CHAPTER II ISLAMISATION IN BANGLADESH FROM SECULAR TO ISLAMIC STATE
CHAPTER II
ISLAMISATION IN BANGLADESH FROM SECULAR TO ISLAMIC STATE
Bangladesh emerged as an independent country after a bloody civil war, with the
active support of India in 1971. The country geographically known as East Bengal was
the part of the eastern wing of Pakistan since 1947. If the movement for Pakistan led to
the separation of the Muslim majority areas of India in 1947, the second partition of the
sub-continent debunked the myth of religion as a stable basis of nation-state. What
imparts distinction to the Bangladesh nationalist movement is the fact that in spite of
fraternal relationship between the two wings of Pakistan, the Bengali East Pakistan found
inspiration from its unique regional and local traditions to spearhead a movement against
its relatively stronger wing. The people of Bangladesh attributed their social, cultural
economical and political exploitation to the West Pakistani rulers and organised a
national movement on secular issues. What lends motivation to the movement was not
the alarm of Islam in danger but to restore and replenish their lost cultural glory as a
distinct people and .to put an end to their economic degeneration in the hands of their
Pakistani Masters.] The emotional attachment to their cultural traditions and distinct
linguistic heritage has nuances that overshadowed the Islamic unity of the two wings at
that point of time. Thus, Bangladeshi nationalism that emerged in the course of the
liberation struggle led by Sheikh Mujib' Awami league was primarily rooted on the
unique combination of land and language.
Soon after its independence, Bangladesh adopted this East Bengali nationalism
together with socialism, democracy and secularism as state ideology, relegating Islam to
private sphere. However, the assassination of the fIrst elected Prime Minister Mujibur
Rahman and the overthrow of his government by a military coup in August 1975 brought
in an Islam-oriented state ideology by shunning secularism and socialism. Not long after
his ascendancy as the new ruler in November 1975, General Ziaur Rahman replaced the
secular "Bengali nationalism" with "Bangladeshi nationalism." Outwardly though
inclusive, the new Bangladeshi nationalism essentially highlights the Muslim identity of
the country, differentiating its Muslim majority Bengalis from their Hindu majority
counterparts in West Bengal in India. With the patronisation of political Islam by the
I See Craig Baxter, "Pakistan and Bangladesh" in Frederick L. Shiels (ed.), Ethnic Separatism and World Politics (Lanham, University Press of America, 1984), pp. 208-262. Also see, A.M.A. Muhith, Bangladesh: Emergence of a Nation (Dhaka: Bangladesh Books International, 1978).
113
state, efforts were made by its protagonists to celebrate their Muslim-ness and protect
Muslim interests.
Ironically, however, Bangladesh unlike Pakistan has a long history of syncretistic
cultural practices, as reflected in Bengali folk cult, literature, music and festivals? A
brief historical overview of the phenomena would explain the peculiarities. Prior to the
Muslim conquest at the beginning of 13th century, a number of religious cults along with
tantric Buddhism had existed side by side in the area3 Islam and the Sufi saints were
accepted by the easy going folks who already had the past experiences of liberalism and
pluralistic co-existences from ancient times'- It was in such favourable conditions that
Islam grew in strength by adapting itself to the demands of local people and their local
living conditions.4 "Initially in Bengal, Islamic cosmology was incorporated within the
local belief system, and Islamic ideas and concepts were presented using familiar
indigenous terms. Thus, the Prophet Muhammad was called an avatar and Allah was
referred to as prabhu, gosai and niranjan (Bengali words used to refer to God.). 5 It is true
that these words were later replaced by the orthodox Islamists nomenclature, but it
nevertheless explains the catholicity of culture, which is not imposed but organic in its
nature.6
This chapter begins with the discussion of the war of liberation leading to the
emergence of Bangladesh as an independent sovereign entity followed by a critical
examination of the post-liberation spirit and the state-ideology based on the principles of
Mujibism to highlight the limitations and the reasons for the loss of its credibility. The
2 Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslim, 1871-1906, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 190.
3 Bengal first came under Turkish influence in 1204. Lakhnauti was the capital of Muhammad Bakhtyar Khalji. Sultan Ruknuddin KaiKaus conquered Satgoan and reigned from (1219-1300). Sultan Shamsuddin Firuz Shah extended the Conquest right upto Sylhet and slowly whole of East Bengal came under Muslim rule. See, Sheikh Rustani Ali, Islam in Bangladesh,
4 AminurRahim, "Communalism and nationalism in Bangladesh", Journal of Asian and African Studies, voL 42, No.6, p. 557.
5 Sufia M. Uddin, Constructing Bangladesh (New Delhi: Vistaar Publication, 2006), p. 33.
6 Talukdar Maniruzzman, "Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends," in Rafiuddin Ahmed, Religion, Nationalism and Politics in Bangladesh (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. 1990), p. 69.
114
chapter ends with an attempt to analyse the social location of Islam, which would help
identify the roots of the fundamentalist challenge in contemporary Bangladesh.
War of Liberation
The war of liberation, which led to the emancipation of Bangladesh, was the
product of the cultural and political aspirations long suppressed by the hegemonic
Pakistani establishment. "Bengali pride was pronounced and easily identifiable. And
pride was translated into cultural nationalism. A state of mind rooted in language and
embellished by history would not yield to alien demands for confonnity with a more
distant was culture. Urdu and Persian poetry were no substitute to Bengali rhyme and
prose." Bengali Muslims were urged by the West Pakistani counterparts to memorialise
Md Iqbal, while their beloved poets were ignored and even ridiculed. British imperialism
had been overbearing and stressful, but by contrast, the conditions Pakistani
establishment would foist upon Bengal were intolerable for the Bengalis. The Muslim
League had come to symbolise the worst of tyrannies and the dream that was once
Pakistan had become a night mare.7
To channelise the over-whelming support of the Bengalis regarding their
uniqueness, the Awami-League under the guidance of Mujib took charge. Maul ana
Bhashani, another strong man of the party held the view that Awami league would be an
alternative to the Muslim League.8 The Awami League, however, had no opportunity to
articulate the local grievances and highlight its programmes because President Ayub's
Basic Democratic system kept it isolated. Despite being politically marginalised, Mujib
made a deal with the West-Pakistani politicians according to which he promised to back
them in their bid to oust President Ayub in return for their support for his "six point
progfamme", which, among others, included the following:
l. Pakistan should be a federationunder the Lahore Resolution of 1940. which implied the existence of two similar entities. Any new constitution according to the Bengalis had to reflect this reality;
7 Lawrence Ziring. Bangladesh: From Mujib to Ershad An Interpretative study. (Karachi: Oxford University press. 1992). pp.I-15.
8 See Craig Baxter; Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting ( Boulder. Colorado: West view, 1984). p.23.
115
2. the federal government should deal solely with defence and foreign affairs;
3. there should be two separate but freely convertible currencies. East Pakistan would have a separate banking measure as well as separate fiscal and monetary policies;
4. The federal unit should have the sole power to tax;
5 Separate accounts from foreign exchange earnings would be maintained. The federating units would be free to establish trade links with foreign countries;
6. East Pakistan would have a separate militia.9
Rather than addressing the grievances of the East wing, then government of Ayub
Khan and the West Pakistani opposition parties tenned the "six point" ofthe League as a
secessionist ploy and a proactive policy was under way to frustrate the Mujib's plans.
Mujib was arrested for conspiring against the state, known as the "Agartala Conspiracy
case."IO Long years in prison and attacks on him for treason and conspiracy only raised
his iconic status among his people who were determined not to give up their liberation
struggle half way. It may be recalled that the deep seated anguish of the people of East
Bengal was due to their subjugation in all fields of existence, at the hands of the Pakistani
vested interest. To mention a few, the Muslim League ministry which ruled East Bengal
until 1954, became unrepresentative and thus indifferent to the interests of East Bengalis.
The Awami league favoured joint-electorates to make democracy more inclusive and
broad based while the Muslim league was not sensitive to minority representation and
their interests. II The Bengalis suffered from lack of parity in administration and
bureaucracy too. The Bengali membership in the Military services was a mere 6 per cent.
All high level post including that of the governor of East Bengal was held by Mohajirs
and West PakistaniS.12
Similarly, the economic grievances included channelisation of funds worth
Rs.730 million on an average per year from the Eastern wing to the West. I3 In addition,
substantial amount of foreign assistance went to the West wing to be invested in the
9 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (Kant: Dawson, 1980), pp. 185-87.
10 It was alleged that with explicit Indian support Mujib and his followers worked on an agenda for an independent country in the Indian town of Agartala located to its North-Eastern border.
II Craig Baxter, South Asia Politics and Government (Colorado: united States of America, 1987), pp. 235-236.
12 Ibid., p. 236.
13 S.R. Chakravarthy, "The National Liberation Movement: Problems and Prospects", in S.R. Chakravarthy and V. narain (ed.), Bangladesh: Volume Two Domestic Politics (Delhi: S.A. Publishers, 1986), p. 2.
116
Indus Basin project while East Bengal remained economically weak with no industries
and no banking. Finally, the suppression of their linguistic and cultural identity
strengthened Bengali particularism. According to a leading Bangladeshi analyst, "The
pre-conception that Bengalis are inferior Muslims, susceptible to Hindu culture and
language and therefore not reliable Pakistanis became linked in the minds of many West
Pakistanis with almost Paranoid fear that the Indian government was constantly engaged
in political and cultural subversion in East Bengal. These ideas, in turn, prevented those
in power in Pakistan from viewing East Bengal's political demands positively.,,14 With
such perception, the Pakistani regime formulated a board to re-orient textbooks on
Islamic lines and censorship was imposed on the press. The biggest onslaught, however,
was on the issue of Bengali language, which led to the upsurge of regional feelings and
the movement saw massive mobilisation of student and youth power in Bangladesh. ls
The assertion of Bengali national identity saw its high mark during the language
movement and formed the basis of the liberation struggle.
Predictably, the change of guard in Pakistani from Ayub to Yahya Khan did not
change the ground realities in East Bengal. Apart from the language issue and six points
programme, the Pakistani establishment was confronted with a host of controversial
issues, notably the withdrawal of material law, limiting the role of the army, transfer of
power to the people's representatives and an enquiry about political killings. A de facto
Awami-League government was established in East Pakistan when Bangabandhu taking
a cue from Mahatma Gandhi asked his people to start a week long civil-disobedience
movement. The movement saw a massive mobilisation of Bengalees leading to the
hosting of the national flag of Bangladesh. However, the course of the war was marked
by extremely violent events including "ethnic cleansing" and the bloody massacre of the
students and intellectuals.16 The l~ge scale repression turned the people increasingly
14 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dacca: Bangladesh Books International, 1980), p. 13.
15 The Pakistan Public Service Commission removed BangIa from the list of approved subjects, as well as from currency notes and stamps. The Central Government's proposal of writing Bengali in Arabic script further made the East Bengalis edgy.
16 To get a detailed eyewitness account of the slaughter of intellectuals bordering on genocide, see Kabir Chowdhury, Genocide in Bangladesh (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), p. 22 and Hamida Rahman, "Katasurer Badhyabhumi" (The killing ground of Katasur), Daubuj Azad (Dhaka), 2 JanuaryI972.
117
skeptical about the legitimacy of the Pakistani state, and streams of teeming Bangladeshis
left their home for security to bordering India. The mass exodus gradually dragged India
into the East-Bengalis conflictP The internal situation in Bangladesh was extremely
volatile with pitched battle between Mukti bahini (Bangladeshi fighters) and East Bengal
Regiment. IS Eventually, Indian intervention set off yet another round of military
confrontation between the two countries. I9 The war of liberation witnessed the
historically inevitable result, the surrender of the Pakistani troops and birth of Bangladesh
in December 1971.
The Language Movement
The importance of the language movement, which laid the secular basis of the
first government in Bangladesh and disturbed the national cohesion and solidarity of
Pakistan, defined in terms of religion need to be further examined. The most distinctive
features of the people of East Pakistan which fonned a common bond between them are
racial and ethnic stock, historical identity, geographic contiguity, shared economic
interest and last but not the least, cultural and linguistic unity. The Bengalis were the
largest ethnic group in Pakistan and their ethnicity was prominently different from the
Pakistanis. The people of the west wing had greater links with the Arabs and Turcomans
while the Bengalis were bereft of any racial mixture. The shorter, darker and friendly
Bengali was starkly different from the taller, fairer martial westerner.20 Part of their
discontent when East Bengal was a part of united Pakistan was the discrimination they
faced on the basis of their presumed "non-martial" attributes.21
Geographically, East Bengal was fonned by a delta of two major rivers, Ganga
and Brahmaputra and the area receives the highest amount of rainfall in a year. A look at
17 The Indian involvement was officially aimed at creating a congenial situation in which the refugees could return, but in reality New Delhi hopes to gain influence over the new state by decidedly supporting the secession of East Bengal from Pakistan. To achieve its objectives, India offered military training to the Mukti Bahini guerillas and other logistical assistance to sustain their fight with the Pakistani army.
18 Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh, n. 13, pp. 82-99.
19 For details regarding Indian role in the Civil War, see Hasan Askari Rizvi, Internal Strife and External Intervention: India's Role in the Civil War in East Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive publishers, 1981).
20 M. Rafiqul Islam, The Bangladesh Liberation Movement (Dhaka: The University Press, 1987) p. 67.
21 Craig Baxter, Government and Politics in South Asia (Colorado: West view Press, 1987), p. 229.
118
its physical map shows that numerous streams and tributaries crisscross the land and
increases the country's vulnerability to annual flooding during monsoon.22 Thus
climatically and ecologically the delta land of East Bengal has hot humid weather
conditions. The maze of channels give rise to thick forests, mangroves good farming
conditions and at the same time a culture and food habits dependent on its vegetation and
nvers. Whereas West Pakistan's topography is endowed with snow-clad high mountain
ranges like the Karakoram and Hindu Kush to its north and dry rocky plateau of
Baluchistan in its southwest and the Thar desert in its southeast. Much of its culture is
based on tribal structure and follows a conservative brand of Islam, closer to their West
Asian brothers.23
The most profound dissimilarity was, however, perceived to be in the sphere of
language. Urdu, the official language of Pakistan was one of the ideological cornerstones
of the country and its strict imposition on linguistically distinct and sensitive Bengalis
trigged regional mobilisation and resistance against the central authority. Commenting
on the language between the two wings, Ayesha Jalal writes, "Pakistan's central leaders
had expected to hasten process of assimilation and secure allegiance to a monolithic
notion of state sovereignty. Instead they created an arena of fierce contestation where
Urdu, Mughal power and an Islam, more doctrinal than syncretic in complexion, gave a
powerful stimulus to the articulation of regional dissent in the linguistic idioms". 24 When
Muslims of the subcontinent gained nationhood in 1947 there was intense identification
with a religious ideology but with the rise of Bengali linguistic nationalism in the 1950's
and 1960's in East Bengal, language became the symbol of unity is defining their
political identity.
