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artiClES Organizational Psychological Capital in Family-owned Franchise Firms and Corporate Social Responsibility 5

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Canine Conundrum: A Case Study in Technology, Ethics and Crisis Management

Caroline Glackin, Jay Azriel, and Russell Porter 41

e Conflicting Drivers of Entrepreneurial Ethics 57

Robert Steinbauer, Nicholas D. Rhew, Eric Kinnamon, and Frances Fabian

Doing the Right ing: Entrepreneurship, Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility in Castro’s Cuba and Pinochet’s Chile 73

Joseph L. Scarpaci

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73

Doing the Right Thing:Entrepreneurship, Ethics, and CorporateSocial Responsibility in Castro’s Cuba and

Pinochet’s ChileJoseph L. Scarpaci

Journal of Ethics & Entrepreneurship, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2014), pp. 73-94©Gardner-Webb University. All rights reserved.ISSN 2326-3776 (Print) ISSN 2326-3806 (Online)

aBStraCtConstrained political regimes from the right and le spur entrepreneurship in ways

that have received little attention in the Americas, and when they do, they addressmacro-economic issues and large multinational firms. In so doing, this macro-scaleapproach ignores thousands of smaller firms that employ tens of thousands of workers.ese case studies from authoritarian Chile and communist Cuba redress this issue ofscale by showing how entrepreneurial ethics and social responsibility drive small-business business plans in unexpected ways. Financial documents such as balancesheets and income statements, or reports in business journals, are uncommon at thislevel of entrepreneurship in these two countries. Accordingly, the cases draw onethnographic field research from the 1980s, 1990s, and the 2010s. e striking changefrom ‘staying under the radar’ to reaching out to numerous stakeholders is telling, andimplies that neither the size of the firms nor the magnitude of sales condition the actsof altruism described in this article. While formal-sector studies emphasize corporatesocial responsibility, in Latin America these reciprocal networks have long existed, butreceive little attention in the business literature.

KEY WORDS: Small-scale Entrepreneurs; Ethics, Reciprocity; Cuba; Chile

JoSEpH l. SCarpaCi is the former chair of Marketing and Management and presently an AssociateProfessor of Marketing at West Liberty University in West Virginia. He serves as Executive Director of eCenter for the Study of Cuban Culture + Economy, and is a partner in e Havana Consulting Group. Telephone: 540.230.3143 Email: [email protected]

74 Journal of Ethics & Entrepreneurship

iNtroDuCtioNEntrepreneurs are characterized by their innovation and risk-bearing actions. Pioneering

work by Schumpeter (1942) and Liebenstein (1968) helped to establish that entrepreneursdiffer from business owners and managers. ey helped to switch the locus of control in thesmall enterprise to the risk-taking actions of the single proprietor. Aer WW II, Druckerand others examined the work setting of entrepreneurs, nudging researchers to avoid theurge to laud them and focus more on specifying the empirical aspects of their work:Drucker observed “there continues to be an implicit assumption that the entrepreneurcontributes disproportionately to the economy of a nation, yet little has been done toisolate this individual for further analysis” (1958: 255).

Decades later, Hofstede (2001) and others gathered cultural evidence that workersreared in the market economies of the Global North enjoy a particular advantage in beingsuccessful entrepreneurs because of the broader cultural milieu in which they were raised.Namely, the values and beliefs associated with individualism, masculinity, time orientation,and power distance (among individuals), seemed to be associated with nations that mightembrace unfettered markets. Hofstede’s typology expanded McClelland’s narrow view onthe cultural construction of risk-taking as a necessary precursor for capitalist behavior (seeMcClelland and Teague, 1975). Simply put, non-Western agrarian societies may not adaptas well to the pressures and risks of industrial capitalism as their counterparts in the GlobalNorth. However, the surge of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and other emergingeconomies suggest a need for reconsidering these ideas about risk and entrepreneurship(Smith and Scarpaci 2000), and for placing these cases in ethical and corporate socialresponsibility (CSR).

A vast literature exists on CSR in the advanced capitalist nations of the North Atlanticand Australasia, and almost exclusively among medium to large firms. e concern amongprivate businesses for societal welfare carries intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. Within a firm,we know that “doing the right thing” instills pride and confidence among employees whorealize there are non-material rewards for working at a firm that addresses social problemsin the course of business (Aguilera et al. 2007; Bhattacharya et al. 2008). External rewardsfor firms practicing CSR not only boost the image of the company in the eyes of themarket, but can also garner goodwill among consumers and adhere them to a firm’s brand,product or service. In other words, CSR gives entrepreneurs useful social capital. While it isbroadly accepted that doing the “right thing” in market economies displays a firm’s moralprinciples that govern the conduct of other business people or groups, less has been writtenabout “emerging economies,” ethical comportment, and CSR. Murphy and Coombes(2009) review of nearly two decades of the social entrepreneurship literature made noreferences to a single paper concerning ethics and CSR.

is paper presents two ethnographic case studies from Latin America taken at points intime when two nations—Pinochet’s Chile and Raúl Castro’s Cuba—that were encouragingprivate sector development. Our cases show that draconian measures from the far right andideological rigidity of the extreme le were catalysts for the protagonists discussed in thispaper to start their own businesses. I identify the stakeholders in economies that hadrecently begun promoting entrepreneurship despite a legacy of socialist economicplanning. Fieldwork in Chile over 5 months between 1985-1989 and one month in 2008,and in Cuba for 6 months, between 1998 and 2013, capture the ethical and entrepreneurialchallenges confronted by two enterprises. e Chilean case draws on a formal girl’s dress

75Scarpaci

couture operation that developed in the slums of Santiago—the nation’s capital—anddeveloped B2B ties with high-end retail outlets in New York, London and Paris. eentrepreneur gained his experience in sewing and marketing from an unexpected realm:the human rights sector. Our Cuban example stems from a sole proprietor pizza makerworking out of his home in the island’s capital city of Havana, who aer being downsizedby the Ministry of Housing, sought a livelihood in the food industry; a sector in peril inthe state-mandated food provision system. ese cases bring forward the contradictionsand difficulties for individual entrepreneurs which, in turn, are modified by ethics andsocially-defined moral values. I argue that corporate social responsibility at this level is partof networks of reciprocity that both Latinamericanist anthropologists and managementexperts have long recognized.

