownedbyYevgenyPrigozhin,aRussianbusinessmanknowntohaveclosetieswithVladimirPutin.27

RussiawassupposedtodeliverweaponsandammunitiontothearmedforcesofCARfreeofchargeandsendmilitarytrainersfromRussia.Since2018,theysupposedlyfightonthesideofGeneralHaftarinLibya.28


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‘Putin’s chef ’ expands operations to Africa

RussianmediahaveidentifiedbusinessmanEvgenyPrigozhinasoneofthemainplayerstowhomMoscowmaybeoutsourcing“dirtywork”linkedtomilitaryandinformationoperationsabroad.Hehasbeendubbed“Putin’schef”bythepressbuthisjobismoredubiousthanitsounds.HeisthoughttobeoneofthemainRussianplayersbeyonditsborders,helpingMoscow’seffortstoinvolvenon-statecontractorsinmilitaryworkandfieldoperations,astrategythatcouldhavebeencopiedfromtheUS.WashingtonhasbeenknowntohireprivatefirmstoworkinIraqandAfghanistan.

Prigozhinisconsideredoneofthe“30mostinfluentialpeopleinSt.Petersburg,”atleastaccordingtoonenewspaper.29ThelevelofhisproximitytoPutinremainsunclear,buthisbiographyprovidessomeinsightintohispersonality.Prigozhinwasbornin1961inSt.Petersburg(thencalledLeningradduringSovietrule).Hedidnottakethelawseriouslyduringhisyouth.Attheageof18,hewasconvictedforthefirsttimeforstealing.Hewasfortunateenoughtoevadeprisonandwasplacedonprobation.Twoyearslater,Prigozhinwassentencedto12yearsinprisonforfraudandrobbery.HespentnineyearsinaSovietworkingcampbeforebeingreleasedin1990,ayearbeforethecollapseoftheSovietUnion.

HestartedupahotdogchaininSt.Petersburgandlaterbecameamanagerforasupermarketchain.Heopenedabar,arestaurant,andacateringcompany.Oneofhisbusinesseswasaluxuryfloatingrestaurant,towhichthenRussianPresidentVladimirPutininvitedFrance’sPresidentJacquesChiracandUSPresidentGeorgeWBushontheirvisitstoSt.Petersburg.Putinalsocelebratedaboardthefloatingrestaurantin2003.

YevgenyPrigozhinfinancestheStPetersburg-basedInternetResearchAgency,whichisbetterknownasthe“trollfactory.”ItwasfirstmentionedbytheRussianmediain2013afterawaveofpostingsandcommentsonsocialmedia,whichtargetedtheoppositioninRussia.Later,theagencyredirecteditsfocusabroadontheUSpresidentialelectioncampaign.In2019,WashingtonplacedtheInternetResearchAgencyonasanctionlistforitsrepeatedeffortstoinfluenceUSpolitics,especiallyelections.30

In2015,YevgenyPrigozhin’scompaniesreceivedcontractsfromRussia’sMinistryofDefenceofaround$1billion.31In2018,RussianPresidentPutintoldUSTVnetworkNBCandAustria’sORFthatheknowsPrigozhinpersonally


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andthatthebusinessmanhadnolinkstothegovernment.HethenwentontocomparePrigozhintotheHungarian-AmericanbillionaireandinvestorGeorgeSoros.32ThatisanothersignofhowMoscowseestheroleofnon-governmentalactorsthatarepushingitsnationalagendaontheglobalscale.

In2019,Prigozhinbecamethechairmanoftheboardoftrusteesofanewlyfoundedmediaholdingcalled“Patriot”.Itsgoalisto“maximizethespreadofinformationabouteventsinRussiaforthecreationofpositiveinformationfieldsandpushbackonmainstreammediathatpromotenegativeinformationanddonotseeanygoodthathappensinourcountry.” 33WhilethatmaysoundlikeabadPRgagfromanadagency,itmakesaperfectsensefromtheRussianpointofview.ThereisageneralperceptioninthecountrythatforeignpressandindependentdomesticmediaareoverlycriticalofthenewRussia.