The debate about the place of Bengali language had starte4 way ahead in 1948,
when Muhammad Ali Jinnah publicly announced that East Bengalis must learn to speak
Urdu. The language issue turned into a crisis when in 1952 the government of Pakistan
revived its old agenda to enforce Urdu as the state language. It is not an exaggeration to
22 D.K. Concise Atlas of the World Digital Mappingfor the 2]" Century, pp. 152-53.
23 Islam, The Bangladesh Liberation Movement, n 20, p. 67.
24 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 225.
119
say that the pent up discontent and disillusionment against Pakistan found a vent in
protest movement against Urdu. The Bhasha Andolon or the language movement was
successful in mobilizing large sections of the populace and the students in particular to
launch a political agitation. Fearing mass mobilization against the new law the central
government outlawed all public meetings and rallies. Several students and civilians died
in police firing and police crackdown on February 21, 1952?5 This day is honoured in
Bangladesh as the Language Martyr's Day and aptly described as the Mussalmaner
Swadesh Prattabartan (the home coming of the Bangal Muslims)?6
The attitude of the Pakistan government and the painful events of February 21
stirred the collective conscience of the young nation. The Awami Muslim League
founded by Maulana Bashani, Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy, Ataur Rahman and Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman had established itself as a political party and spearheaded the interest of
the people of East Bengal. By the later part of 1950's it broadened its political base and
welcomed non-Muslim Bengalis into its fold, corollary to its inclusive plans the party
dropped the name Muslim and came to be known as Awami League only.27 The complete
political death of Muslim League from the soil of East Bengal in the 1954 election was an
indicator of the future course of events?8
The Central command in Pakistan was not ready to give up easily. To strike at the
basis of ethno linguistic nationalism of the East Bengalis, the government sponsored
institutions like the Pakistan Council, Bureau of National Reconstruction (BNR), Writers
Guild Bengali Development Board and Nazrul Academy. The function of these
institutions was to exercise censorship on secular literary works as un-Islamic, and
Islamise Bengali language and culture.29 The result of this government effort was that
poets like Rabindranath Tagore and his works were painted un-Islamic and Kazi N~
25 "Language Movement" (PHP), Banglapedia - The National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, Asiatic Society of Bangladesh at http://banglapedia.netJhtIL0063 .htm
26 Badruddin Umar, Sanskritik Sampradaikata (Dhaka: Janamaitri Publications, 1996), pp. 8-11.
27 Sufia Uddin, Constructing Bangladesh, n.5, p.121.
2& "UF elections Victory" (PHP), Chronicles of Pakistan. http://tberepublicofrumi.com/54.htm
29 A.K. Roy, "The Role of Intellectuals -Pakistan Period" in Dilip Chakravarthy, A Nation is Born (Calcutta: C.V. Bangladesh Sahayak Samiti, 1974), p. 45.
120
Islam's works were considered highly Islamic.3o Rabindra Sangeet was banned on the
basis that it was not in conformity with the ideology of Pakistan. Matching their actions
with words Ayub Khan commented in 1967, "East Bengalis ... still are under
considerable Hindu culture and influence.,,31
Suppressing the Bengali national identity by the Pakistani establishment
boomeranged into a national movement which raw power was unable to quell. Two days
after the fIring event on February 21, 1952, People built a column near a site closer to
Dhaka Medical College were students were killed in the Police fIring. Bengalis recognise
February 21 as Shaheed Dibash (Martyrs' Day). Though the police annihilated all traces
of this people's monument within days of its birth and obstructed the construction of
another minar which was being readied to remember the martyrs of Elrushey (21) the
powerful images of Bengali struggle to protect their rich heritage remained unblemished.
Abdul Gaffar Choudhury's poem Amar Bhaiyer rokte Rangano, which means My
Brothers Blood Spattered became the most celebrated song allover East Bengal. The
motif of the song is
Can I forget the twenty-first of February incarnadined by the blood of my brother? The twenty-first of February, built by the tears of a hundred mothers robbed of their sons,
Can I ever forget it?
Wake up today, the twenty-first of February. Do wake you, please. Our heroic boys and girls still languish in the prisons of the tyrant. The souls of my martyred brothers still cry. But today everywhere the somnolent strength of the people have begun to stir and we shall set February ablaze by the flame of our fierce anger.
?32 How can I ever forget the twenty-first of February •
Many poems have been written on Ekushey but this song by Abdul Gaffar became
the indelible melody of the Language movement. The song is sung every year on 21
30 Ibid., p. 45.
31 Philip Oldenburg, "A place insufficiently Imagined", The Journal of Asian Studies, 44, No.4, August 1985, pp. 711-733.
32 The poem is translated by Kabir Chowdhury. See HenryGlassie and Feroz Mahmud, Living Traditions: Cultural Survey of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2008), Series-II, pp.578-579.
121
February in the Probhat Feri, by people from all parts of the Bangladesh march
barefooted to theShaheed Minar to pay homage to those killed in the language
movement demonstrations by singing Amar Bhaier Rokte Rangano. ''This newly formed
sacred space and event identified two imagined communities, one a common oppressor
and the second the Bengali nation (encompassing many religious communities).,,33 Thus
language acted as a powerful tool to unify East Bengalis and reinforced their belief in a
shared Bengali identity, during the course of their struggle. The language movement
strengthened the bond of the people with heir land and later secured its independence
from Pakistan.
Role of Literature
The post-language movement gave birth to a new literature which was full of
hope and determination to fight communalism, prejudices and obscurantism. The
literature published with the spirit of patriotism, challenged the ideological base of
Pakistan. This new brand of creative literature helped facilitate the spread of socio
cultural and political consciousness. There is a sizeable body of liberation war creative
writing which stands today as the intellectual wealth of society. Here are few quotations
from poet Shamsur Rahman's poem, Liberty
"Liberty you are my mother's white Sari fluttering in the breeze in the yard, Liberty, you are the red color of Mehdi on the tender palm of my sister.
Liberty, you are die naming poster in my friend's hand.
Liberty, you are the thick black loose hair of my wife flowing in the wind
Liberty, you are the colored shirt on my son, the play of sunlight on my daughter's cheek.
Liberty, you tire my garden,
The song of the cuckoo,
The rustling leaves
Of an ancient banyan tree,
The note book where I write my verses
Just as I choose.'.34
33 Sufia Uddin, Constructing Bangladesh, D. 5, p.126.
34 "Liberation War", Muktadhara (A Site for the Bangalees), May 9, 2001 at http://muktadharar.net/plllhtmi
122
This poem evokes joy, love, hope romance and sensitivity. It highlights the
Bengali jest for life, and freedom. Yet in another poem, I Curse Them, poet Shamsur
Rahman reflects anger and hatred against the genocide unleashed by the Pakistani junta:
I curse today those devils of hell, who compelled me to run up the stairs with my feet deep in the blood of my parents. on rivers
and make my bed in wild forests I curse them: let them forever wander with rotting bodies hung around their emaciated necks. I curse them: Their cup for quenching thirst will always fill to the brim with blood, the blood with which they flooded the soil of Bengal. I curse them!,,35
In the field of novel writing, the liberation war provided the core them. The novel
Rifle Roli Awrat (Rifle Bread Women) by Anwar Pasha reverberates with secularism and
human values. The protagonists in the novel were people from different ideological
outlooks but they carry the message of national unity. It was the novelist's tragic fate
that he was picked up by the Pakistani collaborators and killed just two days before the
liberation of his beloved country.
Mujibur Rehman's Tenure as Prime Minister
The state of Bangladesh was born in 1971 out of a mass movement based on non
religious principles. Secularism therefore was officially declared to be one of the state's
guiding principles India's role as a mid wife in the birth of a new nation was an
established fact. Apart from the secular orientation of the freedom movement, the active
involvement of USSR along with India in favour of Bangladesh also gradually influenced
the leaders of the independence movement to adopt secularism as a state principle when
35 Kabir Chowdhury, "The Liberation War and Creative Writing", MUla-Mona (Freethinkers), December 16,2006, p.3 at http://mukta-mona.comlspecialeventl16decemberlkabir_chowdhury.11206.htm
123
the law of Bangladesh was framed in 1972.36 Being the chief spokesman of the people of
Bangladesh, the Awami League was given an absolute majority to exercise power and
thus fr~g of the Constitution was an uncomplicated affair.37
Awami League rode like a colossus on the principles of Mujibism which is a
political philosophy and includes nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism as its
core principles. Keeping with the spirit of the liberation movement the right wing parties
which were suspected of collaborating with the occupational army were banned. The left
however were officially permitted to function owing to their supportive role in the
nationalist war.38
As the young nation set out to build its institutions, Prime Minister Mujibur
Rehman explained the secular plank of a predominantly Muslim populated nation.
"Secularism", he said, "does not mean the absence of religion; Hindus will observe their
religion. Muslims will observe their religion; Christians and Buddhists will observe their
religions. No one will be allowed to interfere in other's religion. The people of Bengal
do not want any interference in religious matters. Religion cannot be used for political
ends.,,39 To achieve the lofty ideals of secularism the Constitution of Bangladesh laid
down several provisions. Article 41, for instance, gives every citizen the right to profess,
practice or propagate any religion. Religious education in institutions of learning was not
compulsory and formation of religious parties prohibited.4o Article 12 stood for the
implementation of secularism by eradication of a) communalism in all forms; b) the
granting by the state of political status in favour of any religion; c) the abuse of religion
36 Ahmed ShufiquI Haque and Md Yeahia Akhter, "Bangladesh, The Ubiquity of Islam: Religion and Society in Bangladesh", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 4, p. 203.
37 Avul Fazl Huq, "Constitution making in Bangladesh", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 46, No.1, pp. 59-76.
3& Rounaq Jaban, Bangladesh Politics Problems and Issues (Dhaka: University Press, 1980) p. 73.
39 Government of Bangladesh, Parliament Debates, October 12, 1972 (Dhaka: Government of Bangladesh, 1972) p. 20.
40 Ministry of Law, Parliamentary Affairs on Justice, Government of the .Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh -(January 1975) (Dhaka: Govt. Printing Press, 1975).
124
for political purposes; and d) any discrimination against or persecution of persons
practicing a particular religion.4)
As already noted, religion was the shield for the protagonists of Pakistani
nationalism to ignore/deny the legitimate economic, linguistic and cultural aspirations of
East Bengalis. Even brutal massacres were carried out by the AI Razakars, AI Sham and
AI Badr against the people of East Bengal to stamp out their un-Islamic dreams. The
emphasis on secularism was thus a product of the spirit of the movement. To realise its
brand of nationalism Sheikh Mujibur Rehman discontinued the old practice of recitations
from the Holy Quran and substituted it with a programme based on morality and ethics
called the "speaking the Truth".42 He instructed the state controlled media to give equal
opportunity for religious citations from Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity.
This over exposure of other religious ideology other than Islam was not accepted among
the Muslims and there was a backlash.43 The policy of the government which aimed at
distributive justice maligned the concept of secularism and Mujib's tough stance against
the religious right led to clandestine activities and the Awami League faced opposition
from the "far right".44
Secularism Reversed
Although the political structure and the constitution were secularized, the
dynamism to make secularism a successful institution was missing. The nature of society
remained primarily Islamic. The heightened nationalist feelings during the liberation
struggle were sustained by the colonial repression of the West Pakistanis. "In the
resultant struggle for emancipation, as Mujibur Rehman called it, they clutched at every
mark of Bengali individuality. The hatred towards the Bengali was total: his culture was
belittle, his efficiency suspected and even his eating habits and way of life were held in
41 The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Ministry of Law, Government of Bangladesh, 1972), p. 5.
42 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends", in Rafiuddin Ahmed, ed., Religion, Nationalism and Politics in Bangladesh (New Delhi: S.A. Publishers, 1990), p. 69.
43 Ibid.
44 Jaban, Bangladesh Politics, n. 38, p. 73.
125
contempt. As a result, there developed, over the painful years, a seething hatred towards
West Pakistan".45
The irony was that once free from the immediate insecurity of being overwhelmed
by West Pakistan's identity and oppression, the secular tools were superseded by the
dynamics of faith. Mujib's close association with Hindu India and political friendship
with Russia gave impetus to rumours of India's hegemonic designs in the region. To
corroborate this they noted the mindless smuggling and illegal inter-regional trade
between the two countries.46 One comes across numerous instances where attempts were
made by Mujib and his followers to discontinue the pursuit of secularism envisaged a few
years ago. His policy of giving equal opportunity to all religious eitations was joked as
"multi-theocracy',.47 The absence of Islamic phrases and symbols in a Muslim mjajority
nation was not taken well be his people.
Wary of a growing sense of alienation from the masses, Mujib on many occasions
emphasised that secularism in Bangladesh was not atheism and even began to Islamise
his public conduct and speeches. Mujib declared that he was proud to be Muslim and that
his country was the sec~nd largest Muslim state in the world.48 As if to send a strong
message regarding his adherence to Islam Mujib was seen leading a Munajaat (prayer) in
November 1972.49 Mujib used terms like Insah Allah (Only if Allah wishes), Bismillah
(in the name of Allah) Tawba and lman (faith).50 Mujib departed from secular traditions
of greeting people with Joy Bangia only (Victory to Bengal) and used Khuda Hafeez
(May God protect yoU).51 Mujib's secularism boomerang~ in the most important field
45 P. Sharan, "Nationalism, Socialism and Democracy in Bangladesh", in D. Bhattacharya, Nation, n. 29, p. 94.
46 Asim Roy, ed., Islam in History and Politics Perspectives from South Asia, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 220.
47 Talukdar Maniruzzman, "Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends", in S.R. Chakravarthy ed., Bangladesh: History and Culture (New Delhi: S.A. Publishers, 1985), pp. 49-50.
48 Bangladesh Observer, II January 1972, p. I.
49 Quoted in Ali Riaz, "God Willing": The Politics and ideology of Islamism in Bangladesh", Comparative Studies of South Asian Africa and Middle East, 23: I & 2 (2003), p. 309.
