7/29/2019 Irrational Solidarity Groups- A Socio-Psychological Study in Connection with Ibn Khaldûn Author(s)- Hellmut Ritter http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/irrational-solidarity-groups-a-socio-psychological-study-in-connection-with 1/45 Irrational Solidarity Groups: A Socio-Psychological Study in Connection with Ibn Khaldûn Author(s): Hellmut Ritter Reviewed work(s): Source: Oriens, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Jun. 1, 1948), pp. 1-44 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1579028 . Accessed: 13/03/2013 07:57 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Oriens. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Wed, 13 Mar 2013 07:57:02 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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7/29/2019 Irrational Solidarity Groups- A Socio-Psychological Study in Connection with Ibn Khaldûn Author(s)- Hellmut Ritter
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
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BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Oriens.
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What are the motive forces that are at the root of historico-political
processes? In his book Machtstaat und Utopie, Vom Streit um
die Ddmonie der Macht seit Machiavell und Morus 1, my brother
Gerhard Ritter, professor of History at Freiburg University, has
pointed out the importance of the Florentine statesman Machia-
velli with regard to the question we have raised. Whatever we
may think of the doctrines laid down in his famous book Del
Principe and their historical significance, Machiavelli was thefirst political thinker who gave the western world a clear insightin the character of one of those motive forces, the one, however,
which is of prime importance: the desire for power which
has its origin in the inborn character of the political individual
and obeys therefore the laws of natural instincts. The significanceand demonic character of this instinctive desire for power has
never, either by Antiquity or the Middle Ages, been so clearly
understood as by Machiavelli. This desire for power (according toG. Ritter) appears first with the political leaders, but reaches the
peak of significance and efficacy only if it is possible to pass it on
to a multitude of people, a nation, and to arouse in this nation its
correlate, the virtiu,viz. the virtue of combative manliness. The author
Miinchen I94o. Now Die Dimonic der Macht, Betrachtungen iiber Ge-
schichte und Wesen des Machtproblems im politischen Denken der Neuzeit,
Stuttgart (I947).ORIENS II
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affections, and the boundary between friend and enemy: "You have
heard that it is said: Love your neighbour and hate your enemy. But I
tell you: Love your enemies... For in loving those who love you, whatwill be your merit? Are not the publicans doing the same? And if youare friendly only with your brothers, what are you doing more than
others?" (Matth. V, 45-47).
The prospect for the abolition of the boundaries of solidarity
through the establishing of one great, common solidarity circle is of
course a small one in public life. The world is not organized for the
surmounting of solidarity circles, but for their strict and correct
preservation. An official of a national solidarity circle who witnesses
cruelties to certain parts of the population in the country, in which
he represents his nation, has not to bother about them so long as no
"interests" of his country are affected. If, for once, an intervention
is made in favour of those who suffer unjustly, it must absolutely be
justified by "endangered interests", for the official world understands
such language only; the various co-existing political circles of powermust respect their mutual interests. The frontiers between the indivi-
dual sovereign states are, as it were, juridically petrified in a world
which can only live through the loosening of these frontiers.
But beyond such traditional, official attitude, the harsh main-
taining of the frontiers between various solidarity circles, the stabili-
zation in principle of the relation between friend and enemy, are bysome people praised as an ideal. They really are fond of that dynamicforce which is actuated through the opposition to an "enemy" circle.
Forthem, adjustment
ofdifferences,
eternalpeace,
areonly
a dream
and not even a beautiful one. G. Ritter says in his characterization of
the political man of power (p. 32): "In proclaiming an 'enemy' every-
thing that stands in his way to success and in placing such relation be-
tween friend and enemy above all other values, ethical laws lose their
autonomous validity for him". The difference between this formula-
tion and our point of view, lies in the fact that we do not consider this
division of the world into friend and enemy as a privilege of the
political man of power only, but beyond this as a characteristicfeature of the social field of power which we call irrational solidarity
Hellmut Ritter14
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gical factors. Once, however, the system has been adopted by the
community, or has been assigned to it by historical fate, it is, thanks
to a restricted horizon in conjunction with the feeling of superiority,
proclaimed as a universal and absolute one. One claims to be in posses-
sion of the absolute truth, of the only true religion, etc. The dogmasof one religion are, as a matter of course, by no means convincingto the adherents of another one and cannot be convincing for others,
since they represent no rational, demonstrable truths, but symbols of
psychological, entirely irrational attitudes.
