-
The copyright in this document is vested in Agip Kazakhstan
North Caspian Operating Company NV. ("Agip KCO"), as delegated
Operator, for and on behalf of the Contracting Companies under the
North Caspian Production Sharing Agreement dated 18th November
1997, as amended and supplemented. All rights reserved. Neither the
whole nor any part of this document may be reproduced, stored in
any retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means
(electronic, mechanical, reprographic, recording or otherwise)
without the prior written consent of Agip KCO.
KASHAGAN DEVELOPMENT EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM
AND FULL FIELD DEVELOPMENT
D-ISLAND DRILLING OPERATIONS HSE CASE
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000
REVISION A02
OCTOBER 2008
ABSTRACT The D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case is intended
to ensure compliance with the Republic of Kazakhstan Governments
legislation and demonstrate an integrated approach to HSE
management for the D-Island drilling completions and commissioning
(Perforations and Stimulations) program. It demonstrates to Agip
KCO, stakeholders, staff, shareholders, the regulator and the
public that essential controls are in place such that the major HSE
hazards & risks arising from rig and Island drilling operations
are both tolerable and reduced to as low as reasonably practicable
(ALARP).
Revision Record
A02 10/08 Issued for Approval D Pashley W Riizzi B Maggioni P02
08/08 Issued for Review D Pashley W Riizzi B Maggioni A01 07/08
Issued for Approval D Pashley W Riizzi B Maggioni P01 05/08 Issued
comment D Pashley W Riizzi B Maggioni Rev. Date Reason for Issue
Responsible Accountable Endorsed
NOTE: When editing this document, as it contains various
automatic fields / links, please ensure that the instructions in AK
Templates User Guide (GE00.KST.K61.GL.0001.000) are followed.
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 2
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Document Verification
RACIE Record
R esponsible: Name: D Pashley Job Title: : Head of Safety
Signed:
Date:
A ccountable: Name: W alter Rizzi Job Title: HSE & SD
Director
Signed:
Date:
C onsulted: See distribution list on Page iii
I nformed: See distribution list on Page iii
E ndorsed: Name: Bruno Maggioni Job Title: Operations
Director
Signed:
Date:
RACIE Terms R Responsible The person who actually produces the
document. A Accountable The person who has the answer for success
or failure of the quality and timeliness of the document. C
Consulted Those who must be consulted before the document is
published. I Informed Those who must be informed after the document
is published. E Endorsed Those who must approve the document before
publication.
Hold Record Marked Page Number (e.g. if there are hold
paragraphs in pages 4 and 6 specify 4, 6)
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 3
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Document Distribution Consulted Distribution List
Date Format (1) Addressee / Job Title Company Location (2)
09/08 EC D Island OIM AKCO AT
09/08 EC D island Drilling Superintendant AKCO AT
09/08 EC D Island HSE Coordinator AKCO AT
09/08 EC Well Completions and Intervention Superintendant AT
09/08 EC Well Operations Senior HSE Advisor AKCO AT 09/08 EC
Drilling Projects Engineer AKCO AT 09/08 EC Drilling Superintendant
(AT) AKCO AT 09/08 EC District Logistics Manager AKCO AT 09/08 EC
NCS OIM AKCO AT 09/08 EC Medical Response & Audit Coordinator
AKCO AT 09/08 EC Head of Safety AKCO AT 09/08 EC Head of Emergency
Response AKCO AT
Informed Distribution List
Date Format (1) Addressee / Job Title Company Location (2)
09/08 EC Operations Director Agip KCO AT 09/08 EC HSE & SD
Director Agip KCO AT 09/08 EC Well Operations Manager Agip KCO AT
09/08 EC Well Construction Agip KCO AT 09/08 EC Head of Well
Operations Engineering Agip KCO AT 09/08 EC Geosciences Manager
Agip KCO DH 09/08 EC EP HSE Manager Agip KCO AT 09/08 EC Kashagan
Safety & Risk Manager Agip KCO LN 09/08 EC Health Services
Manager Agip KCO AT 09/08 EC SIMOPS Cordinator Agip KCO AT 09/08 EC
Francesco Doberti Drilling Project Manager Saipem AT 09/08 EC Serik
Jumagaleyev HSE Coordinator Saipem AT
NOTE: (1) OHC Original Hard Copy / ECElectronic Copy / HC Hard
Copy / EDMSElectronic Document Management System (2) AL-Almaty /
AS-Astana / AT-Atyrau / BT-Bautino / DH-The Hague / LN-London /
MI-Milan
Revision Tracking Rev. Date Description of Revision P01 05/08
Issued for comment A01 07/08 Issued for approval P02 09/08 Updated
and Issued for Review A02 10/08 Issued For Approval
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 4
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
ACRONYMS
Abbreviation Meaning ACV Air Cushion Vehicle AEGL-2 Acute
Exposure Guidelines Level 2 Agip KCO Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian
Operating Company N.V. ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable API
American Petroleum Institution
Arktos Amphibious tracked escape vehicle ASME American Society
of Mechanical Engineers AUEB Alberta Energy and Utilities Board BA
Breathing Apparatus BEPO Best Environmental Practical Option BOD
Basis Of Design BOP Blow-Out Preventer Bopd/BOPD Barrels (US) of
Oil per Day BOPDe Barrels of Oil Per Day equivalent CAC Central
Asia Centre CALPUFF California Puff Model (air quality dispersion
model) CAM Congestion Assessment Method CEP Caspian Environmental
Programme CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics CMS Corporate Management
System CHCD Closed Hole Circulation Drilling CONOP Combined
Operations CPC Caspian Pipeline Consortium CT Coiled Tubing DCS
Distributed Control System DeMS Development Management System DEP
Design Engineering Procedures E&P Exploration & Production
EC Emergency Coordinator EER Escape Evacuation and Rescue EIA
Environmental Impact Assessment EP Experimental Programme ERT
Emergency Response Team ERZ Emergency Response Zone ESD Emergency
Shut-Down ESMP Environmental, Social migration and Monitoring
Plan
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 5
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
FEED Front End Engineering Design FERA Fire & Explosion Risk
Assessment FFD Full Field Development FID Final Investment
Decision
GBS Gravity Based Structure GU State Enterprise H&ER Hazard
& Effect Register HAZID HAZard IDentification study HAZOP
HAZard and OPerability study HEMP Hazard and Effect Management
Process HF Human Factors
HFE Human Factors Engineering HIA Health Impact Assessment HRO
Human Resources Organisation HRA Health Risk Assessment
HSE & SD Health, Safety, Environmental and Sustainable
Development HSE-MS HSE Management System HTHP High Temperature High
Pressure IA Impact Assessment IB Ice Breaker
IBSV Ice Breaking Supply Vessel IBSSV Ice Breaking Supply
Standby Vessel IALA International Association of Lighthouse
Authorities IBEEV Ice Breaking Emergency Evacuation Vessel IDLH
Immediately Dangerous to Health and Life I,HUC Installation,
Hook-Up and Commissioning ILO International Labour Organisation IPF
Instrument Protective System IRPA Individual Risk Per Annum IVB
Independent Verification Body LQ Living Quarters M-NC Makat North
Caucasus MAC Manual Alarm Callpoint MAH Major Accident Hazard MAEF
Major Accident Event Frequency MANCOM Management Committee MODU
Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit MOPO Manual Of Permitted
Operations
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 6
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
MPC Maximum Permitted Concentration MSL Mean Sea Level OGP Oil
& Gas Producers organisation OIM Offshore Installation Manager
OMCC Offshore Marine Control Centre OPCOM Operations Committee OPDS
Opportunity and Project Development System OSC On Scene Commander
PEM Physical Effects Modelling PEP Project Execution Plan PFEER
Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response PFP
Passive Fire Protection
PMS Project Management system PSA Production Sharing Agreement
PSD Process Shutdown System PPE Personal Protective Equipment PTD
Permanent Total Disability PTW Permit To Work
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment RAM Risk Assessment Matrix
RCH Rotating Control Head RoK Republic of Kazakhstan RTJ Ring
Type Joint SAFOP SAFe OPerating procedures SBV Standby Vessel SCBA
Self Contained Breathing Apparatus SCE Safety Critical Element SD
Sustainable Development SDT Shallow Draft Tug SEP Stakeholder
Engagement Plan SIA Strategic Impact Assessment SIL Safety
Integrity Level SIMOPs SIMultaneous OPerations SOLAS Safety Of Life
At Sea SPZ Sanitary Protection Zone TCP Tubing Conveyed Perforating
TEMPSC Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft TMS
Technology management System
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 7
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
TPD Technical Project Documentation TR Temporary Refuge TRIC
Toolbox Talk Risk Identification Card TRIF Temporary Refuge
Impairment Frequency TWA Time Weighted Average VOC Volatile Organic
Compound VMS Value Management System WES Well Examination Scheme
WSE Written Scheme of Examination
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 8
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
MANAGEMENT SUMMARY Background On behalf of seven companies and
under the North Caspian Sea PSA (Production Sharing Agreement),
Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company N.V. (Agip KCO) is
the Operator of the appraisal and development operations in the
Kazakhstan sector of the North Caspian Sea. Successful exploration
of the Kashagan Field, will lead to Full Field Development (FFD)
via the Experimental Program (EP) phase. The principles governing
Agip KCO operations are stated in the EP Statement of Requirements.
