IOWA BOARD OF CORRECTIONS AGENDA Friday, …...2020/06/05 · o As of today, there are 18 II at IMCC cases and 1 at CCF. o We have tested 377 IIs and have 39 pending for offenders

KIM REYNOLDS, GOVERNOR DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ADAM GREGG, LT. GOVERNOR BETH A. SKINNER, PhD, DIRECTOR

The mission of the Iowa Department of Corrections is to: Creating Opportunities for Safer Communities

(Office) 515-725-5701 - 510 East 12th Street, Des Moines, Iowa 50319 - (FAX) 515-725-5799

https://doc.iowa.gov/

IOWA BOARD OF CORRECTIONS AGENDA Friday, June 5, 2020, 9:00 a.m.

LOCATION: Zoom Meeting https://zoom.us/j/91522897312

TOPIC PRESENTER Call to Order Richard LaMere

• Approval of May 1, 2020 Minutes (Action Item) Next Board meeting will be July 10, 2020, Richard LaMere

Iowa State Penitentiary, 32111 330th Avenue, Fort Madison, Iowa (A meeting notice will be posted on the DOC website: https://doc.iowa.gov/)

Welcome Kip Shanks, District Director

Director’s Update Dr. Beth Skinner, Director COVID-19 Dr. Beth Skinner, Director Religion in Prison Ken Pirc and Asst. Attorney General Bill Hill Budget and REC Updates Steve Dick, Fiscal Manager Thank You to IPI Workers (Action Item) Cord Overton Public Comments Public Open Discussion Board Members Adjournment Board Members

The Board of Corrections’ agenda is posted on the DOC Web Site at https://doc.iowa.gov/

under the Board of Corrections Tab.

This meeting recording will be uploaded to the Department's Youtube Channel for members of the public that would like to observe. You can also view previous Board of Corrections meetings at this site. Link: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCltY2PABjitQpT4Op2w3kTw

https://zoom.us/j/91522897312

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCltY2PABjitQpT4Op2w3kTw


The mission of the Iowa Department of Corrections is: Creating Opportunities for Safer Communities

(Office) 515-725-5701 - 510 East 12th Street, Des Moines, Iowa 50319 - (FAX) 515-725-5799 https://doc.iowa.gov/

IOWA BOARD OF CORRECTIONS MINUTES

Friday, May 1, 2020 Zoom Meeting Board Members Present: Chair Richard LaMere, Vice Chair Rebecca Williams, Mark DeJong, Lisa Hill, Larry Kudej and Dr. Mary Chapman. Staff Present: Dr. Beth Skinner, William Sperfslage, Cord Overton, Michelle Dix, Sally Kreamer, Sarah Fineran, Steve Dick, Michael Savala, Susie Pritchard Call to Order, Chair Richard LaMere Chair LaMere called the meeting to order. The next scheduled Board of Corrections meeting is June 5, 2020, tentatively at the Fourth

Judicial District, Residential Correctional Facility, 900 9th Avenue, Council Bluffs, Iowa. The meeting will begin at 9:00 a.m.

Chair LaMere asked for a motion to approve the March 6, 2020 minutes. Mr. Kudej made a motion and Dr. Mary Chapman seconded the motion. All members were in favor of approving the minutes, motion passed. (A meeting notice will be posted on the DOC website: https://doc.iowa.gov/)

Director’s Update and COVID-19 Update –Director Beth Skinner For the last two months, the DOC has been planning to respond to COVID-19 through policy

and procedure planning, tabletop exercises, and regular meetings with staff at various levels. Director Skinner is very proud of how everyone has been working together during this process.

Thank you to the Central Office Incident Command team, Wardens, District Directors and IPI who have been instrumental in our response.

The DOC is meeting daily with Central Office Incident Command, Wardens and District Directors to discuss current cases and various activities going on around the state. Guidance from the CDC and Iowa Department of Public Health (IDPH). Our doctors are giving excellent guidance as well.

The DOC established two COVID-19 hotlines for the public and for staff. These operate Monday through Friday to answer questions regarding our response to COVID-19.

Current stats of COVID-19 for staff and offenders o As of today, there are 18 II at IMCC cases and 1 at CCF. o We have tested 377 IIs and have 39 pending for offenders. o There are 29 pending staff tests.

Practices and strategies to mitigate the impact and spread of the virus o In an effort to reduce the number of people coming into the facilities, the DOC:

Cancelled volunteer programs effective March 9th. Cancelled visitation March 14th. All community work crews in the community were cancelled March 14th.

o We have implemented video visitation, which has received positive feedback. OCIO provided Chromebooks and Dan Clark and Jason Holder were instrumental in setting up.

o We’ve also offered a free quantity of omails and calls for all IIs.


Strategies we are using to reduce the prison population to create space to move people around if there is spread:

o Screening all staff upon entry. o Screening all intakes and quarantining for 14 days. o Masks are mandatory for all staff. o Masks are strongly encouraged for IIs in facilities, but these are required at IMCC

and CCF where we have confirmed cases. o The Pandemic Policy has been updated to be more in line with COVID-19. o Have been sending video message updates to staff and IIs discussing the current

status of COVID-19. o Medical staff are consistently monitoring inmates for symptoms and conducting

random temperature checks at most institutions. o Staff have been trained in infection control procedures and how to use the supply of

PPEs. o Staff are asked to stay home if they are sick. o Reduced transports between prisons and reached out to Sheriff’s Association to put

admissions on hold until May 11th unless there are extenuating circumstances warranting admission in order to contain spread.

Strategies we are using to reduce the prison population to create space to move people around if there is spread

o 8091 is the current population count. March 1st was 8495. This is the lowest the population has been since 2013. This allows space for quarantine in the event of outbreak at the facilities.

o The BOP has ramped up decisions and conducting double board reviews. o The DOC has worked with the District Directors to keep people in the community

rather than revoking if there is no serious public risk. In terms of our neighboring states, we are doing a good job of mitigating cases and spread.

It is imperative that staff to focus on following standards. Mr. Kudej inquired about the CCF COVID-19 case. It is unclear of how the individual

contracted the virus. It is suspected there may be an asymptomatic staff member because there have been no admissions or transports.

Districts are not tracking field supervision clients at the same level. There have been positive cases in areas tied to hot spots in the community. There are some in the residential facilities that are recovered.

Mr. DeJong asked if video visitation has impacted staffing levels, but staff already assigned visiting room would be utilized. It has allowed people who have not been able to visit due to distance the opportunity to see their family again. This is not a long-term solution, but something that we will work toward.

IPI Production – Deputy Director Dan Clark

In early March, Director Skinner asked if IPI would be able to assist with production of PPE. IPI identified two designs that would be provided all staff and offenders three masks. There have

been 85,000+ masks produced to date. These have been provided to CBCs, County Jails, DHS and state agencies.

The ICIW operation was registered with both the FDA and ATF to produce hand sanitizer. To date, 24,000 gallons have been produced. That represents more than 46 million doses.

Operations are also producing gowns for prisons, long term care facilities, DHS facilities and the Iowa Veterans’ Home. Production has increased to meet demand. Precut components to sew gowns have been provided to the Fort Dodge community to assemble. There is video on the website for how to sew a gown and other information to help people.

Face shields were developed for health care providers. The supplies have been hard to come by, so alternative designs and materials have been developed to successfully and safely produce.

IPI is hopeful that there will be some reimbursement from FEMA for the expenses incurred by production of PPE.

Excess PPE is provided to SEOC for distribution. The Director was able to visit and observe some of the production and visit with the hard-working

offenders at the facilities. Mr. Kudej appreciates the work that IPI has done and inquired as to the fiscal impact incurred to

this point. The hand sanitizer supplies were donated from various business, so IPI incurred only staff, offender and distribution costs.

Budget Update – Fiscal Manager Steve Dick

There have been additional costs from the COVID-19 response. The DOC will seek reimbursement through federal resources such as FEMA, the CARES Act as well as the Byrne/Jag Grant.

There is no anticipated impact to the budget appropriation for this fiscal year, but there may been a need to shift funds. However, federal funding may assist with making budget.

The County Confinement budget will be impacted by the jails holding inmates while admissions are on hold. Some areas are showing better budget forecasts.

CBC revenues from rent and supervision fees have dwindled this fiscal year, which will impact budgets going into FY2021. Fiscal staff are working through various budget scenarios to gauge the impact.

Impacts on State revenues will determine the budget appropriation for FY2021. Chair LeMere is concerned about the funding to support two religions over all others. These are

$5,500 per month for consultant services for the two religions, or $66,000 each. These are the result of litigation where the Court required the hiring consultants. There are volunteers for the other religions. There are chaplains at all locations and a statewide religious coordinator and review committee. Mr. DeJong inquired if there was a timeframe statute with this decision. The DOC will seek more information from the Attorney General regarding questions posed by the Board members.

Documents from this presentation can be found on the DOC website, attached to the November 1, 2019 DOC Board Meeting Handouts.

Public Comments, Public No public comments were made.

Open Discussion, Board Members Chair LeMere has been very proud of the Department of Corrections with recent press coverage

on their assistance with PPE production even before other businesses or groups in the community. It has been a team effort. We have a great team and great staff and those incarcerated have been a huge help with this project. Chair LeMere suggested some type of acknowledgement for those IIs for their work, whether a name or a letter in their file.

Mr. Kudej stated that these efforts have been heroic. Mr. Kudej was impressed when the policy on pandemic response was submitted in early March for addressing this type of issue and commended the DOC for their efforts to prepare for possible outbreak early on.

At this time there was nothing major occurring at the Capitol. Been working to ensure the legislature is aware of what we have been doing and possible impacts.

Dr. Chapman commended Director Skinner on her presentation at a recent Governor’s Press Conference. She provided comprehensive information about the Department.

Dr. Chapman is on a statewide corrections advisory committee and hopes to provide more detail to the Board in the near future. The Lumina and Ascendium grants focus on education and partnering with the community. Looking forward to what comes from this five-year process.

A recent correspondence was addressed to all Board members. The Board will allow the DOC to assist in addressing. Michael Savala will share the policy with everyone. When letters are received, they are reviewed by the Board members and a determination made if they should be addressed by the DOC.

Adjournment, Board Members

A motion to adjourn the meeting was made by Mr. DeJong, which was seconded by Mr. Kudej. The meeting was unanimously concluded.

Respectfully Submitted,

Johana Herdrich, Executive Assistant

ASP – Anne Williams – DOC employee

ASP 2nd--- Pastor, Dirk Stadtlander, contract employee paid by Prison Congregation of America.

CCF – Jeremy Wulbecker – DOC employee

IMCC – Calvin Yoder – DOC employee

ISP – Charles Marmor - DOC employee

MPCF – Joe Prainito – DOC employee

FDCF & NCCF – Nicole Dick – DOC employee

ICIW – Sheryl Small – Part time, contract

NCF – Sheryl Small – Part time, contract

Class Code: 03310

IOWA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES ▼

HUMAN RESOURCES ENTERPRISE

CHAPLAIN

DEFINITION

Provides professional pastoral care to institutional residents through counseling and conducting worship services; performs related work as required.

The Work Examples and Competencies listed are for illustrative purposes only and not intended to be the primary basis for position classification decisions.

WORK EXAMPLES

Writes policies, goals and standards for the overall institutional chaplaincy program; assesses residents’ needs, determines how those needs can be met by the chaplaincy program, and measures progress towards goals.

Plans and conducts religious worship services and administers religious rites to meet Iowa Code requirements and/or accreditation standards and to provide residents the opportunity for corporate worship; prepares sermons, chooses songs and liturgies and arranges for volunteers from the community to provide some portions of the service.

Evaluates condition of new residents, establishes a relationship, determines treatment needs, and provides information on religious programs.

Counsels residents and/or their families on an individual or group basis to meet residents’ clinical/developmental goals and to undergird their religious faith.

Visits institutional living units to provide pastoral care to residents, their families and staff.

Plans and provides for religious education and opportunities for fellowship for residents; encourages spiritual growth of residents; develops curriculum, conducts classes and trains others to conduct classes.

Recruits and oversees volunteers to assist with the chaplaincy program to maximize services and program effectiveness.

Functions as a member of an interdisciplinary treatment team to meet resident treatment goals and coordinate chaplaincy program with overall institutional goals; participates in developing case histories, setting treatment goals and evaluating residents’ progress.

Writes letters, reports and progress notes; documents and communicates information on residents and the chaplaincy program. COMPETENCIES REQUIRED

Knowledge of the religious rites, beliefs and practices of the major denominations and of one’s own denomination.

Knowledge of the principles and practices of clinical pastoral care, including counseling, basic psychology and sermon preparation.

Knowledge of the basic principles of developmental theory and group dynamics.

Ability to perform the religious rites practiced by one’s own religion.

Ability to develop treatment goals for individual residents.

Ability to train, motivate and oversee volunteers towards effective service in the chaplaincy program.

Ability to understand human behavior as related to pastoral counseling, volunteer recruiting, training, assessing condition of residents and cooperating with staff.

Ability to plan worship services that are meaningful to institutional residents.

CHAPLAIN ▼ Class Code: 03310 Ability to counsel with institutional residents, their families, and staff members on personal, religious or other related matters.

Ability to appropriately relate religious ideas and concepts to people with physical and/or emotional problems.

Ability to develop policies, goals and standards for the operation of the chaplaincy program.

Ability to assess the needs of institutional residents in relation to the services that can be offered through the chaplaincy program.

Ability to empathize with and give emotional support to people who have physical and/or emotional problems.

Displays high standards of ethical conduct. Exhibits honesty and integrity. Refrains from theft-related, dishonest or unethical behavior.

Works and communicates with internal and external clients and customers to meet their needs in a polite, courteous, and cooperative manner. Committed to quality service.

Displays a high level of initiative, effort and commitment towards completing assignments efficiently. Works with minimal supervision. Demonstrates responsible behavior and attention to detail.

Responds appropriately to supervision. Follows policy and cooperates with supervisors.

Aligns behavior with the needs, priorities and goals of the organization.

Encourages and facilitates cooperation, pride, trust, and group identity. Fosters commitment and team spirit.

Expresses information to individuals or groups effectively, taking into account the audience and nature of the information. Listens to others and responds appropriately. EDUCATION, EXPERIENCE, AND SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

Graduation from an accredited college or university with a Bachelor’s degree in a social/behavioral science that includes a minimum of twenty (20) semester hours of coursework in Pastoral Psychology/Pastoral Counseling;

OR

graduation from an accredited college or university with a Master’s Degree in Divinity;

OR experience equal to one year of full-time work as an institutional chaplain, licensed or ordained minister, or other credentialed pastoral/ministerial position. NOTE:

At the time of appointment or interview, candidates for Chaplain positions must provide the appointing authority with demonstrated evidence (ecclesiastical endorsement or comparable verification) that the candidate is authorized by proper authority to perform ministerial functions within h/his religious denomination. Effective Date: 04/09 DDF

Americans United for Separation of Church and State v...., 509 F.3d 406 (2007)

© 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment Distinguished by Gillam v. Harding University, E.D.Ark., June 24, 2009

509 F.3d 406United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATIONOF CHURCH AND STATE, et al., Appellees,

v.PRISON FELLOWSHIP

MINISTRIES, INC., et al., Appellants.

No. 06–2741.|

Submitted: Feb. 13, 2007.|

Filed: Dec. 3, 2007.

SynopsisBackground: Separation of church and state advocacy group,affected state prison inmates, and others, sued State of Iowaand Christian provider of rehabilitation services, claiming thatfunding of contract with organization providing pre-releaserehabilitation services to inmates violated EstablishmentClause. The United States District Court for the SouthernDistrict of Iowa, Robert W. Pratt, Chief Judge, 432 F.Supp.2d862,granted declaratory and equitable relief in favor ofadvocacy group and inmates. Provider and state correctionsofficials appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Benton, Circuit Judge, heldthat:

[1] prison inmates, advocacy group, and individual taxpayerpossessed standing;

[2] claims were not moot;

[3] provider was a state actor;

[4] funding constituted an endorsement of religion; but

[5] District Court abused discretion in awarding recoupment.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

West Headnotes (57)

[1] Federal Courts Mixed questions of lawand fact in general

After a bench trial, Court of Appeals reviews denovo legal conclusions and mixed questions oflaw and fact.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[2] Federal Courts “Clearly erroneous”standard of review in general

After a bench trial, Court of Appeals reviewsfactual findings for clear error.


[3] Federal Courts “Clearly erroneous”standard of review in general

Reviewing court oversteps the bounds of its dutyon appeal if it undertakes to duplicate the role ofthe lower court.

[4] Federal Courts Questions of fact ingeneral

Federal Courts “Clearly erroneous”standard of review in general

In applying the clearly erroneous standard to thefindings of a district court sitting without a jury,appellate courts must constantly have in mindthat their function is not to decide factual issuesde novo.


[5] Civil Rights Criminal law enforcement; prisons

In separation of church and state advocacygroup's Establishment Clause action againstChristian provider of rehabilitation services instate prison, law professor's testimony describing“Evangelical Christianity” was not relevant toinquiry into whether provider was pervasively

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sectarian. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1; Fed.RulesEvid.Rule 402, 28 U.S.C.A.

[6] Federal Courts Expert and opiniontestimony

In separation of church and state advocacygroup's Establishment Clause action againstChristian provider of rehabilitation services instate prison, error committed by district courtin admitting testimony of law professor todescribe “Evangelical Christianity,” in inquiringinto whether provider was pervasively sectarian,was harmless, in light of provider's sincerestatements of its beliefs. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.1; Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 402, 28 U.S.C.A.


