Is a Mental Image Really Mental ?

Is a Mental Image Really Mental ?

Alessandro Antonietti - Manuela Cantoia - Barbara Colombo

Department of PsychologyCognitive Psychology Laboratory

Catholic University of Sacred Heart of Milan

9th EWIC - Pavia - April 26, 2003

The studies presented here originated in the field of developmental psychology, more precisely within the investigation of children’s “discovery” of the mind.

In this area researchers are interested in- assessing when and how children come to ascribe mental states to human beings [see subsequent slide ];- assessing what features children attribute to such mental states.

As far as the second issue is concerned, according to Wellman the criteria which allow a Western adult to distinguish between a physical and a mental entity are the following []:

Wellman’s criteria:

- mental entities do not afford behavioural-sensory contact

- mental entities do not have public existence

- mental entities do not have temporally consistent existence

- mental entities can be transformed by thinking about them

Wellman claimed that these criteria are mastered by children early in the development.

For instance, in a series of experiments Wellman and his collaborators presented pre-schoolers both with the situation of a child who is perceiving an object that is physically present and with the situation of a child who is imagining that object. [] The experimenters asked some questions about the two situations [] :

Wellman & Estes, 1986; Estes et al., 1989; Wolley & Wellman, 1992:

Wellman & Estes, 1986; Estes et al., 1989; Wolley & Wellman, 1992:

Can you see it with your eyes ?

Can you touch it with your hands ?

Can I see it ?

Can I touch it ?

Can I use it to play ?

Just by thinking about it, can you transform it ?

The results of the experiments suggested that even 3-year-olds can give responses consistent with the previously mentioned criteria [].

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

3-yr-olds 4-yr-olds 5-yr-olds

Percentages of correct responses

Wellman & Estes, 1986, Exp. 1, p. 913

Wellman’s claim is that children share the same basic criteria as adults when requested to define a mental experience - such as imagining an object. In fact, the rates of the “correct” responses recorded in children’s samples were close to the perfect rates which Wellman expected to find in adult samples.

However, some fortuitous observations we carried out by asking adults informally the same questions posed by Wellman and coworkers to children induced us to cast doubts about this prediction.

Thus, we decided to investigate systematically adults’ reactions to Wellman’s questions.

First of all, we collected all the questions asked to children in Wellman’s experiments, by referring them to one (the pen) of the objects considered in such experiments [].

Questions concerning the temporal consistency of mental experience were omitted since - as Wellman admitted - some physical entities - such as smoke - do not possess such a feature.

Can you see the pen? Sensory

Can you touch the pen? Contact

Can you close the pen in a drawer? Behavioural

Can you move the pen up-down

Can another person see the pen?Public Existence

Can you break the pen? Possible

TransformationCan you lengthen the pen? Impossible

Can you use the pen Functionto write anything?

Is the pen real? “Ontological” status

Then we tried to follow exactly the same procedure devised by Wellman and to apply it to undergraduates in different disciplines.

Students attending psychology courses were excluded.

The procedure was as follows []:

Warm up

All participants were presented with a picture of a smile

and they were asked to close their eyes and to turn the mental image of that smile into a sad expression.

Task

“Look at this pen”

Task

“Look at this pen”

“Close your eyes and try to make a picture of that pen in your head”

The nine questions were asked

Condition N

Perceptual 10

Imaginative 15

STUDY 1

In Wellman’s perspective, the expected percentages should be:0 in the first column100 in the last column

Surprisingly, undergraduates were far from reaching the predicted values [].

Responses given to the question “Can you close the pen into a drawer?” were not considered since many participants did not realised the presence of a drawer in the table used in the experiment; most of them responded “no” because they thought there was not a drawer.

PerceptualCondition:

UnexpectedResponse

Question ImaginativeCondition:ExpectedResponse

Sensory Contactno = 0 % Can you see the pen? no = 13 %

no = 20 % Can you touch the pen? no = 53 %Behavioural Contact

no = 20 % Can you move the pen up-down? no = 20 %

Public Existenceno = 0 % Can another person see the pen? no = 57 %

Transformationno = 60 % Can you break the pen? no = 33 %yes = 0 % Can you lengthen the pen? yes = 53 %

Functionno = 20 % Can you write anything

with the pen?no = 13 %

Ontological statusno = 0 % Is the pen real? no = 53 %

In most cases percentages were not significantly different between the perceptual and the imaginative conditions [].