To develop these cases, we draw on a research paradigm that bridges our field researchwith broader literatures. We begin with a brief overview of entrepreneurship in emergingeconomies. A discussion of CSR and networks of reciprocity in Latin America follow thatsection. Next, we turn to a review of the interplay between entrepreneurial goals and ethics,which form what we call in this paper “CSR at the micro-scale.” We argue that the ethicalbehaviors of these two firms are in good measure anchored in the moral beliefs held by theentrepreneurs: clothier and pizza maker. Although the Chilean and Cuban settings reflecta time when socialism was losing its grip on the work force, the business decisions reflect apattern of moral behavior similar to the three levels outlined by business ethicist Stevens(1979): preconventional morality, conventional morality, and postconventional morality.e paper concludes that despite the disparate conditions in Pincohet’s Chile and Castro’sCuba, the marketing professionals in each firm gradually moved towards designing theirbusiness models to minimize ethical problems in their operations, and to avoid ordenounce questionable or unethical practices.

ENtrEprENEurSHip iN EmErgiNg ECoNomiESBarriers to entrepreneurship are significant both in Cuba and Chile. Developing a

sustainable small enterprise sector (“grassroots capitalism”) in the face of numerousobstacles, some of which are of a technical and economic nature, places entrepreneurs on aprecarious slope; keeping production costs down may lead them to steal or resort to theblack market. ese obstacles are formidable and have been analyzed extensively in the vastliterature on transitional economies (Cruz and Villamil, 2000; Nee and Matthews 1996).

A common complaint among small entrepreneurs in Cuba today is the absence ofwholesale-priced inputs (Cruz and Villamil, 2000). Peters and Scarpaci (1998)documented the wholesale dilemma five years into the cuentapropista (solo-proprietorshipexperience that started in 1993 in Cuba) and Morales and Scarpaci (2013) find that itpersists nearly 15 years later. As Ritter observed in the early years of Cuba’s timidprivatizations, restricted access to markets and wholesaling are major limitations forcuentapropistas (Ritter, 1998; Klinghoffer 1998). Word of mouth, viral marketing, orpossibly an article in a foreign tour guidebook or in-flight magazine oen drives foot trafficto private Cuban vendors. In Chile, mainly financial costs have to be surmounted for smallvendors to ply their trades and services, and to advertise freely and through multiplechannels. Despite these challenges, the small entrepreneurs discussed here give back totheir communities in ways that are similar to corporate social responsibility (CSR).


CSr aND ENtrEprENEurSHip iN latiN amEriCaAn axiom of CSR may well be that households and consumers require a certain level of

material and financial well being if their final purchasing choice is to be influenced by afirm’s altruism, versus the value and price of a particular service. Nonetheless, even thesmallest entrepreneur establishes a reputation—even if done in ad hoc fashion—that isreflected by credit practices, contributions to local charitable events, and other aspectsbeyond the marketing mix of price, product, placement and promotion (Grogg 2011).Latin American business responses to social responsibility have largely taken a backseat tobenevolent groups such as trade unions, cooperatives, and Catholic church activities;though recently Pentecostal and evangelical groups have raised their social outreachactivities. Multinational companies, non-governmental organizations, the UNDP, WorldBank, and the Inter-American Development Bank have also pressed for CSR (Zerk, 2006;Husted and Allen 2006; Leutkenhorst 2004) Historically, some of these actors haveprovided such charitable deeds as providing pensions to and caring for the elderly andinfirm. While it would be unfair to simply dismiss centuries of slavery or indenturedservitude carried out in the region, there are historical precedents of community outreachthat would today be considered aspects of CSR or RSE in Spanish (responsibilidad socialempresarial) (Table 1). In line with Hunt et al. (2010), we draw on the context of the “baseof the economic pyramid” in Chile and Cuba. “While the tradition [sic] phrase is ‘bottomof the economic pyramid,’ we prefer to express the concept as the base of the economicpyramid, which implies a strong, foundational relationship to an economy and avoids thenegative connotation oen associated with the word ‘bottom’” (Hunt et al. 2010, 87;emphasis original).

table 1. precursors to Corporate Social responsibility in latin america

Data Sources: Based on Scarpaci (1991), Imas (2006).

iNStitutioN aCtioN(S)

Catholic Church Hospitals, orphanages, schools

Benevolent societies Pension funds, medical care

Private charities Emergency relief funds, hospitals, schools, orphanages

Protestant organizations Hospitals, health care, technical and mechanical (extension) advice

77Scarpaci

CSR is still in its infancy in Latin America (Peinado Vera 2006). e levels ofgovernment support, private sector promotion, and public awareness vary considerably(Table 2). For the purpose of this paper, it is noteworthy that Cuba is among the leastdeveloped CSR nations whereas Chile today ranks near the top, though at the time of theethnographic fieldwork it was not. Nonetheless, CSR practices throughout the regionshare similar though somewhat uneven functions. ese five functions are 1)Disseminating “how-to” guides to incorporate CSR into business plans, 2) Advocate andpublicize the “business case” for CSR and also carry out sector surveys, 3) Publicize “bestpractices” through awarding prizes and certificates to firms engaged in CSR, 4) Developnetworks of civil society organizations who study CSR, and 5) Organize and/or attendworkshops and conferences on CSR (Haslam 2004). Table 3 summarizes a few keyfunctions of selected organizations that promote CSR in Latin America. We purposefullyexclude the CSR programs promoted by multinational corporations such as Coca Cola,Adidas, Nike, Nestlé, Proctor and Gamble, and other firms so that a more national flavorcan be presented.

table 2. levels of Corporate Social responsibility in Selected latin american Countries

Source: Modified aer Haslam (2004, 4).

Country private-sector government advocacy general publicparticipation & promotion awareness

Argentina Low-medium Low Medium

Brazil Low-medium Medium Medium

Chile High Low Medium

Colombia None-low None-low Low

Costa Rica None-low None None-low

Cuba None None None-low

Dominican Republic None None None-low

Ecuador Low None None-low

Mexico Medium Medium Low-medium

Nicaragua None None None-low

Peru None None Low

Trinidad Low-medium None-low None& Tobago

Venezuela None None-low None-low


table 3. Selected CSr programs in latin america

Contemporary CSrin latin america

function Source

Energía social(Colombia)

Provides normalized electricity to subnormalmarkets and draws on small communityenterprises ( called Mypimes) to collectmonthly payments. Hired people who used totap illegally into the electrical grid (calledmarañeros) to serve as contractors.