[7] Constitutional Law Freedom of Religionand Conscience

Constitutional Law ReligiousOrganizations in General

An inquiry into an organization's religious viewsto determine if it is pervasively sectarian underEstablishment Clause is not only unnecessarybut also offensive, and courts should refrainfrom trolling through a person's or institution'sreligious beliefs. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.


[8] Federal Civil Procedure In general; injury or interest

Federal Courts Case or ControversyRequirement

Article III of the Constitution limits the judicialpower of the United States to the resolution ofCases and Controversies, and Article III standingenforces the Constitution's case-or-controversyrequirement. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.

[9] Federal Civil Procedure Causation; redressability

Requisite elements of Article III require that aplaintiff allege personal injury fairly traceable to

the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct andlikely to be redressed by the requested relief.U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.


[10] Constitutional Law Prisons

State prison inmates, who alleged that theyaltered their behavior and had direct, offensive,and alienating contact with Christian providerof rehabilitation services in state prison, hadstanding to challenge and request injunctionagainst state funding of provider's contract underEstablishment Clause, as requested injunctioncould remedy inmates' alleged injury. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 1.


[11] Associations Suits on Behalf of Members; Associational or Representational Standing

An association has standing to bring suit onbehalf of its members if its members wouldotherwise have standing to sue in their ownright, the interests it seeks to protect are germaneto the organization's purpose, and neither theclaim asserted nor the relief requested requiresthe participation of individual members in thelawsuit.


[12] Constitutional Law Taxpayers

Generally, the interest of a taxpayer in seeingthat Treasury funds are spent in accordance withthe Constitution does not give rise to the kind ofredressable personal injury required for ArticleIII standing. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.

[13] Constitutional Law Taxpayers

Constitutional Law Determination ofconstitutionality of actions of other branches ingeneral

Because the interests of the taxpayer are, inessence, the interests of the public-at-large,deciding a constitutional claim based solely on

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taxpayer standing would be, not to decide ajudicial controversy, but to assume a position ofauthority over the governmental acts of anotherand co-equal department, an authority whichplainly courts do not possess. U.S.C.A. Const.Art. 3, § 1 et seq.


Constitutional Law Taxation

There is a narrow exception to the generalconstitutional prohibition against taxpayerstanding, which provides that a taxpayer willhave standing consistent with Article III toinvoke federal judicial power when he allegesthat congressional action under the taxingand spending clause is in derogation of theEstablishment Clause. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, §1 et seq; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.



Exception to general constitutional prohibitionagainst taxpayer standing on EstablishmentClause claims also applies to state taxpayerchallenges of state expenditures contrary to theEstablishment Clause. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, §1 et seq; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.



Separation of church and state advocacy groupand individual taxpayer possessed taxpayerstanding, under narrow exception to generalconstitutional prohibition against taxpayerstanding, to challenge and request injunctionagainst state funding of prison rehabilitationservices by Christian provider as violative ofthe Establishment Clause; state legislature hadmade specific appropriations from public fundsfor a values-based treatment program at stateprison when Christian provider solely providedthe program. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq;U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.



Payments made by non-inmate fee-payers to anInmate Telephone Fund were voluntary fees,not taxes, and thus payers lacked taxpayerstanding, under narrow Establishment Clauseexception to general constitutional prohibitionagainst taxpayer standing, to challenge andrequest injunction against, as violative of theEstablishment Clause, the funding of prisonrehabilitation services by Christian providerpartially through the Telephone Fund; paymentto the fund was a charge correlated to a particularbenefit exacted in exchange for a benefit ofwhich the non-inmates had voluntarily availedthemselves based on the cost of providing abenefit to the inmate. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1et seq; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

[18] Federal Courts Case or ControversyRequirement

Under Article III of the Constitution, federalcourt jurisdiction is limited to cases andcontroversies. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.


[19] Federal Courts Inception and duration ofdispute; recurrence; “capable of repetition yetevading review”

Under Article III cases and controversiesrequirement, controversy must exist throughoutthe litigation; otherwise, the case is moot.U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.


[20] Federal Courts Mootness

Federal courts lack power to decide the merits ofa moot case. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.


[21] Constitutional Law Mootness




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Voluntary cessation of challenged practice ofutilizing state funding for Christian providerof prison rehabilitation services to inmates didnot render Establishment Cause action againstthe practice moot, even though state legislature,and not the defendant provider or Departmentof Corrections, had ended the funding, whereprovider and Department acted by agreeing tothe contract extension that deleted the fundingfrom the state. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1;U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

[22] Federal Courts Voluntary cessation ofchallenged conduct

A defendant's voluntary cessation of achallenged practice does not deprive a federalcourt of its power to determine the legality of thepractice. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.

[23] Federal Courts Weight and sufficiency

Defendant faces a heavy burden of showing thatthe challenged conduct cannot reasonably beexpected to start up again. U.S.C.A. Const. Art.3, § 2, cl. 1.

[24] Federal Courts Government property,facilities, and funds

Cessation of government funding of Christianprovider's inmate rehabilitation program didnot render moot the live controversy aboutrecoupment of previous payments made by stateto the provider. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.


[25] Civil Rights State or territorial action, orindividual or private action, in general

Under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983excludes from its reach merely private conduct,no matter how discriminatory or wrongful. 42U.S.C.A. § 1983.


[26] Civil Rights Private Persons orCorporations, in General

In certain circumstances government maybecome so entangled in private conduct thatdeed of an ostensibly private organization orindividual is to be treated as if a state had causedit to be performed, under § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. §1983.



In determining whether a private actor is actingunder color of state law, for purposes of a § 1983action, issue is whether the alleged infringementof federal rights is fairly attributable to the state.42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.



Under § 1983 color-of-state-law requirement,state action may be found if, though only if,there is such a close nexus between the stateand the challenged action that seemingly privatebehavior may be fairly treated as that of the stateitself. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.



Two-part approach determines whether there isstate action under § 1983; first, the deprivationmust be caused by the exercise of some rightor privilege created by the state or by a ruleof conduct imposed by the state or by a personfor whom the state is responsible, and second,the party charged with the deprivation must bea person who may fairly be said to be a stateactor, either because he is a state official, becausehe has acted together with or has obtainedsignificant aid from state officials, or because hisconduct is otherwise chargeable to the state. 42U.S.C.A. § 1983.



















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[30] Civil Rights Police or peace officers; prisons

Establishment Clause deprivation arising fromprivilege given to Christian providers of inmaterehabilitation services, which possessed accessto state prison facilities, control of prisoners,and substantial aid to effectuate programs, wascreated by the state in its contracts with theproviders, as an element of establishing thatproviders met § 1983 state action requirement.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.


[31] Civil Rights Cooperation with state actor

One way a private party can appropriately becharacterized as a state actor under § 1983 iswhen it is a willful participant in joint activitywith the state or its agents. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.



State's mere acquiescence in a private party'sactions is not sufficient to meet state actorrequirement under § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.


[33] Civil Rights Police or peace officers; prisons

Christian providers of inmate rehabilitationservices acted jointly with state Departmentof Corrections, and as such, they couldbe classified as state actors, as an elementof establishing that providers met § 1983state action requirement; state effectively gaveproviders 24–hour power to incarcerate, treat,and discipline inmates, providers' teachers andcounselors were authorized to issue inmatedisciplinary reports, and progressive disciplinewas effectuated in concert with the Departmentof Corrections. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1; 42U.S.C.A. § 1983.


[34] Constitutional Law ReligiousOrganizations in General

Establishment Clause erects a barrier betweengovernment and religious entities depending onall the circumstances of a particular relationship.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

[35] Constitutional Law Establishment ofReligion

In an Establishment Clause case, the inquiry callsfor line drawing; no fixed, per se rule can beframed. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.


In analyzing an Establishment Clause case, acourt should scrutinize challenged legislation orofficial conduct to determine whether, in reality,it establishes a religion or religious faith, or tendsto do so. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.


[37] Constitutional Law Governmental aid,funding, financing, or subsidization

In determining whether direct aid to anorganization violates the Establishment Clause,court must ask whether the government actedwith the purpose of advancing or inhibitingreligion, and whether the aid has the effectof advancing or inhibiting religion. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 1.

[38] Constitutional Law Rehabilitation andtreatment programs

Prisons Rehabilitation and reformation

Prisons State government

State Department of Correction's purpose incontracting with and funding Christian providerof inmate rehabilitation services was secularand thus permissible under the Establishment























































Clause, where Department offered the programfor the purpose of reducing recidivism in atight budgetary environment, and considered thelong term nature of the program, its supportivecommunal environment, and its extensive post-release care program, as the best indicators thatthe program could reduce recidivism. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 1.

[39] Constitutional Law Aiding, funding,financing, or subsidization of religion

To analyze whether aid has the effect ofadvancing or endorsing religion in violationof the Establishment Clause, the three criteriathat are decisive are whether government aid(1) results in governmental indoctrination, (2)defines recipients by reference to religion, or(3) creates excessive entanglement. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 1.

[40] Constitutional Law Advancement,endorsement, or sponsorship of religion; favoring or preferring religion

Government inculcation of religious beliefs hasthe impermissible effect of advancing religion inviolation of the Establishment Clause. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 1.



Whether funding results in governmentalindoctrination of religion, resulting ingovernment endorsement of religion violativeof the Establishment Clause, is ultimately aquestion whether any religious indoctrinationthat occurs could reasonably be attributed togovernmental action. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.


[42] Constitutional Law Governmental aid,funding, financing, or subsidization

In showing that government aid to areligious organization results in governmental

indoctrination, and thereby advances or endorsesreligion in violation of the Establishment Clause,plaintiffs must prove that the aid in questionactually is, or has been, used for religiouspurposes. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.


Court does not presume inculcation of religion;rather, plaintiffs raising an Establishment Clausechallenge must present evidence that thegovernment aid in question has resulted inreligious indoctrination, thereby resulting ingovernment endorsement of religion. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 1.



State's funding, by means of direct aid, ofChristian provider of inmate rehabilitationservices in state prison resulted in religiousindoctrination, thereby constituting governmentendorsement of religion violative of theEstablishment Clause, where program resultedin inmate enrollment in a program dominatedby Bible study, Christian classes, religiousrevivals, and church services, and stateDepartment of Corrections provided housing andliving quarters to program participants whichafforded participants greater privacy, more visitsfrom family members, and greater access tocomputers. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.



Under the Establishment Clause, a governmentmay not, in administering aid, define recipientsby reference to religion; instead, the aid mustbe allocated on the basis of neutral, secularcriteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion,and is made available to both religious andsecular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatorybasis. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.












































State funding, by means of direct aid, for inmaterehabilitation program administered by Christianprovider was not allocated on neutral criteria andwas not available on a nondiscriminatory basis,thus resulting in government endorsement ofreligion under the Establishment Clause, whereaid to the program was only appropriate toinmates willing to productively participate ina program that was Christian-based. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 1.




State funding, by means of direct aid, forinmate rehabilitation program administeredby Christian provider did not result inexcessive entanglement, so as to constitutegovernment endorsement of religion underthe Establishment Clause, notwithstanding anyadministrative cooperation between program andstate Department of Corrections, where there wasno pervasive monitoring of the program by theDepartment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.



In order to comply with the EstablishmentClause, indirect aid programs must be neutralwith respect to religion, and provide assistancedirectly to a broad class of citizens who,in turn, direct government aid to religiousorganizations wholly as a result of theirown genuine and independent private choice.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.


In analyzing an indirect aid program forcompliance with the Establishment Clause, theincidental advancement of a religious mission,or the perceived endorsement of a religiousmessage, is reasonably attributable to theindividual recipient, not to the government,whose role ends with the disbursement ofbenefits. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.



State's indirect funding of Christian providerof inmate rehabilitation program, by means ofa per diem payment of $3.47 for each inmateparticipating in the program, left inmates withno independent private choice with regard tosuch funds, thereby violating the EstablishmentClause; legislative appropriation could not bedirected to a secular program or to general prisonprograms, thus leaving the inmate with only onechoice. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.


Generally, a prison inmate retains those FirstAmendment rights that are not inconsistent withhis status as a prisoner or with the legitimatepenological objectives of the corrections system.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

[52] Prisons Regulation and supervision ingeneral; role of courts

General standard that prison regulations are validif reasonably related to legitimate penologicalinterests applies only to rights that areinconsistent with proper incarceration, and thatneed necessarily be compromised for the sake ofproper prison administration.






































[53] Federal Courts Equity and equitable reliefin general

In shaping equity decrees, the trial court is vestedwith broad discretionary power; appellate reviewis correspondingly narrow.


[54] Federal Courts Equity and equitable reliefin general

District court's equitable relief must be measuredagainst the totality of circumstances and in lightof the general principle that, absent contrarydirection, state officials, and those with whomthey deal, are entitled to rely on a presumptivelyvalid state statute, enacted in good faith and byno means plainly unlawful.


[55] Civil Rights Grounds and subjects; compensatory damages

District court abused its discretion in grantingrecoupment of state funds provided to Christianprovider of inmate rehabilitation services beforeits order declaring the program violative ofEstablishment Clause; even though provider hadthe ability to repay the funds, district courtgave no weight to the fact that specific statutes,presumptively valid, authorized the funding,made no finding of bad faith by the statelegislature and governor, and did not considerthe testimony of state prison officials creditedelsewhere in the order that the program wasbeneficial and that the state received much morevalue than it paid for. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.


[56] Prisons Judgment and relief

In shaping equitable relief, a court shouldconsider the views of prison administrators.

[57] Civil Rights Grounds and subjects; compensatory damages

Once the district court declared the state fundingof Christian provider of inmate rehabilitationviolative of the Establishment Clause, providerand Department of Corrections could no longerrely on the legality of the program, and thus couldnot retain any funds for services rendered afterthe district court's order. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.1.


Attorneys and Law Firms

*412 Alexander J. Luchenitser, argued, Ayesha N. Khan,Richard B. Katskee, Heather L. Weaver, Americans Unitedfor Separation of Church and State, Washington, DC; DeanA. Stowers, Rosenberg Stowers & Morse, Des Moines, IA,for appellees Americans United for Separation of Church andState, et al.

*413 Gordon E. Allen, argued, H. Loraine Wallace, IowaDept. of Justice, Des Moines, IA, for appellants Terry Mapes,et al.

Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., argued, Kevin J. Hasson, Eric C.Rassbach, Derek L. Gaubatz, Lori E. Halstead, the BecketFund for Religious Liberty, Washington, DC; Anthony F.Troy, Ashley L. Taylor, Robert A. Angle, Megan C. Rahman,Michael E. Lacy, Troutman Sanders LLP, Richmond, VA, forappellants Prison Fellowship Ministries, et al.

Before O'CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret.), 1 WOLLMAN,and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., InnerChange FreedomInitiatives, Inc., and employees of the Iowa Department ofCorrections in their official capacities (DOC), appeal thedeclaratory judgment and equitable relief entered in favorof Americans United for Separation of Church and State,individual inmates, contributors to the inmates' telephoneaccounts, and an Iowa taxpayer. Ams. United for Separationof Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432F.Supp.2d 862 (S.D.Iowa 2006). Having jurisdiction under 28U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms in part, reverses in part, andremands.















































I.

[1] [2] [3] [4] After a bench trial, this court reviews denovo legal conclusions and mixed questions of law and fact.Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,48 F.3d 365, 369 (8th Cir.1995). Factual findings are reviewedfor clear error. Robinson v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 447 F.3d1096, 1101 (8th Cir.2006). Further, a

reviewing court oversteps the bounds of its duty under[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 52(a) if it undertakesto duplicate the role of the lower court. “In applying theclearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district courtsitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly havein mind that their function is not to decide factual issuesde novo.”

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985), quoting Zenith RadioCorp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123, 89 S.Ct.1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969).

A.

InnerChange offers a residential inmate program withinthe Newton, Iowa, medium-security facility. InnerChange,and its affiliate Prison Fellowship, are nonprofit 501(c)(3)corporations. From September 1, 1999 to June 30, 2007, theInnerChange program was funded in part by Iowa.

[5] [6] [7] The purposes of InnerChange are: “Reducethe rate of re-offense and the resulting societal costs” and“Provide a positive influence in prison.” InnerChange's“ultimate goal” is “to see ex-prisoners become contributingmembers of society, by becoming responsible leaders in theirfamily, church and community.” InnerChange, a Christianprogram, describes itself as “an intensive, voluntary, faith-based program of work and study within a loving communitythat promotes transformation from the inside out through themiraculous power of God's love. [InnerChange] is committedto Christ and the Bible. We try to base everything we do*414 on biblical truth.” Further, “Biblical principles are

integrated into the entire course curriculum of [InnerChange],rather than compartmentalized in specific classes. In otherwords, the application of Biblical principles is not an agendaitem—it is the agenda.” The DOC has no control over

the selection or teaching of the InnerChange curriculum or

personnel. 2

The program is quartered in Newton's Unit E. This Unit, dueto construction budget constraints, has wooden cell doors towhich inmates have keys, and community bathrooms withprivacy dividers (thus, “dry” cells). Before InnerChange'suse, Unit E housed honor inmates. Building M at Newtonalso is used only by InnerChange. Building M has offices,classrooms, a computer room, a library, and a multi-purposeroom, but no security cameras.