50 Ibid., p. 309.
51 Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, "Islam in Bangladesh Politics", in Hussain Mutalib and Taj ul Hashmi (ed.), Islam, Muslim and Modern State (New York; St. Martin's Press), 1994, p. 106.
126
of education. Following the guidelines of the 1973 Interim Report of Education
Commission the government of Mujibur Rehman, introduced sweeping changes in the
educational textbooks. Pakistani heroes were deleted from history text books, religious
instructions from grades one to eight was abolished, while it was made an optional course
for students belonging to humanities only from grades nine to twelve. There were
provisions for the minorities to study their own religion. The political idealism or high
ground was rejected by the people. Responding to questionnaires distributed by a
government sponsored commission on Education, 75 percent of Bangladeshis indicated
their support for the continuation of religious instruction as a part of their curriculum. 52
Mujib revived the Islamic Academy which was banned in 1972 and upgraded it to
a foundation to propagate the ideals oflslam. To meet the growing Islamic aspirations of
the people the government of Mujib increased the annual budgetary allocation for
Madrassas; from 2.5 million in 1971 to 7.2 million Taka in 1973.53 The change in the
State's approach to religion was perceived to be too little and a belated gesture, and
Mujib was accused of plotting to rob the sense of identity of the Bengali Muslims which
kept them united. 54 Among the other pro-right gesture which established the self
contradiction of the Awami League was Mujib's visit to Lahore to be a part of the Islamic
Summit in 1974 and his role at the Islamic Foreign Ministers' conference held in Jeddah
to initiate the process towards setting up Islamic Development Bank.55
Failure of Secularism
Mujibism as a political philosophy underwent radical changes just a few years of
its initiation due to a variety of factors and forces hostile to it. One of the most important
challenges of the post liberation government was the re-construction of the war ravaged
52 The Commission circulated a 551 Questionnaires Professors, teachers, principals, V.Co's, student organization, journalists and Islamic teachers. See, the Bangladesh Sikkha Commission Report (Dacca, May 1974), p. 61. Also, see Maniruzzman, "Bangladesh Politics", n. 6, p. 193.
53 B.M. Monoar Kabir, "The Politics of Religion: The Jamaat-Islami in Bangladesh", in Ahmed ed., Religion Nationalism, n. 6, pp. 124-125.
S4 Matiur Rehman, Bangladesh Today: An Indictment and Lament (Wellinghborough, 1978). The author describes Mujib's secularism as positive hostility to the Church.
ss Syed Anwar Husain, "Bangladesh and the Islamic Countries 1972-82" unpublished paper presented at the i7'h Bengal Studies Conference at the institute of World Affairs. Salisbury, USA, July 10, 1982, p. 29.
127
economy. There were fears about Bangladesh's survival owing to the total collapse of
infrastructure in the 9 month war and economic colonization by Pakistan prior to that.56
A UN report estimated the cost of reconstruction in Bangladesh at $938 million. 57 The
priority before the A wami League government was to provide swift relief and
rehabilitation to returning refugees, reconstruction of economic infrastructure and
creating conditions for a socialist economy to flourish. 58
A number of successful operations created semblance of economic stability but
expectations were soaring and there were some glaring failures. 59 Bangladesh under
Mujib witnessed the politics of patronage. Sheikh Mujib was extremely large hearted
when it came to distribution of benefits be it direct financial assistance, professional
placements, various appointments, permits and licences etc, to Awami Leaguers. This
according to Mujib was a minor compensation for their great sacrifices for the
independence of Bangladesh.60 In the words of an observer, "The creation of a parasite,
affluent class, divorced from production and squandering easy money on conspicuous
consumption, only aggravated the economic problems ... With the people's swollen
aspirations and the very unfavourable resource/population ratio, government patronage
satisfied only a few but alienated many.'.61
When basic industries like banking jute, sugar, textiles and insurance was
nationalized all appointments to high posts were Awami League activists, who being
non-professionals led the industries to losses.62 There was large scale smuggling and
black marketing of goods near the Indo-Bangladesh border and these belied hopes of a
mutually beneficial co-operation and economic trade between India and Bangladesh. The
56 At in~ependence Bangladesh was described as an "international basket case". The enormity of economic problems had made Bangladesh totally dependent on external assistance.
57 Jaban, Bangladesh Politics, n. 38, p.75. Also, see Bangladesh Observer, March 26, 1974.
58 Ibid., p. 75.
59 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dhaka: Bangladesh Books International, 1980), p. 159.
60 Ibid., p. 161.
61 Q.K. Ahmed, "Aspects of the Management of Nationalised Industries in Bangladesh" Bangladesh Development studies, Vol. 11, no. 3 (July 1974), pp. 678-679.
62 Ibid. p. 671.
128
high rate of smuggling reduced percentage of official trade through right channels and the
high price of the finished product in the Bangladeshi market remained high.63 The
natural disaster of 1974 when people died of starvation dampened the spirit of the people
towards the new government un-official sources estimated the number of famine related
death at 100,000 by the end of October 1974.64 The state of affairs led to a massive
exodus of villagers to towns and cities in search of relief.
The Awami League government, however, ordered for their forceful exit from the
national capital. The Jatiyo Rakhi Bahini was given the orders to keep them outside the
cities limits.65 The Rakhi Bahini, a para-military force consisting of the former Mukti
Bahini members and unemployed youths had no discipline or rigour of the army and they
indulged in mindless looting of the villagers. In the midst of such chaotic state of affairs,
the army bereft of prestige and power nurtured a deep sense of resentment against the
Awami League leadership. The cycle of events which unfolded in 1975 in the form of a
coup eliminated the father of the nation and his entire family (with the exception of his
daughters who were outside the country) without a murmur of public protest.66
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's ideas and programme prior to 1971 had provided the
basis of Bengali nationalism, but his failure to address the pressing economic issues
undermined its legitimacy and along with it Mujib's secularism lost its popular appeal.67
The departure ofMujib from the national political scene encouraged pro-Islamic forces to
regroup under the cover of various social welfare organizations with the purpose of
helping the poverty sticken masses during the famine. The internally generated coup
leaders installed Khondokar Mostaq Ahmed as the President. But after months of army
63 Jaban, Bangladesh Politics, n. 38, p. 76.
64 Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh Revolution, n. 59, p. 162.
65 The Jatiyo Rakhi Babini or the National Security Force was bought into being by Mujib amidst rumours that it is a substitute for the Bangladesh army. For details, see Ziring, Bangladesh from Mujib, n. 7, pp. 103-4.
66 Ibid.,p.l04.
67 Jalal, Democracy, n. 24, pp. 87-89.
129
unrest and political uncertainty, Genral Zia-ur-Rehman declared himself as the Chief
Martial Law Administrator.68
Awami League: A Divided House
Mujib's secularism project could not be implemented with sincerity partly due to
lack of unity among the Awami League leadership. The student wing of Awami League
were divided into two factions one group supported Mujibism while the other split on the
Question of supporting scientific socialism. A new party under the name of National
Socialist party or the Jatiyo Samajtantric Dal was formed. The various key divisions
within Awami League were brought about by a former student League leader, Serajul
Alam who formed the Bangladesh Communist League.69 Following the split in the
Awami League's student wing in 1972, the AL Labour front and AL-affiliated
Association for Freedom Fighters was also divided.7o Most of the splinter groups came
together to protest against economic hegemony and political imperialistic designs of
countries like Russia, India and others on Bangladesh. To keep up the mask of unity the
term Mujibbad was popularized by Awami League. Mujibbad which meant Mujib's
ideals was projected to be the answer to the ill-effects of capitalism and communism.
"This attempt to develop and ideology based on a personality cult however hurt Mujib's
image. By identifying the new political structure too closely with his personality, Mujib
is held responsible for all the deficiencies of the new system. Even the personal failing of
the Awami Leaguers are blamed on Mujib and MUjibbad',.71 The factionalism inside
Awami League posed a serious challenge to Mujib's leadership and at the same time
undermined the credibility of the party which was generally seen as the rightful heir of
the liberation war.
68 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (England: Dawson, 1980), pp. l31-l32.
69 Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution, n. 47, pp. 167-68.
70 Ibid., p. 168.
71 Jaban, Bangladesh Politics, D. 38, p. 73.
130
BAKSAL
Mujib was bogged with not only dissidence within Awami League but also by
violent excesses committed by the Rakhi Bahini. The para-military force which enjoyed
the blessings of Mujib and Awami League ~ained notoriety for annihilating those rural
leaders who dared the League's candidates in polls or posed any kind of a political threat
to them. The indiscipline displayed by the para-military organization who had taken
upon themselves the role of eliminating Mujib's detractors was also accused of
murdering Awami Leaguers.72 The Bangladesh anny was called in to deal with the
domestic situation, re-establish law and order, and restore credibility of the nation in the
eyes of its own people. Mujib not only initiated a role for the Bangladesh anny in its
internal affairs, he also altered the political process by declaring a state of emergency on
28 December 1974.73 Faced with internal challenges to his leadership and governance
Mujib dissolved the Awami League party and turned increasingly dictatorial. He altered
the high ideals of liberation movement by taking retrogressive steps lice destroying the
judicial independence, suppressing fundamental rights, thwarting democratic proceedings
and resorted to totalitarian control. In his scheme of absolute authority the ideals of
secularism was also sacrificed.
Mujib amended the Constitution to provide for a Presidential form of government
and the President had the authority to form one national party and debar any of the
political groups who oppose this arrangement. The emergency order ensured a five year
term for Mujibur Rehman as President from the date of the constitutional amendment.14
The new national party imposed on the people was the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik
Awami League (Bangladesh Peasants, workers and peoples League) or BAKSAL. By
imposing BAKSAL Mujib went against the pop~ar aspirations of the people and against
his own ideology of Mujibbad. "BAKSAL was not only a coercive assembly; it was
predicated on the elimination of other organizations. BAKSAL was Mujib's way of
expressing his one-party state. Thus in a more significant way, BAKSAL was meant to
72 Anthony Mascarenhas, Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986), p. 44.
73 Ziring, Bangladeshfrom Mujib, n. 7, p. 101.
74 "The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary December 28, 1974" cited in Maniruzzaman's Bangladesh Revolution, n. 47, p. 178.
131
serve the purpose of the Bangladesh's personal dictatorship, not the cause of national
development and unity - - - Mujib heralded the establishment of BAKSAL with the
phraSe the second Revolution.,,75
Commenting on the objectives of the "Second Revolution" which stood to wipe
corruption, to increase agricultural and industrial production, to control population
pressure and to bring about national unity, scholars like Rounaq Jaban felt that the above
mentioned goals were reformist by nature and failed to explain the need of a revolution to
achieve them. 76 The system initiated by Mujib led to curtailment of civil liberties and
people's fundamental rights. Press censorship was established, some dailies were banned
while some were nationalized.77 Mujibur Rehman rationalized these policies as the need
of the time since the nation faced multiple challenges from anti-systemic forces.78 But
the factional fights within Awami League were no less cause for concern. The result was
contradiction in policy matters and bad governance which led to loss of credibility of the
leaders. Last but not the least the authoritarian tendencies has much to do with erosion of
his popularity.
Naxalite Violence
One of the major forces which were directly responsible for the failure of
Mujibism was the violence unleashed by he extremist factions of left parties. The fear of
ultra left was deeply entrenched in their minds. There were a number of ordinances
directed against the extremist factions by the AL government. They included (a)
establishment of special tribunals to prosecute unsocial elements for disturbing law or
administration in any manner; (b) To arrest without warrant on suspicion of having
committed the above offences; (c) removal of any governmental employee, even the
police from service without right to appeal; (d) exemption of the above law from un
constitutionality; (e) giving the President special power to declare emergency when the
75 Ziring, Bangladeshfrom Mujib. n. 7, p. 105.
76 Jaban, Bangladesh Politics, n. 38, p. 118.
77 June 16, 1975 saw the closure of 20 daily newspapers. While Ittefaq and The Bangladesh Times were nationalised, many others like Holiday was banned.
78 See, The Statesman (Weekly), Calcutta, December 21,1974.
132
security or economy is threatened by war or internal disturbances; (f) to enable the Jatiya
Rakxld Bahini JRB to arrest or search without warrant, with no appeal against these
actions; (g) to authorise the government to ban Unions, associations or parties if their
activities were found prejudicial to national interest; (h) to detain a person to prevent him
from committing the prejudicial act. 79
The mindless acts of looting, sabotage and rising incidence of political violence
was fixed on the ultra leftists like the Sarbohoras headed by Siraj Sikdar. The ideology
of the Sarbohora Party was to initiate a revolution by forming a united front of peasant
workers and of the down trodden linguistic and national minorities. The party was highly
critical of Awami League for its closeness with India which in their perception was an
expanding imperial power.80 Parties having the similar world view were other left forces
likethe Sammobadi Dal and East Bengal Communist Party Marxist-Leninist (EBCPML).
They held the view that socialism has failed to meet the aspirations of the people and the
only hope which remained was a social revolution engineered by the poor of the country.
Role of Collaborators
Mujibur Rehman was exceptionally harsh on the collaborators of Pakistani army
who belonged to the right-wing parties. These collaborators had acted due to their
ideological convictions, recruited by the Jamaat-i-Islam and Pakistani forces to
undermine the liberation war. Though the noose was tightened around their necks just
after independence, they continued their work in secrecy.8l Mujib established special
Tribunals to ensure punishment for the 1971 collaborators of Pakistani army, but the laws
against them were not full proof as a result of which out of 37,471 cases against them,
only 2,848 were decided by October 31, 1973. Out of 2,848 accused only 752 were
punished and the remaining 2096 were proclaimed not guilty.82 This liberalism towards
the collaborators ended with Mujib's general amnesty towards them which exempted the
79 The provisions of the Special Power Act 1974 were taken from the proceedings of the Jatiyo Sangsad as quoted in Maniruzzam, The Bangladesh Revolution, n. 59, p. 176.
