Invesco Global Sovereign Asset Management Study 2019 · Invesco Global Sovereign Asset Management Study 2019 Executive Summary ... populism in major economies including Germany and

Invesco Global Sovereign Asset Management Study 2019 Executive Summary This document is not intended for members of the public or retail investors.Full audience information is available inside the front cover.

Important information This document is intended only for Professional Clients and Financial Advisers in Continental Europe (as defined in the important information); for Qualified Investors in Switzerland; for Professional Clients in Dubai, Jersey, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Ireland and the UK, for Institutional Investors in the United States and Australia, for Institutional Investors and/or Accredited Investors in Singapore, for Professional Investors only in Hong Kong, for Qualified Institutional Investors, pension funds and distributing companies in Japan; for Wholesale Investors (as defined in the Financial Markets Conduct Act) in New Zealand, for accredited investors as defined under National Instrument 45–106 in Canada, for certain specific Qualified Institutions/Sophisticated Investors only in Taiwan and for one-on-one use with Institutional Investors in Bermuda, Chile, Panama and Peru.

Aerial reflection of Bryant Park, New York City. Cover image: Navid Baraty

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For the seventh Invesco Global Sovereign Asset Management Study we interviewed 139 respondents, including 71 central banks and 68 sovereign funds. Our respondents were typically CIOs, heads of asset classes and senior portfolio strategists across developed and emerging markets. The asset owners for whom they work represent portfolios totalling around US$20.3 trillion in total, with sovereign respondents representing US$10.6 trillion and central banks US$9.7 trillion (as at 31 December 2018). These interviews took place between January and March 2019 following a turbulent fourth quarter for asset markets in 2018.

Following several years of strong returns on the back of steady global growth and rising equity markets, a more challenging 2018 has prompted sovereigns to take stock and consider whether they are well positioned to contend with a global downturn. This has led some to rethink their assumptions, particularly with regards to passive and factor equity allocations. Some sovereigns have interpreted market volatility as highlighting the limitations of low intervention strategies, shifting away from market cap-weighted passive and ‘set and forget’ factor strategies in favour of more dynamic factor approaches.

More generally it has accelerated the existing trend towards better diversification, both by asset class and geography, and while an end to the economic cycle is considered to be in sight, this is likely to remain the principle driver of asset allocation.

Last year’s study highlighted rising allocations to equities and the displacement of fixed income as the biggest asset class for sovereigns. This year sovereigns have tilted back to fixed income, arresting a five-year trend during which average fixed income weightings fell from 35% to 30% as equity markets posted very strong gains. Fixed income is back on top, now averaging 33% of sovereign portfolios.

Increasing diversification can be seen in further increases in allocations to private markets – a trend we have been tracking for a number of years – and also geographically where sovereigns have allocated away from Europe towards emerging markets, notably China. The prevailing view is one of concern about the prospects for the European economy amid rising populism in major economies including Germany and Italy, and the uncertainty of Brexit.

On average sovereigns now rate the investment attractiveness of the largest emerging market economies materially ahead of their developed market counterparts - a substantial reversal from 2017. Many are making long-term commitments via increases in strategic asset allocations to emerging markets, albeit while expressing caution about their prospects in a slower growth environment. China has seen the largest improvement in its attractiveness rating, despite heightened trade tensions transpiring at the time our interviews were conducted. Sovereigns are weighing this and other China risks against potential returns available from investing on the mainland, and large sovereigns are establishing specialist teams to do so. Many feel comfortable about the preferred status of their capital and were increasing allocations to equities, fixed interest and private market assets.

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Fig 1. Asset allocation Sovereigns only (% AUM)

DSI Liquid altsIlliquid alts

EquityFixed incomeCash

2019201820172016201520142013

11131617181722

3

7

26

35

7

3

9

29

33

9

9

29

33

9

3

13

33

29

5

17

29

29

7

17

33

30

4

30

33

5

33

182

2

Sample size: 2013: 33; 2014: 48; 2015: 44; 2016: 57; 2017: 62; 2018: 63; 2019: 53. Alts: alternatives. Direct Strategic Investments (DSI) are direct investments held outside a private markets’ portfolio.

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Fig 2. Change and expected change in allocation Sovereigns only (% citations)

Increase SameDecrease

Sample size: 45.

Emergingmarkets

Middle East

AsiaEurope

2018

North America

47

53

33

58

9

13

56

31

5

86

9

33

58

9

Emergingmarkets

Middle East

AsiaEurope

2019

North America

33

54

13

13

56

31

40

56

4

91

9

36

62

2

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In our second theme we find sovereigns adapting to increasing scale. While size facilitates opportunities, CIOs of large-scale funds are grappling with opposing challenges and constraints stemming from larger scale.

A key challenge for large-scale funds (>US$100bn in assets) is capacity. With demand for private markets assets rising faster than supply, large-scale sovereigns consume much of the available deal flow. Large sovereigns are also responding by seeking alpha in specialised areas including China and the technology sector. They are better positioned to assess and access new opportunities than their smaller peers, establishing leading internal capability to assess, source and move quickly on these new opportunities

Large-scale sovereigns have been relatively effective in meeting their targeted strategic asset allocations to private markets. However, sovereigns in the middle of the size spectrum lacking established partnerships, experience of sourcing deals directly, and the internal capability of their larger peers can find themselves caught in the middle: too large or no longer wishing to use the co-mingled pools, but too small to make use of these more sophisticated private market strategies available to large sovereigns. Consequently, many find themselves significantly under-weight.