Question Comparison betweenPerceptual and Imaginative

ConditionsSensory Contact

Can you see the pen? z = 1.19, n.s.Can you touch the pen? z = 1.65, n.s.

Behavioural ContactCan you move the pen up-down? z = 0, n.s.

Public ExistenceCan another person see the pen? z = 2.94, p < .005

TransformationCan you break the pen? z = 1.33, n.s.

Can you lengthen the pen? z = 2.79, p < .005

FunctionCan you write anything

with the pen?z = 0.47, n.s.

Ontological statusIs the pen real? z = 2.79, p < .005

Why do various percentages in the first column differ from 0? Not because participants were mad, but because they - according to what they reported when requested to give reasons of their responses - felt to be limited by social constraints: for instance they said that they couldn’t touch, move, use and, above all, break the pen since they were not the owner of the pen.In other cases thy answered “no” because they didn’t want or desire to carry out the described action.

But, why - contrary to Wellman’s prediction - did undergraduates attributed features such as sensory-behavioural contact and so on to the image of the pen? [](We must also consider the possibility that part of the “no” responses were due to the same extrinsic reasons - social rules, etc. - invoked to explain no responses in the percpetual condition).

Is it possible that adults perform worse, from Wellman’s point of view, than pre-schoolers?

Further investigation was needed.

PerceptualCondition:

UnexpectedResponse

Question ImaginativeCondition:ExpectedResponse

Sensory Contactno = 0 % Can you see the pen? no = 13 %

no = 20 % Can you touch the pen? no = 53 %Behavioural Contact

no = 20 % Can you move the pen up-down? no = 20 %

Public Existenceno = 0 % Can another person see the pen? no = 57 %

Transformationno = 60 % Can you break the pen? no = 33 %yes = 0 % Can you lengthen the pen? yes = 53 %

Functionno = 20 % Can you write anything

with the pen?no = 13 %

Ontological statusno = 0 % Is the pen real? no = 53 %

The second experiment was carried out- to replicate these findings through a different design (within subjects)- to ask participants to justify always their responses

The procedure was the same as in the previous study, but undergraduates were exposed both to the perceptual and to the imaginative conditions.The order of presentation of the two conditions was randomly changed.

After each question, participants were requested to explain why they answered either “yes” or “no”.

STUDY 2

Condition N

Imaginative+

Perceptual22

Perceptual+

Imaginative14

Percentages in the Ima-Per condition were similar to those recorded in Study 1. []

However, as far as some questions are concerned, in the Per-Ima condition percentages of the expected responses were higher, near to the predicted values.

Question Imaginative + PerceptualCondition

Perceptual + ImaginativeCondition

Sensory ContactCan you see the

pen?no = 0

(Study 1a = 13 )no = 7

Can you touchthe pen?

no = 45(Study 1a = 53)

no = 86

Behavioural ContactCan you move the

pen up-down?no = 10

(Study 1a = 20)no = 7

Public ExistenceCan another person

see the pen?no = 59

(Study 1a = 57)no = 77

TransformationCan you break the

pen?no = 50

(Study 1a = 33)no = 29

Can you lengthenthe pen?

yes = 45(Study 1a = 53)

yes = 86

FunctionCan you write

anythingwith the pen?

no = 18(Study 1a = 13)

no = 14

Ontological statusIs the pen real? no = 41

(Study 1a = 53)no = 93

Questions about the Imagined Pen:Percentages of Expected Responses under the Two Conditions

In fact, in some cases the percentages of the expected responses significantly differed in the two conditions . []

Presumably, the possibility to compare the imaginative experience to the previous perceptual experience induced participants to recognise the alleged “mental” features (lack of sensory-behavioural contact, availability of impossible transformations, unreality) of the imagery experience.Explanations in term of artifacts produced by the repetition of the same questions can be discarded because these alleged effects did not affect all items.

