Iraq II Ground Zero for the War on Terror

Iraq II : Ground Zero forthe War on Terror

In This ChapterPreparing the country for war

• Shock and awe

• The fall of Saddam

• Aftermath

As you know, after September 11, the United States, with ample reasonand proof, attacked al-Qaeda and its state sponsor, Afghanistan. In theWar on Terror, that was, as they say, the low-lying fruit. The real questionwas: What to do after that?

The decision of the Bush administration was to invade Iraq. The idea wasto "attack the terrorists there so they couldn't attack us here." It seemed tobe a dubious theory. But if Saddam Hussein did indeed have weapons ofmass destruction (WMDs), the West would be hard put to do nothing.'Was it the right decision ? Let's see.

80 Part Z: The Middle [dst and North A1rira

Drumbeat for WarIn his State of the Union address in January 2002, President George . Bush namedthree countries he declared were state sponsors of terrorism, thereby making them an"axis of evil": Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

These three countries were among the most repressive regimes on the planet, seem-ingly capable of creating WAII)s if they had not done so already), and certainly sid-ing with terrorist organizations if not outright supporting them. Of the three, NorthKorea had the greatest likelihood of possessing nuclear weapons, making the decisionto attack Iraq one that many would question. Why did the limited States choose toinvade Iraq, rather than Iran or North Korea?

Reliable ResourcesThe term axis of evil was used for three reasons. First, it harkened back to World

War i[, where Germany, Italy, and Japan were the "Axis powers." Second, the 'phrasewas reminiscent of Bush's political hero Ronald Reagan calling the Soviet Union the "evilerr:.pire," Finally, the phrase certainly had a rind to it.

Iraq and September 11The first reason is that the president and his team seemed convinced that Iraq hadplayed some part in the 9/11 attacks. Former counterterrorism czar Richard Clarkesays that the day after the attacks, on September 12, the president told Clarke that hewanted a memo about Iraq's connection to the attacks. Clarke, however, was con-vinced that 9/11 was the work of al-Qaeda and not Iraq. In point of fact, the presi-dent had been specifically warned that al-Qaeda was planning an attack on the UnitedStates.

Every day, the president is given a foreign affairs briefing , outlining the previous day'sevents and upcoming issues he might face . This is called the "Presidential DailyBriefing," or PDB.

On August 6, 2001 , a little more than a month before the September 11 attacks, thePDB given to President Bush was titled " Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S."The PDB explained that Osanla bin Laden was determined to bring his fight toAmerican soil. The PDB even said that there was an increasing likelihood that a-Qaeda was going to hijack planes.

Chapter 1: lydq ]I: Ground Lero for Of War on Terror 81

Yet even so, there is no doubt that the Bush administration tried to link Iraq to the9/11 attacks in the minds of the American people. In his State of the Union addresson January 2S, 2003, the President said, "Evidence from intelligence sources. secretcommunications and statements by people now in custody reveals that SaddanHussein. aids and protects terrorists, including members of al--Qaeda."

Similarly, Vice President Dick Cheney

repeatedly went on television discussing the

two, implying that Saddam Hussein had

longstanding ties to Osarna bin Laden and

that Iraq had something to do with

September 11.

The Bush administration was so effective in thiscampaign that by the time of the invasion ofIraq, 44 percent of all Americans believed thatat least some of the hijackers had been Iraqi (19of 20 were Saudis, none were Ira(li), and fully45 percent erroneously believed Iraq wasbehind the attacks.

Reliable Resources

-Hon,, s ,:Lr;astandno ties" 'be-"veer ^rcq "_-rd 0f

wacdaj amount to one tcon-hrm,ed meeting, afEer v =; ch theIraq, gover ment did not he`p ,fQaeda. By those standards, theUnited States has !ongstand ng liti_. to North Korea.

N ew Yar ;,mes ed:'ariai. j ne9.2004

But as numerous investigations have since made clear, including that in the 9/11Commission Report, Iraq in fact had nothing to do with either al-Qaeda or theSeptember 11 attacks.

WMDsBut September 11 was not the only reason the Bush administration wanted to con-front Saddam Hussein, or even the most important one. Of more importance was itsbelief that Iraq had or was creating L=1Ds that it was preparing to use against theUnited States and its allies.

In February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell went before the Lnited NationsSecurity Council and made a dramatic, forceful case for war, offering satellite photo-graphs and reports that seemed to prove that Saddam Hussein was in the process ofcreating WMDs.