The national historian is expected to describe the fortune and
misfortune of his national community to which he belongs as an
ardent member of that community. But his nation's triumphs and
victories, which he celebrates, are another nation's humilities, defeats,
and everything will be viewed from the opposite angle by that nation's
historian. But the apparent relativity of historical truth disappearsas soon as the historian's look embraces an ideal horizon, in which
friend and enemy belong together in a higher form of community.Fertile scientific discussion, in which
really objectiveresults are
attained, is only possible either where there exists a natural intrinsic,
tradition-established solidarity of work, or where such solidarityis formed, and if necessary renewed, through conscious acts of
resolution on the part of the different parties concerned. If, as it has
happened, on the contrary, the will for subjectivity and the negationof the objective is manifested, this means that the maintenance of
the demarcation lines, of the friend-enemy relation, is placed above
allvalues,
even above that ofobjective knowledge, even above thevalue of truth. It means renunciation of the truth which is common to
mankind. There is only one truth, that of one's own solidarity circle.
Victory of truth is thought of, as if it were something like a
victory of political power, i.e. science becomes propaganda, and,
ceases to be science; for science, unless it agrees to play the part of a
servant of theology, as in former times, or even to degrade itself to
being a servant of policy, will always claim to be universal, i.e. to be
the truth of that solidarity circle which, in principle, embraces allbeings endowed with reason, and finds its limits only where the limits
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gamated nto a great solidaritygroup.The feeling of solidaritywas
spurredon by religious deas,andthe forcesthusintegrated oughtfor
activity.This they foundin the conquests,whichOmar,a strongpoli-tical personality,organizedafter the smashingof the first apostasymovementfollowingMuhammed'sdeathduringthe caliphateof Ab*i
Bekr.
The necessarycondition for such a war of conquestseems to be
the initiativeof the personalityof the leader,who organizes he war.
That the popularmassesthemselves, n the formof a massmovement
shouldattack a neighbouringcountryis hardlyconceivable.Excited
popular masses may make noisy demonstrations, ocal revolts and
raids, but they do not organizea war. For a war, leadership s
responsible.
II
The feeling of solidarity, he legitimatefunctionof which consists
in giving the community he power of maintaining tself very often
appearsto be mingled with less noble motives. How-
ever much t mayinducethe membersof the community o give upor
restraintheir individualegotism, it goes very well with a collective
egotism,which,again,maydisplay tself in differentdynamicdegrees,varying from comparatively armless to very maliciousforms. Ideal
values,such as preservationof the community's xistence,its dignity,its honour, ts safety fromaggression, ts historicrights,are replaced
by morematerial hings.Someof them,which sound a little less ideal
and are pretty elastic,as for instance"interests",are acknowledgedin diplomatic anguageand have become familiar.Beyondthis, how-
of common occupations. It also comes about between men who were
brought up together and who share the vicissitudes of life (Kamil
Ayad Io8-9). Here indeed substantial elements have been perceived,which lead to the rise of solidarity. Blood relationship is the strongest
bond, especially for semitic nations, at any rate for the Arabs who,
even after settling down, kept up the organization of tribes in the
desert. The city states of Antiquity, too, go back to the organizationin tribes, though for them the existence of tribes did not play the same
dominant role as for the Semites, and the Arabs in particular. The
ancient Arabs could scarcely imagine an association between men who
stood in no relationship to each other, and therefore, when unrelated
people were admitted into a tribe, a common genealogical tree was
established. The genealogical tables of the Arabs partly represent
relationships in the sense of ancestry research, partly are records of
old political alliances, of historical merging of weak tribes into another
strong tribe, etc.
Ibn Khalduin is of course aware of these facts. His inference is
that the feeling of belonging together does not depend on real com-
mon origin, but first of all on the subjective belief of the members
that they have the same blood (Ayad p. Io8). We would say that the
idea of relationship has the character and importance of an ideology
fostering integration 1.