Combined with a more subdued return environment going forward, this has led funds to fork-in-the road decisions about whether to diversify and accept lower risk adjusted returns or become more concentrated and accept higher idiosyncratic risks.

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Fig 3. Asset allocation by size Sovereigns only (% AUM)

DSI Liquid altsIlliquid alts

EquityFixed incomeCash

Sample size: 53.

Small (<US$25bn AUM) Medium (US$25bn-US$100bn AUM) Large (>US$100bn AUM)

10 18 8

3

3

3

11

23

22

15

32

39

64 4

55

20

24

08

Fig 4. Actual vs strategic asset allocation by size Sovereigns only (% citations)

Small (<US$25bn AUM)Medium (US$25bn-US$100bn AUM)Large (>US$100bn AUM)

Sample size: 59.

Underweight

23

Overweight

9

At target

68

21

61

36

9

43

30

Real estate (unlisted)

Underweight

14

Overweight

0

At target

86

43

65

14 13

43

22

Private equity

Underweight

14

Overweight

5

At target

81

36

70

144

50

26

Infrastructure

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In our third theme we find Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) integration continuing at pace, rapidly so with supporters. This is just two years after we highlighted a split in asset owners’ perspectives, with a small but dedicated group of ESG supporters adopting and integrating ESG principles, and a large group of non-supporters seeking more certainty before considering its application.

This group of supporters have considerably developed its thinking, moving beyond early efforts often centred on relatively simple screening, to more sophisticated and specific forms of integration. Many have intensified their focus on ESG, added or deepened dedicated ESG teams, and have overcome initial scepticism (in some cases) to integrate their interpretation of ESG into broader investment policies and processes.

While ESG is spreading across asset classes, investors continue to find constraints to implementation, even in equity portfolios – the issues raised in 2017 relating to lack of definitions and quality data remain for the most part unresolved. These issues were often exacerbated when extending ESG principles to fixed income, with sovereigns citing challenges specific to fixed income integration such as difficulties for bondholders in engagement, limited coverage and application by ratings agencies, limited product coverage and valuation concerns in green bonds.

There is clear progress in ESG. In 2019, we find that leading ESG adopters increasingly see ‘G’ factors as assumed or complete. Given the definitional issues, it has been common practice for asset owners to commence their ESG journey with a focus on ‘G’ issues. Governance issues such as board composition and the ability to flag controversies often made the G easiest to define and measure in a consistent manner, as well as offering some evidence of return or risk benefits. ESG leaders have now started to anchor their policy framework around ‘E’ environmental factors, including the potential to deploy capital to projects which advance initiatives such as de-carbonisation.Social factors are recognised as important but most difficult to define. Leading adopters continue to develop and refine their thinking in this area – ‘S’ as the risk of loss of social licence being an example. Respondents see the value of understanding social issues under the umbrella term of ESG, and some sovereigns have implemented social initiatives internally as a demonstration of commitment to ESG values. However, in comparison to other ESG factors, social variables have yet to become a practicable means of evaluating risk /return.

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Fig 6. Asset classes believed to be viable for ESG implementation by region Sovereigns only (% citations)

Sample size: West: 19; Asia: 10; Middle East: 6; Emerging markets: 4.

Asia

90

100

79

74

58 58

50

40 40 40

75

100

33

67

100 100 100

25

Emerging marketsMiddle EastWest

0 0

EquitiesFixed incomeReal estate (unlisted)Private equityInfrastructure

Fig 5. Respondents with a specific ESG policy at the organisational level (% citations)

Sample size: 113; Central banks: 53; Sovereign funds: 60.

YesNo

Sovereign funds

2019

TotalCentral banks

2017

Total Sovereign fundsCentral banks

64

89

54 56

80

40

36 11 46 44 20 60

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Fig 7. Importance of ESG elements Sovereigns only (average score out of 10)

Sample size: 2017: 23; 2019: 39. Rating on a scale of 1 to 10 (2017) and 0 to 10 (2019) where 10 is the most important.

20172019

Environmental7.91 Climate change

7.83 Sustainability

7.17 Resourceefficiency

5.82 Water scarcity

Social6.90 Human rights

6.43 Diversity

Governance6.86 Executiveremuneration

7.18 Transparency

8.08

7.76

7.22

6.73

7.06

6.71

6.76

7.24

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In theme four, we find sovereigns backing the emergence of new technologies. They are doing so from twin perspectives of the impact of technological advancements in areas of artificial Intelligence (AI) and automation on their portfolios, and also on their society.

Many sovereigns have a mandate to grow and enhance the domestic economy as well as an investment mandate. Accordingly, in addition to establishing venture capital-like portfolios to pursue the early stage opportunities currently seen as plentiful, some also seek to also transfer skills and intellectual property back to their home markets. Their government links help some offer attractive financing and tax arrangements.