RussianmediastartedtoreportonPrigozhin’sactivitiesinAfricain2018.TheyfoundlinksbetweentheRussianbusinessman’scompaniesandtheirworkwithAfricangovernmentsonsecurityissues,politicalconsultingandweaponimports,inadditiontoreceivingaccesstonaturalresourcesandminingexplorationactivitiesascompensation.Prigozhin’scompaniesareknowntooperateinAlgeria,Libya,DemocraticRepublicofCongo,Nigeria,Ethiopia,Kenya,Sudan,Angola,MadagascarandtheCentralAfricanRepublic.HispoliticalconsultantswereinvolvedintheelectioncampaignsintheDRCandMadagascarin 2018.34

PoliticalconsultantswithlinkstoPrigozhinareworkinginatleast20Africancountries,accordingtoRussianmedia.Theirgoalsaretopushanti-Westernrhetoricandinflamelocalconflictsduringelectioncampaigns.

AnotherreportbytheindependentRussianTVchannelRainputthenumberofRussianpoliticalconsultantswithpotentiallinkstoPrigozhinat200.35 Severalreportshavebeenwrittenabouttheinvolvementofthebusinessman’scompaniesinRwanda,Chad,Benin,SouthAfrica,ZambiaandCameroon.Insomecasesthepoliticalconsultantsandexpertsreceivesupportfrommembersofparamilitarygroups.

In April 2018, Russian business daily KommersantreportedthatRussianpoliticalconsultantswouldbemonitoringthepoliticalsituationinMadagascar,Kenya,SouthAfricaandafewotherAfricancountrieswhichhadelectionsscheduledinthecomingtwoyears.Theexperts’workwasorganisedandpaidforbyYevgenyPrigozhin,accordingtothenewspaper.MostoftheconsultantscamefromSt.


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Petersburg,andthejobopeningsinAfricawereonlyopentomaleapplicants.Theywerenotallowedtotalktothemediaabouttheirwork.36

Prigozhin’scompaniesmayhavespentupto$15millionontheirpoliticalconsultingactivitiesinMadagascaralone.ThebusinessmancoordinatedhisinternationalactivitiespersonallywithPresidentPutin,accordingtoRussianpublication“Project,”whichquotesahigh-rankingRussianofficialwhospokeanonymously.37Prigozhin’scompanieshavebeenlinkedtodubiousdealsinseveralcountries.Insummer2020,Washingtonannounceditwasadding moreofthebusinessman’scompaniesfromRussia,Sudan,andChinatoitssanctionslist.38

ThescopeofPrigozhin’sactivitiesinAfricaremainsunclear,butthereisevidencethatthemediaprojectsarenowupandrunning,albeitwithlimitedimpact.ThenewswebsiteAfricaDailyVoiceisheadquarteredinMoroccoandaFrench-languagenewsservice,AfriquePanorama,isbasedinMadagascar’scapitalAntananarivo.39

Moscow offers free content to African media partners

InFebruary2015,RussianstatenewsagencySputniksignedanagreementtoexchangecontentwithEgyptiandailyAl-Ahram.TranslatedstoriesfromSputnikandRTarepublishedonthenewspaper’swebsiteBawaba Al-Ahram,alongsidenewsfromReuters.40Meanwhile,SputnikalsosignedasimilaragreementtoswapcontentwithAlgeria’sstate-runnewsagency,AlgeriaPressService.41 “AlgeriaandRussiaareworkingtogethertocreateamultipolarworld,”saidOlegOsipov,deputyeditor-in-chiefofRussiaTodayMediaGroup,whichownsSputnik.

Inearly2017,SputniksignedanagreementwithSouthAfrica’sState-runnewsagencySAnews.42Inapressrelease,Sputnikwasdescribedas“amodernmultimedianewsagencywithhubsindozensofcountries.Itpointsthewaytoamultipolarworldthatrespectseverycountry’snationalinterests,culture,historyandtraditions”.AsimilaragreementfollowedwiththeMoroccanstatenewsagencyAgenceMaghrebArabePresse(MAP)inDecember2018.43 AndthefollowingMay,MoscowsignedanagreementwiththegovernmentoftheDemocraticRepublicofCongotoestablishconnectionsbetweentheircountries’state-runnewsagenciesandnationalbroadcasters—withtheaimofexchangingcontentandeducatingjournalists.Inaddition,RussiasaiditwoulddelivertechnicalassistancetotheDRCtosupportitstransitiontodigital


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broadcasting.44AnotherdealwasalsoinkedbetweenSputnikandCongolesenationalbroadcasterRadio-TélévisionNationaleCongolaise(RTNC).ThecontractincludescontentexchangeinEnglishandFrenchandalsoforradioprogrammes.45