Inmates are not required to join InnerChange. No one fromthe DOC or InnerChange threatens punishment, reduction inprivileges, or otherwise pressures inmates to participate. Ifinmates join, no one from the DOC or InnerChange promisesa reduced sentence or earlier parole. When joining, an inmateconfirms in writing that participation is voluntary and willnot affect eligibility for parole. The mandatory statement addsthat the program is based on Christian values and containsreligious content, but an inmate need not be a Christianto participate. Also, discontinuation may be voluntary orinvoluntary, and the inmate will not be penalized for voluntarywithdrawal.

Iowa inmates are introduced to the program throughpresentations by InnerChange personnel at the various DOCinstitutions. The Introduction Workbook uses the ChristianBible to illustrate civic values. For example, the workbookincludes Saul's conversion on the road to Damascus, Jesus'choosing of the apostles, and the parable of the GoodSamaritan. It also contains Bible studies, such as Do YouKnow Jesus Personally?; Salvation; and Answered Prayer.An inmate may be eligible for InnerChange after completionof the introductory program. There is a substantial inmatewaiting list eligible to join InnerChange (146 inmates as ofOctober 2003).

InnerChange begins with a four-week orientation, followedby Phases I through IV. According to the orientation materials,InnerChange “is a Christian program, with a heavy emphasison Christ and the Bible. All the components of the programare based on a biblical worldview. You will be expected toattend all [InnerChange] programming, including religiousservices.” Further:

We believe that the root of our transformation is a spiritualchange. [InnerChange] is designed intentionally to helpproduce and nurture spiritual change in you. We focus

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on relationship with God and how that spreads to otherrelationships. We study the Bible a lot. The Bible is God'srevealed truth to us. Jesus *415 said, “If you hold to myteachings, you are my disciples. Then you will know thetruth, and the truth will set you free! ” (John 8:31–32) Thatis the kind of transformation we are talking about.

Orientation materials contain introductory Bible studies andstate that each InnerChange class is led by a biblical counselorwho coaches the inmate in biblical living.

After orientation, to continue to Phase I, an inmate must signthe InnerChange Accountability Covenant, which states:

I understand that the principles in Matthew 18:12–35 willbe applied to my life within the [InnerChange] community.

Those principles are

1. Error leads us to danger (vs.12)

2. The heart of correction is to restore (vs.13, 14)

3. It is the responsibility for those involved to reconcile onan interpersonal level (vs.15)

4. Peer mediation is to be utilized if necessary (vs.16)

5. Removal from the community is a last resort (vs.17)

6. Conflict resolution builds a stronger community (vs.18–20)

7. Interpersonal forgiveness of others is a condition ofpersonal forgiveness from God. (vs.21–35)

I have read, understand, and will adhere to the aboveprinciples as a condition of my participation in the[InnerChange] program.

Each day in Phase I, which lasts 12 months, opens with a30–minute devotional where inmates pray and read aloudfrom Christian scripture. Required classes fill the day, withhomework, including memorization of Bible verses. Classesare followed by an afternoon community meeting. There,inmates pray, make prayer requests, sing religious songs,read from the Bible, and hear a daily devotional message(by an InnerChange inmate). Evening classes begin afterdinner. Friday evenings, a revival service is held; all inmateparticipants are required to attend and take their InnerChange-provided Bibles. Sunday mornings, InnerChange holdschurch services, which all program inmates must attend.

During the typical day in Phase I, an inmate has five or sixperiods of free time, each lasting between 30 minutes and anhour. The DOC admits that during free time, InnerChangeinmates are allowed to use computers, but other Newtoninmates are not.

After completing Phase I, the inmate may enter Phase II,which lasts six months. The inmate signs a ContinuedStay Agreement, to continue participation in the samebasic schedule of morning devotionals, community meetings,afternoon and evening classes, Friday evening revivals,and Sunday morning services. By signing this agreement,the inmate understands that “if I fail to maintain theseexpectations I will be subject to disciplinary actions.” InPhase II, the inmate also is assigned an InnerChange volunteermentor, who assists the inmate in “living the Christian life.”

InnerChange's curriculum in Phases I and II include severalmandatory religious classes, such as Experiencing God,Old and New Testament Survey, and Spiritual Freedom.InnerChange also has treatment classes, such as SubstanceAbuse, Anger Management, Victim Impact, Criminal

Thinking, Financial Management, Family Series, 3 andMarriage/Family/Parenting. *416 InnerChange's treatmentclasses have religious content. For example, InnerChangeaffirms that its (licensed) substance abuse curriculum containsa high level of religious content, based on the premisethat “only Jesus Christ is the cure for addiction.” AngerManagement goals include learning how biblical powerworks and how to apply it. The Criminal Thinking course hasfour goals, each comparing and contrasting secular conceptsto superior biblical truth and Christian ethics. The onlythoroughly secular course is Computer Training, which meetstwo hours each week.

To measure progress in Phases I and II, InnerChange useda “Fruit of the Spirit” evaluation. (In 2005, this form waschanged to a Quarterly Goals Review based upon civicvirtues.) This evaluation rated the inmate's progress based oncharacteristics in Galatians 5:13–26. An inmate's failure tomeet expectations, or low Fruit of the Spirit score, could resultin dismissal from InnerChange. For example, in dismissingone inmate, the entire treatment team met and discussed hisprogress, concluding:

your conduct has been excellentaccording to security standards, andyou are a hard worker. With you as a

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member you have always completedyour work and assignments, however,you are not displaying the growthneeded to remain in the program. YourFocus is not on God and His Son toChange you.

(No discipline was imposed on this inmate upon dismissalfrom InnerChange.) Most dismissals, however, were the resultof minor infractions and attitudinal deficiencies.

Additionally, InnerChange staff, without DOC personnel,supervise inmates in classes, activities, and recreation. TheDOC has authorized InnerChange staff to write and issuea disciplinary “behavior report” on a participating inmate.After seven reports, the inmate receives, from a DOC officer,a “major report,” indicating a serious rule violation. Theinmates who testified at trial stated that InnerChange staffpossess many of the same duties as corrections personnel.

After Phase II, if the DOC places a participating inmate in awork release center, he may enter Phase III. Phase IV begins ifan InnerChange inmate is released from confinement. Duringthese Phases, the inmate is required to stay employed andattend church each Sunday and at mid-week (at the churchagreed to by InnerChange, for the first three months afterrelease).

B.

The contractual and monetary relationship between PrisonFellowship, InnerChange, and the DOC developed over anumber of years. In 1997, the new Newton facility facedbudgetary restraints, overcrowding, and lack of appropriateprograms. Prison administrators rank effective programs aclose second to overcrowding in addressing prisoner securityand safety concerns. Corrections officials searched forinnovative ways to meet programing needs. An InnerChangeprogram in Texas was examined to determine if it wouldwork at Newton. A search also was conducted for otherorganizations with similar services. Although there wereseveral providers of values-based programing, InnerChangewas the only organization officials found that offered a long-term, values-based, residential program with excellent post-release services.

Officials were concerned with the constitutionality ofInnerChange's religious model but concluded, due tobudgetary *417 constraints, that it was the only wayto provide necessary programing. If the budget allowed,corrections officials gladly would offer a broader spectrumof values-based programing. InnerChange's volunteers anddonors enable it to provide in-prison and post-releaseprograming at a greatly reduced cost to the state.

In 1998, Iowa's General Services Department publiclyissued a request for proposals to establish a non-compensated, values-based, pre-release program at Newton.Prison Fellowship and InnerChange, jointly, submitted theonly proposal. Their submission, however, sought partial statefunding. The DOC accepted the proposal.

In March 1999, Prison Fellowship, InnerChange and the DOCcontracted for program services, with reimbursement for non-religious costs and expenses. Under an extension clause, thecontract covered September 1999 to June 2002. In the firstyear of the contract, the DOC paid InnerChange $229,950,with all the money coming from the Inmate Telephone RebateFund. (In 2003, the law was amended to delete the term“Rebate.”) By statute and regulation, expenditures from thisfund are at the discretion of the DOC for the benefit ofinmates. Iowa Code § 904.508A; Iowa Admin. Code r. 201–20.20(1)–(5). In the contract's second year, the DOC paidInnerChange $191,625 from the same fund. InnerChange'soperating costs at Newton were $506,181 the second year. Inthe third year, InnerChange was paid $191,625 from the fundtoward its operating cost of $578,995.

Nearing the expiration of the contract in 2002, the GeneralServices Department issued a request for proposals tothe general public to continue a values-based, pre-releaseprogram at Newton. InnerChange submitted the onlyproposal, again accepted by the DOC (with Prison Fellowshipno longer a party to the contract).

A contract was entered, renewable for one-year terms fromJuly 2002 to June 2005. It provided state funding forthe non-religious parts of the program. In the contract'sfirst year, 2002 to 2003, InnerChange's operating expensewas $603,063. The DOC paid InnerChange $191,625 fromthe Telephone Rebate Fund. This was the last year thatrebate funds were paid to InnerChange. Additionally thatyear, the Iowa legislature appropriated $172,591 to theDOC “for a values-based treatment program at the Newtoncorrectional facility.” This appropriation was used to expand

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the InnerChange program to the Release Center at Newton (aminimum-security facility one mile from the main facility).The appropriation came from the Healthy Iowans TobaccoTrust (proceeds from the master tobacco settlement betweenthe state and tobacco manufacturers). During the contract'ssecond year, 2003 to 2004, the legislature appropriated$310,000 from the Tobacco Trust. Actual payment fromthe Trust to the DOC for InnerChange was $276,909. Theprogram's operating cost was $670,382. In the third year, 2004to 2005, the contract was changed to a per diem paymentof $3.47 for each inmate participating in the program. Thelegislature again appropriated $310,000, with actual paymentto InnerChange of $236,532.55. InnerChange's operatingcosts were $687,655.

In April 2005, the DOC issued the last request for proposalsto continue the values-based, pre-release program at Newton.Two organizations responded, InnerChange and EmeraldCorrectional Management—a non-religious service provider.InnerChange's proposal of $310,000 for a full array ofservices, including a licensed substance abuse program,was lower than Emerald's bid of $562,000. The DOCaccepted InnerChange's proposal. In the *418 contract's firstand second years, July 2005 to June 2007, the legislatureappropriated $310,000 each year. In June 2007, the legislaturerefused to make a further appropriation. In accordancewith the contract extension for 2007–2008, the InnerChangeprogram is operating without state funds.

C.

Until July 2007, the DOC's funding accounted for 30 to40 percent of InnerChange's operating costs. The contractsat issue mandated that government funds cover only “thenon-religious aspects,” or “the non-sectarian portion.” Thedistrict court found that no clear understanding or definitionof non-religious costs was developed. From the first billing(September 1999 to April 2000), the DOC expressed concernabout InnerChange's designation of religious and non-religious costs, but paid the billed amount. After reviewingthe contract, the DOC Director for Offender Servicesconcluded that “the contract doesn't get very specific aboutwhat kinds of expenses are billable.” In 2001, the DOCservices director called for a clear definition of religiousversus non-religious expenses. (At trial, the director testifiedthat the definition was not ever resolved.) The servicesdirector informed DOC officials and InnerChange that billingwas generalized and did not detail why expenses were

characterized as non-religious. Despite this ambiguity, theNewton warden testified that InnerChange gave Iowa farmore value in non-religious programs than it paid for.

Salaries and benefits for InnerChange's personnel were paidby the DOC on a percentage basis. The state paid 82% of theLocal Director's salary; 9% for the Program Manager; 93%for the Aftercare Manager; 77% for the Office Administrator;and 16% for each of four Biblical Counselors (also calledCase Workers). InnerChange staff did not actually divide theirwork time into religious or nonreligious activities or makeany allocation for payroll purposes. The percentages billed byInnerChange were identical for every period (until paymentchanged to per diem).

As for other expenses, the InnerChange Office Administratorrecorded items as religious or non-religious. Items designatedas non-religious were billed to and paid for by the DOC.For example, InnerChange's volunteer-recruitment brochure,A Prison Like No Other, was printed completely at stateexpense. The brochure describes InnerChange as a “24–hour–a–day, Christ-centered, biblically based, program thatpromotes personal transformation of prisoners throughthe power of the Gospel.” It represents the program asimmersing “prisoner-participants in round-the-clock, Christ-centered programming” and advancing the state's objectivesof rehabilitation and recidivism reduction “with everythinggrounded in the Word of God.” The brochure states:

The InnerChange Freedom Initiativeis our chance to demonstrate, in away secular people will never be ableto doubt, that Christ changes lives,and that changing prisoners from theinside out is the only crime-preventionprogram that really works.

At various times, the DOC paid for small religious gifts—keyrings and bookmarks—to volunteers and graduating inmates;a subscription to a monthly Christian devotional booklet;and a “Church Copyright License” to use religious musicin worship. Additionally, all land and cell phone costs werebilled to the DOC. InnerChange's postal meter and thermaltape were billed to the state without detailed accounting. TheDOC paid for InnerChange's computer hardware, software,*419 repair, and internet account. The DOC also paid

for InnerChange's letterhead, envelopes, printer and copier



toner, paper, blank videotapes, and standard office supplies.Each month, every photocopy up to 40,000 was charged tothe DOC. Copies over 40,000 were designated as religious(although the record does not reflect how many total copieswere made each month).

Building M—a modular building housing InnerChange'soffices and classrooms—was constructed in 2000. By thelease-purchase contract, the Telephone Fund paid $294,017for Building M, with ownership in the DOC since 2002.

When the DOC reimbursed InnerChange for costs or paid theper diem amount, the money was deposited in InnerChange'sbank account. From that account, InnerChange periodicallytransferred funds to Prison Fellowship's general accounts, tocover program operating expenses. These general accountsalso contain funds from private sources.

II.

A.

[8] [9] Issues of standing arise throughout this case.There are two strands in standing jurisprudence: “ArticleIII standing, which enforces the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement; and prudential standing, whichembodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise offederal jurisdiction.” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,542 U.S. 1, 11–12, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004)(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Article IIIof the Constitution limits the judicial power of the UnitedStates to the resolution of Cases and Controversies, andArticle III standing ... enforces the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement.” Hein v. Freedom from ReligionFound., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2562, 168 L.Ed.2d424 (2007), quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.332, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1861, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006) (internalquotation marks omitted). “The requisite elements of ArticleIII standing are well established: ‘A plaintiff must allegepersonal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedlyunlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requestedrelief.” Id., quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984).

[10] In the present case, there are four categories ofplaintiffs: inmates, Americans United, an Iowa taxpayer, andcontributors to inmates' telephone accounts (who are alsoformer cigarette smokers). First, the inmates allege they

altered their behavior and had direct, offensive, and alienatingcontact with the InnerChange program. See ACLU Neb.Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1030 (8thCir.2004), adopted by court en banc, ACLU Neb. Found. v.City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 775 n. 4 (8th Cir.2005). Aninjunction can remedy this injury. The inmates have standing.

[11] Next, Americans United has standing if “(a) itsmembers would otherwise have standing to sue in their ownright; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to theorganization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted northe relief requested requires the participation of individualmembers in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver.Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383(1977). The second and third factors are not disputed.

[12] [13] [14] [15] Regarding the first factor, AmericansUnited bases its members' standing on Iowa taxpayer status,as does the individual taxpayer plaintiff. Generally, theinterest of a “taxpayer in seeing that Treasury funds are spentin accordance *420 with the Constitution does not giverise to the kind of redressable ‘personal injury’ required forArticle III standing.” Hein, 551 U.S. at ––––, 127 S.Ct. at2563.

Because the interests of the taxpayer are, in essence, theinterests of the public-at-large, deciding a constitutionalclaim based solely on taxpayer standing “would be[,] notto decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a positionof authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department, an authority which plainly we do notpossess.”

Id.,quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489, 43S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923) (alteration in original). Thereis, however, “a narrow exception to the general constitutionalprohibition against taxpayer standing.” Id. at 2564, citingFlast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d947 (1968). The exception provides that “ ‘a taxpayer willhave standing consistent with Article III to invoke federaljudicial power when he alleges that congressional actionunder the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of’ theEstablishment Clause.” DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at347, 126 S.Ct. at 1864, quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 105–06,88 S.Ct. 1942. This exception also applies to state taxpayerchallenges of state expenditures contrary to the EstablishmentClause. See Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434, 72S.Ct. 394, 96 L.Ed. 475 (1952); Minn. Fed'n of Teachers v.Randall, 891 F.2d 1354, 1356–58 (8th Cir.1989).








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[16] In this case, the Iowa legislature made specificappropriations from public funds “for a values-basedtreatment program at the Newton correctional facility” whenInnerChange solely provided the program. See Hein, 551 U.S.at ––––, 127 S.Ct. at 2565 (in Flast, the acts and expenditureswarranting taxpayer standing were by express legislativemandate and appropriation). Therefore, Americans Unitedand the individual taxpayer satisfy the narrow exception fortaxpayer standing.

[17] Finally, as for the non-inmate contributors to inmates'telephone accounts, each paid money to a telephone accountto permit an inmate to make calls. The profit or commissiongenerated from the telephone vendor was deposited in theInmate Telephone Fund, specifically authorized by Iowastatute. The non-inmates' payment was a charge “correlatedto a particular benefit ... exacted in exchange for a benefit ofwhich the payor has voluntarily availed itself ... based on thecost of providing a benefit to the recipient.” Coal. for Fair &Equitable Regulations v. F.E.R.C., 297 F.3d 771, 778–79 (8thCir.2002). The non-inmates' payments to the Telephone Fundwere thus voluntary fees, not taxes. Id. The payments werenot a pass-through tax, or a “mandatory” fee, as involved inthe cases cited by the plaintiffs. See Freedom from ReligionFound., Inc. v. Bugher, 249 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir.2001). Seealso United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 408,121 S.Ct. 2334, 150 L.Ed.2d 438 (2001); Bd. of Regents v.Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221, 120 S.Ct. 1346, 146 L.Ed.2d193 (2000); Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S.Ct. 2228,110 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,611, 616, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). Therefore,the non-inmate fee-payers to the Telephone Fund do not havetaxpayer standing. Prison Fellowship, InnerChange, and theDOC's motion for partial dismissal, as to standing, is denied,except as to the non-inmate contributors to the TelephoneFund.