To support these efforts, some sovereigns have built internal technology teams and/or portfolios, including establishing offices in major tech hubs like Silicon Valley and Beijing. The ability to devote resources to a specific investment theme such as technology takes advantage of sovereigns’ scale and long-time horizon.

Sovereigns are interested in not just the investment aspects of technology but also the power of technological advancements to disrupt and reshape society. There is a sense of anxiety and pressure among stakeholders - governments, regulators, and investors – to mitigate and even pre-empt negative externalities on society such as loss of employment. As state-owned investors, sovereigns are focused on societal disruption and likely to play an important role in responding. Development and investment sovereigns are furthest ahead in their thinking about the wider impact of technology. Almost half of development and investment sovereigns with a specific technology portfolio or team are focused on the wider impact beyond investment returns.

In their own businesses, sovereigns prioritise process improvements and the integration of technology into the portfolio is surprisingly muted. While some large sovereigns are undergoing large scale technological transformations, many still rely on what is now seen as outdated technology and weak IT infrastructure. Respondents spoke about overreliance on technology that requires human input (such as Microsoft Excel), bringing with it the biases and limitations of human behaviour. The result is likely to be an overhaul of current systems and processes in a move to a more rules-based and continually adaptable (AI) systems.

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Fig 8. Proportion of sovereigns with dedicated technology portfolio or team Sovereigns only (% citations)

Sample size: 63.

Emerging markets

40

60

Asia

64

36

West

30

70

Middle East

89

11

By region YesNo

Liquidity sovereign(stabilization fund)

17

83

Investment sovereign(future fund)

64

36

Development sovereign

90

10

Liability sovereign(pension fund)

33

67

By sovereign type YesNo

Large (>US$100bn AUM)Medium (US$25bn-US$100bn AUM)Small (<US$25bn AUM)

645027

36

50

73

By size YesNo

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Fig 9. Impact of AI on society over the next 10 years Sovereigns only (% citations)

Sample size: 60.

Significant impactModerate impactLittle or no impact

625

33

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We conclude the report with the observation that central banks are moving to towards liquidity and perceived safety, shifting away from government bonds and traditional reserve currencies.

After a long period of comparatively loose monetary policy, banks became increasingly pro-cyclical in their investment strategy – a shift often initially facilitated through portfolio tranching before moving to more holistic approaches. However, a more uncertain environment and uncertainty at the time uneasiness around the direction of travel for Federal Reserve policy has seen a significant rotation from government bonds to deposits, both commercial deposits and deposits with other central banks. European banks in particular have been active to avoid negative yields in European government bonds.

Gold has seen some return to favour despite adding volatility to portfolios. While average gold holdings remain modest across respondents at around 4%, a small number of central banks made large increases to gold in their reserve portfolios. Increases by these institutions are a response to concerns about global instability, political risk, and the US fiscal position. Gold has become an alternative for central banks seeking a ‘safe-haven’ asset which also offers diversification away from the USD. For some central banks, historically high US debt-to-GDP levels create some doubts about the assumed risk-free nature of US government paper and the status of the US Dollar as the world’s reserve currency.

On the flipside gold brings additional issues, including price volatility, lack of yield, storage costs, and perception management when selling. Despite being highly liquid, gold can prove difficult to sell in volume in practice due to the domestic political reactions and the possibility of a lasting negative legacy of selling gold ‘at the wrong time’ (Figure 12).

Meanwhile, strengthened by its the inclusion of the RMB in the Special Drawing Rights basket, the growing importance of China as a trading partner, and structural changes to the domestic bond market, there has been an increase in the central bank holdings of Renminbi. The Renminbi has been the main beneficiary of the decline in USD holdings, increasing from a negligible proportion of world reserves in 2016 to 1.9% at the end of 2018. During this period, it overtook the AUD and CAD to become the world’s fifth most important reserve currency.1

1 Source: IMF COFERS, Data for Q4 2017, 2018, accessed 31 May 2019.

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Fig 10. Allocation of reserves portfolio Central banks only (% AUM)

Sample size: 2016: 15; 2017: 33; 2018: 55; 2019: 36.

2019201820172016

6765

53

49

10

9

1113

129

43

91055

4443

11111010

322 2

Deposits with commercial banks Deposits with central banksGovernment bonds

Alternative asset classes IMF Reserve positionGoldGovt. agencies and multi-laterals

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Fig 11. Changes to gold reserves, last 3 years and next year Central banks only (% citations)

Change over last 3 years sample size: 54; Expected change over next year sample size: 57.

DecreaseSameIncrease

Expected change over next yearChange over last 3 years

13

52

35

4

64

32

Fig 12. Level of agreement with statements on gold holdings Central banks only (% citations)

Sample size: 27.

Strongly agreeAgree NeutralDisagree

Selling significant holdings of gold would prompt significant negative coverage in the local media

Gold is a politicised asset in this country

4615

29

40

19

6

37

8

18

Investment risksThe value of investments and any income will fluctuate (this may partly be the result of exchange rate fluctuations) and investors may not get back the full amount invested.

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