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IRENAEUS CHRISTOLOGY OF MIXTURE
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
Candler School of Theology and the Graduate Division of
Religion, EmoryUniversity
[email protected]
AbstractMany studies have been written on Irenaeus Christology,
but almost allfocus upon soteriological problems rather than
Christology proper.A. Houssiau attempted to rectify this imbalance,
providing the best studyof Irenaeus Christology to date, but even
he missed the fundamental logicthat Irenaeus utilizes to explain
the christological union. In this article Icontend that Irenaeus
uses Stoic mixture theory to conceptualize thechristological union,
including the relationship between the human anddivine in the
experiences and activities of Christ. In so saying, I challengeH.
A. Wolfsons position that Irenaeus use of mixture language
accordswith Aristotelian mixture theory, and I stand against those,
includingWolfson and A. Grillmeier, who maintain that Irenaeus
conception ofthe person of Christ is devoid of philosophical
reasoning.
FIFTY years ago Albert Houssiau observed that previous studiesof
Irenaeus Christology focused upon soteriological problemsrather
than Christology proper.1 Houssiaus objective was toprovide a
counterbalance by focusing his work on Irenaeusconception of the
person of Christ. He succeeded, providingthe best study of Irenaeus
Christology to date. EvenHoussiau, however, missed the fundamental
logic that Irenaeusutilizes to explain the unity of the human and
divine in Christnamely, Stoic mixture theory.
In Against Heresies 4.20.4 Irenaeus refers to the
christologicalunion as a blending (commixtio) of the human and
divine. It isthe only time he does so.2 He oVers no explanation for
what, if
In memory of Ralph Del Colle, teacher, whose thoughts about the
personof Christ will always influence my own. Requiem aeternam dona
ei, Domine. Etlux perpetua luceat ei. Requiescat in pace.
1 A. Houssiau, La Christologie de Saint Irenee (Universitas
CatholicaLovaniensis Dissertationes 3.1; Louvain: Publications
Universitaires andGembloux: J. Duculot, 1955), p. x.
2 J. A. Robinson reads mixing and blending the Spirit of God the
Fatherwith the handiwork of God in Prf 97 as a reference to the
incarnation
The Journal of Theological Studies, NS, Vol. 64, Pt 2, October
2013
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anything, the term reveals about his conception of
thechristological union. Neither does he indicate if the concept
ofblending occupies a place of significance in his thought
morebroadly considered. These observations alone are suYcient
toexplain the minimal attention paid to the place of the conceptof
blending or mixture in Irenaeus Christology. Instead ofregarding
this description as anomalous or at least atypical,and therefore
relatively insignificant, it is my belief that his iden-tification
of the christological union as a blend in the middle ofAH 4
reflects an incorporation of Stoic mixture theory thatbegins as
early as Book 2. Moreover, it is my contention thatIrenaeus uses
Stoic mixture theory not only to conceptualize theunion of the
human and divine in Christ, but also to explain therelationship
between the human and divine in the experiencesand activities of
Christ. Inasmuch as this is the case, Stoicmixture theory is the
logic fundamental to Irenaeus conceptionof the christological
union.
This article is divided into three sections. The first oVers
abrief discussion of the aspects of Stoic mixture theory most
rele-vant to this investigation. The second considers pertinent
schol-arship on the appropriation of Stoic and Aristotelian
mixturetheories in the Christologies of early Christianity. The
lastargues that Irenaeus incorporated Stoic mixture theory
intovarious aspects of his theological account, including
hisChristology.
I. STOIC MIXTURE THEORY
In order to recognize the role that the concept of mixture
playsin Irenaeus thought a basic understanding of Stoic
mixturetheory (and specifically, the theory of blending) is
necessary. Ourtwo most important sources for Stoic mixture theory
areAlexander of Aphrodisias (Mixt. 3, 216.14217.2 and 4,217.2636)
and Arius Didymus (fr. 28, ap. Stobaeum Eclogae1.17.4), but two
passages in Nemesius (Nat. 78.779.2 and81.610) helpfully supplement
their accounts. Prior to delvinginto the details of the Stoic
theory of blending it is important tolocate blending within the
larger Stoic concern to arrive at a
(St Irenaeus, The Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching,
trans. J. A.Robinson [London: S.P.C.K., 1920], pp. 645). I have
disagreed with thisreading elsewhere, arguing that this text refers
to the commixture and unionof the soul and body of the believer
with the Holy Spirit (Irenaeus of Lyonsand the Theology of the Holy
Spirit [OECS; Oxford: Oxford University Press,2012], pp. 18890.
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physical theory that explains how the active
principle(God/Pneuma/Logos) and passive principle (matter) relate
toeach other.3
The narrative construction of Alexanders consideration of
theStoic theory of blending in Mixt. reflects this relationship,
forreferences to the larger Stoic concern frame his analysis of
thetheory of blending. Alexanders discussion of blending in Mixt.
3begins with Chrysippus interest in explaining how the whole
ofsubstance (the passive principle) is unified because pneuma(the
active principle) pervades or permeates its entirety, causing itto
hold together, be stable, and interact (sympathize/sump0scw)with
itself.4 He then returns to this fundamental Stoic interest inthe
active and passive principles at the very end of his discussionof
Stoic mixture theory. In arguing against the theory of blending,he
writes: the bodies that are being blended with another must
bereciprocally acted on by one another (2ntip0scein 3p
2ll0lwn2n0gkh) (that is why neither is destroyed, since the one
acted on bythe other reacts in the process of being acted on).5
A distinctive feature of the Stoic attempt to understand
therelationship between the active and passive principles was
thebelief that the principles must be corporeal: only bodies can
act orbe acted on.6 According to Stoic theory bodies pervade each
other,bodies mutually coextend throughout one another, and
substancesand qualities proper to bodies are preserved in a blend.7
RichardSorabji summarizes Stoic materialism well: they believed
thatmatter was something real and something acted on, that acting
orbeing acted on was the criterion for being fully real, and that
onlybody would satisfy this criterion.8 The particular theory
ofmixture proper to the Stoics that they articulated to explain
therelationship between corporeal active and passive principles
isblending.
3 R. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity
and theirSequel (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), p.
83; DiogenesLaertius, Lives 7.1346.
4 Mixt. 3, 21417; unless otherwise noted, the text and
translation of Mixt.comes from R. B. Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias
on Stoic Physics (SMAP 28;Leiden: Brill, 1976).
5 Mixt. 11, 226.303; the parenthetical remark would seem to
reflectAlexanders understanding, but if so, his understanding
agrees with Stoicthought. Cf. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion,
pp. 938.
6 E.g. Cicero, Acad. 1.39.7 Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 3, 216.14217.2;
4, 217.2636; Arius Did., fr. 28,
ap. Stob. Eclogae 1.17.4.8 Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, p.
37.
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Blending might be best understood in the light of other
theoriesof ancient chemistry. Alexander records Chrysippus as
identifyingmixture as a category containing three diVerent types of
union:juxtaposition (par0qesi"), fusion (s0gcusi"), and blending
(kra'si").9
In juxtaposition particles of the ingredients remain unaltered
andsimply exist alongside each other, such as in a mixture of
beansand wheat. The Stoics followed Aristotle in rejecting
juxtapositionas not producing a genuine mixture.10 In fusion both
ingredientsare destroyed in the process of forming an entirely new
kind ofstuV, a resultant that is a tertium quid. The Stoics did not
considerfusion to be a genuine mixture either,11 preferring instead
the ideaof blending (kra'si"). In a blend of two or more
ingredients, theingredients spread out or mutually coextend
(2ntiparekte0nw/2ntipar0kw) through the entirety of one another.
This coextensionproduces a union in which the active principle
pervades thepassive principle, causing it to hold together, be
stable, andinteract with (sump0scw) itself.12 Yet, in the resultant
producedfrom blending, the original substances and qualities proper
to eachof the constituent ingredients persist,13 and the qualities
of eachshow forth (sunekfa0nw).14 Thus, constituent ingredients
that havebeen blended together continue to actually exist; they do
not justexist in potential as in Aristotelian mixture theory.15
Proof of thepreservation of each of the original substances and
their qualitieslies in the ability to separate the constituent
ingredients from eachother, such as in Arius Didymus example of
dipping an
9 Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 3, 216.14217.2.10 Sorabji, Matter, Space
and Motion, pp. 66, 79.11 Ibid., p. 80.12 Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 3,
216.1417.13 In addition to Mixt. 3, see also Mixt. 4, 217.2636 and
Arius Did., fr. 28,
ap. Stob. Eclogae 1.17.4.14 Arius Did., fr. 28, Dox. Gr. 464.12.
Arius reference to the showing
forth of qualities in a blend occurs in the midst of his
diVerentiation betweenm8xi" and kra'si", such that the latter
specifically speaks of the type of mixturethat occurs between fluid
bodies. The more thorough discussion of Alexander,however, reveals
that the Stoics did not delimit kra'si" so strictly.
15 Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, esp. pp. 679; Aristotle,
GC 1.10,327b2231. E. Lewis argues that the references to the
coextension of bodiesin Alexander of Aphrodisias and Stobaeus are
due to an Aristotelian reading ofStoic sources, and that the Stoics
did not maintain that the constituent ingre-dients themselves were
preserved but only the substances and qualities belong-ing to them
(Diogenes Laertius and the Stoic Theory of Mixture, Bulletin ofthe
Institute of Classical Studies 34 [1987], pp. 8490, esp. 89). In my
judge-ment Sorabjis reading better accounts for the entirety of the
extant sources,especially the examples oVered by Stoics to
illustrate the theory of blending.