The second cause for the rise of solidarity seems to have been
stronger for the Indo-Europeans, at least after their settling down,
1 Even the Islam, which united the Arab tribes did not immediately replacethese blood relationshipties. Only gradually did the conception"brother Mos-lem" becamemore importantthan the conception"tribe brother".The OmayyadEmpire perished owing to tribal feuds; it was not before the massive pene-tration of non-Arab elements that the religious community became more im-
portant than blood relationship. The struggle between these two conceptionsis related clearly by Goldziher in his MuhammedanischeStudien, Halle I888.The same applies to the closer family ties. Goldziher comes to the followingconclusion: "En general, on peut dire que Fancienne doctrine mahometanemanifeste la tendance a faire prevaloir d'une faCon reguliere les devoirs dufidele envers sa famille sur le devoir a l'egard de la foi". Influences chretiennes
dans la litterature religieuse de l'Islam (Revue de l'Histoire des ReligionsXVIII, 195).
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than for the Semites. At any rate, at the later period we see semi-
military and social alliances of various kinds, having nothing to do
with relationship, and whose newer, harmless forms are the innumer-able clubs, comradeships, youth associations, etc., which, according to
circumstance, show a stronger or looser solidarity. The same seems
to have been the case with the Turks. The Turkish slaves, bought in
Central Asia, who formed the Mameluke Corps in Egypt, belong to
this category. The same is true of the so-called Futuwwa associations,
continued in the Anatolian Akhi associations, in which the feelingsof solidarity developed considerable strength. Characteristic of the
spirit of comradeship and the readiness for sacrifice, which wereconsidered among them as pre-requisites, is the story of an Akhi who
had his hand cut off to save that of a younger member, condemned
for theft 1.
The third cause of solidarity, common education, is even to-day
playing a paramount part in some countries, so that it has been said
that political leaders recruit themselves from among old school-
fellows.
1 Herbert W. Duda, CIizaduddinFaqih und die Futitwwa, Archiv Orientalni
VI, 1934, II2-124. In Islam, the necessity of love-ties beyond reach of the
family limits seems to have first been stressed by the mystics. The mysticNiri (d. 9o7), who was sentencedto death with a number of comrades, rushed
forward to the executioner so as to be executed first and thus to prolong the
brothers' lives by a few moments (Al Ghasali, Das Elixir der Gliickseligkeit,translated by H. Ritter, Jena 1923, p. 79). The Prophet is called upon to putforward the necessity of love for non-relatives. From the same circles comes
the sentence: "Our comrades are dearer to us than our wives and children".
Abu Talibal-Makki, Qat al-qulzb
II, 218-19. Thestory
known from Schiller's
ballad "Die Biirgschaft" of the friend who substitutes himself, as bail, for the
friend sentencedto death, is connectedwith the Pythagoreancircle. It was told by
Aristoxenos, primitively a pythagorean in Tarent, later a pupil of Aristotle's
in Athens; he heard the story from Dionysios II personally. Published by
Diels-Kranz, The fragments of the Pre-socratics 5th ed., ist vol. (Berlin
I934), p. 47I etc. Aristoxenos' work was entitledAbout PythagoreanLife. Later,
much altered texts of the Romans': Hyginus, ist century after Christ, source
for Schiller, Valerius Maximus and others. Medieval text of the I5th century
in Der Seele Trost (Kiirschners Natiomwl-LiteraturXII, p. 477). (I owe this
information to my colleague Walther Kranz.) The Arabic text, in which the
tyrannic Governor of the Iraq, Haccac, is substituted for the tyrant, in Saf-
fiiri's Nuzhat al-macalis (Cairo 1313) 213.
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engendering the kind of unity which will make defence possible. This
applies also to the solidarity of fighting troops, which is enhanced
by the common danger of death. Unity among people who are in thesame plight helps to overcome fear of death.
13
There is another kind of solidarity, for the rise of which the
f a c t o r o f t i m e, even the mere sequence of generations, plays an
important role. Common opposition to, common distance from a past
which is felt to be out of date and inferior, may bring about solidarity.This kind of solidarity too appears in various degrees of intensity.
Its most harmless form is the contrast inspired by feelings of
superiority, which sets the young generation against the old. They
dress, behave, enjoy themselves, even talk in a different way from the
older generation; they even have different opinions about life. There
is an Arab saying: "Men look more like their time than like their
fathers".