B.

[18] [19] [20] Closely related to standing is mootness.Under Article III of the Constitution, federal court jurisdictionis limited to cases and controversies. Haden v. *421Pelofsky, 212 F.3d 466, 469 (8th Cir.2000). The controversymust exist throughout the litigation; otherwise, the case ismoot. Id. Federal courts lack power to decide the merits of amoot case. Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Craig, 163 F.3d 482, 484(8th Cir.1998).

Prison Fellowship, InnerChange, and the DOC contend thatany challenge to the fully performed contracts is moot.They cite several cases holding that if a litigant seeks aninjunction against performance of a contract—and before theinjunction is entered, the contract is fully performed—therequest for injunctive relief is moot, as the court cannot enjoincompleted performance. See, e.g., Agrigenetics, Inc. v. Rose,62 F.3d 268, 270–71 (8th Cir.1995); Curtis Indus., Inc. v.Livingston, 30 F.3d 96, 97 (8th Cir.1994); Fauconniere Mfg.Corp. v. Sec'y of Def., 794 F.2d 350, 351 (8th Cir.1986).This reasoning does not apply here. The district court didnot enjoin already concluded contracts. Instead, it onlyaddressed further operation of InnerChange's program atNewton. Additionally, the dispute as to restitution, premisedon the unconstitutionality of the performed contracts, is a livecontroversy.

[21] [22] Prison Fellowship, InnerChange, and the DOCnext move to dismiss all Establishment challenges to the perdiem payment structure, arguing such challenges are mootbecause the program has not been funded since July 1, 2007.To the contrary, the voluntary cessation exception to mootnessapplies. “[A] defendant's voluntary cessation of a challengedpractice does not deprive a federal court of its power todetermine the legality of the practice.” City of Mesquite v.Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71L.Ed.2d 152 (1982). Prison Fellowship, InnerChange, and theDOC object, asserting that the relevant de-funding action wasby the Iowa legislature, not the defendants, and the fundingexpired by its own terms. However, InnerChange and theDOC did act by agreeing to the contract extension that deletedfunding from Iowa.

[23] Prison Fellowship, InnerChange, and the DOC contendthat Americans United has not successfully demonstratedpotential recurrence of the unlawful action. This argumentmisplaces the burden of showing the likelihood of recurrence.“The defendant faces a heavy burden of showing that ‘thechallenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to startup again.’ ” Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 503 (8thCir.2006), quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d610 (2000). Prison Fellowship, InnerChange, and the DOChave not met this burden. They effectively ask this courtto vacate the injunction without any assurance that theywill not resume the prohibited conduct. Therefore, under thevoluntary cessation exception, the district court's injunctiverelief is not moot.





































[24] Finally, the cessation of government funding doesnot render moot the live controversy about recoupment ofprevious payments (discussed below in Section II.G). PrisonFellowship, InnerChange, and the DOC's motion for partialdismissal, as it concerns mootness, is denied.

C.

[25] [26] Prison Fellowship and InnerChange assert theyare not actors under color of state law for purposes of 42U.S.C. § 1983. “[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of§ 1983 excludes from its reach ‘merely private conduct, nomatter how discriminatory or wrongful.’ ” Am. Mfrs. Mut.Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143L.Ed.2d 130 (1999), quoting *422 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457U.S. 991, 1002, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982).However, “[i]n certain circumstances the government maybecome so entangled in private conduct that ‘the deed of anostensibly private organization or individual is to be treated ...as if a State had caused it to be performed.’ ” Wickersham v.City of Columbia, 481 F.3d 591, 597 (8th Cir.2007), quotingBrentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531U.S. 288, 295, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001).

[27] [28] [29] The issue is whether “the allegedinfringement of federal rights [is] ‘fairly attributable to theState.’ ” Rendell–Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 102 S.Ct.2764, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982), quoting Lugar v. EdmondsonOil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d482 (1982). See also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 53–54,108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (contract physician'smedical care of a state inmate is conduct “fairly attributableto the State”). Thus, “state action may be found if, thoughonly if, there is such a close nexus between the State andthe challenged action that seemingly private behavior may befairly treated as that of the State itself.” Brentwood Acad.,531 U.S. at 295, 121 S.Ct. 924 (internal citation and quotationmarks omitted). A two-part approach determines whetherthere is state action:

First, the deprivation must be causedby the exercise of some right orprivilege created by the State or by arule of conduct imposed by the stateor by a person for whom the Stateis responsible.... Second, the partycharged with the deprivation must be

a person who may fairly be said tobe a state actor. This may be becausehe is a state official, because he hasacted together with or has obtainedsignificant aid from state officials,or because his conduct is otherwisechargeable to the State.

Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744.

[30] Regarding the first part, the alleged deprivation isa violation of the Establishment Clause. This violation ispossible because of privileges created by the DOC in itscontracts with Prison Fellowship and InnerChange. TheDOC gave Prison Fellowship and InnerChange access tofacilities, control of prisoners, and substantial aid to effectuatethe program. Thus, the privilege to Prison Fellowship andInnerChange was created by the state. Id.; but cf. Montanov. Hedgepeth, 120 F.3d 844, 848–51 (8th Cir.1997) (infree-exercise challenge, prison chaplain's religious acts werebeyond governmental authority and could not fairly beattributed to the state).

[31] [32] The second, critical inquiry is whether PrisonFellowship and InnerChange can properly be classified asstate actors. The Supreme Court has recognized a number ofcircumstances under which this requirement can be met, but“[t]he one unyielding requirement is that there be a ‘closenexus' not merely between the state and the private party,but between the state and the alleged deprivation itself.”Wickersham, 481 F.3d at 597, citing Brentwood Acad., 531U.S. at 295, 121 S.Ct. 924. One way a private party canappropriately be characterized as a state actor is when it is “awillful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.”Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598,26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted).However, the state's mere acquiescence in a private party'sactions is not sufficient. Wickersham, 481 F.3d at 597, citingBlum, 457 U.S. at 1004–05, 102 S.Ct. 2777.

*423 [33] In this case, the state effectively gaveInnerChange its 24–hour power to incarcerate, treat, anddiscipline inmates. InnerChange teachers and counselorsare authorized to issue inmate disciplinary reports, andprogressive discipline is effectuated in concert with the DOC.Prison Fellowship and InnerChange acted jointly with theDOC and can be classified as state actors under § 1983.SeeCorr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71–72 n.





































5, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (“the privatefacility in question housed state prisoners—prisoners whoalready enjoy a right of action against private correctionalproviders under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); Smith v. Cochran, 339F.3d 1205, 1215–16 (10th Cir.2003) (“persons to whom thestate delegates its penological functions, which include thecustody and supervision of prisoners, can be held liable forviolations of the Eighth Amendment” in a § 1983 action);Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1996)(a private prisoner operator acted under color of state law).

In this case, Prison Fellowship and InnerChange areappropriate parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

D.

[34] [35] [36] On the merits, the plaintiffs invokethe Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, asapplied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,301, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000). Alsoinvolved is the establishment clause of the Iowa Constitution,which is analyzed simultaneously. See Kliebenstein v.Iowa Conference of the United Methodist Church, 663N.W.2d 404, 406–07 (Iowa 2003). The Establishment Clauseerects a barrier between government and religious entities“ ‘depending on all the circumstances of a particularrelationship.’ ” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678–79,104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984), quoting Lemon v.Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614, 91 S.Ct. 2125, 29 L.Ed.2d 745(1971); see McCreary County v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union,545 U.S. 844, 867, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 162 L.Ed.2d 729 (2005)( “under the Establishment Clause detail is key”). For those“who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment the‘establishment’ of a religion connoted sponsorship, financialsupport, and active involvement of the sovereign in religiousactivity.” Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668, 90 S.Ct.1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970). “In each case, the inquiry callsfor line drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed.” Lynch,465 U.S. at 678, 104 S.Ct. 1355. “In our modern, complexsociety, whose traditions and constitutional underpinningsrest on and encourage diversity and pluralism in all areas, anabsolutist approach in applying the Establishment Clause issimplistic and has been uniformly rejected by the [Supreme]Court.” Id. Instead, a court should scrutinize “challengedlegislation or official conduct to determine whether, in reality,it establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.”Id. (emphasis added).

1.

[37] For the contract years 2000 to 2004, Iowa madepayments directly to InnerChange. In determining whetherthis direct aid violates the Establishment Clause, this courtmust “ask whether the government acted with the purposeof advancing or inhibiting religion, and ... whether the aidhas the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.” Agostini v.Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222–23, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d391 (1997) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

[38] In the present case, the district court concludedthat the DOC's purpose in *424 contracting with andfunding InnerChange was secular: offering comprehensiveprograming to inmates and reducing recidivism. Thisconclusion is well-supported. The DOC officials were“confronted with the secular, pragmatic needs of running astate prison facility with sufficient programming in a tightbudgetary environment.” The DOC officials “considered thelong term nature of the InnerChange program, its supportivecommunal environment, and its extensive post-release careprogram, as the best indicators that the InnerChange programcould reduce recidivism....” In this case, the government didnot act with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion.

[39] To analyze whether aid has the effect of advancingor endorsing religion, three criteria are decisive: whethergovernment aid (1) results in governmental indoctrination;(2) defines recipients by reference to religion; or (3) creates

excessive entanglement. Id. at 234–35, 117 S.Ct. 1997. 4

[40] [41] [42] [43] First, “government inculcation ofreligious beliefs has the impermissible effect of advancingreligion.” Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223, 117 S.Ct. 1997. Whetherfunding “results in governmental indoctrination is ultimatelya question whether any religious indoctrination that occurs ...could reasonably be attributed to governmental action.”Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 147L.Ed.2d 660 (2000) (plurality opinion), citing Agostini, 521U.S. at 226, 230, 117 S.Ct. 1997. Further, “plaintiffs mustprove that the aid in question actually is, or has been,used for religious purposes.” Id. at 857, 120 S.Ct. 2530(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). This court does not“presume inculcation of religion; rather, plaintiffs raisingan Establishment Clause challenge must present evidencethat the government aid in question has resulted in religiousindoctrination.” Id. at 858, 120 S.Ct. 2530; see Agostini, 521







































U.S. at 223–24, 226–27, 117 S.Ct. 1997 (in the absence ofevidence showing use of aid to inculcate religion, there is apresumption of compliance with secular restrictions).

[44] In the present case, plaintiffs demonstrated (anddefendants do not seriously contest) that the InnerChangeprogram resulted in inmate enrollment in a programdominated by Bible study, Christian classes, religiousrevivals, and church services. The DOC also provided lesstangible aid to the InnerChange program. Participants werehoused in living quarters that had, in previous years, beenused as an “honor unit,” and which afforded residentsgreater privacy than the typical cell. Among other benefits,participants were allowed more visits from family membersand had greater access to computers.

The DOC officials stress their belief that Iowa received farmore in nonreligious programs than it paid for. But plaintiffsmeet their burden by citing the DOC's statement:

The DOC's “monitoring” ofthe InnerChange Program islimited to receiving and reviewingperiodic service invoices from IFI[InnerChange]. The DOC does not, tobe sure, involve itself in monitoring theInnerChange Program, IFI's billingprocedures, or IFI's use of the moneyreceived from the DOC.

The presumption of compliance with secular restrictions doesnot apply in this case. For contract years 2000 to 2004,religious *425 indoctrination can reasonably be attributed toIowa's funding.

[45] Second, in administering aid, a government may notdefine recipients by reference to religion. The aid must be “‘allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neitherfavor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to bothreligious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatorybasis' ” Id. at 813, 120 S.Ct. 2530, quoting Agostini, 521 U.S.at 231, 117 S.Ct. 1997; id. at 845, 120 S.Ct. 2530 (O'Connor,J., concurring in judgment).

[46] In this case, to use the aid appropriated, inmatesmust have been “willing to productively participate in aprogram that is Christian-based.” The district court found

that inmates' religious beliefs (or lack thereof) precludedtheir participation. For contract years 2000 to 2004, theInnerChange program was not allocated on neutral criteriaand was not available on a nondiscriminatory basis.

[47] Third, as for excessive entanglement, there was nopervasive monitoring by the DOC, though there was someadministrative cooperation. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233–34,117 S.Ct. 1997. For the contract years 2000 to 2004, therewas not excessive entanglement between Prison Fellowship,InnerChange, and the DOC.

Because the indoctrination and definition criteria indicate thatInnerChange had the effect of advancing or endorsing religionduring the contract years 2000 to 2004, the direct aid toInnerChange violated the Establishment clauses of the UnitedStates and Iowa Constitutions.

2.

[48] [49] In the 2005, 2006, and 2007 contract years,funding from the DOC to InnerChange changed from costreimbursement to per diem payment—an attempt to makeInnerChange an indirect aid program. In order to complywith the Establishment Clause, indirect aid programs mustbe “neutral with respect to religion,” and provide “assistancedirectly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, directgovernment aid to religious” organizations “wholly as a resultof their own genuine and independent private choice.” Zelmanv. Simmons–Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652, 122 S.Ct. 2460,153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002). “The incidental advancement of areligious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religiousmessage, is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient,not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursementof benefits.” Id.See also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399,103 S.Ct. 3062, 77 L.Ed.2d 721 (1983).

[50] In this case, there was no genuine and independentprivate choice. The inmate could direct the aid only toInnerChange. The legislative appropriation could not bedirected to a secular program, or to general prison programs.See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 816, 120 S.Ct. 2530 (governmentsupport for religion is permissible where aid passes throughthe hands (literally or figuratively) of private citizens who arefree to direct the aid elsewhere). For the inmate to have agenuine choice, funding must be “available generally withoutregard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublicnature of the institution benefited” and the inmates must
















“have full opportunity to expend ... aid on wholly secular”programs. Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind,474 U.S. 481, 488, 106 S.Ct. 748, 88 L.Ed.2d 846 (1986)(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See alsoAgostini, 521 U.S. at 226–28, 117 S.Ct. 1997 (no violationwhere the aid was provided to students at whatever schoolthey chose to attend); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v.*426 McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, 881–82 (7th Cir.2003) (no

Establishment Clause violation where parole violator couldchoose to enroll in “one of several halfway houses,” only oneof which had a significant Christian element).

Prison Fellowship and InnerChange emphasize that fromtheir viewpoint, they received funds only if the inmate chosethem. Zelman makes clear that the relevant viewpoint isthe chooser's (there, the parents'), not the provider's (there,the private schools'). See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655–56, 122S.Ct. 2460. Here, the inmate had no genuine and independentprivate choice because he had only one option. See id. at 652–53, 655, 122 S.Ct. 2460, approving Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 842–43, 120 S.Ct. 2530 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (areasonable observer would perceive per-recipient direct aidto religious organizations differently than aid that recipientschoose to use at religious or secular organizations).

The district court did not err in concluding that the per diemstructure, as administered, violated the Establishment clausesof the United States and Iowa Constitutions.

E.

Prison Fellowship, InnerChange, and the DOC contend thatany constitutional violation is subject to the standard inTurner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d64 (1987): “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates'constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonablyrelated to legitimate penological interests.” The DOC stressesthat the InnerChange program is reasonably related tolegitimate penological interests, and that “Turner applies toall circumstances in which the needs of prison administrationimplicate constitutional rights,” quoting Washington v.Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178(1990).

[51] [52] Generally, “a prison inmate retains those FirstAmendment rights that are not inconsistent with his statusas a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives ofthe corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822,

94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). The Turner standardapplies “only to rights that are ‘inconsistent with properincarceration,’ ” and “that need necessarily be compromisedfor the sake of proper prison administration.” Johnson v.California, 543 U.S. 499, 510, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d949 (2005), quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126,131, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003) (emphasis inoriginal).

This court has consistently analyzed Establishment claimswithout mentioning the Turner standard, even when applyingthat standard to Free Exercise claims in the same case. SeeMunson v. Norris, 435 F.3d 877, 880–81 (8th Cir.2006)(per curiam); Murphy v. Mo. Dept. of Corr., 372 F.3d979, 982–85 (8th Cir.2004). In this case, there is no FreeExercise or accommodation claim, and taxpayers also assertthe Establishment claims. The Turner standard thus cannotbe used to validate funding violations of the EstablishmentClause by the laws authorizing the InnerChange program atthe Newton prison.

F.

[53] [54] The district court ordered Prison Fellowship andInnerChange to repay the state funds received under all thecontracts (but stayed this equitable relief pending appeal). “Inshaping equity decrees, the trial court is vested with broaddiscretionary power; appellate review is correspondinglynarrow.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200, 93 S.Ct.1463, 36 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (plurality opinion) (Lemon II).The district court's equitable *427 relief “must be measuredagainst the totality of circumstances and in light of thegeneral principle that, absent contrary direction, state officialsand those with whom they deal are entitled to rely on apresumptively valid state statute, enacted in good faith and byno means plainly unlawful.” Id. at 208–09, 93 S.Ct. 1463.