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oil-drenched sponge into a blend of water and wine in order
todraw out the water.16
The Stoics provide three examples from everyday cases
thatillustrate blending. The blending of a cup of wine that has
beenmixed with a lot of water, of a soul that goes throughout the
wholeof the body in mixture with it, and fire that pervades iron.17
Theblending of wine with water is pertinent to other aspects
ofIrenaeus theology; for now I would like to highlight the
blendingof the soul and body.
As with the constituent ingredients in a blend, the soul
pervadesthe entirety of the body such that their mutual coextension
iscomplete. As a result of their mutual coextension every part of
thebody partakes in the soul and vice versa.18 This
thoroughgoingmutual partaking that occurs between the ingredients
of a blenddistinguishes blending from juxtaposition, for it
demonstrates theunity of a product of blending in distinction to
the aggregate natureof a product of juxtaposition in which the
ingredients remainunaltered.19 A portion of Cleanthes thought
recorded by Nemesiusfurther illustrates the mutual partaking of the
soul and body usingthe term sump0scw, which features at the
beginning of Alexandersaccount of Chrysippus thought in Mixt. 3.
According to Cleanthes,the soul interacts with (sump0scei) the body
when it is sick and beingcut, and the body with the soul; thus when
the soul feels shame andfear the body turns red and pale
respectively.20 The union of twobodies joined to each other, as in
a blend, is such that they interactwith (sump0scw) each other as do
the body and soul. Though thesoul itself is neither sick nor cut it
experiences or participates in thesickness or cutting of the body
in some way; likewise the body turnsred and pale when the soul
feels shame and fear.
Yet, while the interaction or mutual partaking of the body
andsoul demonstrate their unity, the soul and body preserve
thesubstantiality and qualities proper to each of them,21 and, as
in a
16 Fr. 28, ap. Stob. Eclogae 1.17.4.17 Todd contends that these
illustrations are merely fictitious aids to the
Stoic argument, not direct examples of blending (Alexander of
Aphrodisias, pp.456), but Sorabji has persuasively argued that
Alexanders own view was thatthese illustrations provide clear
testimony, to persuade and establish the factof blending (Matter,
Space and Motion, p. 84).
18 Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 4, 217.36.19 Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 3,
217.1112; cf. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion,
p. 66.20 Nemesius, On the Nature of Man (De Natura Hominis)
78.779.2 (text
and translation in A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic
Philosophers[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987], vol. 1,
p. 272; vol. 2, p. 269).
21 Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 4, 217.325.
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blend, their qualities show forth.22 Thus there is never a
questionof the soul and body having formed a tertium quid, for we
arealways able to distinguish the actual existence of each of
themthrough the manifest existence of their proper qualities. Proof
ofthe preservation of each of the original substances and
theirqualities, as I already mentioned, lies in the ability to
separate theconstituent ingredients from each other.23 The
illustrationprovided by Arius Didymus is the dipping of an
oil-drenchedsponge into a blend of water and wine in order draw out
the water,but the body and soul are also separated from each other
at thetime of death. As Nemesius writes:
Chrysippus says that death is the separation of soul from
body.Now nothing incorporeal (2s0maton) is separated from a
body(s0mato"). For an incorporeal does not even make contact with
abody. But the soul both makes contact with and is separated from
abody. Therefore the soul is a body.24
Though not explicitly mentioned, the ability to separate thebody
and soul at the time of death is surely connected to theStoic
understanding of the body and soul as being blendedtogether. The
logic of this selection, though, provides furtherinsight into Stoic
thinking. According to Chrysippus the separ-ation of the soul from
the body is only possible because the souland body are both bodies,
are both corporeal. His reasoning isstraightforward: separation
requires previous contact, but contactcan only occur between two
bodies, therefore separation is con-tingent upon the corporeality
of the things united to each other.Materialism is fundamental to
Stoic thought.
According to the Stoics, then, the blending of two
bodiesexplains how the active principle (God/Pneuma/Logos)
andpassive principle (matter) relate to each other. The active
principlepervades the passive principle such that both ingredients
in ablend mutually coextend throughout each other. The
interactionor mutual partaking of the ingredients with each other
is the resultof their blending, and demonstrates their union. At
the same time,ingredients are not destroyed in a blend, for the
substances andqualities proper to them persist, and their qualities
show forth inthe resultant. The actual existence of constituent
ingredients in ablend is corroborated by the possibility of
separating them out
22 Arius Did., fr. 28, Dox. Gr. 464.12.23 Sorabji, Matter, Space
and Motion, p. 80.24 Nemesius, Nat. 81.610 (text and translation
Long and Sedley, Hellenistic
Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 272; vol. 2, p. 270).
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from the resultant. All of which is illustrated by the blending
ofthe soul with the body.
II. THE APPROPRIATION OF MIXTURE THEORY IN EARLYCHRISTIANITY
The presence of mixture language in Irenaeus has not
goneentirely unnoticed, but the suggestion that Irenaeus
mixturelanguage is Stoic in origin has not always been received
positively,or even with equanimity. In his well-known The
Philosophy of theChurch Fathers H. A. Wolfson maintained that
Irenaeus mixturelanguage accords not with Stoic mixture theory but
Aristotelianconceptions of mixture. In particular, Wolfson
identifies twopassages in Irenaeus (AH 3.19.1 and 4.20.4) which he
thinks alignwith a category of Aristotelian mixture theory that he
identifies asunions of predominance.25
Wolfson posits that when taken together Aristotelian and
Stoicthought recognize five possible kinds of union of
physicalthings.26 Moreover, he contends that of these five kinds
ofunion four would not have suited early Christian conceptions
ofthe unity of the humanity and divinity of Christ. Early accounts
ofthe unity of Christ could not have drawn upon unions involvingthe
juxtaposition of ingredients (par0qesi"), unions based uponeither
Aristotelian or Stoic conceptions of mixture (m8xi" orkra'si"), and
still less unions involving the fusion of ingredients(s0gcusi").27
According to Wolfson, unions of juxtaposition andunions of blending
(the Stoic conception of mixture; kra'si")produce resultants that
are merely aggregates of the constituentingredientsresultants that
lack real unity.28 On the other hand,Wolfson maintains that unions
of mixture in the Aristotelian senseand unions of fusion result in
a tertium quid29their resultants arean entirely new kind of thing.
Having dismissed these fourtheories as incompatible with early
Christian conceptions ofChrist, Wolfson forwards a fifth kind of
unitythe union ofpredominance.30 According to Wolfson unions of
predominance
25 H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, vol. 1:
Faith, Trinity,Incarnation (2nd edn; Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1964), p. 396.
26 Ibid., p. 385.27 Wolfson prefers some diVerent titles,
identifying unions involving juxta-
position as composition and unions involving fusion as confusion
(Philosophyof the Church Fathers, vol. 1, pp. 3856).
28 Ibid., p. 382.29 Ibid., pp. 3757, 3845. For an extended
discussion of Aristotelian mix-
ture theory, see Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, pp. 36772.30
Wolfson, Philosophy of the Fathers, vol. 1, p. 386.
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are a subset of Aristotles unions of mixture in which the
resultantis one of the two constituents, the one which happens to
be greateror more powerful, and in which also the smaller is not
completelydestroyed but is related to the greater as matter to
form.31
Early Christian authors utilized this theory of union,
Wolfsonbelieves, in order to describe the christological union.32
Wolfsonargues that because no special term for this union of
predom-inance existed in philosophy it was loosely described as
amixture or as a composition terms utilized in
Aristotlesdiscussions of mixture theory. He then claims, mixture
andcomposition are therefore terms used by the Fathers only in
thesense of predominance .33 But this is a logical non sequitur.
Foreven if Wolfson has correctly identified occasional
philosophicaluses of mixture and composition to express a union
ofpredominance, and Sorabjis study suggests he has not,34 it isnot
necessary to conclude that early Christians understood andused the
terms mixture and composition only in the sense ofpredominance
.
It seems to me that Wolfson allows his understanding of thelogic
of early Christian Christology to overly influence his analysisof
ancient chemical and physical theory, as well as his
conclusionswith regard to the usage of those theories by early
Christians.Early in his discussion he writes that when it came to
thinkingabout the incarnation the problem before [the Fathers] was
to findan analogy for the belief that two persons, the Logos and
the
31 Ibid., pp. 377, 386.32 Ibid., p. 386.33 Ibid. In his analysis
of Theodoret of Cyrus Eranistes Wolfson recognizes
the use of the Stoic conception of mixture by the orthodox
believer in thedialogue but still concludes that it could have been
used to forward the pos-ition of predominance (pp. 4438). The only
time Wolfson finds the use ofStoic mixture theory is in reference
to the exchange of properties belonging tothe two
naturesperichoresis (pp. 41828).
34 Indeed, Sorabjis more recent work brings into question the
very exist-ence of unions of predominance as a subset of Aristotles
mixture theory.Wolfson oVers four examples in support of his
category of predominance.Each example is meant to illustrate that
the resultant is the greater or morepowerful ingredient, but in
such a way that the smaller or less powerful in-gredient remains in
some fashioneither as a quantitative or qualitative acci-dent
(Philosophy of the Fathers, vol. 1, pp. 3779). Sorabjis reading
ofAristotle, however, suggests that neither the quantitative
accident (an increasein volume or bulk) nor the qualitative
accident (the presence of colour) ofthese examples indicate the
continuing existence of the smaller ingredient inthe resultant
(Matter, Space and Motion, pp. 667, 71 for the
quantitativeaccident, p. 70 for the qualitative).