80 Ibid., p. 236.
81 See, Ekattorer Ghatak Ke Ko thaye (Dhaka: Center for Spreading the Consciousness of liberation war, 1987), pp. 70-71.
82 Ibid., p. 69.
133
under trials as well those convicted from any kind of punishment. Their release from
prison according to official sources was to enable them to participate in the third
anniversary of Bangladesh's victory celebrations on 16 December 1973.83 While critics
describe the release of collaborators as a calculated measure on the part of Mujib's
government to counter the radical violence unleashed by the left parties allover
Bangladesh.84
Whatever may be the motive of the government their release and soft treatment
towards the collaborators indicated that Mujib and the leaders within Awami League
were not prepared to stretch the entire exercise any more. The national elite failed to
carry forward the ideology of the liberation war and looked for policy reversals. The end
product of their action resulted in the rehabilitation of the collaborators inside
Bangladesh, who later became the torchbearers of Islamic fundamentalism. Thus,
Mujibism which stood for the principles of Nationalism, Socialism, democracy and
secularism underwent radical changes, after a few years of its initiation. Commenting on
the reasons for the failed secular experiment critics give a number of reasons, prominent
among them was the Islamic identity of more than 80010 of its population, the lack of
compatibility between secularism and forces needed to sustain it and some identify with
the overdose of secularism during the initial years of Mujibur Rehman's regime.
Scholars like Talukdar Maniruzzaman argue that the cultural conditions to nurture the
ideology of secularism is absent in Bangladesh. According to him, "secularism in
Bangladesh did not reflect Bangladesh's societal spirit and history and it arose as a
utilitarian expediency in the political field".85
Refuting the culturist argument of Maniruzzaman, Ali Riaz has contended that
culture/spirit is an abstraction which emerges from the material basis of society. He
further adds secularism as practiced in the Indian sub-continent is distinctly different
from the western variant of secularism. Unlike in the West, secularism entails polity
separation, which in other words means distinction between sate and the church, in the
83 Ibid., p. 22.
84 Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution, n. 59, p. 22.
85 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh Politics Secular and Islamic Trends", in Rafiuddin Ahmed. Religion Nationalism, n. 6, p. 69.
134
sub-continental case, it, however, advocates a role for the state in religious affairs. In
some ways the state is neutral in so far as individual faiths are concerned, and in other
ways state plays a positive role in protecting and ensuring equal treatment to all.
According to Ali Riaz secularism in context to Bangladesh and India is not an alien
concept, instead it is home grown, suiting to the imperatives of multiple identities.86
Secularism to be successful in a given society does not require any pre-condition.
Its success or failure depends on the composition and commitment of the ruling elite.
There may be variation in practices depending on the political exigencies, but secularism
nevertheless is not culturally driven. Ali Riaz also considers such explanations as the
reaction to secular experiment, legitimacy crisis, and external aid as too generalised
without any analytical depth. The crisis of legitimacy is for instance not simply political
or constitutional; it has had its roots in the failure on the part of the ruling elite, to build
and sustain its ideological hegemony.87 A stable polity is dependent on the ability of the
leadership to forge an ideology which enjoys a larger societal consensus. In a short span
the post independence elite of Bangladesh had difficulty in establishing the ideological
hegemony of the ruling elite. The crisis had its beginning with Mujib faltering in his
commitment and pursuit to realise his goals, and the state of affairs aggravated with the
ouster of Mujib from the political scene.
Bases of Bangladeshi Nationalism
Soon after Mujib's death there was a perceptible shift in the emphasis from
syncretistic, linguistic nationalism and secular ideology to the search for a new identity
shaped by distinctions such as ''we'' vs ''they''. Reflective of this trend, ancient texts
were researched by historians to highlight the differences between the Indian part of
Bengal and the contemporary Bangladesh notwithstanding the fact that both of them
belong to the same geographic area, share the same written and spoken language, have
the same food habits and living conditions. Curiously, few scholars even came with the
theory that there were two Bengals and Bengal in historical and cultural terms is not
86 Ali Riaz, "God willing": The Politics and Ideology ofIslamism in Bangladesh", Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and Middle East, VoL 23, No.1 & 2, 2003, pp. 302-305.
87 Ibid.
135
monolithic.88 The author of the work on Bangladesh nationalism, M Anusuzzaman, for
instance, begins with the political history of the rulers and the dynasties, which
influenced in different ways the history of the two Bengals. He defmes political culture of
the two sides in three directions: social equality, localisaton and vernacularisation. He
argues that West Bengal in the ancient times was known as Radha, Sushma, Uttar Radha,
and Dakshina Radha, while areas around the present Bangladesh was known as Harikela,
Pundravardhana and Varendra.
Regarding the rulers, he brings in the distinctiveness by insisting that West
Bengal and adjoining area were under Hindu ruling dynasties like king Sasanka and later,
the Guptas, while Vanga/Bangladesh was under the Buddhist rule. He opines that the title
of Maharajadhiraja held by the Vanga kings reveals then fierce independent orientation,
while the history of present West Bengal/Gauda was inconsistent. The author
differentiates between the two Bengals by asserting that the ancient people of Bengal
were non-Aryans but there was marked Brahmancal influence in their culture because the
Aryan rulers invited and patronised Brahmins from northern regions of India. While the
Aryan rulers were anti-Buddhists, the Vanga kings were Buddhists. Bengali language and
literature had the same literacy style but the Buddhists scholars of Vanga developed
Bengali by writing charyapads in local Buddhist-Sanskrit (Magadh-prakrit), which was
ignored by the Hindu rulers of Sen Dynasty.89 The real transformation came during the
Muslim period (12th century A.D.) when the entire region was named as Bangladesh.90
Bangladesh under the Muslim rulers, according to Aniruzzaman, attained greater
social equality because Islam was based on equality, and there were mass conversions of
low-caste Hindus to Islamic faith. Second, there was localisation, which to the author is
proved by the fact that the Muslim rulers assimilated with the native by learning their
language and cultures, by altering their food habits and using locally available materials
for housing. Local people were appointed to key-posts and they faced no discrimination
88 M. Aniruzzaman, "Bangladesh Nationalism" in Emajuddin Ahamed (ed.), Bangladesh Politics (Dhaka, Centre for Social Studies, 1980), pp.92-82.
89 Ibid., p. 83.
90 M.A.Rahim, Social and cultural History of Bengal, Vol. I (1201-1576), (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1963), pp. 1-6.
136
while using facilities like dykes, roads, tanks and wells. All this, according to the author,
stood in sharp contrast to the Aryan ideals.
After the Muslims, came the British rule which developed Calcutta and its
adjoining areas only. The partition plan of Bengal comprised of geographical areas
roughly corresponding to Vanga and Gouda and thus seemed to change the directions of
history as explained above. The author puts forward the argument that the 1947 plan of
Partition of Bengal was accepted because a united Bengal would mean a greater scope for
the Muslim culture and divided Bengal would allow presentation of Aryan hegemony in
East Bengal. "That West Bengal opted to join India is a strong argument supporting
historical Aryanisation.',9l The author does not limit the distinctiveness to the political
arena alone. He suggests that East Bengal being predominantly Muslim majority
province didn't experience any Brahma Samaj type of reform movement, which its west
Bengal counterpart did. Bengali Muslims stood in revolt against Muslim Pakistan when
more than two decades of rule hindered localisation.
This sort of historical analysis has, doubtless, contributed to the reinvention of
Bangladesh as a national entity distinct from Indian Bengal. Similar thesis was
subsequently incorporated into the official ideology under Ziaur Rahman in an attempt to
forging close ties between the territory and Allah. The arguments advanced by the
Bangladeshi scholar like Aniruzzaman may not stand closer scrutiny of historical facts as
some of them are puerile, hackneyed while other narratives are either concocted or
simply manipulation of historical facts. Nevertheless thesis of this nature has many
takers, particularly those involved in the redefinition of national identity based on the
fusion of land and Islam in the post-Mujib Bangladesh. The state-sponsored Bangladeshi
nationalism is thus an attempt to highlight the historical continuity of Bangladesh as a
separate political and cultural entity and to underline the cultural distinctiveness of the
country and its organic linkages with Islam.
91 Aniruzzaman, " Bangladesh Nationalism", p. 88.
137
Zia Period
Major General Ziaur Rahman inserted the Islamic invocation "Bismillah-ir
Rahman-ir Rahim" (In the name of Allah the Beneficent, the Merciful) above the
preamble of the Constitution.92 Zia ur Rahman amended Article 8(1) of the Constitution
and removed secularism from the principles of state policy. The amendment changed the
state's approach to religion. It not only included absolute trust and faith in Almighty
Allah, but also affirmed its faith on nationalism, democracy and socialism "meaning
economic and social justice, together with principles derived from them . . ... shall
constitute the fundamental principles of state policy',.93
A new clause which was clipped to Article 25 stressed that ''the state shall
endeavour to consolidate preserve, and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim
countries based on Islamic solidarity.,,94 The amendment ordered that the citizens of
Bangladesh would be termed as "Bangladeshi" and not as a ''Bengalee'' as described by
the 1972 Constitution. (Article 6) Zia ur Rahman shunned linguistic nationalism and
opted for territorial and religious nationalism. By coining the term Bangladeshi, he tried
to forge a distinct identity of his people as different from their ethnic cousins in the
Indian part of Bengal. After the ruling military elites interpretation of nationalism Awami
League and few left parties who spearheaded the liberation war were branded as
supporters of secular nationalism, while Zia's new party, the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party (BNP) and all the right wing Islamic parties irrespective of their political
differences were known to be supporters of Bangladeshi Nationalism.95 By using political
Islam President Zia got the much needed legitimacy for his rule.
Article 38 of the Constitution was amended to bring back religious based politics.
The prominent Islam based parties who were allowed to come into being were the
Muslim League, the Jamaat-e-Islami, Nizam-e-Islam, Islamic Democratic League,
92 Zia ur Rahman felt that the Constitution needed he amendments since "there is much resentment among the people". For the full text of President Zia's Speech see Th~ Bangladesh Observer, April 23, 1977.
93 "The Proclamation [Amendment] Order. 1977", The Bangladesh Observer. April 23. 1977.
94 Ibid.
95 Sayeed Iftekhar Ahmed, "Resurgence of Islam in Bangladesh Politics", South Asian Journal. January 2002 at http://www.Southasianmedia.netlmagazine/Journalillresurgenceoflslam.htm
138
Islamic Party, Jamaat-e-ulama-e-Islam, Bangladesh Khilafat Andolan National United
Front and Freedom Party etc. These Islamic parties were banned by Mujib due to their
role during the liberation war (Mukti Joddha).96 Their presence however was legally
endorsed by Ziaur Rehman who ratified the political parties Regulations of 1976. The
state patronization of Islamic parties allowed them to expand their agenda in civil society.
All the right wing parties have their student and youth wings too, prominent among them
include the Islamic Chatra Shibir and Jubo Shibir. These student organizations along
with their parent bodies strive for the establishment of an Islamic society. They began to
increase their social base through various socio-cultural and socio-religious organizations
like the Bangladesh Masjid Mission, Masjid Samaj and Bangladesh Islamic centre.97
These socio-cultural religious groups support, propagate and highlight the Islamic
heritage of Bangladesh by undertaking large scale publications of Islamic literature.98
The government of Ziaur Rehman created a party of its own known as the
Bangladesh Nationalist party. In its efforts to be radically different from the Awami
League, the BNP took the services of Anti-Awami League elements like the Muslim
League. The military junta appointed Shah Azizur Rahman of the Muslim League as the
Prime Minister and received the good will and services of Maulana Abdul Mannan, Chief
of Jamiat-i-Mudarresin (Association of madrassa teachers) the pirs of Sarsina, Jaunpur
noted for their rabid hatred for the Awami League and India into their party.99 In later
years, it was this party of Ziaur Rahman which with the active cooperation of Islamic
forces worked towards enhancing the Islamic identity of Bangladesh.
Apart from constitutional amendments to restore the supremacy of Islam, Ziaur
Rahman undertook some cosmetic measures to increase the visibility of Islam in national
life. They include hanging of Islamic posters and writings from the Holy Koran in public
96 See M. Kabir, Experiences of an Exile at Home: Life in Occupied Bangladesh, (Dhaka: The Author . Press, 1972), pp. 103-120.
97 K.M. Mohsin, "'Trends ofIslam in Bangladesh in S.R. Chakravarthy and Virendra Narayan. Bangladesh: History and Culture, Vol. 1 (Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1988), p. 109.
98 The low cost of books on various aspects of Islam make them popular among the masses. Some of the popular journals include the islamic Foundation Patrika and periodicals like Sabuj Pata, Sampan, Saptadinga, Mayur Pankhi etc.
99 Taj ul Islam Hashmi, Islam is Bangladesh Politics in Hussain Mutalib and Taj ul Islam Hashmi (ed.), Islam, Muslim & Muslim State Case Study of 13 Countries, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1994), p. 112.
139
places, flying of Eid-Mubarak cutouts along with the national flags on Eid, issue of
messages on religious festivals like Fd-i-Miladunnbi, Shab-i Barat, Muharram. Azan
(call to prayer) and principles of shariat was telecast through the mass-media. President
Ziaur Rahman laid the foundation of the Islamic University in Kustia, and a full-fledged
ministry under the Division of Religious Affairs. The Islamic Academy was pumped with
funds for research facilities and upgraded into a foundation. 1oo
Ziaur Rahman was conscious of his country's self esteem and the under current of
resentment against Mujib's overtly pro-India-Soviet Union foreign policy stance. 101
Islam was a powerful rallying cry for all those who criticized Mujib for his over
dependence on India. While addressing the officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Zia said, ''the most significant development in the field of foreign policy of Bangladesh
was that Bangladesh was now in a position to make her own decisions and formulate her
own independent policy to serve her national interests."I02 This policy won him much
acclaim among the intelligentsia, high and middle ranking civil and military officers,
journalists teachers and others. I03 Ziaur Rahman expanded Bangladesh's relations with
brother Muslim countries. After 1975 there were a number of economic and good will
delegations from Bangladesh to Islamic countries and in 1977 President Zia paid an
official visit to Saudi Arabia Apart from aid close relations with the Islamic benefactors
gave rise to increased use of Islamic symbols in national life. In other words, there has
been quantum growth in "institutional Islam" followed by the inflow of petro-<iollars. 104
Important legitimising tool for Zia was to use Islam both in domestic and foreign
policy domain, so as to project his new regime as opposed to the preceding one. In other
words Zia's rule was founded on the negation of what Mujib stood for. In the foreign
100 Emajuddin Ahmed and Dil Roushan Jinnat Ara Nazneen, Islam in Bangladesh, p. 2.
101 M. Rashiduzzaman, "Changing Political patterns in Bangladesh: Internal Constraints and External fears", Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No.9, September 1977, p. 793.
102 Reported in Bangladesh Times July 30, 1977 as quoted in Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh Revolution, n. 59, p.208.