[55] In ordering recoupment, the district court gave noweight to the fact that specific statutes, presumptively valid,authorized the InnerChange funding. The district court madeno finding of bad faith by the Iowa legislature and governor(although the court criticizes the bid process and “stateofficials, in all branches of state government” for permittingthe InnerChange program). However, the actual finding offact regarding the Iowa state officials is:
































[T]hough evidence showsInnerChange received a warmwelcome at the Dept. of CorrectionsBoard, state Legislature, andGovernor's Office, no evidence showsthat the promotion of religion was theprimary concern of those state officialsin passing legislation authorizingfunding.

432 F.Supp.2d at 917. Further indicating good faith is thatthe legislature stopped the funding after the district courtenjoined it. See New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125,130, 98 S.Ct. 340, 54 L.Ed.2d 346 (1977) (reimbursementfor pre-injunction expenses disallowed where “[t]he statelegislature ... took action inconsistent with the court'sorder”). The district court believed that Prison Fellowship,InnerChange, and the DOC had clear notice the programwas plainly unlawful. The case the district court citesis distinguishable factually. See Williams v. Lara, 52S.W.3d 171 (Tex.2000) (a religious county-jail program heldunconstitutional due to the direct participation of the sheriffin setting the program's curriculum according to his ownpersonal religious beliefs). The district court also cites a legalmemorandum by the California DOC, which has no moreweight than that of any other attorney. Even if there weresome risk associated with the program, it cannot be said thatresolution of this case was clearly foreshadowed. See LemonII, 411 U.S. at 206, 93 S.Ct. 1463.

[56] In ordering recoupment, the district court did notconsider the testimony of the state prison officials—creditedelsewhere in the order—that the program was beneficialand the state received much more value than it paid for. Inthe prison context, courts defer to the judgment of prisonadministrators. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,723, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005) (applied statuteby giving “ ‘due deference to the experience and expertiseof prison and jail administrators in establishing necessaryregulations and procedures to maintain good order, securityand discipline, consistent with consideration of costs andlimited resources' ”); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,223–24, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (“prisonauthorities are best equipped to make difficult decisionsregarding prison administration”); Murphy v. Mo. Dept. ofCorr., 372 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir.2004), quoting Goff v.

Graves, 362 F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir.2004) (“We accordgreat deference to the judgment and expertise of prisonofficials, ‘particularly with respect to decisions that implicateinstitutional security’ ”); Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810,812 (8th Cir.1990), quoting Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d1450, 1453 (D.C.Cir.1989) ( “ ‘issues of prison managementare, both by reason of separation of powers and highlypractical considerations of judicial competence, peculiarlyill-suited to judicial resolution, and ... accordingly, courtsshould be loath to substitute their judgment for that of prison*428 officials and administrators' ”). This deference does

not insulate prison administrators' decisions from judicialreview. However, in shaping equitable relief, a court shouldconsider the views of prison administrators, which opposerecoupment in this case.

The district court additionally cited Prison Fellowship'sability to repay the contract funds. Standing alone, this isnot sufficient as it depends solely on the defendant's wealthand deters financially sound organizations from contractingwith the government. See Lemon II, 411 U.S. at 207, 93 S.Ct.1463 (“Appellants would have state officials stay their handsuntil newly enacted state programs are ‘ratified’ by the federalcourts, or risk draconian, retrospective decrees should thelegislation fall”).

Critically, the plaintiffs did not seek interim injunctiverelief to prevent payment by the DOC during litigation,strengthening Prison Fellowship and InnerChange's relianceon those payments. See id. at 204, 93 S.Ct. 1463 (relianceinterest was reinforced because the “tactical choice notto press for interim injunctive suspension of payments orcontracts during the pendency of the Lemon I litigation maywell have encouraged the appellee schools to incur detrimentsin reliance upon reimbursement by the State”). In the absenceof interim injunctive relief, expenses continued to be incurred,and payments spent, for the 24–hour care of inmates. SeeRoemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 767 n. 23, 96S.Ct. 2337, 49 L.Ed.2d 179 (reliance was stronger where themoney had “been paid out to, and spent by, the colleges”).

[57] By the same logic, once the district court declaredthe funded InnerChange program unconstitutional on June2, 2006, the defendants cannot rely on the legality of theprogram and cannot retain any funds for services renderedafter the district court's order. See id.; Lemon II, 411 U.S. at194, 93 S.Ct. 1463.






























Given the totality of the circumstances, the district courtabused its discretion in granting recoupment for servicesrendered before its order.

G.

Prison Fellowship, InnerChange, and the DOC object that theinjunction is overbroad, claiming it bars InnerChange fromever contracting with the DOC. They cite the district court'sultimate statement: “[T]he InnerChange treatment programis hereby permanently enjoined from further operation at theNewton Facility, or any other institution within the Iowa Dept.of Corrections, so long as it is supported by governmentfunding.”

To the contrary, the injunction, in context, applies only toprograms like those operating before the district court's orderand funded by the unconstitutional structures for those years.The court's ultimate declaratory relief is:

[T]he contractual relationship betweenthe state of Iowa, as managed

and directed by the named stateDefendants, and InnerChange andPrison Fellowship violates thePlaintiffs' Establishment clause rightsas contained in the Federal andIowa Constitutions by impermissiblyfunding the InnerChange treatmentprogram at the Newton Facility.

(emphasis added). The district court did not forever banPrison Fellowship and InnerChange from operating in Iowa.

III.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, reversedin part, and the case remanded.

All Citations

509 F.3d 406

Footnotes1 The Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Ret.), sitting by

designation.

2 Prison Fellowship and InnerChange assert the district court erred in admitting testimony from a law professor/Ph.D./author to describe “Evangelical Christianity.” 432 F.Supp.2d at 872–74. An inquiry into an organization's religious views todetermine if it is pervasively sectarian “is not only unnecessary but also offensive. It is well established, in numerous othercontexts, that courts should refrain from trolling through a person's or institution's religious beliefs.” Mitchell v. Helms, 530U.S. 793, 828, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 147 L.Ed.2d 660 (2000) (plurality opinion); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.872, 887, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). The district court abused its discretion, as the professor's testimonyis not relevant. See Fed.R.Evid. 402. However, in light of Prison Fellowship and InnerChange's sincere statements oftheir beliefs, this error is harmless.

3 The district court found that during the three months of this course, an InnerChange inmate receives “more visits thanhe otherwise would be allowed,” allowing “greater exposure to loved ones than he would otherwise have without theprogramming.”

4 The district court correctly stated this test. 432 F.Supp.2d at 914–15. It then, however, focused on a “pervasively sectarian”analysis in order to determine whether government aid had the effect of advancing religion. Id. at 917–25. This court willapply the clear framework in Agostini.

End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.









Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125 (1976)


248 N.W.2d 125Supreme Court of Iowa.

Delores RUDD and Charlotte Walker, Appellees,v.

The Honorable Robert D. RAY, Governorof the State of Iowa, et al., Appellants.

No. 2-59035.|

Dec. 15, 1976.

SynopsisTaxpayers brought suit challenging constitutionality oflegislation providing for salaried chaplains and religiousfacilities at state penitentiary. The Lee District Court, D. B.Hendrickson, J., held that legislation did not offend FederalConstitution but did offend State Constitution, and enjoineduse of public funds for such purposes. Defendants appealed.The Supreme Court, Harris, J., held that legislation did notviolate either First Amendment to United States Constitutionor state constitutional provision pertaining to freedom ofreligion.

Reversed and remanded.

Uhlenhopp, J., filed dissenting opinion in which Rawlings, J.,joined in part.

West Headnotes (10)


Establishment and free exercise clauses ofthe First Amendment apply to legislationpromulgated by states. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend.1.


[2] Constitutional Law Free Exercise ofReligion

Constitutional Law Beliefs Protected; Inquiry Into Beliefs

The free exercise clause of the First Amendmentprohibits the making of a law which inany way interferes with the free exercise ofreligion, extends to unorthodox as well asorthodox religious beliefs and practices, extendsto religious organizations and individuals, anddenies the government any power to proscribe,regulate, or favor directly or indirectly anyparticular religious beliefs or doctrines, thoughnot necessarily acts which citizens may feelcalled upon to perform in compliance with theirreligious views. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1.


[3] Constitutional Law Prisons and PretrialDetention

Prisoners retain some rights to religious freedom.



Constitutional Law Advancement,Endorsement, or Sponsorship of Religion; Favoring or Preferring Religion

The prohibition of the establishment clauseof the First Amendment is not absolute, andsome governmental actions may benefit religionwithout violation of the establishment clause.U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1.


Prisons Religious Practices and Materials

Legislation providing for salaried chaplainsand religious facilities at state penitentiary didnot violate First Amendment to the UnitedStates Constitution; any claim of offense againstthe establishment clause was balanced by itsjustification under the free exercise clause.U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1; I.C.A. § 246.3.


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Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125 (1976)


[6] Constitutional Law General Rules ofConstruction

Words at best are mere messengers of thethoughts and ideas they are sent to convey,and when they are enshrined in a governmentalcharter, so as to speak across centuries, theirhistory, purpose, and intended meaning must beclosely examined.



State constitutional provision governing freedomof religion was aimed at preventingestablishment of state churches. I.C.A.Const. art.1, § 3.


Constitutional Law Taxation

To the extent that state constitutional provisiongoverning freedom of religion differs fromFirst Amendment to United States Constitution,framers of State Constitution addressed andprovided defense against evils incident to statechurch, forced taxation to support same, andpayment of ministers from taxation. I.C.A.Const.art. 1, § 3; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1.


[9] Constitutional Law LegislativeConstruction

In construing constitutional intent it isproper to look at contemporaneous legislativepronouncements.


Prisons State Government

Legislation providing for salaried chaplains andreligious facilities at state penitentiary did notviolate state constitutional provision governing

freedom of religion, which provision containedprohibition against compelling any person to paytaxes for building or repairing places of worshipor maintenance of any minister or ministry; suchlegislation was lawful not in order to spread orencourage religion in prison, but rather in orderto accord prisoners their guaranteed rights toexercise it. I.C.A. § 246.3; I.C.A.Const. art. 1, §3.


Attorneys and Law Firms

*126 Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Stephen C. Robinson,Special Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael P. Murphy, Asst. Atty.Gen., for appellants.

Gordon E. Allen, Des Moines, and Gordon M. Liles, FortMadison, for appellees.

Heard en banc.

Opinion

HARRIS, Justice.

This is a taxpayer's derivative suit challenging theconstitutionality of legislation which provides for salariedchaplains and religious facilities at the state penitentiary. Thechallenge is grounded on both federal and state constitutions.The trial court held the legislation does not offend thefederal constitution but does offend the state constitution.Accordingly the trial court enjoined the use of public fundsfor such purposes. We believe the legislation violates neitherconstitution. We reverse the trial court and remand fordissolution of the injunction.

The facts can be simply stated. Plaintiffs are taxpayingcitizens of the State of Iowa. Under authority given bystatute the Iowa State Penitentiary: (1) employs two full-timechaplains (one Protestant, one Catholic) at annual salariestotaling $25,000, (2) employs a part-time chaplain at a salaryof $216 monthly, (3) expends other funds in relation tochapel activities at the penitentiary. Separate chapel areasare reserved in a previously vacant industrial building forCatholic and Protestant congregate worship. Another group,calling themselves the Church of the New Song, utilizes the


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Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125 (1976)


prison auditorium and also has office and meeting spaceelsewhere in the penitentiary.

The chaplains at the penitentiary are ordained clergymenwho have received advanced training concerning institutionalsettings and counselling. They provide sectarian services.The Protestant services are general in nature. The Protestantchaplains provide service for inmates of all religiouspersuasion, including ‘minority religions.’ Attendance by theprisoners at all services is purely voluntary. The chaplainsprovide substantial counselling service. Counselling is doneon both a group and individual basis, at set times or on a crisisbasis.

I. The trial court held providing for state supported chaplainsand religious facilities does not violate the establishmentclause of the First Amendment to the United StatesConstitution. Plaintiffs appeal from this portion of the trialcourt's ruling.[1] The First Amendment to the United States Constitution

states ‘Congress shall make no law respecting anestablishment of *127 religion, or prohibiting the freeexercise thereof * * *.’ The establishment and freeexercise clauses of the First Amendment apply to legislationpromulgated by states. Committee for Public Education &Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 93 S.Ct. 2955,37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973); Presbyterian Church in United Statesv. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969); Cantwellv. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213(1940). The establishment and free exercise clauses arerelated aspects of the constitutional scheme for church-staterelations. The twin aspects have been described as follows:

‘The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject ofreligion has a double aspect. On the one hand it forestallscompulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or thepractice of any form of worship * * *. On the other hand, itsafeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion * **. The interrelation of the ‘establishment’ and ‘free exercise’clauses has been well summarized as follows: ‘The structureof our government has, for the preservation of civil liberty,rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference.On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from theinvasion of the civil authority.‘‘ Annot., 37 L.Ed.2d 1147,1157 (1974). See also Everson v. Board of Education, 330U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1946).

Because the two aspects are to some extent competing theUnited States Supreme Court has long struggled over theirseparate definitions and the difficulties of properly balancingthem. In Everson, supra, 330 U.S. at 15-16, 67 S.Ct. at 511,91 L.Ed. at 723, appears the following explanation:

‘The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the FirstAmendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the FederalGovernment can set up a church. Neither can pass laws whichaid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion overanother. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to orto remain away from church against his will or force him toprofess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person canbe punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefsor disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. Notax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to supportany religious activities or institutions, whatever they may becalled, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practicereligion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religiousorganizations or groups and vice versa. In the words ofJefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by lawwas intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between Churchand State.’ (Authority).'

Decisions in succeeding decades have taught varied lessonson the subject. In Nyquist, supra, 413 U.S. at 771-772, 93S.Ct. at 2964, 37 L.Ed.2d at 962, the following lines weredrawn:

‘* * * It is enough to note that it is now firmly established thata law may be one ‘respecting an establishment of religion’even though its consequence is not to promote a ‘statereligion,’ (Authority), and even though it does not aid onereligion more than another but merely benefits all religionsalike. (Authority). It is equally well established, however,that not every law that confers an ‘indirect,’ ‘remote,‘ or‘incidental’ benefit upon religious institutions is, for thatreason alone, constitutionally invalid. (Authorities). What ourcases require is careful examination of any law challenged onestablishment grounds with a view to ascertaining whether itfurthers any of the evils against which that Clause protects.Primary among those evils have been ‘sponsorship, financialsupport, and active involvement of the sovereign in religiousactivities.’ (Authorities).'

Drawing from what it described as ‘the full sweep of theestablishment clause cases' the United States Supreme Courtin Nyquist, supra, laid down a three part test for determining

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Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125 (1976)


whether laws which aid religious institutions violate theclause:

‘* * * (T)o pass muster under the Establishment Clausethe law in question *128 first must reflect a clearlysecular legislative purpose, (Authority), second, must havea primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,(Authorities), and, third, must avoid excessive governmententanglement with religion, (Authorities).’ 413 U.S. 773, 93S.Ct. at 2965, 37 L.Ed.2d at 962-963. See generally 16 C.J.S.Constitutional Law s 206(1), pp. 1017-1030; 16 Am.Jur.2d,Constitutional Law, ss 336-340, pp. 645-657.[2] Plaintiffs argue the challenged legislation violates all

three parts of the Nyquist test and thus runs afoul of theestablishment clause. The argument has force but ignores thecompanion free exercise clause with which the establishmentclause must be balanced. The free exercise clause prohibitsthe making of a law which in any way interferes with the freeexercise of religion. The prohibition extends to unorthodoxas well as orthodox religious beliefs and practices. It extendsto religious organizations and individuals. It denies thegovernment any power to proscribe, regulate, favor directly orindirectly any particular religious beliefs or doctrines (thoughnot necessarily the acts which citizens may feel called uponto perform in compliance with their religious views). SeeAnnot., 37 L.Ed.2d 1147, 1170 (1974); School District ofAbington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560,10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963).

The crucial and controlling fact in this case is that it dealswith the exercise of religion by prison inmates. Prison inmatesare restrained and consequently deprived of their liberty. Byreason of their status they are displaced from their homesand communities. They are thereby denied the opportunity toexercise their individual rights to worship in the same manneras could an ordinary citizen.[3] It is clear prisoners retain some rights to religious

freedom. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 1276, 1278 (1967):

‘While the law in this area is still (1967) in a state ofdevelopment, it is now established that prisoners do havecertain rights and privileges in the religious area which thecourts will protect and that the prison authorities may notpunish or discriminate against religious beliefs as such. ** *.’ See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31L.Ed.2d 263 (1972); Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F.Supp. 375(1972); Gittlemacker v. Prasse, D.C., 428 F.2d 1 (3 Cir. 1970);

Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030(1964); Annot., 37 L.Ed.2d 1147, 1159 (1974). A prisoner'sretained rights of religious freedom include some reasonableopportunity to exercise their religion. In Cruz, supra, 405 U.S.at 322, 92 S.Ct. at 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d at 268 n. 2, it is stated:

‘We do not suggest, of course, that every religious sect orgroup within a prison-however few in number-must haveidentical facilities or personnel. A special chapel or placeof worship need not be provided for every faith regardlessof size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be providedwithout regard to the extent of the demand. But reasonableopportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercisethe religious freedom guaranteed by the First and FourteenthAmendments without fear of penalty.’ See also Theriault,supra; Gittlemacker, supra; O'Malley v. Brierly, 477 F.2d 785,796 (3 Cir. 1973).

