IREU 301 Turkish Foreign Policy lecture 5

IREU 301 Turkish Foreign Policy

Lecture 5

Dr. S. BARIŞ GÜLMEZURL: https://royalholloway.academia.edu/barisgulmez

Email: [email protected]

https://royalholloway.academia.edu/barisgulmez




Remember previous lecture•Main Significance of the Lausanne Treaty for Turkey?

•Effects of the Great Depression?

•5 common policies of nation states during the 1930s?

•Unilateralism vs Multilateralism

•How did Turkey conduct foreign policy after Lausanne?

•Through which economic policies did Turkey manage to survive the great depression?

Turkish Foreign Policy (1936-1939)

•Diplomacy as a means to achieve foreign policy goals.•Quite different from the practices of other powers who mostly resorted to unilateral action.

•Raised sympathy and facilitated the achivement of Turkey’s goals.

•Two examples:•Montreux (example of revisionism)•Hatay (example of irredentism)•Partial breach of the principle of preserving the staus quo,

•BUT... All achived peacefully through diplomacy and multilateralism..

The Straits and Montreux•The Straits of Istanbul and Gallipoli under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire

•After the First World War, the regime of the Straits was re-determined through the Lausanne Straits Convention in 1923

•Turkey’s sovereignty over the Straits was restricted as the area was demilitarised and an international commission was assigned for its administration

•Turkey’s security in the Straits severely depended on the League of Nations (Fenwick, 1936:703)

The Straits and Montreux•A decade later, Italy’s revisionist policies raised security concerns in Turkey.

•Mussolini’s speech at the Fascist Congress in March 1934 claiming that “Italy’s historic objectives are in Asia and Africa” alarmed Turkey (Routh, 1937:601)

•Moreover, the recent rapprochement between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was perceived in Turkey as a potential threat to its Thracian border

five main reasons for Turkey to reclaim its sovereignty over the Straits

1) The feeling of general insecurity the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, Germany’s repudiation of the Treaty of Locarno, her unilateral action in reoccupying the Rhineland, Austria’s practical and unilateral denunciation of the military clauses of Saint-Germain, the general process of rearmament, the development of events in the far East, &c. (Japanese revisionism)

five main reasons for Turkey to reclaim its sovereignty

over the Straits2) There was a perceptible danger of European war.Ataturk foresaw a great war in Europe between 1940-1946

3) The Italians had altered the position in the Mediterranean by fortifying the islands of the Dodecanese. Direct security threat to Turkey

five main reasons for Turkey to reclaim its sovereignty

over the Straits4) The guarantee afforded to Turkey by article 18 of the Straits Convention was seriously violated (a)Japan had left the League of Nations, (b)Italy refused to regard herself as bound by certain

international guarantees that she had accepted, so long as sanctions were enforced against her.

5) The habit of unilateral repudiation of international obligations was spreading.

(Note from Sir Percy Loraine to Mr. Eden, No.202 [E 2024/26/44], April 10, 1936.)

Turkey and straits•The feeling of insecurity greatly increased in Turkey a decade after the Lausanne Treaty and Turkey’s lack of sovereignty over the straits made Turkey even more exposed to external threats.

•Turkey decided to apply to the League for the revision of the Lausanne Straits Convention

•The main legal justification: Rebus sic Stantibus.

Rebus sic Stantibus“obligations are terminable on the occurrence of a vital change of circumstances”

(Weinstein, 1969:42)In the Lausanne Straits Convention, the prohibition of use of force was a dominant norm among states. Therefore, the demilitarisation of the straits was ordered.

However, a decade later, the conditions changed: the use of force became popular

Turkey became increasingly concerned about the League’s capability to protect the Straits in the case of a sudden attack (Routh, 1937:605).

Foreign reactions to Turkish demand

Turkey’s application was welcomed in the legal and academic circles, Because it acted in line with international law which was rarely respected at the time.

«The other leading powers had recently been successful in setting aside objectionable treaty obligations by unilateral act. Ability to defy the international community seemed to be rather a mark of distinction and of power, as assertion of sovereignty which, if it could not command respect in others, might at least instil fear. Happily such unworthy motives were not allowed to dominate the policies of the Turkish Government...» (Fenwick, 1936:701)

The Soviet positionNO strong opposition to Turkey’s application except for ItalyGreatest support from the Soviet Union and Britain

The Soviet Union: The Lausanne convention increased freedom of passage for warshipsThe Soviets were exposed to a possible attack in the Black SeaThey were already in favour of a revision

British position supported Turkey’s cause with the motivation to secure Turkey’s friendship against Italy’s increasing claims over the Mediterranean and Africa,

preoccupied with the possibility of a Turkish unilateral remilitarisation of the straits,In such a case, an Italian attack to the Straits would become much more likely

In order to prevent a Turkish unilateral act, the British officials consented to the revision of the Straits Convention

(Medlicott et al., 1977:676)

Positions of othersFrance: aimed for close relations with the Soviet Union against Germany, thus supported the Turkish application endorsed by the Soviets (Özersay, 2002:372).