However, why did undergraduates persist in attributing unpredicted features to imagery?

The analysis of the justifications given may highlight this issue.

Question Imaginative +PerceptualCondition:ExpectedResponse

Perceptual +ImaginativeCondition:ExpectedResponse

Comparisonbetween the

Two Conditions

Sensory ContactCan you see the

pen?no = 0 % no = 7 % z = 1.26, n.s.

Can you touchthe pen?

no = 45 % no = 86 % z = 2.46, p < .01

Behavioural ContactCan you move the

pen up-down?no = 10 % no = 7 % z = 0.31, n.s.

Public ExistenceCan another person

see the pen?no = 59 % no = 77 % z = 1.11, n.s.

TransformationCan you break the

pen?no = 50 % no = 29 % z = 1.25, n.s.

Can you lengthenthe pen?

yes = 45 % yes = 86 % z = 2.46, p < .01

FunctionCan you write

anythingwith the pen?

no = 18 % no = 14 % z = 0.32, n.s.

Ontological statusIs the pen real? no = 41 % no = 93 % z = 3.12, p < .001

Justifications were classified within a set of well-defined categories which can be collapsed in three main broad categories:[]

Category Label Content ExamplesREFERENCE TO THE PHYSICAL REALITY

ABSENCE OF THE

OBJECT

The participant makes reference tothe absence of the physical pen

The pen is not present

PERCEPTUAL

AVAILABILITY

The participant makes reference tothe previous perceptualexperience of the pen

I have just see the pen Other people can perceive the pen (as I

do)SOCIAL RULES The participants makes reference

to constraints depending on socialrules

I can not break the pen since you arethe owner

REFERENCE TO THE IMAGINED REALITYFEATURES OF THE

IMAGINED

OBJECT/SCENE

The participant makes reference tothe features of the imaginedobject/scene

The pen can be fitted in the drawer The pen is a whole object

ACTIONS IN THE

IMAGINED SCENE

The participant can/cannotperform the action on the object inthe imagined scene

I can reach the pen with my hand

REFERENCE TO THE MENTAL REALITYLIMITS AND

POSSIBILITIES

OF SUBJECT’S

IMAGINATION

The participant can/cannotvisualise in his/her mind theobject

I cannot visualise the two parts of thebroken pen

I cannot visualise the details of the pen I can visualise the pen only in a given

locationREFERENCE TO

MENTAL ACTION

The participant makes reference tohis/her mental activity

I imagine to reach the pen with myhand

Mental visualisation is abstractREFERENCE TO

MENTAL

REPRESENTATION

The participant makes reference tothe mental status of the object

The pen is in my mind

Categorisation of Justification Responses to Questions about the Imagined Pen

Justificantions suggested that participants answered the questions by referring to different aspects of the imagery experience.

According to the phenomenological tradition, we can distinguish the physical presence from the intentional presence. []

The physical presence concerns external, concrete, material entities.The intentional presence consists in the fact that a physical (or even a abstract-conceptual) entity appears to my consciousness (in the form of a perceptual, imagery, memory, thinking and so on, experience).

Within the intentional presence we can distinguish:- the content, that is, what is present (the intentioned object, noema)- the process, the act of intentioning that content (noesi), which may involve the construction of mental representation.

PHYSICAL INTENTIONAL

intentioned content intentioning act (noema) (noesi)

When asked to justify their responses, undergraduates gave reasons which show that their were thinking about:

- or the physical object which is the external referent of their imaginative experience

- or the intentioned object which is present in their consciousness through the imaginative experience

- or the mental process and/or representation which is activated in the imaginative experience and allows to imagine something.

An analogy might be useful to clarify these distinctions.