103 MM. Khan and Habib Mohammad Zafarullatt, "The 1978 President Elections: A Review in S.R. Chakravarthy ed., Bangladesh: Domestic Politics, Vol. 2 (Delhi: S.A. Publishers, 1986), p. 106.
104 Syed Anwar Husain, "Religion, Nationalism and Politics in Bangladesh", in R. Ahmed ed., Religion Nationalism, n. 6, p.145.
140
policy sphere for instance Zia made concerted efforts at courting support of Muslim
countries not simply for material benefits, but also for distancing Bangladesh from the
India centric policy of his predecessors. Interestingly the new foreign policy of Zia served
the twin purposes of asserting its autonomy and at the same time building bridges with
the US and its allies in West Asia. This in a way marked the U-tum in Bangladesh's
foreign policy from a pro India - Soviet to increasingly pro-West in a block divided cold
War era. The consequences of this policy change were reflected deeply in strengthening
the Islamist elements inside the country, especially by creating the material base for the
Islamist resurgence. The pro-Western leaning drew Bangladesh closer to the Islamic
World, particularly the US allies in the Gulf, which, in tum, facilitated the steady flow of
funds from the oil rich Gulf countries, contributing to the Islamist consolidation. The
petro-dollars, which various Islamist organizations received to preach an orthodox
narrow version of Islam, were invested in various farms and business establishment, thus
sustaining the Islamist organisations to carry forward their mission. lOS
The role of Ziaur Rahman in the Islamic revival of Bangladesh would be
incomplete without a mention of the retum of the Amir of Jamaat-i-Islami, Golam Azam.
The chief of Jamaat gained notoriety for collaborating with the Pakistani army to
massacre Bengali intellectuals during the war of liberation. The Pakistani army and para
military units known as the al-Badr and ai-Shams were aided in their gruesome task of
killing Bengalis with the help of adherents of right wing parties like the Muslim League
and Jamaat-i-Islami in 1971.106 Golam Azam fled to Pakistan during the liberation
movement and returned with a Pakistani passport. His return in 1978 during Ziaur
Rahman's tenure, his safe stay in Dhaka in spite of serious allegations against him and his
continued stay even after the expiry of his visa- all indicated Ziaur Rahman's desire to
rehabilitate him politically. 107
105 For details see, "Rise of Fanatic Extremism in Bangladesh", Awami League News Letter, vol. 4, no. 12, December 31, 2005,p.l0.
106 The Pakistani army and their right wing E. Bengal collaborators carried out their operations in three phases (a) Operation search light, (b) operation search and destroy and (c) operation scorched earth. They also took to raping Bengali women. In the genocide operations the intellectuals were taken to Rayerbazar, a marshy wet land in Dacca and gunned down blindfolded. See Bangladesh Genocide Archive http://muktadharar.netlplllhtml
107 H. Karlekar, Bangladesh the Next Afghanistan? (New Delhi: Sags publications, 2005), p. 52.
141
The controversy regarding Golam Azam's homecoming was triggered off by
Jahanara Imam, who authored the popular book, Ekattorer Dinguli. A public trial of
Golam Azam in the people's court on the national day of Bangladesh in 1992 took place
where 2000,000 people witnessed the trial. lOS In brief, the entire Golam Azam episode
reveals how political moves were closely linked to Islam which served as a legitimiser for
Zia, for consolidating his regime. In all the post-Mujibur Rahman period saw active
Islamic symbolism to assuage the feelings of fellow Bangladeshi who suffered from the
psychology of neglected faith. 109 Zia's death in 1981 in a violent coup brought another
military general to power. What appeared to be a pattern in Bangladesh at that period of
time was to capture power through unconstitutional means and then form a party, use
government machinery to create support base and finally utilize Islam to gain legitimacy.
General Ershad who succeeded Ziaur Rahman could not be any different from his
predecessor.
Hussain Muhammad Ershad Regime
The right wing forces unleashed during Zia's regime further consolidated under
General Hussain Muhammad Ershad (1983-1990) who like his predecessor persisted with
the policies of institutionalising Islam. General Ershad was convinced of the role of Islam
in the national life of his people and expressed his views before even before assuming the
office of the President. He said, "Islam being the religion of the majority of the
population will be given the highest place in the country's future constitution and Islamic
provisions will be included wherever necessary.110 Both the regimes of Zia and Ershad
respectively created space for the Islamists to be a part of mainstream politics, and raised
Islam to be the highest ideology and agenda of the state. l ]]
108 For details, see, "Nirmul On the March", Dhaka Courier (April 3-16), pp. 14-16 and (May 7, 1993), Vol. 9, No. 40.
109 M. Rashiduzzaman, "The Liberals and Religious Right in Bangladesh", Asian Survey, vol. XXXIV, no. II, (November 1994), p. 984.
110 See Bangladesh Observer, January 15, 1983.
III Ali Riaz,lslamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 103.
142
Ershad often used emotive Issues like Israeli attacks on Muslim Shrines in
Jerusalem and called upon complete refrain from all public activity on some days as a
mark of solidarity for fellow Palestinians. Similarly, the Farakka water crisis with India
was given an Islamic colour by him. He played the Indian card to build up an united front
among Bangladeshis. He once stated, "It is being said today that if we do not get water
from Farakka the northern and southern regions of Bangladesh will turn into a desert, but
I want to remind every body concerned that Islam was born in a desert, but Islam didn't
die. Islam could not be destroyed".i12
In one of the study it was indicated that majority of Bangladeshis would like to
see non-cleric, western English educated, anti Indian and Islam loving politicians to take
over as administrators of their country.ll3 Ershad perhapd tried to fit into this description.
He declared Friday as weekly holiday and introduced the Zakat fund (charity collections)
for the needy. Ershad wanted to give an Islamic colour to the Shahid Minar or the
Martyrs Monement. He objected to the paintings on the premises of the historic
monument un-Islamic and declared that it should be substituted by recitations from the
Koran.114 He tried to keep with popular traditions like frequenting mosques, shrines and
places of Islamic faith, and flaunted his close relationship with some influential pirs like
the Pir of Atrashi, Charmoni and Sarsina.115 Ershad stressed on a mosque-based society
and ensured liberal grants for their upkeeping. He encouraged mosques to receive foreign
assistance for their development. ll6plush with funds from Saudi and Gulf-based
organizations, the Islamists were able to spread their network and increase their politico
religious clout in the days ahead.
General Ershad's most significant step towards Islamising Bangladesh was the 8th
amendment of the cons.titution which established Islam as the state religion of
112 Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends" in Charavarthy (ed.), Bangladesh History, n. 47, p. 71.
JJ3 Razia Akter Banu, Islam in Bangladesh (Leiden E.1. Brill, 1992), p.
114 Karlenkar, Bangladesh, n. 107, p. 53.
115 See, Syed Abdul Maksud ed., Gono Andolon 1982-90 (Bengali) (Dacca: 1991) as quoted in Hashmi, "Islam in Bangladesh" in Mutalib and Hashmi, Islam, n. 99, p. 114. When People at the helm of affairs take the blessings of Pirs, it reveals the kind of influence they could yield in society. 116 -Karlekar, Bangladesh, n. 107, p. 5~.
143
Bangladesh. The constitutional injunction read, "The religion of the Republic is Islam but
other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in the republic."ll7 His State
Religion Act found support among majority of Bengali Muslims as far no one has talked
of bringing about alterations in it. Not satisfied with this measure or as if not to give H.M.
Ershad the glory of being an Islamic benefactor in Bangladesh the Chief of Muslim
League Kazi Abdul Qader demanded Bangladesh to be declared an Islamic Republic.
According to him Islam as the state religion falls short of fulfJlling the movement of the
people of Bangladesh towards establishing principles of Shariat and Quran as the guiding
principles of the state.1I8
There were protests from certain civil society organisations like Naripalchyo and
Oikyo badhyo Nari Samaj who reminded the nation of the spirit of liberation movement
and questioned the construction of a new identity, but their number was miniscule in
comparison to the might of military junta. 119 Soon the military regime faced a rigorous
political Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) and in the 1990 elections
the Bangladesh Nationalist party formed the government with Jamaat-i-Islami as its
supporting coalition partner. The presence of Jamaat in the MRD gave it some legitimacy
in the eyes of the people and from those days there has been no looking back for it.
Bangladesh Jamaat e-Islami
The Jamaat-e-Islami was a conservative organization of Indian Muslims since
1940's its founder Maulana Maududi was strongly opposed to partition of India on
theological grounds, but later accepted Pakistan and worked for the establishment of an
Islamic state based on Sharia laws.120 Jamaat began its innings in independent
Bangladesh (1971) as suspects and collaborators of the occupying forces. The reason of
117 The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Deputy Controller, Government Printing Press, 1990).
118 See Sangram (Bengali daily), June 14, 1988. It is also reported that Muslim theologians like Maulana Mohammadullah (Hafizjee Huzur) who had good contacts with Iran, issued a fatwa condemning Ershad's government as illegitimate and un-Islamic.
119 The feminist organisation distributed leaflets which read that religion is a personal issue and the state has no business to Meddle with it. See Mutalib and Hashmi, Islam, Muslims, n.99, p. 118.
120 For Maududi's views, see Abdul Ala Maududi, Islamic Law and Constitution (Karachi: lamaat-i-Islami Publication, 1965)
144
their being suspects revolves around their dubious role during the massive national
movement. 121 The party remained underground for a few years only to emerge as a
political force under the watchful eyes of the junta rulers. Secondly its participation in
the movement for the restoration of democracy (1990) against the junta rule of Ershad
gave it the much needed political legitimacy. Its staying power in Bangladesh politics is
subject to great research and holds the key in deciding the trajectory of the nation's
political destiny.
Apart from its role in bringing about "awakening among Muslims" according to
the demands of their faith, Jamaat desires that ''the sovereignty of Allah must be
established in all fields of human existence. Mosques and Parliament taqwa and addl.
dikr and shariah are inalienable dimensions of the same reality.,,122 The objectives of
Jamaat-e-Islam is the establishment of the Islamic system in all spheres of life, the first
step dikr therefore is to preach Islam as a revolutionary ideology and then organize and
train those who accept the ideology through complete submission, and then the trained
Muslims commit themselves to the task of capturing state power in order to replace the
un-Islamic regime with an Islamic leadership.123 The whole idea of an Islamic polity is to
implement Islamic social, economic, political ethical, moral and penal laws, and if
necessary enact new legislations only in the spirit of Holy Koran, Sunnah and Prophet's
traditions.124 Seen from this perspective an Islamic community is only empowered to
propel an Islamic state and therefore, Jamaat has its doors open only for Muslims who are
committed to the above cause. The Jamaat in Bangladesh is an Islamic nationalist party
and its ultra conservative cadres work to counter Bengali nationalism and socialism. The
Bangladeshi Islamists have an unfavourable attitude towards the syncretic traditions and
liberalism of Bengali culture. In a profound shift from the relatively plural Bengali
121 The Jamaat-i-Islami now accepts he independence of Bangladesh, and does not want any kind of a reunion with Pakistan.
122 See Jammat website, www.jamaat-e-Islami.org
123 The guidelines and strategy to bring about an Islamic Revolution is mentioned in Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi, The Process of Islamic Revolution (Bengali translation from Urdu) (Dacca: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1962) mentioned in U.A.B. Razia Akter Banu, "Jamaat-i-Islami in Bangladesh: Challenges and Prospects", in Mutalib and Hashmi (ed.), Islam Muslims, n. 99, p. 84.
124 See, Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of Cali fomi a Press, 1961), pp.70-109.
145
religious and cultural practices the Islamists in Bangladesh consciously incorporate the
exclusive principles of their faith in its undiluted form. 125
The role of Jamaat during the liberation days was highly unimpressive. Cadres
from Jamaat and other right wing parties had formed action groups namely the Razakars,
Al Badr, and Al sham to massively sabotage the liberation movement both in rural and
urban areas. Targets of their attacks were not only the Mukti Bahini guerillas but also all
liberal thinking intellectuals so that the new state remains deprived of their services in
nation building.126 The most dreaded of Jamaat leaders was Abdul Kader Molla who was
famously called the butcher of Mirpur (a place on the outskirts of Dacca). Though
considered a war criminal, he was never persecuted and occupied the post of public
relation secretary of Jamaat in Bangladesh.127 Thus, Jamaat has survived the hostile
environment of post liberation days owing to the general clemency granted by Mujibur
Rahman and later allowed to flourish openly by general Zia. In fact the Jamaat and other
allied parties never had it so good under the martial law. Here were generals in politics,
who not only indulged in Islamisation and Islamic rhetoric, but also put them at the
political centre-stage. The phase of benevolence towards Islamists was manifested when
General Ziaur Rahman allowed Golam Azam to enter Bangladesh with a Pakistani
passport. The Chief of Jamaat was declared as the enemy of the' nation and his citizenship
was cancelled in 1973. The restoration of his political status rose the question as to how
would a foreign national be allowed to preside over the fate of a Bangladesh based
party?128
To counter the Islamic ideologues and their patrons the Nirmul Committee or the
National Coordination Committee for the implementation of the spirit of the Liberation
War and elimination of the killers and· collaborators of 1971 was formed. The committee
125 Sayeed Iftekhar Ahmed, "Resurgence ofIslam", n. 95 , p. 4.
126 Eyewitness accounts of the relatives of People who were picked up by Razakars and Al Badr forces describe them as Bengalis. The only survivor of the Rayerbazar killings describes the captors and murderers of Bengali intellectuals as fellow Bengalis. See Dilwar Hossain, Ekottorer Ghatok-dalalera ke kothay (Dhaka: MJCBK, 1989), P. 37.
127 Abdul Kadar MolIa was accused of killing hundreds of people in 1971.
128 For a detailed account of the role of Jamaat and Golam Azam, see Shahriar Kabir, Bangladesh Amraa Ebong Ora (Dhaka: Ananya, 2005), pp. 11-16.
146
was non-political and held Gano Adalats (people's court) to try Azam for sedition. Many
prominent citizens of civil society heard the case for days and on March 26, 1992 the
people's court held a public trial and held him guilty.129 The government ignored the
people's verdict, and charged him with a technical case of non-possession of a passport.
A three member bench of the Bangladesh High Court rejected the executive order of
1973 and passed a judgment declaring him a citizen of Bangladesh. Golam Azam's legal
rehabilitation points to the greater political strategy of Begum Zia, who used him to dent
the political constituencies of the Awami League. As the government had repealed the
collaborators Acts to save the anti-liberation agents and appointed them to high ranking
government posts, the liberation forces seemed to have lost half the battle.130 In addition,
the internal feud among the pro-liberation parties had always made their struggle against
Jamaat a weak one.