The question becomes whether the enhancement of the freeexercise clause by state-provided chaplains and religiousfacilities nevertheless violates the establishment clause. Thefew cases which have addressed the question seem to agreewith our conclusion it does not. Remmers v. Brewer, D.C.,361 F.Supp. 537, 543 (1973); Theriault, supra; Horn v. Peopleof California, D.C., 321 F.Supp. 961, 964 (1968). Our viewwas capsulized by Mr. Justice Brennan in a concurringopinion in School District of Abington Township, supra,374 U.S. at 296-299, 83 S.Ct. at 1610-1612, 10 L.Ed.2d at900-902:

‘There are certain practices, conceivably violative of theEstablishment Clause, the striking down of which mightseriously interfere with certain religious liberties also *129protected by the First Amendment. Provisions for churchesand chaplains at military establishments for those in thearmed services may afford one such example. The likeprovision by state and federal governments for chaplains inpenal institutions may afford another example. It is arguedthat such provisions may be assumed to contravene theEstablishment Clause, yet be sustained on constitutionalgrounds as necessary to secure to the members of the ArmedForces and prisoners those rights of worship guaranteed underthe Free Exercise Clause. Since government has deprivedsuch persons of the opportunity to practice their faith atplaces of their choice, the argument runs, government may, inorder to avoid infringing the free exercise guarantees, providesubstitutes where it requires such persons to be. * * *.

‘* * *.





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Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125 (1976)


‘The State must be steadfastly neutral in all matters of faith,and neither favor nor inhibit religion. * * *. On the otherhand, hostility, not neutrality, would characterize the refusalto provide chaplains and places of worship for prisoners andsoldiers cut off by the State from all civilian opportunitiesfor public communion, * * *.’ See also Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d1276, 1278 (1967); 60 Am.Jur.2d, Penal and CorrectionalInstitutions, s 46, pp. 852-854.

Our holding is consistent with the rule the government mustbe neutral and not hostile to religion. See Zorach v. Clauson,343 U.S. 306, 312-313, 72 S.Ct. 679, 683, 96 L.Ed. 954,961-962 (1952); Everson, supra; McCollum v. Board ofEducation, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L.Ed. 649 (1948);School District of Abington, supra; Gillette v. United States,401 U.S. 437, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971).[4] The prohibition of the establishment clause is not

absolute. This is illustrated by the following examplesof governmental actions which benefit religion withoutviolation of the establishment clause: (1) the use by religiousorganizations of civil courts. Maryland & Virginia Eldershipof Churches of God, Inc. v. Church of God, Inc., 396 U.S. 367,90 S.Ct. 499, 24 L.Ed.2d 582 (1970); Mary Elizabeth BlueHull Memorial Presbyterian Church, supra, (2) the exemptionof property used of religious purposes from taxation. Walzv. Tax Com. of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409,25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970), (3) the Sunday closing or ‘blue’laws, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101,6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher SuperMarket, 366 U.S. 617, 81 S.Ct. 1122, 6 L.Ed.2d 536 (1961);Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366U.S. 582 81 S.Ct. 1135, 6 L.Ed.2d 551, (1961). See generally81 C.J.S. States s 139, pp. 1171-1172; 63 Am.Jur.2d, PublicFunds, s 73, pp. 462-463.

[5] From the foregoing we conclude there is no violationof the First Amendment to the United States Constitution bythe action of the state in providing chaplains and religiousfacilities to prisoners. Any claim of offense against theestablishment clause is balanced by its justification under thefree exercise clause. The trial court was correct in so ruling.

II. Plaintiffs alternatively claim the provision for chaplainsand religious facilities violates Art. I, s 3 of the IowaConstitution. That provision states:

‘The General Assembly shall make no law respecting anestablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise

thereof; nor shall any person be compelled to attend anyplace of worship, pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for buildingor repairing places of worship, or the maintenance of anyminister, or ministry.’[6] Our task is to determine the meaning of this provision.

The framers of our constitution necessarily gave us their ideasin the words they agreed upon. But words at best are meremessengers of the thoughts and ideas they are sent to convey.When words are enshrined in a governmental charter, so asto speak across centuries, their history, purpose, and intendedmeaning must be closely examined. In Ex Parte Pritz, 9 Iowa30, 32 (1859), we said:

‘* * * In the interpretation of the Constitution * * * we areto ascertain *130 the meaning by getting at the intention ofthose making the instrument. What thought was in the mindof those making the Constitution-what was their intention, isthe great leading rule of construction.’

In Edge v. Brice, 253 Iowa 710, 718, 113 N.W.2d 755, 759(1962), we said:

‘It is proper in our determination to consider the intention ofthe framers of the provision as the language used, the objectto be attained, or evil to be remedied, and the circumstancesat the time of adoption indicate. (Authorities). * * *.’

In Halsey & Co. v. Belle Plaine, 128 Iowa 467, 471, 104 N.W.494, 495-496 (1905), we said:

‘* * * In proceeding to give construction to a provisionof the Constitution, it is of importance that we begin bymaking ascertainment of the particular object intended to besubserved. To this end we are required primarily to lookto the words employed, giving to them meaning in theirnatural sense and as commonly understood. If necessary toa fuller understanding, we may place ourselves in touchwith the makers of the instrument, and share in their viewof the general subject by reading the constitutional debates;also the contemporary legislation, if any, having relationto the subject-matter. We may take note of the evil asmanifestly sought to be remedied or guarded against, andof the conditions to be affected, then existing or reasonablyto be apprehended in the future, and as disclosed by theauthentic history of the state. (Authorities). * * *.’ See also16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law s 19, pp. 81-87; 16 Am.Jur.2d,Constitutional Law, s 64, pp. 239-241.[7] The history, purpose and intended meaning of Art. I, s 3

of our constitution can be clearly traced and described. Likesimilar provisions included in the constitutions of all sister








































Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125 (1976)


states Art. I, s 3 has a common origin and parallel historywith the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.All such provisions were aimed at disestablishment of statechurches or, in cases of later western states such as Iowa, atpreventing the establishment of state churches. The history ofreligious freedom in America was summarized in Everson,supra, 330 U.S. at 8-16; 67 S.Ct. at 507-511, 91 L.Ed.2d at719-723; and in Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 N.J. 31, 100A.2d 857, 45 A.L.R.2d 929 (1953).

Among authorities cited by Justice Black in Everson wereSweet, The Story of Religion in America (1939) and Cobb,Religious Liberty in America (1902). These and variousother authorities document the fact that nine of the thirteenAmerican colonies had established churches at the opening ofthe American Revolution. Agitation for separation of churchand state began before the opening of the revolution andcontinued into the nineteenth century.

The existence of a state church brought with it the familiarevils carefully described in Tudor, supra. An evil existing bothon a state or colony basis and on a local basis was a taxing ortithing process particularly galling to citizens who were notmembers of the state church.

An example from the Massachusetts Constitution, adopted inthe midst of the revolution (1779), will serve as an example.Art. III of that constitution proclaimed ‘the right and dutyof the legislature to authorize and require the several towns,parishes, precincts, and other bodies politic, or religioussocieties to make suitable provision at their own expense,for the instruction of the public worship of God.’ It wasnot until 1833, five years before creation of Iowa as aseparate territory and a scant 13 years prior to our constitutionof 1846, that Massachusetts provided for disestablishment.Disestablishment occurred in New Hampshire in 1817 and inConnecticut in 1818. Sweet, supra, at 275.

Under the Massachusetts law the church was a towninstitution; the choice of a minister being made at atown meeting. The system of taxing for church support inMassachusetts went back 200 years. The earliest legislativebody of Massachusetts Bay considered as the first question attheir initial meeting ‘how the ministers shall be mayntained?’Their answer was to provide *131 that houses should bebuilt for the ministers and competent provision made forsupplies and money ‘at publicke expense.’ In three monthsa court ordered the tax necessary for this purpose. Manyacts of the legislature thereafter referred to such a provision.

For example the general court in 1637 ordered the selectmenof Newberry to levy a tax for the minister's support and in1638 enacted a general law that ‘all inhabitants are lyable toassessment for Church as for State,‘ the tax to be collected bydistraint if necessary. Cobb, supra, at 169.

Perhaps the most important event in the drive fordisestablishment was the enactment on December 17, 1785 ofthe Statute of Virginia For Religious Freedom. The Virginiastatute was the direct source of the First Amendment to theUnited States Constitution. Everson, supra, 330 U.S. at 14, 67S.Ct. at 510, 91 L.Ed. at 722.

In view of the direct influence Thomas Jefferson and JamesMadison had on the enactment of the Virginia statute it is notsurprising it became the model for the First Amendment tothe United States Constitution. But it should be rememberedthe movement for disestablishment had been in progress forsome time and four of the original 13 colonies had no statechurch. One of the four colonies with no state church was NewJersey. To prevent establishment of a state church the 1776Constitution of New Jersey provided:

“That no person shall ever within this colony be deprivedof the inestimable privilege of worshiping Almighty God ina manner agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience;nor under any pretense whatsoever; compelled to attend anyplace of worship, contrary to his own faith and judgment; Norshall any person within this colony, ever be obliged to paytithes, taxes or any other rates, for the purpose of building orrepairing any church or churches, place or places of worship,or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary towhat he believes to be right, or has deliberately or voluntarilyengaged himself to perform.” (Emphasis supplied.) Tudor,supra, 14 N.J. at 41, 100 A.2d at 862, 45 A.L.R.2d at 735.

It should be remembered the First Amendment to the UnitedStates Constitution was long thought not to protect individualcitizens from laws passed by the states. The United StatesSupreme Court held in a case decided before the adoptionof the Fourteenth Amendment no provision in the federalconstitution protected the religious liberties of citizens, thatit was left to state constitutions and laws to provide suchprotection. Permoliv v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of NewOrleans, 3 How. (U.S.) 389, 11 L.Ed. 739 (1845). See 16Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, s 336, p. 646.

Not until the filing of Cantwell, supra, in 1940, were thereligious clauses of the First Amendment made applicable tothe states.







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Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125 (1976)


Meanwhile the manner in which the various states addressedthe question of religious liberty and structured the separationof church and state reached a certain consensus. See Cobb,supra, at page 520; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations(Eighth Ed.) pp. 966-975 (1927). Among the five generalmatters which Judge Cooley indicated were not lawful underany American constitution was: ‘(2) Compulsory support, bytaxation or otherwise, of religious instruction. Not only is noone denomination to be favored at the expense of the rest, butall support of religious instruction must be entirely voluntary.It is not within the sphere of government to coerce it. * **.’ Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, supra, at 967. ButJudge Cooley recognized such a principle of constitutionallaw was not offended under certain circumstances, including:‘* * * (W)hen thanksgiving or fast days are appointed;When chaplains are designated for the army and navy; whenlegislative sessions are opened with prayer or the reading ofScriptures, * * *.’ (Emphasis added.) Cooley's ConstitutionalLimitations, supra, at 975.

In view of the greater restraint placed on prisoners we seemore reason for allowance for prison chaplains than formilitary chaplains.*132 [8] To the extent our provision differs from the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution we think ourframers were merely addressing the evils incident to the statechurch. The framers addressed and provided a defense againstthe evils incident to a state church, forced taxation to supportthe same, and the payment of ministers from taxation. Itis not surprising they should borrow from the language ofthe New Jersey constitution of 1776, hereinbefore quoted, inaccomplishing their objectives.

[9] In construing constitutional intent it is proper to look atcontemporaneous legislative pronouncements. See Green v.City of Cascade, 231 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Iowa 1975). See alsoEdge, supra; Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 23 N.W.2d 883(1946); Halsey & Co., supra.

Iowa's first constitution was adopted in 1846. Its second,the current constitution, was adopted in 1857. Art. I, s 3 ofboth constitutions were identical. In 1855, during the periodbetween the enactment of our two identical religious libertyprovisions, the General Assembly enacted a law which inrelevant part provided:

‘It shall be the duty of the Inspectors and Warden of thePenitentiary to appoint a chaplin (sic) to the same, whose duty

it shall be to give them religious instructions, such as maybe found compatible with their condition and circumstances;the chaplain shall receive the sum of one hundred dollarsper annum for his services, to be paid by the Warden, outof the appropriation therefor.’ Laws of Iowa, chapter 96, pp.157-158 (1855).

That provision with alterations has remained in our statutesand appears in the present s 246.3, The Code. It now provides:

‘The warden, deputy warden, assistant deputy warden, chiefclerk, Chaplain, additional chaplain, physician, storekeeper,record clerk, and receiving officer of the penitentiary andmen's reformatory shall receive such salaries as shall bedetermined by the state director.’

It is obvious the 1855 legislature did not feel Art. I, s 3, ofthe 1846 Constitution proscribed having chaplains at the statepenitentiary. It also seems likely the delegates to the 1857Iowa Constitutional convention did not feel Art. I, s 3, of ourpresent constitution would proscribe a statutory scheme thenrecently enacted.

We have considered Art. I s 3, in very few cases. State v.Bartels, 191 Iowa 1060, 181 N.W. 508 (1921); Knowlton v.Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 166 N.W. 202 (1918); State v.Amana Society, 132 Iowa 304, 109 N.W. 894 (1906); Moorev. Monroe, 64 Iowa 367, 20 N.W. 475 (1884); Davis v. Boget,50 Iowa 11 (1878); The Trustees of Griswold College v. State,46 Iowa 275 (1877). We believe none of these cases arecontrolling. The Trustees of Griswold College, supra, perhapscomes the closest to interpreting the meaning of ‘tithes, taxesor other rates.’ But the case stands only for the propositionthe phrase did not prevent exemption of church property fromtaxation, a holding not inconsistent with this opinion.

The parties discuss and dispute the meaning of terms‘minister’ and ‘chaplain.’ See Black's Law Dictionary,Revised Fourth Ed., page 168 which defines chaplain andpage 294 which defines minister. While we perceive adistinction we do not believe it to be conclusive.[10] Our determination is controlled by the same forces and

concerns which caused the federal courts to strike a balancebetween the establishment and free exercise clauses of theFirst Amendment to the United States Constitution. We do notbelieve the prohibition contained in the last clause of Art. I,s 3 in any way disturbs the balance. The prohibition whichprovides ‘nor shall any person be compelled to attend anyplace of worship, pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for buildingor repairing places of worship, or the maintenance of anyminister, or ministry’, was inscribed in our constitution to

























Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125 (1976)


prevent the establishment of a state church. The languagewas borrowed, as we have seen, from eastern states whichhad earlier struggled with the same problem. The provisionof ministers *133 and places of worship within the prisonsin this state is lawful, not in order to spread or encouragereligion there, but rather in order to accord the prisoners theirguaranteed right to exercise it.

The trial court enjoined not only the payment of chaplains'salaries but also the maintenance of places of worship withinthe penitentiary. This was in accordance with the prayer inplaintiffs' petition. On oral submission of this appeal plaintiffscontend more strongly against the payment of chaplains'salaries and suggest in argument the free exercise clausemight be satisfied by tolerating the presence in the prison ofclergymen sent there on a voluntary basis.

Any such argument manifestly presupposes the legislatureacted unconstitutionally in How it balanced the free exerciseand establishment clauses. Under our scheme of governmentit is for the legislature and not for contending parties to strikesuch a balance so long as it does so within the constitutionalframework. We believe the legislature has stayed within suchframework. We hold the trial court erred in enjoining thepayment of public funds for the purposes specified.

III. Defendants claim the State is constitutionally required,not merely permitted, to provide chaplains and facilitieshereunder challenged. Since the legislature has seen fit toprovide the services we see no reason to speculate on what ourholding should be if the legislature chose not to so provide.We do not reach defendants' claim.

The judgment of the trial court is accordingly reversed andthe cause remanded for an order dissolving the injunctionheretofore issued. Tax costs to the plaintiffs.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

MOORE, C.J., and MASON, LeGRAND, REES,REYNOLDSON, and McCORMICK, JJ., concur.

UHLENHOPP and RAWLINGS, JJ., dissent.

UHLENHOPP, Justice (dissenting).

The question is Not whether religion in prisons is desirable.Undoubtedly religion has brought solace and comfort tomany prison inmates and has helped turn inmates around

and head them toward useful and constructive lives. Rather,the question is whether religion shall be brought to prisoninmates by the taxpayers or by churches and religious groups.More specifically, the question is whether the legislaturecan constitutionally appropriate tax funds to bring religionto prison inmates. This question involves the separation ofchurch and state mandated by the United States and IowaConstitutions.

I. The First Amendment to the United States Constitutionstates with respect to religion:

Congress shall make no law respecting anestablishment of religion, or prohibitingthe free exercise thereof . . ..

The Iowa Constitution goes a step further in s 3 of Article I:

The General Assembly shall make no lawrespecting an establishment of religion,or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;nor shall any person be compelled toattend any place of worship, pay tithes,taxes, or other rates for building orrepairing places of worship, or themaintenance of any minister, or ministry.

Probably the most important factor which determines howwe apply these constitutional limitations to specific situationsis the General approach that we take to the clauses. I thinkwe should not apply the clauses narrowly. Rather, we shouldapply them as we apply other constitutional clauses, givingthem full effect according to their language. The UnitedStates Supreme Court enunciated the approach to be takento constitutional limitations generally, in Fairbank v. UnitedStates, 181 U.S. 283, 288-289, 21 S.Ct. 648, 650-651, 45L.Ed. 862, 864:

We are not here confronted with aquestion of the extent of the powersof Congress, but one of the limitationsimposed by the Constitution on its action,and it seems to us clear that the same*134 rule and spirit of construction





Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125 (1976)


must also be recognized. If powersgranted are to be taken as broadlygranted, and as carrying with themauthority to pass those acts which maybe reasonably necessary to carry theminto full execution; in other words, ifthe Constitution in its grant of powersis to be so construed that Congress shallbe able to carry into full effect thepowers granted, it is equally imperativethat where prohibition or limitation isplaced upon the power of Congressthat prohibition or limitation should beenforced in its spirit and to its entirety. Itwould be a strange rule of constructionthat language granting powers is to beliberally construed, and that languageof restriction is to be narrowly andtechnically construed.