Sputnikalsodeliverscontenttoanothermediacompany,inneighbouringRepublicofCongo,Africanews.TheEuronewssubsidiary,whichisheadquarteredinPointeNoire,ismajority-ownedbyMediaGlobeNetworks,managedbyEgyptianbillionaireNaguibSawiris.46InMay2019,RTsignedanagreementwiththestatebroadcasterEri-TVtoprovideeducationforjournalistsandfinancialsupporttothestateTVnetwork.RussiancompanyTVNovosti,whichownstheRussiaTodayMediaGroup,providedEri-TVwiththetechnicalequipmenttobroadcastRTinallofEritrea.ItusesRTcontentinEnglishandArabic.47SputnikalsosignedasimilaragreementwithIvoryCoast’sState-runnewsagencyinAugust2019.

What is Sputnik?

Itisoneofthebiggestcontentprovidersacrosstheglobe,namedaftertheworld’sfirstartificialsatellitewhichtheSovietUnionlaunchedin1957.ThemediacompanySputnik,whichisasubsidiaryoftheRussiaTodayMediaGroup,was founded in 2014.48ItisheadquarteredinMoscowandprovidesonlineandradionewsin33languages,deliveringcontentinEnglish,Arabic,Spanish,ChineseandFarsitoitsinternationalpartners.

Fighting Islamists in Mozambique

Russianguns-for-hire,withlinkstotheKremlin,sustainedcasualtieswhilefightingIslamicmilitantsinMozambique,accordingtoCNNreports.ThisisjustanotherexampleofRussia’sgrowingreachinAfrica.DozensofprivatemilitarycontractorsaresupportingtheMozambicanarmyagainstaninsurgencyinitsnorthmostprovince,CaboDelgado.Mercenariesintheresource-richsouthernAfricancountryappeartobeassociatedwithYevgenyPrigozhin,“Putin’schef.”

Doing politics in Zimbabwe

“TheRussia-AfricaSummithasoverhauledthewholepoliticalagendainAfricaandbroughtnewexpectationstomanycountries,Russiaisonthewayback!”,areporteroftheRussiantabloidKomsomolskaya Pravdawroteafteravisitto


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Zimbabwe.HerarticlediscussedgrowingenthusiasmforRussiaasaplayeronthecontinent.WhilethegoodolddaysoffriendshipwiththeSovietUnionaregone,thememoriesarenot.AndRussiacanbenefitfromthemtoday.Putin’spopularityisontherise.“Ourguysarecomingasmilitaryandpoliticalconsultants—seriousguys.Andtheyareherenotonlyasbodyguards.It’sanall-roundapproach,freedofSovietideology.Thatwasourmistake,”amannamedSashaisquotedashavingtoldtheKomsomolskaya Pravdareporter.SashaapparentlylivedinBerlinfortenyearsbeforemovingtothecontinent:“Africaiswaitingforusandwewillbeidiotsifweareafraidtocomeback.Thefutureishere.” 49

RussianexpertsplayedasignificantroleintheJuly2018presidentialelectioncampaigninZimbabwe.ItmaybethefirsttimesincethecollapseoftheSovietUnionthatRussianpoliticalconsultantstookpartinanelectioncampaigninAfrica.AccordingtoCarnegieMoscowCentre,“ThegeographyofRussianinterestsisbecomingbroaderandbroader.” 50

Russia’sstrategyinAfricancountriesinitiallyfocusedonraisinganti-Westernsentimentandthenrenewingoldterritorialdisputes,accordingtoRussianinvestigativestartupProject.ItobtainedinternaldocumentsfromtheofficesofpoliticalconsultantsworkingforYevgenyPrigozhin.TheRussianexpansioninAfricafacesthreemajorobstacles:non-professionalism,corruptionandalcoholism.51Accordingtothepublication,French-bornKemiSebaisoneofthekeyfiguresofPrigozhin’s“Pan-AfricanProject.”SebaisthefounderofUrgencesPanafricanistes(Urpanaf),apoliticalmovementthatfightsagainst“Frenchneocolonialismandimperialism.”Themovement’splanistoformaunionofacoupleofcountries.Russianpoliticalconsultantsshouldhelppro-Russiancandidateswinelections.Thesecondphasewouldinvolvetheacceptanceofoneleader,KemiSeba,oneofthepossiblecandidatesfortherole.“Thejointfightagainstwesternimperialismmakesusstronger,”SebatoldBBCinaninterview.52