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manfor man ordinarily is a personin their union, which tookplace
in Jesus, were so joined together that only the Logoscontinued to
be a person, whereas the man, though not completelydestroyed, was
not a person.35 Having established as his startingplace that early
Christians actively sought an analogy for achristological model of
predominance, Wolfson finds what they,and he, sought in unions of
predominance. His startingplace inordinately aVects his analysis
and his conclusion, suchthat he found what he was looking for and
only what he waslooking for.
Two more recent works further expose the inadequacies ofWolfsons
account. First, Sorabjis study of ancient chemistry andphysics
shows that Wolfson was incorrect to believe that Stoicsunderstood
the resultant of blending as merely an aggregate of itsconstituent
ingredients, the implication being that blending doesnot produce a
real unity. According to Wolfson, while it is truethat the Stoics
deny that blending is a mere juxtaposition they donot specify
whether that denial includes the juxtaposition ofimperceptible
parts. This, he believes, leaves open the possibilityof
interpreting the Stoic theory of blending as involving
thejuxtaposition of imperceptible parts, an interpretative move
whichhe contends was not only made by Nemesius but was
prevalentwithin early Christianity.36
Sorabji, however, points out that the Stoics followed Aristotle
inrejecting juxtaposition as not producing a genuine mixture.37
Thispoint is borne out by the fact that the two most
importantdiscussions of Stoic theories of union articulate their
theory ofblending (kra'si") in contradistinction to the theory
ofjuxtaposition (par0qesi").38 More importantly, Sorabji calls
atten-tion to Chrysippus explicit denial that division can reach
aninfinite limit because there is no infinitely small thing (o2 g0r
2st0ti 4peiron) to which that division could extend.39
Chrysippus
35 Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Fathers, vol. 1, p. 374.36
Ibid., p. 382; for Nemesius see esp. pp. 4023.37 Sorabji, Matter,
Space and Motion, p. 66.38 Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 3, 216.14217.2 and
Arius Did., fr. 28, Dox. Gr.
463.14464.8.39 Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, p. 102; rather
than reaching an infinite
limit, Chrysippus maintained that division is merely for ever
capable of beingcontinued. The passage under discussion is Diogenes
Laertius Lives 7.1501,in which Chrysippus explicitly denies that
mixture is juxtaposition, for in amixture particles of the
substances involved do not merely surround those ofthe other or lie
beside them (m1 kat1 perigraf1n ka1 par0qesin) (Loeb 185; tr.R. D.
Hicks, ed. J. Henderson).
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position goes against Wolfsons belief that the Stoic denial
ofjuxtaposition left open the possibility of a juxtaposition
ofimperceptible parts,40 for the very notion of imperceptible
partsis a corollary of the idea that division can reach an infinite
limit(the point at which something infinitely small exists, and
could bejuxtaposed with other infinitely small things).41
Therefore, whenChrysippus disallows the latter he disallows the
possibility of theformer.
If, then, it is no longer appropriate for Wolfson to regard
Stoicmixture as juxtaposition, then neither is it appropriate for
him toconsider the resultant of a Stoic mixture an aggregate. Even
moreso given that Alexander of Aphrodisiasa leading advocate
ofAristotelianism, and hence a hostile witnessunderstood
Stoicmixture theory to assert the production of a resultant in
which theconstituent ingredients are united together in their
entirety(3noAsqai di 7lwn) so that being preserved along with
theirqualities they have a complete mutual coextension through
oneanother (2ntiparekte0nesqai 2ll0loi" di 7lwn 7la).42 If
Wolfsonscontention that ingredients in a Stoic mixture do not form
a realunity is no longer persuasive, then it can no longer be
regarded asa viable basis for excluding the possibility that early
Christiansappropriated the Stoic theory of blending to explain the
unity ofthe human and divine in Jesus.
This brings us to the second work that exposes the
inadequaciesof Wolfsons account: Ronald Heines analysis of the
Christologyof Callistus.43 Callistus was Bishop of Rome and a
leadingproponent of monarchianism at the beginning of the third
century.Heine demonstrates that Stoic mixture theory was of
criticalimportance to the Christology of Roman monarchianism,
for
40 An important point, since Wolfson notes this very passage
(DL, Lives7.151) concerning Chrysippus to support his own reading
(Philosophy of theChurch Fathers, vol. 1, p. 382, n. 76).
41 Aristotle (GC 1.10, 328a15; 1517) and then Alex. Aphrodisias
(Mixt. 8,221.25222.26) attack the notion that mixture could be due
to infinite division.In the course of Alexanders argument he states
that if the Stoics understandmixture to occur by an infinite
division of ingredients, then they would not bespeaking of a
mixture but of a mere juxtaposition (221.2534). Sorabji high-lights
the conditional nature of Alexanders argument (if the Stoics
understandmixture to occur by division), and proceeds to call into
question the verynotion that Stoic mixture theory involved
division. Thus, Stoic thoughtwould seem to diVer from that of
Anaxagoras, who may well have envisagedingredients as infinitely
divided (Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, p. 102; seep. 64 for
more on Anaxagoras).
42 Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 4, 217.279.43 R. E. Heine, The
Christology of Callistus, JTS, NS 49 (1998), pp.
5691.
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Roman monarchian theology found in the theory of blending away
to avoid the charges of patripassianism that had plagued
itsprecursor and source, the Asian monarchianism of Noetus.44
Roman monarchians identified that which is divine in Jesus asthe
Father or Spirit (pneAma) and that which is human as the Son.45
The flesh, which is identified as Son, becomes divine when
theindwelling Father/Spirit unites it to himself (Ref.
9.12.18b).46
In this way, Callistus could refer to the Son as one God with
theFather.47 This union of the Father/Spirit with the Son as oneGod
becomes problematic when it comes to the passion of Jesus,for in
order to avoid patripassianism Callistus must be able to saythat
the Son suVers while the Father/Spirit does not. This bringsus to
an important christological statement of Callistus:
For I will not, he says, speak of two Gods, Father and Son, but
ofone. For the Father who was in him (John 14:10) assumed the
fleshand made it God by uniting it with himself, and made it one,
so thatFather and Son are designated one God, and this unity, being
aperson, cannot be two, and so the Father suVered with
(sumpeponqe#nai)the Son.48
In early Christian texts sump0scw usually meant to die
with,often referring to martyrdom, or to suVer with or the same
as.49
This meaning does not fit this usage of Callistus, however,
forRoman monarchianism denied that the Father died.50
44 For a brief discussion of Noetus theology, see ibid., pp.
7889; for theattempt to avoid patripassianism by the Roman
monarchians, see pp. 778, 89.
45 According to Callistus, the spirit which was made flesh in
the virgin isnot diVerent from the Father . . . For that which is
seen (1 John 1:1), which isman, is the Son, but the Spirit
contained in the Son is the Father.Hippolytus, Refutation of All
Heresies 9.12.1718 (tr. Heine, Callistus, pp.63, 69). The
identification of the author of the Refutation is debated; I
shallfollow Heine in using Hippolytus as an eYcient way to refer to
the author ofthis treatise. For a recent discussion of Hippolytan
authorship of various texts,see R. E. Heine, Hippolytus,
Ps.-Hippolytus and the Early Canons, in F.Young, L. Ayres, and A.
Louth (eds.), The Cambridge History of EarlyChristian Literature
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.14251.
46 This union results in a divinehuman distinction within the
Son. Heine,Christology of Callistus, p. 71.
47 Ibid.48 Hippolytus, Ref. 9.12.18; text from Hippolytus,
Refutatio Omnium
Haeresium, ed. M. Marcovich (Berlin and New York: Walter de
Gruyter,1986), p. 354; trans. Heine, Christology of Callistus, p.
63.
49 W. Michaelis, p0scw, Theological Dictionary of the New
Testament 5(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,1967), pp. 9256; sump0scw
seldom means tosympathize. See also, Heine, Christology of
Callistus, p. 75.
50 Heine, Christology of Callistus, p. 75.
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Heine argues that we can see how the Roman monarchiansavoided
patripassianism by understanding Callistus use ofsump0scw in terms
of its Stoic usage to explain the interaction ofthe soul and body
in a human being51an interaction that, thereader will recall, is
based on Stoic mixture theory. As I discussed inthe first section,
the Stoics maintained that the soul pervades(di0kw) the whole human
body just as constituent ingredients in amixture pervade each
other, such that every part of the bodypartakes of the soul while
both the soul and body maintain theirown substantiality
(3p0stasi"/o2s0a).52 This pervading of the soulthrough the entirety
of the body is the basis for the mutualinteraction of the soul and
the body that we saw in Cleanthes.53 Bymodelling the union of the
humanity and divinity of Christ uponthe Stoic understanding of the
union of the soul and body in humanbeings, the Roman monarchians
would have been able to maintainthat the Father/Spirit participated
in the experience of the suVeringand death of the Son/flesh while
not itself suVering and dying as didthe Son/flesh. So Heine writes:
Just as the soul, though it interacts(sump0scei) with the body when
the latter is cut, does not bleed, sothe Roman monarchians could
have thought of the Fathersinteraction with the Son in the Sons
suVering.54
The works of Sorabji and Heine demonstrate that not only is
itinappropriate to exclude the possibility that early Christians
usedStoic mixture theory to explain the unity of Christ, but even
thatthe Stoic conception of mixture played a prominent role in
theChristology of some early Christians, namely the
Romanmonarchians. The rest of this article will demonstrate that
theuse of Stoic mixture theory was not limited to the
Romanmonarchians, for it featured in Irenaeus theology as
well.55
III. MIXTURE IN IRENAEUS
Irenaeus never provides a discussion of his understanding
ofmixture theory abstracted from its theological appropriation,
nor
51 Ibid., pp. 758.52 Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 4, 217.326; Heine,
Christology of Callistus, p. 76.53 As found in Nemesius, Nat.