Giving the present constitutional language separating churchand state its full meaning does not indicate hostility towardreligion; it simply means giving full effect to constitutionallanguage.

We are dealing here with one of our state institutions, thepenitentiary. The record before us shows that in this institutionthe state provides one floor of a state building for exclusivepermanent use as a Protestant chapel and another floor forexclusive permanent use as a Catholic chapel. Each of thesechapels contains the usual alter, furniture, symbols, art, andartifacts of a church. The state constructed and maintains,heats, and lights the building of which the chapels are parts.

The state employs one part-time and two full-time chaplainsfor the penitentiary, who are under the regular meritsystem for state employees. The chaplains receive theirsalaries and benefits from tax funds and carry on theusual religious activities of clergymen-they conduct regularworship services, administer the sacraments, and providereligious counseling. To exemplify the nature of the functionsof the chaplains, counsel asked an inmate to compare hischaplain with one of the regular prison counselors. The inmateanswered:

I don't feel there is any comparison, youknow. I think Father Hoenig is a man of

the cloth, and I think basically his duty,you know, is to deal with us on a religiousbasis, you know, to deal with the soulrather than the physical needs, you know,and the inner parts of an individual, youknow, the things you don't see, you know.

The same characterization appears from the evidence to betrue of the other two chaplains, Rev. Ray, a Baptist, and Rev.Prochnow, a Lutheran.

The state employs these chaplains under its merit systemspecifications. The Iowa Merit Employment Department hasthe following under the heading of ‘Iowa Chaplain’ in its‘Class Specification Sheet’ (Rev. May 14, 1971):Definition. Under general supervision, performs professionalpastoral work in providing counseling and worship servicesat a State institution; performs related work as required.

Education, Experience and Special Requirements. Minimum.Graduation from college and a seminary and ordination as apastor in one of the recognized faiths or denominations andthree years of pastoral experience.

Does the use of tax funds for these chapels and chaplainstransgress the Federal Constitution? The portion of the FirstAmendment to the Federal Constitution relating to religionapplies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84L.Ed. 1213. The trial court held that the state's financialsupport for the religious purposes related does not violate theFederal Constitution, citing School Dist. of Abington Twp.v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844.That case, however, dealt with religious exercises by pupilsin public schools, and eight members of the Court held theexercises to violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

The present case has a unique characteristic. It is not theusual case in which a party claims some state action Indirectlyfosters religion. Here we have outright Direct use of taxmoney for places of worship *135 and chaplains. I findthis direct financial support very difficult to reconcile withlanguage of the United States Supreme Court in Everson v.Board of Education of the Twp. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16, 67S.Ct. 504, 511-512, 91 L.Ed. 711; 723; ‘No tax in any amount,large or small, can be levied to support any religious activitiesor institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever








Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125 (1976)


form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.’ Seealso Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 2965, 37 L.Ed.2d948, 962: ‘What our cases require is careful examination ofany law challenged on establishment grounds with a view toascertaining whether it furthers any of the evils against whichthat Clause protects. Primary among those evils have been‘sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of thesovereign in religious activities.’ Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra,at 668 (397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697).'

II. I believe a conclusion on the federal constitutionalchallenge is unnecessary, however, because of additionalexpress language in the Iowa Constitution.

The trial court held that the appropriation of tax fundsfor the present religious purposes does transgress the IowaConstitution. Section 3 of our Iowa Bill of Rights, in additionto the establishment and free exercise clauses, has thisadditional third part,

nor shall any person be compelled toattend any place of worship, pay tithes,taxes, or other rates for building orrepairing places of worship, or themaintenance of any minister, or ministry.

Our main cases on s 3 are Trustees of Griswold College v.State, 46 Iowa 275; Davis v. Boget, 50 Iowa 11; Moore v.Monroe, 64 Iowa 367, 20 N.W. 475; State v. Amana Society,132 Iowa 304, 109 N.W. 894; Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182Iowa 691, 166 N.W. 202; and State v. Bartels, 191 Iowa 1060,181 N.W. 508, rev'd 262 U.S. 404, 43 S.Ct. 628, 67 L.Ed.1047. In the Davis case this court held that the ‘occasionaland temporary’ use of a public school building for Sabbathschools, religious meetings, debating clubs, and temperancemeetings was not unconstitutional. 50 Iowa at 15. In theKnowlton case this court stated broadly, ‘In this state theConstitution (article I, s 3) forbids the establishment by lawof any religion or interference with the free exercise thereofAnd all taxation for ecclesiastical support.’ 182 Iowa at 706,166 N.W. at 207 (italics added).

Like the trial court, I am unable to square the third part of s3 with two practices here. One practice is that of permittingexclusive and permanent use for religious purposes of spacein a building which the state built and maintains, heats, and

lights, from tax funds. I think this violates the portion of thethird part, ‘nor shall any person be compelled to . . . pay . . .taxes . . . for building or repairing places of worship . . ..’The other practice is that of paying salaries and benefits to thethree chaplains from tax funds. I think this violates the portionof the third part, ‘nor shall any person be compelled to . . .pay . . . taxes . . . for . . . the maintenance of any minister,or ministry.’

The court majority justifies use of tax funds for thesepractices by a process of construction of the third part of s 3:historically, the evil aimed at was taxation for the support ofa state church; this is not support of a state church; ergo thisis not within the prohibition.

The difficulty with this process of construction is the languageof the third part of s 3. Sometimes constitutional clausesare abstract and general such as ‘due process of law,‘ andhistorical antecedents are needed to fill in meaning. Dueprocess does not have “a fixed content unrelated to time, placeand circumstances.’ It is ‘compounded of history, reason,the past course of decisions . . ..’ Joint Anti-Facist RefugeeCommittee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162, 163, 71 S.Ct.624, 643, 644, 95 L.Ed. 817 (848, 849) (concurring opinion).'Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230, 1236. Otherclauses in the *136 Bill of Rights contain broad sweepingguarantees which make historical background useful tounderstanding-such as freedom of speech and of press, andindeed ‘establishment of religion’ and ‘free exercise thereof.’But the language in the third part of s 3 is of the opposite kind,Concrete and Specific: no one may be taxed for building orrepairing places of worship or for maintaining any ministeror ministry.

A constitutional clause may also be uncertain or ambiguous,making the historical setting useful in ascertaining themeaning intended. An illustration is Missouri P. Ry. v. Kansas,248 U.S. 276, 39 S.Ct. 93, 63 L.Ed. 239. There the questionwas whether approval by two-thirds Congressional vote, inthe section of the Federal Constitution on Presidential veto,refers to two-thirds of the members present or two-thirds ofall members. The Court considered historical background inresolving the problem.

Here however we have clear, definite, unambiguouslanguage: no taxation for building or repairing places ofworship or maintaining any minister or ministry. Hence theprinciple applies that construction is unnecessary and weare to be guided by the ordinary meaning of the words.



































Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125 (1976)


The United States Supreme Court stated that principle ofconstitutional law in the early days of the Republic, and thecourts have applied it to this day. The Court stated withreference to a constitutional debt limitation clause, in Board ofLake County Comm'rs v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670, 9 S.Ct.651, 652, 32 L.Ed. 1060, 1063:

Why not assume that the framers of theconstitution, and the people who votedit into existence, meant exactly what itsays? At first glance, its reading producesno impression of doubt as to the meaning.It seems all sufficiently plain; and insuch case there is a well-settled rulewhich we must observe. The object ofconstruction, applied to a constitution, isto give effect to the intent of its framers,and of the people adopting it. This intentis to be found in the instrument itself;and, when the text of a constitutionalprovision is not ambiguous, the courts,in giving construction thereto, are not atliberty to search for its meaning beyondthe instrument.

Elsewhere the principle is stated thus:

It is a general principle that the intentionto which force is to be given is thatwhich is embodied and expressed inthe constitutional provisions themselves,for words are the common signs thatmankind make use of to declare theirintentions to one another. When thewords of a man express his meaningplainly, distinctly, and perfectly, there isno occasion to have recourse to any othermeans of interpretation. 16 Am.Jur.2dConstitutional Law s 70 at 248.

And in 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law s 19 at 81-84:

If the language used is clear andunambiguous its meaning and intent are

to be ascertained from the instrumentitself by construing the language as itis written. Unless the context suggestsotherwise, words are to be given theirnatural obvious, or ordinary meaning. Toascertain the meaning of a constitution,therefore, the first resort in all casesis to the natural significance of thewords used, in the order and grammaticalarrangement in which the framersplaced them. If, thus regarded, thewords used convey a definite meaningwhich involves no absurdity and nocontradiction between parts of the samewriting, then the meaning apparent onthe face of the instrument is the onewhich alone courts are at liberty to saywas intended to be conveyed. There isno occasion for construction where thelanguage is plain and definite.

The proscription on tax support in the third part of s 3 extendsto ‘places of worship.’ I do not see any question about the twochapels we have here: they are places of worship. A chapelis defined as ‘A place of worship; a lesser or inferior church,sometimes a part of or subordinate to another church.’ Black'sLaw Dictionary (4th Ed.).

Nor can I see any question about the three chaplainswe have here: they are ministers. By definition the MeritDepartment *137 specifications require that chaplainsin state institutions ‘perform professional pastoral workin providing counseling and worship services,‘ and thespecifications further mandate ‘Graduation from collegeand a seminary and ordination as a pastor in one of therecognized faiths or denominations and three years of pastoralexperience.’ The actual activities of these chaplains are thoseof a minister-they conduct worship services, they providereligious counseling, and they administer the sacraments.

Moreover, the framers of the third part of s 3 spoke broadlyin connection with ministers. The framers did not limit theproscription to certain kinds or classes of ministers; taxescannot be used to maintain ‘any’ minister or ministry. Weshould not strain to find obscurity or ambiguity when theconstitutional language is clear. 16 Am.Jur.2d ConstitutionalLaw s 75 at 257 (courts ‘are not at liberty to disregard the










Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125 (1976)


plain meaning of the words of a constitution in order to searchfor some other conjectured intent’).

Without expressing an opinion on the first two parts of s 3,I would hold that legislative appropriation of tax funds toprovide and maintain prison chapels and chaplains violatesthe third part of s 3 of the Iowa Bill of Rights.

Finally, would the result I reach mean that the IowaConstitution cuts off prison inmates from all religion exceptsuch as they can provide for themselves? Not at all. As tospace, this court pointed to a constitutionally permissible wayin Davis v. Boget, 50 Iowa 11. Incidental religious use ofa public building is permissible. Spaces such as mess halls,meeting rooms, auditoriums, gymnasiums, and other facilitiesin our state institutions may be used for religious purposes,provided the use is entirely subordinate to the regular useso that the taxpayers are not put to additional expense.

Apparently this is the present practice of the Church of theNew Song in the penitentiary. As to personnel, I believe thatour churches and religious groups, which have founded andoperate edifices, colleges, hospitals, orphanages, and foreignmissions, are able through such agencies as their boards ofhome missions to support clergy for the inmates of prisons.These are the kinds of sources from which financial supportfor religion in prisons should come, rather than taxation.

I would affirm the judgment entered by the District Judge thatappropriation of tax funds for the present religious purposesis unconstitutional.

RAWLINGS, J., joins in division II of this dissent.

All Citations

248 N.W.2d 125

End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.





Department Totals Iowa Department of Corrections

FY2020

Financial Status Reports

Through the Period Ending May 2020

6/2/2020

Department

Revised

Budget

Actual

Revenues and

Expenditures

Encumbrances

Actual

+

Encumbrances

Percent

(Actual of

Budget)

FTE Positions

Correctional Officer 1,374.00

Total Staffing 2,578.08

Resources Available

04B Balance Brought Forward 2,049,137 2,049,137.03 - 2,049,137.03 1.00

05A Appropriation 293,590,355 293,590,355.00 - 293,590,355.00 1.00

--- Appropriation Transfer - - - - ---

--- Legislative Adjustments (63,095) (63,095.00) - (63,095.00) 1.00

201R Federal Support - - - - ---

202R Local Governments 264,000 232,233.59 - 232,233.59 0.88

204R Intra State Receipts 675,017 747,800.00 - 747,800.00 1.11

205R Reimbursement from Other Agencies 3,306 - - - -

234R Transfers - Other Agencies 154,619 925,052.86 - 925,052.86 5.98

301R Interest - - - - ---

401R Fees, Licenses & Permits 534,041 532,732.41 - 532,732.41 1.00

501R Refunds & Reimbursements 1,022,795 910,216.09 - 910,216.09 0.89

602R Sale of Equipment & Salvage 105 - - - -

603R Rents & Leases 784,075 535,118.15 - 535,118.15 0.68

604R Agricultural Sales - - - - ---

606R Other Sales & Services - - - - ---

701R Unearned Receipts - - - - ---

Total Resources Available 299,014,355 299,459,550.13 299,459,550.13 1.00

Funds Expended and Encumbered

101 Personal Services-Salaries 234,737,554 198,220,199.07 - 198,220,199.07 0.84

202 Personal Travel (In State) 163,908 215,130.50 - 215,130.50 1.31

203 State Vehicle Operation 591,079 545,315.58 5,950.00 551,265.58 0.93

204 Depreciation 10,288 23,612.79 - 23,612.79 2.30

205 Personal Travel (Out of State) 30,068 41,364.82 - 41,364.82 1.38

301 Office Supplies 199,722 231,273.57 500.00 231,773.57 1.16

302 Facility Maintenance Supplies 1,631,287 1,732,752.86 132,828.47 1,865,581.33 1.14

303 Equipment Maintenance Supplies 871,755 679,527.31 291,365.47 970,892.78 1.11

304 Professional & Scientific Supplies 885,492 1,044,831.69 37,811.49 1,082,643.18 1.22

306 Housing & Subsistence Supplies 2,263,554 2,170,014.82 204,152.32 2,374,167.14 1.05

307 Ag,Conservation & Horticulture Supply 40,715 61,704.70 781.22 62,485.92 1.53

308 Other Supplies 572,333 659,076.98 133,090.37 792,167.35 1.38

309 Printing & Binding 125 - - - -

310 Drugs & Biologicals 8,347,927 8,170,838.13 - 8,170,838.13 0.98

311 Food 10,800,404 10,183,136.75 194,040.03 10,377,176.78 0.96

312 Uniforms & Related Items 1,534,276 1,340,073.79 116,670.61 1,456,744.40 0.95

313 Postage 48,493 24,994.92 92.28 25,087.20 0.52

401 Communications 595,630 496,724.13 8,688.71 505,412.84 0.85

402 Rentals 97,512 151,772.92 1,188.38 152,961.30 1.57

403 Utilities 9,996,744 7,933,136.74 490,508.00 8,423,644.74 0.84

405 Professional & Scientific Services 2,344,822 1,918,464.51 87,952.29 2,006,416.80 0.86

406 Outside Services 6,197,003 4,712,110.09 74,680.81 4,786,790.90 0.77

407 Intra-State Transfers 256 - - - -

408 Advertising & Publicity 22,102 23,893.13 - 23,893.13 1.08

409 Outside Repairs/Service 1,171,027 1,162,585.47 265,489.01 1,428,074.48 1.22

412 Auditor of State Reimbursements - - - - ---

414 Reimbursement to Other Agencies 6,278,726 5,228,082.61 28,700.00 5,256,782.61 0.84

416 ITD Reimbursements 1,444,953 1,474,831.47 8,400.00 1,483,231.47 1.03

417 Worker's Compensation - - - - ---

418 IT Outside Services 1,992,706 1,826,125.64 - 1,826,125.64 0.92

419 Intra Agency Reimbursement - - - - ---

433 Transfers - Auditor of State 1,200 1,121.25 - 1,121.25 0.93

434 Transfers - Other Agencies Services 154,621 148,378.18 - 148,378.18 0.96

501 Equipment 1,702,229 2,010,075.85 61,654.21 2,071,730.06 1.22

502 Office Equipment 14,945 5,464.47 - 5,464.47 0.37

503 Equipment - Non-Inventory 187,043 457,616.40 51,104.85 508,721.25 2.72

510 IT Equipment 863,858 930,220.19 85,482.60 1,015,702.79 1.18

601 Claims 301 300.00 - 300.00 1.00

602 Other Expense & Obligations 3,207,156 3,025,076.81 196,517.30 3,221,594.11 1.00

604 Securities - 6,233.18 - 6,233.18 ---

701 Licenses 12,327 8,396.00 - 8,396.00 0.68

702 Fees 115 60.00 - 60.00 0.52

705 Refunds-Other - - - - ---

901 Capitals 100 46,262.80 - 46,262.80 462.63

--- Balance Carry Forward - - - - ---

--- Reversion - - - - ---

Total Expenses and Encumbrances 299,014,355 256,910,780.12 2,477,648.42 259,388,428.54 0.87

Ending Balance 40,071,121.59

-

Institutions Totals Iowa Department of Corrections

FY2020



6/2/2020

Department

Revised

Budget

Actual

Revenues and

Expenditures

Encumbrances

Actual

+

Encumbrances

Percent

(Actual of

Budget)