The EP Statement of Requirements describes those requirement
considered essential to ensure Safe and Efficient operations during
the Construction, Drilling, Installation, Hook-Up, Commissioning,
Operations and Logistics for A and D Blocks. The document addresses
the minimum requirements to achieve the above i.e. transportation
of offshore personnel, provision of temporary living quarters
barges, temporary refuge systems, escape craft and logistical
requirements, in order to ensure a safe, co-ordinated, cohesive and
integrated approach for all EP Offshore related activities. The EP
phase includes the development of D-Island drilling, production,
and processing facilities, which are located 70 km south-south east
of Atyrau on a 225m long and 221m wide artificial island in the
north Caspian Sea. Construction of processing and utilities
facilities, on barges connected to D-Island by bridges, is
currently underway. A drilling, completions, and well commissioning
programme commenced in 2006 and is scheduled to be completed late
in 2009. The program will not include well testing. Therefore
reservoir fluids are not expected at the surface unless there were
to be a problem with well control e.g. a kick. Saipem has been
contracted by Agip KCO to undertake the D-Island drilling program
using the rigs 401 and 402 located on the man-made drilling island.
The rigs have been designed and built by National Oilwell Varco
(NOV) to meet the specific requirements of drilling at D-Island.
SCOPE OF HSE CASE The focus of this HSE Case is to present an
integrated approach to HSE management. This HSE Case covers
drilling and completions on D-Island, the accommodation barges,
third party equipment, other activities where they interface with
D-Island activities, and marine (excluding those associated with
construction activities) and helicopter operations within a 500m
zone of the artificial island. All other activities required for
the exploration program i.e. rig mobilisation/demobilisation,
construction, aviation and marine operations outside the 500m zone
and supply base operations, are also excluded. This Drilling
Operations HSE case supersedes previous versions of the case and is
complemented by HSE Execution Plans for the Installation, Hook-Up
and Commissioning programmes. This Drilling Operations HSE case
will be maintained as a live document and revised as appropriate
during the development/operation of D-Island. OBJECTIVES OF HSE
Case The main objectives of the HSE Case are as follows: 1. To
ensure compliance with the Republic of Kazakhstan Governments
legislation and demonstrate an
integrated approach to HSE management for the D-Island drilling
operations programme. 2. To ensure that all HSE inputs are provided
at all stages of the decision making process. 3. To provide the
means for ensuring adherence to Agip KCOs HSE policies and, in so
doing,
demonstrate compliance with them. 4. To establish a common
understanding of specific HSE requirements, and ensure awareness of
these
requirements. 5. To demonstrate to Agip KCO management and
staff, contractors, shareholders, the regulator and the
public that essential controls are in place such that the major
HSE hazards & risks arising from Rig and Island operations are
both tolerable and reduced to as low as reasonably practicable
(ALARP).
Major HSE risks are defined as those associated with major
accident hazards which have the potential to cause multiple
fatalities or massive environmental or socio-cultural effect. These
consequences are intolerable and all possible causes need to be
analysed and controlled and suitably documented in the HSE
Case.
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 9
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Workplace hazards arising from hazardous activities, e.g. hot
work, electrical grinding, etc. are controlled through the Permit
to Work (PTW) system, toolbox meetings and pre-job safety meetings
and other safe working practices defined by the Agip KCO HSE
Management System and are not assessed in the detailed hazard
analysis. Environmental effects arising from the normal and
abnormal operations will be controlled through operational,
environmental and waste management procedures. These effects and
their controls are identified in the HSE Case but are not assessed
in detail. METHOD USED TO PREPARE HSE CASE This Drilling Operations
HSE Case documents HAZIDs, Hazard and Effects Registers, and Bowtie
analyses for major HSE risks. The Hazard and Effects Register and
Bowtie diagrams have been reviewed as part of the HEMP activities
for the development of this Drilling Operations HSE Case and
additional items identified at the HAZIDs and HAZOP from the
Perforation and Stimulations activities have also been
incorporated. Structured risk reviews have been performed by
multidisciplinary teams with representation from Agip-KCO and the
Drilling Contractor Saipem and other Service Companies
(Halliburton, Schlumberger & Baker-Oil Tools). The reviews used
a hazard checklist approach as a basis for the identification of
potential HSE hazards that met the requirements of the Agip-KCO
HEMP Standard. The studies determined whether adequate
safeguards/mitigating measures were in place, or were required to
be put in place. Those hazards with the potential to cause multiple
fatalities or a major environmental effect were, where appropriate,
further analysed by constructing hazard bow-tie diagrams to
highlight the preventive and recovery measures. Of the major HSE
risks identified, the release of reservoir fluids, (blowout), at
D-Island presents the greatest societal HSE risk. The risk of
blowout has been the subject of a large number of additional risk
assessments and studies as well as the bowtie review mentioned
above. A SIMOPs review of concurrent Rig 401 and 402 drilling
activities has been completed. All possible sources of
environmental impact were identified and their significance
assessed, to ensure the adequacy of the control and mitigation
measures. All occupational health hazards that may arise during
normal operations were also identified, together with their
associated controls. HSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM This HSE Management
System describes the system and arrangements in place for managing
the HSE risks associated with drilling operations on D-Island. The
HSE-MS ensures the identification and assessment of hazards
throughout rig operations; that all reasonably practicable measures
have been or are being taken to prevent, control or mitigate these
hazards; that audits are conducted to provide the assurance that
the HSE-MS is being adhered to; and that all activities, engaged in
or contracted to other companies, are managed in a comparable way.
IDENTIFIED MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS The hazard identification process
identified all potential HSE hazards and effects and recorded them
in the Hazard and Effects Register. Ten of these hazards were
ranked as major HSE risks requiring ALARP demonstration:
Hydrocarbons in reservoir (Release of reservoir fluids); Persons
at height (Fall of personnel to a lower level); Explosion (Damage
to well bore); Explosion (Injury to personnel); Overhead equipment
(Loss of control / dropped object); On water transport (Loss of
control); On land transport (Loss of load); Helicopter transport
(Helicopter impact / ditching); Asphyxiates (Loss of O2
atmosphere);
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 10
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Toxic gas (Release of hydrogen sulphide from neighbouring
facility); and Health Hazards (Exposure to food and water borne
bacteria); and Lifting operations.
IDENTIFIED SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS No residual
environmental effects from normal operations were assessed as
significant. Three significant residual environmental effects from
accidental events were identified:
Blowout
Hazardous material spill Spill as a consequence of fire
ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES The primary objective of the HSE Case
has been broken down into four specific objectives and assessed
against defined acceptance criteria, as follows: 1. Demonstrate
that suitable HSE studies have been undertaken and suitable HSE
management
arrangements are in place to ensure that the specification and
conduct of the drilling operations, well services, local marine and
helicopter operations are fit for purpose and safe for
operation:
Industry standard frameworks were used to review the operations
HSE management arrangements against the essential requirements of
an effective HSE-MS. The operations HSE-MS has been structured as a
series of expectations and demonstrates how Agip KCO will meet
these expectations through its management, policies and operational
procedures. Where such essential arrangements are either not in
place or of the required standard, then corrective actions have
been identified in the Remedial Action Plan (Part 6). All
arrangements will be subject to continuous performance monitoring,
regular auditing and periodic management review to assure that
practice meets the agreed standards. It is concluded that, on
completion of the identified Remedial Action items, suitable HSE
management arrangements will be in place to ensure that the
specification and conduct of the drilling operations, LQ
arrangements, and local marine and helicopter operations are fit
for purpose and safe for operation. 2. Demonstrate that all
foreseeable and credible HSE hazards, including Major Accident
Hazards,
have been identified, assessed and are suitably controlled such
that risks to people and the environment are ALARP:
Nine major accident risks have been identified, based on
comparisons with industry hazard checklists and formal reviews by
experienced specialists, and the major hazard register is
considered to be complete. Sufficient risk reduction measures in
the form of independent and effective threat barriers, recovery
preparedness measures and escalation factor controls have been
identified to meet the acceptance criteria for hazards, where it is
practicable to do so. The HSE-critical tasks identified as
essential to provide or maintain these barriers and controls have
been or will be included in appropriate written operating
procedures, job safety analyses, working practices, job task lists
or training standards. A Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) has
been prepared which defines the limits of concurrent drilling
operations and simultaneous construction operations. For less
severe, workplace health and safety hazards, reference has been
made in Parts 3 and 4 of the HSE Case to the arrangements in place
to manage these hazards. For less severe environmental effects
arising from normal and abnormal operations, reference has been
made in Parts 3 and 4 of the HSE Case to the controls and
procedures in place to manage them. It is concluded that all
credible and foreseeable major accident hazards have been
identified and, subject to the completion of the Remedial Action
Plan, suitable and sufficient barriers and controls will be in
place such that risks to people and the environment are ALARP. 3.
Demonstrate that there is adequate provision for the full and safe
sheltering, escape, evacuation,
rescue and recovery of all personnel to a place of safety in the
event of a major accident:
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 11
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Hydrocarbon related hazards (blowout during drilling) and toxic
gas hazards (hydrogen sulphide release from A-Island) were
evaluated as requiring sheltering of personnel and, in the worst
case, evacuation. Sufficient provisions and arrangements have been
identified for the sheltering, escape, evacuation, rescue and
recovery of personnel to a place of safety. Where certain areas
identified require confirmation of detailed issues, then corrective
actions have been provided in the Remedial Action Plan (Part 6). It
is concluded that subject to the completion of the Remedial Action
Plan there will be adequate provision to assure a high probability
of successfully achieving safe sheltering, escape, evacuation,
rescue and recovery of all personnel in the event of a major
accident. 4. Demonstrate that continuous improvement in the
management of HSE hazards will occur in the
workplace: Effective application of the HSE-MS arrangements will
be required to enable continuous improvement in the management of
all HSE hazards and effects at the workplace. The management of
workplace hazards must be subject to continuous performance
monitoring, regular auditing and periodic management review to
assure that practice meets the agreed standards. It is concluded
that provided that the HSE-MS is effectively implemented continuous
improvement in the management of all HSE hazards and effects will
occur in the workplace. CONCLUSION The methods used to develop the
HSE Case provide a systematic and thorough assessment of the
potential hazards associated with D-Island drilling and completions
operations. Competent multi-disciplinary personnel were involved
throughout the process, supported by independent HSE specialists.