No less harmless is the peculiar solidarity in a community withregard to fashions in clothes. Whoever excludes himself from the
fashion of the day becomes ridiculous. However, if change of costume
means not only a mere change of fashion, but is to be regarded as the
external sign of passing from one cultural community to another, the
change of costume may involve tremendous conflicts. Such a mo-
mentous change in clothes fashions, for instance, is illustrated by the
adoption of the European costume by Oriental nations, and conflicts
in family life due to such changes are frequent subjects in modernOriental litterature.
against them. A wise man dissuaded them from doing this.Asked for his reasons,he promised to give an answer on the next day. When they came to get his
answer, he threw two fierce dogs upon one another. The dogs fell upon one
another, biting into one another's flesh until the blood began to flow. He thensuddenly threw a wolf against the two dogs, which immediately gave up fightingand turnedtogether against the common foe. On this the Byzantinesgave uptheir
plan of agression". See also Kaegi, Histori.che Meditationen,p. 18; Toynbee,A study of History II, 169.
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requirea special socio-psychologicaldiscussion, which can only be
toucheduponhere.The community ees in him the concentration nd
personificationof its solidarityforces. It expects from him that herepresent ts collectivefeelingsand make ts collectiveegotismsprevailas far as possible.As their great men nationsregardprimarilysuch
political leaders as have increased the power of their country in-
and successfully served their collective egotism, for instancebyterritorialextension at the neighbour'sexpense. It is by no means
the virtues of justice and clemencywhich secure the attachmentof
his adherence.The use of power,the demonstration f power,even ifcombinedwith cruelty,arouse far greaterenthusiasm hanthe quieteffects of a ruler'swisdom.For desireof powerandaggression,which
man carries within himself but cannot satisfy privately, is thus
satisfied indirectly.The readinessfor devotionto the community s often concentrated
upon its live, personalsymbol,the ruler,the leader,the Prophet,etc.
A whole scale of irrationalfeelings go to him, from simple faith-
fulness to the paroxysmalindulgencein idealizing phantasies.In-
cidentalcontactwith him brings aboutexalted feelings of happiness,andmagicforce is attributedo it; thecreationof legendsandmythical
poetry ensues, he receives, while still alive, God-like honours, and
after his death,which is often doubted,he is raisedto a superhuman
being, and to even more than that.
As every generationof a ruling dynasty does not bring forth a
strongleader, all kinds of interestingsituations ensue for the suc-
cessors. The legitimate descendantsare sometimesthe object of a
venerationwhich they do not wish at all, or are assigneda role for
whichthey are not fit (as for some ShiciteImams). Or the successor
exercisesonly the role of a symbol,whereasreal power and political
leadership are left to others (the Emiralumera n the cAbbasid
Empire, the Majordomo in the Frankish Empire). Ibn Khaldfin,
too, knows the enhanced venerationof rulers and the solidaritybe-
betweensubjects
andrulers,
but he does not include them in the
Casabiya ecause t lacksthe characteristic ign of the participationn
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that betweenthe more impersonal government and the governed. Here
all possible degrees can be observed, from the unquestioning loyalty of
the official to the subversive activities of the revolutionary. In the
Islamic history of sects and dogmas, the problem of whether an
impious government should be obeyed or, to put it in a religious way,whether the common prayer rite should be performed behind an im-
pious Imam, worried the minds a long time. While the sect of the
Kharijites would make the Imams' competence of governing depen-dent on a moral and religious life, Orthodoxy has held the view that
prayer is allowed behind any Imam good or bad, and has adoptedthis theory into its creed. To secede from the ruler invested by
historic development, i.e. by God's will, was not in line with the
Orthodox conception, according to which one was bound to abstain
from abondoning the great masses of Moslems, from whatever "split-
ting of the staff". In this conception, which is supported by many
words of the Prophet, is expressed the so often emphasised "Catholicinstinct" of Islam, which is nothing else but the solidarity feelingdealt with here.
The question of one's attitude towards the government is discussed
in Islamic literature in still another way. In Islamic religious literature
protest against abuses and injustice committed by the government,is often referred to by a Koranic term, the accuratetranslation of which
is difficult: "to command what should be approved and to forbid
what should be disapproved". The question is then raised as to theperson upon whom that duty is incumbent, whether upon everyMoslem or only on those who are qualified for it, or on the Imam
himself, as the representative of the community. By what "should
be approved and disapproved" is meant not only actions of the
government, but lawful and unlawful acts in general 1. Political
1 From the Imam's qualification to exercise by proxy the commandof what
should be approvedof and the forbidding of what should be disapprovedof isthen inferred the police authority of the State.
