IPDPS 2007 Making Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Routing Resilient to Failures Yingwu Zhu Seattle University .

IPDPS 2007

Making Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Routing Resilient to Failures

Yingwu Zhu

Seattle University

http://fac-staff.seattleu.edu/zhuy

IPDPS 2007

Overview

• Background– P2P Anonymous

Routing– Research Problem– Current Solutions

• Our Approach– Erasure Coding– Message and Path

Redundancy– Wise Choice of Mixes

• Evaluation– Experimental Setup– Results

• Summary

IPDPS 2007

P2P Anonymous Routing

• Using P2P networks as an anonymizing network to achieve initiator/responder anonymity

• Using peer nodes as mixes or relay nodes to relay messages, tunneling communication for initiators/responders

• Many are based on Onion Routing – Layered encryption creates an Onion– Multi-hop routing: an anonymous message

represented by an Onion goes through a small number of mixes (strip the Onion)

IPDPS 2007

P2P Anonymous Routing

• Why appealing?– A potentially large anonymity set offered by the

open set of peer nodes– Sidestep political background and local

jurisdiction issues due to the distribution of peer nodes

– Scalable compared to current static anonymizing networks which operate a small set of fixed mixes

– Ideal for hiding anonymous traffics due to communication patterns and heterogeneity of peer nodes’ locations

– More?...

IPDPS 2007

P2P Anonymous Routing

• A big challenge: node churn in P2P networks

• Problems– Fragile and short-lived paths: node

failures disrupts anonymous paths/tunnels– Message loss and communication failures– Complicate path construction which is

expensive, i.e., usually incurs expensive asymmetric encryption/decryption

IPDPS 2007

Overview

• Background– P2P Anonymous

Routing– Research Problem– Current Solutions

• Our Approach– Erasure Coding– Message and Path

Redundancy– Wise Choice of Mixes

• Evaluation– Experimental Setup– Results

• Summary

IPDPS 2007

Research Problem

• Can we make P2P anonymous routing resilient to node failures?

• We are not alone!– Mix-base solutions– Multicast-based solutions

IPDPS 2007

Overview

• Background– P2P Anonymous

Routing– Research Problem– Current Solutions

• Our Approach– Erasure Coding– Message and Path

Redundancy– Wise Choice of Mixes

• Evaluation– Experimental Setup– Results

• Summary

IPDPS 2007

Current Solutions

• Mix-based– Use a group of peer nodes as a mix to

mask single mix node failures– The peer nodes in each group share

secrecy to encrypt/decrypt messages along the path

– E.g., TAP and Cashmere

IPDPS 2007

Current Solutions

• Multicast-based– Initiators and responders join a group– Messages are multicasted to all group

members– Cover/noise traffics are used to gain

initiator/responder anonymity– Bandwidth overhead due to message

multicasting and cover traffics– E.g., P5, APFS, Hordes

IPDPS 2007

Overview

• Background– P2P Anonymous

Routing– Research Problem– Current Solutions

• Our Approach– Erasure Coding– Message and Path

Redundancy– Wise Choice of Mixes

• Evaluation– Experimental Setup– Results

• Summary

IPDPS 2007

Our Approach

• Based on a simple yet powerful idea– Resilience can be achieved by redundancy

• Rely on Onion routing– Layered encryption and multi-hop routing

• Techniques employed– Message redundancy by erasure coding– Path redundancy (coded messages are sent

