Reasoned Document for RDSO/SPN/183/2011 version -2 Page 1 of 40 Remarks on comments received on TPWS specification RDSO/SPN/183/2010 ver -1 SN Clause No. Clause Details Comments from Comment & Suggestion RDSO’s remarks 1. 5.1 Healthy condition of system: A steady lit green light indicating that TPWS is in working condition shall be available in the cab or on the driver’s indication -cum -control panel. This TPWS healthy indication light shall extinguish when any fault is detected by TPWS and immediately “TPWS faulty” red light shall be lit and audible alarm shall sound to attract attention of driver (which shall stop on acknowledgement by the driver). In such case, Emergency brake shall be applied by the TPWS and the train shall be able to move only after the TPWS is isolated. However, the “TPWS faulty” red light shall remain lit till such time fault persists. Bombardier Bombardier (BT) onboard system has built-in advanced self-diagnostic features and as such BT proposes the use of its existing functionality in determining the health status of the system (as described below). During the Start of Mission phase the onboard system will automatically undergo start up healthy tests. All tests are initiated automatically and if some part of the system is found faulty, a faulty message will be displayed on the driver’s DMI. The onboard system will not be ready for operation and must be maintained. On the other hand if all start up tests are successful, this will also be indicated on DMI and the Driver will be allowed to start the operation. During the train run, if some onboard fault occurs this will also be immediately indicated on the DMI and an alarm will be given to the driver. The system will also automatically apply brake, which can be released when the train has fully stopped. Further action depends on the type of fault, however if the fault does not recover, the driver has to switch OFF the onboard then the DMI becomes dark as a best indication to the driver that the onboard system is not working. BT believes introducing additional The requirement of ‘TPWS Healthy’ & ‘TPWS Faulty’ indications is in addition to the indications existing on DMI/ SDMI. These additional indications shall be prominent & will immediately attract the attention of the Driver. Therefore, the requirement as mentioned in the clause is considered necessary.
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Reasoned Document for RDSO/SPN/183/2011 version -2 Page 1 of 40
Remarks on comments received on TPWS specification RDSO/SPN/183/2010 ver -1
SN Clause
No.
Clause Details Comments
from
Comment & Suggestion RDSO’s remarks
1. 5.1 Healthy condition of system: A steady lit green
light indicating that TPWS is in working condition
shall be available in the cab or on the driver’s
indication -cum -control panel. This TPWS healthy
indication light shall extinguish when any fault is
detected by TPWS and immediately “TPWS faulty”
red light shall be lit and audible alarm shall sound
to attract attention of driver (which shall stop on
acknowledgement by the driver). In such case,
Emergency brake shall be applied by the TPWS and
the train shall be able to move only after the TPWS
is isolated. However, the “TPWS faulty” red light
shall remain lit till such time fault persists.
Bombardier Bombardier (BT) onboard system has
built-in advanced self-diagnostic features
and as such BT proposes the use of its
existing functionality in determining the
health status of the system (as described
below).
During the Start of Mission phase the
onboard system will automatically
undergo start up healthy tests. All tests
are initiated automatically and if some
part of the system is found faulty, a faulty
message will be displayed on the driver’s
DMI. The onboard system will not be
ready for operation and must be
maintained.
On the other hand if all start up tests are
successful, this will also be indicated on
DMI and the Driver will be allowed to
start the operation.
During the train run, if some onboard
fault occurs this will also be immediately
indicated on the DMI and an alarm will be
given to the driver. The system will also
automatically apply brake, which can be
released when the train has fully stopped.
Further action depends on the type of
fault, however if the fault does not
recover, the driver has to switch OFF the
onboard then the DMI becomes dark as a
best indication to the driver that the
onboard system is not working.
BT believes introducing additional
The requirement of ‘TPWS Healthy’ &
‘TPWS Faulty’ indications is in addition
to the indications existing on DMI/
SDMI. These additional indications shall
be prominent & will immediately
attract the attention of the Driver.
Therefore, the requirement as
mentioned in the clause is considered
necessary.
Reasoned Document for RDSO/SPN/183/2011 version -2 Page 2 of 40
components as e.g. lamps and switches
for healthy indication will require
additional maintenance in the future and
will in any case have some impact on
system MTBF and reliability. In this
regard, BT believes it is better to avoid
adding extra indication lamps and just
fulfil this requirement with the
functionality described above.
2. 5.8.1 TPWS shall continuously compare the current
speed of train with the permitted speed at all
locations in all those modes in which speed
monitoring is available except for release speed
monitoring. A warning must be given to the driver
to enable him to react and avoid intervention from
TPWS before the application of service brake. The
following actions shall be taken by TPWS depending
upon the difference in current train speed &
permitted speed:
------
------
------
The system shall have provision of configuring the
speed limits/ slabs as mentioned in column 2 of the
above table, by the purchaser. However, these
speed limits shall be in multiples of 5 KMPH or less.
Bombardier BT onboard system fully complies with
Subset – 26 v2.3.0 regarding these
parameters and furthermore actual
implementation in assigning these values
can be further discussed with the end
customer.
These requirements comply with ETCS
standards. Any deviation with this
specification shall be specifically
brought out. However, clause is
modified.
3. 5.14 Isolation of TPWS: System shall have provision so
that TPWS is bypassed in case of failure situation.
Isolation of the entire train borne equipment must
result in disconnection of the system from the
vehicle braking system. This shall be indicated to
the driver by means of a visual indication which
shall be available even if SDMI/DMI has failed. To
avoid accidental/ unwarranted use, the isolation
arrangement of the equipment must be protected
and sealed. Isolation of system must be recorded
by the system as well as recorded in a non-
resettable veeder counter.