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movements of opposition have frequently adopted the Koranic ex-
pression as their watchword. Ibn Khaldfn deals with this question
in order to demonstrate again the validity of his principle that ideal(religious) propaganda without the help of an Casabiya s doomed to
failure. "If that is so for Prophets themselves", he states, "of whom
the breaking of habits (in normal life) can be expected first, what
is then to be expected from others?... In this chapter belongs the fate
of the men of the common people and that of the scholars of the
sacred Law who rose in order to abolish what cannot be approved.For many men, who devote themselves to divine service and religious
life, think that one has to rise against the unjust ruler, and appeal forthe "commanding of what should be approved and for the forbid-
ding of what should be disapproved" in the hope of God's reward;
they have of course many adherents and indifferent followers among
the crowd and the lower people, and they therefore expose themselves
to the greatest dangers. But the majority of them perish in this way...For the power of Kings and States is strongly established; it can be
discarded or overthrown only if power, based on the Casabiyaof the
tribes and tribal groups, calls it to account, as we have already
pointed out" 1.
These sentences of the Arab philosopher of history have lost nothingof their actuality. The attempts of pious circles and personalities to
form an opposition on ideal grounds are according to Ibn Khaldiin,
doomed to failure. But in Islam, too, courageous scholars have
protested occasionally. In the I3th century courageous jurists in Egyptdeclared prayer in a cemetery chapel, which the Sultan had erected,
as not permitted, on account of the inhumane methods used during its
construction2. A tacit, boycott-like opposition to the governmentexisted in certain pious circles of the early Islamic Middle Ages,when any money coming from the government was considered reli-
giously forbidden property. It is even reported that some pious peopleconsidered it forbidden to drink water from a canal dug by the
1 Muqaddimta Beyrouth I9oo) p. 159. Compare Rosenthal, p. 54.
2 Max Herz-Pascha, Die Baugruppe des Sultans Qaldan in Kairo (Ham-burg 1919), p. 37-38.
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a vaguely felt "Weltanschauung",which even those concerned in it can
hardly formulate and which takes the place of a formulated ideology.
The interpreter of this not clearly established ideology is very oftenthe poet who is the normal interpreter of irrational feelings. What
we know of the social ideas of the ancient Arabs, we know from
their poetry. The considerable part which songs play for the young
people's associations, strong in the emotional and weak in the rational
elements, underlines the significance of this phenomenon. The role
of poetry in such associations is sufficient proof of their irrationality.An Academy of Sciences does not sing, nor does a Loan-Office.
Yet often an ideology is formulated. Thus in the creeds of religious
communities, in Party programs, insofar as they express a "Weltan-
schauung". But there too, solidarity is essential, whereas the rational
content of the ideology is less important. The watchword issued maybe wrong, without, for that matter, losing anything of its unifying
power. The fact that not all the points of a Party program can be
approved of does not always prevent cooperation, provided only that
some of the irrational needs are satisfied.
Formulas of religious tenets are retained as symbols of religiouscommunities even where their rational contents are no longer be-
lieved. This is due to the desire to maintain the connection with the
great epoch which created those symbols 1.
I8
There are a number of i n f 1u e n c i n g m e a n s by which solidar-
ityis
achieved, preservedand
cultivated.The best known and most
important way of influencing people is the spoken and written word.
1 Moreover, the maintenance of complicated common symbols of faith in
religious communities seems to be dependent on the existence of a theologicalprofession, which is simultaneouslythe bearer of civilization and which pro-duces a religious and theological literature or is able to interpret texts handeddown by tradition. Minor sects which have no important theologians and do
not own a theological literature usually fall into decay. On the other hand,small popularenclaves, which differ in doctrine andrite from theirenvironments,
often persist with great tenacity when the clergy takes care of the maintenanceof both.
