IIEA Conference, Marburg, Germany 17-18 June 2016 IRAN’S OIL & GAS POTENTIAL AND CHALLENGES Manouchehr Takin* * International Oil & Energy Consultant E-mail: [email protected]. Tel: +44 (0) 7896 809 365 Takin 1
IIEA Conference, Marburg, Germany 17-18 June 2016
IRAN’S OIL & GAS
POTENTIAL AND CHALLENGES
Manouchehr Takin*
* International Oil & Energy Consultant E-mail: [email protected]. Tel: +44 (0) 7896 809 365
Takin 1
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• Doom and gloom, or shining success and growth?
• In this presentation: The historical context An overall view Considerable potential Challenges
EXAMINING IRAN’S OIL & GAS INDUSTRY
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IRAN’S OIL PRODUCTION 1913-2015
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
71
91
3
19
18
19
23
19
28
19
33
19
38
19
43
19
48
19
53
19
58
19
63
19
68
19
73
19
78
19
83
19
88
19
93
19
98
20
03
20
08
20
13
Mil
lio
n B
arr
els
Pe
r D
ay
Sources: OPEC 1913-1949, Oil & Gas Journal 1950 -
Late 1978-early 1979 Islamic Revolution
1980-88Iran-Iraq War
Oil Nationalisation
Sanctions imposed on Iran
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IRAN’S OIL PRODUCTION 1988-2014 (from two sources) IMPORTANCE OF LIQUIDS FROM GAS FIELDS
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.519
88
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
OGJ BP
Million Barrels Per Day
Sources: Oil & Gas Journal and BP Statistical Review of World Energy
Natural gas liquids
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NATURAL GAS RESERVES - IRAN & SOME OTHER COUNTRIES (end 2014)
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy
Trillion cubic
metres
Percent
world total
Iran 34.0 18.2%
Russian Federation 32.6 17.4%
Qatar 24.5 13.1%
Turkmenistan 17.5 9.3%
Nigeria 5.1 2.7%
Algeria 4.5 2.4%
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IRAN: NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION, EXPORTS & IMPORTS (BILLION CUBIC METRES PER YEAR)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
50
100
150
200
250
1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
Marketed production
Gas exports
Gas imports
Marketed production Exports and imports
Source: OPEC
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IRAN: 61% OF PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION IS NATURAL GAS (2014)
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy
36.98%
60.79%
0.45% 0.39% 1.36% 0.03%
Oil
Natural Gas
Coal
Nuclear Energy
Hydroelectric
Renewables
Has ‘gasification’ gone too far?
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OIL RESERVES & PRODUCTION - 2015
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0
50
100
150
200
250
300Ir
an
Iraq
Ku
wai
t
UA
E
Sau
di A
rab
ia
Om
an
Un
ited
Sta
tes
No
rway UK
Production Reserves
Billion barrels of remaining reserves
Million barrels per day of production
Source: Oil & Gas Journal
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OIL RESERVES & PRODUCTION (% of reserves) - 2015
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
0
50
100
150
200
250
300Ir
an
Iraq
Ku
wai
t
UA
E
Sau
di A
rab
ia
Om
an
Un
ite
d S
tate
s
No
rway UK
Annual production as % of reserves Reserves
Billion barrels of remaining reserves
% of reserves producedper year
Source: Oil & Gas Journal
12
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Turk
men
ista
n
Iran
Qat
ar
Russ
ian
Fede
ratio
n
Alge
ria US
Cana
da
Production
Reserves
Trillion cubic metres of remaining reserves
Billion cubic metres of production
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy
NATURAL GAS RESERVES & PRODUCTION - 2014
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NATURAL GAS RESERVES & PRODUCTION (% of reserves) - 2014
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Turk
men
ista
n
Iran
Qat
ar
Russ
ian
Fede
ratio
n
Alg
eria US
Cana
da
Annual production as % ofreservesReserves
Trillion cubic metres of remaining reserves
% of reserves produced per year
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy
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HOLDERS OF HIGH RESERVES (including IRAN) PRODUCE AT RELATIVELY LOW RATES IN COMPARISON WITH HOLDERS OF
LOW RESERVES
IRAN HAS THE POTENTIAL TO INCREASE ITS OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION
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Example of an old field: Forties Field in the UK sector of the North Sea Discovered in 1970, first production 1975, reached 520 thousand barrels per day (tbpd) in 1978. By 2003 had produced more than 2 billion barrels and production had declined to 40 tbpd. BP estimated field decommissioning in 2013. Apache took over in 2003. In 2013 Forties was the second largest producing field (after Buzzard). Forties Field is expected to produce beyond 2030 (20 years longer than the 2003 estimate)
DEVELOPMENT WORK IN OLD FIELDS
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Average well production 16,000 bpd (early 1970s) down to 2,000-3,000 bpd (recent). Remaining reserves of Iran’s old fields: about 30 billion barrels (cf. current reserves of Kazakhstan with 1.6 mbpd production) Efficient production of the old reserves requires systematic field/reservoir monitoring, detailed studies & analysis, implementation of IOR, EOR, ….e.g. expansion of gas injection. Development projects in old fields are profitable, but they are: capital-intensive and ‘expert-intensive’
IRAN’S OLD OIL/GAS FIELDS
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‘The elderly need much greater medical care and treatment than the young’, especially those that did not pay attention to their health, diet and life style when they were young’! Most Iranian oil fields have fractured reservoirs with low permeability in the matrix and high production from the fractures; decades of ‘primary’ production (falling reservoir pressure, declining production and significant quantities of oil trapped in matrix blocks); years of NIOC / Consortium debate: water or gas injection!