Bombardier During isolation of the onboard system
(by mean of Isolation Switch) all
connection to the brake system will be
bypassed and additional EB SIFA valve will
be energized by the vehicle battery.
Isolation of the system is indicated to the
driver by means of a dark DMI.
However if this is not considered as
sufficient, an additional contact can be
The requirement is based on clause no.
4.1.6.3a of ETCS FRS ver.4 .50.
The clause details as “A clear indication
shall be given to the driver, that ETCS
has been isolated, even if the normal
ETCS DMI is defective.”
Indication of TPWS isolation is required
even in case of DMI/SDMI failure e.g.
blanking of DMI screen.
Reasoned Document for RDSO/SPN/183/2011 version -2 Page 3 of 40
implemented into the isolation switch
and an alarm lamp can be then lit. This is
a matter for further discussion with the
customer as introducing any additional
components will require extra
maintenance and decrease reliability.
Isolation switch can be sealed to prevent
unauthorized isolations.
All isolation will be recorded by proposed
JRU and the stored data inside JRU can
not be erased nor manipulated by
unauthorized personnel.
Non-resettable counter is also
necessary so that even without
downloading the data from JRU,
number of EB application cases could
be known.
4. 6.7.2 Where required by the purchaser, an atleast 8
position switch to select the configuration of
different train characteristics predefined based on
maximum permissible speed, train load, brake
characteristics & any other relevant considerations.
Bombardier Such a mechanical switch is not required
by Bombardier onboard system. All fixed
train data parameters are entered during
the installation phase onboard, while
variable parameters can be entered by
the driver using keys on DMI (touch-
screen buttons) according to UNISIG
ERTMS standard.
Below is the list of the variable
parameters that can be entered by the
driver using the DMI during start-up:
Alternative 1.
ATP installed for “fixed train data entry”,
permits the driver to select the type of
train/train configuration from a menu at
the DMI that corresponds to the train he
is going to start-up.
The selected train type includes all
relevant train data needed for the ATP.
Driver chooses and approves the correct
selection.
Alternative 2.
ATP installed for “flexible train data
entry”, permits the driver to individually
select the value of the train data menu
Provision of 8-position switch has not
been considered necessary for
CENELEC DMI. However, the same
would be required for SDMI. (Clause
6.18 of ver-2)
Reasoned Document for RDSO/SPN/183/2011 version -2 Page 4 of 40
presented at the DMI. Train data are as
an example, Train length, Maximum
Permitted Train Speed, Loading gauge,
Axle load, Traction, Airtight system, Brake
percentage etc.
After driver programmed those data he
approves the set-up.
Alternative 3.
DMI offers driver to select Alternative 1 or
2.
Not having the electromechanical switch
also allows a better system reliability.
5. 6.7.3 Green light indicating healthy condition of On
Board TPWS.
Bombardier See comments in 5.1 Required as indicated in remarks
against 5.1.
6. 6.7.4 Red light indicating Faulty condition of On Board
TPWS.
Bombardier See comments in 5.1 Required as indicated in remarks
against 5.1.
7. 6.7.5 Non-resettable type electromechanical counter for
recording the cases of emergency brake application
Bombardier In stead of a mechanical counter
Bombardier proposes the use of JRU to
register any type of emergency brake
application (authorized and non
authorized actions). JRU is also an
integrated standard part of any ERTMS
system and have excellent data storage
functionality. The stored data inside JRU
can not be erased nor manipulated by
unauthorized personnel. Thus any
additional components as mechanical
counters can be avoided ensuring better
system reliability.
Se also applicable comments in 5.14.
Non-resettable counter is also
necessary so that even without
downloading the data from JRU,
number of EB application cases could
be known.
Reasoned Document for RDSO/SPN/183/2011 version -2 Page 5 of 40
Remarks on Draft TPWS specification RDSO/SPN/183/2010 ver -1
SN Clause No. Clause Details Comments
from
Comment & Suggestion RDSO’s remarks
1. 4.20 The system shall be compatible & interoperable
with the existing TPWS on Indian Railways. The
supplier manufacturer shall also submit
certificate mentioning the systems working on
world railways with which their system is
interoperable. The certificate shall include
systems of those manufacturers also whose
TPWS are already working on IR.
ALSTOM Interoperability has to be distinguished between “product
level” and “system level”. Product level (i.e.) Eurobalise is
stable almost from the beginning. ……….
-------
-------
Regarding the interoperability between 2.2.2 and 2.3.0d
“subsystem”, the situation is as summarized in the table
below:
System
interoperability
Train 2.2.2
based on 2.2.2
Train 2.3.0d
Trackside based
on 2.2.2
OK Case by case
analysis
Trackside 2.3.0d Case by case
analysis
OK
It has to be understood which “version of 2.2.2” has been
implemented in the two Indian pilot lines (for both
trackside and trainbourne) (i.e which Change Requests
(CRs) in complement to SRS 2.2.2 have been implemented)
and if there are any plan to up-grade to 2.3.0d of existing
trackside and trains.
The supplier should study
the equipment installed in
the section and make the
system compatible with
the existing one.
The purchaser should
specify the existing
installed TPWS as per
cl.14.0(l).
2. 7.1 The MTBF of each sub-system of track side as well as
On board system shall be as under:
Sub-System Minimum MTBF
(Hrs.)
OBC with JRU 25,000
SDMI/DMI 20,000
BTM 25,000
Balise Antenna 1,00,000
Speed & Distance
Measuring Unit
25,000
TIU 15,000
LEU 60,000
Balise 1,00,000
ALSTOM MTBSF (Mean Time Between Service Failure) for complete
Provision of 8 position selector switch was finalized
by IRPMU in the present contract. This switch only
caters to the requirement of passenger trains.