Secretary- Powell had spent several days previously at Cl.Lheadquarters looking at theevidence he would present, almost all of which turned out to be incorrect.

Landmine!

Cohn Powell would come toregret the speech before the

United Natio ns, On September8; 2005, rowell (who

rtrod since

retired) told ABC News that thespeech was a 'Flag' on hisrecord. Said Powell, "I'm the onewho presented i t On behalf of theUnited States to +,e world, andfit) will always be a part of myrecord. it was painful, it is painnow. "

If the allegations were true, if Saddam Hussein hadin fact reconstituted his bV11D programs in violationof U.N. resolutions, then it would have been grosslynegligent not to take action against Iraq.

So the Bush administration began a two-prongedeffort: First it went to the Security Council askingfor resolutions (which it got) demanding that Iraqcomply with previous U.N. resolutions and allowweapons inspectors back into the country; second, itbegan to cobble together a coalition of countrieswilling to take a stand should Iraq not comply.

Iraq didn't comply, and in October 2002, the U.S.Congress authorized the president to wage waragainst Iraq if necessary, citing, among other reasons,

Iraq's LWIDs, its "threat to the national security of the United States," its assassina-tion attempt on George W Bush's father, and its connection to al-Qaeda.

War!On March 18, 2003, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein and his sons 48 hours toleave Iraq or face the consequences . They did not, and 49' hours later , the secondU.S.-Iraq - ar began.

Utilizing a military theory called "shock and awe," the United States military endeav-ored to not only win the war quickly, but do so in such an overwhelming , spectacularfashion that the enemy would lose its will to fight . The firepower utilized was nodoubt impressive:

1,700 " sorties " were launched.

504 sorties were cruise missiles.

British marines, the British Royal Navy. the Royal Australian Nagy, and manyothers joined U.S. forces to launch a massive air, sea, and land campaign.

The fall of BaghdadThree weeks later, Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, and the Iraqi government, fell.Although Iraq's elite Republican Guard was expected to provide stiff resistance to the

Chapter 1: Iraq IL: Wood iero for the War on Terror 83

advancing coalition army, it never materialized. U .S. forces easily moved into the

Iraqi capital, capturing Saddams palaces in the process and using them as staging

areas.

On April 9, 2003, the sadistic, despotic rule of Saddam Hussein had come to an end.The dictator vanished into thin air and ordinary Iraqis celebrated wildly in the streetsof Baghdad. For a short while, the United States was in fact greeted as a liberator.

Reliable ResourcesTranscript, Meet 6-, Tess , March 1 2003

VICE PRES . CHENE r' i think thiras hove gotten so bad ,ns^de rca from 'he standpoint

of the iraai pecp ! e. my belief i s ' ."e w 1I i n fact, be greeted as li berators.

"AR. RUSSER:: i f our arGl s s Is n o , correc t anti 'JVE Ie not 'rea `ea as ilbero o"w but

conquerors and +e iroairs aeain to resist particular!, in Baghdad, do ;ou l^,ink theAmerica ' people are prepared fo; a long, ccsrI and bloody i;attie ,vi :, nhconrAmerican casudities

VICE PEES. CHENEY: Well, don't think it's unlikel' to unfvid that w,,y, Tin-,, aecause 1really do believe we %x!1 be greeted as liberators

Coalition forces tried in vain to control the ensuing chaos , but their inability to do soforeshadowed the fact that , although the war had been planned meticulously, thepeace had not.

L4'hen looters started ransacking buildings and running off with priceless artifactsfrom Iraqi museums and such, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said:

The task we 've got ahead of us now is an awkward one ... It 's untidy. And free-dom's untidy.knd free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes anddo bad things . They're also free to live their lives and do wonderful things. Andthat 's what 's going to happen here . [Fjor suddenly the biggest problem in theworld to be looting is really notable ... Stuff happens.

feanwhide, in Other Parts of the CountryAs the battle for Baghdad concluded, coalition forces began to occupy key cities,roads, and facilities throughout Iraq.

84 Part 1 : The Middle Tast and Noah Africa

It turns out that years of sanctions against Hussein's government had taken their toll.The Iraqi army proved to be ill-equipped, lacking morale, poorly trained, and none-too-loyal. As coalition forces marched through the country, much of Saddam's army,including the so-called elite Republican Guard, simply disappeared into the crowds.