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sarily destined to rule over others, as at the origin of a body one
of the four elements must outweigh and rule over the others". Ibn
Khaldun knows thus the conception of a class of leaders, held
together by a strong bond of solidarity, which he, as an Arab, imaginesof course to be always genealogically connected. "Even if in one tribe
there are various noble families and many casabiyas (= solidarities),one is bound to be stronger than all of them together, overpowering and
obliging them to obey. In this group, all individual solidarities amalga-
mate, so that it is like a single great 'asabiya" (Rosenthal II). The
creation of power is therefore for Ibn Khaldiunpurely based on a
naturally given dynamism. In his aristocratic State opposing solida-
rities are crushed, forced to obey, and then amalgamated into a single
great solidarity. If, owing to weakening through a life of pleasureand luxuriousness the ruling casabiya group has become degenerate,the rule will pass to a stronger Casabiyagroup of the same nation, i.e.
to another clan." (Rosenthal 24).
Of legal norms, which stabilise and regulate the conditions of powerin a State, Ibn Khalduin does not say much for reasons which do
not concern us here (s. Rosenthal 60). Creation of power and changeof power are considered under a purely dynamic aspect. We cannot
deal here with the relation between right and power in Europeanhistory and the State theory, but we may perhaps all the same take
a glance at modern democracy and the dictatorial State.
Though in modem democracy, in contradistinction to the old feudal
State, the struggle for power at home is free, it has to observe certain
practical rules, whichprevents
itsbecoming dangerous.
Here too,
various solidarity groups, Parties, are struggling for power, but the
struggle is not decided by weapons and violence, but by the polls and
by a mechanically resulting majority. But here, too, Ibn Khaldun's
second phase may come about mutatis mutandis. The Party, which hast a k e n o v e r, turns autocratic and destroys the institution which
helped it to seize power. The regular control of solidarity relationsis eliminated or prevented by terroristic means from taking effect.
A sort ofcompulsory solidarity comes about, which the Centre triesto consolidate by strongly emphasising irrational values and by the
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persuaded thay may be. A national community cannot be created in
this way. For a genuine and prospering community can only subsist
where natural tensions and contrasts remain alive, where there is
abundance and variety of aims, but where all contrasts are bridged
by solidarity. In the keeping alive of a differentiated life-entity, which
becomes fruitful, i.e. creative of civilization, through solidary activity,
in the overcoming of inveterate contrasts, but without crushing in-
dividual existence, lies the secret of a sound organisation of State.
The latter will be a failure whether the national community dissolves
itself into an anarchicalbody
ofpolitical
and ethnicalgroups, fighting
against each other, or whether it is reduced to a dull uniformity, to
a mechanical unity, by artificial and violent means of political pro-
paganda and terroristic pressure.
21
A sort of intermediate thing between conflicts in connection with
home and foreign policy is constituted by t h e conflicts w i t h
ethnical minorities. One might think that under a wise
and moderate leadership it should be possible for various ethnical
groups to live peacefully together in a State. The ideal way of living
together would of course be for the minorities to adopt the political
feeling of the majority, and love their State in the same way as do
they. That this is possible, even where the minorities are ethnicallyand linguistically nearer to the population of a neighbouring country,is shown
bySwitzerland's
example. But,if it cannot be
done,the
ruling nation will have to put up with that cooler, positive, attitude
called loyalty.The latter relation was, as it were, established by law in the old
Islamic countries. The minorities of other religions enjoyed protectionand owned rights of a lower degree; loyalty, financial contributions,were expected from them, but they were exempted from the most
important contribution of solidarity, military service in time of
war. The substitution for the old Islamic conceptions by national andpopular ideologies has changed these relations radically.
38 -Hell;mtutitter
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double morals is on principle equally valid in either case. Where the
purely natural development of power, the dynamic element in political
life, is alone regarded as important and decisive, the external policyis a straight continuation of the home policy and the treatment of
opponents in internal and external policy is on principle the same.
This conception has undergone a certain restriction in the theoryof the constitutional State as established in the i8th and Igth centuries,insofar as the constitutional State monopolizes the use of power al-
together, abolishes free feudal law and connects the use of power with
legal regulations to the largest possible extent. In foreign policy this
has of course been possible only in a far lesser degree than in internal
policy, for there is no supreme authority to adjust the conflicts be-
tween states and nations. All the same, there were certain internatio-
nal limitations of brute force. War was war and peace was peace. The
establishment of a double morality was solemnly proclaimed throughthe declaration of war and everybody knew what he was up to. These
rules have today (I943) almost gone to pieces., Just as in Ibn Khal-
duin's theory, the dynamic forces follow their course unrestrictedly.The old international limitations are now completely destroyed owingto the methods of warfare used by various nations.