Moreover, the selection can only be made based on
4 predefined passenger train configurations at 110
kmph and 130 kmph speed. As the specification is
generic in nature, therefore, provision for setting of
various combinations of freight trains is also
required to be made at this stage. It is further
noticed that train parameters could not be yet fine
tuned and tested for many of these combinations.
Based on the understanding of the system gained
so far, it is imperative to enter exact train formation
in the system so that calculations of point of
interventions for SB/EB are appropriate and do not
result in premature application of SB/EB.
Therefore, provision of entry/selection of exact
train formation should be provided on both DMI as
well as SDMI. For this purpose provision of an
alphanumeric keypad should be made. The steps
for train formation entry should be on following
pattern.
(i) Select type of service: Passenger or Freight or
Light engine
(ii) Select type of coach/wagon
(iii) Enter no of coach/wagon.
(iv) Go to step (ii) or complete the entry
The clause should be modified accordingly.
Provision of alphanumeric
keypad with SDMI will
increase its size which is
already quite big. For
requirement of more than 8
options, it is preferable to
go for DMI.
32. 7.1 The MTBF of each sub-system of track side as well as
On board system shall be as under:
Sub-System Minimum MTBF
(Hrs.)
OBC with JRU 25,000
Electrical
DTE
The basis of MTBF mentioned for various sub-
assemblies is not clear.
Further, the definition of failures and provision for
logging of failures shall be incorporated.
The data is based on a
report of analysis got done
by M/s Ansaldo for TPWS in
India. However, overall
MTBF figures are also
Reasoned Document for RDSO/SPN/183/2011 version -2 Page 26 of 40
SDMI/DMI 20,000
BTM 25,000
Balise Antenna 1,00,000
Speed & Distance
Measuring Unit
25,000
TIU 15,000
LEU 60,000
Balise 1,00,000
included in the clause.
33. 8.3 Train borne (external) equipment shall have minimum
protection code of IP 67.
Electrical
DTE
The word ‘train borne’ shall be replaced by “on-
board”.
Shall be corrected.
34. 8.5 The design of on board & track side systems shall take
into account switching transients that may occur, in
either the system or out side, of any magnitude, upto
and including interruption due to short circuit of 25 KV
system. The design shall also take into account supply
related supply related surge & transient.
Electrical
DTE
The word “supply related” is repeated. Same shall
be corrected.
Shall be corrected.
35. 9.3.3 For on board system, following tests shall also
constitute type tests:
(a) Performance Test as per clause 10.2.2 of IEC 60571
(b) Cooling Test as per clause 10.2.3 of IEC 60571
(c) Dry heat test as per clause 10.2.4 of IEC 60571
(d) Damp heat test as per clause 10.2.5 of IEC 60571
(e) Supply over voltage, Surges and electrostatic
discharge test as per clause 10.2.6 of IEC 60571
(f) Transient burst susceptibility test as per clause
10.2.7 of IEC 60571
(g) Insulation test as per clause 10.2.9 of IEC 60571
(h) Salt mist test as per clause 10.2.10 of IEC 60571
(i) Vibration and shock test as per IEC 61373
(j) Water tightness test for on board external
components as per clause 10.2.12 of IEC 60571
(k) Tests for reliability of electronics used in rolling stock
as per RDSO specification no. ELRS/SPEC/SI/0015 of
Oct 2001.
Electrical
DTE
Visual Inspection as per Clause no 10.2.1 of IEC
60571 shall be added.
Visual inspection is defined
in cl 10.2 which is
considered better than IEC
clause.
Reasoned Document for RDSO/SPN/183/2011 version -2 Page 27 of 40
36. 11.0 (ii) Verification and validation of safety, reliability &
availability etc. as per relevant standards (SIL 4 or
equivalent) from reputed agency having experience in
this field. The agency to be engaged for validation shall
be got approved from RDSO. The certificate alongwith
proof of safety report or its equivalent safety report or
its equivalent giving complete tests & their results that
have been undertaken by the manufacturer or
independent safety assessor shall also be submitted.
Electrical
DTE
The meaning of following is not clear.
“….The certificate along with proof of safety report
or its equivalent safety report or its equivalent
giving complete tests & their results that have been
undertaken by the manufacturer or independent
safety assessor shall also be
submitted.”
This shall be elaborated for clarity.
Cl. 11.1 (ii): Language
corrected.
37. 11.1 Manufacturer shall furnish following informationat the
time of initial type approval:
Electrical
DTE
the word ‘informationat’ shall be corrected as
‘information at’
Corrected.
38. 11.6.2 The braking algorithm along with input parameter shall
be supplied by the manufacturer/supplier & got
approved from RDSO before its implementation in the
section.
Electrical
DTE
In view of experience of existing system, rewording
of clause as follows is suggested.
“RDSO shall supply the data of weight, rotating
mass, and Braking effort of various types of locos,
coaches and wagons. Values of EBD, SBD and max
acceleration with +- 10% accuracy for different train
formations shall also be supplied by RDSO. The
working out of correct train parameters shall be the
responsibility of the supplier based on this
information. The braking algorithm along with the
input parameter values for various train
configurations shall be furnished & demonstrated to
the satisfaction of RDSO by the
manufacturer/supplier before implementation in
the section.”
Corrected.
39. ---- Electrical
DTE
(i) The option of deciding between SDMI and DMI
has been left to the purchaser. Why such an option
has been kept and how the user will decide is not
clear?
It is for the purchaser to
decide as per requirement.