The HSE Case demonstrates that, to the extent possible, all
relevant hazards and effects, particularly those with the potential
to cause a Major Accident Hazard, have been identified and
assessed, and suitable and sufficient controls will be in place,
together with plans for recovery in the event that control is lost.
There are no action items identified in the Remedial Action Plan
which prevent operations continuing although these actions should
be completed as soon as practicable. The objectives of the HSE Case
are considered as to be met and, therefore, the drilling and
completions operations are safe to continue.
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 12
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION 20 1.1 GENERAL 20 1.2 HOLDER
AND ADMINISTRATOR OF THE HSE CASE 20 1.3 BACKGROUND 20 1.4 SCOPE
AND OBJECTIVES 21 1.4.1 Scope 21 1.4.2 Main Objectives 21 1.4.3
Detailed Objectives 21 1.4.4 Demonstrating Achievement of the
Objectives 22 1.5 APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT OF HSE CASE 22 1.5.1
Project HSE Management System 22 1.5.2 Formal HSE Assessment 22
1.5.3 Outstanding Actions 23 1.6 STRUCTURE 23 1.7 USES 24 1.8
REVIEW PERIODS AND UPDATES 25 2 DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS AND
FACILITIES 27 2.1 INTRODUCTION 27 2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
27 2.3 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION, GEOLOGY AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS
29 2.3.1 Geographical Location 29 2.3.2 Safety Zone 30 2.3.3
Geo-technical Information 30 2.3.4 Meteorological Conditions 30 2.4
WELLS CHARACTERIZATION 31 2.4.1 Post-Salt Section 31 2.4.2 Salt
Section 31 2.4.3 Pre-Salt Section (Reservoir Section) 31 2.5
DRILLING AND COMPLETIONS PROGRAMME 32 2.5.1 Drilling Methodology 32
2.6 COMPLETIONS METHODOLOGY 34 2.7 COMMISSIONING METHODOLOGY 35
2.7.1 Perforation System 35 2.7.2 Stimulation System 35 2.8
INSTALLATION LAYOUT 35 2.8.1 Island/LQ Orientation 35 2.8.2 Main
Dimensions 36 2.8.3 Island Layout 36 2.9 ISLAND STABILITY AND
INTEGRITY 37 2.9.1 Well Design 37 2.10 DRILLING RIGS 38 2.10.1
Drillers Cabin and Control Panel 38 2.10.2 Rotary equipment 39
2.10.3 Pipe Handling System 39 2.10.4 Drill Floor 39 2.10.5 High
Pressure Mud System 40 2.10.6 Mud Treatment System 40 2.10.7
Pressure Control System 42 2.10.8 Choke Manifold and Mud-Gas
Separator 43 2.10.9 Trip Tank 44 2.10.10 Cementing System 44 2.11
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 44
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 13
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
2.12 POWER GENERATION AND UTILITIES 45 2.12.1 Main Power
Generation System Island 45 2.12.2 Emergency Power and Lighting
Systems 46 2.12.3 Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) 46 2.12.4
Lighting And Small Power Requirements 47 2.13 TELECOMMUNICATION AND
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 47 2.13.1 Navigation Aids 47 2.13.2
Communication Systems 47 2.13.3 External Communications 48 2.14
FIRE & GAS I EMERGENCY SHUT DOWN 49 2.14.1 Fire and Gas
Detection 49 2.14.2 Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) 50 2.14.3
Hazardous Area Classification 50 2.14.4 Active Fire Protection
Systems 50 2.15 WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 52 2.15.1 Liquid waste 52
2.15.2 Drains 52 2.15.3 Solid Wastes 52 2.15.4 Sewage System 52
2.15.5 Spillage Management 53 2.15.6 Airborne Emissions 53 2.16
UTILITY SYSTEMS AND PIPING REQUIREMENTS 53 2.16.1 Diesel Oil
Filling and Transfer System 53 2.16.2 Water Systems 54 2.16.3 Rig
Air System 55 2.17 COMMON SYSTEMS 55 2.17.1 Mud Mixing System 55
2.17.2 Barite Storage 56 2.17.3 Bulk Storage 56 2.17.4 Drum and
Sack Storage 57 2.17.5 Island Paint Store 57 2.17.6 Island
Explosives and Radioactive materials store 57 2.18 EMERGENCY
EVACUATION AND RESCUE 57 2.19 PERSONNEL SAFETY AND HEALTH 57 2.19.1
Safety Showers and Eyewash Stations 57 2.19.2 Personal Protective
Equipment 57 2.20 SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT IDENTIFIED AS HSE CRITICAL
57 2.21 SHAPAGAT LIVING QUARTERS (LQ/TR) BARGE 58 2.21.1 Shapagat
Particulars 58 2.21.2 Power systems 59 2.21.3 Emergency Power 59
2.21.4 Escape Lighting 59 2.21.5 CCTV 59 2.21.6 F&G detection
system 59 2.21.7 Active Fire Fighting 60 2.21.8 Passive fire
protection system 60 2.21.9 Helideck 60 2.21.10 Temporary Refuge
(TR) 60 2.21.11 Shapagat Sanitation and Drains 60 2.21.12 Diesel
systems 61 2.21.13 Seawater system 61 2.21.14 Heating, Ventilation
and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System 61 2.21.15 Potable Water System
61 2.21.16 Ballast System 62 2.21.17 Breathing Air 62 2.22
KARLYGASH LQ/TR BARGE 62 2.22.1 Karlygash Particulars 62
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 14
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
2.22.2 Power systems 63 2.22.3 Emergency Power 63 2.22.4 Escape
Lighting 63 2.22.5 CCTV 63 2.22.6 F&G detection system 63
2.22.7 Active Fire Fighting 64 2.22.8 Passive fire protection
system 64 2.22.9 Helideck 64 2.22.10 Temporary Refuge (TR) 64
2.22.11 Diesel systems 65 2.22.12 Seawater system 65 2.22.13 Liquid
Waste Management System 65 2.22.14 Heating, Ventilation and Air
Conditioning (HVAC) System 65 2.22.15 Potable Water System 65
2.22.16 Breathing Air 65 2.22.17 Medical Facilities - Hospital 66
2.22.18 Telecommunications 66 2.22.19 Public Address and General
Alarm System 67 2.23 ICE BREAKING EMERGENCY EVACUATION VESSEL
(IBEEV) 67 2.23.1 IBEEV Particulars 67 2.23.2 Power distribution
systems 68 2.23.3 Combustion air System 68 2.23.4 Emergency
Breathing air system 68 2.23.5 Active Fire Fighting 68 2.23.6
Passive fire protection system 69 2.23.7 Diesel Engine Exhaust
Cooling system 69 3 HSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 90 3.1 INTRODUCTION 90
3.1.1 Agip KCO HSE MS Model 90 3.2 POLICY AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
93 3.2.1 Policy 93 3.2.2 HSE Strategic Objectives for D-Island 93
3.3 RESOURCES, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 95 3.3.1 Resources 95
3.3.2 Roles and Responsibilities 95 3.3.3 Management of Personnel
96 3.3.4 HSE Advisor 96 3.3.5 Organisational Structure and
Responsibilities 96 3.4 HSE SPECIFIC PROCESS 99 3.4.1 HSE Cases 99
3.4.2 Hazard and Effect Management 100 3.4.3 Emergency Preparedness
& Response (ER) 104 3.4.4 Incident, Investigation and Reporting
(IIR) 106 3.5 PLANNING (PLAN) 107 3.5.1 Objectives, Targets and
Programmes 107 3.5.2 HSE Planning 107 3.5.3 Legal & Other
Requirements 108 3.6 IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION (DO) 109 3.6.1
Contractor Management 109 3.6.2 Training 110 3.6.3 Communication
111 3.6.4 Control of documents 113 3.6.5 Procedures 114 3.6.6 HSE
At The Workplace 115 3.6.7 Medical Fitness 115 3.6.8 Maintenance
and Inspection 115 3.6.9 Waste Management 116
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 15
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
3.6.10 Security Management 116 3.6.11 Simultaneous Operations
116 3.7 CHECKING (CHECK) 118 3.7.1 Evaluation of Compliance 118
3.7.2 Asset Integrity 118 3.7.3 Drilling Operational Monitoring 119
3.7.4 Management of Change 120 3.7.5 Nonconformity, Corrective
& Preventative Action 120 3.7.6 Control of Records 121 3.7.7
Internal Audit 122 3.8 MANAGEMENT REVIEW (ACT) 123 4 HAZARD AND
EFFECTS MANAGEMENT PROCESS 125 4.1 OVERVIEW OF HEMP PROCESS 125 4.2
HEMP DURING DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 125 4.3 HEMP ACTIVITIES
DURING PREVIOUS OPERATIONAL PHASES 127 4.4 HEMP ACTIVITIES FOR
DRILLING ACTIVITIES 127 4.4.1 Identification of Potential Hazards
127 4.4.2 Risk Assessment 127 4.4.3 Hazard and Effects Register 131
4.5 IDENTIFIED MAJOR HSE RISKS 131 4.5.1 Control of Major HSE Risks
132 4.5.2 HSE Critical Tasks 133 4.5.3 Technical Integrity 133
4.5.4 Release of Reservoir Fluids at D-Island 135 4.6 WORK PLACE
HAZARDS 139 4.7 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE WORKPLACE 139 4.8
DEMONSTRATION OF ALARP 140 4.8.1 ALARP Concept 140 4.8.2 ALARP
Principles 140 4.8.3 Good HSE Practice in Design and Implementation
141 4.8.4 Good HSE Practice in Operations 141 4.8.5 Assessment of
ALARP 142 4.8.6 Continuous Improvement 143 5 EMERGENCY RESPONSE 145
5.1 EER FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 145 5.1.1 Escape 145 5.1.2
Temporary Refuge(s) 147 5.1.3 Medical facilities 148 5.1.4
Evacuation 149 5.2 RESCUE AND RECOVERY 149 5.3 ESCAPE, EVACUATION,
RESCUE AND RECOVERY (EERR) PROCEDURES 150 5.3.1 EERR Philosophy 150
5.3.2 Emergency Response Plan (ERP) 150 5.3.3 ERP Responsibilities
of Personnel 151 5.3.4 Medical Evacuation 152 5.4 MAJOR EERR
SCENARIOS 152 5.4.1 Toxic Gas Release from Neighbouring Facility
152 5.4.2 Shallow Gas Blowout 153 5.4.3 Helicopter Crash / Ditching
within 500m Zone 153 5.4.4 Marine Incident within 500m Zone 153