78.779.2: the soul interacts with (sump0scei)
the body when it is sick and being cut, and the body with the
soul; thus whenthe soul feels shame and fear the body turns red and
pale respectively (textand translation in Long and Sedley,
Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 272; vol.2, p. 269).
54 Heine, Christology of Callistus, p. 78.55 Certain scholars
have considered aspects of Irenaeus theological account
to be monarchian or similar to the theological accounts of those
often regardedas monarchian (see below, n. 138). I disagree with
these readings of Irenaeus.
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does he discuss how mixture theory functions across
theologicalcategories. As a result, it is necessary to read a
number of passagestogether in order to recognize his use of Stoic
mixture theory andin order to understand the role mixture theory
plays in histheology.
Irenaeus use of mixture language and his incorporation
ofconcepts belonging to mixture theory progresses over the courseof
Against Heresies. The first indication of his interest in
mixturetheory occurs in AH 2.17.3, where he uses mixture language
tospeak of the union of two things in contrast to the separation
oftwo things. We next find an unmistakable use of Stoic
mixturetheory in his explanation of the mixture of and
interactionbetween the soul and body in human beings.56 The use
ofconcepts belonging to Stoic mixture theory is discernible
inIrenaeus discussion of the interaction between the human and
thedivine that takes place in AH 3.19.1 and 3, both with regard to
thesalvific joining of human beings to the Word of God and
withregard to the interaction between the divine and human in
Jesushimself. It is at this point in the progression that we find
his use ofmixture language in AH 4.20.4 to characterize the union
of thedivine and human in Jesus. The following examination
willgenerally follow the progression set out here.
3.1. Mixtures Union
As I stated a few pages ago, the Stoic theory of blending
wasregarded as producing a resultant in which the constituent
in-gredients are wholly united. The first step in
demonstratingIrenaeus appropriation of mixture theory is to
determinewhether he recognized mixture as a means of union. If he
didnot, then mixture theory would be insuYcient for the needs ofhis
christological account, for one of Irenaeus chief concernswhen it
comes to the person of Christ was to establish theunity of the
divine and human.57
The passage that contains the most straightforward statementof
Irenaeus thinking is AH 2.17.23. In this portion of his
workIrenaeus is criticizing Gnostic thinking about the production
of
56 AH 2.33.1, 4.57 See e.g. A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian
Tradition, vol. 1: From the
Apostolic Age to Chalcedon, trans. J. Bowden (Atlanta, GA: John
KnoxPress, 1965; 2nd edn. 1975), pp. 1034, and esp. Houssiau,
ChristologiedIrenee, pp. 163235.
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the aeons. Gnostic logic fails, he argues, because Gnostics
main-tain at one and the same time that a unity of substance
existsbetween the aeons and their Author or Father (Propator),
andthat the aeons are susceptible to passion while the Author
orFather is not. In the course of his argument he contraststhings
that are completely separated with those that aremixed or
united:
(2.17.2) It shall be asked, then, how were the rest of the
aeonsemitted? Did they remain united (uniti) to the one who
emittedthem, as the rays to the sun, or (were they emitted) as
distinct andseparated (eYcabiliter et partiliter), so that each of
them [exists] sep-arately and has its own form (separatim et suam
figurationem), as ahuman being [comes] from another human being and
an animalfrom another animal? . . . And [are they] simple and
uniform, and inevery way equal and similar among themselves, as
spirit and light areemitted, or [are they] composite and diVerent,
dissimilar in theirmembers? (2.17.3) But, if each of them was
indeed emitted distinctlyand according to its own generation
(eYcabiliter et secundum suamgenesim), after the likeness of human
beings, then either those gener-ated by the Father will be of the
same substance with him and simi-lar to the one who generated them,
or if they appear dissimilar, thenit is necessary to confess them
to be of some other substance . . .Furthermore, according to this
reasoning each of them will be under-stood (to exist) separately,
divided from one another (separatim divisusab altero), just as
human beings, not mixed with nor united the one tothe other (non
admixtus neque unitus alter altero), but in a distinctform and with
a defined area, each one of them has been delineatedby a magnitude
of size[all of] which are characteristic of a body,and not of a
spirit. Let them, therefore, no longer speak of thePleroma as
spiritual . . .58
In this passage Irenaeus builds his argument upon the contrasthe
establishes between the kinds of products that result fromcertain
courses of production. On the one hand, there arethose products
that are united with that which produced
58 Greek and Latin quotations of Against Heresies are taken from
Irenee deLyon: Contre les Heresies, ed. A. Rousseau et al., 10
vols. (SourcesChretiennes; Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 196582).
Translations of AH aremine, with reference made to the translations
of Robert and Rambaut in ANF1 and Unger and Dillon in ACW 65.
Armenian quotations of Proof of theApostolic Preaching are taken
from Irenaeus, E2" 2p0deixin toA 2postolikoAkhr0gmato"; The Proof
of the Apostolic Preaching, with Seven Fragments, ed.and Eng.
trans. K. Ter-Mekerttschian and S. G. Wilson; Fr. trans.
J.Barthoulot (PO 12.5; Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1919). Unless otherwise
noted,translations of Prf are from St Irenaeus of Lyons: On the
ApostolicPreaching, trans. J. Behr (New York: St. Vladimirs
Seminary Press, 1997).
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them, as rays are united to the sun.59 On the other hand,
thereare those produced as distinct and separated so that they
existseparately from that which produced them. Building upon
thisdistinction, Irenaeus states that if aeons are produced after
themanner of men then they must be regarded as existing
separ-ately, divided from one another, just as human beings, not
mixedwith nor united the one to the other.
Those things that are united (unio) with that which producedthem
in 2.17.2 correspond to those things that are mixed orunited
(admisceo/unio) in 2.17.3. The logic of AH 2.17.23reveals Irenaeus
understanding of mixture. He sets that whichis mixed in opposition
to that which exists separately, dividedfrom one another, while
also placing that which is mixed in thesame category as or
identifying it with that which is united theone to the other. As a
result, it is clear that Irenaeus conceivesof mixture as producing
a unified resultant.
The production of a unified resultant by means of mixture
fitsthe Stoic theory of blending, but Irenaeus discussion also
fitsAristotelian mixture theory. He never specifies whether the
con-stituent ingredients persist in the resultant in actuality or
inpotentiality, or whether the resultant diVers from the
ingredientsin kind (i.e. whether it is a tertium quid), positions
that distin-guish the two systems. This ambiguity does not
characterize his
59 Irenaeus use of the analogy of a ray from the sun to
illustrate a course ofproduction in which the product remains
united with that which produced itseems to stand against his
previous understanding of this analogy. In AH2.13.2 he identifies
the analogy as a Gnostic illustration for the productionof aeons,
in particular the production of Intelligence by the Father. In
2.13.5the analogy is used as an example of, or at least in the
context of discussing, acourse of production that results in the
separation of a product from itssourcenamely, the intelligence of
God. Rather than challenging the suitabilityof the analogy as an
illustration for this type of production, Irenaeus contendsit is
not suitable because it implies a medium that exists prior to the
intelli-gence of God. As a result, it seems that Irenaeus
understands the analogy toillustrate contrary courses of production
in 2.13.5 and 2.17.2. The simplestexplanation for this dissonance
is that his understanding of the analogy in2.13.5 reflects his
polemic against Gnostic thought, while his use of the ana-logy in
2.17.2 reflects his own constructive thought. The emission of a
rayfrom the sun as an example of a type of production in which the
productremains united to its source does have a history prior to
Irenaeus that seemsto be distinct from its Gnostic usage. Several
passages in Philo utilize ananalogy of the sun and its rays (On
Giants 1.3, On the Special Laws 1.7.40,and On Dreams 1.14.77), but
the analogy is not as close to Irenaeus as thatfound in Justins
Dial 128.3. Justin is critical of the analogy, though for
dif-ferent reasons from Irenaeus in 2.13.5.
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discussion of the mixture of the soul with the body in a
humanbeing.
3.2. The Mixture of Body and Soul
Several passages at the end of Against Heresies 2 reveal
thatIrenaeus conception of the union of the body and soul
corres-ponds to that of Stoic theory. We first encounter signs
ofIrenaeus appropriation of Stoic thought in AH 2.33.1 and 4,where
he constructs an argument against the transmigration ofsouls. Some
time ago, William Schoedel recognized thatIrenaeus argument against
Plato in AH 2.33.24 incorporatesarguments from a peripatetic
philosophical tradition that maybe traced back to Strato.60 Eluding
Schoedel, however, was therecognition that Irenaeus argument in AH
2.33.1 and 4 alsoappropriates the Stoic notion of the mixture of
the body andsoul.61 AH 2.33.1 reads:
Their claim about the transmigration from body to body we
mayoverthrow by the fact that souls have no recollection at all of
previousevents . . . For the admixture/embracing
[admixtio/prosplok1] of thebody (with the soul) could not
altogether extinguish the memoryand contemplation of what they had
known beforehand, precisely be-cause they were coming for that
purpose. For as at this time whenthe body is asleep and at rest,
whatever things the soul sees by itselfand does in a vision, many
of these it remembers and communicatesto the body; and as it
happens that upon waking one relates, evenafter a long time, what
he saw in a dream, in this way one wouldremember also those things
he did before coming into the body. Forif that which was seen for
just a moment of time or was conceived ina vision by it (the soul)
alone while sleeping is remembered after it isblended again
(2nakraq8nai/commixta) with the body and is
dispersed(diaspar8nai/dispersa) through all the members, it would
much moreremember those things with which it lived for so long a
time, evenfor the whole period of a past life.