Peinado-Veara(2006)

Forum Empresa(Chile)

Forum Empresa is an inter-American networkcreated in 1997 that unites 20 leadingorganizations in the field of Corporate SocialResponsibility from Canada to Chile. eorganizations in the network represent 19countries in the region and have a combined total of close to 3,000 affiliated businesses.

Forum Empresawww.empresa.org

Desarrollo de laResponsa--bilidad Social Empresarial

of Uruguay

Promotes the conceptual development andpractice of CSR in Uruguay

DERSE website:http://www.deres.

org.uy/home/home.php

Fundación Esquel of Ecuador

e Ecuadorian Social ResponsibilityConsortium (CERES) is a network oforganizations that promotes CSR in Ecuador.It is financed with contributions frommembers and provides strategic planningadvice, workshops, and seminars.

Foundationwebsite:

http://www.esquel.org.ec/index.php?

til=programs&id_prg=10

IDEA - Instituto por elDesarrollo Empresarial

de la Argentina

An academic organization that translates asthe ‘Business Administration DevelopmentInstitute.’ Started in 1999, it provides trainingprograms for niche professions in Argentina.

Foundationwebsite:

http://www.idea.edu.pe/bief.htm

Unión Social deEmpresarios de México

Since 1957 USEM aims to guide, unite andmotivate business leaders so that, in light ofSocial Christian thought, members arecommitted to better themselves and theircompanies. ey use business as a means tobuild a more just and humane society.

Website. http://www.usem

.org.mx/contenidos/index.php?mod=

cont&id=84

Peru 2021 A nonprofit organization made up of businessleaders whose mission is to lead the businesssector to achieve a shared National Vision bymaking the firm an agent of change and todevelop the country through corporateresponsibility as a strategic management tool.

Peru 2021website://www.peru2021.

org/peru-2021/quienes-

somos.html

79Scarpaci

Networks of reciprocity: CSr at the micro-scale In this section I examine the attributes of two entrepreneurs who could reasonably be

classified as businessmen who practice CSR (Table 4). Each operation displays clear corecompetencies, and neither firm has been subject to either great regulation or bribes to localauthorities despite the widely held notion that corruption is rampant everywhere in thedeveloping realm (eobold 1990). As their businesses grew, they established strategicpartnerships with stakeholders that engendered both goodwill that helped to drive downtheir production costs, while also enhancing final product quality. Small changes in thesupply chain relationships even led to minor disintermediations in each business’s practice.

table 4. marketing management attributes of Chilean and Cuban Case Studies

1See Ravsberg, F. (2013). Harmful recycling: On Cuba’s inept officials. Havana Times,http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=99050, retrieved September 27, 2013. Cuba’s Comptroller General recentlyreported that 75% of state-company managers had been “recycled” into other management positions, despiteevidence of turning a blind eye to the and bookkeeping irregularities. Letters to the editor, carefully vetted, inthe daily official newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party, even denounce the cadre of cronyism and managerialmalfeasance.

2 Defined as the “elimination of intermediaries such as wholesalers or distributers from a marketing channel”(Lambe et al., 2008, 85)

attributes Chile (1986-1989) Cuba (2006-2012)

Core competency Manufacturing hautecouture girls’ dresses andaccessories mainly in B2Bsettings for up-scaleboutiques in New York City,London and Paris in hardcurrency (U.S. dollar)

Baking high-quality yetaffordable pizzas exclusivelyfor local patrons whopurchase the productsexclusively in B2C setting inso (peso) currency

Regulatory agencies County tax commission County tax enforcer;Provincial public healthinspector (kitchen)

Bribery prevalence None Low, but rising1

Strategic partnership Backward linkages with onetextile factory; forwardlinkages with human-rightsappliqué (arpillera) artisans,vendors & promoters

Ultimately, with anagricultural cooperative forthe purchase of tomatoesinstead of pricey state-owned retail outlets withimported products

Disintermediation2 Shiing from courier-carrieddesigns and site visits tomore timely FAXcorrespondences

Stopped buying expensiveimported canned tomatoesfrom state retail store


eir support systems derive from personal and professional relationships that too oenhave been characterized as activities in the “gray,” “black,” or “informal” sectors of theeconomy (Hardy 1987). Such characterizations, however, ignore a thick web of formal andinformal contacts in Latin American that draw on fictive kinship (compadrazgo).Historically connected to the roles of godparents who are a part of Roman Catholicsacraments such as baptisms, First Holy Communion, Confirmation, and marriage, theytranscend church functions and serve as fictive kinship relationship. Bonds develop fromthese reciprocal relationships that establish responsibilities and positions of honor thatmean looking out for each other, child rearing, resource sharing, and even money lending.So important are they that families who have established these relationships oen refer tothe adults as “aunt” or “uncle” (tías or tíos in Spanish). ese networks of reciprocitytranscend income groups and social class (Lomnitz 1988).

Case #1. Haute couture in Chile Chile, like Cuba, developed a socialist economy in the 1960s and 1970s. e Christian

Democratic governments of Eduardo Frei (1964-1970) greatly expanded access to socialsecurity, worker benefits, health care and higher education. In 1970, a three-way runoff forthe presidency gave socialist physician, senator and Unidad Popular candidate Dr. SalvadorAllende barely one-third of the popular vote. His candidacy was sealed when, according tothe Chilean constitution, the national congress voted on the two leading candidates andAllende won by one percentage point.

From the outset, Allende made it clear he would expand the state sector. In theeducational field, for example, he ran a “university of all” program, and he begannationalizing strategic mining and manufacturing operations that alarmed U.S. interests,and the Nixon administration. Domestically, workers and students went on frequent strikesand material shortages evidenced by long lines became common by the second year of histerm. Early on in his administration, Fidel Castro visited Chile where he and his entouragewere allowed to travel unhindered throughout the nation. Castro’s entourage brandishedautomatic weapons, which annoyed the Chilean armed forces because it violated mostdiplomatic protocol norms (Sigmund 1977). Allende’s apparent disregard for establishing amarket economy was well known. On one occasion in 1972, he invited Chileanbusinessman, telecommunications magnate, and realtor, Javier Vial to his office to ask himhow his government was doing from the businessman’s perspective. Vial lamented thatthere were too many work stoppages, union strikes, transportation bottlenecks, andrestrictions on capital markets. On hearing the assessment, Allende responded, “at’sgreat. It’s good to hear this confirmed from your perspective in the business sector” (Vial,personal communication).