40. ---- Electrical
DTE
(ii) Suggestions/ comments of Rlys, particularly NR,
NCR & SR, who have experience of the TPWS
system, should also be invited.
The comments of Rlys S&T
deptt. were taken at Signal
Standards Committee (SSC)
meeting. The remarks from
Electrical department of
Railways shall be obtained
by concerned directorate of
RDSO.
Reasoned Document for RDSO/SPN/183/2011 version -2 Page 28 of 40
41. ---- Electrical
DTE
(iii) Comments of TPWS manufacturer’s world over
may give useful inputs. Procedure for revision of
specification, as per ISO guidelines, calls for
involvement of vendors in finalization of revision.
The comments of firms was
included in the specification
as circulated to Electrical
and PS & EMU dte.
Reasoned Document for RDSO/SPN/183/2011 version -2 Page 29 of 40
Other changes in draft TPWS specification RDSO/SPN/183/2010 ver -2 (dt. 24-12-2010)
SN Clause No. Clause Details of specification no.
RDSO/SPN/183/2010 Ver.-1
Reason for change Modified clause
1. 5.8.1
Serial no. 3
of table
Current train speed if exceeds the speed
permitted at the moment (kmph): Above 10
kmph
Warning to the Driver: Continuous audio &
visual warnings
Command for traction cut-off: Yes
Braking/ Brake Command: Emergency brake is
applied till the train is brought to a halt. The
emergency brake gets released when train stops.
Event logging: Yes
While controlling the speed, the TPWS
should apply EB to reduce the speed
below permitted speed.
Current train speed if exceeds the speed permitted at the
moment (kmph): Above 10 kmph
Warning to the Driver: Continuous audio & visual warnings
Command for traction cut-off: Yes
Braking/ Brake Command: Emergency brake is applied by
the TPWS. There shall be following two programmable
options for release of emergency brake
(a) When the current train speed is reduced to or below
the permitted speed.
(b) When train comes to a halt.
Purchaser shall program one of the above options as per
requirement
Event logging: Yes
2. 5.13.4 In case of emergency brake application, it shall
not be possible to release brake until the train
stops. In such cases, the brakes can be released
only after the train has stopped. In case of Train
Trip (Clause Error! Reference source not found.),
in addition, acknowledgement from Driver is also
required for releasing the emergency brake. A
non-resettable type electro-mechanical counter
shall be provided to record in the form of
counter reading, the instances of application of
emergency brake and this record shall not be
affected by interruption of power supply to the
system.
Changes made due to above reasons. A non-resettable type electro-mechanical counter shall be
provided to record in the form of counter reading, the
instances of application of emergency brake and this
record shall not be affected by interruption of power
supply to the system.
3. 5.16.2 (a) it shall be possible to download data of logged
events and selectively sort this data regarding
emergency brake application, service brake
application, speed overshoots of more than 5
kmph than permitted speed, missing balise,
defective telegram, passing of manual stop signal
at ON, train trip etc. Every recorded event shall
be with date and time stamp and the balise ID.
Provision of real date & time has made
in OBC/JRU
it shall be possible to download data of logged events and
selectively sort this data regarding emergency brake
application, service brake application, speed overshoots of
more than 5 kmph than permitted speed, missing balise,
defective telegram, passing of manual stop signal at ON,
train trip etc. Every recorded event shall be with real date
and time stamp of OBC/JRU and the balise ID
Reasoned Document for RDSO/SPN/183/2011 version -2 Page 30 of 40
4. 6.20 Line-side Electronic Unit (LEU) shall also conform
to the latest specifications issued by UIC/UNISIG
and shall be suitable to work with Indian
Railways’ Signalling System. LEU shall be
capable of receiving minimum 10 signal inputs. It
shall be capable of delivering minimum four
separate channels so that at least four data
balises may be driven upto 2500m. The
manufacturer/ supplier shall mention the
maximum number of inputs & maximum number
of channels an LEU can handle.
Interconnecting cable alongwith balise
makes the standard interface for the
LEU.
Line-side Electronic Unit (LEU) shall also conform to the
latest specifications issued by UIC/UNISIG and shall be
suitable to work with Indian Railways’ Signalling System.
LEU shall be capable of receiving minimum 10 signal
inputs. It shall be capable of delivering minimum four
separate channels so that at least four data balises may be
driven upto 2500m. The manufacturer/ supplier shall
mention the maximum number of inputs & maximum
number of channels an LEU can handle. Balise controlling
interface cable shall meet the requirement mentioned in
UNISIG specification for balise.
5. 6.27 (New
clause)
For monitoring the health of LEUs. The Manufacturer/ supplier shall submit the health
monitoring scheme of LEUs.
Reasoned Document for RDSO/SPN/183/2011 version -2 Page 31 of 40
Remarks on Comments received on TPWS Draft specification RDSO/SPN/183 ver-2 (dt. 15-03-2011) sent by email on 18 & 22/03/2011
Sr No
Clause No.
Clause Details Comments From
Comments & Suggestions RDSO’s Remarks
1 2.1 This specification requires reference to the latest approved documents on ETCS/ ERTMS of UNISIG, EEIG, UIC, EC and EU, together with the following documents –
ALSTOM Under clause 2.1 it is mentioned that”…… latest approved document on ETCS/ERTMS of UNISIG, EEIG, UIC,…..”, however this is not sufficient to identify and achieve the interoperability. Therefore, we suggest that RDSO specification shall mention the document reference. “TSI conventional Rail/European commission Decision 2006/679/EC of 28.Mar. 2006 concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating to the control command and signaling subsystem of the trans-European conventional Rail system” and the purchaser as per clause 14.0 shall mention each time the exact versions of those documents referred in RDSO specification at the time of tender, for example “SRS 2.3.0 d full annex A” of European commission Decision 2010/79/EC of 19.oct.2009” in the tender document, which is the latest as of today.