ThelevelsofcooperationbetweencompaniesassociatedwithPrigozhinandAfricangovernmentsvarybycountry,asshownbyamapfromThe Guardian. JournalistsatthedailyhadseenamapofAfricainDecember2018withvarioussymbolsindicatingmilitary,politicalandeconomicties,policetraining,mediaandhumanitarianprojects,and“rivalrywithFrance.”Thelevelofcooperationwasrankedfromfivetoone:fiveisthehighestlevelandonethelowest.TheclosestrelationsarewiththeCentralAfricanRepublic,SudanandMadagascaratfive.Libya,ZimbabweandSouthAfricaarelistedasfour,accordingtothemap,withSouthSudanatthree,andtheDRC,ChadandZambiaattwo.53


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A beginning in Madagascar

Russia’sexpansioninAfricabeganin2018inMadagascarwhere“Putin’schef”,YevgenyPrigozhinplayedakeyrole.54,55Russianconsultanthelpedsomecandidatesduringthepresidentialelections,whichwereheldinNovember2018.56LocalwitnessestoldtheBBCtheysawRussianswith“suitcasesfullofcash.” 57ThecurrentpresidentofMadagascar,AndryRajoelina,wonthe2018electionwithRussiansupport,concludedBritishdailyThe Guardian in an investigationinwhichtheyfoundRussia“producedanddistributedtheisland’sbiggestnewspaper,with2millioncopiesamonth.”RajoelinadeniesreceivingRussiansupport.58“ThesecretofPrigozhin’ssuccessliesinthefactthathewasabletoselladreamtoPutin—adreamofincreasingRussianinfluenceintheworld,”aninsiderfamiliarwithPrigozhin’sstructuressaid,asquotedbyProjectMedia.TheRussianbusinessman’sinternationalactivitiesbeganin2014duringthewarinEasternUkraine.Meanwhile,otherpeopletoldProjectMediathattheRussians“hadnoclue”ofMadagascar.Thewholeoperationcosta“giganticsum.”AtsomepointtheRussiansflew50risographs(semi-professionalprintingmachines)toMadagascartoprint500copiesofelectionmaterials.TheRussianconsultantswereguardedbyWagnerGroup,ownedbyPrigozhin.FerrumMining,aRussiancompanyregisteredinStPetersburg,nowhasaminingconcessionforchromiuminMadagascar.

A Russian troll factory in Ghana

ACNNteamdiscoveredaRussiantrollfactoryinaveryunlikelyplace,Ghana.59

Whilemuchofthetrollingaimedatthe2016USpresidentialelectionsmayhavebeenoperatedfromanofficeblockinStPetersburg,thingscouldnothavebeenmoredifferentlateron.Amonths-longinvestigationbyCNNfoundthatpartofthetrollingforthe2018USmidtermelectioncampaignhadbeenoutsourcedtocontractorsintheWestAfricannationsofGhanaandNigeria.TheyfocusedalmostexclusivelyonracialissuesintheUS,promotingblackempowermentandoftendisplayingangertowardswhiteAmericans.TheirgoalwastoinflamedivisionswithintheAmericanpopulationandprovokesocialunrest,accordingtoexpertswhotrackRussiandisinformationcampaigns.

FacebookandTwitterhadalreadybeenlookingintosomeofthetrollaccountswhenCNNnotifiedthetwosocialmediafirmsofitsinvestigation.Inastatement,Facebooksaidthatits“subsequentassessmentbenefitedfromourcollaborationwithateamofjournalistsatCNN”andithad“removed49


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Facebookaccounts,69Pagesand85Instagramaccountsforengaginginforeigninterference.”

Theworld’slargestsocialnetworkwentontoadd,“thisnetworkwasinearlystagesofaudiencebuildingandwasoperatedbylocalnationals—wittinglyandunwittingly—inGhanaandNigeriaonbehalfofindividualsinRussia.IttargetedprimarilytheUnitedStates.”About13200FacebookaccountsfollowedoneormoreoftheaccountsinGhanaandaround263200peoplefollowedoneormoreoftheInstagramaccounts.Anestimated65%wereintheUS.TwittertoldCNNthatithadremoved71accountsthathad68000followers.“MostweretweetinginEnglishandpresentedthemselvesasbasedintheUnitedStates,”itsaidinastatement.“Theaccounts—operatingoutofGhanaandNigeriaandwhichwecanreliablyassociatewithRussia—attemptedtosowdiscordbyengaginginconversationsaboutsocialissues,likeraceandcivilrights.”