On 11 September 1973, General August Pinochet coordinated a coup d’état that endedthe democratically elected term of Allende, and marked the beginning of 17 years ofdraconian cutbacks in the implementation of a new free-market political economy.3 Chile’smilitary junta, led by General Pinochet, adhered quickly to the laissez-faire policies ofMilton Friedman, then a professor at the University of Chicago. Former Chilean studentsof his quickly offered economic advice, and the Chilean economy was soon described asone shaped by the policies of the “Chicago boys” (Sigmund 1977). In short order, manylarge state firms that had been nationalized were sold off. Tariffs, many of them in tripledigits to protect Chilean producers, were slashed to 10% (Scarpaci 1988).

81Scarpaci

On the civil society front, the Pinochet regime moved with a vengeance to silenceopposition and those with leist tendencies. He targeted student organizations, unions,leist political parties, and other previously condoned forms of civic participation.Although the estimates vary, most authorities agree that nearly 3,000 Chileans were killedin the aermath of the coup d’état; most of this over the course of the following two years.is paled compared to neighboring Argentina’s dirty war with its 30,000-odd casualties; itnonetheless marked an abrupt about-face in the course of Chilean democracy (Wright2007).

Patricio (a pseudonym) was at the time of the 1973 unrest a member of student militantgroup, MIR (Leist Revolutionary Movement). He and his comrades were one of the firstgroups targeted by the Chilean national police (carabineros), secret police (DINA), andarmed forces. Along with thousands of others, he was arrested within the first month of thePinochet regime, and placed in the National [soccer] Stadium where he languished for twomonths. It was a traumatic experience for him, because many of those detained there wereexecuted, tortured, or both.

Upon his release, it was difficult to find work, partly because the economy was in badshape, and partly because he had a police record. He spent the next three years workingwith the Roman Catholic Vicariate of Santiago, whose human rights division became themain internal human rights monitoring organization. One of the activities of the vicariatewas to make appliqués (called arpilleras) that were crudely stitched landscapes thatdescribed life in the nation’s shantytowns, and the experience of those who had beenkidnapped and “disappeared” by the regime (Scarpaci and Frazier 1993). Wheninternational visitors would come to the group’s center on the main town square indowntown Santiago, he would use his French and English in the sales shop to sell thesehandicras. In turn, they were carried abroad and helped spread the word about the humanrights crisis in Chile, because foreign media coverage was closely monitored and word-of-mouth was the only way to denounce the abuses.

During one of the site visits by a delegation of U.S. lawyers, one delegate asked to see thesewing workshop (taller) where the arpilleras were assembled (even though they wereartisan and single-seamstress projects, women would oen sew together to talk about theirpending cases with the judicial system, and console each other for their losses). As Patriciotells the story, one thing led to another, and the U.S. visitor saw a beautiful dress beingsewn by one of the seamstresses. She quickly purchased five girls’ dresses for the upcomingEaster holiday, and continued to pick up small orders as she returned to Chile over the nextfew years.

3e elimination of leist political governments by military overthrew in the Southern Cone (Argentina,Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay) of Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s can be conceptualized as theimplementation of bureaucratic-authoritarianism (BA) regimes (O’Donnell et al; Linz and Stepan 1996; Scarpaci1988). BA governments view progressive le-wing economic (though democratically elected) administrations as atype of cancer attacking the national body. As military officers trained in strategic management, decision making,and engineering, their objectives were to replace the demand-making bodies of civil society with decision rulesthat were allegedly more objective. Drawing on articles in national constitutions, they were able to justify theirintervention based on emergency needs or to attack foreign “bodies” (e.g., international communist parties andlinkages). Unabashedly free-marketers, they set out to dismantle welfare state programs (called Ibañismo in Chile,peronismo in Argentina, and batllismo in Uruguay). Need, poverty, prices, and other matters of governance werequantified whenever possible, and a strong faith was placed in the invisible forces of the market (Finch, 1989;Prezworksi 1992).


By 1978, it became apparent to the U.S. lawyer that there was a demand for these highquality, low-price garments, and she contacted high-end stores in Manhattan. Patriciolearned that similar demand existed in London and Paris, and by 1979, he and fourseamstresses who he considered to be “practically family,” began producing about 50garments a month. Exporting was easy since the lightweight garments could easily fit into asingle suitcase, or amidst other clothes, bypassing the eyes of customs agents at Santiago’sairport and in Europe and the U.S. When tourists would find the shop, he knew thecustoms regulations for many countries; 50 garments could be carried duty-free into theUS and his seamstresses helped him secure appropriate materials for the increased orders.He had to rely on trusted B2B providers to prevent jealous neighbors from going to theauthorities because he lacked export papers or avoided tax payments.

Production styles changed about once a year as purchases were made by buyers. By thelate 1980s, the introduction of the FAX machine allowed for up-to-date changes in fabrics,collars, slips, and embroidery to be changed quickly based on the tastes of the foreignbuyers. When I first met Patricio in 1989, he had business cards that displayed his phonenumber (which in turn, revealed a prefix that was specific only to cell phones; a novelty inChile and in many corners of the world at the time). By 1992, he added five additionalseamstresses—all close family friends who had endured hardships under the dictatorship-and was able to add custom labels based on the shop owner’s brand in New York, Londonand Paris.

Patricio used the 1980s to share aspects of his clothing operation with members of thehuman rights community. For example, because of his social mission and ethics, he hiredmothers, sisters, or daughters of missing or detained individuals as seamstresses; all part ofthe compadrazgo network prevalent in his Catholic Chilean community. e scraps cut forthe bolts of cloth were given gratis to the vicariate so the arpillera sewers could add richtextures to their embroidered appliqués. A textile factory owner who sympathized withPatricio politically gave him discount prices on selected bolts of fabrics such as brightrayon, corduroy, velvet, and other materials that were being phased out. When buyers cameto his shop in the northern Santiago suburb of Conchalí, he would make sure they gotbusiness cards to the vicariates’ showroom in downtown Santiago. In turn, the vicariatemade sure that the human rights tourists received a business card (with a road map and taxitelephone number on the back, in both English and French) that showcased Patricio’sdresses. Word-of-mouth advertising helped to expand a B2B operation to B2C.

e Conchalí neighborhood where Patricio was raised and worked was originally asquatter settlement when it was settled in the early 1960s. By the 1980s, it had graduallybecome upgraded with sewers, streetlights, and nearby police and fire houses. By alloutward appearances, it was a modest working-class neighborhood by Chilean standards,and Patricio was a strong supporter of local charities: firemen, a Spanish benevolent society,and playground equipment for a vacant lot that the county had designated as a park. “iscommunity has been good to me; these are my people. I’m lucky to be alive, so it’s good togive back.” is business ethic guides his work.