No change is required in the clause. This clause mentions about the documents to be referred to. Clause 4.1 clearly indicates that generally system shall be as per latest approved FRS & SRS for ETCS Level-1.
2 3.3.10 MTBSF: Mean Time between such failures which require restart/ maintenance/ repair of system.
ALSTOM Under the clause 3.3 Definition, MTBSF is defined. We will appreciate you modify this definition to make it in line with its original meaning as “Mean Time Between Service-affecting Failures” with mission interruption.
No change is required in clause. The definition given in the specification is considered clear.
3 4.1 ii) b)
General Requirement: on board- system ALSTOM Under the clause 4.1.ii).b), the existing sentence “juridical Recorder unit(JRU) for data logging for diagnostics & Investigation “ shall be modified as juridical Recorder unit(JRU) for Investigation and Data Recording unit for diagnostics”. So that it makes it clear the request of two functions (juridical and Diagnosis).
Clause has been modified. Data logging for diagnostics & for juridical purpose has been made separate. Corresponding change has been done in Cl. 14.
4 4.1 i.b) 4.1 ii.a) 4.1 ii.d)
Line side electronic unit (LEU) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software, its power supply & interfacing system with signaling. On Board Computer (OBC) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software. Balise Transmission Module (BTM) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software.
ALSTOM In these mentioned clauses, the specification is modified to specify beyond the ERTMS/ETCS requirements. Now with this modification the specification will call for specific architecture “2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software” We would appreciate that you maintain an open architecture and not privilege any. The requirement of cenelec SIL 4 justified by a product safety case endorsed by an ISA shall be enough to assure a wide competition.
Clause has been modified. The architecture has been made open.
5 5.16 Data Logging & Diagnostics
ALSTOM We appreciate that JRU is included in clause 4.1.ii)b), however we found the specification reference to JRU and functional requirement were missed out under the clause 5.16. Therefore can we suggest modifying the title of clause 5.16 as “juridical recording, Data Logging and Diagnosis”. We would also suggest that under clause 5.16 to add, “JRU shall be compliant to the UNISIG subset 026 and 027 and the memory shall be crash protected”.
Clause has been modified according to changes in Cl. 4.1 ii) b)
6 4.1 i.b) Line side electronic unit (LEU) with minimum HYTRONIC We request this clause be modified as: Line side electronic unit Clause has been modified. The
Reasoned Document for RDSO/SPN/183/2011 version -2 Page 32 of 40
Sr No
Clause No.
Clause Details Comments From
Comments & Suggestions RDSO’s Remarks
2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software, its power supply & interfacing system with signaling.
S ENTERPRIS
ES
(LEU) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & with common or diversified software, its power supply & interfacing system with signaling. Notes: 1. CENELEC specification/permits the use of common software. 2. Clause 7.1b of RDSO/SPN/192/2005 specification for Electronic
Interlocking permits Common software. 3. Clause 7.1(a) of draft spec-EI for BIG Yards-
RDSO/SPN/271/2009 permits common software.
architecture has been made open.
7 4.1 ii.a) On Board Computer (OBC) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software.
HYTRONICS
ENTERPRISES
We request this clause be modified as: Line side electronic unit (LEU) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & with common or diversified software, its power supply & interfacing system with signaling. Notes: 1. CENELEC Specifications /permits the use of common software. 2. Clause 7.1b of RDSO/SPN/192/2005 specification for Electronic
Interlocking permits Common software.
Clause has been modified. The architecture has been made open.
8 4.1 ii.d) Balise Transmission Module (BTM) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software.
HYTRONICS
ENTERPRISES
We request this clause be modified as: Notes: 1. CENELEC specification/permits the use of common software. 2. Clause 7.1b of RDSO/SPN/192/2005 specification for Electronic
Interlocking permits Common software. 3. Clause 7.1(a) of draft spec-EI for BIG Yards-
RDSO/SPN/271/2009 permits common software.
Clause has been modified. The architecture has been made open.
9 4.20 The system shall be compatible & interoperable with the existing TPWS on Indian Railways. The supplier/ manufacturer shall also submit certificate mentioning the systems working on world railways with which their system is interoperable. The certificate shall include systems of those manufacturers also whose TPWS are already working on IR.
HYTRONICS
ENTERPRISES
We request this clause be modified as: The System shall be compatible & interoperable with the existing TPWS on Indian railways. The manufacturer shall submit a certificate stating that their system is interoperable with all other systems which are manufactured as per UNISIG/ERTMS Specification. Notes: 1. The current RDSO specification is depending on
ERTMS/UNISIG specification. Please refer to clause 2.1
Agreed. The clause has been modified.
10 6.20 Line-side Electronic Unit (LEU) shall also conform to the latest specifications issued by UIC/UNISIG and shall be suitable to work with Indian Railways’ Signalling System. LEU shall be capable of receiving minimum 10 signal inputs. It shall be capable of delivering minimum four separate channels so that at least four data balises may be driven upto 2500m. The manufacturer/ supplier shall mention the maximum number of inputs & maximum number of channels an
HYTRONICS
ENTERPRISES
We request provision to be made in this clause for: a) Locating LEU in centralized Cabin/Relay Room. b) Locating LEU at Signal Post/Distributed architecture. c) This will facilitate use of LOW Power, reduce number of balise
channels and it will be more economical. Notes: 1. Recently Railway called 2 Tenders for this equipment i.e.