Jamaat's Operational Methods
The Jamaat-e-Islami seeks to make mosques the centre of all Islamic activities.
To give impetus to preaching Islam as a revolutionary ideology Jamaat places emphasis
on the establishment of educational institutions, spread of adult education and set up
reading centres for the common man. l3l The ideological engineering project requires
control over schools colleges, madrassas and the student wing of the party. Jamaat-e
Islami has as very strong student organization known as Islamic Chatra Shibir. Apart
from Shibir, bulk of its members comes from madrassas. The Jamaat has kindergarten
schools in every district and has separate English medium schools like the Manarat
School and University.132 It also has coaching centres to help deserving poor students to
get into various professional courses.133
129 See, Dhaka Courier (Dhaka), Vol. 9, May 7,1993.
130 BNP or the Bangladesh National Party has the support of Jamaat and Islami Oikya Jote (lOJ) in the Jatiyo Sangsad. They have been given ministries and other responsible posts.
131 The programme of the party is written under the sub section heading "Social Reform", at www.jamaate-islami.org
132 Smruti S. Pattanaik, "Ascendancy of the Religious Right in Bangladesh politics: A study of Jamaat-eIslami", Strategic Analysis, Vol. 33, no. 2, March 2009, p. 277.
133 Ibid., p. 277.
147
The Islamic Chatra Shibir like its parent body Jamaat has a wide network and has
many serious academics from Bangladesh's schools and universities as its cadres.134
These foot soldiers of Islam later percolate into all spheres of life and all sectors of the
state including education and army services. Jamaat's student front Shibir were all out to
undermine the position of the united opposition parties among students in various
university campuses. 135 It has its alternative media in the form of a newspaper called
Sangram and exercise great influence on the Islamic Research Institute. Shibir
encourages the students to take up Islamic studies and prepares hem to fight the
ideological battle for an Islamic state.136 Shibir members have strong student fronts in the
universities of Rajshahi, Chittagong, Shahjalal University of Science and Technology,
Khustia Islamic University and Jahangir Nagar, The ICS has close ties with similar
Muslim groups in Pakistan, Middle East, Malaysia and Indonesia. It is suspected to have
ties with Islamists groups within India and Pakistani intelligence services.137 It has links
with terror outfits like the Arakan Rohingya National organization on extremists Islamist
group of Burmese Muslims and AI Qaeda outfits in Bangladesh. Inside Bangladesh it has
secret and deep association with home bred Islamist organization like the Harkat ul-Jihad
Bangladesh (HUJIB) Jagrata Muslim Janata (1MB) and other Islamists groupS.138
A look at its Karmashuchi (programme), however, reveals that the ICS is an
organisation which seeks to spread Islam among the student community, to train and
organise them for an Islamic order, to produce men with great morality and ethics, to
create and sustain Islamic education and to free humanity from all kinds of exploitation
by an Islamic-revolution.139 Even though the ICS appears to be a benevolent and a
cultural organization committed to raise Islamic consciousness among the students, its
other activities and external networks makes it a militant outfit, comparable even to the
134 V.A.B. Razia Akter Banu, "lamaat-i-Islami''. n.99, p. 85.
135 The Islamic Chatra Shibir has impressive victories in the student elections in the various universities. It has a indoctrination plan and puts special emphasis on character building, disciplined action to generate Islamic consciousness.
136 South Asia Terrorism portal, Shibir section, available at http://www.satp.org
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 See their website, www.jamaat-e-islami.org and www.shibir.com
148
Taliban.140 In his comprehensive study on Islamists in Bangladesh, Karlekar has
forcefully argued that Jamaat and its associate outfits are comparable to Taliban not only
on matters concerning theocracy and following the basic tenants of Islam, but also in
matters related to women, recreation, entertainment and socio-cultural practices. He
admits that the implementation of the retrogressive measures have not yet taken place in
Bangladesh, but if conditions remain favourable to empower, it politically the possibility
of a 'joyless' Bangladesh is not far. 141
Financial Support
Major portion of financial support came from donations from external sources and
through the Islamic NGO's controlled by them. The main patrons are Saudi Arabia and
Gulf States. The Saudi based Muslim world League (Rabita al Alam al-Islami) and the
AI-Haramayne Foundation (AHF) are major donors. The AI-Haramaine Foundation
which was banned in September 2002 after UN marked it as a terror network is said to
have brought TK 20 crore through the NGO Affairs Bureau from 1997 to 2001. AI-
Haramaine has TK 19 crore more to be utilized on Islamic education in 38 distracts of
Bangladesh.142 Jamaat also received funds from Islami Bank and AI-Arafa Bank for its
madrassas.143 Intelligence sources say that other militant groups received funds from
UAB based welfare organisation Al Fuzaira, and Khairul Ansar Al Khairia, Kuwait based
Doulatul Kuwait, and Revival of Islamic Heritage Society Bahrain based Doulatul
Bahrain, and Benevolence International Organisation registered with the NGO bureau
raises funds for Bin Laden. It is reported that ''no organization in Bangladesh received
any assistance from any of these without recommendation from Jamaat-Shibir."l44
The external funding which flows into Bangladesh is justified in the name of
social welfare activities like building madrassas, mosques and orphanages, but behind
140 Karlekar. Bangladesh. n. 107. pp. 138-140.
141 Ibid.
142 Zayadul Ahsan. "Inside the militant Groups: Foreign funding. Local Business keep them going'. The Daily Star online edition at htlp://www.thedailystar.netl22 August 2005.
143 Sources from Abu Sayeed, Aghashito Judher Blue Print (Blue print of an Undeclared war) 2nd ed. (Dhaka: Agami Publication. 2005). p. 253 as mentioned in Karlekar. Bangladesh. n. 107. p. 156.
144 Karlekar. Bangladesh. n:107. p. 109.
149
the mask of humanitarian efforts the agenda of the Islamists are deeply parochial. The
funds are utilised to produce a band of fanatical youths to carry forward the ideals of a
militant Islamic revolution.145 With a 35 percent unemployment rate in Bangladesh it is
relatively easy for Islamists empowered with good fmancial resources to attract young
blood to their fold. 146 The succeeding Chapter on Bangladesh deals exhaustively as to
how Jamaat has invested its profits wisely over income generating projects and
institutions like fisheries, clinics, schools, industries plazas, real estate, shopping
complexes, transport, hospitality etc. and has become a self sufficient organization.
Foreign money combined with a strong economic base of heir own helps them to fund
political organization, spend on expanding existing institutions and creating new
institutions.147 Professor Abul Barkat estimated the annual net profit from Jamaat's
organizations to be $200 million which is equivalent to 6 percent of the government's
annual development budget. 148
Social base of Jamaat
Jamaat-e-Islami began its work in East Bengal with the help of a few full time
members sent by Maududi in the early fifties and expanded its membership to 425 full
time members and 40,000 associate Members by 1968_69.149 By 1987 their number rose
to 2000 full members and 200,000 associate members.150 ***In a detailed study of the
Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, Razia Akter Banu suggests the demographic characteristics
of the party elite, its central leaders and even its women wing members. She collected
Samples in the year 1981 and later in 1987 and made an interesting survey about the
party. She found that while in 1981 as high as 71 percent of the party elite of the Jamaat
constituted of leaders who were in their 40s and in 1987, 68 percent of their leaders
145 Ahsan, "Inside the Militant groups", n. 142.
146 "Rise of Fanatical Extremism", Awami League News Letter, p. 13.
147 Abul Barkat, Economics of Fundamentalism in Bangladesh, Conference on Religious and social fragmentation and Economic Development in South Asia, (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 15-16 October, 2005), p. 15-16.
148 Abul Barkat, "Political Economy of Fundamentalism in Bangladesh", Social Science Review (Dhaka University), Vol. 23, No.2, 2006, p. 1.
149 Akter Banu, "lamaat-e-Islami", in Mutalib and Hashmi, Islam, Muslims, n. 99, p. 86.
150 Ibid., p. 86.
150
belonged to this group. In 1981 67 percent of its top leaders had college or university
education and in 1987 71 percent of its top ranking leaders had access to college or
university education. The scholar found out that 90 per cent of its members and associate
members came from a common social background - the lower middle class. Jamaat has a
vibrant Islami Chattri Sangstha (Islamic girl student organization) and the women wing
of the party is fairly educated. According to the 1987 survey 79 percent of the women
party elite were matriculates. Thus, Jamaat commanded support and allegiance from
younger, recently educated lower middle class members of Bangladeshi society who
shared Jamaat's dream and efforts for an overwhelming revival ofIslamic ideology.
In the general elections of 1991, the Jamaat won 18 seats in the 300-seated
Parliament. Formation of a government by a party requires 151 seats in the Parliament.
Since none of the mainstream parties secured a majority in the 91 elections, Jamaat
turned to be a king maker by extending its support to BNP to form the government. The
political recognition of Jamaat as a legitimate force gave it an opportunity to expand its
support base and helped other militant organisations to flourish inside Bangladesh. The
2001 general elections also had a role cut out for the Jamaat and the Islamic Okiye Jote
(101). The BNP which already had a majority of 193 seats awarded two ministries to the
Jamaat to be a part of the government.151 Needless to mentio~ it was during the BNP-Ied
alliance government that Bangladesh witnessed a prolific expansion of militant
fundamentalist Islamic organisations and their activities shaking off the secular fabric of
the country and raising the spectre of Talibanisation of the polity. For, Jamaat's presence
in the government emboldened the Islamists groups and freed them from official
harassments. 152
Meanwhile, the Jamaat-e-Islami, earlier opposed to the creation of Bangladesh
fracturing the Muslim fraternity had become a systemic political force by joining the anti
Ershad agitation along side the Awami League and BNP and participating in the national
elections. Critics attribute the Jamaat's conciliatory approach to its receding political
salience in an increasingly polarised Bangladeshi polity. Thus, its deliberate silence on
151 The 2006 general eJections also saw a repeative political dominance of the BNP and Jamaat alliance. See Election Commission Website. www.bd.ec.org/stat/parliament
152 See Ali Riaz. Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh; A Complex web (New York: Routledge. 2008). Chap. I.
151
charges of corruption and graft against BNP and electoral alliance with the BNP were
part of lammat's long-term strategy of becoming a politically potent force at the national
level while making inroads in rural Bangladesh to expand their sphere of influence. "In
doing so, they began to utilise local traditional institutions to further their particular
interpretation of Islamic practices. The sudden increase of salish (village arbitration) and
latwa (religious edicts) at the beginning of 1991 through out the decade bears testimony
to the fact.,,153 It was the latwa issued by a group called Shahaba Sainik Parishad from
shyllet against author Tasleema Nasreen in 1993 that drew international attention to the
controversial phenomenon of latwas in Bangladesh. The year 1993-94 saw hundreds of
latwas issued against the activities of the NGO's, especially the Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC) - a leading agency supported by international and
private donors. Likewise, the Grameen Bank became the primary targets for its campaign
for women emancipation and empowerment. Smaller NGO's like Friends in Village
Development of Bangladesh (FIVDB), Proshika and Nigera Kori also came under
attacks. There are reports of schools run by the NGOs being set on fire, teachers being
attacked and teaching aids destroyed. The rise in the incidence of such attacks against
NGO activity has been highlighted by the Amnesty International. In 2002, it reported
that parents of nearly 700,000 children attending schools run by BRAC were asked to
withdraw their wards or face latwas. I54
The latwas have become a potent source of mobilising popular support for the
islamists in Bangladesh. Predictably, the lamaat in Bangladesh have organized political
protest whenever the judicial system tried to put a brake on it. I55 "The lamaat-i-Islam,
the largest orthodox Islamic party in Bangladesh was blamed for instigating conservative
IS3 Riaz Ali, "Traditional Institutions as Tools of political Islam in Bangladesh", Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 40, No.3, 2005, p. 176.
IS4 "Fundamental Rights of Women violated with virtual impunity", The Amnesty International on Bangladesh (London: 1997) at http://www.amnesty.orgiailib/aipub/1994/Asal130994.ASA.txt Also, see "violence against women", iin 0 Salish Kendro (ASK). 2002 at www.ret.for/alindexlasklwv/ole.htm
ISS Jamaat leader, Delwar Hussaini Sayedee, an MP and ally of BNP is quoted in Daily Janakartha as warning that "the courts won't be allowed to control fatwas. instead fatwas would control courts", Daily Janakartha, January 4, 2001.
152
forces against certain NGO'S".156 The Islamist tirade is not confmed to the NGOs or the
judiciary alone; they have successfully campaigned in January 2001 for imposing a ban
on films made on liberation war themes, or even those in which Islamic themes are
reviewed critically. The director of the movie "Ekatturer jishu" whose film faced stiff
resistance to being screened is quoted as saying, "I have had the honour of participating
in the liberation war - - - I can in no way demean the great war of liberation in the
film".157 Other movies which failed to get the official sanction include Nadir, Madhumati
and Dhusara Jatra. Recently Matir Moina was banned by BNP under Jamaat's pressure
for its critical portrayal of Islamic education in the madrassas.158
The Tablighi Jamaat in Bangladesh
If Jamaat-e-Islami of Bangladesh is the strong face of political Islam, Tablighi
Jamaat (TJ) is an apolitical organisation, which represents Islam from below.
Nevertheless, the TJ influences the social support base of the political Islamists. The
Tablighi movement is one of the most widespread Islamic movements in the world and in
Bangladesh it has made the most rapid expansion. While the Jamaat-e-Islam and other
Islamist groups required political patronage from unstable illegitimate rulers to establish
themselves, Tablighi Jamaatis did not evoke any hostility for its role in 1971, by isolating
themselves from the political involvement in the course of the liberation struggle. "Even
at the peak of fighting, Jamaats carried on with their preaching tours and in their speeches
made no reference to the dramatic happenings around them except to exhort Muslims to
follow the path of Allah in this time of crisis - - - This seems to have made a lasting
impression on the minds of many Bangladeshis, an impression that lasts till this very
day". 159
The Tablighis make a distinction between din (religion) and duniya (worldly
activity) and are basically Islamic preachers involved in the ethical and moral aspect of
156 M. Rashiduzzaman, "The LiberaIsand Religious Right in Bangladesh", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No. II, November 1994, p. 975.