5.4.5 Man Overboard 153 5.4.6 Food Poisoning 153 5.5 EERR SYSTEMS
PERFORMANCE AGAINST GOALS 154 5.5.1 Communication 154
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 16
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
5.5.2 Escape Routes 156 5.5.3 Temporary Refuge 156 5.5.4
Evacuation 157 5.5.5 Rescue 157 6 REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN 178 6.1
INTRODUCTION 178 6.2 REMEDIAL ACTIONS 178 7 CONCLUSION &
STATEMENT OF JUSTIFICATION FOR OPERATIONS 184 7.1 INTRODUCTION 184
7.2 CONCLUSIONS 184 7.2.1 Operations HSE Management System 184
7.2.2 Major Accident Hazard Identification and Assessment 184 7.2.3
Temporary Refuge, Escape, Evacuation, Rescue and Recovery 184 7.2.4
Workplace Hazard Management 185 7.2.5 Leadership and Commitment 185
7.2.6 Authorization 186 7.3 STATEMENT OF JUSTIFICATION FOR
OPERATIONS 187 8 REFERENCES 188 TABLES Table 2.1 : Drill Rig
Dimensions 38 Table 2.2 : Systems Monitored by Rig SCADA system 45
Table 2.3 : UPS Endurance Times 46 Table 2.4 : Fire Extinguisher
Provision on the Island 51 Table 2.5 : Main Island Storage Tanks 56
Table 3.1 : Incident Investigation Authority Matrix 106 Table 3.2 :
D-Island HSE Meeting Schedule 113 Table 4.1 : Design HAZID
Documents 125 Table 4.2 : Design Consequence Modelling / Risk
Assessment Documents 126 Table 4.3 : Design HAZOP Documents 126
Table 4.4 : Frequency Definitions 127 Table 4.5 : Detail
definitions of Consequence Severity 130 Table 4.6 : Major HSE Risks
Identified Requiring ALARP Demonstration 131 Table 4.7 : Summary of
HSE Critical Elements 133 Table 4.8 : Estimated Blowout Frequencies
136 Table 4.9 : Summary of Toxic Dispersion Modelling from Well
Release and Blowouts 137 Table 4.10 : Radius of Radiation Flux End
Points (m) for Vertical Jets 138 Table 4.11 : Qualitative ALARP
Scoring 142 Table 6.1 : Remedial Action List 179 FIGURES Figure 2.1
: D-Island General Arrangement 28 Figure 2.2 : Kazakhstan Sector of
the Caspian Sea 29 Figure 2.3 : D-Island Location 29 Figure 2.4 :
Windrose for the field 31
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 17
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Figure 2.5 : Primary Well Barrier for Conventional and CHC
Drilling 33 Figure 2.6 : Secondary Well Barriers for Conventional
and CHC Drilling 34 Figure 2.7 : Principal Components of the
Installation 36 Figure 2.8 : Karlygash Liquid Waste Management
System 65 Figure 2.9 : Casing & Liner Profile Schematic 70
Figure 2.10 : Simplified Completion Schematic 71 Figure 2.11 :
D-Island Drilling Programme (August 2008) 72 Figure 2.12 : DES and
DSM layout West elevation 73 Figure 2.13 : Feeding DSM with Pipe 74
Figure 2.14 : Assembling pipe stands on DSM 75 Figure 2.15 :
Hoisting Pipe to Pipe Rack 76 Figure 2.16 : Drill-pipe Deployment
77 Figure 2.17 : Common Area lighting System 78 Figure 2.18 : DES
Hazardous Zone Layout 79 Figure 2.19 : DSM Hazardous Zone Layout 80
Figure 2.20 : Hazardous Area Overview 81 Figure 2.21 : Shapagat LQ
Barge 82 Figure 2.22 : Karlygash Barge Lower Deck 83 Figure 2.23 :
Karlygash Barge Main (Level 1) Deck 84 Figure 2.24 : Karlygash
Barge Level 2 Deck 85 Figure 2.25 : Karlygash Barge Level 3 Deck 86
Figure 2.26 : Ice Breaking Emergency Evacuation Vessel 87 Figure
2.27 : IBEEV General Arrangement 88 Figure 3.1 : The PDCA Cycle 90
Figure 3.2 : Structure of Agip KCO HSE-MS 92 Figure 3.3 : Agip KCO
HSEQ Policy Statement 94 Figure 3.4 : Agip KCO Organisation Chart
for Drilling Operations on D-Island 97 Figure 3.5 : Drilling Team
98 Figure 3.6 : Agip KCO Risk Assessment Matrix 102 Figure 4.1 :
HEMP High Level Process 125 Figure 4.2 : Agip KCO Risk Matrix 128
Figure 4.3 : Example Major HSE Risk Diagram 132 Figure 4.4 : ALARP
Solution Matrix 143 Figure 5.1 : D-Island Station Bill (an example)
159 Figure 5.2 : Location of LQ and TR facilities 160 Figure 5.3 :
Escape Routes from Drilling Area to Muster Stations 161 Figure 5.4
: D-Island Fire Fighting Equipment 162 Figure 5.5 : Layout of
Common Services Area 163 Figure 5.6 : Common Area Escape Routes 164
Figure 5.7 : DSM Level 1 Layout 165
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 18
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Figure 5.8 : DSM Level 2 Layout 166 Figure 5.9 : DSM Level 3
Layout 167 Figure 5.10 : DSM Level 3 Layout 168 Figure 5.11 : DSM
Level 4 Layout 169 Figure 5.12 : DSM Level 5 Layout 170 Figure 5.13
: DES Level 0 Drill Floor Layout 171 Figure 5.14 : DES Level 1
Layout 172 Figure 5.15 : DES Level 2 Layout 173 Figure 5.16 : DES
Drill Floor Layout 174 Figure 5.17 : DES Drill Floor Roof Layout
175 Figure 5.18 : Mast Escape Route 176 APPENDICES Appendix A
Hazard Checklist Appendix B Hazard and Effects Register Appendix C
Safety Critical Task Catalogue Appendix D MOPO Appendix E Major
Accident Bowtie Diagrams
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 19
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
PART 1 INTRODUCTION
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 20
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 GENERAL
This HSE Case, prepared by Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian
Operating Company N.V. (Agip KCO), is intended to demonstrate the
highest level of Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE) attention
during the drilling phase at D-Island. Agip KCOs aim is to:
HAVE AN HSE PERFORMANCE TO BE PROUD OF; AND EARN THE CONFIDENCE
OF CUSTOMERS, STAKEHOLDERS AND SOCIETY AT LARGE.
In the context of this document, the focus of risk is on the
potential loss of life and environmental damage. The HSE Case also
establishes the manner in which Agip KCO demonstrates compliance
with:
LEGISLATION, THE REQUIREMENTS OF AGIP KCO AND ITS COMPANY SAFETY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY.
More specifically it establishes a common understanding of the
hierarchy of the HSE-MS for the drilling phase of operations, and
identifies the goals and objectives that have been set, the risks
that are present, and the systems in place to achieve a high
standard of HSE performance. The HSE Case reflects the current
status of the equipment and systems, HSE studies, and understanding
of the hazards associated with D-Island during drilling operations
This Drilling Operations HSE case covers the in drilling programme
that started in 2006 and that will be completed during 2009. The
Drilling operations HSE case is being maintained as a live document
and revised as appropriate during the development/operation of
D-Island.
1.2 HOLDER AND ADMINISTRATOR OF THE HSE CASE Holder The Holder
is ultimately responsible for the HSE management of the operations
covered by the Case and is the final approval authority for the
contents of the Case. The Holder is responsible for issuing the
Statement of Justification for Operations, thus accepting
accountability for the HSE management of the operations and
declaring that all known major HSE hazards that could occur have
been identified and are under control, subject to the close-out of
the outstanding actions in the Remedial Action Plan. The Holder is
Agip KCOs Operations Director. Administrator The Administrator is
responsible to the Holder for management of the HSE Case. The
Administrator is responsible for initiating the appropriate
programmes to ensure awareness and proper use of the Case by the
project. The Administrator is responsible for the technical
accuracy of the contents of the HSE Case and for ensuring that
revisions and updates are prepared when necessary. The
Administrator is responsible for ensuring that distribution of the
Case and its revisions and updates are adequately controlled. The
administrator is Agip KCOs HSE & SD Director
1.3 BACKGROUND On behalf of seven companies and under the North
Caspian Sea PSA (Production Sharing Agreement), Agip KCO is the
Operator of the appraisal and development operations in the
Kazakhstan sector of the North Caspian Sea. Successful exploration
of the Kashagan Field, will lead to Full Field Development (FFD)
via the Experimental Program (EP) phase. The principles governing
Agip KCO operations are stated in the EP Statement of Requirements
[1]. The EP Statement of Requirements describes those requirements
considered essential to ensure Safe and Efficient operations during
the Construction, Drilling, Installation, Hook-Up, Commissioning,
Operations and Logistics for A and D Blocks. The document addresses
the minimum requirements to achieve the above i.e. transportation
of offshore personnel, provision of temporary living quarters
barges, temporary refuge systems, escape craft and logistical
requirements, in
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 21
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
order to ensure a safe, co-ordinated, cohesive and integrated
approach for all EP offshore related activities.