Eastern Railway & IRPMU (NCR). 2. In IRPMU (NCR) Tender, Provision was made to Locate LEU’s
for both at Centralized location and at Signal Post i.e. distributed locations.
No change is required in the clause. This shall be as per the scheme/ quantity given by the purchaser.
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LEU can handle. Balise controlling interface cable shall meet the requirement mentioned in UNISIG specification for balise.
11 3.3.11 National Values: These values are the values of different parameters such as maximum permitted speed, speed in shunting mode, and speed in OS mode, overlap distance, permitted roll away/ reverse movement distance etc. which are based on rules of train operation.
Siemens Ltd The Examples are not clear: “maximum permitted speed” of what? E.g. in SR mode or unfitted mode speed? “Overlap distance” is not at all part of National values as defined by UNISIG. Proposal: These values are the values of different parameters such as speed in shunting mode, speed in OS mode, permitted roll away/ reverse movement distance etc. which are based on rules of train operation.
The terms given are for example only to define National values. The values of the parameters as required by the system shall be supplied by the purchaser.
12 4.1 i.b) 4.1 ii.a) 4.1 ii.d)
Line side electronic unit (LEU) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software, its power supply & interfacing system with signaling. On Board Computer (OBC) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software. Balise Transmission Module (BTM) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software.
Siemens Ltd General safety requirement should not predict architecture solution to achieve the safety. It is the task of the safety case to show and prove safety. The way of doing so is usually described by CENELEC (EN 50126; EN50128; EN50129). The use of 2 out of 2HW together with diversified SW is a mark of e.g. SIL 5 development which seems here beyond common railway requirements. SIL 4 is usually achieved by the use of 2 out of 2 HW “OR” by the use of diversified SW. Proposal: for all above items i)b/ ii) d: change “&” to “or”
Clause has been modified. The architecture has been made open.
13 4.1 ii.d) Balise Transmission Module (BTM) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software.
Siemens Ltd Balise Transmission Module (BTM) is not a defined component by UNISIG or an interoperable constituent of its own etc., it belongs in general to the onboard constituent. According EN50159-1 the reference architecture for the transmission system defines: the non safe part of transmission system (usually antenna, receiver and so on belongs to that part). The safe part of the transmission system performing the safe transmission functions and he safe application functions part (usually performed by the EVC). The safe part will be performed usually with a 2 out of HW or with diversity SW. So Balise transmission at onboard does have non-safe and safe parts. Proposal: Delete ii) d:”….with 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software “ behind”…..(BTM)”
Clause has been modified. The architecture has been made open.
14 4.1 i.a) Switchable balises – This balises are interfaced to signal aspect through LEU. The telegrams/ data transmitted by these balises
BOMBARDIER
Please change as below "This balise are interfaced to signal aspect through LEU / object controllers of CBI (where CBI's are installed) such that balises can be
For standardization, only one mode of interfacing has been defined in the specification.
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depend on the aspect of the signal. These are provided at a location near the signal. The Permanent Speed Restriction & track topography related information is also transmitted by these balises within the telegram/data related with signal aspect.
directly driven by object controller eliminating the requirement of LEUs in that area". The telegrams / data transmitted.........signal aspect.
15 4.1 i.b) Line side electronic unit (LEU) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software, its power supply & interfacing system with signaling.
BOMBARDIER
Our LEU is not based on CPU architecture the LEU is SIL 4 approved and has reliability figures as mentioned in the clause 7.1. The safety in Bombardier LEU is achieved as under: The LEU 2000 output interface is implemented on the balise driver board. Each balise driver board contains one output channel for one balise. Each balise driver board consists of a logic unit and one balise driver unit. Based on the combination of input signals from the lamp detector boards, the logic unit selects the corresponding telegram from the memory and through the balise driver unit the selected telegram is repeatedly sent to the balise. The LEU 2000 is designed to handle three independent hardware failures without a hazardous situation occurring. This is achieved by dividing each logic unit into four independent blocks; A1, A2, B1 and B2, see Figure below:
The dissipated power in each lamp/control signal load is measured independently in the four detectors on the lamp detector board. The measured power is used to determine whether the signal lamp (or control signal) is on or off. The results are then transmitted separately as logical values (1=ON, 0=OFF), to each logic block on the balise driver board.
Clause has been modified. The architecture has been made open.
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The selected telegram that is sent to the balise is assembled from four quarters sent by the four ASICs in a specific order, one after the other. In this regard, the synchronization of the four ASICs, sending one quarter of the telegram each, is the key process that results in a stream of bits that reconstructs a complete and coherent balise telegram on the output line, from the LEU 2000 to the balise. If there is an error, the function is disabled.
At any time, a given logic block (A1 for instance) “knows” only two quarters of the selected telegram: the quarter that it sends and the quarter that it checks (coming from B2 in this example). However, the logic block A1 is totally “unaware” of the information sent by the logic blocks A2 and B1. When the balise does not receive a telegram from the LEU 2000, it will transmit an internally stored default telegram, which is a fixed telegram, with information indicating that no telegram has been received from the LEU 2000. Each balise driver board is programmed individually i.e. it is possible for one LEU 2000 to control several completely different balise groups, based on information from several signals. We request RDSO to only mention the safety integrity level achieved by equipment shall be as per clause 4.19 & availability shall be as per 7.1 of RDSO/SPN/183/2010 Ver-2 Draft specification. RDSO shall not mention about the safety concept but shall mention about achieving the safety and availability.
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Hence; we request to modify the clause and remove “2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software” requirement.
16 4.1 ii.a) On Board Computer (OBC) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software.