EXAMPLE OF TECHNICAL CHALLENGES IN OLD FIELDS
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Example: Haftkel, on stream 1928, peak production 200,000 bpd, had fallen to 14,000 bpd in 1976 when gas injection commenced; resulted in the expansion of the oil column, production rose to 34,000 bpd by the mid-1990s; estimated extra recoverable oil 500-600 million barrels (Saidi SPE 1996). However, an oil field gas-injection programme is a billion Dollar project and should not be blindly implemented in all Iranian oil fields. Detailed reservoir studies, proper monitoring and planning are necessary for each of the reservoirs in each of the fields and should also evaluate water-injection and other IOR/EOR methods. These projects are CAPITAL & EXPERT INTENSIVE!
GAS INJECTION INTO OIL FIELDS
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Onshore: Aghajari (1939), Ahvaz (1961), Bibi Hakimeh (1964), Gachsaran (1941), Karanj (1965), Kupal (1971), Mansuri (1974), Marun (1966), Parsi (1966), Rag-e Safid (1966) & others. Offshore: Abuzar (1976), Dorud-Kharg (1964), Salman (1968) & others. (figures in brackets): year of first production
EXAMPLES OF OLD PRODUCING IRANIAN OIL FIELDS STILL HOLDING CONSIDERABLE RESERVES
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The Islamic Republic of Iran has priority for developing cross-border fields. The preferred method of developing shared fields is unitisation, though many problems will be faced: Different (foreign) companies operating in the neighbouring country Different regulatory regimes on the two sides Political differences between governments Better chance for fields on the Iraqi border?
SHARED FIELDS
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Some examples of fields shared with: Iraq: Azadegan, Danan, Dehloran, Khorramshahr, Naft Shahr, West Paydar, Yadavaran, Yaran Kuwait & Saudi Arabia: Arash, Esfandiar, Foruzan Oman: Hengam Qatar: South Pars The UAE: Salman, Nosrat
DEVELOPING OIL/GAS FIELDS SHARED WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES
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SCHMEATIC LOCATION MAP OF FIELDS ACROSS IRAN-IRAQ BORDER
Source: Takin ‘Stealing Iraq’s Oil – is the Iraqi press right?’ (CGES 2008)
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Majnoon (on the Iraqi side): Several billion barrels of recoverable reserves, multi-reservoir field, requiring complex production systems and heavy investment. Foreign companies are Shell (operator) and Petronas. Operations started 2009, first export of oil 2014. Azadegan (on the Iranian side): We are far behind.
EXAMPLE OF A FIELD ON THE IRAQI BORDER
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Has been under preparation since 2013. Is expected to be a major improvement on the former Buy-Back model. It is still to be finally approved. Already negotiations and provisional agreements are being made with international oil companies. More than 50 projects are said to be offered, investment requirements: $100-$300 bn
IRAN PETROLEUM CONTRACT (a new contract model)
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In the Middle East and in Iran, public opinion is still strong about the excesses of the old ‘oil concessionaires’, their unfair practices, acting almost as ‘a state within the state’, influencing governments, etc. Foreign operators, their management and staff still face resentment. They should emphasise their professional responsibility, technical expertise, provision of capital, long-term commitment and the expectation of a ‘win-win’ outcome from their involvement in Iran.
LEGACIES FROM THE FORMER OIL CONCESSIONAIRES OPERATING IN THE MIDDLE EAST
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Politicisation of Iranian hydrocarbon industry and repeated personnel changes since the Revolution Breaking the National Iranian Oil Company & ‘Privatisation’ Many sanctions still remain Finalisation of the new ‘Iran Petroleum Contract’
SOME OTHER CHALLENGES