The EP phase includes the development of D-Island drilling,
production, and processing facilities, which are located 70 km
south-south east of Atyrau on a 225m long and 221m wide artificial
island in the north Caspian Sea. Construction of processing and
utilities facilities, on barges connected to D-Island by bridges,
is currently underway. A drilling, completions, and well
commissioning programme commenced in 2006 and is scheduled to be
completed late in 2009. The program will not include well testing.
Saipem has been contracted by Agip KCO to undertake the D-Island
drilling program using the rigs 401 and 402 located on the man-made
drilling island. The rigs were designed and built by National
Oilwell Varco (NOV) to meet the specific requirements of drilling
at D-Island.
1.4 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 1.4.1 Scope
The focus of this HSE Case is to present an integrated approach
to HSE management. It is a Drilling Operations HSE Case covering
the HSE risks arising from the drilling operations for the D-Island
drilling rigs, LQ arrangements, and the marine and helicopter
operations associated with the drilling operations within a 500m
zone of the artificial island. The HSE Case excludes passenger and
freight loading at the heliport or marine base and in-transit
transportation of personnel; transport of materials and equipment;
and heliport, marine base and supply base activities.
1.4.2 Main Objectives The main objectives of the HSE Case are as
follows: 1. To ensure compliance with the Republic of Kazakhstan
Governments legislation and
demonstrate an integrated approach to HSE management for the
D-Island drilling programme. 2. To ensure that all HSE inputs are
provided at all stages of the decision making process. 3. To
provide the means for ensuring adherence to Agip KCOs HSE policies
and, in doing so,
demonstrate compliance with them. 4. To establish a common
understanding of specific HSE requirements, and ensure awareness
of
these requirements. 5. To demonstrate to Agip KCO management and
staff, Contractors, shareholders, the regulator
and the public that essential controls are in place such that
the major HSE hazards & risks arising from Rig and Island
operations are both tolerable and reduced to as low as reasonably
practicable (ALARP).
Major HSE risks are defined as those associated with major
accident hazards which have the potential to cause multiple
fatalities or massive environmental or socio-cultural effect. These
consequences are intolerable and all possible causes need to be
analysed and controlled and suitably documented in the HSE Case.
Workplace hazards arising from hazardous activities, e.g. hot work,
electrical grinding, etc. are controlled through the Permit to Work
(PTW) system, toolbox talks and pre-job safety meetings and other
safe working practices defined by the Agip KCO HSE Management
System and are not assessed in the detailed hazard analysis.
Environmental effects arising from the normal and abnormal
operations will be controlled through operational, environmental
and waste management procedures. These effects and their controls
are identified in the HSE Case but are not assessed in detail.
1.4.3 Detailed Objectives More specifically, the objectives of
the Case are to: Demonstrate that suitable HSE studies have been
undertaken and suitable HSE management
arrangements are in place to ensure that the specification and
conduct of the drilling, LQ
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 22
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
arrangements, and local marine and helicopter operations are fit
for purpose and safe for operation.
Demonstrate that all foreseeable and credible HSE hazards,
including major accident hazards, have been identified and that
suitable and sufficient barriers and controls will be in place such
that risks to people and the environment are ALARP.
Demonstrate that there is adequate provision for the full and
safe sheltering, escape, evacuation, rescue and recovery of all
personnel in the event of a major accident.
Demonstrate that HSE management arrangements are in place to
define responsibilities for procedures to ensure the control of,
and continuous improvement in the management of, all HSE hazards
and effects at the workplace.
1.4.4 Demonstrating Achievement of the Objectives The criteria
used to determine whether each of the HSE Case objectives has been
met are as follows: 1. HSE Management Arrangements - Agreement
between Agip KCO and contractors, on the
required standards of design and operation (as per the agreed
Combined/Simultaneous Operations Bridging Document); and the
commitment of all parties to meeting these standards.
2. Major Hazards - The acceptance criteria used, to determine
whether all foreseeable and credible major accident hazards have
been identified, are industry hazard checklists and formal reviews
by experienced specialists.
3. Sheltering and Evacuation - Identification of major accident
risks requiring temporary refuge and evacuation of D-Island, and
suitable and sufficient recovery preparedness measures in
accordance with the major hazards acceptance criteria.
4. Workplace Hazards - Agreement between Agip KCO, and
contractors, (as per the Combined/Simultaneous Operations Bridging
Document) of the required standards for continuous improvement in
the management of workplace HSE hazards and effects; and the
commitment of all parties to meeting these standards.
1.5 APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT OF HSE CASE 1.5.1 Project HSE
Management System
The Agip KCO Corporate Management System (CMS) is supported by
an HSE Management System Execution Strategy which defines how the
CMS is implemented at the operational level with respect to HSE. An
EP Offshore HSE Plan [58] has been developed to set out the
activities necessary to implement the HSE-MS for the Kashagan EP
phase including D-Island drilling and to ensure that appropriate
Contractor HSE Plans have been developed. An assessment was carried
out of existing Agip KCO HSE procedures against the operational
requirements of the project to identify any missing procedures that
needed to be developed. Additionally, the HSE-MS interfacing
arrangements for key areas of the project (e.g. training and
competence, permit to work, well control, emergency response, etc.)
were reviewed to ensure that the HSE responsibilities of Agip KCO
and contractors were fully understood and that the associated
procedures were adequate. The HSE-critical tasks that put in place
or maintain controls for the identified major accident hazards have
been defined and included in operational procedures as appropriate.
Finally, a comprehensive site audit will be undertaken to verify
that all controls exist in reality and that the HSE-critical tasks
are accurate and assigned to the correct responsible party.
1.5.2 Formal HSE Assessment A hazard identification study was
undertaken to systematically examine the proposed rig layout and
operations with the purpose of identifying any hazards or
operability problems that could result in either injury to
personnel, environmental pollution, release of hydrocarbons or
damage to equipment/structures. The study determined whether
adequate safeguards/mitigating measures were in place, or were
required to be put in place.
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 23
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Those hazards with the potential to cause fatalities or a major
environmental effect were further analysed, where appropriate, by
constructing hazard bow-tie diagrams to highlight the preventive
and recovery measures. An assessment of the hazards associated with
the uncontrolled release of reservoir fluids from D-Island and
neighbouring facilities was undertaken to estimate the hazard
distances, analyse the mitigation measures and make recommendations
for design improvements. A review of the sheltering, evacuation,
escape, rescue and recovery arrangements was also undertaken to
assess the adequacy of the arrangements for toxic gas hazards that
would require evacuation, and make recommendations for design
improvements. All possible sources of environmental impact were
identified and their significance assessed, to ensure the adequacy
of the control and mitigation measures. All occupational health
hazards that may arise during normal operations were also
identified, together with their associated controls. Finally, a
Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) was distilled from the hazard
analyses to define limitations on activities during periods of
abnormal operating conditions.
1.5.3 Outstanding Actions Any outstanding actions not resolved
during the project design and construction phase or issues
identified during the preparation of this HSE case are included in
the Remedial Action Plan with responsibilities and target
completion dates assigned.
1.6 STRUCTURE The HSE Case is contained in a single volume with
the following sections Management Summary The Management Summary
provides a brief overview of the major findings during the
preparation of the HSE Case, a summary of the areas for improvement
and the conclusions. Part 1 - Introduction The Introduction
describes the scope, objectives and structure of the HSE Case,
including a brief explanation of the contents of each part of the
HSE Case. Part 2 - Description of Operations and Facilities The
description provides sufficient information to enable a clear
understanding of the drilling, LQ arrangements, and local marine
and helicopter, with an emphasis on aspects relevant to HSE. Design
HSE features are documented, including the merits of the HSE
configurations, systems and components. The main barriers and
controls mentioned in the Hazard and Effects Register are
described. External circumstances are also described, such as
meteorological conditions. This information promotes an
understanding of how major hazards and effects could affect the
operations and the facilities. Part 3 - HSE-Management System This
describes the system and arrangements in place for managing the HSE
risks associated with drilling operations at D-Island. The HSE-MS
ensures the identification and assessment of hazards throughout rig
operations; that all reasonably practicable measures have been or
are being taken to prevent, control or mitigate these hazards; that
audits are conducted to provide the assurance that the HSE-MS is
being adhered to; and that all activities, engaged in or contracted
to other companies, are managed in a comparable way. Part 4 -
Hazard Identification and Assessment The hazard assessment
demonstrates that all potential major hazards have been identified,
the risk from the hazards has been evaluated and is understood, and
the controls to manage the causes and consequences are in place.
The Hazards and Effects Register presents, in a clear and concise
form, the results of the analysis made of each hazard and effect
associated with the operations. Bowtie diagrams are used, where
appropriate, for the identified major risks and
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 24
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
illustrate that suitable and sufficient barriers, and controls
are in place to reduce the risks to people and the environment to
ALARP. The Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) defines
limitations on activities during periods of abnormal operating
conditions, e.g. during concurrent high risk activities or
unavailability of critical safety systems. Those HSE-Critical Tasks
identified as essential to provide or maintain the necessary
controls and recovery preparedness measures for hazards to meet the
objectives of the HSE Case are described in this part of the HSE
case. The tasks may be design, inspection and maintenance,
operational, administrative or training tasks. This part also
specifies who is responsible for the tasks, the inputs required to
carry out each task and how it is verified that each task has been
undertaken properly. Part 5 - Emergency Response Summary This part
of the HSE Case describes the Emergency Response systems, plans and
arrangement in place for the drilling operations at D-Island. Agip
KCO has developed formal procedures which detail appropriate
emergency actions in response to incidents associated with D-Island
activities. To supplement these emergency response procedures,
there are a number of pre-incident plans which cover specific
identified emergency scenarios. Part 6 - Remedial Action Plan This
provides a plan to resolve any shortfalls, deficiencies or
outstanding actions identified and thereby improve the HSE
performance of the operations. It includes priorities,
responsibilities for ensuring completion and target completion
dates. Part 7 - Conclusion and Statement of Justification for
Operations This states the conclusion reached on achieving the HSE
Case objectives and states the justification that conditions are
satisfactory for continued operations.
