Is GPS More Vulnerable Than Ever? Panelists: Richard Linzy, Data Architect Engineer, Windstream Communications Richard Funderburk, Timing Systems Architect, Trimble, Inc. Sarah Mahmood, Science & Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security Moderator: Marc Weiss, NIST Consultant, Marc Weiss Consulting
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Is GPS More Vulnerable Than Ever?Panelists:Richard Linzy, Data Architect Engineer, Windstream CommunicationsRichard Funderburk, Timing Systems Architect, Trimble, Inc.Sarah Mahmood, Science & Technology Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security
Moderator:Marc Weiss, NIST Consultant, Marc Weiss Consulting
Webinar Introduction:Is GPS More Vulnerable Than Ever
3. Environmental Impactsa. HVAC Compressorb. Antenna Fieldsc. New Building construction
Cost of Impacts to Business
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1. Loss of Sync Clock in a Central OfficeA. Voice Services
a. Loss of SS7 servicesb. Loss of all 911 services to local marketc. Loss of all Long Distance calling
B. Data Servicesa. Quality of service impact to 100 Gb Ethernet Linksb. Quality of service impact to Sonet or SDH carrier Systems.c. Quality of service impact to VoIP carrier services.d. Quality of service impact to Wireless systems.
Sync Diversity Architectures
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1. GPS Antenna Diversity 2. Clock Card Redundancy for Holdover1. Network Diversity using PTPv2 (1588V2)2. Route Diversity using weighted routing Algorithm
BNG
BNG
Site “A”
Customer Access Network
MDR
MDR
TP5000-1NTP
SYNC
TP2700 PTP B/C
TP5000-2NTP
SYNC
1PPS/TOD
1PPS/TOD
GPS
NTP
PTP1588v2
Grand Master Site “A”
PE
MDR
MDR
Site “B”
TP2700 PTP B/C
GPS
TP5000-3NTP
SYNC
TP5000-4NTP
SYNC1PPS/TOD
1PPS/TOD
Grand Master Site “B”
PEPTP
1588v2PTP
1588v2
PTP1588v2
NTP
Winterstate 100Gb
RT Wgt 100
BNG
BNG
Rt Wgt 50
Rt Wgt 50PTP/NTP/SYNC
Rt Wgt 50
Adtran5K
Adtran5K
Adtran5K
Adtran5K
Adtran5K
Adtran5KSyncE
SyncE
NTP Sync Device
PTP Sync Device
PTP Master Link
PTP Client Link
SyncE Timing Link
Color Code Legend
RT Wgt 50PTP/NTP/SYNC
RT Wgt 50
SS
RT Wgt 50
GPS
GPS
THANK YOU
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Richard FunderburkTiming Systems ArchitectTrimble, Inc.
Is GPS More Vulnerable Than Ever?Richard FunderburkTiming Systems ArchitectTime & Frequency Division
Mar 8, 2017
Market Perceptions
Researchers Steer Off Course to Show Potential Power of ‘GPS Spoofing’August 2, 2013 at 12:00 AM EDT
EXCLUSIVE: GPS flaw could let terrorists hijack ships, planesPublished July 26, 2013
Vulnerability Assessment & Awareness: Test Events• Purpose:
• Validate laboratory test results in live-sky test environments • Provide this signal environment to industry stakeholders
• Past Events:• Jamming Exercise 2016 at White Sands Missile Range• October 2016 event at Savannah River National Laboratory
• Planned Future Events:• April 2017 GET-CI Event: Allow CI GPS equipment manufacturers to
test their equipment in live-sky spoofing environment • Jamming Exercise 2017: Focus on live-sky jamming environment• More events targeted at specific stakeholders
DHS Science and Technology Directorate | MOBILIZING INNOVATION FOR A SECURE WORLD 27
Awareness: Best Practices (1)
• “Improving the Operation and Development of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Equipment Used by Critical Infrastructure”
DHS Science and Technology Directorate | MOBILIZING INNOVATION FOR A SECURE WORLD 28
Examples• End-User Guidance:
• “Obscure antennas. Install antennas where they are not visible from publicly accessible locations or obscure their exact locations by introducing impediments to hide the antennas.”
• Manufacturer Guidance:• “Enhance anti-jam capabilities. To the
extent possible, the GPS receiver should be specified and developed to provide good anti-jam capabilities so that it can operate through high received levels of interference and jamming.”
Awareness: Best Practices (2)
• “Best Practices for Improved Robustness of Time and Frequency Sources in Fixed Locations”
DHS Science and Technology Directorate | MOBILIZING INNOVATION FOR A SECURE WORLD 29
Examples• Receiver Guidance:
• “If the receiver has the capability, record average signal strength/Automatic Gain Control level once the stabilization is complete as a benchmark to be checked during routine maintenance”
• Manufacturer Guidance:• “Place the antenna where it cannot be seen
from publically accessible locations, or deny view of the antenna from public locations using an RF-transparent material… place the antenna where a roof line or structure blocks direct line of sight to the antenna from publically accessible locations.”
Improved Equipment:Horizon Ring Nulling Timing Antenna
• Wide variety of threats to fixed site GPS timing receivers
• Unintentional interference: e.g., spectrum encroachment and out-of-band RF interference
• Intentional interference• Interference sources tend to be below
antenna mounting• MITRE’s low cost horizon ring nulling
(HRN) helix timing antenna• Reduces impact of interference and
multipath slightly above to below the horizon
• Antenna design available for commercial transition via no costlicense agreement
DHS Science and Technology Directorate | MOBILIZING INNOVATION FOR A SECURE WORLD 30
Diversity:CPNT Requirements
• Purpose• Define and validate PNT
requirements with end-users in critical infrastructure sectors
• Approach• Engage directly with CI
end-users for input
• Status• Complete:
• Electricity Subsector• Wireless Communications
• Next:• Financial Services • Emergency Services
DHS Science and Technology Directorate | MOBILIZING INNOVATION FOR A SECURE WORLD 31
Future Requirements Excerpt
Electricity Subsector Wireless Communications
Diversity:Explore Technologies
• Study and test potential other technologies to provide PNT solutions for critical infrastructure applications
DHS Science and Technology Directorate | MOBILIZING INNOVATION FOR A SECURE WORLD 32
• eLoran NYSE Demo (April 16 2016)• eLoran signal received inside
building to within 30 nanoseconds of UTC reference where GPS signals were not receivable.
• For all locations, 95% of data collected is within 200 ns of UTC.
• Iridium Demo (October 2016)• Testing conducted at Savannah
River National Lab.• Average delta to GPS was ~200
nanoseconds.• Able to receive signal even when
GPS was jammed.
DHS Risk Management & Program Strategy
DHS Science and Technology Directorate | MOBILIZING INNOVATION FOR A SECURE WORLD 33