Case #2. a Cuban pizzeriaEntrepreneurship in Cuba has undergone substantial changes since the beginning of the

post-Soviet era around 1991. New opportunities arose for Cuban entrepreneurs, withdevelopments such as the decriminalization of the dollar and more incentives to attractforeign investment through joint ventures (CEPAL, 1997; Pérez-López, 1994; Pérez-

83Scarpaci

López, 1995). Peters and Scarpaci’s work in 1998 provided the first systematic account ofentrepreneurs’ experiences in this new realm of limited small-business activity and inspireda spate of work on the vicissitudes of these new workers’ entrepreneurial actions (e.g.,Ellinson, 1999; Cruz and Villamil, 2000; Trumbull, 2001; Henken, 2002; Scarpaci, 2002;Osborn and Wenger, 2005; Phillips, 2007). is literature highlights obstacles for theseself-employed workers, where the state still looms large over entrepreneurial activity inCuba. us, the movement away from the Soviet influence seemed to simultaneouslyliberalize and tighten the regulatory environment in which Cuban entrepreneurs operate(Pérez-López, 1995, Frank, 2010; González-Coro and Larson 2007; Gordon 1976; Gott2010). In official circles in Cuba, the “non-state” (e.g., private) narrative continues to beabout “perfecting socialism” (Zawadski, 2009), but ordinary entrepreneurs realize the statehas no choice.

e term “Special Period” (or Special Period in a Time of Peace, “El período especial enel tiempo de paz”) was a term coined by Fidel Castro in 1993 to refer to the draconiancutbacks caused by the loss of favorable terms of trade when the Soviet-bloc trading group,the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or Comecon, founded in 1949)dissolved. Self-employment quickly disappeared in the first decade of the Cuban revolutionas the state began controlling the principal means of production such as sugar mills,transportation lines, shipping and airlines, textiles, pharmaceuticals, and food processing.Although almost all workers have been tethered to public-sector employment since theearly 1960s, a small number of workers were granted permission by the communistgovernment to ply their trades. Professions such as locksmiths, beauticians, upholsterers,and other single-worker enterprises characterized much of the work force allowed to workoutside the public realm. As noted earlier, though, the legalization of the dollar in 1993moved in tandem with liberalizing work laws (Scarpaci, 1995). By 1996, the governmentreported approximately 200,000 workers (not quite 2 per cent of the labour force in Cuba)as cuentapropistas (self-employed workers, or those “who work for their own account;”trabajan por cuenta propia in Spanish). By 2007, the figure hovered around 150,000. emore popular of these trades included home restaurants, cobblers, beauticians, bicycle-taxidrivers, lighter re-fuelers, confectionary and juice vendors, and artists (Scarpaci et al.,2002). In early 2013, approximately 605,000 workers are licensed to work in the privatesector (ONE 2013).

Vladimir (pseudonym) was 20 years old when he began working for the Cuban housingministry. He began as a laborer but gradually worked his way up to foreman and mastermason (maestro albañil). He was 24 years old when the so-called Special Period came tobe. By 1995, new construction was so sporadic that Vladimir was laid off. He was pleasedto accept the layoff as he had seen neighbors who were working in these nascent privatesector trades. at same year, he used a pile of construction scraps of wood and glass thathe had been gathering over the years to build a more attractive façade on his suburbanHavana home. He converted his living room into the seating area; abiding by the law, hehad only three tables with four chairs each, giving him the allowable 12-seat maximum.e rest of the materials were used to build a bar-like high counter that served as atransition from his kitchen to the front dining room.

e regulatory environment for workers like Vladimir has always been convoluted.Essentially, small businesses were outlawed in Cuba until 1993, presumably because anascent petite bourgeoisie threatens the socialist system. Home restaurants, for instance,


can only employ family members but the number of place settings was limited to just 12(though reforms in 2010 increased the number to 18, and then to 50 in 2011). He knowsthat certain foods such as lobster and beef were prohibited from sale in these homerestaurants; they were designed for sale in state-run restaurants where handsome profits canbe had. (In 2011, all such restaurants had these restrictions lied but this was aer the fieldresearch). However, lookouts outside his restaurant alert him when state inspectorsapproach. is gives him time to rid the premises of non-familial labour and illegal foods.A lobster dinner, for instance, ranges between the equivalent of $20-30 USD in most stateor joint-venture restaurants, but can be had for under $10 USD in most home restaurantsor paladares. Vladimir promotes a lobster thermadore dish with rice and salad for $11USD. Regulating beef production is also perplexing. Beef (carne de res) never appears onthe state ration list of food items. Instead, it can be purchased in pesos at agriculturalmarkets (mercados agroprecuarios), but a pound can equal a week’s wages for state workers.Vladimir is one of the few pizza makers who tops his pizza with strips of beef, an idea hegleaned from a foreign film shown on national television (e.g., meat-lovers pizza). 4

Most paladares, however, employ outside (non-family) laborers and maintain a “look-out” of sorts that alerts the operation when state inspectors are nearby. If inspectors arrive,beef and lobster are hidden and oen tossed over to a neighbor’s property or balcony.Operating a paladar, like all self-employment in Cuba, requires paying monthly licensurefees to the county (169 of them island-wide) by the first of the month. Each county has amatrix of prices based on whether the self-employer charges in pesos or in hard currency(today called CUCs or convertible currency units).

In the case of restaurants, if Vladimir wishes to serve alcohol, then a hey alcohol licenseis added to his monthly fees. His home restaurant in Plaza Municipality in Havana caterslargely to tourists, and his charging in hard currency and serving alcohol requires a paymentequivalent of $800 USD before he opens his doors on the first of each month. A friend ofhis charges only in Cuban pesos in the same county, and pays only 400 pesos monthly(about $8 USD). County authorities can permanently withdraw a business license if anyself-employed worker fails to pay for a monthly fee on time; there is no guarantee that thestate will allow re-entry into the market. Vladimir prefers to play on the safe side and paysthe expensive alcohol and hard currency fees.