157 Mahdud AI Faisal, "Censor Board Crucifies Ek a-tturer Jishu", Dhaka Courier, Vol. 9, No. 40, (May 7, 1993).
158 See, Jai Jai Din (Dhaka), January 15,2002.
159 Yoginder S. Sikand, "The Tablighi Jamaat in Bangladesh", South Asia, VoL XXII, No.1 (1999), p. 114.
153
their faith. The reason for the growth of TJ is said to be the solace and peace it offered
amidst the ravages of a war and extremely challenging conditions after the war in
1971.160 The· importance of Islam in public life which increased after 1975 coincided
with the increased popularity of TJ in Bangladesh and thus the two factors must have
influenced each other.161
Tablighis have a rich oral tradition and stories of miracles saints, the pleasures of
Zannat (heaven), and tales of hell, easily transmits knowledge about their religion among
ruraI folks with little or no educational exposure. Other activities of the Tablighi Jamaat
include holdings of the alami iftema (annual gathering) every year before Ramadan on
the banks of river Tir at Tongi. The Tongi gathering is considered to be the largest
gathering of Muslims after the haj pilgrimage at Mecca.162 Such congregations and
religious functions organised by the Tablighi Jamaat and numerous other Islamic
revivalist groups in East Bengal have impacted Bengali Muslim customs, rituals and
institutions, sharpening religious consciousness at popular level.163 No Bangladeshi
governments, whether BNP or the Awami League, would afford to ignore the political
importance of the gathering at Tongi. Accordingly, authorities make elaborate
arrangements for health camps, transport, sanitation, drinking water and better roads and
bridges to make the ijetma a success. 1M The Tablighi Jamaat with its reformist agenda
aimed at purifying Islamist practices came into being in response to the aggressive
reformist agenda of the Arya Samaj of Hindus.165 With no threat from any quarters
today, the Tablighis who work for effective implementation of Islamic practices has
increased religiosity among the Muslim masses in Bangladesh. It is worth mentioning
160 Ibid.
161 B.K. Jahangir, Violence and consent is a peasant society and other Essays (Dhaka, 1990), p. 58 quoted in Sikand, "The Tablighi", n. 159, p. 116.
162 It is reported that the Tongi ijtema gathered 2.5 milJion Muslims from 70 different countries in the year 1994. Every year the numbers register an increase.
163 For details, see Peter J. Bertocci, "Islam and Social Construction of Bangladesh Countryside" in R. Ahmed (ed.), Understanding Bengal Muslim, n. 6p. 71-85.
164 The Bangladesh Observer, Dhaka, January 15 and January 18, 1994.
165 Md. Rashiduzzaman, "Islam Muslim Identity and Nationalism in Bangladesh", Journal of South Asia and M.E. Studies, Vol. 18, No.1, 1994, pp. 36-60.
154
that in view of the political nature of the religion, the thin line separating religiosity and
extremism in Islam often gets blurred.
Popular Islam
The growth of popular Islam in Bangladesh is evident from the number of Waz
Mahjils (religious gatherings) and religious debates called bahas in the country. Waz
Mahjils are a regular feature in small towns and villages through out Bangladesh. These
religious gatherings invite baktas or Islamic orators who help in the spread of Islamic
values. One such popular bakta who came to limelight in the 1980s was Maulana Delwar
Hossain Saydee, a member of the lamaat-e-Islami's central committee and Member of
Parliament. His retrogressive public speeches and video tapes with titles like "Purdah.
and Women's right in Islam", "Rights of Husbands and wives", "Women and Non
Muslims in Islam" are available both within and outside Bangladesh.166
The Muslim orators are often "invited one-or two nights long waz mahjils in the
dry season during November to February. They cast a magical spell on their audiences,
mostly arousing a fear of hell, in conformity with the popular culture which glorifies
death and the hereafter. The Baktas invariably portray women as the main source of evil
and corruption and justify beating of wives in accordance with the Sharia law.,,167 The
contribution of these religious meetings to the spread of Islamic values in society is duly
acknowledged by politicians.168 The reason behind waz mahjils is to bring back deviant
Muslims to the core ideology of Islam and awaken the spiritual consciousness of the
Muslim masses. The subject matter of the speeches, in the gathering is not the existing
economic, social or political problems but the glory and supremacy of Islam and the
prophet.169
The religious debates or bahas which began way back in 1860's are still popular
practices in Bangladesh. Originally, the purpose of bahas tradition was to address
166 Taj Hashmi, "Popular Islam and Misogyny: A case study of Bangladesh", A Social Science Journal, Vol. 2, No.1, 2006, p. 34.
167 Ibid., p. 35.
168 Golam Azam, Bangladeshe Islami Andolon (The Islamic Movement in Bangladesh), 3rd edi (Dhaka: Islamic Publication, 1981), p. 14. \
169 A.S. Huque and M.Y. Akhter, The Ubiquity of Islam, p.216.
155
misconceptions about various Islamic practices. The bahas were generally not about lost
glory or injustices inflicted on Muslims but to teach the faithful correct norms of Islamic
behaviour. It is true that many debates ended into ugly quarrels, but it gave the Bengali
Muslims a chance for social interaction with Muslims beyond their village border, led to
greater mobilisation and gave them a better understanding of their religious identity.17o
Rafiuddin Ahmed in an exhaustive study of Bengal Muslims (1871-1906) traces these
religious meetings to the traditional practices of earlier reformists of Bengal and argues
that these waz mahfils united the Muslim masses, enlightened them to be better Muslims,
but often alienated the non-Muslims of the villages, and thus undermined the syncretic
cultural traditions in Bengal. l7l The present fate of Bangladesh's minorities (discussed in
detail in the succeeding chapter) also indicates their socio-cultural isolation from the
majority community. The enhanced religious consciousness of the Muslims have
coincided with the rise of orthodox Islam and the corresponding mental and physical
oppressions of Hindus at various levels.
Madrassas, Mosques and Shrines
As already discussed, madrassas are Islamic seminaries or educational institutions
which imparts religious based knowledge in particular. The students from these
seminaries are largely brain-washed with a kind of world view incompatible with and
markedly different from those pass outs from secular educational institutions. The
ideological indoctrination makes them fit recruits for extremist organisations fighting for
the establishment of an Islamic state. The products of madrassas outside government
control often harbour a dogmatic mindset and act as cultural policemen. l72 The
torchbearers of political Islam in Bangladesh are financed from multiple external sources
and the government has no control over the channeling of money and resources for
charitable and religious purposes. Religious education seems to have made great
progress with the suppression of secular education. It is reported that "In 84,000 villages
170 Asim Roy, "Impact ofIslamic Revival and Refonn in Colonial Bengal and Bengal Muslim Identity", in Asim Roy, n. 46, Islam in History, p. 66.
171 Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, n.2, pp. 103-104.
172 It may be noted that the_dreaded Taliban was born in similar Madrassas in Pakistan. See "Refonning Madrassas" Bangladesh Observer, February 28, 2006.
156
of Bangladesh the number of madrassas is 74,000. While students in the primary schools
have doubled in the last decade, the number has multiplied by thirteen times in
madrassas.,,173 There are 3,312 government approved madrassas.174 Unofficial statistics
show that there are 8,000 private madrassas under the Bangladesh Qawmi madrassa
Education Board and thousands more which are beyond governmental control and thus
are not registered nor have their curriculum approved by the state.175 Scholars working
on madrassas and the pattern of education point out that nearly 3.34 million students are
now studying at Bangladesh's thousands of madrassas, which is five times higher as
compared to Pakistan. 176 It may be noted that Bangladesh has the highest ratio of
mosques per kilometers. It is reported that there are over 200, 000 mosques spread over
approximately 55,26 sq. miles of territory. 177
Apart from mosques, there also exist a number of socio-culturallreligious
organisations, which work for popularizing Islamic ideals. Prominent among them are
the Islamic Foundation, Bangladesh Islamic Centre, Islam Prachar Samity, Koranic
School society, world Islam Mission, Bangladesh Jamaitul Mudorresiz Itlehadul Ummah
and the Council for Islamic Socio-cultural Organisation. The above organisations have
varied roles like preaching Islam, pUblication and research of Islamic literature, study of
Koran and Hadith etc. The Islamic Foundation, for instance, imparts training and co
ordinates the functioning of the Imams. It sponsors and encourages discussions, seminars
and workshops and carries out research on aspects of Islam. It's most significant work
being the publication of the Islamic Encyclopedia. The Bangladesh Masjid mission works
to transform mosques into centres of socio religious aWakening. The Islam Prachar
Samitis work in the field of conversion to Islam among non-believers, and helps deviant
Muslim youth in rehabilitation and vocational trainings. The Koranic schools stresses on
173 Asim Roy, "Introduction" in Is/am in History, n. 46, p. 12.
174 Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh 1984-85: Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 1985).
175 "lehadi Terror in Bengladesh", Asian Centre for Human Rights, September 7, 2005.
176 K.M. Mohsin, "Trends ofIslam in Bangladesh" in S.R. Chakravarthy and V. Naraina, (ed.), Bangladesh History and Culture Vol. 1, (New Delhi: S.A. Publishers, 1986), p. 35.
177 Salahiddin Ahmed, Bangladesh: Past and Present (Delhi: A. P. H. Publishing Corporation, 2004), p. 315.
157
character building and inculcating moral values and the Bangladesh Islamic centre
undertakes translation works from foreign language to Bengali, and extends financial
support to those working in this field. The Bangladesh Jamaitul Muddare has a Wide
network of teachers and students of various madrassas as its members and uses their
services for promotion of ideals of Islamic way of life. The world Islam Mission has a
humanistic mission of helping the poor, orphans and disabled, whereas the Ittehadul
Ummah and the Council of Islamic Socio-cultural Organisation try to coordinate and
bring about unity among Islamic bodies in Bangiadesh.178
Saints and Shrines
There are numerous tales of holy men who brought Islam to Bengal from West
Asia. It is reported that manuscripts as old as 17th century tell the story of Saint Shah
Jalal of Sylhet. The saint is believed to be a Yemeni Arab who brought with him a
sample of soil from his land to search and settle in a region that had the same soil quality.
The story needs mentioning owing to its popularity through oral traditions in Bangladesh,
regarding the advent of Islam.179 There are numerous shrines to Shah Jalal along with
other Saints allover Bangladesh. The commonality found from the oral traditions about
the saints is the supernatural powers associated with clearing the tiger, snakes and
crocodile infested forests and the power to breathe life into another or travel great
distance with lightening speed.180 It is the devoted followers of saints who build Mazars
and mosques and the sites soon acquire a mystical aura and attracts pious Muslims for
Ziyarat (visitations). Bangladesh has a rich Sufi cultural tradition of respecting a roving
mendicant or the pirs. The Shrines and Dargahs of the pirs are places of venerations.
God-fearing Bangladeshis throng these sites to be helped by the saints, ''to receive
training as well as knowledge through Tareeqat (mystic procedures and practices), at the
feet of divine, well versed and well accomplished in the knowledge and practices of
178 Ibid .• pp. 35-36.
179 S. Uddin, Constructing Bangladesh, n. 5, pp. 146-148.
180 Ibid.
158
Sharia who is capable of imparting the same to those who approach him desiring such
knowledge and discipline".lsl
With the growth ofWahhabism and Islamist parties, the sufi practices have come
under attack. ls2 There are sign boards, which remind visitors not to indulge in forbidden
practices like prostrating and performing vows at shrines. IS3 Despite the protests from
fundamentalists, sufi traditions remain indelible aspects of Bengali Islam. Chittagong in
the South Eastern part of Bangladesh has a rich history of sufi practices and mystical
orders, and thus has not been a comfortable place for Tablighi activists who insist on a
rigid sharia-centered Islam. No wonder, there are often media reports about the Tablighi
preachers being prevented from entering the area and even physically assaulted by the
local people. l84
Other Islamic Traditions
The analysis of popular Islam in Bangladesh today would remain incomplete
without a mention of the liberal traditions and practices of rural Bengal. Notable among
them are the buffalo sacrifices, music and songs and dikr (chanting of God'~ name),
which persist even today despite the fundamentalist upsurge. Such traditions represented
by the better known maijbhandari sufi brotherhood, which commands one of the largest
spiritual groupings in Bangladesh today. ISS The maijbhandari cult reveres the memory of
Hazrat Shah Sufi Syed Golamur Rahman, who was popularly known as Baba Bhandari.
Hazrat Shah's teachings along with that of five other holy saints form the spiritual basis
of the Maijbhandari tariqa (order). To mark Baba's birthday commemoration, lakhs of
people visit the forty odd shrines and fmally, the main centre to be a part of the ritual
ceremonies.186 The celebrations begin with the chanting of the names of the saints, the
181 Nafeesuddin Siddiqui, Mystic procedures and Practices in Proceedings of the Islamic Cultural Studies Conference, August 11-12, 1979. North Brisbane, Vol. II, p. 70.
182 Wahhabis do not believe in sainthood and the role of a saint as a mediator on ·their behalf and God. They totally surrender to the five pillars of Islamic faith only.
183 Sufia Uddin, Constructing Bangladesh, n. 5, p. 148.
184 Sikand, "The Tablighi", n.159, p. 118.
185 Peter J. Bertocci, "A Sufi Movement in Bangladesh: The Maijbhandari Tariqa and Its Followers", Contributions to Indian Sociology, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2006), p. 1.
186 Ibid., pp. 6-8
159
utterances of the Kalima and Allah's name and finally seeking blessings from the Pir in
the form of touching his feet. The gatherings witness initiation ceremonies where a
faithful approaches the pir to become his disciple (murid). The commemoration ends
with the distribution of tabarruk (blessed food).187
Musical performances constitute the core of maijbhandari mahphils. The mystical
outpourings are accompanied by the dhol and ektara (musical instruments also used by
the Bauls of Bengal) and differ from Qawwali (Sufi musical traditions in north India and
Pakistan, due to its spontaneity and collective participation. 188 Bengali Islam's mysticism
also has pir worship in its fold. Pir is a Persian word meaning ancient or elderly. In
Bengal it implies a Muslim spiritual guru/guide. Pirs have had no mean contribution to
the increase of Islamic values in Bangladesh socieity. Apart from spiritual guidance,
people visit them to ask them to pray for general well being, to be free from illness, to
secure material benefits and for the fulfillment of their wishes. Pirs observe urs annual
festivals and even the head of the state visits them for his blessings.189 Pir adulation has
been subjected to severe criticism and considered shirk by the Wahhabis. Maulana
Akram Khan in his journal Masik Mohammadi has condemned the reverence to "social
customs like chehlun, matan or siyam. These were social gatherings where prayers were
offered for the peace of departed souls, but which were not based on scriptural authority.