If I see this picture of a pen[] and someone ask me anything about it (for instance: Is it coloured?), I can answer by referring:

- or to the physical pen which was the original model reproduced in the picture

- or to the pen that I see in the picture (which is a pen with given characteristics - colour, size etc. - but it is not the physical pen; is the physical pen as it is appears in the picture. By looking at the picture, I see the pen but I’m aware that what I see is not a three-dimensional, concrete pen, even though I can imagine to manipulate and so on the pen I see)

- or the pattern of pixels activated onto this computer screen, which assumes this given form because of the electronic processes which occur within this machine and which produces electromagnetic waves, and so on

It is worth noticing that references to the third aspect (the mental) were more frequent in the Per-Ima condition: the contrast with the perceptual experience hinted participants at focusing on the mental acts or activities or representational medium involved in the imaginative experience. []

Question Imaginative + PerceptualCondition

Perceptual + ImaginativeCondition

Physical Imagined Mental Physical Imagined MentalCan you see thepen?

27 0 73 18 0 82

Can you touch thepen?

31 8 61 0 8 92

Can you move thepen up-down?

20 20 60 0 8 92

Can anotherperson see thepen?

44 12 44 9 0 91

Can you break thepen?

31 19 50 0 0 100

Can you lengthenthe pen?

31 25 44 0 0 100

Can you writeanything with thepen?

54 12 33 0 9 91

Is the pen real? 40 13 47 0 0 100

Justification (Questions about the Imagined Pen):Percentages of Each Category under the Two Conditions

Ima + Per Per + ImaP I M P I M

Can you see thepen?

27 0 73 18 0 82 X2 = 3.77, n.s.

Can you touch thepen?

31 8 61 0 8 92 X2 = 37.28, p < .001

Can you move thepen up-down?

20 20 60 0 8 92 X2 = 31.88, p < .001

Can anotherperson see thepen?

44 12 44 9 0 91 X2 = 52.05, p < .001

Can you break thepen?

31 19 50 0 0 100 X2 = 66.07, p < .001

Can you lengthenthe pen?

31 25 44 0 0 100 X2 = 77.78, p < .001

Can you writeanything with thepen?

54 12 33 0 9 91 X2 = 81.55, p < .001

Is the pen real? 40 13 47 0 0 100 X2 = 72.11, p < .001

Justification (Questions about the Imagined Pen):Comparison between the Two Conditions

Significant associations between yes-no responses and justifications emerged: the expected responses tended to be given by participants who thought of the mental process rather than of the physical or intentioned object. []

Justification ResponseNo Yes

Physical 37.5 % 25.0 %Imagined 50.0 % 0.0 %Mental 12.5 % 75.0 %

Imaginative + Perceptual Condition:Questions about the Imagined Pen

Can you lengthen the pen?

Justification ResponseNo Yes

Physical 20.0 % 75.0 %Imagined 10.0 % 12.5 %Mental 70.0 % 12.5 %

Can another person see the pen?

X2 = 97.94, p < .001

X2 = 73.04, p < .001

Since references to the so-called “mental” aspect of imagery were enhanced by the contrast between the perceptual and the imaginative experiences, we decided to deepen this issue by asking explicitly participants to compare the two experiences (Study 3).

Participants were asked to look at a pen (Perceptual situation) and then to create a mental image of that pen (Imaginative situation).

Then they were invited to identify differences between the two situations.

They were also asked 4 questions: Can you touch the pen?Can you break the pen?Can you lengthen the pen?Can another person see the pen?

STUDY 3

Questions were asked with reference both to the perceived pen (“Look at the pen: can you touch it?”) and to the imagined pen (“Try to imagine the pen: can you touch it?”).

The order of the two questions within each pair was counterbalanced:

50% of the participants were asked to answer first about the perceived pen and then about the imagined pen(Perceptual + Imaginative condition)

the other 50% of the participants were asked to answer first about the imagined pen and then about the perceived pen(Imaginative + Perceptual condition)

After each question participants were asked to justify their response.

Condition N

Imaginative+

Perceptual16

Perceptual+

Imaginative16

Responses to the direct hint at realising differences between the perceptual and imaginative situations were classified into the following categories:[]

Also in this case it was found that undergraduates made reference to different aspects in order to differentiate the perceptual and the imaginative experiences.

Spontaneously, however, they did not identified the “mental” aspects as the differentiating element.

We also notice that about 20% of participants failed to find differences between the two situations.