Seasonal work related to peak tourist arrival months are particularly vulnerable in thisregard and Vladimir is affected by this fluctuation. Like other private sector operators suchas bed-and-breakfast establishments, restaurants, bicycle-taxi operators, and relatedancillary services, Vladimir must “weather” the lean low season, and continue to paylicensure fees during the off-season. ere is no guarantee that simply shutting down in thelow season that he will be able to get licensure approval when the high season returns. estate keeps Vladimir and others like him paying, with little transparency about licensuredecisions. In short, entry and exit into the marketplace are complex for Cubanentrepreneurs.

4Control over beef is even more perplexing in the countryside. Ranchers can raise cattle for milk, but when theanimal dies, the police must be called to document the event. e animal is taken away to the local slaughterhouseand the meat and leather become property of the state. If a rancher loses a head of cattle to a rustler because ofextreme negligence or collision with thieves, he/she can be sanctioned up to seven years in prison, whereas thesentencing for an apprehended cattle rustler is just three years. Such are the Orwellian tales of private enterpriseon the island.

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Inspectors join this cat-and-mouse game by trying to “catch” the restaurants charging inhard currencies when they are not licensed to do so. My field work and in-depth interviewswith cuentapropistas in 1998 and 2008 show that corruption and bribery are not majorimpediments for restaurateurs. Havana used to boast 600 such eateries in the 1990s:Cuban authorities stopped issuing licenses for new ones, reversed that decision in the mid-2000s, but the total number of paladares has been drastically reduced. e logic of thesepolicy shis comes from officials of Cuba's Tourism Ministry, who argue that it is unfair forthe state to spend millions to attract international visitors only to be undercut by smaller,private firms. Elsewhere in the private-sector realm it is safe to conclude that activities thatdon't compete with the state, such as selling snacks, patching tires or fixing bicycles—allconducted with Cuban currency—are less restricted, though hardly encouraged (Newman2001; González-Corzo and Larson, 2007). Vladimir’s struggle to be a successfulentrepreneur in a highly regulated economy means looking for creative ways to surviveminimally, as do millions of others (Rosenberg-Weinreb 2009).

Entrepreneur Vladimir treads this ethical line carefully, one that straddles illegality andwhat other settings would be considered normal business practices. He is constrained bynot being able to 1.) Buy in bulk, 2.) Get most of his ingredients from anyone other thanthe state, 3.) Contest inspectors whose on-the-spot assessment specify how many receiptshe should have to justify the production of pizzas he is selling (and therefore not buyingingredients on the black market or stealing from government restaurants).

Unlike his Chilean counterpart, Patricio, Vladimir was not reared in a Catholic-imbuedculture because the Cuban revolution frowned upon religious practices up until 1992,when it formally modified its constitution to allow freedom of worship. However, nearlyfour hundreds years of Spanish culture and three and half centuries of African slaverycreated important reciprocity networks. Fictive kinship (compadrazgo) is too a part ofCuban society although it has lacked the Catholic affiliation found more broadly in theregion. e Cuban scholar Fernando Ortíz revived the indelible role that African culturebrought to Cuba back in the 1930s. From hiding African religions behind the veil ofRoman Catholicism (a practice called syncretism), to developing support networks ofplantation slaves working in the homes of masters, and those freed slaves, Cuba’sreciprocity networks are well developed. And while the terms of calling non-familymembers “aunts and uncles” has disappeared because of its Catholic and bourgeoishistories, a new term has arisen during the socialist realm: the buddy system or “socio”(León 1995; Haddad 2003). is playful term, part of Cuban street humor (called choteo),is explained by León as drawing partly on the traditional work for business partner (socio)but is also a tongue-in-cheek reference to the word for socialism (socialism). León firstobserved its usage in the 1990s and playfully coined it as “buddyism” (or socio-lismo). InCuba today, one seeks out a socio (male) or social (female) to “solve problems” (resolverlos problemas) (see also Colantonio and Porter 2006; Blue 2004; Otero and O’Brian2002).

Vladimir must maintain good relationships with everyone: inspectors, neighbors,suppliers, and the local neighborhood watchdog group, the Committee for the Defense ofthe Revolution (CDR). He sees his CDR several ways. At first, he tells me, he had a verypragmatic view of business: get ingredients, sell as many pizzas as possible, and turn aprofit. Aer 10 years in business, his attitude began to change. He remarked that peoplebegan to look up to him and to rely on him as a “socio.” At first, he thought, people would


come to his restaurant, lounge around without buying little more than a soda or beer,because they were looking for something free. Later, he began providing some small loans($10 to $30 USD) to people he knew and trusted; a classic example of neighborhood trustand respect because of the sensitive nature of indebtedness plays in Latin culture (Lomnitz1988), especially one crawling out from under the labyrinth of socialism As the businessgrew, he found himself bringing pizza to sick school children or elderly pensioners who ranout of food at the end of the month. He never charged interest on his loans, and neverforced repayment. Vladimir is not a religious man, but he told me in 2010 that “it was theright thing to do; that and not getting arrested for dangerousness (peligrosidad) or illicitenrichment (enriquicmiento iílcito)” charges that were easy for police and inspectors toimpose, and hard for anyone to defend themselves against. “My good works,” he tells me,“may have kept me out of trouble, but in my heart, I know I must do the right thing” (hacerlo correcto).

Beyond this Creole style of CSR, Vladimir knows how to stay under the radar. In 2006,when his business had really taken off, he told me ‘as long as my gold chains stay under myshirt and [are] not shining in the tropical sun, I can trod along with minimal hassle frommy neighbors and inspectors. Vulgar displays of sudden wealth (called guapería in Cubanparlance) quickly arouse the suspicions of state authorities. is resonates with Farid’s(2007) finding about entrepreneurs in Islamic Egypt: “Money is both good as asymbol/terminal value and as a means/instrumental value in that individuals associatemoney with power and status, feelings of happiness, wealth and respect from others, andachievement and success within the society.” Budding entrepreneurship for Vladimir andother Cubans is a balancing act between material success and culturally definedostentatious displays. ere is a social expectation that he share his good fortune among hisown reciprocal networks. In Castro’s Cuba, sharing wealth either tangibly or intangiblyamong neighbors and engaging in neighborhood activities sponsored by the Committeefor the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) is a good business practice. He describes hisinteractions with the CDR this way: “We don’t have a chamber of commerce (cámara decomercio) like in your country, or like before the Revolution. So my lobbying is the localCDR.” is implies attending meetings and occasionally volunteering for all-night vigilantshis in front of state stores (that are oen targeted by burglars); behaviors that other self-employed workers also reported Peters and Scarpaci (1998).