The building of mausoleums over graves, the offering of prayers by the graveside,
making manta or vows at shrines was similarly considered haram. Man's desire to seek
intercession between himself and God through holy men like pirs and sanyasis was
condemned because he believed that Islam recognised no intermediary between man and
God.,,190 Bengali Islam has thrived in spite of the lack of consensus on such matters and
pirs in Bangladesh continue to command great respect and social acceptance. Although
popular Islam has survived the relentless opposition from the orthodoxy, its saliency and
187 There is a striking similarity with the Hindu rituals of buffalo sacrifice during the Durga Puja celebrations, which brings the entire village together. See Madeleine Biardeau, "The Sani tree and the Sacrificial Buffalo", Contributions to Indian Sociology, Vol. 18, No.1, pp. 1-12.
188 Bertocci, "A Sufi Movement", n. 185, p. 6.
189 President H.M. Ershad often visited the pir of Alrosi, who was widely believed to have healing powers.
190 Tazeen M. Murshid, The Sacred and the Secular Bengal Muslim Discourses, /871-1977 (Calcutta: Oxford University press, 1995), p. 399.
160
appeal is waning due to the rise of political Islam since the lifting of ban on religion
oriented parties in 1976.
Peasant Islam
In explaining the peasant factor in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in
contemporary Bangladesh, some analysts have underlined the role played by the rural-
based pedantry from historical perspective. A leading Bangladeshi scholar has, for
instance, tried to locate Islam in the peasant society where Islam has not only provided an
identity but also constitutes their ''moral economy." In other words, Islam is considered
as integral part of Bangladesh, which is primarily agrarian with more than 80 percent of
people being rural-based having no access no modern method of cultivation. A majority
of them are landless or semi-landless and traditionally "known for their unpredictability,
their vacillating and non-committal nature and their propensity for violence, anarchy and
factiousness typical of most peasant societies.,,191 It is perhaps the raw and strong
emotion in them that help in the mobilisation of peasant by various groups, from Islamic
reformists through secular nationalists to fundamentalist and orthodox ullemas. The
peasants with their historical proclivity towards participatory means of protest have
played significant role even in the Faraizi and Wahhabi movements in the early 19th
century, the Pakistan movement of the 1940s and later, the Bangladeshi nationalist
struggle and in the upsurge of orthodoxy in Bangladeshi society.
To begin with, the 1947 partition of India and the emergence of Pakistan saw
massive peasant mobilisation against the exploitative and oppressive Hindu Zamindars,
bhadrolok-Mahajan triumvirate. In the struggle for existence Hindus and Muslims were
seen as separate entities.192 The Islamists got the opportunity to win away the peasantry
and created a support base for themselves in the countryside. Birth of Pakistan and
Islamic fraternity did very little to pull them from despair and the only change noticeable
was the replacement of the competitive Hindus with the West-wing elites. The
disenchantment with Muslim League politicians after partition gave way to nationalist
191 Hashmi, "Islam in Bangladesh Politics", n. 51, p. 101.
192 The social consciousness of the Bengal Muslims was high especially due to revivalist movements, spread of education political mobilization/activism and Muslim solidarity against Hindus. See, Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, n. 2, p.160.
161
movement for the separation of East Bengal from its West wing. In this struggle, the
ethnic identity of the Bengali Muslims proved to be a unifying factor and which led to the
installation of a secular regime and initiation of a secular ideology for governing the new
nation. The secular experiment soon became defunct with the imposition of statist Islam.
With an extended social network, Islam in Bangladesh gained wider acceptance in the
wake of the state failure to deliver welfare measures. The resultant poverty and insecurity
of the people of Bangladesh turned them towards religion. ''Their religiosity and inherent
peasant culture are conducive to the growth of fatalism as well." 193
It is thus argued that Islamic fundamentalism has relatively strong societal roots,
which provides the staying power and cannot be contained by force, without making
serious attempt at the transformation of society. It is the societal Islam in Bangladesh
which has played a significant role in providing legitimacy to the Islamists and
influencing both the state policy and official discourses, particularly concerning national
identity.
Anti-Indianism and Political Islam
Anti-Indianism among Bangladeshis is another important factor that has
contributed in no mean way to the rise of political Islam. Historically, the "Hindu phobia"
of Bengali M~lims, a legacy of the British colonial days, transforming into "Indophobia"
during the Pakistani period remained embedded in the psyche of the average Bengali
Muslims even though India acted as midwife in the birth of the new nation. The close
proximity of the nationalists with New Delhi became a political liability for the Mujib
government, so much so that its failure to deliver was attributed to interference and
pressure of India. The secular measures of the new government such as the constitutional
ban on religious parties and neutrality of the state in matters of faith were seen as
attempts to please the rulers in Delhi. "Bengali nationalist sentiment", according to an
193 Taj-ul Islam Rashmi, "Islamic Resurgence in Bangladesh: Genesis, Dynamics and Implications" in S. P. Limaye, M. Malik and R. G. Wirsing (eds.), Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia (Honolulu Hawaii: Asia Pacific Centre of Security Studies, 2004), p. 71
162
observer, was ''too strong to tolerate a high level of Indian influence in Bangladesh
affairs .,,194
The traditional social divisions in Bangladesh are heavily influenced by the spirit
of nationalism based on religion and culture. In other words, either of the one is evoked
to mobilize the masses whenever the people have feIt threatened from outside.195 When
the Mujib government came down heavily against the collaborators during the first few
years of its rule, pro-Islamic people who sere otherwise known as devout Muslims were
brought under the state's surveillance and ''the reaction went deep down to the grass-root
level having a corroding effect. The propaganda that it was all done against the
"believers" at the instigation of Hindu India was taken to be true by a large section of the
rural population. This also led to the thought of establishing a Muslim Bengal from then
on, consciously or unconsciously.,,196
The direct intervention of the Indian military, doubtless, brought an end to
Bangladeshi suffering, but it robbed the Mukti Bahini of its pride of liberating the
country in their own terms. Maulana Bhashani, the old man of Bangladesh politics talked
of the necessity of Islamic socialism and was part of the anti-Mujib campaign.197
Bhashani in his public speeches was rhetorical about the greedy Marwari traders and
their economic manipUlative activities in Bengal. The nascent capitalist class had every
reason to feel inhibited by these threats. Small Bengali traders felt that the secular
policies of the Awami League would motivate the wily Hindu businessmen to return and
reclaim their abandoned property.198 Rise of communal tensions between Hindus and
Muslims in the later half of 19th century was due to the similar perceived economic and
social competition between the two main communities. The highly orthodox Wahabi and
194 Marcus Franda, Bangladesh: The First Decade (New Delhi: S.A. Publishers, 1982), p. 67.
195 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Group interests and Political Changes: Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh (New Delhi: SA Publishers, 1982), pp. 215-17.
196 Ahmad Moudud, Bangladesh: Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1999), p.52.
197 Islamic socialism highlights the egalitarianism of Islam. It makes no distinction between men on the basis of birth. It preaches Zakat and believes that the wealth of the society should not be monopolised by a particular section of society.
198 Basant Chatterjee, Inside Bangladesh Today: An Eye-witness Account (New Delhi: 1973), p. 43.
163
Faraizi movements were a result of communal tensions and responsible for the growth of
a coherent Muslim religious identity and heightened Muslim activism. l99
The anti-India sentiments found its favourite flogging horse in the Indo
Bangladesh friendship Treaty signed by the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and
Mujibur Rahman on March 19, 1972. The treaty was meant to promote mutual friendship,
cooperation and peace in the region for a period of twenty five years. The Joint
Declaration signed in Dhaka sought ''to give concrete expression to the similarity of
views, ideals and interest" between India and Bangladesh.2OO The treaty was claimed to
be "inspired by common deals of peace, secularism, democracy, socialism and
nationalism".201 The treaty of friendship was badly misinterpreted. Weird images of
India using Bangladeshi territory in case of a war with China were drawn. The entire
propaganda mills created an Indian phobia and whipped the pathological hatred of
Muslims against Hindu India The fear of being dubbed an Indian agent was great among
political parties and even mainstream parties. This explains why the A wami League
chose to maintain silence in the face of various criticism and clarifications on renewing
the Indo-Bangladesh Friendship Treaty.
Finally, the Bangladesh economy faced great challenges and the nationalist
fervour triggered during the liberation war was not enough to wish away problems of
hunger, famine and rehabilitation. India along with numerous other countries provided
assistance, but the vilifying campaign did not stop.202 The increased smuggling between
India and Bangladesh made India look like a country with hegemonistic designs, out to
dominate economy of small neighbours?03 The obsession of Bangladesh with the Indian
state strengthened the Islamists and led towards ideological polarisation within the
country. In a show of open defiance towards India, the junta rulers after the 1975 coup
undertook corrective measures to set right all that had gone wrong during Mujib's tenure.
199 Gopal Krishna "Islamisation in Nineteenth century Bengal" in Gopal Krishna (ed.), Contribution to South Asian Studies, (New Delhi: Vikas Publication, 1979), pp. 88-10.
200 See the Text of the Treaty in Foreign Affairs Record, March 1972, pp. 61-63.
201 Ibid., p. 63.
202 Total $ 850 million was given to Bangladesh in addition to food assistance worth $ 173 million and multilateral aid worth $ 350 million. Bangladesh Observer, March 26, 1974.
203 Ziring, Bangladesh from Mujib to Ershad, n. 7, p. 91.
164
President Ziaur Rahman, for instance, envisaged an independent foreign policy, which
made Bangladesh less dependent on India and drew Muslim countries closer to feel
connected with the Islamic Umma and meet the aspirations of the majority community in
the country. 204
Likewise, in the domestic plane Zia introduced linguistic-territorial-Islamic
nationalism, which he called "Bangladesh nationalism" in the place of linguistic
territorial-secular nationalism as it was felt that recognition of Islam was necessary to
counteract Indian influence. The imposition of a Bangladeshi Islamic identity as different
from its earlier Bengali identity assured his people that their country's identity would not
to be swamped with the Bengali identity, which explained the status of their ethnic
cousins in the Indian side of the border.
Islam Oriented parties
As noted, political isolation of the religion-based parties in Bangladesh ended
with the lifting of the ban in 1976. In the following decades, their number rose steadily
with almost identical goal of turning Bangladesh an Islamic state. The Government
intelligence sources in the later half of the 1970s revealed the existence of about 100
Islamic parties and organizations since the lifting of the ban.2os However, only 30
Islamic parties contested elections after the withdrawal of restrictions on them, which
include the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, Bangladesh Islami Front, Bangladesh ](hilafat
Andolon, Bangladesh Krishak Raj Islami Party, Bangladesh Muslim League (Jamir Ali),
Bangladesh Tanjimul Islam, Islami Al Zihad Dal, Islami Oikya Jote, Islami
Shashantantro Andolon, Islamic Dal, Zaker Party, Jamiate ulumaye Islami Bangladesh,
Islami Dal (Saifur), Bangladesh Inquilab Party, Bangladesh Islami Republican Party,
Muslim People Party, Bangladesh Khelafat Party, Muslim League (Yousuf), Muslim
League (Matin), Muslim league (Quader) and Jamayate Ulamaye Islami Front.
The Muslim League is one of those political parties in Bangladesh today that
traces its roots to Pakistani Muslim League in Bangladesh. It continues to nurture the
204 J.N. Dixit, Liberation and Beyond (Dhaka: University Press limited 1996), pp. 280-282.
205 Shakhawat Liton, "Islamic Parties Boom After the 1976 Ban Lifting", at http://www.thedailystar.net
165
dream that Bangladesh should be an Islamic state and campaign for changing the flag and
national anthem. Hostile to towards India, the Muslim League of Bangladesh has often
accused the government of being subservient to India.206 Committed to similar ideas and
goal, the Islamic Democratic League, the Justice Party and Nizam-e-Islam advocate the
principles of Islamic justice and talk of bringing present legal procedures and codes in
accordance with holy Koran and sunnah. They support closer ties with all the Islamic
countries. The Bangladesh Khilafat Andolan (BKA) is a new political outfit, which also
stresses on the introduction of Koranic instructions in education, reorganisation of Zakat
and wakfs. It needs mentioning that the BKA put up its candidate for the 1981
Presidential election and secured third largest share ofvotes.207
The mushrooming of Islam-based parties and organisations could be partly
attributed to the oil boom of the 1970s in West Asia, which enhanced the role and status
of Muslim states in global politics. The oil-led prosperity and its impact on the global
economy encouraged the Muslim groups to throw up an alternative political order based
on Islamic precepts and ideals. Highly dependent on the largesse from these oil rich
Islamic countries, Bangladesh remains susceptible to the policy directives of the Islamic
donors from outside.
To sum up, a variety of factors discussed above accounts for the Islamisation in
Bangladesh notwithstanding its local syncretistic cultural practices and unique historical
experiences including its emergence as an independent entity in defiance of a national
identity defined by Islam. While the failure of post-independence leadership prompted
Mujib's dictator-successors to sponsor Islamisation from above, the activities of the
Tabligh Jamaat • a grassroots-based puritan movement together with attempts at whipping
up Indophobia and mobilising the "peasant Islam" facilitated the process in Bangladesh
from below. Capping them all was the spread of Wahhabi school of thought through
thousands of Islamic seminaries (madrasas), which together with the culture of Jatwas
206 See Bangladesh Islamic parties at www.country-data.com!cgi-biniQuery/r-1199.html
207 The election manifestos of these parties were published in Bangladesh Times, December 25, 1979 cited in Emazuddin Ahamad and D. R. J. A. Nazneen, "Islam in Bangladesh: Revivalism or Power Politics?", Asian Survey, Vol. XXX, No.8, August 1990, p. 796.
166
and the delivery of Islamic justice by the rural ulema through traditional local institutions
like salish (village arbitration) underpinned the fundamentalist challenge in Bangladesh.
With the growing clout of the Islamist political parties and the disproportionate
influence they wielded in the 1990s onwards, the government failed to combat Islamic
extremism effectively, setting off the region-wide fear of Bangladesh as the "next
Afghanistan." The chapter IV makes an attempt to identify the factors that contributed to
the surge of Islamic extremism since the restoration of civilian rule in 1991 and brings to
the fore its baleful consequences on the society, particularly on the minority, women,
NGOs and the intelligentsia.
167