The members of the Balkan Entente: supported to secure their partnership with Turkey and the stability in the Balkans (Routh, 1937:610)

Germany: Not a party to Lausanne. The revision was negative for Italy not for them. Germany had good trade relations with Turkey. Stayed out.

Italy: Directly targeting Italy. Rejected outright, but Italy was alone in its protests

Montreux Convention•Signed in 20 July 1936•Dismissed two important restrictions on Turkey issued by Lausanne

1-Demilitarization of straits2-International straits committee

Turkey was even granted the right to close the straits for warships under special circumstances1-imminent threat of war2-Turkey is belligerent during the war: enemies cannot pass, even the passage of enemy trade ships is under Turkey’s discretion.

Significance of Montreux for Turkey

Increased Security: Restoration of Turkish sovereignty over the straitsregained its historical role of “the armed guardian of the straits” (Streit, 1936).

Increased Strategic importance: led European powers to seek its friendship and avoid its enmity

Gained a peaceful image: Transformation from «Terrible Turks» to «Peaceful Turks»


Turkey won a good name with the signature of the Convention because rather than using force, it respected international norms,gained the consent of almost all of the state parties to the Straits Convention

Won a good name for multilateralism and diplomacy:«the Montreux Convention constitutes more than a Turkish victory but “a victory for the principle of conciliation and the practice of negotiation” (The New York Times 20 July 1936, p.14).


“a proof, sorely needed these days, that the revision of treaties can be effected by means other than the threat of force or by unilateral denunciation” (The New York Times 20 July 1936, p.14).

Won a good name for the League of Nations as well:Raised hopes for regaining its credibilityThe League Council was given the right to reverse, with two-thirds of its votes, Turkey’s right to close the straits while acting against an aggressor (Fenwick, 1936:705).

Turkish victory over straitsMontreux: Turkey became the holder of balance.Used the delicate balance of power of the time in its favour.Enjoyed relative autonomy.

Turkey successfully found a point of convergence among major powers, like Britain, France and the Soviet Union (Routh, 1937:647-648).

Turkey profited from forging close relations with more than one great power at the same time

The Accession of Alexandretta (Hatay) to Turkey

Part of Syria, located in the North East of the Levantine Mediterranean

Long under the Ottoman rule

After the First World War, France declared its Mandate in SyriaAnkara Agreement of 1921 by France and Turkey foreseeing a special regime in Alexandretta under the French mandate securing the rights of the local Turkish community (Kinross, 1964:482)

In 1936, France granted independence to Syria including Alexandretta

French withdrawal from SyriaAccording to Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu (2002:283)Three main reasons:1- France was alarmed by the revisionist actions of Italy and Germany, and focused all its energy to Europe.

2- The political unrest in the region and the overall economic burden became very costly to France.

3-NO petroleum reserve was found in Syria

Turkey’s objectionTurkey formally objected to the Franco-Syrian agreement during the session of the Council of the League of Nationsdemanded the rediscussion of the future of Alexandretta

The original Turkish proposal:Alexandretta should be recognized as an independent state entering into federation with Syria and Lebanon on equal terms with themFrance rejected the proposal but consented to the discussion of the issue in the auspices of the League of Nations

(Beeley, 1937:773-774)

Turkey’s objectionThe League remained too slow...Ataturk did not dismiss the use of force option if necessary.

According to Kinross (1964:83); Atatürk believed that «a country [France] which had refused to fight for the Rhineland was unlikely to fight for Alexandretta», but he realized also the need to safeguard French amour propre, thus dismissed the use of force option.

Turkey needed French alliance against Germany and Italy, just like France need Turkey. No need for more enemies...

France persuaded•Ataturk’s resolute stance proved successful.

•His threat to use force intimidated France.

•France could not risk fighting against Turkey while dealing with Germany.

•This would directly hand Turkey into the hands of Hitler.

•Instead of enmity, France needed amity.