over multiple disjoint paths)– Wise choice of peer nodes as mixes in each

single path

IPDPS 2007

Overview

• Background– P2P Anonymous

Routing– Research Problem– Current Solutions

• Our Approach– Erasure Coding– Message and Path

Redundancy– Wise Choice of Mixes

• Evaluation– Experimental Setup– Results

• Summary

IPDPS 2007

Erasure Coding

• Widely used in file & storage systems– Tradeoff between data availability and

storage cost

• Breaks a message M into n coded segments, each of length |M|/m

• m of n segments suffice to reconstruct M

• Redundancy r = n/m

IPDPS 2007

Overview

• Background– P2P Anonymous

Routing– Research Problem– Current Solutions

• Our Approach– Erasure Coding– Message and Path

Redundancy– Wise Choice of Mixes

• Evaluation– Experimental Setup– Results

• Summary

IPDPS 2007

Message and Path Redundancy

……

M1

Mk

Mn

M: original message Mi: coded segment with length of |M|/m, 1≤ i ≤ n

M1

Mk

Mn

M1

Mk

Mn

……

M1

Mk

Mn

Bob Alice

Onion Routing

Alice can reconstruct M upon the first m arrived coded segments

IPDPS 2007

Allocation of Coded Segments

• Message M n coded segments with length of|M|/m, redundancy r = n/m

• k disjoint paths from Bob to Alice• Idea: equally distribute n segments over k paths (k ≤

n, assume k is a multiple of r for simplicity)• P(k) = Psuccess (Alice receives M)

= Prob(≥k/r paths succeed in message delivery)

Goal: maximize P(k) with respect to k and r

p = (pnode_availability)L

L: # of nodes in a path

IPDPS 2007

Allocation of Coded Segments

Guideline to maximize routing resilience upon different node availabilities and message redundancy degrees

IPDPS 2007

Validation of 3 Observations

Impact of different ks on success of routing under different node availabilities of 0.70, 0.86, and 0.95, where L = 3 and r = 2.

IPDPS 2007

Overview

• Background– P2P Anonymous

Routing– Research Problem– Current Solutions

• Our Approach– Erasure Coding– Message and Path

Redundancy– Wise Choice of Mixes

• Evaluation– Experimental Setup– Results

• Summary

IPDPS 2007

Wise Choice of Mixes• Problem

– Current mix-based protocols do NOT consider node lifetime when choosing mixes

– Random selection in mixes• Our goal

– Choose nodes that tend to live longer as mixes

– Improve path durability (prolong path lifetime)

• Challenge– Can we predict node lifetime?

IPDPS 2007

Node Lifetime Distribution

Figure 1: Cumulative dist. of the measured Gnutella node lifetime dist. comparedwith a Pareto dist. with α=0.83 and β = 1560 sec.

IPDPS 2007

Wise Choice of Mixes

• Based on the Pareto distribution– Prediction: Nodes that have stayed a long time

tend to stay longer in the system

• Each node gossips node liveness information they have learned

• Each node seeking anonymity makes mix choices to construct anonymous paths based on node liveness prediction

IPDPS 2007

Overview

• Background– P2P Anonymous

Routing– Research Problem– Current Solutions

• Our Approach– Erasure Coding– Message and Path

Redundancy– Wise Choice of Mixes

• Evaluation– Experimental Setup– Results

• Summary

IPDPS 2007

Experimental Setup

• Simulator built from P2psim 3.0 by MIT• Augment OneHop

– Membership management is essentially a hierarchical gossip protocol

– Learn node liveness information • Node lifetime dist. to simulate churn

– Pareto– Uniform– Exponential

IPDPS 2007

Results

• Main results are omitted here. • Security analysis

– Similar to Onion Routing

• Please see paper for details

IPDPS 2007

Impact of wise choice of mixes on path durability (the duration that a sender can successfully route messages to a destination

over 4 disjoint paths with redundancy degree of 4)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Pareto Uniform Exponential

Node lifetime dist.

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IPDPS 2007

Overview

• Background– P2P Anonymous

Routing– Research Problem– Current Solutions

• Our Approach– Erasure Coding– Message and Path

Redundancy– Wise Choice of Mixes

• Evaluation– Experimental Setup– Results

• Summary

IPDPS 2007

Summary• Strike a balance between routing resilience

and bandwidth cost while preserving sender anonymity

• Message redundancy by erasure coding and path redundancy– Improve path construction and routing resilience– Tolerate up to path failures

• Choice of mixes based on node lifetime prediction– Based on Pareto dist.– Surprisingly, work very well for other dist. like

Uniform and Exponential dist. (significantly better than random selection)

• Bandwidth cost by erasure coding is modest

IPDPS 2007

Questions ?