1.7 USES The HSE Case is a living document, in that it will be
reviewed, updated and used as part of the primary reference and
guidance source for a number of activities essential for the HSE
management of activities in the D-Island drilling program, as
follows: A basis for assuring a common and consistent approach to
the HSE management of
operations by Agip KCO and contractors. A means for improving
the project HSE management and performance. A systematic framework
to enable management to assure themselves formally that the
major
accident hazards arising from the drilling, LQ arrangements, and
local marine and helicopter operations within 500m of the island
are adequately controlled.
A baseline for the systematic assessment of the risk associated
with any future changes to the operations.
A guide for managers and supervisors in preparing hazard
awareness training, handbooks, etc for the workforce.
A guide for all new personnel at all levels involved in the
operations, whether with Agip KCO or contractors, to provide rapid
familiarisation with the HSE-MS, the hazards and the associated
technical and procedural controls used for managing them.
A framework upon which HSE and system compliance audits may be
developed and programmed.
A reference for incident investigation, reporting and follow-up.
The HSE-Critical Tasks listing provides a reference for managers
and supervisors of the HSE-
critical tasks to be undertaken, who is responsible for them,
the inputs required to carry out each task and how they will verify
that each task has been undertaken properly.
An input to the contracts and design specifications of the
HSE-critical issues to be addressed by contractors.
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 25
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
A framework for demonstrating to the Republic of Kazakhstan
Regulatory bodies that major HSE risks are being managed.
The Remedial Action Plan assigns corrective actions to
individuals. 1.8 REVIEW PERIODS AND UPDATES
Activities necessary to maintain the HSE Case will be
implemented and co-ordinated by the Administrator, under the
direction and authorisation of the Holder. These include:
Assignment of the HSE-critical Tasks lists and the Hazard and
Effects Register to relevant Agip
KCO and contractor company personnel. They are charged with the
task of verifying the relevance, currency and accuracy of their
designated tasks.
Management review of the HSE Case document following completion
of modifications. Re-issuing updated parts of the document as
necessary, for example, after any major changes. All signatory
pages will require re-endorsement should the signatories change.
Following incident reviews/accident investigations, in accordance
with Agip KCO requirements. The Administrator will incorporate any
deficiencies noted during the above maintenance
activities into a revised version of the Remedial Action Plan.
In this way the Remedial Action Plan is continuously updated with
new actions and deficiencies, and closed-out actions removed.
.
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 26
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
PART 2 DESCRIPTION OF FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 27
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
2 DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS AND FACILITIES 2.1 INTRODUCTION
D-Island is an artificial island which will act as a hub for
drilling and production operations for the Experimental Programme
(EP) project. During the drilling phase of the project two drilling
rigs (Rigs 401 and 402) will operate on the island, with living
quarters on adjacent barges. The two drilling rigs can operate
simultaneously with a total of 38 slots available (closest approach
will be 13 slots [2]). It is currently planned to use 12 slots as
per the drilling programme (see Section 2.5). Each rig is serviced
by an adjacent mobile mud module containing five generators and mud
processing. Pipe handling equipment is installed on the roof of the
module. Common utilities are housed to the south of the island and
include diesel and base oil storage (SE corner), mud conditioning,
power generation (including emergency generator) and steam boilers
(for winterisation). Accommodation is provided on grounded living
quarters barges; the Shapagat (POB 120) and the Karlygash (POB
180), with integral TRs. Evacuation from the island will be by
helicopter or IBEEV. The layout of the completed D-Island
installation is presented in Figure 2.1 Specific operations covered
by this case This HSE Case covers drilling and completions on
D-Island, the accommodation barges, third party equipment, other
activities where they interface with drilling activities, and
marine (excluding those associated with construction activities)
and helicopter operations within a 500m zone of the artificial
island. All other activities required for the exploration program
i.e. rig mobilisation/demobilisation, construction, aviation and
marine operations outside the 500m zone and supply base operations,
are also excluded.
2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS The northern zone of the
Caspian Sea was designated as a nature reserve by the Cabinet of
Ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 1974, and modified by
the decree of 1991 permitting oil exploration. In order to protect
and conserve the natural environment, including flora, fauna and
marine life, Agip KCO ensures that all of its operations cause
minimal impact to the environment, being conducted in accordance
with Agip KCOs Environmental Strategy zero spillage and minimum
discharge. This strategy requires that all liquid waste materials
containing substances which may be harmful to aquatic life or
wildlife, or injurious to life or property, are treated to avoid
disposal of harmful substances into the sea. Drilling fluids are
collected and shipped to shore for further treatment and disposal
or re-use, and drilling cuttings, sand and other solids are not
disposed of into the sea. Mud and mud chemicals containers (sacks,
bags, pallets etc.) and other solid wastes are compacted and
incinerated or transported ashore for disposal or recycling. Major
accident events, such as blowouts or major oil spills, would pose a
serious threat to the environment. These events are assessed in
detail in Part 4 of this HSE Case, where specific controls to
prevent their occurrence or mitigate their consequences are
identified. Detailed assessment of the effects of such events on
the surrounding environment is documented in the Environmental
Impact Assessment [[3] and [4]].
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 28
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Figure 2.1 : D-Island General Arrangement
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 29
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
2.3 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION, GEOLOGY AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS
2.3.1 Geographical Location
The area of operation is the Kazakhstan sector of the north east
Caspian Sea (Figure 2.2), which is characterised by shallow waters
between 1 and 9m in depth with an average water depth of 6.2 m.
Figure 2.2 : Kazakhstan Sector of the Caspian Sea The artificial
island is located approximately 70 km south east of Atyrau, in the
north Caspian Sea at location latitude 46 deg. 22 north and
longitude 52 deg. 81 east, in a nominal water depth of about two
metres (Figure 2.3). Due to its position on the surge plain of the
eastern side of the North Caspian, water levels are subject to both
seasonal variations and weather-induced short-term up- and
down-surges. The down-surges may reduce the water level
sufficiently to prevent logistical operations for short periods.
The shallow water location of the island is sited away from normal
shipping lanes.
Figure 2.3 : D-Island Location
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 30
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
2.3.2 Safety Zone A Safety Exclusion Zone has been defined
around the facility, the boundary of the Safety Exclusion Zone
being 500 metres from the outer edge of any berm in its current
configuration. The Agip Onshore Operations Manager is responsible
for ensuring that systems are in place such that no vessels or any
other parties, which are not invited or belonging to the Agip KCO
operation, enter the Safety Zone without authorisation. The
D-Island OIM is responsible for vessel entry; lawful or non lawful.
Monitoring of vessels approaching the island is carried out by the
Radio Operator in the living quarters, who is responsible for
warning any unauthorised vessels that may encroach. EP Offshore
Logistics will provide for marine vessel control in the form of the
Offshore Marine Control Centre (OMCC). Marine Superintendents,
Co-ordinators and Vessel Tracking specialist at the OMCC monitor
and control project vessel movements. This is currently being
developed.
2.3.3 Geo-technical Information The artificial island was
constructed by placing a rock core on to the seabed with an
impermeable 2 mm geo-membrane, placed between sand layers on top of
this, and then approximately 1 m depth of further rock and
compacted soil above this. The geo-membrane was included to prevent
spill and contamination migration. The island surface was graded
using gravel and prefabricated concrete slabs and foundations laid,
the topside facilities then being installed, their foundations
typically being made from pre-fabricated concrete slabs. A full
survey of sea bottom conditions, and vulnerability to seismic
events was carried out prior to construction of the artificial
island. The carboniferous limestone formation targeted for the
wells is approximately 3,800 m below the surface. An expected total
drilling depth of 5,000 m is estimated.
2.3.4 Meteorological Conditions The average air temperature in
the north Caspian Sea is 8-10C. The mean air temperature in January
is between -7 and -10C, falling to a possible -30C with the arrival
of the Arctic air masses. During the summer months of July and
August the mean air temperature for the entire Caspian Sea is
24-26C, with a possible maximum of 42-44C. Water temperatures are
subject to similar extreme variability. During the summer months,
the shallows can exceed 26C. From November, the area starts to
freeze over in the shallowest north-eastern parts and, as the
winter proceeds, the extent of ice cover increases and spreads
westwards until most of the sea is frozen. The pack ice can be up
to 0.9 m thick, with an average thickness of approximately 0.5 m.
During severe winters, the ice period can last up to 170 days. Ice
cover generally persists through to April. Winds tend to cause the
ice to move northwards (mainly January), which, in some areas,
creates ice ridges measuring one to two metres in height. This
height has been allowed for in the design of the island height. The
average wind speed is 4 6 m/s over the waters of the north east
Caspian. Strong winds and storms occur mainly in springtime, with a
frequency over the year of 30-40 days. Wind speeds can reach 25
m/s, with extremes of 30 m/s. These stronger winds can create storm
surges, which are non-periodic fluctuations in sea level, lasting
an average of 5 days. They occur most frequently between September
and March, with a maximum rise in water level of 3-4m observed in
the shallow areas of the north Caspian Sea. The wind rose for
D-Island is illustrated in Figure 2.4 [6]. The characteristics of
the wind-generated waves in the north Caspian Sea are strongly
influenced by the shallow depths of the area and wave heights of up
to 2 to 3 m can occur.