The British factor...•Britain was looking for a tripartite front with France and Turkey against Germany (Levy, 1938a)

•Turkey put the Alexandretta issue as its top priority before developing its relations with France any further

•Britain exerted vast influence on France for an agreement with Turkey concerning the Alexandretta question “in a manner satisfactory to Turkey” (Levy, 1938b)

•Britain was convinced that Turkey had no revisionist ambitions

•Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary used good offices between the parties to mediate the talks

Bilateral agreementIn 27 January 1937, the parties reached an agreement Alexandretta would be an entité distincte, forming an autonomous administration only tied to Syria in foreign policy (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2002:284).

official language would be Turkish

NO army since its territorial integrity would be guaranteed by France and Turkey (Beeley, 1937:779)

As an entité distincte, Alexandretta would conduct elections to choose its own administration

The issue of elections in Hatay

registration of the electorate was a crucial problemseveral different ethnic groups none of which amounted to more than half of the total population (220.000)

•Sunni Muslim Turks: 85.000 (38.3%)•Alawite Arabs: 62.000 (27.9%)•Sunni Muslim Arabs: 22.000 (10%)•Christian Arabs: 21.000 (9.5%)•Christian Armenians: 25.000 (11.3%)•Others: 2000 (3.2%)

(Satloff, 1986:154)


Turkish authorities objected:

The fact that they spoke Arabic would not automatically mean they were Arabs. The mother tongue of the Christian Armenians living there was Turkish (Beeley, 1941:480).

Turkey proposed voters’ declaration without having to show evidence of their mother tongue and religion.The League Council accepted Turkey’s offer


The election registration was in favour of the Turkish communityAlthough comprising 39% of the society, the election committee decided that 46% of the voters were registered as Turks

Although not ethnically Turkish, around 10.000 Hatay residents declared to be Turkish voters. A number of Armenians who spoke Turkish registered as Turks.

Some argue that the main reason was the persuasion of non-Turkish electors through bribery or intimidation (Beeley 1941: 484)No proof though...

ElectionsTurks won 22 seats out of 40 acquiring the majority in the Parliament.

Tayfur Sökmen was elected as the President

The name of Alexandretta was changed to the Republic of Hatay

The Republic of Hatay, given the threatening situation in Europe, decided to join Turkey as the 64th city of the Turkish Republic in 23 July 1939.

HatayHatay continues to be the source of conflict between Turkey and Syria.Official maps of Syria still show Alexandretta/Hatay within Syrian borders.

Academia divided about Turkey’s Hatay policy:Some (Beeley, 1941; Khadduri, 1945 and Satloff, 1986) show Turkey as a revisionist power, unlawfully annexing Alexandretta intimidating or persuading its local inhabitants

Others (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2002:291 and Kolars, 1999:106) claim that Turkey remained in compliance with the League of Nations without resorting to unilateral action


•Diplomacy as a means to achieve foreign policy goals.•Quite different from the practices of other powers who mostly resorted to unilateral action.

•Raised sympathy and facilitated the achivement of Turkey’s goals.

•Two examples:•Montreux (example of revisionism)•Hatay (example of irredentism)•Partial breach of the principle of preserving the staus quo,

•BUT... All achived peacefully through diplomacy and multilateralism..

Turkish Foreign Policy right before the WWII

•Threat perceptions:•Biggest threat – Fascist Italy (1936)•Mussolini’s demands over Asia minor, remilitarization of Dodecanese

•Biggest threat shifted to Germany (1938)•Invasion of Austria made it clear for Ataturk•Turkey had been searching for alliances against Italy.

•Now, the need for foreign assistance to thwart a possible German attack (Hale, 2000:64-65)


•Due to the Great Depression, Turkey «sacrificed guns for butter»

•Defense expenditure was as low as 20% in early 1930s.

•Increased to around 40% in 1938 but not enough to deter Germans or Italians

•Outdated weaponry - Almost no tanks – 100 aircrafts

•huge gap in air and naval fleets•Military equipment not enough to defend borders•Foreign assistance needed

Turkish Foreign Policy (1939)•Foreign assistance mainly came in the form of export credits from Britain amounting to £16 Million (Levy, 1938b)

•Turkey was irritated with Britain’s appeasement policy

•Turks required alliance against Germans and Italians•After the invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia by Germany and the invasion of Albania by Italy, Turkey felt almost certain that the invasion of Turkey was imminent.

•Besides, Turkey was surprised that the Soviets signed a non-aggression pact with Germany.

•Alliance with Britain and France became a necessity.

Turkish Foreign Policy (1939)•As late as 1939, Britain ended its appeasement policy and sought alliance with both Turkey and France to form a defensive bloc against Germany and Italy

•If Turkey was attacked by a European power, Britain and France would have to join the fight against the hostile forces.

•If Britain and/or France were attacked in the Mediterranean, then Turkey would have to fight on their side.

•Hitler attempted to prevent this alliance by threatening Turkey

•Urged that Turkey revise the treaty denying to fight against Germany if France or Britain was attacked by the Nazis.

Turkish Foreign Policy (1939)

•Hitler aimed for a European axis including Germany, Italy and Turkey.

•Probably would force Turkey to join the WWII on Germany’s side.

•Turkey resisted the German threats and stayed out of the war.

To be continued...•Turkish Foreign Policy during the second world war•Active neutrality

Suggested reading: ORAN 2002, Vol.1Hale 2001, chapter 3Selim Deringil’s book

IREU 301 Turkish Foreign Policy lecture 5

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