Irenaeus reference to the mixture of the body and soul occurs
inthe midst of his argument against the transmigration of
souls.There may, in fact, be two references but the first is
uncertain.In the first he challenges the notion that souls do not
remember
60 W. R. Schoedel, Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Adversus
Haereses ofIrenaeus, VC 13 (1959), pp. 2232, at 246.
61 I am not the first to argue that the end of AH 2 reveals
Stoic influence.In the middle of the last century, M. Spanneut
argued that Irenaeus concep-tion of dreams in AH 2.33.3 is Stoic in
origin (Le Stocisme des Pe`res delEglise: De Clement de Rome a`
Clement dAlexandre [Paris: Editions duSeuil, 1957], pp. 21617).
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events that took place in previous existences by arguing that
theadmixture/embracing (admixtio/prosplok1) of the body with
thesoul could not remove from the soul the memories and
contem-plation about the past. It is unclear whether we should
follow theLatin text or the later Greek fragment. If the Latin
reflects theprimitive text, then the mixture of the body and soul
of which itspeaks fits the Stoic theory of blending. Even so,
little else can besaid of this first reference. The second
reference, however, ismore informative.
Irenaeus argues that because a soul remembers the brief
hap-penings of a dream once it is blended again with a body, it
wouldsurely remember that which happened throughout the wholecourse
of a past life when blended with a new body. Of particularinterest
are the phrases that describe the reunion of the soul withthe body
after the completion of the dream: after it is blendedagain
(commixta/2nakraq8nai) with the body and is dispersed
(dis-persa/diaspar8nai) through all the members. Two aspects
ofthese phrases indicate Irenaeus thought is Stoic in origin.First,
a fragment has preserved 2nakerann0w as the term usedto speak of
the blending again of the body and the soul. Theverb belongs to the
same word family as does kra'si", the tech-nical term for the Stoic
theory of blending. Secondly, the notionthat this blending involved
the dispersal of the soul through allthe members of the body
corresponds to the pervading or mutualcoextension of the active
principle through the passive principlethat occurs in blending.
Both Alexander of Aphrodisias andArius Didymus use the soul and
body as an example of thismutual coextension.62
These observations establish Irenaeus understanding of theunion
of the body and soul in AH 2.33.1 as Stoic in orientation.A few
paragraphs later, in AH 2.33.4, he further appropriatesStoic
thought:
For the body is not more powerful than the soul, since indeed
fromthat one is (given to the body) breath, and life, and increase,
andcohesion, but the soul possesses and rules over the body. It is
cer-tainly retarded in its speed, to the degree in which the
body
62 Alexander of Aphrodisias: the soul . . . pervades (di0kein)
the whole of thebody while preserving its own substantiality
(o2s0an) in the mixture (tI m0xei)with it (for there is nothing in
the body possessing the soul that does notpartake (4moiron) of the
soul) (Mixt. 4, 217.326); and Arius Didymus: thesouls within us . .
. are mutually spread out (2ntiparekte0nousin) along with ourbodies
through and through (5di4 7lwn) (fr. 28, Dox. Gr. 463.278;
trans.Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, p. 82).
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participates in its motion; but it does not lose its own
knowledge. Forthe body is like an instrument, whereas the soul
stands in the place ofthe reason of the artist. As, therefore, the
artist quickly conceives ofthe work in himself, but carries it out
slowly by means of an instru-ment because of the immobility of what
is being acted on, so too thespeed of the mind having been mixed
with the slowness of the in-strument results in a temperate
operation. So also the soul by parti-cipating (participans) with
its body is hindered to a certain degree, itsspeed being mixed
(admixta) with the slowness of the body. Yet itdoes not lose
altogether its own powers (suas virtutes): indeed as it issharing
(participans) life with the body, it does not itself cease to
live.Thus, too, when it is communicating other things to the body,
it losesneither the knowledge of them, nor the memory of the things
whichhave been considered.
This pericope does not explicitly refer to the mixture or
blendingof the body and soul, but rather speaks of the
participation (par-ticipare) of the soul with the body. The
language of participation,however, also fits Stoic thought. In the
selection from Alexanderof Aphrodisias provided in the note above
we see that becausethe soul pervades the entirety of the body,
there is nothing inthe body possessing the soul that does not
partake (4moiron) ofthe soul.63 The blending of two ingredients
results in their par-ticipation with or partaking of each other,
just as the soul andbody partake of each other in their union.
Moreover, this par-ticipation, as Alexander indicates prior to the
sentence justquoted, never jeopardizes the continued existence of
the sub-stance and qualities proper to each ingredient. These
conceptscome through in Irenaeus description of the mixing of the
op-erations of the soul and body. The mixing (admiscere) of
therapid operation of the soul with the slower operation of thebody
is an aspect of the participation of the soul and body thatresults
from their blending. Furthermore, the moderation of thesouls
rapidity of operation does not mean that the soul losesaltogether
its own powers (suas virtutes), a statement that cor-responds well
to the preservation of the qualities proper to con-stituent
ingredients in a blend.
At this point, the fundamental piece of Stoic thought
concern-ing the blending of the body and soul that we have not
discussedwith regard to Irenaeus is the identification of the soul
as a body.The impediment of the souls operation by that of the
bodycould, in fact, reflect the conception of the soul as a body.
Forthe very idea that the motion or speed of the soul may be
subject
63 Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 4, 217.36; see also 3, 217.1013.
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to resistance suggests the corporeality of the soul, since
resist-ance is typically construed as belonging to the interaction
ofmaterial things.64 Other passages, however, more clearly
indicatethat Irenaeus thinks of the soul as being corporeal.
The first two passages I would like to highlight occur in
thelatter half of Against Heresies 2. In AH 2.19.6 we read:
For he (the aeon Saviour) will not have the likeness and
appearance(speciem) of angels, but of those souls in whom also he
is formed(formatur)just as water when it is poured into a vessel
takes theform (formam) of that vessel, and if at some point it
should freezein it, it will have the shape (speciem) of the vessel
in which it hasfrozensince souls themselves possess the figure
(figuram) of the body(in which they dwell), for they themselves
have been adapted (adap-tatae sunt) to the vessel, as I have said
before.
Massuet remarked long ago that we may infer from this
passagethat Irenaeus believed souls to be corporeal, insofar as
they pos-sess a circumscribed figure.65 The same inference may be
drawnfrom another passage that occurs towards the end of the book.
InAH 2.34.1 Irenaeus argues that the rich man is able to
recognizeLazarus and Abraham for several reasons, one of which is
thatafter death the soul preserves the figure of the body to which
ithad once been adapted.66 This logic follows closely upon
thatwhich we saw in AH 2.19.6 and the same inference may bedrawn:
the ascription of a circumscribed figure to the soul sug-gests
Irenaeus believed the soul to be corporeal.
Understanding Irenaeus attribution of figure to the soul
aspresupposing the corporeality of the soul garners significant
64 Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, p. 99. Sorabji points out
that theresistance that would occur in blending as one body
pervades another wouldbe a function of the diVerent densities
belonging to the two bodies.
65 Sancti Irenaei episcopi Lugdunensis et martyris Detectionis
et eversionis falsocognominatae agnitionis, ed. R. Massuet (Paris,
1710; repr. PG 7; Paris, 1857),col. 774, n. 34.
66 AH 2.34.1: souls not only continue to exist . . . but retain
the same form(characterem) of the body to which they are adapted
(adaptantur), and soulscontinue to exist . . . and have the figure
(figuram) of a human being, so thatthey may still be recognized.
Grabe directs the reader to Tertullians argu-ment for the
corporeality of the soul in On the Soul (de Anima) 7 (SanctiIrenaei
episcopi Lugdunensis Contra omnes haereses libri quinque, ed. J. E.
Grabe[Oxford: E. Theatro Sheldoniano, 1702], p. 192, n. 2).
Interestingly, given hisreading of AH 2.19.6, Massuet argues that
Irenaeus does not express an opin-ion like Tertullian, contending
that character refers to individual spiritualproperties (PG 7,
cols. 8334, n. 93). This interpretation is unconvincing be-cause
the passage is speaking of the physical recognition of Lazarus
andAbraham by the rich man.
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support from a statement he makes earlier in Book 2. In AH2.7.6
Irenaeus defines that which is created in contradistinctionto that
which is spiritual:
those things which are corruptible (corruptibilia), and earthly
(terrena),and compound (composita), and transitory (praetereuntia)
cannot be theimages of those which according to them are spiritual,
unless thesevery things also are admitted to be compound
(composita), circum-scribed (circumscriptione), and having a shape
(figuratione), and thusno longer spiritual, and diVusive (eVusa),67
and incomprehensible(incomprehensibilia).
The characteristics ascribed to that which is createdbeing
cor-ruptible, earthly, compound, circumscribedindicate that
bycreated Irenaeus means material. Included among the
charac-teristics that he ascribes to created, material things is
figuratio,having a figure or shape. The possession of figure is
proper tothat which is material, in contrast to that which is
spiritual. Thatbeing the case, Irenaeus ascription of figure
(figura) to the soulin AH 2.19.6 and 2.34.1 presupposes the
materiality or corpor-eality of the soul.
The final text that bears on this discussion manifests a
strikingsimilarity to Nemesius Nat. 81.61068 insofar as it speaks
of thesoul as corporeal while also defining death as the departure
orseparation of the soul from the body. In AH 5.7.1
Irenaeuswrites:
What, then, are mortal bodies? Could they be souls? On the
contrary,souls are incorporeal (incorporales) when put in
comparison (quantumad comparationem) to mortal bodies (mortalium
corporum): for Godbreathed into the face of man the breath of life,
and man becamea living soul (Gen 2:7). Now the breath of life is
incorporeal (incor-poralis). But neither can they call it mortal,
since it is the breath oflife. And for this reason David says, My
soul also shall live to Him(Ps 21:30, LXX), as much as its
substance is immortal. Neither,though, can they say that the mortal
body is spirit. What, then, isthere left to call the mortal body,
except that which was formed,that is, the flesh, of which it is
also said that God will vivify it? Forthis it is which dies and is
decomposed (moritur et solvitur), but notthe soul nor the spirit.