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As regards the question of the possibility of restoring these rules
and extending them to the abolition of free feudal law between the
nations altogether, it is in our opinion identical with the question of
thepossibility
ofsuper-national solidarity,
whichwould then haveto be protected and consolidated by supernational legal regulations.
The prerequisite of a law-creating foreign policy is the developmentof a super-national solidarity.
The obstacles for the realization of a super-State solidarity are byno means inconsiderable. The individual solidarities of the nations and
their desire for isolation are still stronger than the modest tendencies
for super-national common feelings. The giving up of the free feudal
law in favour of a central settling of all differences has for thoseconcerned the character of submission to a foreign power. The indivi-
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dual rulers owe their positions to the fact that they are at the head
of a whole orchestra of national solidarity feelings and collective
egotisms. Is it not a capitis diminutio if they can no longer decide forthemselves upon the most important questions, those of foreign policy,but must submit to the opinion of others?
The hitherto practised form of the organisation of international
relations is, moreover, little fitted to prepare such a solidarity. For
it is obvious from what has been said above that such a super-national
solidarity can have nothing to do with the spirit in which the usual
alliances of interest between States are made. These are merely the
expression of a temporary, casual constellation of interests and last no
longer than the interests themselves.
Nor have the permanent or temporary conferences and congressesof representatives of many or all countries proved to be the sources
in which genuine solidarity thrives. Each representative of a countrywent to such conferences rather with the instruction and firm in-
tention, not so much to think of the prosperity of the whole familyof nations, as to get for his country as much as possible, just as
the parties in a bad Party-State do not make a State policy, but an
egotistic party policy. Instead of helping at least to prepare true
solidarity, these conferences are rather the stage on which the repre-
sentatives of various countries are offered a wished-for opportunityof demonstrating impressively the interests and claims of their coun-
tries. This, moreover, is-as a consequence of the century-old divi-
sion of Europe into individual rival States-in line with the conception
of theskilled professional diplomat who,
inprinciple,
must not and
should not go beyond the circle of "interests" of the individual State
represented by him. Such inflexible thinking in competing national
solidarity cilrcles, however, does not in the long run work out in
favour of the individual States themselves. What is required is the
integration of the individual solidarities into a super-nationalsolidarity
rooted in the heart of man rendered possible by the will for tolerance
of other individualities, a conception embodied in the sentence of the
Arab thinker Al-Beruini: "The efforts of men in this world aredifferent and on this difference rests the civilization of this world".
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This is the only way to free ourselves from situations which have
long become intolerable. Perhaps common opposition to the disturber
of peace and rest will then form the common front which is necessaryfor the maintenance of solidarity. Neither diplomatic skill, nor brute
force will be able to take the place of this grown solidarity. It must
rise from the ardent desire of the nations themselves, as a genuine
longing, not a phrase used to disguise or embellish interests of the
stronger and liable, sooner or later, to be unmasked.
Thus irrational solidarity has a double face. It may do good and it
may bring harm. It is a natural force of the human soul and may, like
any other natural force, wisely ruled and directed, not only bringendless blessing on the human society, but it is even indispensablefor the existence of this society. Overexcited and misguided, however,
it may cause horrible disaster and ruin, worse than that which the
unleashed forces of nature bring upon men.
Reason, that other great force given to us, can neither replace nor
create the irrational forces of the soul. Butjust
as theengineer
can
force the power of the torrent into harmless and useful courses,
reason can perhaps lead the irrational forces of solidarity and show the
course along which they may work for the good of mankind, instead
of inflicting disaster on it. But it can only be used if there is goodwill.
For scholars united by the common ideal of searching for and
establishing objective truth in every field of human knowledge,
theestablishing
ofsupernational solidarity will be easier than
for other
people, international cooperation having been acknowledged long ago
as indispensable for the progess of human knowledge. After all
the material and ideal destruction brought upon the world by the
last war, such international cooperation will be still more necessarythan it used to be in the peaceful prewar times. The solidarity of
scientists will perhaps help a little in getting out of the presentdisastrous situation which threatens the very civilization of mankind.
Let us therefore remember the old tale from "Kalila and Dimna",the Arabic translation of the Indian Mirror of Princes Pan;atantra:
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