BOMBARDIER
We request RDSO to only mention the safety integrity level achieved by equipment shall be as per clause 4.19 & availability shall be as per 7.1 of RDSO/SPN/183/2010 Ver-2 Draft specification. RDSO shall not mention about the safety concept but shall mention about achieving the safety and availability. Hence; we request to modify the clause and remove “2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software” requirement.
Clause has been modified. The architecture has been made open.
17 4.1 ii.d) Balise Transmission Module (BTM) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software.
BOMBARDIER
We request RDSO to only mention the safety integrity level achieved by equipment shall be as per clause 4.19 & availability shall be as per 7.1 of RDSO/SPN/183/2010 Ver-2 Draft specification. RDSO shall not mention about the safety concept but shall mention about achieving the safety and availability. Hence; we request to modify the clause and remove “2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software” requirement.
Clause has been modified. The architecture has been made open.
18 4.17 The TPWS track-side system shall interface with the signalling system without affecting normal working & safety of signalling system. It shall take input regarding signal aspect through potential free contacts of the Lamp Checking Relays (ECRs).
BOMBARDIER
We request you to consider other solutions such as direct control of balise with object controllers wherever possible. Hence, request you to add " In case of interlocking renewal the balise can also be controlled directly by the object controller system of the interlocking"
For standardization, only one mode of interfacing has been defined in the spec.
19 5.14 Isolation of TPWS: On board system shall have provision for isolation to cater for failure situation which shall result in disconnection of the system from the locomotive braking system. This shall be indicated to the driver by means of a visual indication which shall be available even if SDMI/DMI has failed. To avoid accidental/ unwarranted use, the isolation arrangement of the equipment must be protected and sealed. Isolation of system must be recorded by the system as well as recorded in a non-resettable veeder counter.
BOMBARDIER
During isolation of the onboard system (by mean of Isolation Switch) all connection to the brake system will be bypassed and additional EB SIFA valve will be energized by the vehicle battery. Isolation of the system is indicated to the driver by means of a dark DMI. However if this is not considered as sufficient, an additional contact can be implemented into the isolation switch and an alarm lamp can be then lit. Isolation switch can be sealed to prevent unauthorized isolations. All isolation will be recorded by proposed JRU and the stored data inside JRU can not be erased nor manipulated by unauthorized personnel. Hence, we propose to eliminate the requirement of non-resettable veeder counter.
The requirement is based on clause no. 4.1.6.3a of ETCS FRS ver.4 .50. The clause details as “A clear indication shall be given to the driver, that ETCS has been isolated, even if the normal ETCS DMI is defective.” Indication of TPWS isolation is required even in case of DMI/SDMI failure e.g. blanking of DMI screen. Non-resettable counter is also necessary so that even without downloading the data from JRU, number of EB application cases could be known.
20 5.16.1 System shall be provided with diagnostic functions, which can be accessed through PC/ laptop, and a standard interface cable
BOMBARDIER
Trackside Diagnostics: The need and level of diagnostic functions is to some extent depends
The clause has been modified for clarity & sub-clauses made separate for On-board & track side
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connected to the diagnostic interface of train borne computer and track side equipment to download or upload data. Memory capacity of system shall be sufficient to keep log of minimum last one-week train running data. The memory shall keep log on First-In-First-Out basis.
on the LEU implementation. Bombardier’s implementation is based on PCB's with ASIC's instead of microprocessors and software which creates a more reliable product and reduces the need for those maintenance functions that normally are required for microprocessors based system. The diagnostic functionality in the Bombardier LEU is performed by a separate LEU monitoring board that can provide information to e.g. an external SCADA system. The LEU monitoring board is normally offered as an option since the MTBF of LEU is over 800,000 hrs in combination with no need for preventive maintenance which makes it possible to achieve the customer availability requirements also without monitoring board.
equipments.
21 5.19 Interoperability: The On Board system of a manufacturer shall be compatible & interoperable with Balise of another manufacturer & vice versa. Similarly, Balise and LEU of different manufacturers shall be interoperable with each other.
BOMBARDIER
Please add "Valid for systems and products delivered in compliance with identical versions of the UIC/UNISIG specifications". Also we would like clarify that interoperability is only achieved if the products are compliant with the same version of the UIC/UNISIG specifications.
The interoperability with the TPWS systems existing on Indian Railways has to be ensured.
22 6.18.2 Red light & Green light indicating respectively the faulty & healthy condition of On Board TPWS. Non-resettable type electromechanical counter for recording the cases of emergency brake application.
BOMBARDIER
The Red light & Green Light functionality shall be removed as this functionality is achieved via DMI during the Start of Mission phase. The onboard system will automatically undergo start up healthy tests. All tests are initiated automatically and if some part of the system is found faulty, a faulty message will be displayed on the driver’s DMI. The onboard system will not be ready for operation and must be maintained. On the other hand if all start up tests are successful, this will also be indicated on DMI and the Driver will be allowed to start the operation. During the train run, if some onboard fault occurs this will also be immediately indicated on the DMI and an alarm will be given to the driver. The system will also automatically apply brake, which can be released when the train has fully stopped. Further action depends on the type of fault, however if the fault does not recover, the driver has to switch OFF the onboard then the DMI becomes dark as a best indication to the driver that the onboard system is not working. In stead of a mechanical counter Bombardier proposes the use of JRU to register any type of emergency brake application (authorized and non authorized actions). JRU is also an integrated standard part of any ERTMS system and have excellent data storage functionality. The stored data inside JRU cannot be erased nor manipulated by unauthorized personnel.
The requirement of ‘TPWS Healthy’ & ‘TPWS Faulty’ indications is in addition to the indications existing on DMI/ SDMI. These additional indications shall be prominent & will immediately attract the attention of the Driver. Therefore, the requirement as mentioned in the clause is considered necessary.