FTE Positions

Correctional Officer 1,374.00

Total Staffing 2,539.08

Resources Available

04B Balance Brought Forward 1,689,260 1,689,260.29 - 1,689,260.29 1.00

05A Appropriation 278,175,119 278,175,119.00 - 278,175,119.00 1.00


--- Legislative Adjustments 3,236,796 3,236,796.00 - 3,236,796.00 1.00


202R Local Governments 264,000 232,233.59 - 232,233.59 0.88

204R Intra State Receipts 17 - - - -

205R Reimbursement from Other Agencies 3,306 - - - -

234R Transfers - Other Agencies 154,619 914,197.11 - 914,197.11 5.91

301R Interest - - - - ---

401R Fees, Licenses & Permits 534,041 532,732.41 - 532,732.41 1.00

501R Refunds & Reimbursements 972,795 872,862.34 - 872,862.34 0.90

602R Sale of Equipment & Salvage 105 - - - -

603R Rents & Leases 784,075 535,118.15 - 535,118.15 0.68








203 State Vehicle Operation 567,100 528,057.96 5,950.00 534,007.96 0.94

204 Depreciation 10,287 23,612.79 - 23,612.79 2.30


301 Office Supplies 188,419 213,577.91 500.00 214,077.91 1.14

302 Facility Maintenance Supplies 1,631,287 1,732,752.86 132,828.47 1,865,581.33 1.14

303 Equipment Maintenance Supplies 871,755 679,527.31 291,365.47 970,892.78 1.11

304 Professional & Scientific Supplies 885,492 1,044,831.69 37,811.49 1,082,643.18 1.22

306 Housing & Subsistence Supplies 2,263,554 2,170,014.82 204,152.32 2,374,167.14 1.05

307 Ag,Conservation & Horticulture Supply 40,715 61,704.70 781.22 62,485.92 1.53

308 Other Supplies 563,433 658,024.71 133,090.37 791,115.08 1.40


310 Drugs & Biologicals 8,347,927 8,170,838.13 - 8,170,838.13 0.98

311 Food 10,800,404 10,183,136.75 194,040.03 10,377,176.78 0.96

312 Uniforms & Related Items 1,534,276 1,340,073.79 116,670.61 1,456,744.40 0.95

313 Postage 45,211 21,578.50 92.28 21,670.78 0.48

401 Communications 511,268 414,523.27 8,688.71 423,211.98 0.83

402 Rentals 97,512 151,772.92 1,188.38 152,961.30 1.57

403 Utilities 9,996,744 7,933,136.74 490,508.00 8,423,644.74 0.84

405 Professional & Scientific Services 2,307,922 1,898,757.32 87,952.29 1,986,709.61 0.86

406 Outside Services 1,316,575 1,304,554.89 74,680.81 1,379,235.70 1.05

407 Intra-State Transfers 256 - - - -

408 Advertising & Publicity 22,102 23,893.13 - 23,893.13 1.08

409 Outside Repairs/Service 1,171,027 1,162,585.47 265,489.01 1,428,074.48 1.22


414 Reimbursement to Other Agencies 5,382,482 5,033,158.13 28,700.00 5,061,858.13 0.94

416 ITD Reimbursements 1,424,785 1,449,083.31 8,400.00 1,457,483.31 1.02


418 IT Outside Services 205 3,450.00 - 3,450.00 16.83


433 Transfers - Auditor of State - - - - ---


501 Equipment 1,642,229 2,010,075.85 61,654.21 2,071,730.06 1.26

502 Office Equipment 14,945 5,464.47 - 5,464.47 0.37

503 Equipment - Non-Inventory 187,043 452,891.36 51,104.85 503,996.21 2.69

510 IT Equipment 789,374 845,051.41 85,482.60 930,534.01 1.18

601 Claims 301 300.00 - 300.00 1.00

602 Other Expense & Obligations 3,207,156 3,024,925.94 196,517.30 3,221,443.24 1.00

604 Securities - - - - ---

701 Licenses 12,327 8,396.00 - 8,396.00 0.68

702 Fees 115 60.00 - 60.00 0.52


901 Capitals 100 46,262.80 - 46,262.80 462.63


--- Reversion - - - - ---

Total Expenses and Encumbrances 285,814,133 247,020,602.47 2,477,648.42 249,498,250.89 0.87


-

Central Office Totals Iowa Department of Corrections

FY2020



6/2/2020

Department

Revised

Budget

Actual

Revenues and

Expenditures

Encumbrances

Actual

+

Encumbrances

Percent

(Actual of

Budget)

FTE Positions

Correctional Officer -

Total Staffing 39

Resources Available

04B Balance Brought Forward 359,877 359,876.74 - 359,876.74 1.00

05A Appropriation 15,415,236 15,415,236.00 - 15,415,236.00 1.00


--- Legislative Adjustments (3,299,891) (3,299,891.00) - (3,299,891.00) 1.00


202R Local Governments - - - - ---

204R Intra State Receipts 675,000 747,800.00 - 747,800.00 1.11

205R Reimbursement from Other Agencies - - - - ---

234R Transfers - Other Agencies - 10,855.75 - 10,855.75 ---

301R Interest - - - - ---

401R Fees, Licenses & Permits - - - - ---

501R Refunds & Reimbursements 50,000 37,353.75 - 37,353.75 0.75

602R Sale of Equipment & Salvage - - - - ---

603R Rents & Leases - - - - ---








203 State Vehicle Operation 23,979 17,257.62 - 17,257.62 0.72

204 Depreciation 1 - - - -


301 Office Supplies 11,303 17,695.66 - 17,695.66 1.57

302 Facility Maintenance Supplies - - - - ---

303 Equipment Maintenance Supplies - - - - ---

304 Professional & Scientific Supplies - - - - ---

306 Housing & Subsistence Supplies - - - - ---

307 Ag,Conservation & Horticulture Supply - - - - ---

308 Other Supplies 8,900 1,052.27 - 1,052.27 0.12


310 Drugs & Biologicals - - - - ---

311 Food - - - - ---

312 Uniforms & Related Items - - - - ---

313 Postage 3,282 3,416.42 - 3,416.42 1.04

401 Communications 84,362 82,200.86 - 82,200.86 0.97

402 Rentals - - - - ---

403 Utilities - - - - ---

405 Professional & Scientific Services 36,900 19,707.19 - 19,707.19 0.53

406 Outside Services 4,880,428 3,407,555.20 - 3,407,555.20 0.70

407 Intra-State Transfers - - - - ---

408 Advertising & Publicity - - - - ---

409 Outside Repairs/Service - - - - ---


414 Reimbursement to Other Agencies 896,244 194,924.48 - 194,924.48 0.22

416 ITD Reimbursements 20,168 25,748.16 - 25,748.16 1.28


418 IT Outside Services 1,992,501 1,822,675.64 - 1,822,675.64 0.91


433 Transfers - Auditor of State 1,200 1,121.25 - 1,121.25 0.93


501 Equipment 60,000 - - - -

502 Office Equipment - - - - ---

503 Equipment - Non-Inventory - 4,725.04 - 4,725.04 ---

510 IT Equipment 74,484 85,168.78 - 85,168.78 1.14

601 Claims - - - - ---

602 Other Expense & Obligations - 150.87 - 150.87 ---

604 Securities - 6,233.18 - 6,233.18 ---

701 Licenses - - - - ---

702 Fees - - - - ---


901 Capitals - - - - ---


--- Reversion - - - - ---

Total Expenses and Encumbrances 13,200,222 9,890,177.65 - 9,890,177.65 0.75


-

Capitals Totals Iowa Department of Corrections

FY2020



6/2/2020

Department

Revised

Budget

Actual

Revenues and

Expenditures

Encumbrances

Actual

+

Encumbrances

Percent

(Actual of

Budget)

FTE Positions

Correctional Officer -

Total Staffing -

Resources Available

04B Balance Brought Forward - - - - ---

05A Appropriation 779,000 779,000 - 779,000.00 1.00


--- Legislative Adjustments - - - - ---


202R Local Governments - - - - ---

204R Intra State Receipts - - - - ---

205R Reimbursement from Other Agencies - - - - ---

234R Transfers - Other Agencies - - - - ---

301R Interest - - - - ---

401R Fees, Licenses & Permits - - - - ---

501R Refunds & Reimbursements - - - - ---

602R Sale of Equipment & Salvage - - - - ---

603R Rents & Leases - - - - ---




Total Resources Available 779,000 779,000.00 779,000.00 1.00


101 Personal Services-Salaries - - - - ---

202 Personal Travel (In State) - - - - ---

203 State Vehicle Operation - - - - ---

204 Depreciation - - - - ---

205 Personal Travel (Out of State) - - - - ---

301 Office Supplies - - - - ---

302 Facility Maintenance Supplies - - - - ---

303 Equipment Maintenance Supplies - - - - ---

304 Professional & Scientific Supplies - - - - ---

306 Housing & Subsistence Supplies - - - - ---

307 Ag,Conservation & Horticulture Supply - - - - ---

308 Other Supplies - - - - ---

309 Printing & Binding - - - - ---

310 Drugs & Biologicals - - - - ---

311 Food - - - - ---

312 Uniforms & Related Items - - - - ---

313 Postage - - - - ---

401 Communications - - - - ---

402 Rentals - - - - ---

403 Utilities - - - - ---

405 Professional & Scientific Services - - - - ---

406 Outside Services - - - - ---

407 Intra-State Transfers - - - - ---

408 Advertising & Publicity - - - - ---

409 Outside Repairs/Service - - - - ---


414 Reimbursement to Other Agencies - - - - ---

416 ITD Reimbursements - - - - ---


418 IT Outside Services - - - - ---


433 Transfers - Auditor of State - - - - ---

434 Transfers - Other Agencies Services - - - - ---

501 Equipment 629,000 188,654 - 188,653.59 0.30

502 Office Equipment - - - - ---

503 Equipment - Non-Inventory - - - - ---

510 IT Equipment - - - - ---

601 Claims - - - - ---

602 Other Expense & Obligations - - - - ---

604 Securities - - - - ---

701 Licenses - - - - ---

702 Fees - - - - ---


901 Capitals 150,000 150,000 - 150,000.00 1.00


--- Reversion - - - - ---

Total Expenses and Encumbrances 779,000 338,653.59 - 338,653.59 0.43

Ending Balance 440,346.41

-

% Change 03/20 REC % Change 05/20 REC % Change 03/20 REC % Change 05/20 REC % Change

FY17 FY18 FY19 FY 19 Act vs. FY20 FY 20 Est vs. FY20 FY 20 Est vs. FY 21 FY 21 Est vs. FY 21 FY 21 Est vs.

ACTUAL ACTUAL ACTUAL FY 18 Act ESTIMATE FY 19 Act ESTIMATE FY 19 Act ESTIMATE FY 20 Est ESTIMATE FY 20 Est

TAX RECEIPTSPersonal Inc. Tax 4,469.0 4,746.7 4,944.0 4.2% 4,995.1 1.0% 4,613.2 -6.7% 5,050.6 1.1% 5,141.4 11.4%Sales/Use Tax 2,812.3 2,941.5 3,045.5 3.5% 3,233.4 6.2% 3,147.8 3.4% 3,342.1 3.4% 3,174.6 0.9%Corporate Income Tax 549.7 565.0 706.3 25.0% 726.5 2.9% 648.3 -8.2% 692.2 -4.7% 748.4 15.4%Inheritance Tax 86.1 83.1 80.7 -2.9% 77.5 -4.0% 88.8 10.0% 81.4 5.0% 87.0 -2.0%Insurance Premium Tax 114.8 121.8 153.4 25.9% 135.2 -11.9% 145.9 -4.9% 138.4 2.4% 152.3 4.4%Beer Tax 14.0 13.7 13.5 -1.5% 13.5 0.0% 12.6 -6.7% 13.5 0.0% 12.9 2.4%Franchise Tax 53.8 46.7 59.6 27.6% 56.4 -5.4% 57.0 -4.4% 62.5 10.8% 73.3 28.6%Miscellaneous Tax 1.4 1.7 14.1 729.4% 24.0 70.2% 24.4 73.0% 20.6 -14.2% 20.4 -16.4%

Total Tax Receipts 8,101.1 8,520.2 9,017.1 5.8% 9,261.6 2.7% 8,738.0 -3.1% 9,401.3 1.5% 9,410.3 7.7%

OTHER RECEIPTSInstitutional Payments 11.6 12.0 11.2 -6.7% 10.6 -5.4% 11.2 0.0% 10.6 0.0% 11.2 0.0%Liquor Profits 116.1 118.1 125.6 6.4% 129.1 2.8% 129.1 2.8% 129.1 0.0% 129.1 0.0%Interest 2.2 4.7 9.0 91.5% 13.7 52.2% 15.3 70.0% 13.7 0.0% 15.3 0.0%Fees 25.3 26.1 28.9 10.7% 27.6 -4.5% 30.8 6.6% 27.6 0.0% 30.8 0.0%Judicial Revenue 94.3 97.4 95.4 -2.1% 95.4 0.0% 95.4 0.0% 95.4 0.0% 95.4 0.0%Miscellaneous Receipts 60.6 52.3 62.2 18.9% 51.7 -16.9% 52.0 -16.4% 52.0 0.6% 52.0 0.0%Racing & Gaming 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0% 2.2 0.0% 2.2 0.0% 2.2 0.0% 2.2 0.0%

Total Other Receipts 310.1 310.6 334.5 7.7% 330.3 -1.3% 336.0 0.4% 330.6 0.1% 336.0 0.0%

Total Gross Receipts 8,411.2 8,830.8 9,351.6 5.9% 9,591.9 2.6% 9,074.0 -3.0% 9,731.9 1.5% 9,746.3 7.4%

Accruals (net) 73.5 48.0 19.2 16.8 -12.5% 361.1 14.7 -12.5% (350.9)Refunds (1,059.8) (1,135.1) (1,131.9) -0.3% (1,093.0) -3.4% (1,085.5) -4.1% (1,069.5) -2.2% (1,104.0) 1.7%School Infrastructure Transfer (460.4) (480.8) (503.1) 4.6% (534.0) 6.1% (511.4) 1.6% (550.4) 3.1% (519.8) 1.6%

Total Accrual General Fund Receipts 6,964.5 7,262.9 7,735.8 6.5% 7,981.7 3.2% 7,838.2 1.3% 8,126.7 1.8% 7,771.6 -0.8%

TransfersLottery 78.3 84.6 90.4 6.9% 83.0 -8.2% 77.0 -14.8% 84.0 1.2% 79.0 2.6% 05/20 REC % Change

Other Transfers* 197.2 36.4 32.6 -10.4% 26.0 -20.2% 26.0 -20.2% 26.0 0.0% 26.0 0.0% FY22 FY 22 Est vs.

ESTIMATE FY 21 Est

Total Transfers 275.5 121.0 123.0 1.7% 109.0 -11.4% 103.0 -16.3% 110.0 0.9% 105.0 1.9%

Net General Fund Revenues 7,240.0 7,383.9 7,858.8 6.4% 8,090.7 3.0% 7,941.2 1.0% 8,236.7 1.8% 7,876.6 -0.8% 8,199.5 4.1%Estimated Gambling Revenues Transferred

To Other Funds 288.8 292.1 291.4 -0.2% 293.6 0.8% 220.7 -24.3% 293.6 0.0% 268.6 21.7%Amount of Interest Earned on Reserve

Funds (transfer to RIIF) 6.1 7.7 14.7 90.9% 16.0 8.8% 16.0 8.8% 15.0 -6.3% 17.0 6.3%

Department of Management

REVENUE ESTIMATING CONFERENCEESTIMATE OF GENERAL FUND RECEIPTS

May 29, 2020($ in millions)


The mission of the Iowa Department of Corrections is: Creating Opportunities for Safer Communities

(Office) 515-725-5701 - 510 East 12th Street, Des Moines, Iowa 50319 - (FAX) 515-725-5799


June 5, 2020 We write to you on behalf of the Iowa Board of Corrections. At our last Board Meeting, IPI Director Clark gave a thorough presentation on the work that IPI has done in producing PPE for thousands of frontline workers around the state. The sheer quantity and quality of the products you have contributed to producing is nothing short of amazing. We were informed of the tens of thousands of products you have helped create such as gowns, face masks, face shields, and hand sanitizer. The essential workers that have and will use these products are able to do their jobs a little easier and more safely thanks to your efforts. The effects of COVID-19 on our state have been felt by everyone that lives and works here, and that includes all of you working in IPI. Thanks to your efforts, Iowans that have been serving on the front lines in such areas public safety, hospitals, the Veterans Home, long-term care facilities, and more have been able to wear the vital equipment necessary to do their jobs. Throughout the process you have demonstrated your leadership in providing training guidance and supervision to your workers. You’ve responded with urgency, cleverness, and flexibility as you and those you supervise have adapted to the situation. The importance of your work is truly impressive. There have been many news stories covering this work you and the incarcerated workers have been doing, but as a Board, we wanted to extend our personal thanks and appreciation for your efforts. By helping provide this equipment, you have not only helped those serving on the front lines against our common enemy, but you have also progressed the cause of second chances for those currently incarcerated. Again, we thank you for your efforts in this time of crisis, and extend our best wishes in the future, The Iowa Board of Corrections

Rick LaMere, Board Chair

is hereby thanked by the Iowa Board of Corrections for their work in

PPE PRODUCTION DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

PRESENTED BY:

Chair of the Iowa Board of Corrections

ON THIS DAY: June 5, 2020