DiSCuSSioNese cases tell the story of small–scale CSR development–or networks of reciprocity–

with two entrepreneurs, thousands of miles and decades apart, which struggle to buildprofitable businesses in difficult circumstances. What do they tell us about ethics andentrepreneurship in two striking emerging economies in the western hemisphere? Macro-economic and political forces changed the course of the Chilean and Cuban entrepreneurs.Adversity–economic, political and personal–spurred their search for a new livelihood.Patricio started out working and volunteering for a non-profit organization and drew onfictive kinship relationships to do so, whereas Vladimir had never been exposed tononprofit organizations because they are absent in Cuba. Material and civil liberty crises inthe Cuban and Chilean cases, respectively, imbued both of them in marketing managementand charting paths with ethical compasses.

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5Source: Stevens (1979)

e maturation of their moral positioning vis á vis the broader community parallelswhat Stevens (1979) calls preconventional, conventional and postconventional levels ofmorality (Table 5). In the early phase, concerns and responses to the formal businessenvironment are myopic. In the conventional stage, both firms are legally recognized andtheir interactions with stakeholders (local authorities, neighbors, and workers) have castthem into a different light; their leadership positions place in the eye of the public. Wherethe Chilean and Cuban cases depart from Stevens model based on the advanced capitalistnations, is the roles of fictive kinship and networks of reciprocity. As the firms mature sodo the levels of morality that shape their business behaviors. Patricio seeks out nonprofitsand sells to them at discounted rates, while Vladimir selectively lends money, not in a loan-

morality level &definition5

Chilean haute couture Cuba pizzeria

preconventional:rudimentary; calculating andeven selfish. Response toimmediate rewards orpunishments

Cutbacks in public jobsprograms force entrepreneurinto clandestine, informaloperation. Police ‘arrest’record in human rightsmovement makes it hard tofind formal-sector work.Word-of-mouth advertisingprevails.

Downsizing of state housingministry forces him intounderground pizza operationto make ends meet. Kitchennot subject to foodinspections by authorities.Word-of-mouth advertisingprevails.

Conventional:Shis from self-centeredperspective to what thebroader society expects.Obedience to society ororganization is paramount.Marketers mainly concernedabout legality of proposedaction others’ perception ofit.

Registers business with localtax authorities despite therequirement to pay taxes onbusiness. Legality allows firmto advertise by pamphlet andin phone directory withoutretribution. Registers workerswith Labor Ministry andwillingly pays part of health-care and retirement costs.

Registers business with localtax and health authoritiesdespite the requirement topay taxes on business. Newlegal status allows him topost (and pay additional taxfor) one sign outside hisbusiness. Presents legal state-store only sales receipts todocument purchase of flour,salt, spices, and yeast.

postconventional: Reflects the morality of themature adult. Marketers areless concerned about whatothers believe about thefirm, and more about howthey assess themselves overthe long term.

Devotes 2% of profits forhuman rights’ survivors’ andwidowers’ pension funds.Sells dresses at discount ratesto nonprofit nationalorganizations to providework for unemployed femalehousehold heads.

Provides start-up capital withzero interest to local soloentrepreneurs and tocooperative selling high-quality tomatoes.

table 5. morality and Business Behaviors


sharking fashion, but to those in need. at these levels of morality move in tandem withthe evolution of their businesses is not a causal relationship. Indeed, Stevens (1979) makesit clear that the process is neither linear nor one of causation. Yet the haute couturediscounting to Chilean nonprofits and the pizzeria’s steady business with tomatocooperatives have changed lives in ways far beyond the core competencies of these twoenterprises.

CoNCluSioNMilton Friedman, an economist not known for championing regulation of any sorts,

once remarked: “If business people do have a social responsibility other than makingmaximum profits for shareholders, how are they to know what it is?” (Cited in Lamb, Hairand McDaniel 2012, 88). e Nobel laureate surely did not have the managementstrategies of Patricio the fashion designer or Vladimir the pizza maker in mind when heposed the question. e two men discussed in this paper did not have many shareholders,but they relied on key stakeholders. In this paper I have argued that this small-scalecorporate social responsibility in Chile and Cuba stem from a long history of networks ofreciprocity. Both men were radically transformed in direct opposition to antitheticalpolitical economies in which their businesses operated, neither of which ever delivered thepromises of equality and well-being. Chilean Patricio continues his activities in leistpolitics, while Cuban Vladimir—like many Cubans—has become apathetic politically.Over time, their efforts to directly and indirectly share the benefits of their operationsplacated authorities and earned them goodwill with local customers and neighbors.

Patricio and Vladimir will not gain insight into their businesses by following leads fromMilan’s fashionistas or Tokyo’s schoolgirls. eir foci on strengthening core competencies,behaving ethically, and doing the right thing have generated profits and, as Hammond andPrahalad (2004, 30) argue, are incremental steps in developing-world entrepreneurship:“To reach [the poor, entrepreneurs] must shed old concepts of marketing, distribution, andresearch. Getting it right can both generate big profits and help end economic isolationthroughout the developing world.” However, at no point in our fieldwork did theseentrepreneurs correlate money with wellbeing (bienestar; see Sirgy and Lee 2008).

As their businesses evolved from nascent to established practices, parallel changes werealso evident in their ethical behaviors and the development of their small-scale CSR. estriking change from “staying under the radar” to reaching out to numerous stakeholders istelling. It implies that neither the size of the firm nor the magnitude of sales condition theseeming acts of altruism described here. Hiring victims of human rights abuses in Chile, orproviding pizza for the elderly or infirm in Cuba, probably added little value to themarketing mix of these entrepreneurs. Milton Friedman would have probably wanted anempirical metric to indicate at what point in these businesses practices did the notion to dothe right thing appear. And unlike many start-up businesses in Asia, Africa and LatinAmerica (Lee and Jones 2008), no bi or multi-lateral agencies such as the United StatesAgency for International Development, World Bank, International Monetary Fund,United Nations Development Program, European Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment, or the Inter-American Development Bank were involved in theseenterprises. CSR in Latin America is unevenly practiced and remains in embryonic stagesin most countries.