For to die is to lose vital capacity, and then tobecome breathless,
and inanimate, and devoid of motion, and to dis-solve (deperire)
into those [elements] from which one has derived thebeginning of
[ones] substance. But this happens neither to the soul,
67 Following Rousseaus suggestion that eVusa et locupletia
appears to be adoublet (SC 293, p. 224).
68 Quoted in the first section.
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for it is the breath of life, nor to the Spirit, for
uncompounded(incompositus) and simple (simplex) is the Spirit,
which cannot bedecomposed (resolvi) and is itself the life of those
who receive it.As it stands, then, death is shown to be a matter of
the flesh,which, after the soul has departed, becomes breathless
and inanimate,and is decomposed little by little into the earth
from which it wastaken. This, then, is what is mortal.
At first glance one might read this passage as standing
againstmy argument for the souls corporeality, for Irenaeus states
thatthe breath of lifewhich is the soulis incorporeal
(incorpor-alis). Such a reading overlooks, however, the crucial
qualificationthat occurs in the previous sentence: souls are
incorporeal whenput in comparison to (quantum ad comparationem)
mortal bodies.Irenaeus does not think of the incorporeality of the
soul abso-lutely but relatively: the soul is incorporeal when
compared tothe corporeality of the body.
The ascription of incorporeality to the soul when considered
incomparison to the body suggests that Irenaeus might considerthe
soul to be corporeal when compared to something else, suchas the
Spirit.69 Just such a comparison may take place a fewsentences
later when Irenaeus attributes simplicity to the Spiritbut not the
soul, leaving open the possibility that the soul iscomposite.
According to Irenaeus, the body is that which diesand is decomposed
(moritur et solvitur), not the soul or theSpirit. To die would be
to lose vital power, to become breathless,inanimate, devoid of
motion, and to dissolve or decompose into athings constituent
elements. The soul, as the breath of life,could not be that which
dies because it is not subject to theloss of vital power, to
becoming breathless, inanimate, anddevoid of motion. Indeed, these
are proper to the soul,70
which bestows them upon the body. The Spirit, as that whichis
simple (simplex) and not composite (incompositus), could not bethat
which dies because it is not subject to dissolving (deperire)or
decomposing (resolvi) into constituent elements. The attribu-tion
of simplicity to the Spirit but not the soul is not incidental;
69 Scholars have disagreed over whether Irenaeus holds a
trichotomous ordichotomous anthropology. I have argued elsewhere
that Irenaeus holds a di-chotomous anthropology, according to which
the human being is composed ofbody and soul. The reference to the
Spirit in AH 5.7.1 refers to the receptionof the Holy Spirit by the
perfect human being. See Briggman, Irenaeus and theHoly Spirit, pp.
149, 1656, 17381.
70 Strictly speaking, animation or temporal life is not proper
to the soul.The soul possesses life because it has pleased God to
bestow life upon thesoul (AH 2.34.4; cf. Briggman, Irenaeus and the
Holy Spirit, pp. 16773).
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it accords with Irenaeus understanding of the nature of
each.Irenaeus regards the nature of the Spirit as being simple and
notcomposite, while earlier we read in AH 2.7.6 that created
beingsare composite or compound (composita). Irenaeus connects
thesetwo statements when, in AH 5.12.2, he says that the Holy
Spiritcreates the soul/breath of life.71 Reading these passages
togetherallows us to see that the soul, as that which is created,
is com-posite, while the Holy Spirit, as the uncreated Creator, is
simpleand not composite.72
It is clear that whether something is simple or composite
dif-ferentiates the uncreated from the created, but I would like
tosuggest that in Irenaeus mind the degree to which something
iscomposite diVerentiates created things from each other.73 Wecould
say that the created order is defined by a scale of com-plexity. I
believe this understanding explains his ascription ofrelative but
not absolute incorporeality to the soul. The soul isincorporeal
when compared to the body because it is less com-posite or more
simple than the bodythe soul is the breathbreathed by God,74
whereas the body is formed from the dustof the ground.75
DiVerentiating between the complexity of thesoul and body is
possible, and only possible, because both thesoul and body are
created. Complexity belongs to the createdorder alone. Uncreated
divinity, as has just been demonstratedwith regard to the Holy
Spirit, is defined by its simplicity. If,then, the soul is
incorporeal relative to the body because it is less
71 AH 5.12.2.72 D. Minns is correct when he writes: In Irenaeus
view, only material things are
made up of bits and pieces. I do not believe, however, that his
next sentence rep-resents the thought of Irenaeus: Souls are
immaterial and therefore simple: theyhave no parts to come unstuck
and therefore they are incorruptiblethey have noinnate capacity for
corruption as bodies do (Irenaeus: An Introduction [Washington,DC:
Georgetown University Press, 1994; London and New York: T & T
Clark,2010 ], p. 95). Not only is it incorrect to think of the soul
as immaterial and simple, asI have shown above, but it is also
wrong to assert that souls do not have an innatecapacity for
corruption, such that they are incorruptible. Incorruptibility, or
im-mortality, does not belong to the soul by nature, but comes to
human beings whoreceive power or grace from the Holy Spirit (e.g.
AH 5.8.12). This is true of Adamand Eve prior to the Fall, who
depend upon the power/grace of the Spirit to sustaineternal life,
as well as postlapsarian human beings, who depend upon the
power/grace of the Spirit to restore eternal life (Briggman,
Irenaeus and the Holy Spirit, esp.pp. 16673, 7980).
73 This reading of Irenaeus also has a basis in Stoic thought,
which recog-nized some things to be more material than others. See
Sorabji, Matter, Spaceand Motion, p. 116; Sorabji refers to
Calcidius, in Tim. ch. 289.
74 As we have seen, e.g. in AH 5.7.1, which quotes Gen. 2:7.75
E.g. AH 3.21.10.
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composite or more simple than the body, then it would makesense
for Irenaeus to think of the soul as being corporeal relativeto the
Holy Spirit, because the soul is composite whereas theSpirit is
simple.
As I said at the beginning of my discussion of AH 5.7.1,
thistext is similar to Nemesius Nat. 81.610 because it speaks of
thesoul as corporeal while also defining death as the departure
orseparation of the soul from the body.76 Chrysippus
explanationthat death is due to the departure of a corporeal soul
builds uponthe Platonic understanding that death is the separation
of thesoul from the body77 to arrive at the un-Platonic
conclusionthat the soul is corporeal. Unlike Chrysippus, Irenaeus
doesnot go so far as to say that two objects must be corporeal
inorder to conceive of their separation. Nevertheless,
Chrysippusexplanation of death as the separation of two corporeal
objects,the soul from the body, would seem to fit Irenaeus logic in
thispassage.78
To this point I have shown that Irenaeus recognized mixtureto
produce a unified resultant such that what is mixed is unitedthe
one to the other (AH 2.17.3). Moreover, Irenaeus concep-tion of the
union of the body and soul corresponds to the Stoicunderstanding of
the blending of the body and soul, an under-standing that includes
the identification of the soul as corporeal.It is clear, then, that
Irenaeus incorporates both the languageand the concepts belonging
to the Stoic theory of blendinginto his theological account. As we
have seen, this appropriationof Stoic theory appears as early as AH
2 and persists at leastthrough the beginning of AH 5. Between these
two books, inAH 3 and 4, Irenaeus uses the theory of blending to
explain theunion of the divine and human in Christ.
3.3. Mixture Christology
For the character of the mixture involved, one would expect
orthodoxbelievers in two natures to draw on Stoic, rather than
Aristoteliantheory. For the ingredients in a Stoic mixture persist
actually, not
76 AH 5.7.1: As it stands, then, death is shown to be a matter
of the flesh,which, after the soul has departed, becomes breathless
and inanimate, and isdecomposed little by little into the earth
from which it was taken.
77 Phaedo 64C, 67CD.78 This is not to say that deathand here I
am speaking of the loss of
temporal lifeis simply a mechanistic separation of the soul from
the body,for that would neglect the will of God in the bestowal and
preservation of thatlife (AH 2.33.4; see also 5.12.2).
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potentially, and one can be dominant, as the divine nature was
sup-posed to be, without obliterating the other.79
Several passages in Against Heresies 3 and 4 combine to
revealthat Irenaeus utilizes the Stoic theory of blending to
explain themanner in which the divine and human are united in
Christ andthe manner in which they relate within that union. My
approachof proceeding according to the literary chronology of
AgainstHeresies will establish the development of Irenaeus
thought,and, therefore, the context in which we should read his
referencein AH 4.20.4 to the blending (commixtio) of the human
anddivine in the christological union.
The first possible sign in Book 3 of a christological interest
inthe Stoic theory of blending occurs in AH 3.16.6:
they wander from the truth, because their thought departs from
him who istruly God, being ignorant that his only-begotten Word,
who is alwayspresent with the human race, united to and
interspersed in his own forma-tion (unitus et consparsus suo
plasmati), according to the pleasure of theFather, and was made
flesh, is himself Jesus Christ our Lord . . .
Previous consideration of this text has been concerned with
twoquestions: whether unitus et consparsus suo plasmati refers to
theincarnation or the presence of the Word to his creatures,
andwhat Greek term lies behind consparsus.