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Thus any additional components as mechanical counters can be avoided ensuring better system reliability. Hence, we propose to eliminate the requirement of Red/Green Light and electro mechanical counter.
23 6.6 The on board as well track side systems of TPWS shall be immune to following interference currents generated by locomotive/EMU etc.
The track side system shall be immune to electro-magnetic interference generated by thyristor / chopper-controlled locomotives, traction return currents.
BOMBARDIER
Please change to " Trackside System shall comply with EN50121-4 standard"
The requirements mentioned in this clause are for the conditions prevailing over Indian Railways and therefore, should be complied.
24 7.7 Manufacturer shall guarantee availability of spares throughout the life of the equipments.
BOMBARDIER
We propose to specify the number of years for which the spares would be required.
Availability of the spares is to be guaranteed for the life as submitted against Cl. 11.5.
25 11.1 ii) The certificate of verification and validation of safety, reliability & availability etc. as per relevant standards (SIL 4 or equivalent) from reputed agency having experience in this field. The agency to be engaged for validation shall be got approved from RDSO. The certificate of proof of safety giving complete tests & their results that have been undertaken by the manufacturer or independent safety assessor shall also be submitted.
BOMBARDIER
Please change as "Any reputed ISA shall be used for getting" the certificate of verification & validation of safety, reliability & availability etc. as per relevant standards…...RDSO shall be informed in writing while engaging the agency”…….....submitted.
The change requested is not acceptable. The agency shall be engaged with the approval of RDSO only.
26 4.1.(i)b 4.1.(ii)a
(Safety Architecture and compliance) Line side electronic unit (LEU) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software, its power supply & interfacing system with signaling. On Board Computer (OBC) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software.
ANSALDO The target safety level of TPWS is SIL4. This can be achieved in various ways with 2oo2 or 2oo3 hardware redundancy and common or diversified software. Ultimately the product will have to meet SIL4 safety requirements following CENELEC specification EN50126, EN50128 and EN50129, validated by a third party. The above mentioned clauses have specifically mentioned about diversified software.
Clause has been modified. The architecture has been made open.
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4.1.(ii)d
Balise Transmission Module (BTM) with minimum 2 out of 2 hardware architecture & diversified software.
We suggest this should be left open mentioning as “common or diversified software”.
27 5.3 Calculation of Speed The system shall incorporate the necessary hardware and software module for accurate calculation of the train speed duly accounting for wheel slip/skid corrections. Manufacturer shall submit the details of the speed calculation module along with the supporting international standards/practices being followed world over for the same. Calculation of speed shall be with an accuracy of ±2% subject to maximum of ±2 kmph. Further, the variation in wheel diameter due to normal wear during time period between two loco maintenance schedules shall not affect accuracy beyond the limits specified in this clause.
ANSALDO According to UNISIG subset 041 on Performance Requirements for Interoperability, clause : 5.3.1.2 states that Accuracy of speed known on-board : Value ± 2 km/h for speed lower than 30 km/h, then increasing linearly up to ± 12 Km/h at 500 km/h.” With reference to the UNISIG specification mentioned above, we request you to kindly amend the description of the clause accordingly.
The requirement was there in ver-1 of the specification also. No other vendor has given any comment on this requirement. The requirements as mentioned in the clause should be complied with.
28 6.2 Protection of cards from dust All the cards shall be suitably protected, enclosed and provided with mechanical dust proofing covers to avoid dust ingress and then mounted in a robust metallic housing so that entire assembly is capable of withstanding shocks, vibrations, electromagnetic induction and electrical surges etc.
ANSALDO The component density of the PCBs used for TPWS is quite high and it needs some air Circulation to avoid hot spots. Enclosing the PCBs inside a mechanical enclosure will Trap the heat inside. Protection of the modules from dust and EMI/EMC may be achieved at the rack and Cabinet level. Thus it is suggested to keep the implementation open for the supplier to Satisfy the requirement.
The clause has been modified.
29 6.7 Electromagnetic compatibility Electromagnetic compatibility of the entire On-board equipment as well as track side equipments including interlinking cables shall comply with European Standards EN50238 for Railway Applications – Compatibility between rolling stock & train detection system and EN 50121 for Railway Applications – Electromagnetic Compatibility, as applicable. Adequate provisions should be made in the design for suppression of internal transients, spikes and to withstand external transients, spikes and surges as per limits laid down in IEC-60571.
ANSALDO
The clause mentioned about EMC compatibility referring to both EN50238 and EN50121. Please clarify which specific requirements you would like to have for Compliance.
The clause is modified as under: ‘Electromagnetic compatibility Electromagnetic compatibility of the entire On-board equipment as well as track side equipments including interlinking cables shall comply with European Standards EN 50121 for Railway Applications – Electromagnetic Compatibility and On-board equipment shall also comply with EN50238 for Railway Applications – Compatibility between rolling stock & train detection system. Adequate provisions should be made in the design for suppression of internal
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transients, spikes and to withstand external transients, spikes and surges as per limits laid down in IEC-60571.’
30 8.1 PCB Layout The PCBs shall meet the requirements clause 6.8 of RDSO/SPN/144/2006.
ANSALDO
Clause 6.8 of SPN/144/2006 speaks about the PCB layout, track widths and separation. Considering the component density, both track width and separation are decreasing Without degradation of the performance of the module. Considering the present day technology, it is suggested to keep the clause open Without specific reference to SPN/144/2006.
Cl. 6.8 of RDSO/SPN/144/2006 does not mention about track width & separation.