Kind of difference Percentage

Physical(differences in size,colour, orientation etc.:as the concrete penactually is)

28

Imagined(differences insharpness, vividness,definition, details etc.:as the intentioned penappears)

48

Mental(memory-based,insubstantial etc.: as theimage of the pen wasconstructed in the mind)

3

No difference 21

Percentages of “yes-no” responses” were not significantly different in the two conditions, but were higher than those recorded in the previous studies. []

It is likely that the request to detect possible differences between the perceptual and the imaginative situations induced participants to differentiate their responses about the two situations.

Question Condition Comparison betweenthe Two Conditions

Imaginative +Perceptual

Perceptual +Imaginative

Can you touch thepen?

No = 50 No = 68 z = 1.04, n.s.

Can you break thepen?

No = 50 No = 36 z = 0.80, n.s.

Can you lengthen thepen?

Yes = 67 Yes = 88 z = 1.42, n.s.

Can anther personsee the pen?

No = 83 No = 76 z = 0.49, n.s.

Is the pen real? No = 50 No = 64 z = 0.80, n.s.

Expected Responses to the Questions about the Imagined Pen: Percentages under the Two Conditions

Justification based on “mental” aspects were more frequent in Study 3 as compared to Study 2 [], with few significant differences between the two conditions. []

Also these findings can be interpreted as consequences of the contrast effect produced by the initial invitation to compare the perceptual and imaginative situations.

Question Imaginative + PerceptualCondition

Perceptual + ImaginativeCondition

Physical Imagined Mental Physical Imagined MentalCan you touch thepen?

0 17 83 4 8 88

Can anotherperson see thepen?

17 0 83 10 0 90

Can you break thepen?

17 0 83 12 0 88

Can you lengthenthe pen?

0 0 100 0 0 100

Is the pen real? 25 0 75 5 0 95

Justifications (Questions about the Imagined Pen):Percentages of Each Category under the Two Conditions

Ima + Per Per + ImaP I M P I M

Can you touchthe pen?

0 17 83 4 8 88 X2 = 7.39, p < .05

Can anotherperson see thepen?

17 0 83 10 0 90 X2 = 2.10, n.s.

Can you breakthe pen?

17 0 83 12 0 88 X2 = 1.01, n.s.

Can you lengthenthe pen?

0 0 100 0 0 100 X2 = 0, n.s.

Is the pen real? 25 0 75 5 0 95 X2 = 15.69, p < .001

Justification (Questions about the Imagined Pen):Comparison between the Two Conditions

CONCLUSIONS

The results of the 3 studies showed that adults, asked the same questions which Wellman and collaborators addressed to children, failed to give spontaneously the predicted responses.

This suggests that adults fail to ascribe to the imaginative experience mental features such as lack of sensory-behavioural contact, public existence, unreality, and so on.

This occurs since people, when requested to form “a picture in their head” of an object and asked about the features of such a “picture”, make reference to different aspects of the imaginative experience.

More precisely, adults - but also children, if not biased (Cantoia, 2002) - interpret the questions either as concerning the imagined object or as concerning the image of the object (which are not the same thing).

The imagined object tends to be perceived as characterised by the same properties and susceptible of the same actions (even though in an imaginative form) as the corresponding physical object.

Only the image of the object - and the processes which support its generation, maintenance, and manipulation - tends to match the criteria for the “mental” proposed by Wellman.

However, persons can be oriented to think to the mental counterpart of the imagined object when they have the possibility, or are induced, to compare perceptual and imaginative experiences.

In this case, the two kinds of experiences- share the same physical object and- make reference to the (approximately) same intentioned object.

Consequently, differences can be found only in the way (either perceptual or imaginative) in which the object is intentioned, namely, in the mental processes or representations which accompany those intentioning acts.

IMPLICATIONS

Highly dramatic:Do imagery experiments concern images of objects, environments, scenes etc. or imagined objects, environments, scenes etc.?

Less dramatic:Do experimenters interpret findings of imagery studies in terms of images of objects etc. or in terms of imagined objects etc?

Mildly dramatic:Do participants in imagery experiments answer, when requested to report their imaginative experiences, by referring to images of objects etc. or to imagined objects?