As to the first, Albert Houssiau questioned whether unitus
etconsparsus suo plasmati refers to the incarnation or the creation
ofhuman beings. He ultimately decided in favor of the
incarnationbut with the reservation that the question is diYcult to
settle.80
Neither J. Armitage Robinson nor Aloys Grillmeier were
astroubled over the passage as Houssiau, both reading it as a
ref-erence to the incarnation. Robinson compared the text to Prf
40,where Irenaeus writes of the Word: this One came to
Judaeaengendered of God by the Holy Spirit, and born of the
VirginMary. He observed that the Armenian term ( ) trans-lated as
engendered in Prf 40 means sown, and suggested thatAH 3.16.6 also
refers to the Word that the Father sows by hisHoly Spirit.81 The
fact that Irenaeus argument in 3.16.6 hasnothing to do with the
Holy Spirit keeps me from following thataspect of Robinsons
argument; on the other hand, his referenceto Prf 40 does reveal
that language similar to consparsus has aplace in Irenaeus theology
of the incarnation. Grillmeier, for his
79 Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, p. 120.80 Houssiau,
Christologie dIrenee, p. 225.81 Robinson, Demonstration, p. 65.
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part, classed this phrase among others that reveal the rich
lan-guage Irenaeus uses about the union of God and man in
theincarnation.82 Though I agree with Houssiau that the placementof
the phrase between references to a more general presence ofthe Word
to human beings and references to his peculiar pres-ence in the
incarnation could bring into question whether thephrase refers to
the incarnation, the broader argument of thepassage concerning the
unity of Jesus person strongly indicatesthat it has to do with the
union of the Word and humanity in theincarnation. The decisiveness
of Robinson and Grillmeier areinstructive.
As for the term that lies behind consparsus, no consensus
hasemerged. Suggestions have included pefurme#no",83
sumfuraqe1",84
and sunesparme#no".85 The first two belong to the same
wordfamily and would be translated along the lines of mixed
ormingled with and kneaded or blended together. The thirdwould be
translated along the lines of interspersed with andits presence
would likely entail an allusion to Stoic concept ofl0go"
spermatik0". This concept, however, is foreign to
Irenaeusthought,86 rendering the originality of sunesparme#no"
highlyimprobable.
Unless we recover the original Greek, no final determinationwill
be possible. At the same time it is worth pointing out thatthe
meanings of each of these terms are compatible with theStoic theory
of blending, with which Irenaeus is familiar atthis point in his
writing. When read in the light of the theoryof blending, unitus et
consparsus suo plasmati would refer to theunion that results when
the Word pervades or extends through-out (conspargere) the created
human substance (plasma). Such areading would support Houssiaus
insistence that when speaking
82 Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 1, p. 104, n.
230.83 S. Irenaei, ed. Grabe, p. 241, n. 6. Houssiau (Christologie
dIrenee, p. 225,
n. 2) follows Grabe in proposing pefurme#no", contending the
Latin, Syriac, andArmenian terms all suggest it.
84 Rousseau oVers this term in his Greek retroversion (SC 211,
p. 313).85 K. Prumm, Gottliche Planung und menschliche Entwicklung
nach
Irenaus Adversus haereses, Scholastik 13 (1938), pp. 20624,
34266, at 343.The possibility of this reading is noted by
Grillmeier, Christ in ChristianTradition, vol. 1, p. 104, n. 230,
and Houssiau, Christologie dIrenee, p. 225,n. 2.
86 It seems that Irenaeus modified Justins concept of L0go"
spermatik0" inorder to contend that Christ was disseminated in
Scripture (J. Behr, Irenaeuson the Word of God, Studia Patristica
36 [2001], pp. 1637, at 164.) See alsoJ. Lashier, The Trinitarian
Theology of Irenaeus of Lyons (Ph.D. diss.,Marquette University,
2011), p. 147.
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of the union of the Word with his plasma Irenaeus
implicitlycompares the unity of Christ to the union of the soul
andbody in human beings,87 for he would be thinking of both interms
of the Stoic theory of blending.
If it is correct to read this passage in terms of Stoic
mixturetheory, then AH 3.16.6 shows the expansion of Irenaeus use
ofthe theory of blending. His initial use of the theory to
charac-terize the union of the soul and body at the end of
AgainstHeresies 2 has expanded by the middle of Book 3 to include
anexplanation of the union of the divine and human in
Christ.Whatever the case, AH 3.19.1 does reveal progression
inIrenaeus thought, for we find there another development inhis
appropriation of mixture languageits use to characterizethe
salvific union between God and human beings:
But, again, those who assert that he is just a mere man who
wasbegotten by Joseph remain in the bondage of the old
disobedience,and are dying, having not yet been blended (nondum
commixti) withthe Word of God the Father, nor receiving liberty
through the Son . . .For it was for this reason that the Word of
God [was made] man, andhe who is the Son of God was made the Son of
man, that man,having been blended (commixtus) with the Word of God,
and receiv-ing the adoption, might become the son of God.
Irenaeus twice uses commiscere with reference to the union
be-tween human beings and the Word of God. In the first
instancethose who have not yet been blended (nondum commixti) with
theWord remain in a state of death, while in the second
instancethose who have been blended (commixtus) with the Word
becomechildren of God.88
87 Houssiau, Christologie dIrenee, p. 247; see also p. 205.88
Early commentators upon this text often read or oVered
interpretations
that encouraged reading these words as speaking of the
christological union,such as F. Feuardent as quoted in Sancti
Irenaei episcopi Lugdunensis Quaesupersunt Omnia, ed. A. Stieren
(Leipzig: T. O. Weigel, 1853), vol. 2, p.903; S. Irenaei, ed.
Massuet, cols. 93940, n. 55; and Sancti Irenaei episcopiLugdunensis
libros quinque adversus haereses, ed. W. W. Harvey (2
vols.;Cambridge, 1857), vol. 2, p. 103, n. 4. The interpretation of
these words asreferring to the salvific union began at least as
early as Grabes edition (S.Irenaei, p. 249, n. 6), but consensus
formed around this interpetation at theturn of the twentieth
century with the writings of F. R. M. Hitchcock,Irenaeus of
Lugdunum: A Study of his Teaching (Cambridge, 1914; repr.Eugene,
OR: Wipf and Stock, 2004), p. 136, n. 1; The Treatise of Irenaeusof
Lugdunum Against the Heresies (London: S.P.C.K., 1916), vol. 1, p.
133, n.1; and J. A. Robinson, Selected Notes of Dr. Hort on
Irenaeus Book III,JTS, OS 33 (1932), pp. 15166, at 162. Years later
Houssiau also aYrmed thisreading (Christologie dIrenee, p. 192, n.
3).
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The presence of the language of blending or mixture in thistext
has been the source of confusion and concern over the years.In
fact, Irenaeus mixture language may have been controversialas early
as the fifth century. Theodoret of Cyrus quotes the por-tion of
this passage containing the second use of commiscere, butthe Greek
text he provides, t1n l0gon cwr0sa", does not corres-pond to the
Latin commixtus verbo.89 Grabe was the first to oVeran explanation,
suggesting that Theodoret altered the Greekword that commixtus is
rendering in an eVort to not lend anyencouragement to the
proponents of Eutyches Christology.90
Massuet disagreed, noting that Theodoret recognized thatkra'si"
can express a union without confusion (s0gcusi").91 Hethen arrived
at a more reserved judgement: Theodoret hadeither worked from
memory or used an interpolated text.92
Whatever the cause of the alterationabout which consensusmay
never be possible93Massuets examination led him toidentify the word
behind commixtus as either sugkerasqe1" orsugkekrame#no".94 Stieren
seems to follow Massuet, listing thesame possibilities.95 Hort
believed it was probably sugkeker-asme#noi,96 while Hitchcock
maintained it was either sugkraqe0"or sugkekrame#no".97 More
recently, Rousseau gives the originalas sugkraqe0".98 Whatever the
particular form of the verb, allagree that the original term
Irenaeus used belongs to the same
89 Theodoret of Cyrus, Eranistes, 1, Flor. 1, ed. G. H.
Ettlinger (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 98, line 20.
90 S. Irenaei, ed. Grabe, p. 249, n. 6. Feuardent seems to have
been the firstto notice the contrast between Theodorets Greek and
the Latin text ofIrenaeus (as quoted by Stieren in S. Irenaei, vol.
2, p. 903). Grabes explan-ation for the contrast builds upon
Feuardents earlier note.
91 Of particular interest to this study is the fact that Massuet
never connectshis observations with regard to Theodorets
understanding of kra'si" to theStoic theory of blending.
92 S. Irenaei, ed. Massuet, cols. 93940, n. 55. Grabe, too,
admits the pos-sibility that Theodoret was working from memory but
quickly turns to hissuggestion of Theodorets polemical alteration
of the text behind commixtus(S. Irenaei, p. 249, n. 6).
93 The debate continued over a century later in Harvey (S.
Irenaei, vol. 2, p.102, n. 5), Hitchcock (Irenaeus of Lugdunum, p.
136, n. 1), P. Nautin (LeDossier dHippolyte et de Meliton dans les
florile`ges dogmatiques et chez les his-toriens modernes
[Patristica, 1; Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1953], pp. 2931),and
Houssiau (Christologie dIrenee, p. 192, n. 3).
94 S. Irenaei, ed. Massuet, col. 939, n. 55.95 S. Irenaei, ed.
Stieren, vol. 1, p. 525, n. 2.96 Robinson, Notes of Hort on
Irenaeus, p. 162. Horts suggestion is
printed beside commixti Verbo.97 Hitchcock, Irenaeus of
Lugdunum, p. 136, n. 1.98 Rousseau, SC 210, p. 343.