TheactivityuncoveredbyCNNhadstrikingsimilaritiestothe2016RussiantrollcampaigninwhichhundredsofaccountsdesignedtopassasAmericanwerecreated.

InOctober2019,FacebookclosedanetworkofaccountsthatwereactivelytargetingatotalofeightAfricancountries.“Althoughthepeoplebehindthesenetworksattemptedtoconcealtheiridentitiesandcoordination,ourinvestigationconnectedthesecampaignstoentitiesassociatedwithRussianfinancierYevgenyPrigozhin,”thesocialnetworksaid.60

Conclusion

SomeexpertsbelievenewspaperheadlinesaboutRussia’sinvolvementinAfricahaveledmanytooverestimatetheextentofMoscow’sinfluencebyexaggeratingtherealityandsensationalisingthetopic.RussianambitionsinAfricaarequitemodestanditsplansremainunclear.61NeverthelessMoscow’seffortstoinfluencepublicopiniononthecontinentshouldbeseenasapartofabroaderstrategytopushbackonUSattemptstospreadliberaldemocracyontheonehandandpromotethebusinessinterestsofRussiancompanies(withlinkstothegovernment)ontheother.WhatRussialacksinresources—comparedtoWashingtonandBeijing—itcancompensateforthroughinformationcampaignsabroad.Moscowseesthemasalegitimatetoolofforeignpolicyintryingpushitsownagendaontheglobalstage,muchlikeWesterncountriesdowiththeirforeignlanguage,state-sponsoredbroadcasters.WithRT,SputnikandRuptly,Russiacreatedtoolsforspreading


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itsnarrativesworldwideandestablishinganalternativeviewoftheworldthatisnotalwayslimitedbyWesternstandardsofmediaethics.Intheglobalfightofnarrativesandthecompetitionforpeople’sminds,Westerndemocraciesmayfaceadilemmaofeithersignificantlyincreasingtheirresourcesforinternationalbroadcastingorlosingthecompetitiontoother,lessdemocraticregimes.

RussianeffortstopushbackonwesternideologicalnarrativesandtopromoteitsbusinessinterestsarepartiallyrootedintheSovietpast.TheUSSRandAfricancountriessignednumerousagreementsonculturalcooperation.Basedonthose,theUSSRopenedculturalcentrespromotingSovietculture,ideologyandwayoflife.AtthesametimeMoscowsoldweaponstoarmiesinmanyAfricancountries.

AfterthecollapseoftheUSSRin1991,thenewRussiangovernmentlostfocusonAfricaasitneededtodealwithothermoreurgentdomesticproblems.Sometraderepresentationsandevenembassieswereclosed.

Butsince2013-2014,asapartofbroaderefforttore-establishitselfasaglobalsuperpower,RussiaanditsState-runmediastartedsigningpartnershipagreementswithAfricanmedia.MostrecentlyRTandSputniksignedagreementswithnationalbroadcastersinEritreaandtheDRC,amongothers.62Underthoseagreements,contentandsometimesevenbroadcastingequipmentareprovided.Thestrategicgoalofsuchagreementsisofcoursetore-establishitspositionasaglobalsuperpowerbydisseminatingRussia’sviewonglobalpoliticsandregionalconflictsviabothclassicalmediachannels,suchastelevision,butalsoonsocialmedia,whichareincreasinglyimportant.

IncontrasttotheSovietaimofpromotingthecommunistideology,modernRussiawantspragmaticinfluencebasedoneconomicinterests.63


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Notes

1 https://www.dw.com/en/was-russia-behind-the-coup-in-mali/a-54705282

2 https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-africa

3 Russianlawsprohibittoputinquestiontheterritorialintegrityofthecountry,theusageoftheword“annexation”mayendinthecriminalinvestigation.