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 31
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Figure 2.4 : Windrose for the field
2.4 WELLS CHARACTERIZATION Drilling of the Kashagan wells can be
broadly characterized in accordance with the following sections
classification:
2.4.1 Post-Salt Section Between the salt diapirs and the surface
lie normally pressured sedimentary rocks of Recent to Permian age.
The bulk of these formations are composed of shales and sandstones
which are not expected to give rise to significant drilling
problems. Interbedded limestones are encountered in the Upper
Cretaceous and Upper Jurassic intervals and while they may slow
penetration rates significantly, they are not expected to give
drilling problems.
2.4.2 Salt Section The salt layer overlying the carbonate
reservoir varies considerably in thickness across the Kashagan
field and even within the range of wells to be drilled from the
Block A location. Characteristic salt diapir features generate salt
intervals of up to 2,000 m, while salt withdrawal in other areas
results in intervals of only a few tens of metres. To date, only
minor problems from salt mobility have been encountered during
drilling operations and analysis of samples has, so far, revealed
an absence of the highly mobile potassium and magnesium based salts
in preference for the less mobile halites with traces of the
immobile anhydrites and carbonates. It is possible within the salt
that rafted and perhaps over-pressured sediments could be
encountered although only interbeds of anhydrite have been seen
during drilling operations to date.
2.4.3 Pre-Salt Section (Reservoir Section) The reservoir is
composed of Carboniferous sediments with the Artinskian sediments
form the reservoir seal for Kashagan. The limestone reservoir
section is encountered below the Artinskian Shale. Areas around the
rim of the reservoir are expected to have secondary porosity in the
form of karsts and fractures. According to current data it is
possible that some parts of the Platform Interior may also exhibit
some of these secondary porosity features but these areas will
likely be limited in their extent. D-Island wells target Platform
Interior.
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 32
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
2.5 DRILLING AND COMPLETIONS PROGRAMME The D-Island drilling and
completions programme from 2006 to 2009 is illustrated in Figure
2.11. It should be noted that operational requirements may lead to
the programme being revised.
2.5.1 Drilling Methodology The traditional drilling technique
involving overbalanced drilling mud circulated through the drill
string and up the annulus while drilling the well is the main
drilling approach through all well sections at D-Island. In
principle, the mud column is the first barrier and the BOP is the
second barrier [19]. However, drilling with overbalanced drilling
mud through highly potential loss zones increases the possibility
for loss of the primary barrier i.e. the mud column. For this
reason a contingency has been made for the use of closed hole
circulation drilling, (CHCD) at D-Island in cases of severe losses
that might impair the safety of operation. In traditional drilling
techniques mud returns to the surface and the pressure of the mud
column is maintained between pore pressure and fracture gradient in
the open hole section. The CHCD approach requires no return of mud
to the surface as this technique consists of pumping a sacrificial
fluid, (for D-Island this is seawater), through the drill string
into the formation in the open hole section. During this operation
the upper part the annulus is filled with mud heavier than
seawater. The mud cap is pumped through the kill/choke lines with
one of the mud pumps. The exerting pressure from the sacrificial
fluid and the mud cap is maintained above the fracture pressure
during actual drilling, but between pore pressure and fracture
gradient during tripping and when making connections i.e. similar
to traditional drilling approach. In order to prevent mud being
returned to surface from the annulus during actual drilling a
rotating circulation head (RCH) is installed on top of the BOP. The
mud pump system consists of three mud pumps (see Section 2.10.5).
While drilling with the traditional drilling method approach, two
pumps will be used to pump drilling mud through the drill string
and one will be kept in reserve. Whereas in the CHCD approach one
pump will be used to pump sacrificial fluid through the drill
string and one to pump mud cap mud through the kill/choke line to
annulus, and one mud pump will be kept as reserve. The RCH is
dynamic pressure rated to 2,500 psi and static pressure rated to
5,000 psi, while the BOP is rated to 15,000 psi. The CHCD approach
can be compared with the well kill technique "bull heading" where
kill mud is pumped through the drill string and the annulus in
order to prevent formation fluid reaching the surface and to kill
the well. One characterization of the CHCD approach is a continuous
bullhead technique for drilling purposes, in a safe manner. Primary
Well Barriers During overbalanced drilling, only the drilling fluid
can be defined as the primary well barrier. As long as the exerting
(static) pressure from the mud column is maintained between pore
pressure and fracture gradient in the open hole section, the first
barrier is intact regardless of equipment failure on the rig.
Drilling with overbalanced drilling mud through highly potential
loss zones increases the possibility for loss of the primary
barrier i.e. the mud column, the CHCD approach has been introduced.
During mud cap drilling with the CHCD technique, several components
can be defined as the primary well barrier. It is the exerting
(dynamic) pressure from the pumped fluid (sacrificial fluid and mud
cap) that constitutes the main part of the barrier. However, there
are several components on which the exerting pressure depends:
Pumps for mud and sacrificial fluid; Power system for pumps;
Sealing capability of rotating circulating head (RCH); Supply of
mud and sacrificial fluid; Kill/choke line for mud cap; and
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 33
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Kill/choke valves. If any of the above components fail, the
exerting pressure in the open hole section will be impaired,
possibly causing formation fluid inflow into the well (see Figure
2.5). To prevent this, the secondary well barrier has to be
activated in order to continue a safe operation. During tripping
and when making connections in the CHCD mode, the well fluid will
be in a static condition to prevent well fluid release on the drill
floor. This implies that the exerting pressure from the well fluid
in the open hole section must be maintained between pore pressure
and fracture gradient. During these sub-activities in the CHCD
mode, the primary well barrier is the same as the system for the
traditional overbalanced drilling mode.
Figure 2.5 : Primary Well Barrier for Conventional and CHC
Drilling
Secondary Well Barriers During overbalanced drilling and CHCD
(see Figure 2.6), the following components can be defined as the
secondary well barriers: Casing shoe; Casing; Wellhead seal;
Kill/choke valves; and BOP. Given failures of the primary well
barrier, failure of any of these components will result in a
blowout. When drilling in High Pressure High Temperature (HPHT)
conditions, utilizing traditional over-balanced drilling method,
the first barrier, the mud column, is found to be highly
unreliable, due to tight pressure margins. In HTHP wells, an
average of one kick experienced per well drilled is not
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 34
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
uncommon. The expected tight pressure margin conditions at the
Kashagan field can be compared to these conditions while drilling
HTHP wells. Using CHCD, the mud column is less critical because
drilling can commence while fluid is pumped in to the well. In case
the equipment related to CHCD should fail, the BOP will have to be
closed. This is similar to drilling utilizing traditional drilling
methods.
Figure 2.6 : Secondary Well Barriers for Conventional and CHC
Drilling 2.6 COMPLETIONS METHODOLOGY
The six main steps in a completion operation [64] include: 1)
Displace the drilling mud with seawater for casing qualification;
2) Displace well with a heavy completion fluid; 3) Run completion
string; 4) Nipple down BOP and install the X-mas tree; 5) Displace
Base Oil with Completion Fluid; and 6) Set the production packer
For the D-Island wells two methods have been used for carrying out
the completions and are as follows;
Overbalance using Micromax; and Overbalance using a Caesium
Formate completion fluid
In all cases two confirmed safety critical barriers must be
maintained at all times between the formation hydrocarbons and the
surface environment. In all cases the cemented casing and liner
provides the primary barrier against the fluids in formation. The
secondary barrier is provide by the hydrostatic head of the well
completions fluid. (Figure 2.9) details the Casing and Liner
profile and Figure 2.10 shows a schematic of the D-Island
completions arrangement.
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 35
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
2.7 COMMISSIONING METHODOLOGY Two operations will be performed
as part of the commissioning programme, perforation and
stimulation, and involve third party temporary equipment being
located in the wellhead area and are described below. It is not
intended to conduct well testing during the 2008/2009 winter
period.
2.7.1 Perforation System Perforations are carried out using
Tubing Conveyed Perforating (TCP) guns run downhole using coiled
tubing (CT) through a specially designed BOP stack (two triple
BOPs). The guns will be 22ft and 28ft lengths and run in by
individual length using an AutoLatch system. As each section is
lowered the top set of rams open and allow the CT and gun to be
lowered whilst a lower set of rams remain closed around the CT
providing a seal. The rig BOP will be fully open during this
procedure but the lubricator valve (located further downhole) will
be closed. An E-Line cable is run inside the CT to log depth and
the charges are fired through a shielded electrical cable thus
avoiding the need for radio silence. When perforations are taking
place the well is slightly overbalanced, squeezing any fluids back
into the formation with Base oil. The gun design eliminates the
possibility of well fluids being brought to the surface on
retrieval however the guns are flushed with 10bls of base oil
before breaking out the guns. The used base oil is sent to surge
tanks and any gas that may have accumulated is sent to the burner
system operated by Schlumberger. The perforation equipment is
operated by Halliburton and a HAZID and HAZOP were conducted for
the perforation operation [69].
2.7.2 Stimulation System The stimulation system mixes and pumps
hydrochloric acid into the formation once the wellbore has been
perforated using Tubing Conveyed Perforating (TCP) guns. The acid
is run from the wellhead down-hole using Coiled Tubing (CT) for the
first stage stimulation and then via 4 pipe during Bullheading.