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word family as does kra'si",99 the technical term for the
Stoictheory of blending.100
Irenaeus discussion of the union between God and humanbeings
continues at the end of AH 3.19.1, where he bases thebenefits of
the salvific union upon the attainments of the chris-tological
union. He writes:
For by no other way could we have received incorruptibility
andimmortality, except by having been united (aduniti) to
incorruptibilityand immortality. But how could we be united
(adunari possemus) toincorruptibility and immortality, unless,
first, incorruptibility and im-mortality had become that which we
also are, so that the corruptiblemight be absorbed (absorberetur)
by incorruptibility, and the mortal byimmortality, that we might
receive (perciperemus) the adoption of sons?
The union (adunare) to which Irenaeus refers here is the
blend-ing (commiscere) of the Word and human beings of which
hespoke in the first part of AH 3.19.1. We have cause, then,
toutilize Stoic mixture theory as an interpretative lens when
con-sidering this discussion of the salvific union. Two features
ofStoic thought are relevant to the interpretation of this
text.First, as I have mentioned, the constituent ingredients in
ablend preserve the substances and qualities proper to them.101
The union, then, between human beings and the divine Worddoes
not jeopardize their distinction; they remain diVerent inkind, and,
therefore, always distinguishable even whenunited.102 Second,
blending is designed to explain how theactive principle
(God/Pneuma/Logos) and the passive principlerelate to each
other.103 The absorption of the corruptibility andmortality of
post-lapsarian human beings by the incorruptibilityand immortality
of the divine Word should be recognized as theaction of the divine
Word upon the passive human being withwhom it is blended.
99 Harvey is the sole exception (S. Irenaei, vol. 2, p. 102, n.
5), preferringthe Greek given by Theodoret, but his reasoning seems
to be driven by histheological predetermination that commixtus is
inadmissable.
100 This would also hold for the term behind the earlier use of
commiscere inthis passage, since the second usage builds on the
first.
101 E.g. Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 3, 21417.102 Irenaeus is ever
concerned to maintain a distinction between the uncre-
ated God and created beings. In AH 4.38.1, 3 believers, as
created beings,grow increasingly perfect, ever closer to the nature
of God, but never arriving,always limited to an approximation of
God, the uncreated One, the perfectOne (Briggman, Irenaeus and the
Holy Spirit, pp. 1789).
103 Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 3, 216.1417; Diogenes Laertius, Lives
7.1346.
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These two points combine to yield the understanding that
theabsorption of corruptibility and mortality by incorruptibility
andimmortality does not involve the diminution or transformation
ofthe substance or qualities of the human being. This
corresponds,for instance, to Irenaeus conception of temporal life
and eternallife as two modalities of the one physical or biological
life ofhuman beings. The union of human beings with the
incarnateWord through the Holy Spirit involves the bestowal of
additionalgrace or power upon the believer, resulting in the
modulation oftemporal life to eternal life. The eternal life of the
believer,characterized by incorruptibility and immortality, is not
diVerentin kind from temporal life, characterized by corruptibility
andmortality, but diVerent in strength or order. There is always
oneand the same human life, capable of modulation, but
everhuman.104
The Stoic conception of the relationship between the
activeprinciple and passive principle can be recognized not only
inaspects of Irenaeus conception of the relationship betweenGod and
human beings, but also in the relationship betweenthe divine and
human in the person of Christ. Just a paragraphor two later, in AH
3.19.3, Irenaeus writes:
For just as he was man so that he might be tempted, so also was
hethe Word so that he might be glorified: the Word remaining
quiescent(requiescente/3suc0zonto"), that he might be capable of
being tempted,dishonoured, crucified, and of suVering death, but
the human nature(homine) being absorbed (absorto)105 in it, when he
was conquering,
104 Briggman, Irenaeus and the Holy Spirit, esp. pp. 16673.105
Theodoret (Eranistes, 3, Flor. 3, ed. Ettlinger, p. 230, line 13)
has suggi-
nome#nou. Theodorets text is followed by Grabe (S. Irenaei, p.
250, n. a),Massuet (S. Irenaei, col. 941, n. 64), and F. Loofs, who
suggests the Latintranslator altered the text (Theophilus von
Antiochien Adversus Marcionem unddie anderen theologischen Quellen
bei Irenaeus [TU 46.2; Leipzig: J. C. HinrichsBuchhandlung, 1930],
p. 91, n. 1). The Latin is held to be correct by Stierenon the
basis of internal textual comparison (S. Irenaei, vol. 1, p. 526,
n. 6),and Harvey on the basis of sense (S. Irenaei, vol. 2, p. 104,
n. 6). Houssiaufollows the Latin, which he sees as translating
katapoqe#nto", on the basis ofinternal textual comparison and
Theodorets tendency to correct passages thatmay be read as a
challenge to diophysite Christology (Christologie dIrenee,
pp.1923). According to Rousseau, sugginome#nou makes little sense
and is withoutdoubt an accidental corruption of katapinome#nou,
which is well supported bycomparison with other passages in
Irenaeus (SC 210, p. 344). It is diYcult forme to see how such a
corruption could be accidental; it makes more sense forthe
alteration to be the result of Theodorets polemic, as Houssiau has
sug-gested. As for the particular form of katap0nw, the present
tense (katapinome#nou)forms a grammatical parallel with 3suc0zonto"
and suits the relational dynamicunder discussion better than the
aorist (katapoqe#nto").
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and enduring (suVering), and performing acts of kindness, and
roseagain, and was taken up (into heaven). This one, therefore, the
Son ofGod, our Lord, being the Word of the Father, and the Son of
man,because from Marywho was descended from human beings and whowas
herself a human beinghe has received a generation proper to ahuman
being, and was made the Son of man.
Irenaeus takes but a moment to aYrm the necessity of both
thehuman and divine natures to the existence of the
incarnateWord;106 he then moves to his primary concern of
explaininghow the human and divine exist as one.107 Previous
scholarshave disregarded the straightforward reading of this text
as refer-ring to a dynamic involving the divine and human natures
ofJesus. According to Loofs the dynamic expressed by the
terms3suc0zwn and sugginome#no"108 does not indicate a natural
union(5 nwsi" fusik0) but an energetic (energetische) union
betweenthe Word and his humanity.109 Sagnard maintains that the
titlesSon of God and Son of man indicate that the union takes
placeat a personal rather than natural level.110 Houssiau
andRousseau, for their part, believed that 3suc0zwn and
katapi-nome#no"111 refer to a dynamic interaction of the qualities
belong-ing to the human and divine natures.112
A straightforward reading of this passage, however, under-stands
3suc0zwn and katapinome#no" to describe an interactionthat takes
place within the christological union at the level ofthe two
natures: it is the divine Word who remains quiescent(3suc0zonto"
toA L0gou) and his humanity that is absorbed orswallowed up by the
Word (katapinome#nou toA 2nqr0pou). This
106 Rousseau provides a succinct explanation of the first line
of this text inSC 210, p. 344.
107 This discussion is an aspect of Irenaeus argument for
identifying Jesusas the Godman, an argument that occupies all of AH
3.19.
108 Loofs follows Theodorets text; see n. 105.109 Loofs,
Theophilus von Antiochien, p. 91.110 Irenee de Lyon: Contre les
Heresies, ed. F. Sagnard (Sources Chretiennes
34; Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1952), p. 337, n. 1. The simple
distinctionbetween a personal and natural union does not fit
Irenaeus thought.Hitchcock was correct long ago to say: Irenaeus
does not represent theWord or Son of God as taking a second
Personality, but a second Nature toHimself. His manhood had no
personality of its own (Irenaeus of Lugdunum,pp. 1545). This taking
of human substance by the Word/Son involves a unionof the divine
and human natures or substances.
111 Houssiau and Rousseau follow the Latin text; see n. 105.112
Rousseau, SC 210, pp. 3445; Houssiau, Christologie dIrenee, pp.
1915.
Houssiau goes so far as to suggest that Irenaeus is not here
concerned withthe union between the Word and his humanity, but just
two momentsglori-ous and ingloriousin the life of Christ (p. 195,
n. 2).
I R E N A E U S C H R I S T O L O G Y O F M I X T U R E 545
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interaction is dynamic and according to Irenaeus explains howthe
two realities of Jesus are able to exist as one. The Wordremains
quiescent when it is necessary for Jesus to take part incertain
activities or experiences (being tempted, dishonoured,crucified,
suVering death), and the Word absorbs or swallowsup his human
nature when it is necessary for Jesus to takepart in others
(conquering, enduring, performing acts of kind-ness, rising again,
being taken up into heaven).
A cogent interpretation of this passage, then, must explain
thisdynamic interaction in terms of Christs human and divine
na-tures. It must also account for a particular aspect of
Irenaeuslogic that is fundamental to his conception of this dynamic
inter-action. According to Irenaeus, the Word alone is the subject
ofthe activity that determines the relationship between the
humanand divine in the christological union. This restriction of
activityto the Word is evident in the grammatical construction of
thetext. The active participle 3suc0zonto" indicates the Word is
theagent of activity when it comes to remaining quiescent, and
thepassive participle katapinome#nou, the term likely behind
absorto,113
indicates that the Word is once again the agent of activity
whenit comes to absorbing or swallowing up his humanity.114 TheWord
remains quiescent and the Word absorbs or swallows uphis
humanityhis humanity does not act upon the Word.115
In so saying, Irenaeus is not aYrming the one reality of
theincarnate Word by identifying the Word as the subject of
every
113 Some texts, including the 1526 editio princeps of Erasmus,
have absorpto(see S. Irenaei, ed. Grabe, p. 250, n. a).
114 Wolfson points out that katap0nw plays an important ro