4 https://www.rbc.ru/politics/24/10/2019/5db1b8179a79474dfdd8da41

5 https://www.dw.com/en/was-russia-behind-the-coup-in-mali/a-54705282

6 https://carnegie.ru/commentary/80187

7 https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/5db1b1489a79474abbeda165

8 https://tass.ru/obschestvo/7037458


10 https://news.rambler.ru/other/43042291-eksperty-otnosheniya-v-sfere-media-nuzhno-stroit-bez-posrednikov/


12 https://www.rfi.fr/ru/россия/20191023-rt-sputnik-africa-summit-sochi

13 https://www.rfi.fr/ru/россия/20191028-rt-france-откроет-бюро-в-северной-африке

14 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/25/how-russia-independent-media-was-dismantled-piece-by-piece

15 https://www.znak.com/2019-04-10/prezentovan_fond_zachity_nacionalnyh_cennostey_kotoryy_zaymetsya_propagandoy_v_rf_i_na_zapade

16 https://www.znak.com/amp/160538

17 https://fznc.world/без-рубрики/fond-zashhity-natsionalnyh-tsennostej-perevel-pervye-5-mln-rublej-dlya-okazaniya-pomoshhi-marii-butinoj/

18 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm577

19 https://politros.com/138549-osnovateli-fonda-zashity-nacionalnykh-cennostei-rasskazali-o-gumrabote-v-afrike

20 https://www.rfi.fr/ru/россия/20191024-suverenitet-i-traditsionnye-tsennosti-kak-rossia-pomozhet-afrike

21 https://www.vesti.ru/article/2411011

22 https://www.rfi.fr/ru/россия/20191024-suverenitet-i-traditsionnye-tsennosti-kak-rossia-pomozhet-afrike


129

23 https://riafan.ru/1291726-malkevich-nalichie-vneshnego-vraga-v-lice-turcii-obedinilo-liviiskii-narod

24 https://thebell.io/po-sledam-chvk-vagnera-chto-rassledovali-v-afrike-pogibshie-rossijskie-zhurnalisty

25 https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-imposes-sanctions-on-russian-financiers-global-sanctions-evasion-network/

26 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/11/leaked-documents-reveal-russian-effort-to-exert-influence-in-africa

27 https://www.rbc.ru/politics/23/04/2019/5cbee1129a7947b026697815

28 https://www.dw.com/ru/чвк-вагнера-все-что-о-ней-известно/a-42596738



31 https://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2015/09/11/56bc9f549a7947299f72bb96

32 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-04/putin-teases-that-his-troll-factory-ally-is-just-like-soros

33 https://www.svoboda.org/a/30199330.html

34 https://www.proekt.media/investigation/prigozhin-afrika/

35 https://novayagazeta.ru/news/2019/03/20/150159-dozhd-v-afrikanskih-stranah-rabotayut-ot-100-do-200-svyazannyh-s-prigozhinym-polittehnologov

36 https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3607961

37 https://www.svoboda.org/a/29874364.html


39 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/11/leaked-documents-reveal-russian-effort-to-exert-influence-in-africaf

40 https://theconversation.com/russian-influence-operations-extend-into-egypt-111167

41 http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin’s-expanding-media-conglomerate

42 https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sanews-sputnik-ink-cooperation-pact

43 https://fr.sputniknews.com/international/201812171039340259-agence-maghreb-arabe-presse-partenaire-sputnik/

44 https://digital.gov.ru/ru/events/39062/

45 https://ria.ru/20190523/1554844447.html


130

46 https://drc.mid.ru/drc

47 https://eritrea.mid.ru/home/-/asset_publisher/gghH0dCpgI9h/content/13-maa-v-asmere-v-sootvetstvii-s-podpisannym-memorandumom-o-sotrudnicestve-i-okazaniu-vzaimnoj-pomosi-v-sfere-televizionnogo-vesania-mezdu-rossijskoj-?inheritRedirect=false

48 https://ria.ru/20200710/1574187415.html

49 https://www.kp.kz/daily/27070.4/4139322/


51 https://www.proekt.media/investigation/prigozhin-polittekhnologi/

52 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R3PM9IvTC4M&feature=youtu.be


54 https://www.proekt.media/investigation/prigozhin-polittekhnologi/

55 https://www.proekt.media/investigation/prigozhin-afrika/

56 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/11/world/africa/russia-madagascar-election.html

57 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R3PM9IvTC4M&feature=youtu.be


59 https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/12/world/russia-ghana-troll-farms-2020-ward/index.html

60 https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/29/africa/russian-mercenaries-mozambique-intl/index.html


62 http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-campaign-africa

63 https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/kalika_russia_africa_ru_2019.pdf

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