Stimulation activities are carried out under the control and
supervision of Halliburton. Stimulation equipment consists of the
following items: 2 x 6k High Pressure pumps on the acid tanks 15 x
2000gal acid tanks 2 x 32m3 Mixers
1 x 80m3 Mixer
1 x 80m3 Base oil storage tank Various containers of additives
and corrosion inhibitors All of the above system is in a bunded
area with the tanks also having drip trays and additional absorbent
material lining the trays. The 4 line is secured with Grey locks
and is chained down. A HAZID was conducted for the stimulation
operation [70], the temporary location of the stimulation equipment
in shown in Figure 2.7.
2.8 INSTALLATION LAYOUT 2.8.1 Island/LQ Orientation
The orientation of the island and principal components of the
installation are shown in Figure 2.7.
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 36
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Figure 2.7 : Principal Components of the Installation The
artificial island provides the base from which drilling operations
are conducted. The accommodation and TR barges are moored on the
south side of the island provide Living Quarters (LQ) and Temporary
Refuge (TR) facilities.
2.8.2 Main Dimensions
The overall dimensions of the rectangular island are 225 m long
and 221 m wide and its surface is approximately 3.5 m above current
sea level. The island has vertical sides protected by sheet piling
and, on the north-west and south-west sides, there is a wall
extending some 2 m above ground level, providing protection against
wind and waves.
2.8.3 Island Layout Areas of the island are grouped according to
function, and located with respect to each other according to
hazard potential (see Figure 2.7), the principal areas being:
Drilling rig and associated systems, situated at the centre of the
island:
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 37
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Drilling rig (including draw works, wire line unit, mud logging,
winches, rotary table, Drillers control panel);
Mud and cuttings handling (including mud gas separator, trip
tank, degassers, choke/kill manifold, shale shakers,
centrifuges);
Power generation, distribution and utilities; Pipe handling; and
Cuttings storage.
Ancillary equipment and systems, around the perimeter of the
island, including: Cement unit; Stimulation equipment Diesel and
lube oil storage; Water storage; Workshops and shelters; and Cargo
laydown areas.
2.9 ISLAND STABILITY AND INTEGRITY In the summertime, the
environmental loads are generated by the wind, in combination with
wave action and sea level surges. In the winter, when the Caspian
Sea is frozen, moving ice sheets are generated, which build up as
rubble ice around the island. Calculations by the island designers
and engineers demonstrate that the artificial island, the rig and
equipment on the island, are capable of withstanding the predicted
operational, weather, environmental loads and temperatures imposed.
The principal hazards associated with rig foundations or
instability on the island arise from: Under scour of the island,
causing the island to fail; Wind and wave induced side forces in
excess of the maximum design limit, causing damage to
the islands structure; and Ice induced side forces in excess of
the maximum design limit, causing damage to the islands
structure.
The island is subject to inspection monthly in accordance with
Agip KCO procedures. Any deterioration detected during these
inspections will be referred to specialist Civil Engineers for an
assessment of the island integrity. In the event of forces in
excess of the predicted maximum, which result in structural damage
(or predicted structural damage), which could cause the integrity
of the island (or major piece(s) of equipment) to fail, the
D-Island OIM will decide whether to cease operations and evacuate
the island, in accordance with the requirements of the Emergency
Response Plan [8]. Monitoring of sliding ice and lateral ice
hazards on the island during the winter is described in detail in
the Agip KCO ice management guideline [61].
2.9.1 Well Design Well design is performed by Agip KCO and is
described in the Kashagan Field Drilling Manual [11]. A schematic
of the well design and casing and liner profile is shown in Figure
2.9. A simplified completion schematic is shown in Figure 2.10
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 38
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
2.10 DRILLING RIGS The two identical drilling rigs, 401 and 402,
were constructed by National Oilwell Varco (NOV), and consist of
the Drilling Equipment Set (DES) and the Drilling Support Module
(DSM). In addition a Common Area (CA) Module will be used by both
rigs for various operations 13]. Rigs 401 and 402 are identical;
reference to the DES and DSM will therefore refer to both rigs. The
DES will be positioned on the northern part of the island. The DES
consists of the skid base, substructure, drill floor, and Bootstrap
mast. The north skid base is elevated 43 higher than the south skid
base. There are 38 wells on the island but only 12 will be drilled,
the DES and DSM skid East-West on a Lift & Roll System. The DES
consists of 4 skid bases, substructure, drill floor and bootstrap
mast and equipment for drilling including the Draw-works, Top
drive, BOP Stacks, Rotary table, Drillers cabin, Hydraulic Power
Unit and BOP Accumulator Unit. The DSM is located directly south of
the DES. The module consists of 24 individual modules and 8 skid
bases. The DSM, like the DES, skids East-West on a Lift & Roll
System. The DSM consists of the Solids Control Equipment,
Electrical Module, Casing and Drill Pipe Handling Equipment, Mud
Pumps, Generators, and other various pieces of equipment. The
overall dimensions for the drilling systems are presented in Table
2.1 and the DES and DSM are illustrated in Figure 2.12.
Table 2.1 : Drill Rig Dimensions
DES Overall Dimensions
Length (North-South) Width (West-East) Height Skid base (4
sections) 3.66 m 9.14 m 1.83 m
Note: Top of steel of the North Skid base at 1.3 m (4.3 ft)
higher Length (North-South) Width (West-East) Height Substructure
16.15 m 14. 63 m Drill Floor 24.11 m 14.63 m
17.17 m (Overall Height Of Substructure incl.
Drill floor)
Base Height
Mast 9.14 m X 9.14 m 48.77 m (Clear Working Height) DSM Overall
Dimensions
Length (North-South) Width (West-East Height 44.12 m 35.94 m
15.55 m CA Overall Dimensions Length (North-South) Width (West-East
Height 40 m 150 m 18 m
2.10.1 Drillers Cabin and Control Panel Prime considerations for
the design of the Drillers cabin and control panel has been: Good
communications with derrick (monkey board), drill floor and pipe
deck personnel; Excellent visual capabilities under a variety of
weather and operating conditions; Proper information availability
without information overload; and a
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 39
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Safe working environment, including the provision of safety
glass with mesh where required. 2.10.2 Rotary equipment
The top-drive has an integrated travelling block and hook, rated
load capacity 680 tonnes and is fitted with two Internal BOPs
(IBOP) and a mud saver sub, and provides for wireline access. The
top-drive pipe-handler link tilt shall is capable of full access to
the mousehole and to latch on the pipe from the pipe chute to
pick-up or lay-down of pipe. A 37 bore rotary table is provided,
rated at 590 tonne to support the load of the drill string or
casing and to rotate the string during Kelly drilling (as back-up
for the top-drive system). The 37 minimum bore shall ensure that
the 30 conductor and any required wellhead spools may pass
through.
2.10.3 Pipe Handling System The system is design to meet the
following requirement: Handling, loading and manipulating 3 and 5
7/8 drill-pipe and tubing or casing (2 3/8 up
to 20 on the pipe rack / catwalk assembly; Handling of casing up
to 14 of 100 ppf from make up to feeding the drill floor
hoisting
equipment; Make-up and brake-out 3- 5 7/8 R3 drill-pipe of line;
Transfer of drill pipe, tubing and casing from V-door, to and from
the rotary / top drive area
or the mousehole; and Remote make-up / break-out of drill pipe
in the rotary / top drive or the mousehole. An Iron Roughneck is
provided capable of handling a stand of drill pipe every minute (60
per hr). It is capable of accessing the rotary table and is
situated so that the operator has a full view of jaws during
operation. Remote operated air actuated slips, controlled from
Drillers console and locally, are provided for the full range of
drill pipe anticipated. A hydraulic Cathead, with a line pull of
30,000 lbs, is located on the rig floor such that the tongs can be
used safely and efficiently. Pipe doping is not carried out on the
drill floor but before the pipe is lifted in the racks. The pipe
handling system is illustrated in Figure 2.13 to Figure 2.16. The
pipe loading and handling systems on Rigs 401 & 402 is
currently not operational and an alternative method of carry out
pipe handling operations is being used. A 110 tonne crawler crane
is used to load pipe from the ground to the catwalk system, where
an operator disconnects the pipe from the slinging equipment. In
order to carry out this task the whole side of pipe deck has been
removed to improve the visibility of the crane operator. The
Bucking machine designed to make up and break out drill pipe is not
being used as it does not function as required.
2.10.4 Drill Floor
The drill floor layout allows for all required operations to be
performed in a safe and efficient manner and, as far as possible,
provide the maximum unobstructed working area. The drill floor has
the following specification: A set-back area with a minimum
capacity of 350 tonnes; Set-back area is flush with rig-floor,
incorporating a surface non-damaging to tool joints; Ability to
withstand drop impact of a 9- drill collar (3.1 tonnes), from a
height of 1.0 m; Fully sealed with drainage system, capable of
handling all mud spillages (zero discharge); Approved non-slip oil
resistant rubber type work surface in the area adjacent to the
rotary
table; Pad-eye for a lower logging sheave rated to 22,480 lb
(10,000 kg), recessed into the rig-
floor and the recess provided with a cover; Two access / egress
ways with clear pathway leading from the drill floor;
-
Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 40
of 310
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Personnel elevator with proper certification and classification
from ground level to drill floor level with intermediate stop at
the BOP deck;
Rigid gates to close off the top of all ramps; Mouse-hole,
designed for easy removal and safe efficient make up of drill pipe;
Rat-hole as back-up provision for Kelly drilling; Three utility
winches, two 5 tonne SWL on the drill floor and one (5 tonne SWL)
on the BOP
deck; Two certified 500 kg SWL man-rider winches; when required
by the drilling operations; Doghouse, mounted on the North side of
the drill floor; Drilling console, equipped with all required
instrumentation for control and monitoring of
operations; BOP control panel; Choke control panel; and Cascade
breathing air distribution system and Self Contained Breathing
Apparatus (SCBA).
2.10.5 High Pressure Mud System Primary control of well
pressure, whilst drilling, is provided by the hydrostatic head
o