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However, signs of change are in sight. e Cuban government’s announcement inOctober 2010 about downsizing nearly half a million state workers (in a nation of 11million total residents) implies that small and medium enterprises could provide apotentially critical employment option for the Cuban economy, which is undergoingconsiderable structural change. Optimistically, the emergence of grassroots capitalism inCuba is not only consistent with, but also supportive of, the decentralization of economicand political power. Vladimir will likely serve as a source of knowledge, goodwill, andinformal mentor for budding entrepreneurs. However, it will likely have to be “packagedand announced” as consistent with the Revolution’s goals, at least while the Castrobrothers live. And even though Chile is no longer a “developing nation” besieged by humanrights problems and their attendant sympathizers, Patricio was able to adjust to marketconditions and provide a niche in his country of 15 million.

We are reminded in this study of ethics and entrepreneurship of these tiny enterprises bythe remarks of former British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. In his post-officepublication, Beyond the Crash, he assesses the reasons for the economic crisis thatprevailed globally from 2006-2010. He argues for a new kind of market, one that hasmorals (Brown 2010, 236). While not the first student of economics to make that claim, itwould seem that these two entrepreneurs from the Global South offer something to reflectupon in assessing this debate. Support from fictive kinship and reciprocity networks givesmall businesses the moral standing, social capital, and neighborhood-based legitimacy tooperate, independent of the legal statues in each country. Intangibles such as these havebeen lost in the macro-economic histories recounted about the so-called Chilean miracle,or Cuba’s transition from socialism. is paper supports Lomnitz’s (1988) contention thatinformal exchanges are not always illegal and play an undervalued role in supportingnascent market economies. Pinochet’s bureaucratic-authoritarianism and Castro’s socialismshaped these entrepreneurial experiences and their attendant acts of social responsibility inunanticipated ways, leading entrepreneurs to follow a culturally-defined moral compassand to “do the right thing.”

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aBout tHE EDitorS of tHE

JourNal of EtHiCS & ENtrEprENEurSHip

Dr. DoNalD w. CauDill is a Professor of Marketing inthe Broyhill School of Management in the Godbold Schoolof Business at Gardner-Webb University in Boiling Springs,North Carolina. Previously, Dr. Caudill was a Professor ofBusiness and Leadership and Chair of Marketing,Management and Leadership, and E-Business andEntrepreneurship at Bluefield College in Virginia and aProfessor of Marketing and Director of the AppalachianLeadership and Entrepreneurial Center at Bluefield StateCollege in West Virginia. He was also an Associate Professorof Marketing and Honors Professor at Belmont University inNashville, Tennessee. Dr. Caudill served as an AssistantProfessor of Marketing at Southern Arkansas University, theUniversity of North Alabama and the University of Tennessee at Martin. He began histeaching career as an Instructor of Marketing at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and StateUniversity in 1981. Dr. Caudill was a member of the graduate faculty in the Jack C. MasseyGraduate School of Business at Belmont University, and has taught classes via satellite(distance learning) for West Virginia Graduate College, evening, weekend, and onlinegraduate courses for Averett University, the University of Tennessee at Knoxville andMountain State University (WV). In addition to 31 years of teaching at the university level,Dr. Caudill has worked in selling, retail management, and marketing research. He also hasowned and managed several entrepreneurial businesses including a small advertising agency.

A Virginia native, Dr. Caudill has a B.S. degree in Business Administration from BereaCollege (Kentucky), an M.B.A. from Morehead State University (Kentucky), an M.S. inmarketing from the University of Memphis (Tennessee), and a Ph.D. from VirginiaPolytechnic Institute and State University. He is a member of Pinnacle, Phi Eta Sigma, DeltaMu Delta and Sigma Beta Delta academic honor societies and e Gamma Beta Phi Societyand Alpha Kappa Psi.

Dr. Caudill has had nearly 100 articles published in professional journals and tradepublications and has presented over 50 papers at conferences (and won Best Paper Awards).He has authored four seminar manuals and several business/leadership book manuscripts.Dr. Caudill’s research has been cited in textbooks and in numerous referred journals. He hasbeen interviewed for several newspaper and magazine articles and on radio and televisiontalk shows. Dr. Caudill has been a consultant for small and large businesses and a workshopleader and speaker at state, regional, and national conferences and conventions. Dr. Caudillwon both the Godbold School of Business (2010) and the University (2011) ResearchAwards. He also won the President’s Award for Community Engagement (2012).

Dr. Caudill has been on the editorial review boards of numerous journals. He is or hasbeen a member of the United States Association for Small Business and Entrepreneurship,the American Marketing Association, the Association of Consumer Research, the Academyof Marketing Science (a Fellow), and numerous other organizations. He is a frequentconference presenter, paper reviewer, discussant, session chair and panelist.


JamES E. littlEfiElD is Emeritus Professor of Marketing atVirginia Tech in Blacksburg, VA. Jim retired aer 28 years at VirginiaTech and 18 years at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.He served as Department Head at each institution.

He is the author or coauthor of eight books and numerous researcharticles in marketing and international marketing. Much of Jim’scareer was spent abroad, having lived, researched, and taught in fourcountries and traveled in 70 countries. A major activity wasdeveloping and taking students on study abroad programs toSwitzerland and other places in Europe, China, Vietnam, Cambodia,and other parts of Asia, and Chile. His industrial experience was with

General Motors in Detroit, the B.F. Goodrich Company in Akron, and numerous consultingassignments in the U.S. and abroad.

Dr. Caudill is a former American Marketing Association Hugh G. Wales National FacultyAdvisor of the Year, a life member of Pi Sigma Epsilon (National Fraternity in Marketing, SalesManagement and Selling) and Sigma Pi (Social) Fraternity, and the winner of theHigginbotham Award for Outstanding Service. He has been named Who’s Who inAdvertising, Who’s Who in the South and Southwest, Who’s Who Among American Teachers,Who’s Who Among Emerging Leaders of the World, Who’s Who in American Education,Who’s Who Among Young Professionals, and twice selected as an Outstanding Young Man ofAmerica.

Dr. Caudill has traveled throughout the United States and studied marketing in numerousforeign countries including Canada, e Bahamas, Aruba, Mexico, Belize, Honduras, Brazil,Argentina, Paraguay, France, Israel, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, England, Greece,Spain, Australia, Hong Kong and China. Dr. Caudill was a Visiting Advertising Professor toFitzgerald and Company in Atlanta, GA and served an internship at Wisdom Media. He hasbeen an advisor to Phi Beta Lambda and is a Sam Walton Fellow of Students in Free Enterprise(SIFE). His students have won numerous awards and honors.

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