This was also true in the northern, Kurdish, part of the country. The Kurds have longbeen a people without a homeland, much like the Palestinians. Historic Kurdistan ismade up of parts of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, but historic Kurdistan is long gone.

However, after the Gulf War in 1991, the northern part of Iraq, a traditional enclaveof the Kurds, was given protection by coalition forces. A sort of mini-Kurdistan wascarved out. After the US.-led invasion of Iraq began in 2003, Kurdish forces quicklyand easily routed the Iraqi army there too, further securing the nascent Kurdishhomeland.

Mission Accomplished?A mere two weeks after the fall of Baghdad, the president, landing on an aircraft car-rier in full Air Force togs, in front of a banner proclaiming "?vlission Accomplished,"declared that major combat operations in the war were over. The president had noway of knowing that the intransigent, small rebellion facing coalition forces wouldsoon turn into a full-fledged resistance. Even so, if the mission was to bring peace, sta-bility, and democracy to Iraq, the mission most certainly had not been accomplished.

Landminel

irag fact sheet:

Weapons of mass destruction found: 0

Average number of U.S. troop deaths, per day: 2

Civilian deaths: More than 100,000

Cost of the war, per week: $ I billion

Number of new J.S. military bases planned: 6--14

Source: Institute for Po icy Studies

Chapter 1: Iraq IL Ground Lero for the Cdr on Terror 85

The Day AfterThe fall of Saddam Hussein 's regime led to an outbreak of violence throughout thecountry because there were no police to stop the hoodlums and, in what can only heseen as a major oversight , the Iraqi army was disbanded , exacerbating the situation.

In December , post-war events took a turn for the better when Saddarn . Hussein wasfound , hiding in an underground cellar of a farmhouse near his hometown of Tikrit.He was jailed and as of this writing is standing trial for crimes against his people.

The capture of Saddam was supposed to be a turning point in the violent and uglyaftermath of a very successful war, but it was not. Several other events also came andwent that were supposed to signal better days ahead:

In June 2 004, "sovereignty" of the country was transferred back to the Iraqis,but what had now become a guerilla war only gained strength.

In January 2005, Iraq held its first election. The insurgency continued.

In October 2005 , Iraqis ratified a new constitution (which states that Islam willbe "a main source " of law). The guerilla war, which was now almost a full-fledged civil war, was in full swing.

The Islamic Republic of Iraq?To complicate matters even more, whereas Saddam Hussein's Iraq might have been arogue state, by most accounts terrorists had little sway there. This was especially trueof Islamic terrorists, who loathed the secular Hussein (and vice versa). But the newIraq appears well on its way to becoming a home for Islamic terrorism. Did GeorgeBush create the opposite of what he intended:

No less an authority than Donald Rumsfeld has wondered the same thing. In a memoto his staff, three years after the September I 1 attacks, while the Iraq imbroglio wasin full swing, Rumsfeld wondered whether the United States was winning or losingthe ",at on Terror:

Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on

terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists

every day than ... the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying

against us?

It is no wonder then that by the end of 2005, the American public began to questionwhether the war, and the deaths of its young men and women in support of the war,were worth it. Whereas 63 percent of all respondents to the CBS/New York Times pollin December 2003 thought the United States did the right thing by invading Iraq,only 44 percent thought so by September 2005.

The ProblemSeveral things combined to create the unstable situation that is post-Saddam Iraq.First, Saddam Hussein's regime was in fact so rigid that the ethnic and religious dif-ferences we see today were held in check. The war unleashed internal strife, power,and feelings that had been quashed for years.

Second, recall that Iraq is not a natural nation state. Carved, as it was, out of the oldOttoman Empire by Britain after World 'War I, the country should rightly be threecountries: one Kurdish, one Shiite, and one Sunni.

Finally, imposing the idea of democracy on a region and a people with no history orfeel for such a political system is idealistic and brave, but also naive. If it works, itmight be a monumental achievement. If the democratic country- that is createddecides to become a fundamental Islamic state, it might be a disaster.

The Least You Need to KnowAlthough it seems clear that Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11, that it possibly

had AMDs was reason enough for most in the United States to want to go to

war,

Overwhelming firepower enabled the United States to easily topple Saddam.

4 A persistent insurgency unexpectedly sprang up after the war.

Iraqis may yet form a stable, democratic government, or they might form anIslamic republic.